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The Ocean of the Soul

Men, the World and God in the Stories of Farīd al-Dīn ʿAṭṭār

by Hellmut Ritter

Translated by John O'Kane *with Editorial Assistance of* Bernd Radtke

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To begin with I would like to express my gratitude to the publishing house Brill for having taken the initiative to propose the present translation project several years ago.

With regard to providing the financial support which made this translation possible Brill is also to be thanked along with the Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft and in particular the German cultural organization Internationes which sponsors the translation of important German books. Likewise, the Ritter family has also been very generous in contributing to this project. The practical business of arranging the funding in question was undertaken by Bernd Radtke.

And Bernd deserves my special thanks for other forms of assistance he has given me in producing the final English version of *Das Meer der Seele*. Besides answering my many queries about the original German, he has painstakingly provided references to Richard Gramlich's magisterial translations of sources Ritter cites in the main text, as well as new bibliographical data in both the Analytic Index and the Bibliography. These additions were deemed necessary in view of the relevant developments in scholarship since Ritter's book was first published in 1955. Bernd also helped me by putting in all cross-references in the English version and by sharing the tedious job of substituting the English page references in the Analytic Index. And last but not least, he was responsible for producing the camera-ready copy according to specifications laid down by Brill.

Here I should also say a word about the thorny problem of transliteration which inevitably arises in a translation of this nature. My primary concern has been to simplify matters without introducing any misunderstandings. I have therefore adopted a system which treats Persian words like Arabic but indicates the distinctive features of Turkish. This should not cause any difficulties for the specialist and be somewhat easier on the eye for non-specialist readers. I may also add that any typos or insignificant errors in Ritter's text have been corrected without pointing this out. In that respect my special thanks must go to Rudolf

Sellheim who had been indispensable as general editor in the production of Ritter's original text. He has had the kindness and patience to proof-read the whole of the English translation and to offer numerous corrections and useful suggestions.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

Hellmut Ritter, one of Germany's greatest Orientalists, is an inspiring model of scholarship for anyone professionally active in the field of Islamic Studies. He was born in 1892 in Lichtenau (Hessen) and died in 1971 in Oberursel im Taunus where he lies buried. Several of his ancestors, as well as his father and two brothers, were clergymen. After completing his *gymnasium* studies in Kassel, Ritter spent five semesters at the University of Halle where he studied under Carl Brockelmann and Paul Kahle, and then one semester in Strassburg studying with Nöldeke, Littmann, Landauer and Frank. In 1913 he became a tutorial assistant in the Seminar für Geschichte und Kultur des Orients in Hamburg and the following year, at the age of twenty-two, passed his oral doctoral examination in Bonn. Shortly after the out-break of World War I he was inducted into the army and sent to Iraq as an interpreter on the staff of field marshal von der Golz, and later to Palestine with general von Falkenhayn. His dissertation, with Carl Heinrich Becker as promotor, was published during the war in the journal *Der Islam.*[1] After Germany's defeat, Ritter was appointed professor of Oriental Studies at Hamburg at the age of twenty-six, without having received a postdoctoral degree (Habilitation). From 1920 to 1925 he was co-editor of *Der Islam* which Becker had founded in 1908. Having lost his university post because of a scandal over his homosexuality, from 1927 Ritter became head of the Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft's office in Istanbul where he remained until 1949. In 1936 he became a lecturer for Persian and Arabic, and in 1938 a full professor, at the University of Istanbul.

In 1949 Ritter returned to Germany where he was made associate professor, and four years later professor, of Islamic Studies at the University of Frankfurt. However, in 1956 he returned to Turkey for a second productive period of residence, this time with a commission from UNESCO to catalogue manuscripts of Persian poets in Istanbul's libraries in collaboration with Herbert Duda and Ahmed Ateş. He remained in Istanbul until 1969 when ill health obliged him to return to Germany.

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1 *Ein Arabisches Handbuch der Handelswissenschaft, Der Islam* 7/1917/1-97.

The true measure of Ritter's achievement lies in the breadth, perceptive insight and originality of his scholarly publications.[2] His doctoral thesis (1916), *Ein Arabisches Handbuch der Handelswissenschaft*, sheds light on a little-known subject through an Arabic work whose contents ultimately go back to the Hellenistic Greek author, Bryson. Ritter's analysis of the text is masterful. This was followed by a publication based on his sojourn in Iraq, "Mesopotamischen Studien" (1919-23), which deals with topics ranging from river boats to folksongs and poetry on war. Also at this time he turned his attention to the *Picatrix*, an Arabic handbook on Hellenistic magic, and published a description of its contents in Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg (1921-22) which was to appear later in a slightly reworked version in: *"Picatrix". Das Ziel des Weisen von Pseudo-Mağrīṭī*, translated into German from the Arabic by Hellmut Ritter and Martin Plessner, London 1962. Two noteworthy essays appeared in 1923 and 1924, the first on the Prophet Muḥammad,[3] the second to do with the abolition of the caliphate.[4] In the area of Turkish studies there appeared in 1921 "Aserbeidschanische Texte zur nordpersischen Volkskunde I"[5]—a subject which would occupy him again in 1939—as well as his first collection of Turkish shadowplays, transcribed and translated into German (1924).[6] Ritter's interest in Persian was already attested in his doctoral thesis. This interest persists in his article "Zur Futuwwa" in 1920.[7] Then in 1923 Ritter published a selection of passages from the Persian and Arabic writings of the great theologian Muḥammad al-Ghazzālī: *Das Elixir der Glückseligkeit*, with an excellent paraphrase of Ghazzālī's autobiography.[8] It was also during these years (1927) that Ritter produced one of his most penetrating studies, which ostensibly deals with the Persian poet Niẓāmī's use of metaphor but remains unique for its

2 For a nearly exhaustive list of Ritter's publications see the bibliography compiled by E. A. Gruber in *Oriens* 18-19/1965-66, pp. 5-32, which contains 26 books, over 100 shorter and longer articles, and more than 220 book reviews.

3 "Muhammed" in: *Meister der Politik*, Stuttgart 1923, pp. 149-79.

4 "Die Abschaffung des Kalifats" in: *Archiv für Politik und Geschichte*. Mai-H. 1924, pp. 343-67.

5 *Der Islam* 11/1921/181-212.

6 *Karagös. Türkische Schattenspiele*. Hrsg., übers. u. erkl. von H. Ritter. Erste Folge: Die Blutpappel. Die falsche Braut. Die blutige Nigar. Hanover 1924.

7 *Der Islam* 10/1920/244-50.

8 Al Ghasali, *Das Elixir der Glückseligkeit*, Jena 1923. (Religiöse Stimmen der Völker. Die Religion des Islam, Bd. 3.) Reprinted Dusseldorf 1959.

ability to elucidate the distinctive technique and aesthetic character of medieval Persian poetry.[9]

Once Ritter moved to Istanbul, a second new phase in his life began. With his first article entitled "Philologika I" (1928) he initiated a series of studies which would continue into the early 1960s. Those which Fritz Meier,[10] his former student, singled out for special consideration in his obituary on Ritter are the following: "Philologika III (Muhammedanische Häresiographen)", "Philologika VII (Arabische und Persische Schriften über die profane und die mystische Liebe)", "Philologika VIII (Anṣārī Herewī, Senāʾī Ġaznewī)", "Philologika IX (Die vier Suhrawardī)", "Philologika X (Farīdaddīn ᶜAṭṭār I)", "Philologika XI (Maulānā Ǧalāladdīn Rūmī und sein Kreis)",[11] and "Schriften Jaᶜqūb ibn Isḥāq al-Kindī's in Stambuler Bibliotheken".[12] The above articles are all based on Ritter's pioneering examination of manuscript materials in Istanbul libraries which were often incompletely or erroneously catalogued. At the same time, Ritter was continually engaged in editing important Arabic and Persian medieval texts, for the most part but not exclusively, in the *Bibliotheca Islamica* series which he founded and directed under the auspices of the Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft.

The following works which Ritter contributed to the series deserve particular attention: al-Ashᶜarī's *Maqālāt al-islāmiyyīn* (1929-33), al-Nawbakhtī's *Firaq al-shīᶜa* (1931), the first volume of al-Ṣafadī's biographical dictionary *al-Wāfī bi'l-wafayāt* (1931), a new edition of Niẓāmī's *Haft Paykar* (*Heft Peiker*) in collaboration with Jan Rypka, an edition of ᶜAṭṭār's *Ilāhīnāma* (1940), and Aḥmad Ghazzālī's *Sawāniḥ* (*Aphorismen über die Liebe*, 1942). Meier in his obituary underlines the extent to which these works demonstrate Ritter's philological acumen, industry and the scope of his literary and historical erudition. By 1941 a second volume on the Turkish shadow-theater appeared. Meanwhile, on the basis of newly discovered sources Ritter enriched our knowledge of the arts of chivalry, delivered decisive judgements on problems to do with Mawlānā Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, and in this connection presented the first precise

9 *Über die Bildersprache Niẓāmīs*. Berlin/Leipzig 1927. (Beihefte zu *Der Islam*. H. 5)

10 For information about Ritter's life and works the present writer has consulted: Fritz Meier's obituary on Ritter, *Der Islam* 48, 1972; Meier's excellent review of Ritter's *Das Meer der Seele* in *Oriens* 9/1956/319-31; Richard Walzer's obituary on Ritter in *Oriens* 23-24/1974/1-6; and Thomas Lier, "Hellmut Ritter und die Zweigstelle der DMG in Istanbul 1928-1949" in *Hellmut Ritter und die DMG in Istanbul*, Istanbul 1997.

11 All these articles appeared over the years in *Der Islam*. Cf. Gruber, *Oriens* op. cit.

12 *Archiv Orientální* 4/1932/363-72.

description of the Mawlawiyya's use of dance along with musical notations.[13] This subject is examined more fully in his later article "Die Mevlânafeier in Konya vom 11.—12. Dezember 1960".[14] Also deserving special mention among the publications of this twenty-two year period in Istanbul is Ritter's fundamental article about the ascetic Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, in which Ritter examines and critically evaluates the traditional materials handed down about this dominant figure in early Islam. Besides contributing numerous articles to the Turkish-language encyclopaedia *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, Ritter, together with other scholars, founded the International Society for Oriental Research and became editor of its journal *Oriens* whose first issue appeared in 1948.

The third phase in Ritter's career began in 1949 when he returned to Germany and took charge of setting up the Oriental Studies Department of Frankfurt University. Likewise, he continued as editor of *Oriens* until 1954 when Rudolf Sellheim assumed this task. The two great works of this period of his life, however, were his in-depth study of the Persian mystical poet, Farīd al-Dīn ᶜAṭṭār, and his text-edition and translation of the Arabic-writing theoretician on eloquence and rhetoric, ᶜAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī. *Das Meer der Seele. Mensch, Welt and Gott in den Geschichten des Farīduddīn ᶜAṭṭār*—here presented in English translation as *The Ocean of the Soul. Man, the World and God in the Stories of Farīd al-Dīn ᶜAṭṭār*—was first published in 1955. The book has since remained unsurpassed not only as the definitive work on ᶜAṭṭār but, one might argue, as the greatest interpretive study of any literary figure in Islamic civilization. With regard to al-Jurjānī, already before his impressive work on Niẓāmī's use of metaphor (1927) Ritter had been engaged in studying Arabic doctrines on eloquence and figures of speech. Indeed, he had spent three decades attempting to penetrate the difficult Arabic text, *Asrār al-balāgha*, by the twelfth-century author al-Jurjānī, before publishing a critical edition with numerous and reliable variants in 1954 and then following this in 1959 with a complete German translation and notes. The value of making accessible one of the most imaginative and difficult of Arabic works is enhanced by the text-edition's detailed introduction which briefly sketches the history of Arabic doctrines of eloquence, Jurjānī's place in that history, and illustrates with examples the independent, psychological approach worked out by Jurjānī regarding the effect of rhet-

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13 Cf. *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Musikwissenschaft* 1, 1933.

14 Cf. *Oriens* 15/1962/249-70.

orical devices in prose and poetry. Then in 1953 Ritter's work on the Turkish shadow-play reached its conclusion with a third large volume on the subject. And in 1954 he published an important, pioneering article on the origins of the Ḥurūfī sect.[15] Meanwhile, in connection with his editorship of *Oriens*, his output of book reviews during these years increased phenomenally.

In the autumn of 1956 Ritter returned to Istanbul with a commission from UNESCO to catalogue manuscripts of Persian poets contained in library collections of that city. As it turned out, Ritter remained in Istanbul another thirteen years. During this fourth period of his life, he went on to publish three further articles in the series entitled "Philologika", bringing the total up to XVI (these now appeared in *Oriens* rather than *Der Islam*). Philologika XIV, XV and XVI present his final observations on philological problems concerning the poet ᶜAṭṭār who had occupied his attention for several decades. In 1959 he edited for the first time Ibn al-Dabbāgh's *Mashāriq al-anwār*, a thirteenth-century work dealing with Ṣūfī love theory. Likewise, he contributed many articles to the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, some of them being a reworking of earlier contributions to the *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*. But his chief scholarly occupation during this final residence in Istanbul came to be the study of the Neo-Aramaic vernacular of the Jacobites of Eastern Anatolia. In Beirut and Istanbul he tape-recorded reports, stories and fairy-tales in ṭūrōyo, the spoken language of the Christian community of Ṭūr ᶜAbdīn. The final result, published toward the end of his life and posthumously, is a five-volume work, consisting of transcribed texts with German translations, a grammar and glossaries.[16]

In *The Ocean of the Soul* Hellmut Ritter sets out to examine and elucidate the world of ideas of the poet Farīd al-Dīn ᶜAṭṭār. He uses as the basis for his study the poet's four epic works, the *Asrārnāma*, *Ilāhīnāma*, *Manṭiq al-ṭayr* and the *Muṣībatnāma* but likewise takes account of the poet's other writings, as well as a dazzling array of primary sources in Arabic, Persian and Turkish, in order to map out the broad cultural context which constitutes the parameters of ᶜAṭṭār's spiritual and intellectual world. In the words of Fritz Meier: "It is a pioneering, encyclopaedic work, one which sheds light in a unique manner both on Islamic mysticism and Persian didactic poe-

15 "Die anfänge des ḥurūfīsekte" in: *Oriens* 7/1954/1-54.

16 *Ṭūrōyo. Die volkssprache der syrischen christen des Ṭūr ᶜAbdîn*, vol. I, Beirut 1967; vol. II, Beirut 1969; vol. III, Wiesbaden 1971; vol. IV, Wiesbaden 1979; vol. V, Stuttgart 1990.

try, a work which one can scarcely imagine will ever be surpassed."[17]

I do not here wish to paraphrase Ritter's Introduction which for the most part reviews the scanty information that has come down to us about ᶜAṭṭār and gives handy plot outlines of the poet's above-mentioned works. But in what follows I would like to cite some of the distinctive observations Ritter makes concerning these texts and draw attention to what he says about the working method he adopted for composing *The Ocean of the Soul.*

After a cursory survey of all ᶜAṭṭār's works, Ritter describes the plot and characteristics of the four long narrative poems which are the primary texts dealt with in *The Ocean of the Soul.* These epic poems have in common that their contents consist of religious and mystical teachings which are illustrated by an abundance of interpersed brief stories. Of the four *mathnawī*s in question, the *Ilāhī-nāma*, the *Manṭiq al-ṭayr* and the *Muṣībatnāma* display in their structure a particular variation of the Indian frame-story. Ritter points out that ᶜAṭṭār's handling of the frame-story is far more sophisticated than that of his predecessors. Rather than simply being a device for stringing together a number of unrelated stories, in the *Manṭiq al-ṭayr* and the *Muṣībatnāma* it constitutes the main interest, exhibiting a clear architectonics and a dramatic composition which progresses towards a final goal. In this connection Ritter writes:

"When in the *Manṭiq al-ṭayr* a nightingale, a duck, an owl, etc. appears, this does not simply mean the same thing as when in the *Sindbādnāma* and its imitations the first vizier is replaced by the second, and the second is replaced by the third, while the stories narrated by each person could easily be interchanged, but the natural peculiarity of the nightingale, the duck and the owl determines the character of the conversation and the ensuing group of stories. If one asks how it is possible to obtain viewpoints for the ordering of mystical concepts from the individual characteristics of a nightingale, an owl and a duck, the answer is that this is made feasible through the artistic device which one may designate as the magic wand of Persian poetry and the key to its understanding—fantastical aetiology. In the case of beings which by nature cannot speak, this artistic device is connected with a second such device, the so-called 'language of states' (*ẕabān-i ḥāl*). A lifeless being, or in any case one which normally does not possess the power of human speech, begins to talk

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[17] Cf. Meier's obituary on Ritter, *Der Islam* 48/1972/197. And see Meier's book review in *Oriens* referred to above in ftn. 9.

and to tell about itself and to say things which are nothing other than a fantastical, poetic transformation and interpretation of its specific characteristics and situation" (pp. 3-4).

Before proceeding to give a resumé of the plot and contents of the *Ilāhīnāma*, Ritter remarks: "The *Ilāhīnāma* is dominated by an older motif of Islamic piety, that of *zuhd. Zuhd* consists of cutting one's ties with this world, giving up worldly objectives, and renouncing worldly desires and pipe-dreams which are to be replaced by ideals of mystical ethics and piety" (p. 4). In pages 4-8 he then presents a detailed summary of the *Ilāhīnāma*, a critical text-edition of which he had published some years earlier. The work's frame-story portrays a king who asks each of his six sons what his greatest wish in life is. After each son gives a rather worldly-oriented answer, the king admonishes him to adopt a higher, more pious ambition. Numerous stories are introduced by the king to illustrate good and bad behavior in this respect.

Pages 8-18 deal with the overtly allegorical *Manṭiq al-ṭayr*. All the birds of the natural world come together and decide to set out under the leadership of the hoopoe to find their king, the legendary Sīmurgh. The fact that an earlier *Risāla of the Birds* has survived affords Ritter the opportunity to demonstrate the superiority of ᶜAṭṭār's treatment of the same subject. In commenting on the dénouement of the *Risāla*, Ritter notes:

"The goal attained is serving God at God's court, which is not the actual goal of real mystics, namely to become immersed in God, to be dissolved in God and to become transformed in Him. Here love of God does not go beyond that of the servant for his master. A respectful distance always remains" (p. 10).

By way of praising ᶜAṭṭār's version, Ritter adds:

"He portrays at great length the dangers, menaces and difficult halting-stations which will have to be traversed. Then he expands the conclusion by adding the motif of extinction and the motif of finding God within oneself. In this connection he also exploits most cleverly a rhetorical figure of speech, the *tajnīs-i murakkab*, based on Sīmurgh and *sī murgh* 'thirty birds'. Finally, employing poetic images, he discusses creation's relationship to God in accordance with pantheism" (p.10).

Pages 18-30 summarize and comment on the *Muṣībatnāma*:

"The content of the *Muṣībatnāma* consists of the soul's journey during the mystical meditation of spiritual withdrawal... In later times *pīr*s subjected their novices, the *murīd*s, to a forty-day withdrawal, during which the latter would gradually reduce their food,

frequently adopt an uncomfortable posture, and then experience all manner of illuminations and visions which they had to recount to the *pīr* who would interpret them. In the *Muṣībatnāma* the meditating soul's thought which traverses the mythical and physical cosmos is personified as a traveller (*sālik-i fikrat*)... He traverses forty stations which correspond to the forty days of withdrawal and after every visionary dialogue with a mythical, cosmic and physical being, or personified powers of the soul, he receives instruction from the *pīr*..." (p. 18).

"The traveller thought" communicates with cosmic beings and essences on the basis of an assumed mystical-poetic epistemology. In this connection Ritter comments: "The means by which the poet has these beings speak is, as in the *Manṭiq al-ṭayr*, 'the language of states' (*zabān-i ḥāl*). He has considered it necessary expressly to draw attention to the fact that the speech of all these beings in the *Muṣībatnāma* is to be understood in this sense.

Listen... while I lay down the foundation of this book for you! ...if the traveller speaks with the angel, if he seeks an answer from Earth and Heaven, if he visits the Throne and the Footstool, or poses questions to both, has the prophets instruct him and causes every atom to recount experiences to him, all this occurs through 'the language of states' (*zabān-i ḥāl*), it isn't 'spoken speech' (*zabān-i qāl*). In spoken speech it would be a lie, but in the language of states it's true. (MN 0, *Sharḥ-i kitāb*)."

As for the nature of the higher quest and the dilemma of the mystic protagonist, Ritter explains:

"At the same time this journeying in the spirit is the means by which man comes to the knowledge that he is more than flesh and blood, that he has a rank higher than that of the angels, that in fact, as we shall see, he actually carries the universe within himself and is the universe. It is the path to purifying oneself to the level of becoming pure spirit- or soul-being. A person in his corporeality from birth to death is not the real person, but the real person is 'the divine secret and the pure soul'" (p. 21).

The desperate state of "the traveller thought" is described by ᶜAṭṭār as follows:

He is at odds with himself and with the world. Neither the belt of Christian faith pleases him, nor the Ṣūfī's robe. He finds himself to be no better than a dog. He knows of no one worse off than himself. He's neither nothing, nor something, neither a whole, nor a part... He has neither faith, nor certainty, nor doubt. He's neither a Muslim, nor an infidel... He has nothing to hope for from people, for they're all caught up in half-measures, foolishness and trivialities. But at last he

does find a *pīr*—without a *pīr* one can't travel this path—to whose guidance he can entrust himself. The *pīr* sends him on the journey. (P. 22).

In the case of the *Asrārnāma*, Ritter does not provide an actual summary of its contents, noting:

"The *Asrārnāma* is distinguished from the three previously treated works, to begin with, by its more modest size, and then by a lack of the characteristic frame-story which gave the large epics their splendidly tight organization and their clear architectural construction. The individual sections are strung together without any discernible scheme, similarly to the *Mathnawī* of Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī..." (p. 30).

Ritter concludes his Introduction with some crucial remarks about methodology. He underscores the fact that the greater part of the narrative in ᶜAṭṭār's works consists of exemplary stories. In them men of piety, lovers, kings and fools act out the behavior which is recommended in the theoretical and paraenetic sections of the poems. Regarding the function of the stories, Ritter adds:

"Many give emphasis to a detail by amplification, many are in the end broadly spun out stories in which, despite all the symbolic or allegorical significance, the poet's love of story-telling gains the upper hand, and interest in the subject-matter prevails. For the most part the stories are also of literary-historical interest. At the same time an abundance of motifs is reflected in them from the world of ideas of Islamic mysticism and pious practices in Islam. From this viewpoint, i.e. as evidence of this world of ideas and practical piety, in what follows they will be presented in a systematic ordering which resulted more or less of its own accord from an attempt to sift and order the immensely rich material" (p. 31).

In closing Ritter specifically spells out the way he intends to order and interpret stories from ᶜAṭṭār that he cites throughout *The Ocean of the Soul*:

"We will now present ᶜAṭṭār's stories ordered according to the conceptual motifs which they portray. It must be pointed out, however, that the idea which we extract from a story is not always identical with the motive which caused ᶜAṭṭār to relate the story. We interpret the stories often in islolation, detached from their context, and then suggest, where it seems necessary, what the poet wished to illustrate with a particular story. This method may be remotely compared with a historian of literature or culture who, for instance, compiles the objects of comparison which occur in the similes of a poet or an era of poetry, without considering the poet's intention, in order to establish which objects of intellectual and material culture were

included in his horizons and were alive in the realm of his imagination" (p. 32).

The overriding virtue of Ritter's *Ocean of the Soul* is that it succeeds in constructing an integrated picture out of a vast array of medieval religious ideas, theological doctrines and literary didactic-mystical sources. Moreover, it manages to do this without misrepresenting or oversimplifying the complex materials which it presents as evidence for its interpretation. On a primary level the book may be viewed as sketching a fundamental religious dilemma and then tracing the redemptive solution which eventually came to emerge in mystic circles and among poets. Put very simply, the first twenty-one chapters of Ritter's book examine a multitude of theological and ascetic ideas which form the backdrop to man's spiritual dilemma as postulated within an Islamic cultural framework. Chpt. 23, "Seeking Closeness to God", documents the soul's yearning to resolve this dilemma. It functions as a transition to Chpts. 24 to 27 which deal with love in all its aspects in an Islamic context and demonstrate how certain concepts of love allow man to resolve his seemingly hopeless dilemma. Chpts. 28 to 30 round off the psychic drama that has been traced by defining more closely the nature of the mystical solution which ᶜAṭṭār subscribes to, i.e. "extinction in God", or in pantheistic terms, the individual's immersion and disappearance in the primordial world-ground.

The unbridgeable distance separating man from God, God's absolute transcendence, His "lack of need" of man's worship, and His divine prerogative to deal with human beings arbitrarily if He should so wish, leave man engulfed by emotions of isolation, impotence and desperate yearning:

"...ᶜAṭṭār's epics are to a great extent dominated by a mood of acute sorrow. But this is not only caused by the thought of death and fear of the final reckoning... Rather, the mood often expresses itself as a more general unspecific weltschmerz.. The mood in ᶜAṭṭār is also determined by a sense of an inner rift, a 'hybridity', as he likes to put it, a sense of being pulled back and forth between different states, of dissatisfaction with one's own behavior, and finally by an eternally unquenched yearning for God and knowledge of the world-ground, which is at times transformed into an almost violent impulse for self-surrender, for extinction in God, in the Universe" (p. 133).

God is the agent behind all of man's actions. Therefore man's task is to diminish his ego, adopt humility and wait in readiness for

God's grace. But man's yearning compels him to strive actively after God:

"Whoever wishes to be admitted to God's proximity must... maintain himself in readiness before God's door so that when good fortune is bestowed on him and the glance of God's grace falls on him, he will be granted admittance to the king's court. But ᶜAṭṭār is not only aware of this expectant, passive behavior. He also knows about the active striving of the seeker of God who, impelled by yearning, wanders through the whole world, the whole cosmos, to find the divinity hidden in inaccessible remoteness, the primordial ground of all being. Thus the birds undertake the long and perilous journey in order to reach their Sīmurgh, and likewise the unclear longing of the traveller through the cosmos, who hastens from one being to another and asks each one in vain for help and deliverance from his torment, is in the end directed toward the world-ground" (p. 357).

The spiritual power which ultimately endows man with the stamina and perseverance to undertake his quest for God springs from love:

"...there is a spiritual power which is suited above all others to promote the soul's concentration on another being, to suppress and eliminate all other ties and interests, to make that being into the center of one's feelings, and from within this emotionally laden center to dominate all aspects of life and to determine all expression in life; a power which is more effective than any other efforts at overcoming restraints and hindrances, which can traverse the distance of a day's travel in minutes and performs achievements of high aspiration where all other efforts fail. The power in question is love. It provides the mystic with assistance to attain his goal, closeness to God, and to achieve union with Him.

In the case of the lover the intensity of feeling is stronger, the capacity for suffering and enduring is greater, the happiness of proximity is higher than with the world-renouncing ascetic and the saint of actions who sees the purpose of his existence in acts of obedience. But even beyond this, love has its own laws and specific qualities of emotion which makes it more than simply a means of intensifying other spiritual emotions. We shall therefore have to devote special attention to this subject" (pp. 358-59).

The human response to beauty has the potential to become an intense, transcendent experience which elicits awe and impels man to worship. As Ritter points out, this particular form of emotional response is already described in the works of Plato:

"Some people actually react to the sight of higher human beauty not only as if they had been struck by lightning—indeed, we have seen how strong the effect is with ᶜAṭṭār's personages and how some of them are too weak 'to bear the unveiling'—but for them the encounter is an encounter with the transcendent world beyond appearances which takes away their breath and obliges them to engage in worship.

The first author to describe this, as is well known, was Plato. 'When someone who is fresh from the mystery, and saw much of the vision, beholds a godlike face or bodily form that truly expresses beauty, first there come upon him a shuddering and a measure of that awe which the vision inspired, and then reverence as at the sight of a god, and but for fear of being deemed an utter madman he would offer sacrifice to his beloved, as to a holy image of a deity.' (*Phaedrus* 251a). Thus, in beholding the beautiful ephebe, he experiences the vision of absolute beauty itself. And already Plato, like the Neo-Platonists after him, demanded as an ideal attitude complete detachment from the beautiful of the sensory world in favor of the vision of transcendent beauty" (p. 449).

Throughout his poetry ᶜAṭṭār introduces many diverse stories to do with love. But whatever literary delight he may take in the storyteller's art, in recounting the plight of lovers he is primarily concerned with a higher purpose:

"ᶜAṭṭār in his stories is not out to depict various empirically attested experiences of the human heart in order then to pronounce judgement of the behavior of the subjects and objects of these experiences. His stories are allegorical and serve solely to proclaim a unique love which alone deserves the name, a love for which relief from the violence of emotion, deliverance from the fire of passion, is not a consideration, for which there is only the path forward, whose end, the annihilation of the ego, is not a limit to be avoided but the real goal, or not that either, but a transitional stage to a new form in which the ego is extinguished and after the command 'Die!' a new existence arises on an entirely different basis" (pp. 382 f.).

"In ᶜAṭṭār the inborn yearning of human beings to surrender to undiluted feeling in its absolute intensity, to sink utterly into a sea of sensation and allow it to submerge consciousness of individual personality, indeed even life itself, breaks through in an entirely different manner. Total surrender to love in ᶜAṭṭār is not so much an object of observation and amazed contemplation, but rather an ideal requirement whose fulfilment alone supports one's claim to the title of true, genuine lover. Only the writings of the mystics strike chords

which one again hears in ᶜAṭṭār. The mystics are in fact the great virtuosos of feeling, psychic states, internal attitudes, and at the same time professional investigators and interpreters of these. They were also the first to create a language by means of which a richer and more differentiated psychic life could be expressed" (p. 383).

Early on in *The Ocean of the Soul* Ritter draws attention to the way in which mysticism's development in an Islamic context was an understandable response to a specific existential dilemma:

"The mysticism of love overcomes the harshness of God's arbitrary acts through a love which surrenders itself to the beloved's will, indeed causes itself to experience delight in the effects of that will, even when the latter are painful. But the doctrine of God also being the sole agent in human behavior accommodated itself with the current of mysticism which set itself the goal of effacing individual activity, even individual personality, in God's personality, i.e. *fanāʾ*, and finally the doctrine has been theoretically incorporated as a self-evident truth in the pantheistic monism fostered by mysticism. These developments can be followed quite extensively in ᶜAṭṭār" (p. 68).

And he reiterates this point a second time toward the end of the work:

"...the uncompromising transcendence of God is mitigated and softened in Islamic mysticism. Moreover, the Ashᶜarite doctrine of God's continual and direct action in the world and on the world, the doctrine of God's causation of human acts, is itself a factor which diminishes the gulf between Creator and creature. It is an inherent consequence of this doctrine that the profession of faith: *Lā ilāha illā'llāh* 'There is no god but God' becomes elevated to the proposition: *Lā fāᶜila illā'llāh* 'There is no active subject but god'" (p. 615).

Pantheism may be seen as a later, "advanced" stage of mysticism, an emotional view of the world which strives after a loss of self through total immersion within God:

"...the whole of creation is a self-manifestation of God who, as the only real Being, stands concealed behind all things and provides them with their Being. In things the attributes of God take on concrete form and in this way become accessible to perception" (p. 492).

"God created the world (mankind) so that, like a divine Narcissus, He might admire His own beauty in it, as in a mirror, and engage in love-play with Himself. All beauty in the world, even that of the flowers and meadows, of beautiful women and beautiful youths, is a reflection of God's absolute beauty which has come to light in these 'places of manifestation'. Every lover in reality loves in his or her

beloved the beauty of God. Put more precisely, through the lover God loves Himself" (p. 492).

The ultimate implication of pantheistic mysticism is that behind the impulse of love for a beautiful object stands God's love of Himself:

"...among the Islamic mystics is another idea stemming from an early pantheistic trend, namely that God alone has true Being and exists, which idea finds a certain support in the orthodox dogmatic proposition that God Himself directly causes everything that happens, even the acts of people. Thus is the case of the lover who loves God's reflection in beautiful persons, it is actually God who loves Himself. The subject and object of love thereby coincide with one another in divinity which is perfect in all respects, and is the only truly existing and active entity" (p. 573).

In this connection, God is represented as saying in a quatrain attributed to Abū Saᶜīd ibn Abī'l-Khayr:

"I am love, the lover and the beloved at the same time; at the same time, mirror, beauty and the seeing eye" (p. 573).

As Ritter remarks on p. 575: "When it comes to love of God, God is also the real agent."

Ritter has much to say about the attitudes of Ṣūfīs toward mystical love, their ecstatic dancing in the presence of youths, their communal gatherings for contemplative gazing at the beautiful face of the male *shāhid*. Likewise, when commenting on the rather extreme antinomian behavior of the *qalandar*s who on the surface appeared to be living the life of debauched lovers, Ritter remarks:

"...the content of *qalandar* poetry is not merely a straightforward description of 'happiness of hearts' in which, for instance, there is no further mention at all of the neglected religious duties and the despised Ṣūfī rules. On the contrary, these poets are forever joyfully jangling their cast-off chains, so to speak, as if their consciousness of having destroyed their commitments confers an even greater happiness than the pleasure of their acquired freedom itself. They are proud that they have cast everything behind them, continually play at converting to Christianity and Magianism, describe the pious as hypocrites and declare that for themselves church and Kaᶜba are the same, and much more besides. But similarly the euphoria of the carousing drinker who, without a cent left in his purse, 'hasn't got a leg to stand on', sounds forth from these verses" (p. 504).

Finally, Ritter generalizes about the role of mysticism of love in Islam in the following terms:

"Thus for the mystics of love, alongside or in place of self-justification through the profession of faith, through works, or by means of the Prophet's intercession, there emerges self-justification through love. The demands of legalist religion recede into the background, another possibility contained in monotheism is activated: the relationship of the master who gives orders and the slave who obeys is transformed into the relationship between beloved and lover" (p. 581).

All these ideas and attitudes, most of which were available as a diffuse cultural legacy to all metaphysical thinkers and poets in the twelfth century, are investigated by Ritter with extraordinary thoroughness and traced within the poetic works of ᶜAṭṭār. *The Ocean of the Soul* contains a high proportion of direct quotation from ᶜAṭṭār and other primary sources, thus enabling the reader to experience a closer, more vivid relation to the original formulation and context of the points under discussion. In this respect, the degree to which Ritter is able to transport us into the mainstream of medieval religious ideas and emotions that he deals with, is truly extraordinary. Most chapters of the book open with a more or less brief intellectual generalization and then proceed to marshal pertinent evidence from representative Islamic sources. This working method, which shuns speculative theory and schematization on a grand scale, aims to reproduce the flesh and blood of its subject-matter, to present the closest semblance of concrete reality that modern philology has to offer.

In closing, I would like to single out a few chapters of *The Ocean of the Soul* which have particularly impressed me and are virtually able to stand on their own as independent studies of the topics they deal with. Generally speaking, Chapter 1: "Death and Transitoriness", and Chapter 2: "The World", are excellent sketches of the fundamental medieval cast of mind, in many respects equally valid for the Christian as well as the Islamic world. Chapter 7: "Men of Power", gives a lucid description of the political atmosphere of the era in which ᶜAṭṭār lived and the idealistic negative views then current in pious circles about rulers and the government. Chapter 9: "The Poet on Himself", I find interesting for how it shows the extent to which ᶜAṭṭār's individual personality and existential angst shine through the conventionality and commonplace themes poets of his time cloaked themselves in. Perhaps my favorite chapter in the book is Chapter 10: "Strife with God: The Fool". The lenient attitude in Islamic society toward the madman and the fool permits the latter to

speak out against exploitative kings and all manner of hypocrisy and inauthentic behavior. His voice is frequently the otherwise unheard voice of the common people and the poor. Finally, I may repeat my predilection for Chapters 25, 26 and 27 which plunge the reader into a maelstrom of evidence attesting to the unimaginable diversity and intensity of erotic expression found in the pious and poetic literature of ᶜAṭṭār's world.

INTRODUCTION

The Persian poet and mystic Farīd al-Dīn Muḥammad ᶜAṭṭār,[1] a druggist and apothecary by profession, who according to an uncertain and legendary tradition died during the Mongol invasion of Iran, allegedly in the year 627/1229 or 632/1234, but probably already by 617/1220 when his home city Nishapur was conquered by Genghis Khan, has left to posterity a rich literary legacy. His work includes a collection of lives of saints (*Tadhkirat al-awliyāʾ*), two collections of lyrical poetry (*Dīwān* and *Mukhtārnāma*), and a fairly long series of so-called *mathnawī*s, i.e. works of didactic and narrative content in verse, named thus because in contrast to the lyric verse form with fixed end-rhyme, only the two hemistiches rhyme with one another whereas the end-rhyme changes. One of these epic works is a worldly romance of love and adventure (*Khusraw u Gul*. For a summary see *Der Islam* 25/161-71), and for this reason belongs to a literary genre which in all likelihood ultimately goes back to Hellenistic models. (Cf. *Oriens* 1/135-39). Another is a moral booklet (*Pandnāma*) which has long been popular in the East as a schoolbook, while the rest are works of religious-mystical contents which are interspersed with numerous stories.

These religious *mathnawī*s, furthermore, fall into at least two stylistically different groups which one may perhaps attribute to different periods in the poet's life. The authenticity of the second, "later" group of epics, however, is not entirely above suspicion, and they have recently been categorically rejected as works of the poet with weighty arguments which must still be examined in detail (Saᶜīd Nafīsī, *Justujū*). On the other hand, the authenticity of the epics belonging to the first, "earlier" group, which are closely related in style and content, has never been contested. They rank among the most beautiful blossoms of Neo-Persian poetry. They consist of the works: *Asrārnāma* (*The Book of Secrets* = AN),

[1] For the time being cf. the author's "Philologika X" in: *Der Islam* 25/1938/134-73, and his article "ᶜAṭṭār" in the *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*. The information presented there is out of date today. Cf. now: Ahmed Ateş, "Konya kütüphanelerinde bazı mühim yazmalar" in: *Belleten* 16/1952/94-96; as well as Additional Notes at the end of this book.

Ilāhīnāma (roughly, *The Book of God* = IN), *Manṭiq al-ṭayr* (*The Language of the Birds* = MṬ), and *Muṣībatnāma* (*The Book of Misfortune* = MN).

These four works have in common that their contents are made up of religious and mystical teachings which are illustrated by a large number of interspersed brief stories. Of these four *mathnawīs*, the last three to be named, the *Ilāhīnāma*, the *Manṭiq al-ṭayr* and the *Muṣībatnāma*, display in their structure a peculiar variation of the Indian frame-story with interspersed individual stories, whereby the frame-story consists of a self-contained fabulous or fantastical tale which is intended to present particular religious or mystical ideas. The literary form of the frame-story had already become indigenous in Persian prose through *Kalīla vu Dimna*, the translation of the Indian mirror for princes, the *Pançatantra*. Apart from this famous work, it is represented by the *Sindbādnāma* or *The Story of the Seven Viziers (the Wise Masters)* and its imitations, the *Marzubānnāma*, the *Bakhtyārnāma*, the still unpublished *Farāʾid al-sulūk* and, finally, the formally rather rigidified *Thousand and One Nights*. The frame-story is chiefly kept going by a series of dialogues between, on the one hand, continually reappearing pairs of speakers and, on the other, speakers who change. In the *Sindbādnāma* and the *Marzubānnāma* the subjects discussed in the individual dialogues are for the most part always the same or at least closely related to one another. In ᶜAṭṭār's epics different subjects alternate with each other in the dialogues. This variation is brought about by having a series of figures who are characteristically different from one another appear before a main figure who remains the same. Each of the former determines the character and content of the conversation and lends it a distinctive color. Moreover, a peculiarity which ᶜAṭṭār gives this form of literary architectonics is that after the discussion between the speakers one of the chief figures who do not change offers a concluding explanation. In the *Ilāhīnāma* each of the king's six sons, one after the other, presents to his father his youthful greatest wish in life. The father then discusses with each son the value, or lack of value, of the wish in question and at the end provides each conversation with a concluding explanation. In the *Manṭiq al-ṭayr* dialogues arise between the representatives of the various species of birds and the hoopoe which then—and in this case only once—are brought to a conclusion by an explanation directed to all the birds. In the *Muṣībatnāma* the world-traveller goes before various mythical,

cosmic and natural beings, the prophets and personified powers of the soul, and asks them for help in his spiritual need. In each case he is then rejected by these beings in their reply and afterwards receives from his mystical master, the *pīr*, to whom he returns, a concluding explanation about the nature of the interlocutor with whom he has just been conversing.

The *Manṭiq al-ṭayr* and the *Muṣībatnāma* display a common divergence from the *Ilāhīnāma* in that in them the dialogues only form part of the main narrative, whereas the fable of the *Ilāhīnāma* consists exclusively of these dialogues. The *Muṣībatnāma*, on the other hand, is formally speaking somewhat closer to the *Ilāhīnāma*, to the extent that the dialogues make up by far the greatest part of the frame-story, whereas the *Manṭiq al-ṭayr* exhibits a richer and more variegated structure, and there the chief fable stands more in the foreground. The frame-story in ᶜAṭṭār has an entirely different weight and incomparably greater significance than in his predecessors. It is not simply some kind of frame arrangement with a decorative design at the top, in which, in numerical succession, one picture after another is inserted, but it actually constitutes the main interest, it has a clear architectonics and a well thought through, dramatic composition which, at least in the *Manṭiq al-ṭayr* and the *Muṣībatnāma*, strives towards a definite final goal. Each new figure which appears has a specific life of its own, a special symbolic character which to a large extent determines the character of the subordinate stories. When in the *Manṭiq al-ṭayr* a nightingale, a duck, an owl, etc. appears, this does not simply mean the same thing as when in the *Sindbādnāma* and its imitations the first vizier is replaced by the second, and the second is replaced by the third, while the stories narrated by each person could easily be interchanged, but the natural peculiarity of the nightingale, the duck and the owl determines the character of the conversation and the ensuing group of stories. If one asks how it is possible to obtain viewpoints for the ordering of mystical concepts from the individual characteristics of a nightingale, an owl and a duck, the answer is that this is made feasible through the artistic device which one may designate as the magic wand of Persian poetry and the key to its understanding—fantastical aetiology. In the case of beings which by nature cannot speak, this artistic device is connected with a second such device, the so-called "language of states" (*zabān-i ḥāl*). A lifeless being, or in any case one which normally does not possess the power of human speech, begins to talk and to tell about

itself and to say things which are nothing other than a fantastical, poetic transformation and interpretation of its specific characteristics and situation.

Cf. the author's "Das Proömium des *Maṯnawī-i Maulawī*" in: ZDMG 93/172; Qudāma, *Naqd al-nathr* 7.

ᶜAṭṭār is an unequalled master in making use of this artistic device, and the wealth of fantasy and abundance of ideas with which he overwhelms the reader time and again evokes admiration.

As far as the relationship of the individual stories to the main fable is concerned, to begin with the content and character of the stories are determined by the subject dealt with in the conversation and they serve to illustrate this subject. The poet, however, is happy to digress by concluding a story with an aspect of the subject that is different from the one he introduced it with, and he then proceeds by way of free association. Thus the main idea frequently only determines the first or the first few subordinate stories, whereas the others are connected through free association and often with rather forced transitions. Moreover, many of the brief stories only serve to amplify and underscore a point of detail which by no means has to be essential. As a result, for our sensibility at least, the point in question often acquires an unjustifiable weight.

It is well known that in the case of ᶜAṭṭār's imitator Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī the associative connection has finally become the sole prevailing principle of organization, which does not in fact increase the enjoyment of his long poem.

This will all become clearer if we briefly review the contents of the frame-stories of the three epics.

ILĀHĪNĀMA

The *Ilāhīnāma* (cf. Bibliography: IN) is dominated by an older motif of Islamic piety, that of *zuhd. Zuhd* consists of cutting one's ties with this world, giving up worldly objectives, and renouncing worldly desires and pipe-dreams which are to be replaced by ideals of mystical ethics and piety. The fable of the epic is as follows:

A king calls his six sons before him and invites them, one after the other, to tell him what their highest wish in life is. He will then fulfill their wishes (pp. 30-31). Instead of doing this, however, he attempts to show them the baseness and worthlessness of their wishes and makes an effort to win over his sons on

behalf of higher goals, which gives the poet the opportunity to discuss a series of vices and virtues, and mystical concepts.

The eldest prince wishes to win the daughter of the king of the fairies, whose beauty and cleverness he has heard about. The father accuses the son of sensuality and, as an example of pure love, describes for him a beautiful and virtuous wife who during her husband's absence is besieged, threatened and tormented by one lover after another, and yet preserves her pure womanhood and loyalty to her husband (1/0-1, pp. 31-47).

The son answers that if there were no sensuality, mankind wouldn't persist, and neither his father, the king, nor he, the prince, would exist in the world.—The father replies that he doesn't wish to ban sensuality altogether, but the fact that, from among all the things one could wish for, the prince has chosen the sensual form of a love relationship gives the impression that he knows nothing of the higher grades of love, the highest of which reveals itself in the willingness to die for the beloved's sake.—Here then for the first time in this poem are heard those tones of a higher love prepared for boundless suffering and the ultimate sacrifice, a love which perceives death at the beloved's hand as the highest distinction (2/0-1, pp. 47-51).

The prince objects that without a wife there would be no children. Through a child our memory lives on, the son is our intercessor at the Final Judgement. Everyone has need of such a son, I as well.—The king points out to the prince the danger which a son can become for a father. Whoever isn't free of all faults, for him the possession of a child signifies a hindrance on the path to religious perfection. A story about the mystic Ibrāhīm ibn Adham serves as an illustration and describes the danger of being distracted from God by the family. Children in fact force parents to abandon the path of asceticism. God alone is entirely free of ties to children, for He has no children. What a source of pain a son can be for his father is depicted in the story about Jacob and Joseph (3/1-0, 6, pp. 59-60, 64-65).

In the end the prince asks his father at least to tell him who the fairy princess he so keenly desires really is.—The king answers with a story from which it emerges that the wished for princess is one's own soul. Actually, the whole world is nothing but one's own self (4/0-1, pp. 72-77).

The second prince wishes to possess the art of magic. Then he'll be able to wander over the whole world in any shape he desires, behold all beauties and spend time with them, will obtain everything he wants to have, and thus become master of the whole world.—The father says: "Satan has overpowered you, the demon has seduced you. You wish only to live for your vain desires. Whatever good you do, you don't do for the sake of the good but for the sake of your lust and in order to be seen by people" (5/0, pp. 87-88).

The son replies: "All human beings pursue their desires and inclinations. If I as well, in pursuing my desires, practice a little magic, there's no harm in that,

as long as I repudiate it all afterwards."—The father answers: "Don't vainly squander your life, for surely you know that tomorrow you must die. The example of the magician angels Hārūt and Mārūt, who are tormented by thirst and hang upside down a hand's breadth above water, should be a warning to you. Who knows whether like them death won't also overtake you in Babylon, the way it overtook that young man in India whither he had himself transported by Solomon's wind in order to escape from death" (6/0-1, pp. 100-101).

The prince responds that the ideals his father praises are too lofty for him. He can't bring himself to relinquish his desire for the art of magic.—The father replies: "You should only strive for things which are right in the eyes of God and worthy of yourself, otherwise what you strive for will lead you into ruin, just as the highest name of God led into ruin that man who had Jesus teach him this name" (7/0-1, pp. 112-13).

Finally, the prince asks his father to explain to him what magic really is and why he considers it so reprehensible.—The father answers: "Magic is the devil's work. The devil has implanted himself in man and set up his throne in man's interior. How this came to be is taught by the story about the devil's child that was eaten by Adam and Eve" (8/0-1, pp. 126-29).

The third prince wishes for Jamshēdh's magic drinking-cup, in which he'd be able to see all the secrets of the world.—The father replies: "What leads you to this wish is pride and ambition. In this way you want to elevate yourself above people. But when death places the saw on your head (Jamshēdh died by being sawn in two), you'll have no profit from this drinking-cup. You'll be miserably destroyed" (9/0, pp. 139-40).

The prince retorts: "All men, especially the great of this world, strive after fame and honor. The love of fame is inborn in man and distinguishes him from an animal."—The father answers: "Obedience to God's commands is the right way to elevate oneself; striving after worldly honor leads to sin" (10/0, p. 153).

The prince objects: "The bad effects you attribute to striving after honor and fame don't necessarily have to occur! If I maintain the right balance and only strive after a little fame and honor, I'll be safe from the delusion which could hurl me into ruin."—The father answers: "This small amount can also lead to your downfall. Even complacently observing one's obedience becomes a barrier between you and God. How much more so, striving after honor and fame!" (11/0, p. 169).

Finally, the prince asks the king to explain to him what Jamshēdh's drinking-cup really is.—The father answers with the profound story about Kay-Khusraw and Jamshēdh's drinking-cup (12/0-1, pp. 184-86).

The fourth prince comes to tell his wish. The goal of his desires is the water of life.

The father says: "What lies at the root of this wish is hope for a long life (*ṭūl-i amal*), which must be overcome, and not knowing when one has had enough (*ḥirṣ*)" (13/0, p. 198).

The prince asks his father to explain to him what the water of life is. The father answers with the legend of Alexander and explains that the true water of life is knowledge (14/0-1, pp. 215-19).

Now the fifth prince appears. He wishes to have Solomon's ring through whose power he'll be able to attain mastery over human beings and spirits, and understanding of the language of animals.—The father says: "Kingly dominion is worthless because it's ephemeral. Only kingly dominion over the hereafter has worth. If you strive after that dominion, a loaf of bread is enough for you from this world" (15/0, pp. 244-45).

The prince responds: "No human being is free of the desire for dominion. That wise man was right who maintained that only through royal power does one attain real pleasure in life."—The father replies: "The only reason you strive after ephemeral kingly dominion in the here and now is because you haven't heard about the kingdom of the hereafter. The great who've known that kingdom have cast away this earthly realm, just as the son of Hārūn al-Rashīd, Sabtī, renounced his rule" (16/0-1, pp. 258-64).

The prince replies that kingly dominion is worth striving after; all the great and wise have striven after it.—The father answers by pointing to the transitoriness of earthly royal power and the heavy burden it places on the one who possesses it (17/0-1, p. 269).

When the prince then asks the father to explain to him what the signet-ring of Solomon really is, the father answers with the legend of Buluqyā and ᶜAffān (18/0-1, pp. 285-86).

Now it's the turn of the sixth and last prince to speak. His wishes are directed at possessing the art of making gold, by means of which he wants to provide the world with peace and security, and to make the poor rich.—The father accuses him of being overpowered by greed for worldly possessions. The bird of greed can only be sated with earth, with the grave (19/0, pp. 300-301).

The son responds that all too great poverty can lead to unbelief. Gold protects against this. Gold provides help for one's worldly and religious life, and therefore one should definitely ask God for gold and the elixir.—The father responds: "It's impossible to combine worldly goods and religion" (20/0, p. 314).

The prince thanks his father for his admonition but persists in his opinion that the elixir will be of use to him both in his worldly and in his religious life. If the world and religion extended their hand to him, then he could also hope for the beloved's favor and achieve happiness in love.—The father contradicts him most emphatically. Possessions and love absolutely exclude one another. As long as you don't give up everything, you're only an apparent lover. Tears, fire

and blood, these are the things which await the real lover. This is illustrated by the long story about the poetess Rābiᶜa's tragic death from love.

The prince then asks what the elixir is.—The answer is given by the father in a strange story about Plato and in an epilogue in which suffering is described as the real elixir (22/0-1, pp. 352-55). Alternatively, in the epilogue of the ninth story (pp. 361-62) the elixir is the light of God which illuminates and transforms human beings.

MANṬIQ AL-ṬAYR

In the case of ᶜAṭṭār's *Manṭiq al-ṭayr* (cf. Bibliography: MṬ) we are in the fortunate position of knowing the source on which the poet drew. This was *The Risāla of the Birds* (*Risālat al-ṭayr*, cf. Biblio.), the Arabic version of which is attributed to Muḥammad Ghazzālī (d. 505/1111), and the Persian version to his brother Aḥmad (d. 517/1123). (Certain stylistically rough qualities of the Arabic text lead one to conclude it is a translation. The Persian version is perhaps the original). The contents of this *risāla*, according to the Persian version, are as follows:

The birds, despite their diversity in species, voices and habitats, come to the conclusion that they absolutely must have a king. No one seems to them to be more worthy of kingship than the Sīmurgh. They learn from people who've reached his royal court that he lives on the Island of Loftiness in the City of Greatness and Majesty. They're gripped with a longing to go to visit him. Just then a voice calls to them: "Don't hurl yourselves into ruin! Remain instead in your nests!" But they persist in their intention because otherwise they fear they'll go mad from longing. Then the voice calls to them again: "Take care not to enter the endless desert! Bottomless seas, insurmountable mountains, hot and cold regions lie along the road to him. You'll perish along the way." But this warning only increases their longing; despite everything they set out on the way. Many drown in the sea. Those used to a hot climate perish in the cold, those used to the cold perish in the heat. Only a small group reaches the royal court. The Sīmurgh has them questioned about their wish. When they say they've come so that he may be their king, he has them told: "We're king whether you say so or not. We're not in need of your service and obedience. Turn back!" The birds are disheartened and ashamed, and don't know what they should do. To stay there is pointless, but in their great fatigue and exhaustion it's impossible to turn back. Thus they once more send a message to the Sīmurgh in the hope that he may perhaps admit them into his presence. They have him told: "Though You're in no need of us, we're not without need of serving You. This is the court of the needy: therefore allow us into Your presence! We're satisfied with a glance of mercy!" But they're given the message: "Arise and return to your home, for

you don't have the strength to bear the revelation of Our Majesty!" (Reference to surah 7/143). Then they say: "Now true misfortune has befallen us!" They're completely desperate and prepare themselves to die. Then, when they've finally given up all hope, a new message comes to them from the king: "Don't despair! Whereas Our lack of need and Our loftiness makes Us reject you, Our mercy causes Us to accept you. Now that you've observed your impotence and helplessness, and have given up the hope of reaching Our court, you've become worthy of Our mercy. For this is the court for the needy and the poor." Then, filled with joy, they all draw near and are received into the group of the Sīmurgh's servants.

Now that they're admitted into the king's proximity, they ask about the fate of their fellow-travellers who perished along the way. For they wish to see them again and would like them to be able to witness what a position of honor they've attained. The answer is given: "Do not believe that those who were killed on the path of God are dead!" (Surah 2/154). Once more they ask: "We would like to see them again. How can we reach them?" The answer comes: "You're still caught up in humanity. You can't see them before death. When you've ended this service and flown forth from the nest of the body, then you'll see them again. But as long as you're still in the body's cage and you still bear the fetters of legal obligations (*takālīf*) on your feet, you're not able to reach them." And they also ask: "What is the situation of those who remained behind because of lowly thought, misfortune and incapacity?" The answer is given: "They didn't act this way because of incapacity but because We didn't love them. Had We so wished, We would have led them to Us. Don't think that you've come on your own initiative! We aroused your longing and brought you to Us."—The invitation now follows to do the same as the birds, to undertake purification, to pray, to recollect God, etc. Then surah 27/16 is quoted: "And we were taught the language of the birds" (*manṭiq al-ṭayr*), after which ᶜAṭṭār has named his poem.

The views which come to light in this *risāla* do not go beyond the framework of very moderate mystical teachings. Human beings recognize that they are in need of a divine ruler and experience a longing to find Him. Concerning where God is to be found, they are instructed by those who have already found the way to Him (i.e. by the prophets and men of God). They do not find Him through reflection like heroes of a philosophical Robinson Crusoe adventure, nor through mystical contemplation. Their relationship to God is that of a servant to his master. Men fall into three categories: there are those who do not take part in the journey because of apathy, laziness and misfortune, others lack strength along the way, and the third category persevere and do not allow any difficulties to hold them back from the goal, i.e. attaining closeness to God. The goal is not the pleasures of Par-

adise but closeness to God. But dwelling in divine proximity has retained the character of service. Divinity, however, is not in need of man's service. The seekers of God are only accepted out of mercy, once they have attained the understanding that God does not need them and have thereby become aware of their complete impotence. God dispenses mercy and disfavor in whatever way He pleases. He chooses whom He wishes to be His friends. Indeed, God's omnipotence goes still further. That a portion of mankind does not seek Him and becomes wretched, and that others seek Him and become blessed, is not their own doing but is brought about by God. The goal attained is serving God at God's royal court, which is not the actual goal of real mystics, namely to become immersed in God, to be dissolved in God and to become transformed in Him. Here love of God does not go beyond that of the servant for his master. A respectful distance always remains. Most of these motifs we shall also find in ᶜAṭṭār, but his world of ideas is richer than that which is expressed in *The Risāla of the Birds*.

What has ᶜAṭṭār made out of his source? First of all, he richly amplified it. He mentions by name the individual species of birds who prepare themselves to make the journey. He knows the leader and the driving spirit behind the undertaking, the hoopoe. He has the unwilling birds present a detailed justification of their refusal in their dialogues, while he makes very skilful use of fantastical aetiology. He portrays at great length the dangers, menaces and difficult halting-stations which will have to be traversed. Then he expands the conclusion by adding the motif of extinction and the motif of finding God within oneself. In this connection he also exploits most cleverly a rhetorical figure of speech, the *tajnīs-i murakkab*, based on Sīmurgh and *sī murgh* "thirty birds". Finally, with poetic images he discusses creation's relationship to God in accordance with pantheism. In detail the fable unfolds in the following manner:

After a long introduction in which God is addressed, the Prophet and the four caliphs are praised, and much space is taken up with a warning against fanatical, i.e. Shīᶜite, condemnation of the Prophet's Companions, there follows in the first *maqāla* (p. 23) the poet's greeting to the birds who are addressed individually one after the other and characterized by their peculiar traits with a symbolic interpretation. Then the actual story begins (with the second *maqāla*, p. 26). The birds come together in order to seek a king for themselves. The hoopoe, the

messenger of Solomon,[2] says to the other birds that he knows where the king is but that he can't travel to him alone. He lives behind the mountain Qāf,[3] is called the Sīmurgh[4] and has in front of him 10,000 veils of light and darkness.[5] No one has ever seen him and what one knows about him is pure fantasy. The road to him is long and dangerous. Once he shed a feather over China and since then the unrest in the world has been due to him (p. 28). No one knows more about him than the markings of his feather which is kept in the hall of paintings in China. All creation originates from this feather. Whoever of the birds wishes to come along on the journey, let him prepare himself.

The birds are gripped with longing to visit their king. But since the journey is very difficult, they present all manner of excuses. What keeps them from participating in the journey are priorities which aren't contemptible *per se*, but earthly or even trivial. The hoopoe now begins to talk them out of these, the way the king in the *Ilāhīnāma* endeavors to invalidate the princely but earthly ideals of his youthful sons by referring to ideals of a higher order.

The first bird to speak is the Nightingale (3/0, p. 28). He explains that he's bound by love to the rose whom he extols in his songs, and he can't separate from her.—The hoopoe replies: "Love for a creature as ephemeral as the rose is foolish, particularly in view of how she laughs at her adorer every spring." (Fantastical aetiology).

The Parrot (4/0, p. 30) explains that because of his green feathers he's the Khiḍr[6] of the birds. It's enough for him to take a drink of the water of life.—The hoopoe responds that what's right isn't to preserve one's life but to sacrifice it for the beloved.

The Peacock (5/0, p. 31) has only one longing, to return once more to Paradise.[7]—The hoopoe reproaches him, saying the Lord of Paradise is of greater worth than Paradise itself.

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2 In accordance with surah 27/20 and the Solomon legend connected with it. See A. J. Wensinck in the EI under "Hudhud".

3 See M. Streck ibid. under "Ḳāf".

4 On this legendary bird see V. F. Büchner ibid. under "Sīmurgh"; *Les oiseaux et les fleurs*... d'Azz-eddin El-Mocaddessi, publiées... par M. Garcin, Paris 1821, pp. 110-13 of the Arabic and pp. 218-19 of the French text; Freiherr von Dalberg, "Simorg, der persische Phönix" in: *Mines d'Orient* I, 199; the article "ᶜAnḳā" in the EI.

5 According to a saying of the Prophet (*ḥadīth*) upon which Ghazzālī's *Mishkāt al-anwār* is constructed. On this work see Wensinck, "G͟hazālī's *Mis͟hkāt al-anwār* (*Niche of Lights*)" in: *Semietische Studien uit de nalatenschap van Prof. Dr. A. J. Wensinck*, Leyden 1941, pp. 192-212.

6 As is well known, in the Alexander legend Khiḍr is originally Alexander's cook who by chance finds the water of life, which Alexander had sought in vain, and becomes immortal. Cf. Wensinck's article "Khaḍir" in the EI. He is dressed in green.

7 On the dubious role which the peacock played in the story of Paradise cf. Kisāʾī, 1/35; Thaᶜlabī, chpt. 5 of the *Qiṣṣat Ādam*; Weil, *Biblische Legenden der Muselmänner* 20-21.

The Duck (6/0, p. 32) says he can't leave the water. He's the ascetic among the birds. He performs a major ritual ablution every moment (by diving under the water) and prostrates himself.—The hoopoe replies that water is only good for those with an unwashed countenance.

The Partridge (7/0, p. 33), who nourishes himself with jewels and sleeps on top of jewels, can't separate from stones.[8]—The hoopoe responds that jewels are nothing more than colored stones and aren't worthy of your attaching your heart to them. Solomon too recognized the worthlessness of a kingly dominion that depended on a little stone in a signet-ring (7/1).

The Humā (8/0, p. 35) says it's enough for him to choose kings by means of his shadow.[9] He's attained so high a rank in this way that he only gives bones to his animal soul to eat and thereby protects his spirit-soul from everything lowly.—The hoopoe responds: "It would be better, oh you arrogant bird, if you didn't cast your shadow over kings. For they must all eventually become detached from kingly dominion and on the day of reckoning they have aweful things to fear."

The Hawk (9/0, p. 36) says his highest goal is to be worthy of the king's hand. That's why he trains himself in good manners such as are suitable when associating with kings. He has no other desire but to wait upon the king.—The hoopoe responds that all sovereigns have their match, only the king Sīmurgh does not. Moreover, being close to kings is dangerous.

The Heron (10/0, p. 37) always sits by the ocean which he loves, and doesn't wish to separate from it.—The hoopoe says: "The ocean is fickle and untrue. One day it will swallow you up."

The Owl (11/0, p. 38) resides in ruins, being in love with the treasures that are buried there. It makes better sense to love these treasures than to love the Sīmurgh.—The hoopoe points out that it's folly to attach oneself to treasures which one must abandon at death.

The Sparrow (12/0, p. 39) explains that he's too weak for so great an undertaking. He would die along the way. Thus he would rather seek his Joseph in a well.[10]—The hoopoe says this is simply hypocrisy, nor is anyone permitted to love Joseph.

In this way one bird after the other excuses himself. Finally, they ask the hoopoe what kind of connection actually exists between them and the Sīmurgh. (Likewise, at the end of every discussion the princes ask their father what the ob-

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8 Alectoris graeca. The bird has a red beak and red feet and lives in stony regions. Small pebbles are found in its stomach which help with breaking down its nourishment.

9 According to folk-belief, the person on whom the Humā's shadow falls will become king. Cf. C. Huart's article "Humā" in the EI; Chauvin 6/75. In fairy-tales it is usually a hawk which lands on the person who will become king. ZDMG 36/241; Radloff, *Proben* 4/480; Knowles, *Folk-tales of Kashmir* 159; Bolte-Polívka 1/325, 4/408 (O. Spies).

10 What is meant is a species of sparrow that nests close to wet areas and bodies of water, such as the Passer hispaniolensis.

ject of their desire really is). If there were a real connection between them and the Sīmurgh, they would display greater longing for him (13/0, p. 40).

The hoopoe's answer provides ᶜAṭṭār with the opportunity to present his views about the relationship of God to His creatures. The hoopoe explains that the Sīmurgh has cast his shadow over the world, and from this shadow all birds have originated. That's their connection with him. This pantheistic doctrine is then dissociated from heretical doctrines which claim God can "dwell" inside a person (*ḥulūl*). You're a shadow of the Sīmurgh, not the Sīmurgh Himself.

The birds have understood their connection with the Sīmurgh and are now disposed to set out on the road with the hoopoe (14/0, p. 44). But being weak, they're in doubt as to whether they'll be capable of enduring the dangers of such a journey.—The hoopoe answers them: "The true lover gives no thought to the danger of death. He's ready to sacrifice his life and his faith to love." The long story about Shaykh Ṣanᶜān serves to illustrate this (14/1, pp. 45-60).

The birds are so gripped by this story that they decide to undertake the journey (15/0, p. 60). The hoopoe is chosen by lot to be the leader and is crowned (with the crest on his head). The road which they've chosen to travel proves to be completely devoid of living beings, and dead quiet. When someone asks why it's like this, the hoopoe answers that such silence is a sign of the sublimity and majesty of the king. This is illustrated by a fine story about Bāyazīd who experienced this silent sublimity of God on a moon-lit night in the desert (15/1, p. 61).

Fear creeps over the birds when they behold the endless expanses which they will have to traverse (16/0, p. 61). They gather around the hoopoe and ask him to free them from the doubts and inhibiting misgivings which have taken hold of every one of them. The hoopoe then mounts a pulpit and answers various questions of the birds.

The first bird (17/0, p. 63) asks: "How is it that you've attained a higher rank than we have?"—The hoopoe answers: "Solomon once caused his glance to fall on me. One only attains such rank due to the merciful glance of the king."

Another bird (18/0, p. 66) says the road is too arduous, and he's too weak to traverse it. He'll surely die along the way.—The hoopoe answers: "Even if you must suffer death on this road, it's still far better than to die in the unclean world. In this world one only meets with trials, cares and disappointments."

Another bird (19/0, p. 69) says he's too heavily laden with sins to be honored with proximity to the king.—The hoopoe replies: "The gate of repentance is open for you."

Another bird (20/0, p. 73) says he has a hybrid nature. One moment he's an ascetic, the next a wine-drinker. One moment he prays to God, the next Satan leads him astray.—The hoopoe responds: "This is the same with everyone. If all people were perfect in advance, there would have been no need to send the

prophets. A person who has resolved to obey God only slowly comes to cope with his task."

Another bird (21/0, p. 75) says that the dog of his carnal soul doesn't want to obey him.—The hoopoe answers with the remark that, from the time of youth's madness up to advanced old age, the dog of the carnal soul doesn't want to die.

Another bird (22/0, p. 72) complains about the seduction of Satan. The hoopoe replies: "Your desires are your Satan. If you give into your desires, hundreds of devils will emerge from you."

Another bird (23/0, p. 80) says his heart is attached to gold and earthly possessions.—The hoopoe explains to him that gold is after all only a colored stone and worthless. Being attached to possessions and worldly goods makes demands on the heart and holds one back from God.

Another bird (24/0, p. 83) says: "I have a fine castle which my heart is attached to and I live there like a king. Why should I give up a paradise to undertake a long and dangerous journey?"—The hoopoe says: "If death didn't exist, you'd be right. But since death awaits you, your castle is merely an attractive prison."

Another bird (25/0, p. 86) says: "I'm caught in the bonds of love which has completely set me on fire and robbed me of reason. To endure without the beloved would be to renounce faith in love."—The hoopoe explains: "You're caught in the bonds of external form. What you call beauty is merely an ephemeral mixture of mucus and blood. Only transcendent beauty is faultless and worthy of love."

Another bird (26/0, p. 89) is afraid of death.—The hoopoe replies: "Death is our destiny. You were born to die."

Another bird (27/0, p. 93) complains of excessive sorrow which never leaves him in peace.—The hoopoe says: "It's foolish to feel sorrow over earthly things that you've lost. To attach one's heart to the ephemeral is madness. Moreover, often what at first appears to be a tribulation is in reality a treasure. Every moment you experience a hundred proofs of God's mercy. So you shouldn't be ungrateful if once in a while some hardship also occurs."

The next four birds who present their opinions and attitudes are representatives of particular religious virtues and therefore aren't reprimanded by the hoopoe, but praised.

One bird (28/0, p. 96) wants to be obedient and wait until a command comes to him.—The hoopoe praises him for this attitude. An act of obedience carried out under a command is better than a lifetime of acts of obedience without a command. The relationship of man to God is that of slavery. The slave's task is to serve and display respect. Whoever can't do this is rejected by the king.

Another bird (29/0, p. 99) says he attaches his heart to nothing except God and is ready to sacrifice everything.—He too is praised by the hoopoe. One must first free oneself from all ties before one sets out on the road.

Another bird (30/0, p. 101) says he has few acts of obedience which he can point to, but his aspiration is high.—He is also praised.

The next bird (31/0, p. 104) takes pride in the virtue of a sense of fairness and in remaining true to his word.

The next (32/0, p. 107) asks whether one may be bold before the king.—The hoopoe answers that someone in an intimate relationship with the king may allow himself a certain boldness. Indeed, many a bold word of an insane lover is tolerated.

The next bird (33/0, p. 110) asserts that he has devoted himself entirely to love of the Sīmurgh. Now he wants to set out and attain loving closeness to him.—The hoopoe instructs him that this kind of unilateral affirmation of love doesn't entitle one to loving closeness to the king. Only when the divine Beloved calls you and recognizes you, does the relationship of love become a reality. Love between man and God originates with God.

Another bird (34/0, p. 113) thinks that he's attained a degree of perfection through his ascetic exercises and doesn't want to leave the place where he performs these exercises.—The hoopoe reprimands him for his deluded arrogance.

Another bird (35/0, p. 117) asks what he can find pleasure in during the journey.—The hoopoe instructs him about finding pleasure in God.

The next bird (36/0, p. 120) asks what he should request from the king when he reaches him. The hoopoe instructs him that nothing but the Godhead Himself should be the goal of his desires.

Another bird (37/0, p. 125) wishes to know what merchandise one should take along to that country. It must be something that's scarce there, so one may be of service to the king with it.—The hoopoe answers: "Knowledge of secrets and absolute obedience are available there in abundance, but a burning soul and a wounded heart will be well received."

Another bird (38/0, p. 127) asks: "How long is the road?" The hoopoe answers: "Seven valleys which we must cross lie along our road. How many parasangs the road is no one knows, for no one has ever returned from this journey."

He now describes the individual valleys.

The first valley is the Valley of Seeking. It's full of difficulties and hardships. Years of striving and hard effort are necessary there. You must sacrifice and put at risk money and goods. You must walk in blood and give up everything. When your heart has become free and cleansed of all ties, then the light of God begins to shine for you, then your fervor is more intensely kindled. Though fire and a hundred precipices threaten the traveller, he'll still cast himself into the flames like the moth and crave a drink from the cup of that wine-pourer. But the drink will make him forget both worlds. Faith and unbelief will be the same to him, if only the door is opened for him.

The next valley is the Valley of Love (39/0, p. 132). Then comes the Valley of Knowledge (40/0, p. 137). In this valley there are roads which run in different directions. The difference between the roads travellers take is determined by the difference in their strength and aptitude. Thus one person found an idol, another the Kaᶜba.

In the next valley, the Valley of Detachment (41/0, p. 141), the senselessness and futility of most of what happens in the world becomes evident. Countless human lives are wasted before a prophet arises who draws near to God. Worlds are destroyed. Nor does it mean any more than if a piece of straw vanished from the water's surface, etc.

Then comes the Valley of Oneness (42/0, p. 146). In it all apparent multiplicity proves to be one. All ones multiplied by one still come out as one. However, it's not a matter of single units in a numerical series but the oneness which lies beyond measure and number, oneness in which past and future eternity come together as one. The substance of the world is one.

Next comes the Valley of Bewilderment (43/0, p. 150). For whoever enters this valley all clear concepts become confused. He doesn't know whether he exists or not, whether he's in the center or at the edge, whether he's visible or hidden, whether he has faded away or is persistent or both at once. He says: "I don't know", and this as well he doesn't know. He's in love and doesn't know with whom. He doesn't know whether he's a believer or an infidel. His heart is full of love but at the same time empty. He loses faith in himself and no longer knows a way out.

The next valley is the Valley of Denudation and Extinction (44/0, p. 156). This is the valley of oblivion, dumbness, deafness and unconsciousness. Here hundreds of thousands of shadows have passed away before one sun. If the ocean of the universe begins to surge, the pictures painted on its surface disappear. Whoever dives into this ocean and resurfaces after having been forlorn, wins insight into the secret of the cosmos. Travellers who stepped into this ocean disappeared with their very first step. No one takes a second step.

The description of these seven valleys shows the birds just what sort of hardships they have before them (45/0, p. 163). Many lose heart and die at this halting-station. Only a small group still sets out on the road, and most of these lose their life during the long flight that lasts many years. Finally, only thirty remaining birds reach the goal—the Sīmurgh's royal court. The court is higher and loftier than all understanding can grasp and all knowledge can fathom. Here the lightning of lack of need flashes and hundreds of worlds are burnt up in one moment. Here a hundred thousand suns, moons and stars mean no more than a mote in a sunbeam.

The birds feel totally annihilated. After all, what are they? What does it matter whether they exist or not? They remain for a long time in this hopelessness until a palace guard at last notices them and asks where they come from and what

they want. They answer: "We've come here so the Sīmurgh may be our king. We set out on our journey long ago. We were several thousand but only thirty still remain. We've come this long way in the hope of finally finding peace at this court. Perhaps the king, in his bounty, will cast a glance of favor on us.—The palace guard answers: "You fools, whether you exist or not, He's still the absolute, eternal Lord. Worlds of whole armies mean no more than an ant at this king's door. Go back to where you came from!"

Due to this answer the birds are utterly disheartened and close to death. Finally, they say: "Even if He despises us to such an extent that He would send us back, contempt which comes from Him is the greatest honor in our eyes.—The palace guard answers: "If the lightning of lordliness flashes forth, it kills everyone in one instant. What's the meaning of honor and contempt then?"—They say: "This doesn't frighten us. Does the moth ever recoil in fear from the candle's flame? Even if we can't find the path to union with Him, we won't stop seeking Him."

Though lack of need was boundless, the face of kindness in the end turned toward the birds. The Sīmurgh's chamberlain draws back the curtain, has the birds sit on the cushion of proximity in the seat of respect and honor. But then he presents them with a document to read. When the birds peruse the document, they find all their actions recorded in it. In shame and bewilderment they pass away and disappear. But then through the light of majesty they receive new life, and behold, everything they did and omitted to do is washed clean from their breast. The sun of proximity shines and in the reflection of their selves, the thirty birds (*sī murgh*), they now recognize the Sīmurgh. If they look at the Sīmurgh, they see themselves and if they look at themselves, they see the Sīmurgh. And if they look at both at the same time, they see only one Sīmurgh.

Before such an amazing situation, they're reduced to deep awe and contemplation. Finally, they ask for an explanation of this mystery and receive the answer: "This kingly presence (*ḥaḍrat*) is like a crystal-clear mirror. Whoever comes here sees himself in it. No one's eye penetrates unto Us. How can the eye of an ant reach to the Pleiades. All these valleys you passed through, all this perseverance you displayed, was Our doing alone. Being the Sīmurgh befits Us rather than you, for We are the Sīmurgh in essence. Disappear within Me so that you find yourselves again in Me! It's a matter of the original substance which is pure and without need. Whether what's derived from it exists or not, makes no difference. The real sun is always there, regardless of whether the mote in the sunbeam or the shadow remains."

Then they disappeared in Him and were annihilated in Him. The shadow disappeared in the sun, and this was the end.

After a hundred thousand aeons had gone by (p. 168), the annihilated birds were returned to themselves, and they entered the state of "persistance after extinction". Words are incapable of describing this occurrence. "Nevertheless, our

companions", so says ^{c}Aṭṭār, "asked us to give them instruction about this, at least in the form of a parable." And so he wishes to relate a story. (What kind of a story it is we shall learn at the end of this book). After he has recounted the story (45/6, pp. 169-75), he explains that he can't provide any further explanations. He now wishes to be silent and will only say more once he has received a command from divine providence (p. 175).

MUṢĪBATNĀMA

The content of the *Muṣībatnāma* (cf. Bibliography: MN) consists of the soul's journey during the mystical meditation of spiritual withdrawal. It is possible that in particular the reports about the psychic journeys of the celebrated mystic Bāyazīd Bisṭāmī (d. 261/874), which ^{c}Aṭṭār himself has presented in the *Tadhkirat al-awliyāʾ*, provided the impetus for this poetic fantasy or had some influence on it. According to these reports, Bāyazīd experienced in meditation ecstasies and psychic journeys of this kind which conveyed him to the higher world ($1/154_{17-20}$; 1/172 ff.). He regularly had himself locked up for this purpose (TA $1/140_{7-9}$) and part of the time would stand on his toes ($1/143_{17-20}$; $1/157_{20-21}$) and part of the time adopt the posture of meditation with his head on his knees ($1/140_{10-14}$). In later times *pīr*s subjected their novices, the *murīd*s, to a forty-day withdrawal, during which the latter would gradually reduce their food, frequently adopt an uncomfortable posture, and then experience all manner of illuminations and visions which they had to recount to the *pīr* who would interpret them (*^{c}Awārif al-ma^{c}ārif*, chpts. 26-27; *Gaben*, pp. 193-204/26-27). In the *Muṣībatnāma* the meditating soul's thought which traverses the mythical and physical cosmos is personified as a traveller (*sālik-i fikrat*) who is in the relationship of a novice to a *pīr* of this kind. He traverses forty stations which correspond to the forty days of withdrawal and after every visionary dialogue with a mythical, cosmic and physical being, or personified powers of the soul, he receives instruction from the *pīr* about his partner in conversation, so that here as well the pattern of speech, reply and concluding instruction is maintained.

The psychic state of this traveller is one of inner distress, helplessness, conflict and desperation, as was the case with the birds in the Valley of Bewilderment (see above p. 16). What he seeks from the beings he visits is help, guidance and deliverance from his tormented state. On each occasion he begins his talk with a *captatio benevolentiae* which consists of mentioning the famous

qualities of the being in question. He then presents his request and receives a negative reply which is always justified by the particular being's own difficult situation. The prophets refer him to Muḥammad, and only Muḥammad shows him the right path, the path into one's own soul.

Clearly, with regard to this poetic conception ᶜAṭṭār has before him the tradition from the Prophet about intercession at the Resurrection (*ḥadīth al-shafāᶜa*), according to which, at the Resurrection, people will turn to one prophet after another and, having enumerated their famous qualities, will ask for intercession, but they will be rejected by all of them until they come to Muḥammad. Thus ᶜAṭṭār has expanded the series of prophets by means of other speakers and replaced the request for intercession with the more general request for help out of a hopeless situation.

This *ḥadīth*, as far as it interests us here, goes as follows:

The Prophet said: "I am the Lord of mankind on the Final Day. Do you know why? On the Final Day, God will assemble the first and the last in a place where the voice of one crying reaches everyone and the gaze takes in all persons. Then when the sun declines, the people are overcome with such anxiety and fear that they cannot endure and bear it. They say to one another: 'Don't you see the situation you're in? Don't you see how badly matters stand for you? But look around you for someone to intercede on your behalf with your Lord!' Then they say to one another: 'Let us go to Adam!' Then they go to Adam and say: 'Oh Adam! You're the father of mankind, God created you with His hand and breathed His breath into you, and He ordered the angels to prostrate themselves before you. Undertake intercession on our behalf with your Lord! Don't you see the situation we're in? Don't you see how badly matters stand for us?' Then Adam speaks: 'My Lord is more angry today than He has ever been before and ever will be again. He forbade the tree to me, and I didn't obey Him. I myself, I myself (have need of intercession)! Go to Noah!'

Then they go to Noah and say to him: 'Oh Noah! You're the first of the envoys who were sent to earth, and God has named you "the grateful bondsman" (surah 17/3). Undertake intercession on our behalf with your Lord! Don't you see the situation we're in? Don't you see how badly matters stand for us?' Then Noah speaks to them: 'My Lord is more angry today than He has ever been before or ever will be again. I prayed against my own people. I myself, I myself (have need of intercession)! Go to Abraham!'

Then they go to Abraham and say: 'You're the prophet of God and from the totality of mankind you're His friend. Undertake intercession with your Lord on our behalf! Don't you see, etc.' Then Abraham says to them: 'My Lord is more angry today, etc.', and refers to the lies which he was guilty of (surah 37/88,

21/63, and how he pretended his wife was his sister, Thaᶜlabī 50). 'I myself, I myself...! Go to Moses!'

Then they go to Moses and say: 'Oh Moses! You're the envoy of God. God distinguished you among men by having sent you as His envoy and speaking with you. Undertake intercession on our behalf, etc.!' Moses then says: 'My Lord is more angry today, etc. For I killed a man I wasn't ordered to kill. I myself, I myself...! Go to Jesus!'

Then they go to Jesus and say: 'Oh Jesus! You're the envoy of God and you spoke to people while in the cradle (surah 3/46). You're a "Word" from Him which He cast unto Mary, and "Spirit" from Him (surah 4/171). Undertake intercession on our behalf, etc.!' Then Jesus speaks to them: 'My Lord is more angry today, etc.', and without mentioning any particular sin, he still says: 'I myself, I myself...! Go to someone else!'

Then they come to me (Muḥammad) and say: 'Oh Muḥammad! You're God's envoy and the last of the prophets. God has forgiven you all earlier and later sins! Undertake intercession on our behalf, etc.!' Then I go (so says the Prophet) below the divine Throne and prostrate myself in worship before my Lord... Then God speaks: 'Oh Muḥammad... Undertake intercession! It will be accepted!'"

Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, Istanbul 1334, 1/127-28; *Ṣaḥīḥ Bukhārī*, ed. Krehl 4/482-84; *Iḥyāʾ* 4/450, *Ṣifat al-shafāᶜa*; Shaᶜrānī, *Kashf al-ghumma* 2/257-59. The *ḥadīth* is discussed in detail by T. Huitema, *De Voorspraak (Shafāᶜa) in den Islam*, Leyden 1936, 22 ff. In Raimundus Lullus: Enrico Cerulli, *Il "Libero della Scala"*, Città del Vaticano 1949, pp. 465-71. In addition see EI s.v. "Shafāᶜa".

ᶜAṭṭār has greatly elaborated the basic pattern of this *ḥadīth* and expanded it. The traveller not only asks the prophets for help but he addresses a whole series of mythical, cosmic and natural beings as well. He visits in succession the Archangels, the Bearers of the Throne, the Throne, the Throne-Frame, the Tablet of destiny, the Reed Pen, Paradise and Hell, the Sky, Sun and Moon, the Four Elements, the Mountain, the Ocean, the Three Natural Kingdoms, Satan, the Spirits, Man, Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, David, Jesus, Muḥammad, Sense Perception, the Power of Imagination, Reason, Heart and Soul.[11]

The means by which the poet has these beings speak is, as in the *Manṭiq al-ṭayr*, "the language of states" (*zabān-i ḥāl*). He has considered it necessary expressly to draw attention to the fact that the speech of all these beings in the *Muṣībatnāma* is to be understood in this sense.

[11] A similar question and answer game is also found in ᶜIzz al-Dīn Maqdisī, *Sharḥ ḥāl al-awliyāʾ* (GAL², Suppl. 1/809. Ms. İsmail Saib, Ankara).

Listen... while I lay down the foundation of this book for you! ...if the traveller speaks with the angel, if he seeks an answer from Earth and Heaven, if he visits the Throne and the Footstool, or poses questions to both, has the prophets instruct him and causes every atom to recount experiences to him, all this occurs through "the language of states" (*zabān-i ḥāl*), it isn't "spoken speech" (*zabān-i qāl*). In spoken speech it would be a lie, but in the language of states it's true. (MN 0, *Sharḥ-i kitāb*).

Likewise, the poet informs us that "the traveller" is the personified "thought" of the mystic, thought which is achieved by means of *dhikr*, i.e. by means of continuous repetition of God's name or the profession of faith. This thought traverses the cosmos in mystical meditation.

If it's permitted to see everything in dreams, then don't turn away if someone sees it in interior revelation (*kashf*)... For the follower of the path (the mystic) the traveller is his thought: thought which is achieved through his *dhikr*.

Rāhraw-rā sālik-i rah fikr-i ōst fikrat-ē k-ān mustafād-i dhikr-i ōst.

Rational thought is characteristic of unbelievers, whereas thought of the heart is characteristic of the mystic. "The traveller thought" doesn't arise from the intellect but from the heart.

At the same time this journeying in the spirit is the means by which man comes to the knowledge that he is more than flesh and blood, that he has a rank higher than that of the angels, that in fact, as we shall see, he actually carries the universe within himself and is the universe. It is the path to purifying oneself to the level of becoming pure spirit- or soul-being. A person in his corporeality from birth to death is not the real person, but the real person is "the divine secret and the pure soul".

Nēst mardum nuṭfa-ē az āb u khāk hast mardum sirr-i quds u jān-i pāk.

Indeed, the angels would not have prostrated themselves before a drop of sperm. "Oh clod of earth, do you not want this your clod of earth to become pure soul?"

Ārzū mē-nakunadh ay musht-i khāk tā shawadh īn musht-i khākat jān-i pāk?

The means to this etherealization is "the pain of seeking".

"The traveller thought" doesn't rest from the pain of this seeking either day or night. He travels until he's substituted the soul for the body, caused the body to reach the soul before death.

Sālik-i fikrat zi-dard-i īn ṭalab mē-nayāsāyadh zamān-ē rōz u shab.
Mē-rawadh tā tan kunadh bā jān badal dar rasānadh tan ba-jān pēsh az ajal.

At this point, after a rather abrupt transition, the desperate state of "the traveller thought" is described, which from now on is conceived of as a personification.

He is at odds with himself and with the world. Neither the belt of Christian faith pleases him, nor the Ṣūfī's robe. He finds himself to be no better than a dog. He knows of no one worse off than himself. He's neither nothing, nor something, neither a whole, nor a part... He has neither faith, nor certainty, nor doubt. He's neither a Muslim, nor an infidel... He has nothing to hope for from people, for they're all caught up in half-measures, foolishness and trivialities. But at last he does find a *pīr*—without a *pīr* one can't travel this path—to whose guidance he can entrust himself. The *pīr* sends him on the journey.

But on the journey at first things are no better than previously. He sees thousands of roads before him, sees himself faced with thousands of difficulties. In confusion, he's now pulled in one direction, now in another. He doesn't know whether he should go forward or stand still, and finally is close to madness. He gives vent to his psychic state in a long speech addressed to "pain". At last, having arrived in a place where he can neither go forward nor backward, he rises into the air and makes his way to:

Gabriel (1/0). After a lengthy *captatio benevolentiae* which enumerates the angel's titles to fame,[12] his lofty position and sublime characteristics, the traveller complains to him of his suffering: "I'm helpless and far from my people, I've ended up in the world without head or foot. Perhaps you know a remedy for the pain that's in my heart."—Gabriel answers: "Be on your way! Like you, we're forever in the grip of this pain. But be gone! Our own pain is enough for us!" Gabriel is overawed, as he says, by reverence for God and in fear of Him doesn't even dare to speak His name.

The traveller then returns to his *pīr*. The *pīr* instructs him about the nature of Gabriel who is the bearer of God's command, carries out God's instructions obediently and in silence, and only dared to speak His name for the first time after 70,000 years. If he wishes to acquire something from Gabriel's nature, he must sacrifice his life for God's command. (1/0-1). Stories follow which have to do with the name of God.

The traveller now goes before the trumpeting angel Asrāfīl (2/0) who kills men with a blast of his trumpet and with a second blast raises them from the dead.[13] After mentioning his titles to fame, he begs him: "You who with one breath wake a whole world to life, make me alive again with a breath or kill me and cast me into the earth!"—The angel says he himself awaits his fate with trembling, etc.—The *pīr*, to whom the traveller returns, gives him instruction about the angel's nature. He's the lightbeam which calls forth to life and which

[12] Cf. Carra de Vaux's article "Djabrāʾīl" in the EI and Halim Sabit Şibay's article "Cebrāʾīl" in the *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*.

[13] See A. J. Wensinck's article "Isrāfīl" in the EI.

destroys. If the traveller wishes to attain something from Asrāfīl's nature, he must surrender to the fate of death (*taslīm*).

The traveller continues and goes to Michael (3/0) who keeps the keys to the treasure-chambers of life's sustenance (*arzāq*), causes seeds to grow and looks after the weather.[14] He asks the angel to nourish him as well with milk like a child. He's a child when it comes to love, may the angel give him an upbringing and so lead him forth from this sorrow.—Michael rejects him, describes his difficult situation with fantastical interpretations of various meteorological phenomena, and explains that he has enough to do with his own cares.—The *pīr* instructs the traveller about Michael's activity as dispenser of nourishment. Behind the daily bread which you're allotted you must always envisage God as the dispenser, otherwise you fall into covert idolatry.

The traveller comes before the angel of death ᶜAzrāʾīl[15] (4/0) and asks him to take his life and cause his heart to be alive. Without the beloved he doesn't want to live.—The angel answers: "If you knew my pain, you wouldn't ask me for something like this. I weep over every soul which I must take. Hundreds of worlds of blood-guilt are on my neck. If you knew just one of the fears I undergo, you would simply turn to dust.—The traveller goes back to the *pīr* who instructs him about the angel of death and makes observations about death.

The traveller comes to the representative of the angels who carry the divine Throne (5/0), and says to him: "You who bear the burden of the Throne, you can also bear my burden. My life's day has become late, my fellow-travellers have gone. I've lost my way, I can neither go forward nor backward."—The angel says: "I'm in a difficult situation myself. I bear the Throne on my shoulders, while my feet rest on the void." He then goes on to say that the angels are busy with serving God, that love is a matter for human beings not for angels, and that the angels are servants of mankind.—The *pīr* instructs the traveller about the obedient service of the angels.

Now the traveller goes to the Throne itself (6/0). The Throne, which is endowed with so much majesty, will surely be able to show him the way.—But the Throne replies to him that its own situation is very unsure and sorrowful. It doesn't have the power to support God, is like a bubble on the water's surface, etc.—The *pīr* instructs the traveller that the Throne signifies the world of compassion (surah 20/5).

The traveller goes to the Throne-Frame (the heaven of the stationary stars) (7/0), enumerates its titles to honor (the zodiac, *āyat al-kursī*, etc.) and asks it for directions.—The heaven of stationary stars complains of its endless wandering which it must begin again every thousand years, etc.—The *pīr* speaks about

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14 See A. J. Wensinck's article "Mīkāl" in the EI.

15 See A. J. Wensinck's article "ᶜIzrāʾīl" in the EI and Halim Sabit Şibay's article "Azrâîl" in the *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*.

the longing which drives the heaven of stars and causes it to rotate. The same longing must drive human beings to detach themselves from this world.

The traveller goes to the Tablet[16] (8/0) and says to it: "You who are the bearer of divine secrets, of the heavenly signs, upon which all destinies are recorded, help me the helpless one!"—The Tablet replies: "I'm only like the ignorant children who have the tablet placed on their lap and, in fear of the teacher, read what's written on it. With tears I wipe clean the writing from the tablet. I wait in perplexity to see what new signs will appear on me, etc."—The *pīr* gives instruction to the traveller, to the effect that distress and happiness are recorded on the tablet *without any reason*.

Likewise, the Reed Pen, which the traveller asks to open a door for him and to tell him a secret, can't help the traveller. It has had its head cut off, has tied a knot in its belt and runs along keeping the side of its head down. It knows nothing about what it writes.—The *pīr* instructs the traveller that the least thing which happens has previously been recorded by the Reed Pen, etc. It always goes on writing straight ahead, and this continuing straight ahead on the path is the way to reach the goal.

Paradise (10/0), which the traveller now visits, responds to mention of its titles to honor by describing its true condition. While it does so, the argument appears that the majority of the inhabitants of Paradise are simple-minded (*Aktharu ahli'l-jannati'l-bulh*), whereas the truly pious have scorn for it.—The *pīr* instructs the traveller that the true joy of Paradise consists of gazing upon God's beauty.

Now the traveller visits Hell (11/0). Hell, which itself is full of burning, will be able to help him.—But Hell says it burns out of fear that one day it will pass away itself (because of surah 28/88), etc.—The *pīr* then instructs the traveller that the world is hellish, and that one must free oneself from it.

The traveller goes to the Sky (12/0) and asks it what the purpose of its thousands of eyes and its eternal rotation really is. The Sky should say what it's seeking and be the traveller's travel companion.—The Sky describes its situation with several fantastical aetiologies: "During the day I wear the blue color of mourning and nights I spend in black water. Seeking causes me to bleed at dawn. I've become a ring which has lost its head and foot, and therefore I'm outside the door (of secrets) like the door-knocker. The hand of predestination grasps me by the ear and spins me in a circle. The stars are glowing coals in a brazier. My clothes are made for me from black tar, my head spins in confusion more than yours does, etc."—The *pīr* talks about the Sky in a similar manner, and stories follow in which the psychic state of searching in vain, of being unable to understand, is described.

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16 On the origin of this idea cf. Heinrich Speyer, *Die biblischen Erzählungen im Qorān*, Gräfenhainichen 1931, pp. 333-34.

Now the traveller asks the Sun (13/0) to give him a sign of the goal of his striving.—The Sun refers to its own sorrowful state: "I'm just as sorrowful as you. That's why my face is yellow and my clothes are blue from grief. Because of this love I burn day and night, because of this worry I'm a spring without water. At times I throw my shield on the water (out of despondency), and sometimes I lift up my sword in order to kill myself (zodiacal light).—The *pīr* says that the Sun is the court of lofty striving, etc.

The Moon (14/0) as well, which the traveller asks to give him a sign during his dark night, rejects the traveller and describes its own situation with fantastical aetiologies.—The *pīr* says that the Moon is the Sun's lover. But it lacks the strength to support the Sun's proximity and would be annihilated by it.

Now the traveller asks Fire (15/0) to show him the way, as it once showed Moses the way in the burning bush.—But Fire says it forever has ashes on its head out of grief, etc.—The *pīr* instructs the traveller that the nature of Fire is gluttony, and it signifies greed and avarice.

The traveller goes to the Wind (16/0) and reminds it that it's the breath of life in all living beings, that it bore Solomon through the air, that it destroyed the unbelieving people the ᶜĀd, etc. May it therefore bring him a whiff of fragrance from the beloved.—The Wind answers that it itself seeks in vain at all doors, has dust on its head due to grief, etc.—The *pīr* speaks of the Joseph man bears within the Egypt of his soul and from whom at all times he catches a fragrant whiff. (Elsewhere the hidden divine substance in man is also described as Joseph). One should be satisfied with this fragrant scent, etc.

The traveller goes off to see Water (17/0). Water, which is capable of quenching the heat of glowing iron, may also quench his ardor, etc.—But water, consisting of nothing but tears, flows on day and night in futile seeking, nor can it itself find the path to God, much less show others the path to Him.—The *pīr* makes it clear that water is the origin of purity, and he admonishes the disciple not to be a slave to his belly and to sensuality, and not to soil himself this way, etc.

The traveller asks the Earth (18/0), which conceals so many treasures, to open for him the door to the treasure of secrets.—The Earth rejects him because it's dead and solidified, and since it also bears all the dead within itself, etc.—The *pīr* explains that the Earth is the world of forbearance, of patient endurance and friendly attitude, which virtues are then clarified in pertinent stories.

The traveller goes to the Mountain (19/0) and asks it to bring him to the rescuing mountain Jūdī (the Koranic Ararat) and to cause him to reach his goal.—The Mountain explains that it's incapable of this. The Mountain's foot is chained and it's exposed to being stoned. It's ashamed because it has a heart of stone, etc.—The *pīr* explains that outwardly the Mountain may appear to be still but in reality it wanders about like the clouds (surah 27/88).

The traveller now asks the Ocean (20/0) to give him a sign of that which is devoid of signs because it contains the sea within itself, and not to refuse water to him who is the thirsty one.—The Ocean answers that it's thirsty itself and out of shame it has begun to sweat. The fish themselves wept because of its situation. It seeks a drop from the ocean of God. How can it, being thirsty itself, quench the thirst of others who are thirsty?—The *pīr* explains that the Ocean is the symbol of eternally unquenchable longing, which despite any amount of drinking forever remains thirsty. Thirst of the soul and thirst of the heart are necessary but both with moderation, because too much and too little both deter from perfection. This is illustrated with a story about a suicidal love.

Now the traveller goes before Minerals (21/0). The Mineral answers in response to the mention of its titles to fame (the black stone of the Kaᶜba, Solomon's signet-ring, Alexander's magic mirror, etc.): "Even if God swears by me (the stone of the Kaᶜba) (surah 52/4), you still have nothing but wind from the Kaᶜba. I don't move forward a single step. Out of sorrow I'm black. Likewise, people forever make images of idols from me and so make themselves and me into infidels. Even if I'm solid, the fire of Hell will cause me to ignite (boiling pitch). Because of grief over this, my foot is always in the mud."—The *pīr* explains that the mineral world is a symbol of death.

The traveller now visits the Plants (22/0) and asks them to enliven him with their fragrant scent or to prepare him a drug from herbs for his pain.—The Plants refer to their rapid withering and the forms of death which threaten them. Sometimes the saw is placed upon their head, sometimes they're cut up in pieces. One time they're burnt, another time their heads (blossoms) are torn off, etc.—The *pīr*, making use of a rather forced interpretation of the qualities of plants, speaks about mystical madness.

The traveller comes to the Wild Animals (23/0). He says that in their existence they're completely oriented toward God. Several of them, like the bee, the ant and the spider, God has distinguished by mentioning them in the Koran, etc. They ought to help him and convey him upwards out of lowliness.—The Animals say they're short-lived, powerless creatures and are unable to help.—The *pīr* expounds on mystical monism and introduces stories connected with this theme.

The traveller goes to the Birds (24/0). He praises them as free beings who have escaped the cage and the snare. Among them is the hoopoe, bearer of Solomon's secrets, the kingly Sīmurgh, etc.—The Birds' spokesman says in reply to the traveller's request for help: "Day and night we've sped through the world seeking but in the end we're just as confused as you. The bird among us who's a lover, the nightingale, has been allotted nothing but his songs. The Humā must eat bones (see p. 12 above), etc."—The *pīr* says that the bird is a symbol for the concepts of the higher world, and expatiates on the relation of the body to the soul.

The traveller proceeds to the Tame Animals and Fish (25/0) and, after enumerating their many titles to honor, asks them for happiness.—But the Animals reproach him, saying one should not seek precious jewels among oxen and donkeys, etc.—The *pīr* explains that an animal is a similitude for the carnal soul which one should not spoil with food.

Now the traveller goes to Satan (26/0). In his eulogy he describes Satan as the being who has experienced the most suffering. Due to *one* act of disobedience after 70,000 years of intimate closeness to God he became cursed. But now he's lord over the whole world. Perhaps he knows a hidden path to the treasure, which he, the traveller, could also follow and escape from torment.—Satan warns him, after describing his own fate, not to follow the road to accursedness like himself.—The *pīr* explains that Satan is the world of resentment and selfish existence. And he then describes Satan's present relationship to God in Satan's own words.

The traveller goes to the Spirits (27/0). Since they can overcome human beings through possession, they should also be able to free him from his bonds, so he thinks. May they release him from his chains and show him a door to God's secret.—The representative of the spirit-world answers that spirits are inferior to human beings. They even become spellbound in magic circles and enclosed in bottles. He can't help the traveller.—The *pīr* talks about possession and madness, and the stories that follow are about fools and the insane.

The traveller goes to Man (28/0) and enumerates his titles to honor. He is the pivot of creation around which everything rotates, the bearer of the entrusted deposit (*amāna*, surah 33/72), he is served by angels, a military review will be held with his troops on the Final Day, God speaks to him, and for his sake God "the Hidden Treasure" has revealed Himself. Therefore, since he's found the path to the treasure, let him also show this path to the traveller.—Man points out his sorrowful situation to the questioner: "He's bound to the law, menaced with punishments, cut off from God by a hundred partitions, the final reckoning awaits him, etc."—The *pīr* expounds on the human soul, through which the path to the divine Beloved passes.

Now the traveller goes to Adam (29/0) and asks him, who taught the angels the names of all things, to teach him as well.—Adam refers him to Muḥammad.—The *pīr* says that Adam voluntarily gave up his high rank and freedom in Paradise, and chose slavery to God.

The traveller asks Noah (30/0), the lord of the Flood, to free him from dying of thirst in the thirst of love.—Noah also rejects him and advises him to turn to the Prophet of the end of time, Muḥammad.—The *pīr* says Noah's name comes from *nawḥa*, lamentation for the dead, and explains to the disciple that suffering is the means to becoming a man of God.

The traveller goes to Abraham, the hospitable "Friend of God" (31/0), and asks him to offer him hospitality.—Abraham admonishes the disciple to be

obedient and refers him to his descendant Muḥammad.—The *pīr* instructs him about love of God (*khillat*).

The traveller goes to Moses (32/0) and asks Moses, who has been allotted the happiness of speaking with God, to give him an atom of happiness.—Moses admonishes him to eliminate the self and undergo extinction, and likewise refers him to Muḥammad.—The *pīr* explains that the soul of Moses is the world of love (*ᶜishq*), a love which is prepared to sacrifice its life.

David (33/0), whom the traveller asks for guidance along the way, exhorts him to travel the mystic path and again refers him to Muḥammad.—The *pīr* says that David's soul is the ocean of love (*mawaddat*, i.e. love which the master feels toward his subordinates).

Now the traveller proceeds to Jesus (34/0) and asks him to confer on him life and the state of being God's bondsman.—Jesus admonishes him to purify himself and to give up his self.—The *pīr* describes Jesus as the representative of nobility (*karam*), kindness (*luṭf*) and purity (*pākī*).

Now the traveller finally comes to Muḥammad himself (35/0). The Prophet feels sorry for the desperate young man. He smiles and says: "As long as you're enmeshed in your you-ness, you'll be intoxicated and full of longing. Become nothing in God's being, become a shadow that disappears in the sun! The road thither passes through your own interior. There you must proceed through five stations: sense perception, imagination, the intellect, the heart and the soul. If you put these five stations behind you, you then behold yourself without your self. You then see everything with another's eye, you hear everything and are yourself deaf, you speak with a tongue which is not yours, you live with a life which is not your own.[17] Disappear in theophany (*tajallī*)! What you'll then experience, I can't tell you here. You'll see it yourself once you've arrived there, etc."—The *pīr*, to whom the traveller returns, explains that Muḥammad is the representative of poverty.

The traveller, as he was told, now goes to visit Sense Perception (36/0) and asks it to make the secret known to him.—Sense Perception responds to his eulogies by describing its inferiority: it's caught in dependent imitation, is always divided into five parts and therefore far from *tawḥīd* (the profession of God's oneness). It knows nothing of inner meaning, is devoted to external form, etc.—The *pīr* explains that Sense Perception is the representative of I-ness and distraction.

The traveller goes to Imagination (37/0). He praises it because it unites the impressions of the five senses and is therefore closer to oneness. He asks it to lead him forth from multiplicity into oneness so that he may emerge from dis-

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17 This is an allusion to the famous saying of God (*ḥadīth qudsī*): "My bondsman goes on seeking closeness to Me through voluntary religious works until I love him. And if I come to love him, I am the hearing with which he hears, the sight with which he sees, the hand with which he grips, the foot with which he walks, etc." P. 576 below.

traction and reach the valley of love and proximity to God.—Imagination answers with a description of its imperfect condition. It only sees everything behind a curtain, i.e. as pure fantasy.—The *pīr* explains that Imagination is superior to Sense Perception because at any moment it can visualize everything to itself, whereas Sense Perception is at all times subject to separation and distance. Thus Imagination is capable of love's closeness, whereas Sense Perception is condemned to separation from the beloved.

The traveller goes to Intellect (38/0). Intellect, which actually endows Sense Perception with life, should drive away the death which resides in his heart and confer life on him, and cause him to reach his goal and his God.—Intellect says: "You have no intellect, if you expect this from the intellect!"—The *pīr* instructs the traveller that Intellect may be the judge and witness in the entire cosmos, but that those who talk about intellect for the most part tell lies and speak nonsense. And with empty disputations (*qīl u qāl*) one doesn't reach perfection in the station (*maqām*) of intellect.

The traveller goes to the Heart (39/0). "You're between the fingers of God",[18] he says. "Now since you're so close to God, confer closeness to God on me, the far-off one!"—The Heart answers that it's no more than a reflection of the sun of the soul, etc.—The *pīr* explains that the heart is the seat of love.

The traveller now reaches the last of the stations, the Soul (40/0). He says to it: "You're soul (*jān*) and world (*jihān*) at the same time, you're the breath of the All-merciful and the exhalation of God. My soul is a derivation from your ocean. I die, now you do what seems good to you. If you bestow life on me, then you elevate me for all eternity."—The soul answers: "You've traversed the whole world in vain, until you've finally reached my shore. What you've been seeking is within you. You're a partition unto yourself. Dive into my ocean and lose yourself there completely."

Now the traveller throws himself into the ocean of the soul and realizes at this point that he himself is everything, that he is the primordial ground of all things. When he has realized this, he says to the soul: "Oh soul, since you were everything, why did you first cause me to wander so widely?" The soul answers: "So that you would realize my worth. If someone finds a treasure without effort, he doesn't know how to appreciate it. Only a treasure which is acquired through hardship is appreciated for its worth." The traveller understands that he didn't realize his own worth, that he would have done better to go into his own soul instead of into the world.—Thereupon he returns to the *pīr* and the *pīr* explains to him the nature of the soul. It is the creative divine light, the light of Muḥammad, from which all supernatural and earthly things have arisen.[19] When these expla-

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18 *Ḥadīth*: "The heart of the believer is between two fingers of God." Ibn Qutayba, *Mukhtalif al-ḥadīth*, 263 et passim.

19 Cf. T. de Boer's article "Nūr" and L. Massignon's article "Nūr Muḥammadī" in the EI, as well as Tor Andrae, *Die person Muhammeds*, pp. 319-20.

nations are concluded, the *pīr* declares: "Now your soul has become worthy of the path (*mard-i rāh*). Now nothing remains for you to do except to undergo extinction within extinction. As long as you still beheld yourself in the midst of things, you were far from the mystery of direct vision. Now you must recognize that your seeking was the divine Friend's seeking after Himself."

The traveller does as he is bidden. Everything before and behind him, both worlds, he then sees within himself. He finds that both worlds are a reflection of his soul, and that his soul is more than both worlds. He has learned the secret of his soul and has now become alive and the bondsman of God. His journey *to* God has gone this far, now the journey *in* God lies before him. "But this", so says the poet, "I can't describe here any further. If God bestows life on me, I'll describe it in a new book. But for that God's permission is required."

The conclusion of the *Muṣībatnāma* is thus closely similar to that of the *Manṭiq al-ṭayr*. The main idea, seeking God, the ground of existence, outside oneself, and finding Him within, is also the same. Only in the frame-story of the *Muṣībatnāma* the personal conception of God recedes further into the background. It is more a question of the cosmos, the primordial ocean, God's primordial light, the world-soul which is connected with the mystic's soul, than of a personal God or a being which represents Him (the Sīmurgh).

ASRĀRNĀMA

The *Asrārnāma* (cf. Bibliography: AN) is distinguished from the three previously treated works, to begin with, by its more modest size, and then by a lack of the characteristic frame-story which gave the large epics their splendidly tight organization and their clear architectural construction. The individual sections are strung together without any discernible scheme, similarly to the *Mathnawī* of Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, to whom when the latter was a child, ᶜAṭṭār is supposed to have given this work. In this small work many of the themes which, in diverse variations, dominate the larger epics are touched upon in brief. Theoretical teachings and paraenesis occupy more room than in the other works.

An analysis of the basic plots of the above-mentioned epics of ᶜAṭṭār in fact gives scarcely any notion of their rich contents. They are much richer in ideas and conceptual motifs than the logic of their basic plots would lead one to expect.

Indeed, what takes up the most room in these works—with the exception of the *Asrārnāma*—are the individual illustrative sto-

ries. For the most part they have a symbolic character, as do the frame-stories of the *Manṭiq al-ṭayr* and the *Muṣībatnāma*. Many are exemplary stories in which men of piety, mystics, lovers and fools achieve the behavior which is called for in the theoretical or paraenetic sections. Many give emphasis to a detail by amplification, many are in the end broadly spun out stories in which, despite all the symbolic or allegorical significance, the poet's love of story-telling gains the upper hand, and interest in the subject-matter prevails. For the most part the stories are also of literary-historical interest. At the same time an abundance of motifs is reflected in them from the world of ideas of Islamic mysticism and pious practices in Islam. From this viewpoint, i.e. as evidence of this world of ideas and practical piety, in what follows they will be presented in a systematic ordering which resulted more or less of its own accord from an attempt to sift and order the immensely rich material.

ᶜAṭṭār's works display this piety in a relatively late, already very developed form, in which the old and the new appear to be mixed together and integrated in an original way. I have abstained from a diachronic examination which investigates the historical roots of each particular motif. This would have been to enter upon a limitless domain. Nonetheless, throughout there are glances back into the historical past which are meant to facilitate the reader's orientation and understanding. Literary sources of the stories could only be identified to a modest extent. Systematic investigations of sources were not carried out. That as well would have led too far afield. Where an original model was known, it was often interesting to see how ᶜAṭṭār transformed it and adapted it to his own purposes. From a purely formal viewpoint, the stories he takes up become more vivid, they are embellished and enriched with details. They are often also greatly changed in their contents and supplemented with entirely new elements. The symbolic or allegorical significance which they acquire in his hands often sets them in a new light, often in another light than we would expect. Consequently, these stories, and what they symbolize and illustrate, must be judged primarily as testimony for ᶜAṭṭār's own views and not as historical sources for the period they are set in according to the plot. These views of ᶜAṭṭār have been culled from many sources but they form an organic whole. The unity of ᶜAṭṭār's world of thought would perhaps become even more visible if one took account of the poet's lyrical poetry as well (though again this also contains many new features). But it

is not possible to enter into this subject within the framework of the present book.

We will now present ᶜAṭṭār's stories ordered according to the conceptual motifs which they portray. It must be pointed out, however, that the idea which we extract from a story is not always identical with the motive which caused ᶜAṭṭār to relate the story. We interpret the stories often in isolation, detached from their context, and then suggest, where it seems necessary, what the poet wished to illustrate with a particular story. This method may be remotely compared with a historian of literature or culture who, for instance, compiles the objects of comparison which occur in the similes of a poet or an era of poetry, without considering the poet's intention, in order to establish which objects of intellectual and material culture were included in his horizons and were alive in the realm of his imagination. Thus the stories themselves and their independent contents occupy the foreground of our examination. The train of thought which caused the poet to relate them, and the often forced interpretation which he gives a story, will also attract our attention but only secondarily. It would be wrong not to admit that a certain hindrance regarding this secondary purpose is imposed by the fact that an element of uncertainty is associated with the interpretation of ᶜAṭṭār's theoretical train of thought because of the difficulty of his language—at least so long as there continue to be no critical editions of the texts, and one must work, for better or for worse, with manuscripts and faulty printed editions. To a certain extent one can clearly understand the content of a story even when the text is somewhat unsure, but the discussions which introduce or continue it, and whose understanding often depends on a single word, cannot always be interpreted with certainty without a critical text. Hopefully the time is not too far off when it will be possible to read and to enjoy these works in accurate critical editions.

I have not attempted a classificaion of ᶜAṭṭār's world of ideas on the basis of intellectual history. His ideas are drawn from too many sources to do that. His pantheism has a number of points in common with that of his contemporary Ibn ᶜArabī (d. 638/1240), but from a technical viewpoint the latter's system is incomparably more developed and complicated.

In view of the above, the reader is now referred to the presentation which follows.

The stories will be cited according to the number of the *maqāla* and within the *maqāla* according to the number of the story, even if such numbering is lacking

in the text being used. O describes the section of the frame-story or theoretical discussion which appears before the first story and with which each *maqāla* begins. In the case of IN and MṬ the page numbers are also given of the printed texts of Ritter and Garcin de Tassy respectively.

CHAPTER ONE

DEATH AND TRANSITORINESS

The medieval Islamic outlook on life is to a great extent dominated by the basic attitude that it is not worthwhile to engage very actively in this world, to enter into psychic and material commitments in it, because death all too quickly brings an end to everything. Nor is it by any means simply fear about the judgement which will occur after death, the thought of the necessity of presenting an account of all one's deeds, which dampens one's sense of enjoyment of life's pleasures and makes them appear to be punishable foolishness, but it is transitoriness itself which negates the value of all things. To modern man the thought that whatever lacks eternal duration has no value is not so compelling. For medieval people, on the other hand, the opposite of the earthly, transient life, namely the other-worldly eternal life, was a far more vivid, effective idea than it is for most persons today. It attracted the greatest degree of attention and interest, and as a result whatever is transitory became demoted in value. Certainly, in all times there have been people for whom the idea of the hereafter meant nothing. We shall also come across them in ᶜAṭṭār under the label of "worldly men". But in the literature which concerns us here, they are subject to the sharpest criticism, and this criticism is far more vocal than is the case in the present age which takes pleasure in the here and now.

Cf. H. Ritter, "Studien zur islamischen Frömmigkeit. I. Ḥasan al-Baṣrī" in: *Der Islam* 21/1933/1-83; C. H. Becker "*Ubi sunt qui ante nos in mundo fuere*" in: *Islamstudien*, Erster Band, Leipzig 1924, pp. 501 ff. We cannot here enter into the Hellenistic and Christian models for this attitude toward life, the *meditatio mortis*. For such comparisons cf. Tor Andrae, "Zuhd und Mönchtum. Zur Frage von den Beziehungen zwischen Christentum und Islam" in: *Le Monde Oriental* 25/1931/301 ff. As for persons who were indifferent cf. Tor Andrae, *Die letzten Dinge*, pp. 46-47.

Let us consider how this attitude is expressed in ᶜAṭṭār.

1

Everything on this earth is transitory, joy as well as sorrow.

The king orders his wise men to cast a ring for him which will make him happy when he's sad, and sad when he's happy. The wise men produce a ring for him on which is inscribed: "This as well shall pass away." (IN 15/7, p. 252).—Compare the Turkish expression: *Bu da geçer yahu!*

The world would be beautiful, if death did not exist.

How beautiful this old fabulous cloister would be, were there no death. In this saray of affliction sorrow prevails because we're not allowed to remain together. Life would be beautiful and free of cares, if horrid death weren't on our heels. (AN 15/0).

The whole surface of the earth is one great cemetery. The earth consists of the mouldering bones of the dead.

If you pick up a handful of earth from the ground and ask this sorrowful earth about its story, it will weep bitterly like the rain clouds. From every speck of dust cries of grief will arise... It's as if every small speck of dust said in the language of states (*zabān-i ḥāl*): "We've been cast under people's feet. You too will soon gird your waist with this belt (ready yourself for it). Oh you negligent fools! How long will it please you to cast us under your feet? We were once like you, and in the end you'll become like us." (AN in 17/2).

We are familiar with this theme from the quatrains of ᶜUmar Khayyām: One should set down one's foot gently on the earth. This may have been the pupil of some beautiful person's eye.

E.g. Arberry 121 *nahār-ē būdhast;* 83 *jūy-ē būdhast;* Rosen no. 20 *zār-ē būdhast;* no. 99 *gil dārand*; no. 297 *hushyārī*.

One finds already in the pessimistic poet Abū'l-ᶜAlāᵓ al-Maᶜarrī (d. 449/1057) whom ᶜUmar had read (*Oriens* 5/193): "Set down your foot gently! I believe the earth's surface consists of nothing else but these bodies. Therefore, if you can, travel in the air (and step) not proudly on the physical remains of God's bondsmen!"

Sharḥ al-tanwīr ᶜalā Siqṭ al-zand 1/209. Similarly, a verse in Ibn Rajab, *al-Dhayl ᶜalā Ṭabaqāt al-ḥanābila* I, Damascus 1951, p. 108.

We also know this motif from ᶜUmar Khayyām in the form that the jug or the clay cup begins to speak and informs the reveller that the jug is made from a dead person's dust, or that the potter is called upon to be gentle with his clay because it was once a human being's body.

Arberry 13 *gudhar-ē*; 58 *kāshī*; 68 *dōsh*; 85 *ghāyat-i āz*; 91 *paywast*; 114 *bar gil dārand*; 122 *ḍarar-ē*. The motif of clay being from dead men's bones is also found in Ṭurṭūshī 21; and cf. ibid. 19 where a brick begins to speak.

These motifs also occur in ᶜAṭṭār:

There's no earth which had not previously been a pure (human being). So be careful where you set down the drinking-cup! You may be unaware that you're setting it down in blood. Every speck of the earth's dust is a deceased person's body, every drop is the life's blood of those who've departed. (MN18/4).

Solomon wishes to drink water from a jug which hasn't been mixed with the dust of the dead. No one is able to procure clay for such a jug. Finally, a demon claims he can procure such clay. He travels down to the bottom of the ocean and brings back clay from there. But the jug fashioned from this straightway begins to speak and says: "I'm so-and-so. From here to the Bull (on which the earth rests) and the Fish (on which the Bull stands) everything consists of human bodies. If you want clay which isn't the body of this or that person, and wish a jug from it, there's no such thing on earth." (IN 16/3, pp. 266-67).

Death is inescapable for every living being.

Even if you have dominion over the earth by means of the signet-ring (like Solomon who, thanks to his signet-ring, had power over human beings and spirits), in the end your place is still under the earth. No one remains on earth for eternity. Look at the cemetery, if you don't know this! (AN 17/0).

Whether you wish or not, in the end you must take leave of everything you have. Even if you have a kingdom from "the moon" to "the Fish", in the end you must still pass through this gate. And though you be an Alexander, one day the transitory world will prepare a shroud for you from Alexandrian cloth. Whether you're a beggar or a king, only three ells of linen and ten bricks will accompany you. (IN, p. $388_{4\text{-}6}$; partially verbatim in AN 17/0).

One of the birds in the *Manṭiq al-ṭayr* doesn't want to go with the hoopoe on the journey to the Sīmurgh because he's afraid of death. The hoopoe replies to him: "You were born and raised to die. How can a drop of water do battle with the ocean, etc.?" (MṬ 26/0, pp. 89-90).

The bird Kyknos, the swan, lives in India. He doesn't breed but lives in grief and solitude without a female companion and child. If he begins to warble, all the beasts are silent and listen. His beak has holes in it like a flute. A philosopher learned the rules of music from him. He lives to be almost a thousand years old. When he feels death approaching, he climbs onto a funeral pyre he's prepared and sings a dirge for himself. All the wild animals then come to him, and many of them die listening to the sounds of his song. Then he flaps his wings. Fire bursts forth from them and ignites the pyre. From the ashes emerges a new swan. (MṬ 26/1, p. 90).

The ancient legend of the dying swan is here conflated with the Egyptian legend of the Phoenix. Cf. C. A. Nallino, *Raccolta* 6/191-201; Ettinghausen, *Unicorn* 65, note 26.

A fool sees a donkey's head set up in the garden and asks what this means. He's told that it's there to ward off the evil eye. He says: "If the donkey heard that, it would laugh. While alive, it wasn't able to protect itself from death. After death how is it supposed to be able to protect others from the evil eye?" (AN 16/3).

It does not help to escape from death if you twist and turn.

So long as the snake advances along its path, it twists its body in the convolutions of a snake. When it wishes to enter its hole, it's obliged to extend itself in a straight line. (IN, p. 144_{9-11}).

You now have no idea of how you will fare but soon enough you will understand. Even while in life, you are already engulfed by death.

A man chops down a green tree. A care-laden person comes along, sees the tree and remarks: "This tree is still green and fresh because it doesn't know it's been chopped down. In a week it will have noticed." (IN 7/11, p. 119).

It is futile to wish to escape from death.

ᶜAzrāʾīl, the angel of death, meets a young man with Solomon and stares at him with a sharp gaze. Fear grips the young man and he asks Solomon to have him transported to a distant country. Solomon has him carried to India on a cloud (or by the wind). When the angel of death appears before Solomon a few days later, the prophet asks him why he'd looked at the young man with such a sharp gaze. The angel answers: "I was surprised to meet him here, since I'd received the order to collect his soul three days from now in India." (IN 6/1, p. 101).

Also in Ghazzālī, *Naṣīḥat al-mulūk* (cf. Fritz Meier in ZDMG 93/1939/395-408); *Tibr* 45; Ghazzālī, *Ibāḥiyya*, p. 21 of the text, p. 43 of the translation; *Mathnawī*, 1/956 ff. and Nicholson's *Commentary* with additional references; *Mustaṭraf*, Būlāq 1268, 2/334; Chauvin 6/183-85; René Basset 3/358, 537. On the supposed Talmudic source cf. S. Hillelson, "The Source of a Story in the *Mathnawī*, etc.", JRAS 1937/474. The miniature in *Le Livre des merveilles du monde* (of Aḥmad Ṭūsī) with introduction by Henri Massé, Paris 1944, planche II.

It is pointless to take measures against the fate of death.

A king has read in the stars that on a certain day and at a certain hour, he will suffer a great misfortune. He has himself a sturdy castle built and sees that it's strictly guarded. However, by mistake he seals up the last opening himself and so comes to die a miserable death. (IN 9/3, p. 143).

One of the birds says to the hoopoe when the latter invites him on the journey to find the Sīmurgh: "I have a beautiful castle which I'm very attached to. How could I give it up to undertake a long and dangerous journey?"—The hoopoe

says: "You would be right, if death didn't exist. But since death is waiting for you, your castle is nothing more than a beautiful prison." (MṬ 24/0, p. 83).

A king builds himself a magnificent castle and has all the people admire it. Only one ascetic says: "Your castle would be like Paradise if it didn't contain a hidden breach through which the angel of death will enter." (MṬ 24/1, p. 83).

Ṭurṭūshī 19. Preceding this there is also a similar story of apparently Christian origin. One finds an old Arab verse of similar content in Caskel, *Schicksal* 29.

The measures taken by people against inevitable fate rebound like an arrow against the archer himself. ᶜAṭṭār illustrates this with a funny story, no doubt in order to cheer up the reader.

A peasant comes to the city and hears a musician play. The music pleases him so much that out of enthusiasm he throws his shoe at the singer's head (apparently as a gift, but the effect is different from what he intended). The musician tears out the peasant's mustache. Having returned to his village, the peasant says that in his opinion the city is of no worth. But his mustache shows how matters really stand with him. (AN 15/4).

Death snatches people from the midst of work and pleasure, and allows no postponement.

A greedy man gathers together immense treasures. When he thinks he has enough, he says to his heart: "Eat, drink and be merry!" But when he wishes to set about enjoying his wealth, the angel of death arrives and demands his soul from him. The rich man offers him money, if he will leave him alone. The angel refuses. The rich man attempts to buy him off at least for three days, two days or even one day. The angel won't let himself be bribed. Finally, he allows the rich man just enough time to write down a last warning for those who will survive him. (IN 13/5, pp. 203-04).

Cf. *Qūt* 1/180; *Nahrung* 2/12 f./32.10-11; *Tausendundeine Nacht* (Littmann) 3/732-33. The story found there 3/726-28, in which the angel of death comes first to the proud king and then to the pious man, occurs in almost the exact same version in Ghazzālī's *Naṣīḥat al-mulūk*, as transmitted from Wahb ibn Munabbih; *Tibr* 41-42. For a king who builds himself a castle, see Qalyūbī, no. 130. Cf. also *Riᶜāya* 78-79.

When death arrives, it is too late to set worldly matters in order.

A merchant, who feels his end is drawing near, summons a bunch of people in order to have them settle a hundred things. When his hour of death is at hand, he calls to them: "Quick, quick!" Someone standing by his bed says: "Your entire life you've calculated and counted. You should stop it now and die quickly!" (MN 21/2).

The road to the cemetery is the direct road. All other roads are merely detours which lead to it.

A fool lies on top of a grave and won't leave. Someone says to him: "Do you want to spend your whole life here? Go into the city! There you'll see people."

He answers: "The dead man won't let me. He says: 'The road to the city is a big detour.' So why should I go to the wicked people in the city when they'll all be coming here?" (MN 4/3).

The famous ascetic Ibrāhīm ibn Adham is asked by a horseman for the road to a human settlement. The saint directs him to the cemetery. The horseman becomes angry and beats Ibrāhīm with his whip until the latter bleeds. When he rides on and reaches the city, he sees a crowd of people coming in his direction and hears they're waiting for Ibrāhīm ibn Adham, whose glance protects one from punishment in the hereafter. The horseman inquires about Ibrāhīm's appearance and realizes whom he's beaten. He returns to Ibrāhīm, who's washing the blood from himself, and begs him remorsefully for forgiveness. The saint instructs him about the meaning of the directions he gave him. All settlements established by human beings in the end become cemeteries. Consequently, he had correctly informed the horseman. (MN 18/5; TA 1/103-04).

Qushayrī, *Risāla* 111, *Bāb al-khuluq*; *Sendschreiben* 341/35.9; Ṭurṭūshī 119. There Ibrāhīm asks God to confer Paradise on the ruffian. He knows that for his part he'll be rewarded for the pain he suffered and he doesn't want good to come to him from the beating, while harm comes to the soldier because of him. For a very similar story cf. ibid. 120 top. In a treatise on Platonic philosophy, Ms. Ayasofya 4833 fol. 4a, the following story occurs: A man steals someone's turban and runs off with it in an easterly direction toward the settlement. The person whose turban was stolen runs in a westerly direction toward the cemetery. When someone asks him why he's running toward the west, while the thief has run off toward the east, he answers: "I'll lie in waiting for him here. He has no choice but to come here." See also *Ḥadīqa* 673.

The grave is the first halting-station of the hereafter. The thought occurs in a *ḥadīth*.

Wensinck, *Concordance* 1/30 A bot.

Ḥasan al-Baṣrī utters reflections at a man's grave, to the effect that the grave is the last halting-station of the here and now, and the first halting-station of the hereafter.

The dead are simply waiting for the others to come after them. The idea is formulated by Ḥasan al-Baṣrī.

"Ḥasan al-Baṣrī" 20-21.

A vizier when dying complains that he's sold the hereafter for this world. The poet then remarks: "Those who've passed away have reached the first halting-station and are waiting impatiently for those who'll come later. How long will you keep them waiting?" (MN 21/3).

The Ṣūfī Dāwūd Ṭāʾī, while walking along in great haste, is asked why he's in such a hurry. He answers: "They're waiting for me impatiently at the gate. I'm in a hurry because they force me to hurry." (MN 21/4).

This is apparently a very free variant of the story related by Qushayrī, *Risāla* 13; *Sendschreiben* 48/1.8. See p. 196 below.

A young man asks a wise fool to recite the *Fātiḥa* for his old sick father. Maybe he'll be cured. The fool threatens him with his walking stick, saying: "Hurry up and come out of the house! The prophets and those who've passed away are all waiting. Why are you holding them up on their way?" (MN 21/5).

The fool Bahlūl lies down alongside a grave and won't leave. Someone says to him he should move on. He answers: "I'll only move on, once I've heard the vow of this dead person. He vows he won't shake the earth from himself until everyone lies under the earth like him."

Cf. *Rawḍ al-rayāḥīn* no. 34b.

A fool goes to the cemetery and observes how one dead person after another is brought there and the prayers for the dead are pronounced over him. In his view the prayers for the dead should be pronounced once and for all for everyone.—He's right. One should pronounce the prayers for the dead (the four *takbīrs*) on behalf of everything that exists in the world. (MN 11/3. See 12/6 below).

Existence here is an endless round of birth and death. To understand this exceeds our capacity of comprehension. One must give up thinking about it.

An old woman sits in the cemetery in her simple robe. Whenever they bring a dead person, she sews a pleat in her robe until, in the end, the robe consists of nothing but pleats. One day it happens that many people die and so many dead are brought that the old woman can no longer finish sewing the pleats. She tears the thread, breaks the needle and decides to burn her pleated robe. (MN 23/12).

See the rather remotely similar story in *Qābūsnāma* 40-41, chpt. 9.

Age is a warning sign for a human being (the theme of an exhortation AN 19/0). It reminds him that he will be confronted by an opponent for whom he is no match.

A wrestler finds a white hair on his head. He weeps and says: "I've overcome so many men but this white hair will overcome me. I've been able to hold my own against all men but before this hair I'm powerless." (MN 36/5; similarly IN 11/2, p. 170).

A foolish old man, who's taken a young woman as his wife, is made conscious of his age by the fact that the young woman won't let herself be kissed by him. When he wants to kiss her, she says: "I don't like your white hair. They place white wadding in the mouth of the dead. And when you kiss me, you also place white wadding in my mouth!" (IN 17/7, pp. 277-78).

See a *mawāliyā* in Maqqarī, *Azhār al-riyāḍ* 2/226, cited from Ibn Khaldūn, in which the motif appears.

Nor should the young be proud of their youth. Old age and death will befall them as well.

A youth mockingly asks an old man with a bent back how much he paid for his hunch. The old man retorts: "I got it for nothing. Just wait, you'll also be given one for free!" (AN 19/1). (In this *maqāla* the poet speaks a lot about his own old age. He is seventy years old.)

Qābūsnāma 41 in chpt. 9; Khusraw Dahlawī, ibid. 246; Ibn al-Jawzī, *Ẓirāf* 80-81.

Nor does it help to give a child a name which indicates strength or long life. (If a couple has had several children who died, it is customary to name the next child "he lives", in Turkish Yaşar.)

A son is born to a large man and he names the child after the warrior Rustam. But the boy remains small and weakly. (MN 14/3).

Abū Sa^c^īd suffers from a despondent mood and orders his servant to bring someone in off the street, so that by conversing with the person he may be released from his apprehensiveness. The servant brings in a gebr (a fire-worshipper). Invited to speak by the shaykh, he relates that a son was born to him yesterday. He named him Jāwēdh, "Eternal", but he died the very same night. (MN 14/4. Whether Abū Sa^c^īd's mood is changed by this story is not mentioned).

It is pointless to mourn for a deceased child because it has not yet seen the world. Whether one has seen much or little of the world, the end is still the same.

A fool hears a father say while walking behind the coffin of his darling child (*mīwa-i dil*) who has died: "Oh that you died without having seen the world!" The fool says: "So he thinks he's seen the world hundreds of times? And if you wish to take the world with you, then you'll die without having seen it." (MṬ 24/5, p. 85).

It's no help to mourn the death of someone who has passed away. Perhaps you'll endure pain for seven days because of a dead person who's been snatched from you. On the eighth day you realize it's pointless. (IN 9/4, p. 144).

Cf. a verse on this subject by Ibn al-Shibl in Ṣarrāf, *ᶜUmar al-Khayyām*, p. 129.

One's love life is destroyed by death.

A young man's beautiful young wife dies in childbirth. In grief he pours over her grave the rose-water he once washed his beloved wife's feet with. Why did he wash her feet, since he was obliged "to wash his hand" of her (to separate from her)? (IN 16/5, pp. 268-69).

Dying is difficult and bitter.

Jesus drinks sweet water from a stream. Later he drinks the same water from a jug. From the jug the water tastes bitter. While he wonders about this, the jug begins to speak and says: "I'm an old man and have already been formed a thousand times into a drinking-cup, a jug and a trough, and still the bitterness of

death hasn't left me. Nor will it abandon me though I'm formed into a jug a thousand times again. That's why the water you drink is so bitter." (MṬ 26/4, p. 92).

When Jesus would think about his death, afterwards the place he sat in was covered with bloody sweat. (MN 4/10). (An echo of the Gethsemane story).

When Abraham must die, God asks him what of all things was the hardest to bear. He answers: "That I was supposed to sacrifice my child, that I saw my father in Hell-fire, that I was hurled into the fire—all that is nothing compared with dying." God answers: "What comes after death is so difficult that dying is a relaxation (*rāḥat-i rūḥ*) by comparison." (MN 4/11).

A son accompanies the corpse of his father to the grave and says: "I've never experienced a day as painful as this!" A Ṣūfī who hears him says: "Nor has your father!" It's a far worse day for the father than for the son. (MṬ 26/2, p. 91).

A flute player is asked on his deathbed how he feels. He answers: "What should I say? During a whole lifetime I've 'blown wind', and now I'm going beneath the earth." (MṬ 26/3, p. 91).

Solomon asks a lame ant which clay is most mixed with grief. The ant says: "The last brick which is used to wall up the grave pit. Because by then all hope has run out." (MṬ *Khātima*/10, p. 183).

Entire cities die out and decay, and testify to the brevity and transitoriness of human life.

A fool lingers in thought by the ruins of a city and voices his reflections: "When this city still stood and was full of people, where was I then? And now that I've come here, where have all the people gone? When I didn't exist, they existed, and when I came into the world, they had disappeared. I don't understand this."—Who knows what this circle signifies, and what is there that's not gripped by it? No one knows the meaning of this coming and going. (MN 16/9).

Very similar melancholic reflections are found in Abū'l-ᶜAlāᵓ al-Maᶜarrī (d. 449/1057) in his *Luzūm mā lā yalzam* and in ᶜUmar Khayyām.

Arberry 4 *hēch naᵓī*; 5 *naw and*; 7 *bērūn shudh*; 17 *nāmast*; 19 *shudhē kū*; 60 *ghubār*; 79 *darāz*; 97 *raftan-i māst*; 98 *bishust*; 109 *ṭay shudh*; 117 *Ṭōs*; 120 *dunyā chīst*; 135 *khwāhī shudh*. Cf. also pp. 85 ff. below.

2

The passages cited so far do not yet contain any reflections about the cause of death. "The uncanniness of Being-towards-death" (Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, end of § 50)[1] is simply experienced in its full gravity. Of course, the Muslim knows it is God

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1 The quotation is not verbatim but a paraphrase of the sense.

who imposes death on man, who calls him into life and then calls him away again, and he knows he must resign himself to this.

Cf. ᶜUmar Khayyām, Arberry 31 *aflāk nihādh*; Rosen no. 40 *ārāst*.

But to begin with matters are not made more comprehensible because of this. The significance of life and death which God brings about is unfathomable.

In ᶜAṭṭār's *Ushturnāma* the central figure is a Turkish puppeteer who symbolically represents God. He puts on multifarious plays with his puppet. When a figure has ended his role, he throws him back into the box from which he had previously taken him. He's asked why he destroys the work of his own hands but he gives no reply. An apprentice, who suspects more than others the meaning of the play, seeks to fathom the secret. But he's not allotted a clear answer either. (The epic dissolves into heaps of piled up fantastical allegories).

In Books I and VII of Plato's *Laws* human beings are referred to as toys, marionettes of the gods, but without the melancholic undertone. Cf. Apelt's translation pp. 30-31, 286.

A fool expresses himself in very harsh terms regarding God's bringing things to life and killing them.

Someone asks a fool what God is really doing after all. The fool answers: "Have you seen the writing-tablet of boys? Like these young boys, one moment He writes something new on the tablet, and the next He wipes out what He's written. God's engaged in this the whole time. He does nothing but bring things into being and annihilate them." (IN 17/5, p. 273).

Another fool, having been asked about God, answers that He's a potter who first makes pots with great skill and then smashes them Himself. (AN 17/2).

And as a more noble comparison:

A king, without asking you, has placed a treasure for himself somewhere. If it pleases him, he takes the treasure away again. Or if it pleases him, he lets it remain. (IN p. $388_{7\text{-}8}$). (Cf. also the variants in p. 87 below).

3

In the ancient Arab poets it is not God who is made responsible for causing death but a half-mythically conceived death-lot (*maniyya*, *manāyā*, *manūn*) or *dahr*, all-devouring time (or "days" and "nights") which is imagined as a kind of mythical being.

W. Caskel, *Das Schicksal in der altarabischen Poesie*; my article *Dehrīye* in the *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*; Watt, *Free Will* 20-21; Helmer Ringgren, *Fatalism in Persian Epics*. The conception is connected with the Iranian *zrvān*. Regarding *dahr* as a philosophical term (= αἰών), see S. Pines, *Beiträge zur islamischen Atomenlehre*, p. 51.

This idea is already branded in the Koran as a typically heathen way of thinking. The heathens say: "It is only *dahr* which kills us" (surah 45/24). However, if Muslim poets like Ibn al-Muᶜtazz (d. 296/908) still revile *dahr* in their dirges for deceased friends, perhaps they do so because they shrink from denouncing God Himself or reproaching Him, as do the fools in ᶜAṭṭār—as we saw and shall hear more about below. Sometimes one finds the heathen and the religious interpretation of death alongside one another in the same poem. Thus Ibn al-Muᶜtazz, in his dirge for the death of the caliph Muᶜtaḍid, says: "Woe unto you, oh *Dahr*! You've left no one behind for me. You're a bad father who devours his own children!—I beg God for forgiveness! No, it's all divine providence. I'm content with God who is the one, eternal Lord." (*Dīwān*, ed. Lewin 4, no. 218). It is as if the poet remembered the prohibition to revile *dahr* which is attributed to the Prophet himself: "Do not revile *dahr*, for God is *dahr*."

Mukhtalif al-ḥadīth 281; *Fayḍ al-qadīr* no. 9785; Wensinck, *Concordance* 2/155 A. Abū'l-ᶜAlāᵓ also often describes *dahr* as the destroyer of all living things. *Luzūm mā lā yalzam*, passim; cf. also *Risālat al-Ghufrān* 358-61.

In Persian poetry it is more frequently the rotating sky or, as we shall see in the next chapter, the inconstant world, which is held responsible for life's transitoriness and vicissitudes. Such is already the case in ᶜUmar Khayyām.

Arberry 10 *gardūn-rā sūdh*; 55 *gul-ē bar nāradh*; 57 *diljūy*; 87 *digar*; 90 *man u tū*; 101 *rāz*; 119 *ghamnāk kunī*. The sky also appears in him as a puppeteer: 116 *luᶜbatbāz*.

The same is occasionally the case in ᶜAṭṭār.

My heart is truly broken because of this sky, because of all those he brings into existence and then kills! Who is there that this rotating dome brings into existence without then taking away his life in the end? The sky's wheel brings you something else every day, a new tribulation every hour. (AN 16/1, with still more images).

Rotating wheel of the sky, for a long time you've been causing the mill for men's blood to turn. I'm amazed at you, you wicked wheel of the sky, because you cast into the earth those you yourself have raised with tenderness! (IN p. $271_{14\text{-}15}$).

The sky behaves like human beings who raise chickens in order to slaughter them.

The hawk chides the domestic fowl because it's so fearful of human beings. In fact, human beings look after it, feed it and protect it from its enemies, and yet, as though unloyal and ungrateful, it always runs away from humans. The domestic fowl answers: "Don't you see those chickens over there suspended by

the legs with their heads cut off? That's the loyalty of a human being! The only reason he looks after me and protects me is in order to kill me later on!" (IN 17/2, pp. 270-71).

C. Brockelmann, "Fabel und Tiermärchen in der älteren arabischen Literatur" in: *Islamica* 2/1926/115-16; Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā'* 103.

But even more frequently it is the personified world that appears as the enemy of man whom she faithlessly kills.

CHAPTER TWO

THE WORLD

Due to death and transitoriness a heavy shadow falls upon this earthly world which is frequently itself held responsible for its transitory character or the incessant dying which prevails in it. The literature which takes up the theme of "censuring the world" (*dhamm al-dunyā*) is voluminous, beginning with the *ḥadīth*-corpus and including the domain of popular sermons and literature of edification.

From the rich abundance see: *Fayḍ al-qadīr* no. 4269-85; the *khuṭba* of the Khārijite Qaṭarī b. al-Fujāʾa in Sharīshī 1/69-70; "Ḥasan al-Baṣrī" in: *Der Islam* 21/21 ff.; *Qūt* 1/242-45; *Nahrung* 2/205-216/32.308-319; *Iḥyāʾ* 3/183; *Mufīd al-ʿulūm* 167-79, *Kitāb Ḥaqīqat al-dunyā wa-āfātihā*; *Muḥāḍarāt al-udabāʾ*, *ḥadd* 19; *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/66-68.

In ᶜAṭṭār the world is also reviled, and there are warnings against it. Sometimes melancholic reflections are presented about its fickle, unloyal nature, its way of murdering people, and other times it is pointed out that the world is merely a temporary place of sojourn, and that it would be folly to settle into it for the long term. Or the focus is on its worthlessness, utter nothingness and loathsomeness. Likewise, reference is made to the religious dangers which it conceals for the pious man.

1

The world is not worth much more than an atom.

ᶜĀmir ibn ᶜAbd al-Qays is eating leeks with salt but no bread. Someone asks how he can be content with such modest food. He answers: "There are people who are content with a lot less." The other person asks what sort of people those are. He answers: "They're the people who prefer this world to the world to come. For the world is only one atom alongside religion, but leeks contain a hundred thousand atoms." (MN 24/4).

Iḥyāʾ 4/173, *Bayān faḍīlat khuṣūṣ al-fuqarāʾ*; *Stufen* 420/D.42. Somewhat amplified in ᶜAṭṭār.

The world is nothing (*lā shayʾ*). (MṬ after 22/2, p. 79).

It is no long-term place of residence.

Jesus says: "The world of the here and now is a bridge. Pass over it but don't build on it."

Qūt 1/256; *Nahrung* 2/245/32.371; *Iḥyā'* 4/193, *Bayān faḍīlat al-zuhd*; *Stufen* 468/D.144; as a saying of Ḥasan al-Baṣrī in the *Kāmil* of Mubarrad 58_{4-5}. Also in an inscription of the Emperor Akbar: Rev. H. Heras, "A Quotation from the Words of Jesus Christ in one of Emperor Akbar's Inscriptions" in: *Islamic Research Miscellany* 1/1948/61-71. Cf. *Oriens* 3/161.

The world is a caravanserai, a hospice with two gates. You enter through the one gate and you go out through the other. (IN p. 387_{19} = AN 17/0. Cf. IN p. 143_{9}).

One will recall the well-known story about how the prince of Balkh, Ibrāhīm ibn Adham, is moved to renounce kingship because Khiḍr, in the appearance of a camel-driver, turns up in his castle uninvited and explains that the castle is a caravanserai where he wishes to take a room. Questioned about his audacity, he asks the prince: "Then who lived in the castle before?" Ibrāhīm answers: "My father." "And before your father?" "My grandfather." "And before that?" "So-and-so." "And before that?" "His father." "And where are they now?" "They've all passed away and are dead." The uninvited guest then remarks: "Well, isn't a caravanserai where one person arrives and another one departs?" (See p. 206 below).

Life in this world is comparable to that of a spider which builds a web with great effort and catches flies in it until the master of the house comes along with a broom and in one instant sweeps away the spider, the web and the flies. (MṬ 24/3, p. 84).

Life is as fragile as the glasses which Abū Saᶜīd transports on a donkey. He must walk along slowly with the donkey because if it falls down, he won't have anything left. (AN 17/1. The motif is elaborated further with many images).

The world resembles the fleeting patterns which women tatoo on their hands. (IN p. 274).

A fool compares the world to a chessboard on which one figure is driven out of its house and another occupies its place. (IN 17/4, p. 273).

2

But the killing and murder which occurs is also ascribed to the world itself.

Ringgren, *Fatalism* 47-48.

The world itself kills human beings. It's a blazing fire which forever consumes new people. (MṬ after 22/2, p. 79, where the motif "*dunyā*" is treated in detail).

It's like that sea monster which can change itself into the shape of every sea creature and uses this ability to deceive its prey and hunt it down. (MN 11/10). (ᶜAṭṭār calls the animal Būqalamūn. He has in mind a kind of Proteus).

The world elevated to the level of a subject is represented in the personification of a faithless woman who seduces men with her arts in order to kill them. First she appears as a tempting, beautiful young woman, but then she unmasks herself in her true form as a horrible old witch.

She'll be presented to human beings in this form on the Resurrection, and they'll be asked whether they recognize in the ugly old woman the world by means of which they showed off to one another, and due to which they envied and hated one another. (*Qūt* 1/269; *Nahrung* 2/283 f./32.428).

The image already occurs in Ḥasan al-Baṣrī's sermon, as well as in Ghazzālī's *Iḥyā*ᵓ and his Mirror of Princes where a special chapter is devoted to each of the similitudes for the world.

"Ḥasan al-Baṣrī" 21; *Iḥyā*ᵓ 3/185-90, *Bayān ṣifat al-dunyā bi'l-amthila*; *Tibr* 33 ff. The similitude cited in *Iḥyā*ᵓ 3/188 and *Tibr* 37, of travellers in ships which stop at an island, originates in Late Antiquity. Cf. H. Ritter and R. Walzer, "Uno scritto morale inedito di al-Kindī", Reale Academia dei Lincei 1938, Serie 6, vol. 8, fasc. 1, p. 42.

The world is a foul-smelling old woman with a crooked back who every day kills a hundred thousand bridegrooms. Every day she adorns herself differently and every moment she ambushes a hundred men. (MN in 11/9).

Jesus, who always wanted to see the world some time, one day meets an ugly old lady who's toothless, has a bent back, white hair, blue eyes (a sign of bad luck) and a black face, and gives off a foul smell, but is wearing a robe that glitters with hundreds of colors. Her one hand is brightly painted, while the other is smeared with blood. Her face is veiled. When Jesus asks who she is, she answers that she's the world which he desired to see. A conversation unfolds between the two of them in which she explains that she's veiled because no one who's seen her face would draw close to her. The colorful clothes and the painted hand serve as a means of seducing people. The other hand is red with the blood of men whom she's killed. Jesus asks whether she doesn't feel any pity for her victims. She says she doesn't know what pity is, she only knows about shedding blood, etc. Finally, Jesus turns away from this disastrous creature. (IN 5/3, pp. 91-92; cf. *Qūt* 1/244$_{8-10}$; *Nahrung* 2/213/32.316).

The world is a Rustam who kills his own son. Nay, an old witch who fattens you up in order to devour you. (IN p. 270$_{10-12}$).

She's cruel and has no concern for you. She has many bridegrooms like you and has celebrated many weddings. (IN p. 388$_{18}$-389$_{1}$; cf. also 388$_{9-10}$).

Another time man's relationship to the world is symbolized by the horrible story of the prince who on his wedding night, in his

drunkenness, mistakes the corpse-platforms of the gebrs for his bride's castle and sleeps with a female corpse which has been exposed there for the vultures. His state is then described when he is found by his royal father and the prominent men of the realm. (IN 19/10, p. 307-09).

3

The goods of this world are inferior, even loathsome, disgusting and repulsive; the joys of this world worthless.

Gold and silver appear worthless in the shadow of death. The angel of death will not let himself be bribed with them. (P. 38 above). At the moment of death they are of no use. (IN p. 304_4).

On the path of the Ṣūfīs gold and silver enjoy no honor.

A man who gathers wormwood shrubs for fuel finds a purse of gold. Instead of rejoicing, he reproaches God for having caused him to find something so worthless. (IN 15/11, p. 256).

The story reminds one of another story in which a thirsty bedouin in the desert finds a purse full of jewels instead of the water he desires. Unfortunately I can no longer recall where I read it.

A dog appears to know the worthlessness of money.

Someone asks a dog: "Do you have money (*zar*)?" The dog feels insulted, starts howling and attacks the questioner. (AN 20/2).

The partridge has to be instructed by the hoopoe that jewels are nothing but worthless, colored stones (MṬ 7/0), and the owl is reproached by the hoopoe because he attaches his heart to treasures which he must leave behind at death. (MṬ 11/0; above p. 12).

The whole conversation of the sixth prince with his father, in which the son defends his striving to learn the art of making gold, revolves around the question of the value or worthlessness of earthly goods. (Above p. 7).

Human beings are not the actual owners of their goods. Everything which they think they possess falls to God as the sole heir. (Surahs 15/23, 28/58, 3/180, etc.).

The fool Bahlūl strikes the graves of a cemetery with his walking stick. Asked what this is supposed to mean, he answers: "Everyone who's buried here is a liar. The one said: 'My castle and my pavilion.' Another: 'My possessions and my gold.' The third: 'My field and my vineyard.' The fourth: 'My garden and my water-basin.' But God says: 'All these claims are false. Everything is My inheritance, not yours.'" (IN 9/2, p. 142).

In the old Egyptian Bazaar in Istanbul the following inscription is supposed to have been found: "The owner of merchandise, the owner of property—where is

the first owner of this? That is a lie, this is a lie. Amuse yourself a while with this."

Mal sahibi, milk sahibi, hani bunun ilk sahibi?
O yalan, bu yalan, bir az da sen oyalan!

In Arabic manuscripts one often finds as the owner's stamp the words: "The turn (to hold the book temporarily) of so-and-so." (*fī nawbat fulān*). This shows how alive the attitudes were which we are describing.

The world and its goods are represented as being downright loathsome and repulsive.

An alleged saying of the caliph ᶜAlī goes: "The world is a carcass and whoever wishes to own it must put up with the jostling of dogs." (*Qūt* 1/244, here one finds variants of the image; *Nahrung* 2/213/32.316).—In another form: "The world is a carcass and those who strive after it are dogs." (*Mathnawī* 1/2325, cf. Nicholson's *Commentary*).

The world is a carcass devoured by worms who are worldly people. (IN p. $304_{2\text{-}3}$).—The friend of the world resembles a dog that eats a carcass, and when it's sated, it leaves it for the next dog. (IN 19/5, p. 304).

She's a dirty vessel that dogs drink from. Abū'l-ᶜAlāᵓ, ZDMG 31/497.

ᶜAbbāsa-i Ṭūsī says: "The world is a carcass from which the lions first eat their fill. Then come the panthers, then the wolves and dogs, and then the ravens. What's left over falls to the dung-beetles and ants. The lions are the kings, the panthers the *amīr*s, the wolves and dogs the followers of the latter, and the ravens the subordinates of the latter. The dung-beetle is the tax-gatherer, and the ants are the people in the bazaar." (IN 19/6, p. 305).

Cf. *Barlaam und Josaphat*, ed. Hommel, p. 151.

The world resembles sour milk that flies land on. (AN 18/3).

The world is a privy which one enters as rarely as possible. (*Qūt* 1/245 top; *Nahrung* 2/215/32.317).

On closer examination the luxury goods of this world reveal themselves as completely inferior. They become unmasked.

The attar of roses and musk of this world consist of tears (of the rose) and blood (of the musk-deer). It's madness to seek pleasure in tears and blood. Many people enjoy the scent of aloeswood. What's attractive about it? Basically it's nothing but smoke. Whether you here possess satin and black brocade, the one as well as the other is the spit of a worm. Honey may be tasty and sweet but it's only the excretion of poor bees. (AN 15/0).

Yes, on closer inspection the delights of this world reveal themselves to be loathsome filth.

Shaykh Abū Saᶜīd remains standing by a latrine and considers it a long time. People find it strange and a *murīd* asks what this means. The shaykh answers:

"This filth says to me: 'I was a much desired gift of God. Staying one hour in your company has turned me into what you see here.'" (MN 17/2; *Asrār al-tawḥīd* 221; O'Kane, *Secrets* 403; Ghazzālī, *Elixir* 53).

A refined gentleman holds his nose in the latrine and pulls up his skirts. A fool says to him: "There's no need for you to hold your nose. Indeed, tomorrow you'll eat what you don't want to smell today." (MN 17/3).

A wise man walks past a dungheap and a cemetery. He calls out: "This is the gift of God, and these are the people who strove after it." (MN 17/4).

Even love of a beautiful creature on closer examination turns out to be love of loathsome mucus and blood.

A gifted and diligent student falls in love with the beautiful slave of his teacher, neglects his studies because of her and finally becomes ill. The master destroys the girl's beauty by having her bled several times. He carefully collects the extracted blood in a vessel together with her menstrual blood. When the young man's love grows cold, he shows him the vessel filled with the unclean blood and draws the following conclusion: "Since your love grew cold the moment these things had left your beloved, it's clear it wasn't her you loved but this foul blood." The student then repents, renounces love and takes up his studies again with new zeal. (MN 25/4).

Niẓāmī relates almost the same story about Aristotle, his student Archimedes, and a Turkish girl given by Alexander as a present. *Sikandarnāma-i baḥrī*, Bibl. Indica, Calcutta 1852 and 1869, pp. 31-34. Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī has taken it into his *Mathnawī* with the genders reversed. It is the story of the king's slave girl and her love for a goldsmith, at the beginning of the first book. Cf. my remarks about this in *Orientalistische Literaturzeitung* 1941, column 250.

If these stories did not have a pronouncedly paraenetic character, one could view them as an expression of revulsion for the world.

4

But from a religious perspective as well the verdict on the world is negative.

The world has no value before God. According to Ḥasan, God hates the world and despises it, and since creating it, He has not deigned to look upon it.

"Ḥasan al-Baṣrī" p. 22. Ayyūb al-Qurashī has written a special treatise on the relevant *ḥadīth*. GAL[2] 2/450, 16.

According to another *ḥadīth*, the world is the prison of the believer and the Paradise of the infidel.

Fayḍ al-qādir no. 4275; Wensinck, *Concordance* 1/377; *Iḥyā'* 4/113, II; *Stufen* 272/B.274. For the Gnostic origin of the thought see R. Bultmann, *Das Urchristentum*, p. 184.

A dervish alludes to the *ḥadīth*, this time by way of praising the beauty of nature:

A dervish looks up at the star-filled sky and says: "Oh God, if the roof of Your prison is so beautiful, what must the roof of Your garden (Paradise) be like!" (AN 13/3.—See also MṬ verse 2005).

In view of the hereafter and what will happen there to human beings, whatever one can possess in this world is of no importance.

Ibn Sīrīn says: "My soul has never envied anyone, for every person is either destined for Paradise or for Hell. If he's destined for Paradise, he'll receive everything there. Why should I envy the little he possesses here on earth? But if he's destined for Hell, then there's really no reason to envy what he possesses before his bad end befalls him. Instead, one should begin singing a dirge on his behalf or pray for him." (MN 21/10).

The world is also morally bad. It is the field in which the base drives, the passions, avarice and greed produce their effects.

What is the world? The nest of avarice and greed, a legacy from Nimrod and Pharaoh. (MṬ 22/2, verse 2024).

It is the place of thoughtlessness, of punishable negligence.

Someone asks ᶜAlī: "What is it one finds most in the world?" He answers: "Obedience is what one finds most in Heaven because the angels live there. On the earth what one finds most of all things is indifference. But under the earth (in Hell) what one finds most is futile longing (*ḥasrat*)." (MN 23/11).

But most of all the world with its goods is a hindrance to the religious life and future blessedness.

According to a saying from the Prophet, a person who only says one word here about the world distances himself from Paradise by a distance of 500 years' travel. (IN 19/4, p. 304).

It holds one back from God with its goods. (IN 19/9, p. 306).—When someone asks Junayd about the world, he answers: "The world is whatever is close to the heart and draws one away from God." (*Ḥilya* 10/274₃₋₄).

Even the most trivial worldly possession makes it impossible to reach God.

A man sees himself in a dream in Paradise entering upon a road. An angel asks him where he wants to go. He replies: "To God." The angel says: "Do you think you can reach God's presence with all the wealth you've gathered and that you're attached to?" The man wakes up in fear, divests himself of his possessions and only keeps a piece of felt from which he makes himself a robe. The next night he sees himself again on the road in Paradise. Again the angel asks where he wants

to go. He replies: "To God." The angel says: "Do you want to go to God with this robe of felt? In the case of Jesus, even a needle caused him to be shut out (cf. 12/5 below), and you make yourself a suit of armor out of felt?" The man then burns the felt robe and the next night when he sees himself in Paradise again, he's invited by the angel to sit down on the road. For the king is now about to come. (MN 35/2).

The world is a wasteland to which the heart should not become attached.

Ja[c]far al-Ṣādiq says: "The world is a place of barrenness. But even more barren is a heart which has become attached to a wasteland. The hereafter, on the other hand, is well-cultivated land. But even more well-cultivated is the heart which desires nothing but the hereafter." (IN 19/7, p. 306).

Yaḥyā ibn Mu[c]ādh walks past a village. Someone says to him: "This is a beautiful village!" He replies: "More beautiful still is a heart which is free from the beautiful village." (IN 19/8, p. 306; TA 1/300).

Dīn and *dunyā*, religion and the world, cannot be combined together.

The famous vizier Niẓām al-Mulk rides over a bridge and sees a fool who has lain down in the bridge's shade. The vizier says to him: "Whether you possess reason or are a fool, in any case you're lying there very comfortably and without cares!" The fool says: "Oh Niẓām, can two swords fit in one scabbard? You have dominion over this world, you don't need religion. If you wish to have religion, don't take pride in the world! Both cannot be together. Be on guard against false play!" (MN 9/6).

5

The world is a fief, the consecrated property of the devil.

Jesus placed half a brick under his head before going to sleep. When he wakes up, he sees the devil standing beside him. Jesus asks him what he wants. The accursed one answers: "The world is my fief, and this brick belongs to it as well. If you have disposal over my property, then you also belong to me." Jesus then throws the brick away and sleeps on the bare earth. (MN 16/7).

Qūt 1/265; *Nahrung* 274/32.412; *Iḥyā*ʾ 4/10, *Bayān anna wujūb al-tawba* [c]*āmm*, and 4/197-98, *Bayān darajāt al-zuhd*; *Stufen* 39/A.52 and 482/D.174; *Ḥadīqa* 392-94.

What you gather from door to door you steal from the devil, and whoever steals from the devil, he'll see what happens to him tomorrow. (MN 8/7 at the end). In particular Satan is lord of the marketplaces. A *ḥadīth* says: "Don't be the first to go to the market, and don't be the last to leave it. For the market is Satan's battlefield and he raises his banner there!"

Cf. H. Ritter, "Ein arabisches Handbuch der Handelswissenschaft" in: *Der Islam* 7/1916/30-31.

Solomon has to recognize the effect of this dominion of Satan when he decides to renounce his kingly wealth and to acquire his sustenance by basket-weaving.

Solomon one day asks God to make Satan serve him the way the other spirits do. God warns him against this request but in the end Satan is forced to present himself before Solomon's gate ready for service. Solomon, who despite his wealth appreciates the value of poverty, is accustomed to acquiring his personal sustenance by basket-weaving. He has a servant sell the baskets in the market. After Satan has been subordinated to Solomon's command, the servant suddenly can no longer find a customer for the basket he's taken to the market and brings it back unsold. That day Solomon must go hungry. The next day he produces a still better basket in order to find a possible buyer. But again the servant returns from the market empty-handed. The situation continues like this for a while, and Solomon loses so much weight that God Himself asks him what's wrong. He answers: "I have a desire for bread." God says: "Then eat some!" Solomon replies: "But I don't have any." God: "Sell your wares and buy some!" Solomon: "I've sent loads of baskets to the market but there are no longer any buyers now." Then God says: "If you're keeping the lord of marketplaces in bonds, you shouldn't be surprised if you can't sell your baskets. How can anyone buy and sell, if the devil is kept in bonds?" (MN 8/8).

Cf. Alexander Rüstow, *Das Versagen des Wirtschaftsliberalismus als religionsgeschichtliches Problem*, pp. 104-05.

For Satan is the personification of "economic egotism", of the wishes and lusts of the carnal soul.

One of the birds who's called by the hoopoe to undertake the journey with him to the Sīmurgh excuses himself by saying he can't free himself from the snares of Satan. The hoopoe replies: "Your wishes and desires are Satan. When you put a wish in your head, hundreds of devils emerge from it. The world, this prison, is in every respect the fief of Satan. Hold back your hand from his fief, then he can't do anything to you." (MṬ 22/0, p. 78; above p. 14).

Someone complains to a pious man that the devil is tempting him and ruining his religion. The pious man answers: "Just a while ago, before you came, the devil was here and complained about you, saying: 'The whole world is my fief. Whoever is an enemy of the world doesn't belong to me. So tell him he should go his own way and withdraw his hands from my world! Since he unjustly appropriates my world, I ambush his religion. But whoever departs from my fief completely, I have nothing to do with him.'" (MṬ 22/1, p. 78).

CHAPTER THREE

DISTRESS, SUFFERING AND OPPRESSION: A THEODICY

Yet even aside from the devaluation of the world and the goods of this world due to their transitoriness, and aside from their religious inferiority and the danger they pose, the image of earthly existence remains very dismal. Indeed, even the minimum which is necessary to eke out one's life is not available everywhere. People's needs are badly provided for, the general distribution of goods is arbitrary, and mankind is subjected to suffering and oppression. As we shall see, it is chiefly through the mouth of the poorest of the poor, ᶜAṭṭār's fool figures, that the people, otherwise condemned to silence, voice their criticism against the government and the administration—often in quite strange language.

1

God apparently wishes that the poor man should go hungry and weep because of hunger.

A man sees a fool weeping and asks him why he's crying. The fool says: "Because I'm naked and hungry." The man: "You may well be hungry but that's no reason to weep like this!" The fool: "But that's exactly why He causes me to go hungry, so I should weep!" (MN 21/12).

Qushayrī, *Risāla* 66, *Bāb al-jūᶜ*; *Sendschreiben* 209/13.4. Perhaps weeping is to be judged positively from a religious point of view. See 15/1, 14), p. 244), below. But the stories which follow here scarcely allow that sort of positive interpretation.

Another person replies to a fool who asks him for bread: "That's God's affair." The fool says: "I already experienced that in the year of hunger. Those who died of starvation were lying about and He didn't give me any bread." (MN 27/8).

A pious officer has a neighbor who's an indigent fool and he regularly has food sent to him. One day at the king's order the officer must go off on a journey. The fool comes to him in consternation and asks whom he intends to entrust him to. The officer says: "God!" The fool responds: "Don't do that! He'll let me starve." (AN 16/2 in Ayasofya 4792, fol. 216a).

Reference to God's providing sustenance makes just as little impression on the fool as reference to God's omnipotence.

A fool is weeping due to hunger. Someone says to him: "Come, don't cry like that! God, who has suspended the sky without columns, can give you bread." The fool answers: "Would that He had placed hundreds of columns under the sky but given me a piece of bread! I need bread and something to put on it. What do I care about a sky without columns!" (MN 22/11).

Someone asks a fool in the madhouse whether he has a wish. The madman answers: "I haven't eaten anything for ten days and have the hunger of ten men." The visitor says: "I'll go and bring you bread, meat and sweets." Then the madman says: "Speak in a whisper so God doesn't hear! Otherwise, He surely won't allow you to bring me bread but will say you have to let me starve." (MN 2/6).

2

Prayer is no help.

A prayer leader says a prayer and all the people chime in "Amen!" A fool asks: "What does 'amen' mean?" Someone says: "Amen means: May it turn out as the prayer leader beseeched God." The fool says: "That's completely pointless. Whatever happens isn't what the prayer leader and what you want, but what God wants." (IN 10/11, p. 167).

Bringing your sorrow to God's attention only makes matters worse.

Shiblī visits a madhouse. There a young madman bids him to ask God in his next intimate prayer with Him why He has so tormented him, the madman, and caused him to lie chained in a foreign place, far from his father and mother, in hunger and cold. When Shiblī, in tears, turns to go, the madman calls after him: "No, don't tell God any of what I said to you! If you tell Him, He'll make it a hundred times worse. I won't ask Him for anything, because nothing makes an impression on Him. He's sufficient in Himself." (MN 2/5).

The source is perhaps the story recounted in 10/4 of the *Maṣāriᶜ al-ᶜushshāq*.

A *pīr* says to his friend: "I see all human beings caught up in sorrow and cares. The chief cause of this is that God does what He wishes, not what they want and they need. When a person prays, what he wants only comes about if God wants it." (MN 23/7).

When hearing these utterances, which are half-bitter, half touchingly resigned, one must of course not forget that basically they simply express a doctrine established in the Koran (81/29) and the Muslim profession of faith. And adopting such a doctrine is part of Islamic piety: What God wishes happens and what He does not wish does not happen. (Ashᶜarī, *Maqālāt* 291). Other-

wise, how mysticism in religious terms elaborates the fact that God's judgement cannot be influenced is well illustrated in Rundī's *Commentary* on the *Ḥikam* of Ibn ᶜAṭāᵓ Allāh (2/11-12). There, for example, the following thoughts are developed: God has not commended prayer of supplication as a means of acquiring gifts from God, but in order to manifest man's relationship with God as being that of a bondsman to his lord.—When someone who has fundamentally submitted to the will of God prays, he does so in order to adorn his limbs with prayer of supplication. Indeed, prayer of supplication (with its characteristic body posture) is a form of rendering service, through which the limbs are adorned. Or he does so in order to comply with God's command which enjoins prayer of supplication.—The use of the prayer consists in demonstrating man's need for God. God, for His part, does what He wishes. The result is that God's bondsman must continue prayer of supplication even if all his wishes are granted, and whether they are granted or not should make no difference for him. It is not proper for God's bondsman to allow himself to turn his face away from God's Throne because his wishes and desires have been granted.—During prayer what should matter to the person praying is not whether his wish is granted, but his conversation with God.—What God will give you is already determined before you ask. What comes afterwards cannot be the cause of something which preceded. What has been fixed from eternity is more lofty than that any one particular cause could be attributed to it.

Such refined religious reinterpretations of prayer of supplication are far removed from the fools in ᶜAṭṭār. In their words the gloomy experiences they have had with prayer of supplication are quite simply reflected. They are critical but resigned. They perceive the difficulty in its full harshness but they do not eliminate it by altering the original sense or purpose.

God sometimes even grants the prayer of His friends who quarrel with Him though not with miracles, but rather in a way which deliberately puts them in their place and at best leaves it to them to interpret what happens as a response to their prayers.

A fool who has no shirt on his back asks God for a piece of linen cloth to cover his nakedness. The divine voice answers: "I'll give you a piece of linen cloth but it will be a shroud." The fool replies: "Yes, I know You and I'm familiar with how You look after Your slaves! You don't give a helpless man a piece of linen cloth until he's dying. Someone must first die, poor and blind, and then he receives a piece of linen from You in the grave." (IN 8/6, p. 146).

Or the answer to a prayer is all too literal.

A hungry fool goes into the desert. He asks God: "Is there actually anyone in the world who's even hungrier than I am?" The divine voice answers: "I'll show you someone who's hungrier than you." Then along comes a starved wolf and it attacks the fool. The fool cries out: "Oh Lord, don't kill me in such a wretched way! I've seen one that's hungrier than I am! Now I'm more sated than all other people, sated without bread. In the future I'll only ask You for life and never again for bread!" At that the wolf lets him go and runs off into the desert. (MN 3/7).

An Arabic story:

A man has the habit of always saying: "Health and well-being!" (*al-ᶜāfiyata'l-ᶜāfiya*). When someone questions him as to why he asks for these things, he recounts: "I used to be a porter. One day I was carrying a load of flour and lay down to rest. At the time I used to say: 'Oh God, if you give me two loaves of bread every day without work, I'll be content with that.' Next I saw two men fighting and I went to make peace. The one man struck me on the head with an object he intended to strike his opponent with, and I was bleeding. That moment the headman of the neighborhood came and arrested both of them. When he saw me covered in blood, he took me along as well, thinking I'd been involved in the fighting, and put me in prison. There I remained for quite some time and every day two loaves of bread were brought to me. At night I saw someone in a dream who said to me: 'You prayed for two loaves of bread a day without work, but not for health and well-being!' Then I said: 'Health and well-being!' There was a knocking at the door and someone called: 'Where is ᶜUmar, the porter?' Then they let me go free." (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 179, *Bāb ruʾyā'l-qawm*; *Sendschreiben* 531/53.12).

God rewards His servants for their worship with misery.

"In our city", so relates ᶜAṭṭār, "there was a merchant (*khwāja*) who went mad and remained in this state for fifty years. He was the laughing-stock of the young boys and walked about impoverished and down-at-heel, begging from house to house. One day he saw a young man hurrying to the mosque so as not to miss the prayers. He called to him: 'Yes, go on in there quickly! I often went in there as well and prayed, and in return He's landed me in this state. If you want to end up like me, go on in quickly!'" (MN 2/8).

3

And so suffering and oppression go hand in hand with the deficient provision of people's needs. This world is a house of tribulation (see the long description of life's vale of tears AN 15/0, 16/0), and that is an essential characteristic of the world. Thus Ibn ᶜAṭāʾ Allāh al-Iskandarī (d. 709/1309) remarks in one of his "wise sayings": "Do not consider it strange that suffering and

cares descend upon you while you are still in this world. The world simply displays what is worthy of its quality and what necessarily results from its characteristics." (*Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 1/32).

The chief of the early Ṣūfīs of Baghdad, Junayd (d. 298/910), says: "I don't perceive what I endure from the world as something loathsome. For I accept it as a basic fact that the here and now is a house of grief and sorrow, of torment and affliction, and that the world is utterly bad. Thus it's normal if it confronts me with everything I find repulsive. If it confronts me with what I like, that's something above the normal. But the original, normal situation is the first case." (*Ḥilya* 10/270; *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 1/33).

If there's joy, it's not without a period of ensuing grief. If there's existence, it's not without fear of destruction. Do you obstinately seek joy from the world? No joy will come to you from the world. (From the big description of life's vale of tears, AN 15/0. It ends with the verse:) "I've enumerated for you the joys of this world. Having been alive and well, I died of grief over this."

"Human beings", so says a fool, "resemble the cupper who sucks out blood and empty air."—If you take one breath in joy—, hundreds of troubles follow upon every joy. Closeness to the beloved without separation doesn't occur for anyone. There's no rose without thorns, no sugar without flies... The faithless world is an inn which consists of sorrow and torment from its mid-point to its outer surroundings. I don't know anyone without sorrow. (AN 15/1).

This is in fact an inheritance from our primordial father Adam.

If Adam hadn't eaten the grain of wheat (Koranic, instead of the apple), mankind wouldn't suffer one grain of sorrow. Adam was afflicted with sorrow for three hundred years and wept blood because of one grain of wheat. He was our father and our origin. Due to one grain of wheat he became the target of a hundred torments. If you wish to take pleasure in eating a mouthful—it's impossible because you're a son of Adam. If he couldn't have a grain of wheat without a hundred torments, then you have no right to a mouthful without sorrow. Resign yourself to this with forbearance! (AN 15/1, the continuation. Cf. IN p. $388_{15\text{-}16}$).

It is our lot to consume our liver (a metaphor for experiencing pain and sorrow).

A poor man has a craving to eat roast meat once a year. When he finally has the money, he goes to the butcher. The butcher, who's in a foul mood, gives him bones, a bad piece of meat, and liver. So how did it go as far as his fulfilling his wish? As it was, he'd consumed "liver" and asked for another piece besides! For with us there's simply no going without consuming liver. (AN 15/2).

This at times downright self-pitying complaint about sorrow and suffering in the world, which strongly contrasts with the peaceful composure inherent in Junayd's words, permeates ᶜAṭṭār's entire work. We can only give a few samples.

Only after thousands of slaps on the back of the neck does the poor man manage to eat his bread.

Someone asks a Ṣūfī how he spends his time. The Ṣūfī answers: "With dry lips and wet skirts (soiled with sins) I sit in this ashhouse. I've broken no bread without someone nearly having broken my neck first." (MṬ 27/3, p. 94).

The joys of one person are purchased through another's suffering.

A man burns aloeswood. Someone else is delighted by the pleasant scent and exclaims: "Ah!" The first person says: "So that you may exclaim 'Ah!', the poor aloeswood must burn!" (MṬ 24/6, p. 86).

If you take a pumpkin and carve eyes and a face in it and fill it with ice so that due to the melting ice it continually weeps, then you'll have an image of our situation (AN in 18/3).

It is pointless to adopt preventative measures against misfortune.

An officer shows a fool his fortress which he takes to be impregnable. But the fool says: "Misfortune falls from the sky! Thus the fortress won't be of any help to you against misfortune." (IN 14/21, p. 238).

A human being is impotent and helpless in face of all this.

He consists of bones covered with skin, is subjected to repulsive bodily functions, and for the slightest cause is afflicted with illness. He's been born into this prison with a hundred pains, and death awaits him in the end. (AN in 18/2).

Similar reflections are found in AN in 16/4.—Cf. also ʿUmar Khayyām, Arberry 4 *hēch naʾī*.

We're as powerless as the mote in a sunbeam which is whirled about in impotence, without ever becoming the sun. It remains eternally only a mote in a sunbeam. One time it will become aware of its weakness.

The bat decides that, since he doesn't have the strength to bear the sun, he will fly upwards to it with his eyes closed in order to perish in it (and so become united with it). Despite the warnings he's given, he sets out and flies for years until his strength fails. Since despite his flying about for such a long time he still hasn't perceived anything of the sun, he thinks he's flown beyond it by now. A sensible man reproaches him: "You haven't even advanced one step and you claim you've gone beyond the sun!" When the bat hears this, the little strength he has left abandons him, and he calls out to the sun in bitter irony: "Ah, you've really gained a very clear-sighted bird! Rise upwards a little further still!" (MṬ 27/6, pp. 95-96).

The bat may well think he's king of the birds in the night-time when the countryside is available for his fluttering flights alone. But as soon as the sun comes up, he's cast back into his nothingness.—Therefore you too be on guard against silly illusions! (AN in 16/4).

4

But as the pious man no longer holds blind impersonal time or the inexorable rotation of the sky's wheel responsible for death, neither does he simply consider the world which is bad by nature or his own natural weakness to be the cause of his suffering and dependence on powers stronger than himself. The being on whom he absolutely depends is God who in His unfathomable wisdom "for no reason", as ᶜAṭṭār puts it, has imposed his lot on man and determined his destiny. In Ashᶜarī's profession of faith it says: "And they hold the doctrine that good and bad occur in accordance with God's ordaining and predetermination, and they believe in God's ordaining and predetermination, whether it be good or bad, sweet or bitter. And they believe that they do not have the power to benefit or to harm themselves, unless God so wills. And they put their affairs in God's hands alone and they profess that they are in need of God at all times and dependent upon Him in all circumstances." (*Maqālāt* 292). "And they believe in predetermination, the good and the bad, the sweet and the bitter, and that whatever struck them could not have missed them, and whatever did not strike them could not have struck them." (Ibid. 293).

Know here that good and bad come from "yonder"! Profit and loss come from "yonder". (IN p. 147_9).

According to Islamic belief, God causes the lot of human beings to be written down on the Tablet of destiny (above p. 24), and the conviction that everything happens as it does because it has been written thus, that destiny is inescapable, is known to be one of the firmest pillars of Islamic piety. (See p. 238 below).

Nor is it actually a matter of knowledge of the law and behaving in conformity with it, but what counts is what has been written.

A man goes to a shaykh in tears and says to him: "I've had my fill of being a slave (of God), and lordliness doesn't come to us either. Now I have neither the one nor the other. What am I to do?" The shaykh answers: "Just beat your head (against the wall)! Such talk comes from 'knowledge and action' (*ᶜilm* and *ᶜamal*)."—One must look at the Tablet of predetermination. How long will I go on looking (in hope) at "knowledge and action"! (MN 23/5).

This story actually serves as an amplification of the motif of inner disunity (8/5 below), but the story which follows deals with the "Tablet of destiny" theme:

Someone asks a sailor what the most wondrous thing is that he's experienced on his travels. He answers: "The most wondrous thing is that the ship comes back safely to the harbor. It goes off far away on the whirling sea, and we wait to see what sort of wind will blow. All the arts we know have no effect, and no one knows what's written on the eternal Tablet." (MN 23/6).

5

If in this view impersonal, compelling destiny stands more in the foreground, there is no lack of evidence on the basis of which God's intervention in man's destiny is perceived as something far more personal and more direct, and not as a mechanical carrying out of an inflexible, fixed decree. In particular the mystics habitually held this view and developed it. We have already seen how mystic fools considered their hunger and their misery to be directly willed by God and imposed upon them (pp. 55 f.).

That man is impotent in God's hands, is not master over himself, throws a pious man into helpless confusion:

During a sermon a confused person hears a preacher say before an assembly: "God kneaded Adam's clay (*gil*) for forty days in the hand of His omnipotence." Then he hears the preacher say: "Man's heart (*dil*) is between the fingers of God" (above p. 29, ftn. 18). The person then exclaims: "So what's a poor creature to do? If our heart and our body are in His hands, what's still in our hands? He's everything in the world, what am I then? Do I exist or not? I really don't know, if He's everything!" (MN 23/3).

Later we shall see how this situation is given a positive value by the mystics and integrated into their emotions. ᶜAṭṭār gives a hint of this attitude with the verse that introduces the above story: "When heart and body (*dil u gil*) are lost in God, then a man truly becomes a man."

God even imposes sufferings, persecution and martyrdom on his prophets and saints. The sufferings of the prophets Adam, Noah, Abraham, Ishmael, Jacob, Joseph, Job, Jonah, Moses, David, Solomon, Zacharias, John, Jesus and Muḥammad—who, as is well known, consoled himself with the destiny of the other prophets as long as he was exposed to the persecutions of the Meccans—are all enumerated in the *Manṭiq al-ṭayr* (verses 154-169).

Nor are they even allowed to complain.

When Jacob goes on mentioning the name of Joseph who's been torn from him, God has him told that He'll strike him from the list of prophets if he doesn't pull himself together. Thereupon Jacob falls silent, but when he sees

Joseph in a dream one time, he can't refrain from fetching up a sigh. Gabriel then reproaches him, saying he's broken his vow not to show regret. (MṬ 12/11, p. 40. See also p. 247 below).

Lamenting and bearing up in silence are equally useless. God's commands concerning how to behave when in pain contradict one another.

A pious man suffers intense toothache one night. He complains and moans until the morning. Then a divine voice reproaches him for his unseemly behavior. During the next night he's silent out of shame before God. The voice then reproaches him saying that's improper as well.—One can neither speak nor remain silent! (AN 18/2).

Gabriel says to the much afflicted Job: "Why are you holding back? Lament with all your woeful soul! Even if you had to suffer death every moment, it wouldn't cause God concern. Your patient endurance of pain is pointless." (IN 7/5, p. 116).

A great man said: "The prophet Job was plagued by worms for so many years, only so that he would emit a cry of pain. Once he had cried out, God released him from torment. But when the saw was placed on top of Zacharias' head, God ordered him not to utter a sound until the saw had finished him off. Otherwise, God would strike his name from the list of prophets."—Thus God demands silence from one person and lamentation from another. People aren't allowed to do the one or the other! (IN *Khātima*/6, p. 374).

Variants: *Lumaᶜ* 51; *Schlaglichter* 97/25.3; *Mukhtalif al-ḥadīth* 225; *Asrār al-tawḥīd* 212; O'Kane, *Secrets* 384-85; *Iḥyāʾ* 4/116$_6$, *al-Rukn al-thālith min kitāb al-ṣabr*; *Stufen* 278/B.286; *Talbīs* 334. On Zacharias see EI s.n. "Zakariyyāʾ".

6

Why doesn't God cause justice to prevail in the world?

In order that God's lordliness be made manifest. God had everything that ever was, is and will be, but the servitude and humiliation which would confirm His being were missing. Therefore He created human beings so they would serve Him as bondsmen. Therefore He stirred up confusion in the whole world, mingled all the horizons within one another. Hundreds of worlds full of lordship and power existed: from within the world of servitude arose confusion. (MN 37/11, at the end).

However, true lordliness is only visible when human beings turn to the ruler with their complaints and their troubles. And if such troubles are not on hand, they must be created so that the ruler can wield power as a ruler.

When Maḥmūd of Ghazna sits in the royal reception hall with his vizier Ḥasan Maymandī, the two of them remain alone. No one asks to be admitted. No beggar seeks the sultan's presence, no one seeking justice approaches his throne of judgement. A great silence prevails in the royal hall. No one displays any sign of hope in the ruler or of fear before him. Maḥmūd says: "How is it that this hall is empty of persons with complaints or with requests? It's not a proper situation for a royal hall!" The vizier answers: "The world is so filled with justice thanks to you that no one any longer needs to come here with a complaint." The sultan replies: "You're right. I will therefore now create confusion." And he sends his soldiers to all cities and villages to extort taxes. And behold, the royal hall quickly fills up as is befitting. (MN 37/12).

Yet one must not describe God, who is elevated above right and wrong, as unjust. He does no wrong, His bondsmen do wrong.

An old man says to a fool: "God does wrong (*ẓālim buwadh*). One may rightfully say this." The fool replies: "God does nothing wrong, but He has a hundred thousand bondsmen who do wrong." (MN 4/6).

CHAPTER FOUR

THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION

1

The Islamic religion, as was that of the Jews before it, is first and foremost a religion of law. The Lord of the Worlds sends His creatures and slaves, i.e. mankind, a quantity of commands and prohibitions through His messenger and sets before them, depending on whether they obey the issued commands or not, the prospect of reward or punishment in the hereafter, both of these in the most extremely intensified form of eternal pleasures in Paradise and fiery torment in Hell. The content of the issued laws partially concerns the ethical behavior of people towards one another. But in the foreground stand the demands for recognizing God's oneness and the mission of His prophet Muḥammad, as well as proscriptions for acts of worship, ritual duties, commands and prohibitions regarding food, and individual proscriptions of various kinds, which together take up a good deal of room.

God Himself, however, stands above the law He has decreed as an absolute ruler who is in no way bound by His promises and threats, who can do whatever He wishes with mankind, regardless of whether they have been obedient or not. Moreover, the idea of omnipotence is taken to such an extreme that the deeds which are to be rewarded or punished appear to be a direct outcome of God's will, are in fact brought about by God Himself.

Yet regardless of how man's action comes about, whatever God does with him in the hereafter is fundamentally independent of man's action. If God wishes to send all the believers to Hell and confer Paradise on all the infidels, He can do so without anyone being allowed to call Him *ẓālim* "unjust" because of it. If it has pleased Him to promise the believers Paradise and to hold up the prospect of Hell to the infidels, if there were particular groups of people to whom, even during their lifetime, the Prophet could promise Paradise, this is an act of God's free disposal which one should have knowledge of but the causes and reasons for which

no one should presume to fathom. No entitlement to exemption from punishment or to reward in Paradise will be gained by the most pious behavior. Indeed, the idea of predestination is even more drastic in its conception. God's judgement is so independent from man's behavior that it has already been carried out before a person is born. The good and bad deeds he does are simply signs which reveal whether he belongs to the class of *electi* or *reprobati*.

In the religious consciousness of orthodox Islam the doctrine of a lack of freedom, or a limited freedom, of human action (determination) and that of the predetermination of human destiny in the other world (predestination) came to be firmly established.

Cf. W. M. Watt, *Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam*, London 1948; and William Thomson's review of it in: *The Muslim World* 40/1950/207-16, 276-87.

But since the threat of punishment for acts of disobedience to God likewise still exists, and thus man's destiny in the hereafter is made dependent on his actions, a difficult aporia is created in the realm of religious feeling, to resolve which various attempts have been undertaken in Islamic theology. The Muᶜtazila proceeded in the most radical manner. On the one hand, they affirmed human free will, while on the other they introduced *a priori* the postulate of justice into the concept of God. No acts of will, so they taught, can be imagined as arising in God which contradict the postulate of justice. A just God must and will reward the good and punish evildoers. His arbitrariness in populating Paradise and Hell entirely according to His whim, the inconsistency that virtue and obedience provided no guarantee of reward in the other world, were eliminated and smoothed out by a fairness whose acts God necessarily implemented.

Goldziher, *Vorlesungen* 105.

As is well known, these doctrines did not become established. Through a governmental act of the caliph Mutawakkil (232-247/847-861) the Muᶜtazila were deprived of their leading position and at a later date were only able to maintain themselves sporadically and in sects. The idea of God, who as an absolute ruler can behave arbitrarily with His creatures and slaves, corresponded more to the religious feeling of the people and has become the truly popular idea of God in orthodox Islam. A different conception of the relationship between God and man, one based on an ideal of mankind being children of God, according to which God appears as a strict but loving father, had no prospect of success in

Islam for the reason that everything which even remotely recalled the Christian doctrine that God had a son, namely Jesus, had to be perceived as abominable unbelief because of surah 112/3: "He did not beget, nor was He begotten." God is creator and absolute lord. Man is a creature and slave, and whatever God wishes happens to him. This has remained the foundation stone of the popular Islamic conception of the relationship between God and man up until today.

What modifications this relationship has undergone in mysticism shall be discussed later.

In the consciousness of the broad masses of the Islamic population an extraordinarily simplified solution to the aporia described above became established which was first developed by the religious party of the Umayyad caliphs, the Murjiʾa. It consists in extensively curtailing the range of those Koranic verses which threaten the sinner with eternal punishment, so extensively that eternal punishment in Hell is in practice only a matter for unbelievers. The Muhammadan is justified by means of his profession of the true faith (see p. 282 below). For the serious sinners who are believers the intercession of the Prophet on behalf of his community comes into action, which guarantees Paradise to his followers. (Cf. Ashʿarī, *Maqālāt* 147 and 149-50, and see p. 284 below).

During a conversation in my presence between an elderly Turkish gentleman and my Greek barber, I had occasion to note in what a drastic form certainty of attaining Paradise may at times express itself when more or less the following sentence emerged from the mouth of the Muhammadan: "*Biz, öldükten sonra doğru cennete gideceğiz, sizin hâliniz ne olacak?* When we die, we go straight to Paradise. But what will happen to you?"

This conviction of justification by means of the profession of faith corresponds to certain tendencies in earliest Islam. Already during the lifetime of the Prophet pronouncing the profession of faith, the acknowledgement that Allah is the only God and that the Prophet is His messenger, played so central a role that all the other requirements to a great extent receded behind it. Changing over to Islam is the really essential act. The idea of a mission is the crux of the religious idea itself, the act of changing over the most important religious achievement. Thus the Muslim, in the end, is always justified before his God by the fact of his profession of faith. The socio-psychological law of the remission of sins within a circle of solidarity has here had far-reaching results.

Cf. H. Ritter, "Muhammed" in: *Meister der Politik*, pp. 361-62 and "Irrational Solidarity Groups" in: *Oriens* 1/1948/6-7.

However, not all Muslims take God's threats so lightly. The juridical concept of obedience in Islam, just as in Judaism and Christianity (Bultmann, *Urchristentum* 76), has resulted in a great deal of uncertainty regarding salvation. The early ascetics, such as Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, tremble in permanent uncertainty and anxiety regarding their future destiny. Ḥasan fears that tomorrow God will cast him into Hell-fire without asking many questions ("Ḥasan al-Baṣrī" 15), and therefore he is continually in a bad mood. We shall find the same in ᶜAṭṭār, but we shall also encounter other, in part exceptionally bold, statements concerning the problem of theodicy.

The real mystics have melted down the above-depicted harsh doctrines in a wholly characteristic way in accordance with their religious emotions. The mysticism of love overcomes the harshness of God's arbitrary acts through a love which surrenders itself to the beloved's will, indeed causes itself to experience delight in the effects of that will, even when the latter are painful. But the doctrine of God also being the sole agent in human behavior accommodated itself with the current of mysticism which set itself the goal of effacing individual activity, even individual personality, in God's personality, i.e. *fanāʾ*, and finally the doctrine has been theoretically incorporated as a self-evident truth in the pantheistic monism fostered by mysticism. These developments can be followed quite extensively in ᶜAṭṭār.

2

But before we begin an analysis and description of them, it will be useful at this point to consider briefly the dogmatic position adopted by the earlier Ṣūfīs with regard to the above-mentioned problems.

That position is developed in as much detail as one could wish for in a relatively early work, the *Kitāb al-Taᶜarruf li-madhhab ahl al-taṣawwuf* by Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Isḥāq al-Kalābādhī (ed. Arberry, Cairo 1933) who died in 380/990. In his dogmatics Kalābādhī takes up the position which is characteristic of Ashᶜarī's successors.

1) God is the creator of all acts of human beings, just as He is the creator of their physical selves. Everything they do, good and bad, occurs on the basis of the arrangement, predetermination and will of God. Otherwise, they would not be slaves, they would not be dominated by one lord and they would not be created...

Since their acts are things, God must be their creator. For if they were not created, then God would have created some things, and not created others. (P. 23).

2) The ability to act (*istiṭā*ᶜ*a*) is created at the same time as action, it does not exist before or afterwards. (P. $25_{1\text{-}2}$). (This is against the Muᶜtazila who assume an ability to act on the part of a human being before action, which gives him the capacity to do something or its opposite. Ashᶜarī, *Maqālāt* $230_{12\text{-}13}$).

3) Human beings possess action and "acquisition" (*iktisāb*) in a real sense, for which they are rewarded and punished. God's command and prohibition are based on this, as is the announcement of reward and punishment. Human beings freely choose their acquisition and wish for it. Nothing causes them or forces them to do it and they have no reluctance toward it. But when we say that they choose, what is meant is that God provides us with a choice (*ikhtiyār*). In this way both compulsion is excluded, as well as leaving the action (to human beings). (Pp. 25-26).

The concept of "acquisition" (*iktisāb*, *kasb*, cf. surahs 2/286, 30/41, 42/30; Bāqillānī, *al-Inṣāf*, p. 40) does not occur in the profession of faith of the *ahl al-sunna* which Ashᶜarī adopted for himself (*Maq.* 290-97). Yet Ashᶜarī professes his belief in it in a modified form (*Maq.* $552_{8\text{-}9}$ and *Luma*ᶜ § 87 ff.). The doctrine, in various formulations, is pre-Ashᶜarite and was probably thought up by Ḍirār. It is also put forward by Najjār and Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam. Cf. Montgomery Watt, "The Origin of the Islamic Doctrine of Acquisition" in: JRAS 1943/234 ff.; idem, *Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam*, London 1949, pp. 104 ff.; as well as William Thomson, "The Sects and Islam" in: *The Muslim World* 39/1949/215 ff.; Louis Gardet and M. N. Anawati, *Introduction à la Théologie Musulmane*, Paris 1948, pp. 60, 151, 161; Pines, *Beiträge zur islamischen Atomenlehre*, p. 31.

Admittedly, for the strict Ashᶜarites this *kasb*, *iktisāb* has no effect in bringing about an action. It is only another aspect under which the action can be viewed. The action, in so far as it is based on a human being's ability to act created by God at a given moment and connected with it, is *kasb*, but as far as it is based on God's omnipotence, it is *khalq* "creation". Nallino is right when he points out (*Raccolta* 2/29 and 429-39) that this solution is more verbal than substantial. The term *kasb*, *iktisāb* goes back to passages in the Koran such as 2/286, 30/41, 42/30, 35/45. (Bāqillānī cites these in *al-Inṣāf* 40). There this metaphor, which is taken from the realm of commerce, actually means acquiring, earning a reward or a punishment for an action (Bāqillānī, *al-Inṣāf* 40), and the dogmatic teaching of retribution in the hereafter is specifically based on this. Naturally, it is understood that the expressions in this sense can only be used about a human being as a subject. They are therefore used by dogmatists for the very reduced human role in an action, whereas they describe the decisive intervention of God as *khalq*. (Cf. also Charles C. Torrey, *The Commercial Theological Terms in the Koran*, pp. 27-29; R. Paret, *Grenzen der Koranforschung* 26; J. Schacht, "The History of Muhammadan Theology" in: *Studia Islamica* 1/1953/29-33). The difference between voluntary and involuntary human actions, e.g. between the hand movement when giving an orphan child a slap and the hand movement of someone suffering from a trembling palsey (*murta*ᶜ*ish*), or between climbing to the top of a minaret and falling from one, were of course

well known to the dogmatists and they speculated about how one might build this distinction into the Ashᶜarite doctrine or modify the doctrine. Here we cannot enter into the details of the discussion and the formulations it arrived at. (Cf. Bāqillānī, d. 403/1012, *al-Inṣāf*, pp. 40-41, and al-Galanbawī, d. 1205/1790, *Ḥāshiya ᶜalā Sharḥ al-ᶜAqāʾid al-ᶜaḍudiyya* of Ījī, Istanbul 1316, 2/247 ff.). Regarding the concept "choice" (*ikhtiyār*), see *Iḥyāʾ* 4/5, *Bayān wujūb al-tawba*; *Stufen* 29/A.22: "A decision of the will according to the vacillation of one's desires (*taraddud al-khawāṭir*) is called *ikhtiyār*."

4) God is free to act arbitrarily and to impose predestination as He wishes.

a) God does with human beings as He wishes and imposes on them what He wishes, whether it is for the best (*aṣlaḥ*) or not (this being against the Muᶜtazila, according to whom God must do what is best), because the creation is His creation, and the command is His command. He is not held accountable for whatever He does, whereas they are accountable (surah 21/23). If this were not the case, there would be no difference between master and slave.

b) The good which God does for human beings by way of beneficial acts, life and health, faith, guidance, and (demonstrations of) kindness, occurs due to pure mercy. He could have not done it and He is not bound by duty to do so. (Against the Muᶜtazila). (Pp. 27-28).

Reward and punishment do not occur because man has a claim to them (or deserves them), but they are an outcome of the divine will, mercy and the exercise of justice (but here not in the sense of the Muᶜtazila, as an attribute inherent in God which makes it impossible for Him to act unjustly). Indeed, human beings do not deserve an unending punishment for offenses which have an end, and a reward which is unlimited in number for good deeds of limited number. If He wished to torment with punishment all beings in the heavens and on earth, in so doing He would not be acting unjustly (*lam yakun ẓāliman*). If He were to bring all the unbelievers into Paradise, it would not be absurd. (P. 28).

Cf. the stark formulation in *Qūt* 1/10$_{18-19}$; *Nahrung* 1/344/28.5: "He will not be held accountable for (questioned about) whatever He does, because He is an almighty, exalted, tyrannical king (*malik qahhār, ᶜazīz, jabbār*). But they will be held accountable because they are subdued, lowly, compelled slaves."

c) For injustice (*ẓulm, jawr*) is not something which is fixed *a priori*, but is what is decreed and postulated as such by a higher commander. Yet God is not subordinate to anyone else. (Hence, positivistic legal theory, aimed against the Muᶜtazila who proclaimed a kind of natural law). Likewise, what is morally attractive and repulsive is not fixed *a priori* but is declared to be such by a divine act of will. (P. 29$_{8-12}$). (Moral concepts are not autonomous concepts).

A human being's destiny in the hereafter has already been determined by the time of his birth. The person's actions have no influence on his destiny in the hereafter. The names of the blessed and the damned have been recorded from all eternity in God's book, and this list is not subject to any later corrections. The blessed is already blessed in his mother's womb, and the damned is already

damned in his mother's womb. (Concerning the old controversies about this *ḥadīth*, see *Mukhtalif al-ḥadīth* 5, 33, 158).

5) A human being's actions are simply signs and an announcement in advance of what God has decided about the actor. (P. 36_{1-4}). At the same time acts of worship are an adornment of the limbs (above p. 57) which God does not allow one to renounce. (P. 36_{4-5}).

6) God's intervention is not fully concluded with predestination. He helps everyone attain what he was created for. (P. 36_{3}).

7) Nonetheless, God does reward and punish the actions of human beings because He has announced a reward for good actions and punishment for bad actions, and He keeps His word. (P. 36_{7-8})

8) The duty to follow His commands and to carry out His orders remains unchanged, and is not decreased by attaining higher levels of sanctity or an interior relationship to God as is the case with the "Friends of God" (*awliyāʾ*) and "Knowers of God" (*ʿārifūn*). On the contrary, those who are on such a high level will be even more zealously concerned with works. (P. 35_{2-8}).

9) Although God has the right to dispose over the destiny of a human being arbitrarily, independently of his works, certain expressions of God's will are found in revelation from which one may conclude that He will see to it that better treatment is given to certain classes of people and worse treatment to others:

a) The unbelievers are assured of damnation. (Pp. 29_{1}, 30_{5}).

b) The Prophet and the ten blessed ones mentioned by name, as well as the Companions, are, according to a saying of the Prophet, assured of blessedness. (P. 47_{15-19}).

c) Theoretically, those believers who have good works to their credit and otherwise are only guilty of small venial sins should be safe from damnation. (The significance of these little sins is judged variously, p. 30_{5-11}). But since no one can claim sinlessness for himself, certainty in connection with one's destiny in the hereafter is limited to the believer being certain in any case that he will not remain in Hell-fire for eternity and even in the worst case that he will be transferred from Hell to heaven on the basis of his faith in God and the Prophet, though this faith is as small as an atom. (P. 33_{4-5}).

d) The believer is not certain of escaping temporary punishment in Hell, although the possibility exists for God to forgive even his great sins on the basis of a free decision of His will or on the basis of the Prophet's intercession. (Pp. $30_{12\ ff}$, 32_{6-11}). Here is where there is a place for begging for mercy and begging the Prophet for intercession.

10) Accordingly, the pious man hovers between fear before God's punishment and hope of His forgiveness. The true man of piety will make the highest demands on himself. He will take as seriously as possible his falling short of God's requirements and the sins he has committed. He will behave as if all of God's threats were directed against him alone, and all of God's promises were

only for others. A drastic example of this was Sarī al-Saqaṭī who said: "I look in a mirror several times a day out of fear that my face may have turned black" (Cf. Qushayrī *Risāla* 61, *Bāb al-khawf*; *Sendschreiben* 195/10.16). (Pp. 30_{17}-31_{8}.— Cf. also p. 315 below).

So much for Kalābādhī.

Regarding the same problems, see *Iḥyā'* 4/219-223, *Bayān ḥaqīqat al-tawḥīd*; *Stufen* 521-551/E.9-76.

3

If we now return to ᶜAṭṭār, we will find in his work the same fundamental elements of the doctrines described above. Only, thanks to the illustration provided by the stories, in him everything appears more three-dimensional, vivid and easy to visualize than in Kalābādhī's textbook. Furthermore, in ᶜAṭṭār, as we shall see, all religious motifs are raised to the ultimate degree. The forms of aporia which arise from these doctrines are more deeply felt and expressed with incredible poignancy.

Predetermination and punishment.

We saw in the review of Kalābādhī's dogmatic Tenets that, according to the orthodox view, God creates the actions of human beings and is therefore the author of those actions, yet He will nonetheless reward human beings for good actions and punish them for bad ones. Man's active share in his deeds is reduced to the pale concept of "acquisition" (*iktisāb*) and interior consent, which latter concept makes it possible to eliminate from the discussion the idea of compulsion (*jabr*) that involves reluctance or the feeling of being forced into something one dislikes and does not want.

In ᶜAṭṭār the aporia appears in unmitigated sharpness, is painfully felt and finds expression in gripping images and stories.

I don't know, I don't know. My God, You know, You know what You want! One person You called unto You with a hundred forms of friendliness, and another You drove away from You with a hundred pains. The former had no acts of obedience to his credit, nor had the latter committed sins. No one has access to Your secret! (IN p. $377_{6\text{-}8}$).

A polo-stick strikes a ball from east to west and says to it: "Pay attention to your course, so you don't fall into a ditch! For if your course is crooked, you'll remain in fire and prison for all eternity!" But since the course of the ball is determined by the blow of the one who strikes it, the ball has no guilt if it follows a crooked course! Even if the sin is not committed by you (*nā kardan-i tust*), you still have the sin around your neck (*dar gardan-i tust*)! (IN p. $117_{16\text{-}20}$).

Eternity extending backwards (*azal*) is like a bow from which a thousand arrows are shot every moment. In future eternity (*abad*) is the goal. If the arrow flies straight, naturally that's because the archer aimed carefully and performed his task well. But if the arrow strays from a straight course, then curses come pouring down on the poor arrow!—I know of nothing more strange than this. My heart bleeds, I know nothing more than this! (IN 7/8, p. 118).

Abū Bakr Sufāla says: "They put me in the water and order me not to get wet." (IN 7/9, p. 118).—There follows a reflection on the pain of pious men which arises from their awareness of this hopeless situation. (Pp. 118_{12}-119).

Satan himself appears to be a victim of this unsolvable contradiction.

One of the great men hears Satan say: "This affair (my destiny) doesn't come from that face as beautiful as the moon (God, whom he still loves despite everything) but because my robe is black. (I.e. my bad fortune has willed it this way). They don't want me to perform acts of obedience, and nonetheless they hang the sin around my neck." (IN 8/2, p. 129. See p. 561 below).

In just half an hour God wiped out a thousand years of obedient service on Satan's part.

Similar thoughts are found in ᶜUmar Khayyām: Rosen no. 66 *riḍā-i tu kujāst*; 265 *dar jihān kēst bi-gū*.

4

God can bestow one mercy after another on His worshipper and so lull him into a false sense of security (*istidrāj*), only then to withdraw his mercy suddenly and hurl him into eternal damnation. One speaks of God's cunning (*makr*) which manifests itself in such behavior.

Ayyūb al-Qurashī wrote a special treatise on the subject: GAL² $2/450_{31}$. Regarding this view in the *ḥadīth*, see W. M. Watt, *Free Will* 18-19.

Satan has been the victim of this cunning, nor are the other angels protected against it.

When what happened to Satan happened (when he was cursed), Gabriel and Michael began to weep and they wept for a long time. God then asked them: "Why are you weeping so?" They said: "We don't feel safe from Your cunning." Then God said: "That's how it should be! Don't feel safe from My cunning!" (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 61, *Bāb al-khawf*; *Sendschreiben* 195/10.1; *Iḥyāʾ* 4/157, *Bayān aḥwāl al-anbiyāʾ*; *Stufen* 378/C.161).

"Don't let yourself be deceived", so says Ḥātim al-Aṣamm, "by the quantity of your religious devotions! For what happened to Satan happened to him after a

long period of worship." (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 62, *Bāb al-khawf*; *Sendschreiben* 195/10.16).

The same thought is found in ᶜAṭṭār. (The stories about Satan we shall defer until Chpt. 27/15).

Many a person passed his whole life in the faith but in the end died an unbeliever.

Abū Bakr al-Warrāq appears to a dervish in a dream weeping. "Why are you weeping like this?", asks the dervish. The deceased answers: "How can I not weep? Out of ten dead who were brought today to the cemetery where I lie, not one died a believer." (IN 17/8, pp. 278-79).

A human being has no sure means of knowing whether he belongs to the accepted or the rejected. Only a few pious men have the gift of being able to recognize from certain signs that someone has been rejected. But it is not allowed for them to make known their knowledge (*Qūt* 1/231; *Nahrung* 2/171 f./32.264). Some, however, do speak, as in the case of Shiblī who described a hypocritical baker as a man of Hell. (IN 5/1, pp. 88-89; TA 2/170). Muḥammad ibn Faḍl is capable of pointing out the signs of misfortune in a person. (TA $2/88_{2\text{-}5}$).

Unbelievers and sinners make the mistake of assuming that they enjoy good standing with God because of the abundance of favors they receive. But this is delusion (*ghirra bi'llāh. Riᶜāya* 270-73, 274 ff.). The angels weep over people like this.

On his heavenly ascension the Prophet passes by a great lake on the banks of which is a group of angels who continually fill the lake with their tears. He asks why they're weeping this way and is given the answer: "We're weeping over the people of your community who think things are well with them and spend their whole life in this illusion, whereas things are really very bad with them." (IN 13/4, p. 202).

Even the prophets are not secure with regard to a bad end.

Sahl al-Tustarī sees in a dream thirty prophets in Paradise and asks them what they had most feared during their life. They answer: "Coming to a bad end (*sūʾ al-khātima*)." (*Qūt* 1/229 middle; *Nahrung* 2/166/32.253).

5

God decides on belief and unbelief.

In the same way that God creates moral behavior in human beings, His will and intervention is also the cause behind the most crucial religious decision that there is, the decision for faith or unbelief. It is well known that the Prophet's experiences with the obstinate Meccans are the actual basis for the contradictory

teachings of the Koran regarding the origin of faith and unbelief. As a preacher of a new faith, Muḥammad had to make his compatriots aware of the consequences of not acknowledging his mission, namely God's punitive tribunal. The incomprehensible experience that his preaching to the Meccans remained ineffective, he could not make sense of, however, other than by assuming that God Himself had willed their unbelief. The soul on different occasions and in different circumstances requires something different, and this difference results in logically contradictory dogmatic propositions which cannot be explained by means of purely rational thought. The aporia finally found expression in the proposition that in principle one ought not to ask the reason for God's actions.

Thus, without any reason, God condemns some people to unbelief and, without any reason, He bestows on others the gift of grace for the faith.

Nimrod, the great adversary of Abraham, is rescued through God's intervention from temporal death only to be all the more certainly doomed to eternal ruin.

A ship sinks on the high seas in a storm. Only one woman saves herself on a floating plank. She gives birth to a boy and drowns. God orders the waves and winds to protect the boy. The plank is driven ashore, the suckling babe is found and raised by a fisherman. One day the boy finds a magic salve which when rubbed on one eye gives him the ability to see the Celestial Throne, the Footstool and all the spheres, but when rubbed on the other eye, confers sight to behold all the treasures hidden under ground. When the angels ask God who this mortal is, they're told: "This is Nimrod who will be Our enemy."—See how He has raised him up and how He suddenly hurls him back into destruction! No one in the two worlds has insight into God's secret. What sense does it make to occupy oneself with the reason behind God's ordaining. (IN 14/2, pp. 219-20).

On Nimrod see Heller's article "Namrūd" in the EI. Regarding the salve cf. Yāqūt, *Muᶜjam al-buldān* 1/258; Stith Thompson, *Motif-Index of Folk-Literature* D 1323.5.—See also Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiᶜ al-zuhūr*, Cairo 1291, p. 82.—It is a frequently occurring characteristic in ᶜAṭṭār that decisions of God's will are revealed in talks between Him and the angels. Cf. the Index of the *Ilāhīnāma* under *Malāʾika*.

The eighty-year-old Nimrod, who is tormented by a gnat, finally understands that the gnat is punishment for his having denied God. He offers all his treasures to Abraham, if only Abraham will ask God, out of His mercy and compassion, to bestow the light of faith on him. Abraham actually does intercede for him and says to God: "Remove the closed lock from this ignorant person's heart, let the door chain be lifted and open the door for him! Make his soul, which is caught in a frenzy, fresh through the faith! Out of mercy don't allow him to die as an idol-

ater!" But the divine voice answers: "Don't worry yourself about him! One can't bargain with Us to acquire faith, it's Our free gift. If We so wish, then the command goes forth and faith emerges from unbelief." It's no wonder that the pious, who see how God has no concern for those who seek Him, can't sleep at night and find no peace during the day! (IN 7/2, p. 114).

In Jewish legend, Titus, the destroyer of the Temple, dies because of a gnat which penetrates into his brain.

When Pharaoh is drowning, he wants to pronounce the profession of faith at the last moment, but Gabriel fills his mouth with mud from the sea so that he can't complete saying it and dies an unbeliever. If he had succeeded in pronouncing the entire profession of faith and not only half of it, four hundred years of a life of sin and unbelief would have been forgiven him. (MN 0/2.—Tha[c]labī 124).

For this reason the pious are suspended in permanent uncertainty as to whether they will die in the true faith or whether God will make them into unbelievers before their death.

A fire-worshipper converts to Islam at the hand of Bāyazīd and cuts the belt he's wearing, the sign of his unbelief. Instead of rejoicing at this, the great shaykh weeps. When someone asks him in amazement what reason he has to be sad, he answers: "God has undone this unbeliever's belt of unbelief after seventy years and in one moment transformed his wretchedness into salvation. Perhaps He will now gird this belt on me! What am I to do then? Why should I not weep?" (IN 7/3, p. 115).

Worked out on the basis of a famous saying: Qushayrī, *Risāla* 48-49, *Bāb al-mujāhada*; *Sendschreiben* 155/4.3; Massignon, *Recueil* 28.

And see the story of a Ṣūfī who becomes a Christian and is killed fighting against the Muslims, in Qushayrī, *Risāla* 61, *Bāb al-khawf*, *Sendschreiben* 194 f./10.15. Two stories about Muslims who fall in love with Christian women, become Christians and will not let themselves be talked out of it, are told as dreadful examples of God's "cunning" in the *Rawnaq al-majālis*. See p. 401 below.—And a similar conversion story occurs in Tha[c]lab, *Majālis* 1/30-32.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE UNQUENCHED DRIVE FOR KNOWLEDGE

This is not the place to enter into the different attempts which have been made to explain "the origin of the idea of God". Primordial psychic impulses and primitive stages of consciousness whose investigation has been pursued in various groping attempts, the later human perception that natural events lack a totally rational explanation, the basic need in man to come to terms spiritually, intellectually and practically with his peculiar existential plight in the world, between birth and death, with his subordination to transcendent forces and powers, with the solitude of the human race in the cosmos and that of the individual in his soul, and likewise the need to feel protected by a power superior to all the threatening forces, these are some of the primary factors which could contribute to explaining the phenomenon of the idea of God. Still other elements to consider are man's inner situation, his dependence on an animal and spiritual nature, on drives which he can only imperfectly master, this combined with the desire to overcome that dependence. And then there is the necessity to rein in the Ego which wants to impose itself and expand, to bring under control its excessive sense of self-importance, thereby making social relations possible.

But reflections such as these are based on an idea of a primordial man who is more or less endowed and constructed with the characteristics of a modern human being. The soul of an empirical man, especially of a primitive man, contains many more mysterious characteristics and is far more difficult to comprehend. The phenomenology of religion is considerably richer and more multifarious, and the beginning stages of man's spiritual development lie outside the realm of empirical experience.

Here we are dealing with a late stage of monotheism. To begin with, its essential concern is the firm belief in the real existence of a being raised above all earthly imperfections which, on the one hand, as absolute subject, as the author of all things outside the

human will and influence, solves the question of the riddle of the world through its being and activity, and, on the other hand, as absolute personality of the will, exercises the function of establishing a law and assures compliance to it by means of warnings and sanctions.

At a later stage this divine being's character of reality becomes so heightened that primary reality is attributed to Him alone. Everything else only has a secondary existence which is derived from Him.

Religious man at a certain stage, after myth has been dismissed and rational thought has replaced mythology with a theology, comes to feel the need to draw closer to this highest being through the means of knowledge at his disposal, to make sure of His real existence and to reach insights regarding His nature and His attributes. For a purely traditional believer who adheres to a revealed religion like Islam, this need certainly offers no special problem. As he sees it, God has revealed Himself in history through a series of religious personalities, the prophets, the last of whom was Muḥammad. The content of this revelation is recorded in writing in a holy book, and therefore all that still matters is to interpret this revelation, the Word of God—in the process of which, revelation comes to be completed through the orally transmitted instructions of the bearer of revelation, the Prophet—and to keep it alive in the hearts of the faithful through teaching, recitation and preaching.

But it is different for the speculative theologian and the philosopher of religion. He seeks, with the support of revelation, to affirm and give an account of God's existence and His attributes by means of rational deduction and dialectic.

Finally, the mystic is different again. He accepts on faith revelation and tradition, indeed he even plays them off against heathen philosophy, but he also wants to experience God Himself without mediation. And though he does not expect to achieve this in the highly privileged manner of the prophets, he nonetheless seeks a direct personal contact with divinity, a contact for which he prepares himself through ascetic and meditative practices, and exercises of concentration. The speculations of the dogmatists and the deductions of the philosophers hold no interest for him. He sees these as purely human activity, futile efforts of a finite, created organ, reason, to arrive at that uncreated, eternal being, who only manifests Himself to His creatures but cannot be demonstrated by a creature. All utterances which man makes concerning

God are transposed from man onto God, are a human product, and possess no epistemological worth. Only in the service of revelation is reason able to achieve something useful, as philosophy it is surpassed and worthless. Thinking is only worthwhile as thought of the heart, as meditation, not as rational thought of the intellect.

The teachings of revelation and tradition are fully confirmed by the mystic but they are only a part of what is required. The value of occupying oneself with the sciences which deal with the sources of knowledge is limited. A person who spends his whole life studying and learning these sciences has ultimately chosen a wrong, in fact a worldly, profession.

On the other hand, the mystic is far removed from effortlessly attaining possession of knowledge of God and the world-ground through *a priori* inner experience. Unquenched, tormented yearning for knowledge which one moment is directed to the riddle of the world and asks in vain about the meaning of existence, and the next seeks to penetrate to divinity which is hidden behind seventy thousand veils, drives the seeker restlessly forward and in all directions—this motif is in particular impressively developed in ᶜAṭṭār—until he finds what he is seeking at the source, within his own soul. Of course, here he is once more thrown back on his inadequate Ego, and God, after all, still remains transcendent! How mystics attempt to overcome this difficulty, namely by means of the idea of man's primordial affinity with God, a fundamental bond between the soul and the world-ground, and likewise by eliminating human subjectivity, the Ego, through extinction, we shall come to see later. But now let us return to ᶜAṭṭār.

1

The methods of knowledge available to human beings are inadequate. They lead to no unanimously accepted conclusion. Each person sees the truth differently. Only one in hundreds of thousands of people attains knowledge of the divine mysteries. But it is necessary to strive after this knowledge unrelentingly.

After the Valley of Love the birds have to make their way through the Valley of Knowledge (above p. 16). There one finds a great number of paths which diverge. No one of them resembles another. Each traveller only advances as far as the limits of his perfection allow, he only approaches (God) by as much as corresponds to his particular situation. Consequently, the knowledge involved is

variable. One person finds the prayer-niche, another the "idol". When the sun of knowledge shines forth, everyone sees according to his capacity and in reality only finds his own heart again. But when the secret of the (divine) being is made visible to him, he then sees the kernel within the husk, he no longer sees anything but the divine friend. A hundred thousand secrets appear to him from behind the veil. But a hundred thousand men lose their way before one of them becomes capable of seeing secrets... If you don't see the beauty of the friend, stand up and don't sit down, and seek after secrets! If you know nothing of this, you resemble a donkey. Shame on you! (MṬ 40/0, pp. 137-38).

God's essence and attributes are inaccessible to reason.

Cf. e.g. *Iḥyā'* 4/264, *Bayān anna ajall al-ladhdhāt, etc.*; *Stufen* 651/F.62; Henry Corbin, *Sohrawardî d'Alep, fondateur de la doctrine illuminative (ishrāqī)*, Paris 1939, pp. 20-21; Ghazzālī, *Ibāḥiyya*, Introduction p. 5; H. Ritter, "Philologika XI" in: *Der Islam* 26/1940/118.

The fact that His essence is higher than all reason (*munazzah*) constitutes one of God's titles to glory which the poet mentions in the eulogy of God with which he opens his poems.

In the name of Him... whose essence is eternal, in describing whose essence reason is deaf and dumb (incapable). Souls end up in confusion if they have to describe Him, reason bites its finger in perplexity. No one knows His eternal attributes. Whatever attribute you ascribe to Him: He's more than that. (IN p. $2_{1a, 2b, 5-6}$)—Reason has described You at great length but in the end remained behind with a soul full of suffering. (P. 4_{12}).—On account of Your light reason fell into confusion, out of shame it remained ignorant. (P. 6_{12}).—You're more than all the description I give. (P. 7_{3a}).

I've been killed through desperate confusion, I know no help other than that of helplessness. Oh You on whose path reason is a suckling babe, in searching for You aged reason lost its way. How should I, a simpleton, arrive at such a being? And if I did arrive, how should I attain Him who is elevated (*munazzah*) above all (knowledge). (MṬ verses 172-73).

Oh You, the sight of whom is hidden from body and soul, because of whom reason and wisdom lose their way! Reason, soul and heart are limited in themselves. How can a limited (being) attain his God? (MN, in the introduction).

All utterances which reason makes about God are brought from outside, are a human construct (see p. 619 below) and describe nothing about Him. God is entirely different from everything that man declares about Him.

Regarding the popular *tanzīh* theology, cf. Macdonald's article "Allāh" in EI 1/322a.

Every judgement you utter, that is you yourself. "Great", "knowing"... that is you yourself... All things you know as His attribute, you read out from the notebooks of your own understanding. But since your understanding is you, not He, it's not right to attach attributes to Him. Since His attributes are neither He nor

outside of Him, how can you attach attributes to Him? Know His essence! Know Him through Him, that is your path! (AN, the end of 11/5).

A foolish man goes outdoors with a candle in order to see the sun in the sky. In his ignorance he thinks he can't see the sun without the candle. (AN 11/6).

Shiblī says: "...and everything by which you distinguish Him in your delusion, and by which you grasp Him in your most perfect concepts with your reason, will be sent back and returned to you. It has been brought forth in time and is created like you." (*Luma*[c] $30_{7\text{-}8}$, similarly $223_{11\text{-}13}$; *Schlaglichter* 68/15.5 and 342/89.11).

What kind of a gate is it whose lock has no key! What kind of ocean is it whose bottom can't be seen! Knowledge is not the business of every unworthy person. This is attested by the words: "You're all fools with regard to His essence." (*Kullukum fī dhātihī ḥamqā*). Everything you know, that is what you are... Since He is outside of everything that exists, one has nothing of Him in one's hand except delusion. As long as He doesn't show Himself to you the way He is, how can you say you've seen Him and know Him? All you see is mere fantasy, all you know is mere absurdity.

A *murīd* frequently pronounces the name of God before a famous shaykh. The shaykh says to him: "Actually, God has no name. No matter what you call Him, that's not Him, it's you. And everything you know, that's not Him." (MN 0/1).

In conversation the Ṣūfīs avoid the *ishāra ilā'llāh*, designating God with a name or the pronoun "He", or pointing upward to heaven, etc., because to do so assumes God is at a distance. Cf. *Luma*[c] 30_4, 223-24; *Schlaglichter* 68/15.5, 342/89.11; *Qūt* $2/67_{12\text{-}14}$; *Nahrung* 2/547/32.790; *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 1/91-92; Bīrūnī, *Mā li'l-Hind* 43; *Asrār al-tawḥīd* 219; O'Kane, *Secrets* 400; Anṣārī, *Ṭabaqāt* 83 a-b.

All that you say and know, is you... Know Him through Him, not through yourself! The road to Him comes from Him, not from reason... Only an illusory idea of Him is given to human beings, to tell of Him is impossible. All good and bad, everything they've said about Him, they've said from themselves, etc. (MṬ verses 90-91, 94-95).

In this ocean there are thousands of drops, but the jewel is hidden at the bottom of the ocean. People have written and disputed much about God's attributes. For thousands of aeons men have thought about this but the end result was inability and perplexity. (AN in 7/5).

The personified Intellect itself rejects the traveller who turns to it and asks to be made to reach God: he has no reason if he thinks that reason has this capacity (above p. 29). Reason, so it criticizes itself, brings forth a hundred thousand explanations and then sends out a world of doubts. It becomes caught in logical errors, in *petitio principii*. No real agreement is reached through it. To be sure, reason is fully competent in knowledge of God (here this capacity is conceded to it), but soul and heart are more competent still.—The *pīr*, to whom the traveller returns, acknowledges the importance of reason: It's an interpreter who reports

on God, it's the just judge over earth and heaven, its judgements have validity, it's the key to difficulties, etc., but what those who talk about reason have to say is usually lies and nonsense. (MN 38/0).—Sometimes a donkey demonstrates the foolishness of wise men:

When Alexander with his wise men seeks a way out of the land of darkness back to his army camp, his advisers have no better means than to let themselves be led by a donkey. If a donkey has more worth than intelligent men, what is one to expect from unintelligent men? (MN 38/1).—(In the Alexander romance, as is well known, Alexander leaves behind the foals of horses and donkeys at the edge of the land of darkness. The mothers of these animals, having been taken along, then find their way back to their foals following their maternal instinct).

If reason becomes arrogant, it leads to unbelief. It must bow to the holy command (the holy law).

God has toppled wretched reason with the holy law. (MN in the eulogy to God at the beginning).

Bal^camī carries out religious worship for four hundred years and writes four hundred books proving the oneness of God. But one night he gets up, produces a hundred proofs denying God and begins to worship the sun. This is what results when reason oversteps its limits.

Nothing like this is reported about either of the two Bal^camīs (see EI s.n.). Perhaps there is a confusion here between the predecessor (or successor) of the older Bal^camī in the vizierate, Jayhānī whom the *Fihrist* p. 338 reckons to be a *zindīq*, or Ērānshahrī, about whom Bīrūnī, *Mā li'l-Hind* p. 4 reports that he propagated a religion invented by himself. Cf. Pines, *Beiträge zur islamischen Atomenlehre* 34-35; Minorsky, *Marvazī* 129.

Better, and leading to the goal sooner than the overly refined reason of wise men, is the simple reason of simpletons.

An elderly fiddle player can no longer earn his bread. No one wants to hear him. In the end, he enters an old mosque and performs a concert for God. He asks God not to leave him unrewarded for his playing like the others have done. That moment Shaykh Abū Sa^cīd passes by the mosque. He has just received a hundred pieces of gold as a gift for his dervishes from a rich man. He lets the dervishes go hungry and sends the money to the fiddle player in the deserted mosque. The money belongs to him. Out of gratitude, the old man vows only to wish to play for God in the future, because God alone knows how to appreciate an artist's worth.—Thus less intelligence makes matters easier. (MN 38/3).

Cf. *Asrār al-tawḥīd* 86-87 (O'Kane, *Secrets* 193-95) where Abū Sa^cīd's follower Ḥasan Mu^ɔaddib recounts a version of the story in great detail. Here the old man is not a *rabāb* player but a player of the long-necked lute (*ṭanbūr*). And see *Mathnawī* 1/1913 ff. where the story involves a harp player in the time of the caliph ^cUmar.

The poet also professes that he believes in this childlike faith:

If you wish to present these mysteries through reason, then you gird the waist of the gebrs (fire-worshippers) with their belt. I hold the notion of faith which old ladies hold (*īmān al-ᶜajūz*). (AN in 6/5).

2

Heathen philosophy, which is based on reason, *ratio*, has been devalued and dethroned by the ḥoly law.

How can you claim to find the happiness of the angels in the wisdom of the Greeks? If you don't separate yourself from this wisdom, how can you then become a man in the wisdom of religion?... The U of unbelief (*kāf-i kufr*) is preferable to me to the P of philosophy. Because one can guard against unbelief if it's unmasked. But the art of dispute sends even an intelligent person down the wrong path. After the torch of religion burned the wisdom of the Greeks, one can no longer ignite the heart's torch with that science. (MṬ *Khātima* after 3, verses 4500-01, 4503-07).

No one is further removed from the law of the Hāshimite Prophet than the philosopher. Holy law (*sharᶜ*) means following the Prophet's command, whereas following philosophy is to pour earth on one's head. Philosophy is the language of Zoroastrianism, philosophy stands with its back turned against religion. The philosopher finds his sufficiency in universal intelligence (*ᶜaql-i kull*), the command "Speak!" (*qul*, frequent beginning of a verse in the Koran) is enough for our understanding... Guidance through reason is weak because it has grown up out of itself... Reason has need of "Speak!" and God's command, so it can proceed along its way and show the way to others... Your knowledge and your reason consist of travelling in accordance with the command, not to go astray following reason alone. (MN 0, toward the end).

Philosophizing about the workings of nature as well is shunned by the Ṣūfīs. They do not ask about the "reasons" for God's ordaining.

Cf. p. 615-16 below.—See the dogmatic controversies about the cause (*ᶜilla*) of the world's creation in Ashᶜarī, *Maqālāt* 252-53.

Someone asks Bāyazīd why the heavens and the earth are as they are; why the earth is fixed and the heavens rotate, etc. Bāyazīd answers: "We don't speak about the reason for the whole, therefore we don't seek the reason for the particular. Philosophy asks about reasons (causes), therefore it has no part in the religion of Muḥammad. In this religion and community there is nothing but acceptance of the way things are and submission to that." (AN 6/6).

The famous philospher ᶜUmar Khayyām confesses in his grave that he sought in vain for knowledge. (In his quatrains this form of resigned agnosticism is frequently expressed).

E.g. Arberry 30 *u-ādāb shudhand;* 70 *rah nēst;* 95 *farsūdhand;* 97 *raftan-i māst*; 130 *mē-kōshand.*

A man with the gift of being able to hear the dead speak in their graves is brought to the grave of the philosopher ᶜUmar Khayyām. He declares: "This is a man in imperfection. At that gate to which he turned, he laid claim to knowledge. Now that his ignorance has been made clear to him, he's drenched in sweat because of his soul's confusion. He has ended up between shame and confusion. By pursuing knowledge he has ended up deficient."—At that gate where the seven heavens (spheres) (like a door-knocker) knock (and remain outside, cf. p. 88, line 5 from bot.), how can one talk about knowledge? (IN 17/3, p. 272. Cf. *Der Islam* 26/1940/118).

3

In this way the holy law is set up in opposition to philosophy. Reason needs to be supervised by revelation and guidance from the prophets.

For the Ṣūfī, however, there is still another kind of thought, "the heart's thought" in meditation, in contemplation, which is to be achieved by means of *dhikr*, concentration of the soul on God. Thought based on reason is a matter for unbelievers, whereas "the traveller thought" emerges from *dhikr* (above p. 21). Of course, there is no longer a process of revelation such as was conferred on the prophets, but God bestows illuminations and forms of understanding on His friends, on the basis of which they speak higher truth.

The traveller thought doesn't come forth from reason, he comes forth from the heart. People of the heart possess another form of experience (*dhawq*) and another understanding (*fahm*) which is higher than the understanding of both worlds. Whoever activates this understanding throws himself into the ocean of mysteries.

ᶜAlī asks Ḥudhayfa: "Besides the Koran is there still a divine revelation (*waḥy*) today?" He answers: "There is no divine inspiration (*waḥy*) besides the Koran, but God gives His friends a very good understanding, and with this understanding, which arises like revelation from God, they speak the truth regarding His word (*dar kalām-i ō sukhun gōyand rāst*)." (MN, *Sharḥ-i kitāb*/1).

But the real source of mystical understanding is the soul. This understanding through the soul (*ᶜirfān*) stands in contrast to understanding through reason, it stands above understanding through reflection (meditation), which ends in helpless bewilderment (*taḥayyur*), and above transmitted science (*ᶜilm*) which ends in ignorance.

Set up two balances for your reason and your soul and place the latter in the scales! If reason weighs more, that's a deficiency for you (a falling short in weight). If the soul weighs more, then the beloved is yours. (MN 40, after 5).

True inner understanding (*ᶜirfān*) comes into being when that which you call reason becomes null and void (*bāṭil*). Reason is necessary in order to bear being God's slave, whereas the soul is necessary in order to bear God's lordliness. How can reason get along with the soul? When it comes to running, an animal carcass is no match for Burāq (the Prophet's mount on his journey through the heavens). Your pain comes first of all out of reflecting, it ends up in helpless bewilderment. Knowledge is necessary in order to know that the end of knowledge is ignorance. (Ibid.).

How understanding takes place in the soul, and what forms of understanding are to be won in this way, we shall hear about below (Chpt. 30).

4

However, the path to understanding is difficult for the mystic. ᶜAṭṭār and his characters are far removed from knowing that they are in firm possession of understanding. They admit "that they cannot know anything", and numerous indeed are the stories in which this knowledge that one cannot know anything, as well as the conviction that the riddle of the world and human existence is unfathomable, are illustrated. Nor is ᶜAṭṭār able to boast that he possesses knowledge of God (*maᶜrifat*).

Why do I go on talking so much? One simply can't describe You with attributes (*nayāyī dar ṣifat*)! What should I do since I really have no understanding (*maᶜrifat*). (MṬ verse 81).—I'm killed by helpless confusion. I've no choice but helplessness (*na-dāram chāra juz bē-chāragī*). (MṬ verse 171).—I've staked reason and soul, religion and heart, in order merely to understand the perfection of a mote in a sunbeam. No one knows the innermost being of a mote in a sunbeam (atom) completely. How long will you still ask, how long will you go on speaking? (MṬ verses 141, 144).

The sky's wheel has many secrets behind the curtain, which no one has ever fathomed. I've long sought the thread for this secret and haven't found it, though I've sought during a lifetime. Perhaps this secret shouldn't be told, perhaps the pearl of secrets shouldn't be pierced.

A slave carries a covered bowl in silence. Someone asks him what's in the bowl. The slave answers: "Be quiet! Why has the bowl been covered? If one were meant to know this secret, the bowl wouldn't be covered."—Who knows and understands anything about what this eternally rotating wheel of heaven does? (AN 13/1).

The following story simply seems to amplify the notion of "forever turning round in circles".

A sage says to a counterfeiter: "I'll catch you in the net in such a way that you turn about me ten times on a brick (?)."

Ḥakīm-ē-rā yakī zar (variant *sar*) *bar badal zadh ḥakīm andar ḥaqq-i ō īn mathal zadh*
ki dar dāmat chunān āram ba-mardī ki bar yak khisht dah girdam bigardī (AN 13/2).

The little that one does know only makes the riddle even greater.

There are many stars in the sky which are a hundred times larger than the earth. It takes five hundred years for a stone to fall from the sky to the earth. In comparison with the nine spheres the earth is no larger than a poppy seed in the ocean.—The only thing you have from the heavens is a beautiful spectacle.

A dervish contemplates the star-filled sky and says: "Oh God, if even the roof of Your prison is this beautiful, what must the roof of Your garden be like!" (Above p. 52).—After long reflections on the strange behavior of the stars which he has described with many images and similes, the poet explains: "It's not right to be occupied with these golden idols, because one can't understand the sense behind their rotation. You're like someone who knows nothing about chess and doesn't understand the sense of the moves." (AN 13/3).

If this secret gives you a headache, don't break your head over it.

Amplification by a fool:

A dumb peasant comes to the city and there sees a minaret for the first time. He asks what kind of a tree it is and what kind of fruit it produces. Some jokers inform him that it's a tree which all year bears a "*ṭang*" (a sound word: the Ms. glosses it as *āwāz*) as fruit, which is helpful against headache. When the peasant, who suffers from headache, climbs the minaret at the instigation of the jokers in order to pick the fruit, he falls from the top and breaks his neck. (AN 13/4).

A similar story with a different joke about the minaret already occurs in Bar Hebraeus (cf. *The Laughable Stories*, ed. and transl. E. A. Wallis Budge, London 1897, p. 152, no. 605). Also similar is the Persian prank in Meherjibhai Nosherwanji Kuka, *The Wit and Humor of the Persians*, Bombay 1894, p. 175, no. 65.

Now the poet addresses his readers in order to draw their attention to their dubious situation, helplessness and incapacity:

You're like a lame ant who wishes to climb up a hair and reach the moon. What sense does it make if a blind man boasts of being able to split a hair in a dark well? You exist and you don't exist: you're not nothing, nor are you something outside of nothing.

A *pīr* says: "You neither become lost, nor are you here. Even if you become as honored as the Celestial Throne, you'll still be reckoned (by God) as nothing,[1]

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[1] ?: *Agar chun ʿarsh-i aʿlā gardī az ʿiz ba-hēchat bar namē-gīrand hargiz.*

and even if you shrink to the size of an atom, you still won't become lost." (AN 13/5).

What do you want, what are you talking about, where are you? Peasant, talk about the buttermilk!

An eloquent preacher mounts the pulpit and gives a sermon on every imaginable subject. A fool cries out: "What's really your purpose with this talk?" The preacher answers: "For forty years I've spoken secrets and I perform a major ritual ablution before every sermon. Why shouldn't I hold preaching sessions?" The fool says: "Preach another forty years, perform a major ritual ablution and speak about Koranic interpretation and Tradition. And when you've spoken for eighty years, then come to me with the milk jar and I'll pour some sour milk in it for you!"—You've spent a whole life to find your jar but what you find in the jar is only sour milk. (AN 13/6).

All that is revealed to the person for whom the curtain is lifted is the fact that God almighty creates innumerable worlds and then destroys them:

A *pīr* asks God to lift the curtain for him. God grants his request, and he sees the two worlds fitted inside one another like the layers of an onion and inhabited by strange creatures. Some walk on their side, others on their head. Some go about without a head, others fly without wings, people of different kinds, each disappearing on a different path. When the *pīr* sees this, he becomes dizzy. After a while he asks God to raise the curtain again. Then he sees nothing more of all these creatures. Thus God shows him His unfathomable omnipotence in the hands of which both worlds are like wax and which every moment can create worlds or close doors shut so that God, who has no need of creatures, remains alone. (AN 13/7).

A *pīr* sees a camel with a blindfold over its eyes and how it turns about in a circle to drive a water-apparatus. He lets out a shout and enters "a state". When he comes back to his senses, he tells his companions: "This camel says to me: 'I walked from morning till evening and thought I had advanced quite a distance along the road. But when the blindfold is removed, then I see I haven't moved from my position.'"—So we all still haven't advanced beyond the first step but are caught in forms and formalities (*asīr-i rasm u āyīn*). (AN 14/1).

A king, without you, set down a treasure for himself somewhere. If it pleases him, he takes the treasure away again. If not, he lets it lie. What's the point for you to know why he set down the treasure or why he took it away? Since you weren't there, you'll never find out! (AN 14/1; see the variant on p. 43).

Don't attempt to draw close to the occurrence of secrets. You're not the man for it. You won't find the pearl of meaning (*maᶜānī*), and when you do find it (in death), you'll drown. Whoever seeks the deepest reason for these secrets, is seeking the key to the treasure in the bazaar. Whoever found this secret let it become lost so you wouldn't learn it. Whoever became familiar with the pearl of

these secrets threw them immediately into this ocean (death). In fifty years a needle became used up, now it lies at the bottom of the ocean. For a long time the husk floated on the surface of the water, then the wave cast water over its head and it sunk to the ocean floor. (AN in 13/8).

The poet then recounts his own discouraging experiences. (See Chpt. 9).

Yet if one does not have the key, at least it is still a comfort to know the door. But "the thread of reason has lost the thread's tip, and the house of illusion has lost the door".

A Ṣūfī hears a man lamenting: "I've lost the key to my door. Has anyone perhaps found the key? The door is locked. What should I do?" The Ṣūfī says: "What are you complaining about? Be happy that you know the door! You only have to sit down in front of it. Eventually someone will come and open it. Your case is not difficult but what should I say who know neither the key, nor the door? I wish to God I could find the door, whether it's open or closed!"—Nothing is given to man. My lot is futile yearning and confusion. The track is lost. How should I find it again? (MṬ 43/3, pp. 154-55).

Thus the Ṣūfī himself doesn't know the object of his seeking. (Cf. also Chpt. 8).

An endless amount of time goes by before one is able "to perceive a whiff" of God.

Shaykh Abū Saᶜīd is suffering from a feeling of emotional constriction (*qabḍ*) and goes into the fields to find distraction. There he sees a peasant who's tying up a cow to milk it, and he tells him of his feeling of constriction. The peasant says: "Oh Abū Saᶜīd, if they were to fill everything between the earth and heaven with millet seed, and every thousand years a bird were to come and take one grain of it until it was all consumed, and this was repeated a hundred times, the soul still wouldn't have perceived a scented whiff of God. And that, oh Abū Saᶜīd, is still quick!"[2] (MṬ 38/5, p. 131).

Freely rendered from *Asrār al-tawḥīd* 29; O'Kane, *Secrets* 108-09; Nicholson, *Studies* 18. Cf. Bolte-Polívka 3/232.

Only death brings release from this confusion, from this "spinning of the head".

A shaykh, together with his novices, collects a millstone which they need. While they're under way the stone breaks in pieces. The shaykh enters an "ecstatic state" because of this. The novices grumble, not only because they've wasted their effort and money, but also because they find the shaykh's behavior inappropriate. But the shaykh says: "The stone has broken in pieces in order to be freed from the head's turning, and thus it has disclosed to me the secret that

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2 Read: *Bū Saᶜīdā, zūdh bāshadh.*

breaking up is deliverance from confusion."—The one whose head spins and is confused remains caught in eternal pain. (MN 12/1).

One cannot find God.

A man visits a "fool" and sees him lying "in blood and dust", confused and upset. He asks him: "What do you do here day and night?" The fool answers: "Day and night I seek God." The visitor says: "I also seek Him." The fool: "Then you too sit like me for fifty years in blood!"—Since it's not possible to untie this knot, there's no sense in dying, nor in being born. This much I know that, despite all the turning and twisting, I know nothing, I know nothing! (MN 12/2).

A fool says that he likes best to sit on a heap of ashes and pour earth on his head with both hands and cover himself in sackcloth and weep. To everyone who asks him something he would like to say: "I don't know, I don't know!"—Whether you're learned or ignorant, in the end your head is confused (*sargardān*). (MN 12/3).

An amplification:

If someone wants to set out on the pilgrimage, he must take leave of his family and make peace with his enemy. But when he arrives at the Kaᶜba, the only thing he does is turn about, circling the Kaᶜba.—The final end of all action is nothing but the head's spinning about. (MN 12/4).

What you seek you don't find, nor can you stop your seeking.

The restless woodpecker taps his beak day and night against the branches of trees, whether the wood is soft or hard. One day he fell in love with Solomon, and Solomon promised he would yield to him if he brought him wood which is neither dry nor wet, neither straight nor crooked. Since then he continually searches for this wood but doesn't find it.—Likewise, human beings seek for a wood which doesn't exist. Throw your seeking into the ocean's water, because you'll never find such wood! People only have its name but no other gain from it. (MN 12/5).

For other unsolvable tasks see Bolte-Polívka 2/362 ff.

Effort is futile.

A king's daughter sets as a task for her suitor that he pick up an emptied sack of millet seed, grain by grain, with the tip of a needle. Despite years of effort, the lover doesn't manage to pick up a single grain. (MN 12/6).

See Bolte-Polívka, in the Index under "Aufgaben für die Freier".

Someone asks a Ṣūfī how he is. He answers: "For thirty years I've been running about and I haven't found one grain of gold. Now I'm sitting still and waiting for a hundred treasures to appear to me!"—You've no hope of finding one grain of gold, so how can you find treasures and jewels? (MN 12/7).

It is futile to ask about the fundamental principle behind events in the world. We only hear the din and the noise, we know nothing about the sense.

A fool throws a stone into a glazier's shop and is delighted at how everything shatters with a beautiful crash and tinkling sound. People reproach him saying he has caused damage to the owner. He replies: "I was so pleased by the crash and tinkling that I have no thought of damage and profit." (MN 8/4).

No one knows the truth, everyone dies with an empty hand.

Maᶜshūq Ṭūsī walks past the shop of a dealer in spices just when the owner is putting together an expensive perfume of musk and ambergris. He buys it and rubs it under the tail of a donkey that's standing in front of him. Asked about the sense of this strange gesture, he says: "These human beings know as little about God as this donkey knows about perfume." (MN 8/5. In *Talbīs* 386 it is rather Shiblī who perfumes the tail of a donkey with ambergris).

Nature as well takes part in the general helplessness.

The sky, out of sorrow at not having reached the goal of its searching, dressed in blue as a sign of mourning. The mountain girded its waist in order to seek this truth but in the end was reduced to dust (surah 7/143) because it had nothing but wind in its hand. The ocean died of thirst with dry lips (*lab*: also shore). The sun sets every day with a yellow cheek because of this pain. Every month the moon throws away its shield. The earth has dust on its head because of cares. (AN in 13/9).—Nearly all beings answer the world-traveller with fantastical aetiologies when he seeks their help and guidance (above pp. 22 ff.).

A venerable man says: "The sky every day asks the earth: 'Do you finally have knowledge of God?' One can't live without this knowledge!"—We're all confused, and our head is set spinning in this endless valley. Who knows what's in store for those who've died? They all passed away with their head full of absurd desires. They were extinguished like a bright lamp. We've all remained outside before the door like the door-knocker, incapable and powerless in our affairs and in our actions. (AN 13/10).

ᶜUmar Khayyām also describes the heavenly bodies as being bewildered (*sargardān*). Cf. Rosen no. 91 *aywānand*.

CHAPTER SIX

WORLDLY PEOPLE

How do people react then in view of this situation? How do they deal with the inevitability of death, the transience of existence? How do they deal with the inadequate and uncertain provision of sustenance, the arbitrary distribution of earthly possessions? What do they do in face of the threatened sanctions for offenses for which they are not actually responsible; in face of predestination which disposes over their destiny even before they are born? How do they come to terms with the fact that it is denied to them to fathom the meaning of events in the world, that God remains eternally transcendent, unattainable and inaccessible to their requests?

Furthermore, is the situation really so hopeless, the darkness so dense, that nothing remains but fear, desperation, perplexity and "spinning of the head"?

ᶜAṭṭār presents us with various typical groups of people, each of which has found, or believes it has found, a solution for itself. Their portrayal and criticism take up a considerable portion of the four epics which concern us here.

1

Numerically the largest of these groups of people is certainly the group of worldly men, for whom the problem of the earthly situation does not seem to exist, who take no notice of it but, untroubled by what is to come, with no thought for death and the final judgement that awaits them, live their lives devoid of cares and pursue their earthly purposes and goals. They are the representatives of "evasive concealment in the face of death, which stubbornly dominates everdayness" (Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* § 51). Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, who describes their doings and activities in gripping images, calls them hypocrites, Muslims in name (*munāfiqūn*, "Ḥasan al-Baṣrī" 42 ff.), and Mālik ibn Dīnār thinks that there are so many of them that if they grew tails, the believers

would no longer find any ground to walk on. ("Ḥasan al-Baṣrī" 43, ftn. 3).

It is the task of a sermon to sound the alarm against this sleep of indifference. The admonition to wake up and think of the hereafter is an old motif in Islamic sermons.

See "Ḥasan al-Baṣrī" 44-46. The theme is so common that even the rascal hero of Ḥarīrī's *Maqāmāt*, when dressed in the false clothes of a preacher and intent on extracting people's money from their purses, chooses this theme for his sanctimonious sermon. (*Maqāma* 1)

It is also a main motif in the paraenetic portions of ᶜAṭṭār's poetic works. One moment the reader is addressed and his false attitude is criticized, the next moment people's foolish attitude is made the focus of attention by means of parables and stories.

All your life you've taken it easy in careless indifference, you haven't been awake for a single moment. (IN p. 97_{13}).—You sleep without cares or thoughts and suspect nothing. But like it or not, you're going to die. Whether you're a beggar or a king, you'll take with you on the road three ells of linen cloth and ten bricks. (See p. 36).

You occupy yourself with your own Being, see only yourself, are worse than Satan. God has given you hundreds of treasures of Being but in your drunkenness you join together with Satan. God has called you to Himself, whereas you run after Satan. God sees every one of your deeds like individual motes in a sunbeam, but you have chosen actual lust (*hawā*, also air) like a mote in a sunbeam.—The time will come, however, when the veil suddenly falls from your eyes. Once your lowliness is made apparent, the fire of shame will burn in your soul the way it burned in the souls of Joseph's brothers.

When Joseph is sitting in the well, Gabriel comes to him and predicts his great future. "Your brothers will come to you", so he says, "to ask you for bread. What will you do with them then?" Joseph answers: "I'll point out to them what they've done. Shame is punishment enough for them." (IN 18/5, pp. 291-92).

Oh thoughtless one who've lost your way, you'll die unexpectedly. You spend your whole life in thoughtlessness... If your eye once beholds the right path, you'll perceive your misfortune with futile regret. (AN 18/0).

If sheep behave with indifference and are then led off to slaughter, that's nothing wondrous. After all, they have no intelligence. The only thing that's wondrous is the butcher who sits in complete peace, though he knows his turn will also come. (IN 17/1, p. 270).

While asleep, a deaf man waits on the road for the caravan. But he goes on sleeping and misses it. It passes by without him perceiving it. When he wakes up, people tell him that the caravan has passed by and ask him why he slept so deeply. Now his travel companions are gone. The deaf man says: "Woe is me! I was deaf and asleep. Now that I've awoken from sleep, I no longer find a travel

companion!" (AN 7/9. The parable also occurs in a more elaborate form in the *Ushturnāma*).

For a clearer picture cf. *Asrār al-tawḥīd* 50 (O'Kane, *Secrets* 142) where Abū Sa^cīd recounts how he once fell asleep and missed the caravan: "Every evening, as is the habit of those travelling on foot, I would go on a bit ahead of the camels of the caravan and sleep until the caravan arrived. Then I would rise and walk with the caravan..."[1]

One cannot possess the world and religion at the same time.

You seek religion, and your heart is drunken with the world. Don't you know that the two can't come together? ...You've turned one face turned toward the world and another face toward religion. Give up this two-faced situation! One face, one direction is enough! (AN 12/0).

Further amplification:

A fool sees how the people on a street are all running in different directions. He calls out to them: "You must all go in one direction!" (AN 12/1).

Cf. the saying of Abū Sa[c]īd: "Sufism consists of two things: to look in one direction and to live one way." *Asrār al-tawḥīd* 249; O'Kane, *Secrets* 431; Nicholson, *Studies* 49.

The Indian *pīr* said: "When a donkey driver sits on a donkey, he leads a second donkey alongside himself on a rope. But you've sat your heart on two donkeys at the same time. Aren't you afraid you'll fall off both of them?" (AN 12/3).

For further examples, which could easily be added to, see IN pp. $97_{7\text{-}14}$, $98_{9\text{-}14}$, $205_{3\text{-}5}$, $261_{11\text{-}12}$, $278_{6\text{-}11}$, 369_2.

2

However, worldly men withdraw only too readily from the admonitions of the preachers. Sermons are not heard by rich people but by the poor.

[c]Abbāsa is asked why rich people don't attend his sermon. He answers: "Because I say things which are wholly disagreeable to the rich. With me his gold appears as worthless as copper (tin). I make the collar around his neck into a noose and his shirt into a shroud. With me his castle becomes a grave for him. I can't cover up his faults for him. With me his religion becomes unbelief. So why should he desire my company?" (MN 23/13).

People do not want to recognize themselves.

A fool holds up a mirror before the people when they come out of the mosque on Friday. When they're very numerous, he throws the mirror on the road in

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1 In the *Asrār al-tawḥīd* the man left behind by the caravan is not Shaykh Abū Sa[c]īd. The two brothers Pīr Muḥammad Shawkānī and Zayn al-Ṭā[ɔ]ifa [c]Umar Shawkānī recount the story about their father. (Translator's note).

anger. But the people always give him back the mirror instead of making use of it and looking at themselves in it. (MN 8/6).

3

Instead of conforming to God's commands, the worldly man is attached to his lusts, his pleasure and his errors.

This is the criticism the second prince is obliged to hear from his father (above p. 6).

Hārūn goes with the fool Bahlūl to the cemetery. There they find a skull in which pigeons have laid eggs. Bahlūl explains to Hārūn that this is the head of a man who had attached his heart to the (forbidden) sport of flying pigeons. In death as well this passion has not left his head and consequently pigeons now nest in it. (MN 21/7).

An ant sees a wasp who is happily flying about, in contrast to the ant who is performing obedient service. Asked why he's so happy, the wasp answers: "Why shouldn't I be happy? I land wherever I wish and munch on any kind of food I please. I travel through the world so as to have fun. Why should I be sad?" Having spoken thus, he flies into a butcher's shop and lands on a slab of meat. Then along comes the butcher and chops him in half with a meat cleaver. The two halves fall to the ground. The ant lifts up one half, hauls it away and makes the wise observation: "Whoever, like you, just does what's fun, this is the end in store for him, etc." (IN 12/14, pp. 211-12).

Also found in the *Sindbādnāma* of Samarqandī, ed. Ahmed Ateş, no. 34, pp. 336-37; *Asrār al-tawḥīd* 230-31; O'Kane, *Secrets* 418. Cf. Robert Anhegger, "Die Fabel von der Grille und der Ameise" in: *Asiatische Studien* 1949, 30-47; idem, "Türk Edebiyatında Ağustosböceği ile Karınca Hikâyesi" in: *Türkiyat Mecmuası* 9/1951/79-94.

A heart which has once accustomed itself to the pleasures of the soul loses the capacity to penetrate into the deeper sense of things behind the curtain. It understands as little about such things as the sewer-sweeper who's accustomed to the smell of filth understands about musk.

A sewer-sweeper passes by the shop of a perfume dealer and suffers a fainting spell. The druggist rushes outside and tries to bring the unconscious man back to his senses with aromatic essences. But this only has the opposite effect. Then another sewer-sweeper comes along and rubs some filth under his nose. The unconscious man now comes back to himself.—"So it is also with the person accustomed to false teachings (*bidᶜat*)", ᶜAṭṭār continues, "who has never caught a whiff of the true doctrine (*sunnat*)." (AN 7/6).

4

The main defect in the people of the world, alongside their indifference *vis-à-vis* death and the imminent final reckoning, is their greed (*ḥirṣ*), their insatiability which can never be satisfied and always wants more.

Cf. e.g. the *Bāb al-ḥirṣ wa-ṭūl al-amal* in Abū'l-Layth al-Samarqandī's *Tanbīh al-ghāfilīn.*

In the *Ilāhīnāma* the sixth prince who has chosen the gold-maker's art as the goal of his desires is reproached by his father the king for this defect (above p. 7). His father presents him with the images which we have already become familiar with, of the falsity of Lady-World (p. 48) and admonishes him to be aware that the bird greed is only glutted once it has fed on the earth of the cemetery. A good portion of the stories on "censuring the world", which we have already met with, originate in this section of the *Ilāhīnāma.*

A symbol for insatiable greed is a monstruous beast named "Devourer" (Halūᶜ) because of its voracity. This monster lives behind Mt Qāf which surrounds the world. Near the monster are seven grass-filled steppes, and behind it seven lakes. Every day it strips bare the seven steppes and drinks dry the seven lakes. But then it can't sleep due to fear that it won't find anything to eat and drink the next day. The next day, however, God fills the steppes and lakes with grass and water... (IN 19/1, p. 301).

Many of the stories on the subject of greed are widely disseminated, as for instance the story about Jesus and the three persons who end up killing one another out of greed.

Jesus is travelling somewhere with a companion. He has three loaves of bread with him. One of these he eats, the companion eats one, and the third is left over. When Jesus leaves the road to go to drink, the companion eats the third loaf of bread. When Jesus comes back, he asks the companion where the third bread is. He says he doesn't know. They come to a sea. Jesus holds onto the hand of the person accompanying him and they walk upon the sea. Jesus asks the companion: "By the God who works these miracles, tell me the truth about the bread!" "I don't know anything", says the companion. They walk on. Jesus catches a gazelle by simply calling it, and they eat it. Jesus brings the bones back to life and the gazelle runs off. Jesus poses the same question and receives the same answer. They come upon three piles of earth. Jesus changes them into gold through his prayer and says: "The one mound belongs to me, the second to you, and the third to the person who secretly ate the bread." The companion then says: "I am the one." Thereupon Jesus gives all three piles of gold to the companion and says: "You're not fit to be my travelling companion", and he leaves him. After that two other people come along, see the gold and begin to fight with Jesus' former companion. Finally, they agree to divide the gold into three parts. But since they're hungry, they send one of their number into the city to

buy bread. The fellow goes off, eats his fill and poisons the bread he intends to bring back. Meanwhile, the other two conspire to kill the third man when he returns and divide his gold among themselves. And so they do but then they die themselves from the poisoned bread. When Jesus passes by again and sees the three dead men lying there, he turns the gold back into earth so no more people will die because of it. (MN 15/1).

The story has been translated into German from ᶜAṭṭār by Rückert, ZDMG 14/280. It is widely disseminated in Arabic literature: *Qūt* 1/255; *Nahrung* 2/243 f./32.365; Thaᶜlabī, 247-49; *Rawḍ al-rayāḥīn*, no. 322; Ṭurṭūshī 14, and from there *Mustaṭraf* 2/325, trans. by G. Rat, Paris-Toulon 1902, 2/792; *Tibr* 39; Ṣaffūrī 1/207; R. Basset in: *Rev. des Traditions Populaires* 14/1899/438-39; L. Cheikho, *Majānī al-adab* 1/66-67. European versions and notices: Chauvin 8/100-01; James Robson, "Stories of Jesus and Mary" in: *The Muslim World* 40/1950/240. The oldest Arabic version is found in Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr* on surah 3/52, Cairo 1321, 3/179-81, Cairo 1324, 3/198-200. As reliable sources Ṭabarī cites Suddī and Wahb ibn Munabbih who are well known as popular narrators and transmitters of Judaeo-Christian stories. The story pattern goes back to a folk tradition among the early Christian Arabs. Cf. Sidersky, *Les Origines des Légendes Musulmanes*, Paris 1933, p. 6. It appears to have originated in an apocryphal Gospel or a kind of "Haggada enlargement of the life story of Jesus". Cf. Ernst Kuhn, *Barlaam und Joasaph*, Munich 1883, (*Abh. Bayr. Ak. Wiss.* 1. Kl. Bd. 20) p. 82.

We are able to follow the individual steps of how the story pattern travelled to the West. A Spanish Moorish version, which goes back to Ṭurṭūshī, is contained in the *Leyendas Moriscas*. The table of contents is given in Grünbaum. The connecting link to the Arabic versions is found in *Le Novelle antiche*, Biagi, Florence 1880, p. 117, under the title "Come andando Christo co' discepoli suoi videro molto grande tesoro", and is then once more attested, for example, in the *Novellae* of Morlini, Paris 1855, p. 84: "De illis qui in Tiberi reputo thesauro, ad invicem conspirantes, veneno et ferro perire" or in *Ci nous dit*, P. Paris, *Les manuscrits françois de la Bibliothèque du Roi*, Paris 1831-48, 4/83-84. Thus the story spread rapidly in the West and finally ended up in a fairy-tale of the Grimm Brothers, "Bruder Lustig". Cf. Bolte-Polívka 2/150-63; Aarne-Thompson, *Types* no. 785; Cosquin, *Contes populaires de Lorraine* 1/285-88, etc. The following assertion of Honti in *Handwörterbuch des deutschen Märchens* 2/614 can no longer be maintained: "It is exceedingly probable that the origin of this comic tale is to be found in medieval German minstrel poetry. I say German, because from other countries we only find modern oral versions." In fact, Ṭabarī, who provides the earliest Arabic version, lived from 839 to 923. Therefore, Honti's conclusion that "The Mohammedan version owes its existence to the Crusades" should rather be the other way round: The European version owes its existence to the Crusades, if the story was not brought to the West even earlier through Moorish-Spanish mediation. Regarding the whole question, see Otto Spies, "Das Grimm'sche Märchen 'Bruder Lustig' in arabischer Überlieferung" in: *Rheinisches Jahrbuch für Volkskunde*, 2. Jahrgang, Bonn 1951, pp. 48-60. (Otto Spies).—The last part of the story also occurs in *Marzubānnāma* 74.

No less widely disseminated is the less serious story about the man who receives lessons from a bird he has caught but, due to his blind greed, immediately forgets them.

Sha^c^bī relates: "A man catches a sparrow. The bird promises to give him three useful lessons if he lets it go. It will tell him the first one immediately and the others once it's set free. The man agrees and the bird tells him the first lesson: 'Never grieve over a thing you've lost!' Now the man sets the bird free and it imparts the second lesson from a tree: 'Never believe something which is impossible until you've seen it yourself!' Then it says, while flying up a mountain: 'Moreover, you're a big fool. I have two jewels in my belly, each of which weighs twenty *mithqāls*. If you hadn't let me go free, they would now be yours.' The man is bitterly angry over his stupidity but asks for the third lesson. The bird says: 'Why should I give you a third lesson when you've already forgotten the first two. You were upset over a thing you lost and you believed something which is impossible. I don't weigh two *mithqāls*. How could I have two jewels in my belly which both weigh twenty *mithqāls*?' Having spoken thus, it flies away and the man is left standing." (IN 13/13, pp. 210-11).

This Sha^c^bī is the famous traditionist who died around 110/728. The story is found in his biography *Ḥilya* 4/316; as well as in *Iḥyā*ʾ 3/207-08, *Bayān dhamm al-ḥirṣ*; Ibn al-Jawzī, *Maqāmāt*, Ms. Istanbul Univ. Libr. A 673, fol. 3a; idem, *Adhkiyā*ʾ, final chapter; Sharīshī 1/15; *Mathnawī* 4/2245 ff.; M. b. ^c^Alī b. Bābōya al-Qummī, *Kamāl al-dīn wa-tamām al-ni^c^ma*, litho. Tehran 1301, p. 339; *Tausend und eine Nacht*, Henning, 22, pp. 122 ff. The story is Buddhist and comes from Barlaam and Josaphat: *Bilawhar wa-Yūdāsif*, litho. Bombay 1306, pp. 83, 4 ff.; Fritz Hommel, "Die älteste arabische Barlaamversion" in: *Verhandlungen des VII. Internationalen Orientalistenkongresses*, Vienna 1886, Semit. Sektion, p. 158; Ernst Kuhn, "Barlaam und Joasaph. Eine bibliographisch-literargeschichtliche Studie." in *Abhandlungen der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 20. Band, 1. Abt., Munich 1894, pp. 75-76, with abundant literary references; C. Brockelmann, "Fabel und Tiermärchen in der älteren arabischen Literatur" in: *Islamica* 2/1926/108; Wilhelm Bousset, "Wiedererkennungsmärchen und Placidas-Legende" in: *Nachr. Ges. Wiss. Göttingen*, Phil.-hist. Klasse 1917, p. 715; F. Shordone, "Une Rédaction inédite de la fable du paysan et du rossignol" in: *Byzantinoslavica* IX, 2, 1948, pp. 177-81.

The consequences of lacking a sense of contentment with little, of not being satisfied with what one has, is often illustrated in fable literature by the fable of the two (three) wishes.

Bolte-Polívka, 2/213 ff.

A variant of this fable also occurs in ^c^Aṭṭār.

A poor thorn-gatherer who lives in the steppes and nourishes his wife and children with great difficulty, being dissatisfied with his situation, begs Moses to ask God to provide him with an effortless form of sustenance. When the prophet makes this request, God answers that this is not possible but that He

will give the man two free wishes. In the meantime, a king arrives in the area where the house of the thorn-gatherer is located, sees the man's pretty wife and, hearing that she's the wife of a thorn-gatherer, thinks she's too good for a gatherer of thorns. The king has the woman put in a trunk and brought to his residence. When the thorn-gatherer comes home from the fields, he finds his children weeping and learns from them what has happened. Then he makes the wish that God transform the woman into a bear. He then goes into the city to acquire bread for his children. When the king has the trunk opened, instead of the hoped for woman he finds a female bear, believes she must be a fairy who can change into any shape, and has her taken back home again. When the thorn-gatherer comes home, he finds his children in terrible fear of the female bear. There's nothing else for him to do but use his second wish, to the effect that God give his wife back her previous shape! He is cured of his ungratefulness and from then on knows how to appreciate better the value of what he possesses. (MN 26/3).

The story is clearly a free reworking of another frequently recounted tale. An Israelite is granted three free wishes. He uses the first by wishing that his wife would become the most beautiful of all women. When this wish comes true, the wife considers herself too good for him and looks for other men. He then changes her into a bitch (female bear) with the second wish, and then is forced, under pressure from the children, to use the third wish to restore her to her former self. It occurs in this form in Muᶜāfā b. Zakariyyāᵓ (d. 390/1000, GAL², Suppl. 1/312), *al-Jalīs al-ṣāliḥ*, Ms. Damad Ibrahim 282, fol. 10a. The man in question is supposed to be the person referred to in surah 7/174, which verse is otherwise connected with Balaam or Umayya b. Abī'l-Ṣalt. The story is elaborately embellished in the *Siyāsatnāma* (Schefer 160-62, Tehran 1310, pp. 136-38). There, as in ᶜAṭṭār, the woman is changed into a bear. The story also occurs in ᶜAwfī's *Jāmiᶜ al-ḥikāyāt*: M. Niẓāmuddīn, *Introduction to the Jawāmiᶜu'l-Ḥikāyāt*, p. 84. Cf. also EI s.n. "al-Basūs".

Human beings have inherited this precipitate greed from their primordial ancestor Adam. Greed for a grain of wheat caused him to lose Paradise. (AN in 20/6).

Human beings sell their precious time in life for filthy lucre. (IN p. 303_{7-8}).

But death soon puts an end to storing up goods out of greed.

The ant makes itself "a window" in the earth and gathers grain in it all year long. But when a gust of wind suddenly comes, it wafts away the ant, the window and the grain all together. (AN 29/7.—Cf. the simile of the spider above p. 46).

A mouse wants to steal an egg. Since he can't carry it by himself, he calls another mouse, lays the egg on his own belly and has the companion drag him homewards by the tail. But outside the cat is lying in wait and straightway releases him from all greedy desires. (AN 20/8).

Another story about a mouse who steals an egg is found in the *Marzubānnāma* 204 ff.

A rag-collector gathers scraps of rags his whole life long and piles them up in his house. Then a glowing coal falls on the rags and everything goes up in flames. (AN 18/1. A long paraenetic passage follows).

The greedy man collects treasures only to die among them. In the same way the silkworm spins its own grave. (AN in 20/13).

Compare with this the verse in Ṭurṭūshī 21: "Like the silkworm which never stops weaving and, laden with cares, perishes within what it has woven", and Ibn al-Shibl (Ṣarrāf) 132.

Greed is punished in the hereafter by transformation into an animal.

The owl doesn't want to be separated from the ruins he lives in because a treasure is buried there which he hopes to find. The hoopoe responds to him: "Suppose you did find the treasure. How will it help you when you die? Moreover, love of treasures and gold is unbelief. Sāmirī, for instance, who cast the Golden Calf was an unbeliever. And don't forget that the person whose heart is attached to gold will be resurrected in another shape that corresponds to his greed!" (MṬ 11/0, pp. 38-39. See above p. 12)

Cf. *Iḥyā*ʾ 3/200, *Bayān dhamm al-māl wa-karāhat ḥubbih.*

A foolish man who's died and left behind a hidden pot of gold appears to his son in a dream in the shape of a mouse that scurries around the buried gold. His son asks him what this means. He answers: "I must see whether anyone has found the gold." The son asks: "And why do you have the shape of a mouse?" The father answers: "Whoever's heart was attached to gold has this shape. Let yourself be warned by my example and throw the gold away, my son!" (MṬ 11/1, p. 39).

ʿAṭṭār recounts an experience of his own with a miser.

He relates: "In our city there was a miser. He became ill and I was called to prepare a potion for him. I found a bottle of rose-water by the sick man. When I wanted it to be opened to have the patient sprinkled with it, he protested most vehemently, explaining that if his heart were torn from his body, it wouldn't be as hard for him as having this bottle opened. He died and they buried him and sprinkled the same rose-water over his grave." (AN 20/14).

Worldly men strive after foul-smelling and disgusting things. (Above p. 50).

A fool holds his nose when he has to have dealings in the bazaar. Asked why he does this, he answers: "I can't stand the stench of the people of the bazaar."—"Why do you sit down with them then?" "Because I have some business to settle with them" (MN 15/4).

One who seeks the world resembles the dung-beetle that forever collects filth, rolls it into a ball and attaches its heart to it. With the greatest effort it rolls the ball up to its hole. But the hole is too small to let the ball pass through, and so

it must remain outside.—In the same way man leaves behind his gathered goods before the grave's door. (MN 11/1).

They are busy running after a cadaver, a corpse. Like dogs, they eat the flesh of cadavers. (Cf. p. 50).

A fool sees a man from the ordinary people running in order to arrive on time for the prayer over a dead person. He says to him: "Are you afraid your soup will get cold? (*Guft chīz-ē sard mē-gardadh ba-rāh?*). Run fast now so you get there on time!"—You can't do without the cadaver of the world. That's why you run in that direction as soon as you see a dead person in the distance. (MN 11/4).

They appropriate the goods of the dead, they even take away their shroud.

A fool sees how they're burying a dead person and sees the shroud from a distance. He says: "I'm naked from head to foot. I want to remove his winding sheet and make myself a shirt from it." Someone hears what he said and remarks: "Is that the behavior of a Muslim then?" The fool replies: "When I see how you all snatch the shroud from corpses day and night, why should this door be closed for me?" (MN 11/5).

5

The sign of worldly mentality, of setting goals in the transitory here and now, of vain hope in a long life, forgetfulness of death, is to raise up a building. Already Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, when depicting the ideal portrait of the Prophet, did not neglect to say: "He did not set brick upon brick, nor need upon need."

"Ḥasan al-Baṣrī" 49. The memory of exacting corvée labor for construction in the time of the Umayyads, who took great pleasure in building, may play a role in this condemnation of construction work. But the lack of interest in building and architecture is also bedouin and typically Arab. Cf. Creswell, *Early Muslim Architecture* I, Oxford 1932, p. 30. An interest in building only begins with ᶜAbd al-Malik.

Tradition represents the Prophet as not only living a meager life but also as opposing the most modest luxury of the Companions.

What one imagined to be proper moderation regarding accommodation, household utensils, etc., is vividly illustrated in *Iḥyā*ᵓ 4/203 ff., *Tafṣīl al-zuhd fīmā hū min ḍarūriyyāt al-ḥayāh*; *Stufen* 484 ff./D.178 ff.

Why do you set brick upon brick, when you will only sleep under the bricks of the grave?

The Prophet, without greeting him, walks past ᶜUmar who's busy arranging a water-channel. ᶜUmar runs after him in consternation and asks the reason for this

neglect. The Prophet says: "You're led astray by building. Apparently you don't believe in death." (MN 16/8).

Nor does Jesus build houses.

Someone asks Jesus: "Why don't you build yourself a house?" He answers: "I'm not such a fool as to do that. What's not eternal isn't fitting for me." (MN 36/10).

A rich merchant builds himself a beautiful house. When it's finished, he invites everybody to visit him and admire the house. On the day of the reception a fool sees him busily running here and there. He says to him: "I would also like to come and shit on your house, but I don't have time. Excuse me." (MṬ 24/2, p. 84).

Yaḥyā ibn Muᶜādh in a sermon rails against building castles and the luxury of the religious scholars:

You have castles like Caesar, houses like Chosroes, not like ᶜAlī! Your faces are like that of Pharaoh, your morals like those of Satan (variant: a sultan), your weddings are Pharaonic, your mourning ceremonies like those of the gebrs... but you have nothing Muhammadan in manner! You have nothing to do with the religion of Muḥammad! (MN 38/7; TA 1/304).

Or the poet himself sermonizes:

Why do you build in this (world of) baseness castles and look-out towers when your mother has borne you for the earth? Why do you have look-out towers raised to the sky, when your body is going to decompose in the earth? (IN p. 389_{4-5}. Similarly MN in 16/7).

6

Furthermore, criticism is levelled against the arrogance and pompousness of worldly people, against their haughty magnificence, the vain pride they take in their beauty, sumptuous clothes and possessions. Once again it is the "fools" and the ordinary folk who openly voice their opinions before the worldly people.

While having his head shaved before donning the pilgrim's garb on the pilgrimage to Mecca, a fool asks why one actually needs to have one's hair shaved. He's told that it's a religious custom (*sunna*). He then says: "If it's a religious custom, then it's surely a religious duty (*farīḍa*) to shave off beards. For in every beard there's so much wind (pomposity, pride) that it's a torment for hundreds of free (open-standing) doors. To do that would be better than this custom." (MN 36/8).

A fool finds a skull in the cemetery, fills it with earth and buries it. Asked the meaning of this act, he answers: "This head was so full of the wind of conceit and arrogance that I now fill it with earth to drive the wind out of it." (MN 36/8).

Another fool picks up a skull in his hand, tears out its hair and throws it on the ground. To someone who questions him about this, he answers: "This head (was so inflated with pride and arrogance that) the world was not big enough for it, but now not even one hair (from it) has a place (in the world)." (MN 36/9).

As for another fool, when a group of affected fops walked by, he covered his face with his robe until they had passed. Asked why he did this, he replies: "I wanted to protect myself from the mustache-wind (metaphor for pride and arrogance) and the stench (of this pride)." (IN 13/18, p. 215).

A man passes through Baghdad in a magnificent manner surrounded by soldiers and servants. The fool Bahlūl holds up a hand filled with earth before his face and says: "So much arrogance is not fitting for a creature that's made of earth! His lordship is perhaps a Pharaoh but not God!" (IN 13/17, p. 214).

Muḥammad ibn ᶜĪsā, the companion of the caliph Amīn, is riding through Baghdad on a richly caparisoned steed, escorted by numerous slaves. A person asks: "Who's that?" An old lady answers: "That's someone whom God has pushed away from Himself. For if God didn't wish to keep him far from Himself, He wouldn't have him occupy himself with such vanities." Muḥammad ibn ᶜĪsā hears this. Getting down from his horse, he repents and becomes a pious man. (IN 14/12, pp. 229-30).

Muḥammad ibn ᶜĪsā is probably Muḥammad ibn ᶜĪsā ibn Nahīk. See the historians who write on the caliphate of Amīn (193-198/809-813). Qushayrī relates the same story about the vizier ᶜAlī ibn ᶜĪsā (d. 334/946) in *Risāla* 48, *Bāb al-tawba*; *Sendschreiben* 154/3.27. Cf. Harold Bowen, *The Life and Times of ᶜAlī ibn ᶜĪsā 'The Good Vezier'*, Cambridge 1928, p. 186.—A similar story about the Būyid vizier Muhallabī occurs in Shayzarī, *al-Nahj al-maslūk fī siyāsat al-mulūk*, Turkish translation, Būlāq 1252, p. 55.

7

Just as worldly people do not think about death, they pay no attention to the consequences of their sins. In this respect, the guilt for their sins is so great that it is surprising that even one of them escapes and that the Last Judgement has still not overtaken them.

"That human beings will stand there in shame on the Final Day", says a pious man, "is no surprise. What causes one surprise is simply that with so many sins anyone at all will escape." (IN 13/2, p. 201).

During a long continuing drought the people entreat Ṭāwūs ibn Kaysān to ask God for rain. He answers: "It's not strange that the blessing of rain has been withheld from you. It's only strange that stones don't rain down on so many sins." (IN 13/3, p. 201).

The words spoken by Ṭāwūs end with verse 15. There his reply is concluded. Ṭāwūs died 106/724. Ibn Saᶜd 5/391-95; *Ḥilya* 4/3-23, no. 249. Mālik ibn Dīnār appears in place of

Ṭāwūs in *ᶜIqd* 3/169; and the person bears no name in *Iḥyāʾ* 4/112₅, *al-Rukn al-thālith min kitāb al-ṣabr wa'l-shukr*; *Stufen* 269/B.271.

People deserve nothing better than bad treatment.

Ḥajjāj, the tyrannical governor of ᶜIrāq, says to persons who complain about his violent acts: "Look at what bad people you are that God has let loose on you someone like me!" (MN 38/8.—*Tibr* 71).

Sometimes acts of injustice and deception already meet with sudden punishment on earth.

A man who waters down his milk is punished by having his cow swept away by a torrent. The torrent was the water which he had been adding to the milk all that time.—How can one practice injustice if one thinks of death! (MN 4/7. Damīrī 1/137 and *Mustaṭraf* 2/126, following *Iḥyāʾ*).

Or the wrongdoer is punished in the grave.

Bahlūl walks barefoot through puddles in the winter. When someone asks him where he's going, he says: "To the grave of this and that suppressor of the law. The grave is full of fire which he's being punished with. I want to warm myself there." (MN 4/5).

Only the person who has experienced it with his own body is capable of describing how dreadful the punishment in the grave is which the angels Munkar and Nakīr inflict on the sinner.

Jesus walks over a burial-field and hears moaning arise from a grave. Through his prayer he awakens the dead person, and an old man with a bent back comes before him. Jesus asks him: "Who are you? When did you die? When did you live?" The man answers: "I'm Ḥayyān ibn Maᶜbad. I died 1800 years ago and I haven't had peace from this torment for one moment." Jesus says: "Why have you been tormented like this?" The man replies: "Because I misappropriated one *dānak* of an orphaned child's property." Jesus: "Did you die an unbeliever so that you had to suffer so much because of one *dānak*?" The man: "No, I died a believer but still had to endure this for so many years." Then Jesus, through his prayer, causes him to die a second time, and the old man lies down again in the earth in the sleep of death. (IN 19/2, pp. 302-03).

In a variant of this story Jesus awakens a skull. G. Weil, *Biblische Legenden* 256-91. A particularly small epic dealing with this legend, the *Jumjumanāma*, is attributed to ᶜAṭṭār, and has attained a certain popularity among the Turkish peoples. (Cf. my article "ᶜAṭṭār" in the *İslâm Ansiklopedisi* and Fuad Köprülü, *Türk edebiyatı tarihi*, Istanbul 1926, pp. 362 ff.)—A very divergent, highly detailed variant of the story, in which the awakened king relates that he was killed by a usurper, his nephew, is found in the *Ushturnāma*. An Arabic version appears in Ms. Gotha no. 2736.

8

Being engaged in the practice of the theological-juridical sciences, *fiqh* and *ḥadīth*, with their newly arisen special technique is viewed by the early men of piety in Basra as worldly activity. Already Ḥasan al-Baṣrī propounds a different ideal from that of the up-and-coming *faqīh*: "The (true) *faqīh* is he who renounces this world and desires the hereafter, who knows his religion precisely, who is constantly devoted to the service of God, who is on guard against illicit possessions, who does not attack the honor of Muslims and does not encroach upon their property and behaves loyally toward their community." ("Ḥasan al-Baṣrī" p. 32. Cf. p. 56 and the judgement after his death p. 66). Only someone who proves his religious knowledge in his practical dealings and is free from worldly desires can be considered an authentic religious scholar.

The Basrans have remained true to the views of their great master. (*Qūt*, *Faṣl* 31, 1/129-178, 252; *Nahrung* 1/418-556/31. 1-244, 2/235 f./32.353). Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī rejects issuing legal judgements as being the business of *amīrs* and their officers or of popular preachers (*quṣṣāṣ*). (*Qūt* 1/131-32; *Nahrung* 1/426 f./ 31.15). In his view the *ḥadīth* technique is a useless innovation. In a special chapter (*Bāb tafḍīl al-akhbār... wa-dhikr al-rukhṣa wa'l-saʿy fī'l-naql wa'l-riwāya* 1/176-78; *Nahrung* 1/550-556/ 31.233-244) he defends the transmission of *ḥadīths* according to their sense, as was already the practice of Ḥasan, and the transmission of "sound" *ḥadīths* with weak *isnāds*. The philology associated with *ḥadīths* and the Koran, for instance distinguishing individual variant readings in the Koran, collecting several *isnāds* for one *ḥadīth*, and putting emphasis on a verbatim transmission, are a thorn in his eye (1/165-66; *Nahrung* 1/519-524/31.171-180). Already the early female mystic Rābiʿa al-ʿAdawiyya considers being engaged with the science of *ḥadīths* as worldly activity and therefore accuses Sufyān al-Thawrī of loving the world. (*Qūt* 1/156-57, 2/57; *Nahrung* 1/499/31.131, 2/482 f./32.709; Smith, *Rābiʿa the Mystic* 16). The knowledge these others acquire through *ḥadīths*, the Ṣūfīs acquire through direct experience and inner illumination. (TA 2/121-22). The representatives of external learning (*ʿulamāʾ al-ẓāhir*) or "worldly scholars" (*ʿulamāʾ al-dunyā*) are reproached for using their knowledge to gain money and prestige, and for this reason place themselves at the service of the government, i.e. the *amīrs*.

According to Makkī, once the provincial governors themselves no longer had the time, nor the inclination, for juridical science, they began to consult scholars of external sciences and *muftīs* in the mosques. If the *amīr* held a court session, to the left and to the right of him sat a legal scholar (*muftī*) to whom he would turn. In accordance with their opinion, he would give instructions to the police. *Qūt* 1/133$_{12-14}$; *Nahrung* 1/430/31.21; cf. H. F. Amedroz, "The Mazalim Jurisdiction in the Ahkam Sultaniyya of Mawardi" in: JRAS 1911/635 ff.; Emile Tyan, *Histoire de l'organisation judiciaire en pays d'Islam*, Paris 1938-43, 2/141 ff. "La justice des maẓālim."

Contrasted with the latter are "the religious scholars of the hereafter", the representatives of "the science of the heart", whose prototype is Ḥasan al-Baṣrī. Makkī transmits a very harsh remark of Bishr al-Ḥāfī about the people of *ḥadīth*s: "'So-and-so has transmitted to us' is a gate from among the gates of the world, and when you hear a man say: 'So-and-so has transmitted to us', what he really means is: 'Make room for me!'" (*Qūt* 1/135$_4$; *Nahrung* 1/434/31.26). Up until the most recent times, indeed up to the present, this contrast between the Ṣūfīs and the *ᶜulamāᵓ al-ẓāhir* or *ᶜulamāᵓ al-rusūm* has persisted. Whoever converted from school studies to mysticism would throw his books in the water and break his reed pens.

Echoes of these attitudes are also found in ᶜAṭṭār.

In ancient times there was a religious scholar who knew 400 bookcases of learning by heart and was also not lacking in works of obedience. The prophet of that era had to inform him at God's bidding: "Because you love the world, God will not accept one atom from you (from your works)." (MN 11/9).

Whoever listens to the dog inside himself will be resurrected on the Final Day in the shape of a dog. In fact, in the community of the last of the prophets the transformation of humans into animals no longer takes place on earth, but whoever gives up religion for the world can be resurrected as a pig (cf. above p. 99). In earlier times men of this kind were occasionally transformed into pigs even on earth.

Moses had a disciple who was very proud of his learning. The disciple one day moved to another place, and Moses didn't hear anything about him for a long time. One day Moses sees a man who's drawing along a pig behind him. The pig is none other than the missing disciple. In his base striving he had not reaped any fruits from his learning but he had pursued the world with it. (MN 25/2).

In the source in which the story originates (*Qūt* 1/144$_{4-10}$; *Nahrung* 1/462/31.70), it is nothing but a malicious attack on the people of *ḥadīth*s:

There was a man who attended on Moses (as a disciple) and began to say: "Moses—peace be upon him!—has transmitted to me" and: "Moses, the Speaker with God, has transmitted to me", until he became rich and his possessions multiplied. Then Moses lost sight of him and asked about him but couldn't find any

news of him. Finally, one day a man arrived leading along a pig that bore a black rope around its neck. Moses asked him: "Do you perhaps know so-and-so?" The man said: "Yes, he's this pig." Moses then said: "God, I beg You to change him back to himself so I can ask him what happened." God revealed to him: "Oh Moses, were you to beg Me with that which Adam begged Me and those who are below him in rank begged Me, I wouldn't fulfill your request. But I'll tell you why I've done this to him: because he strove after the world with religion."

To make the heart white is better than to blacken paper.

Ḥasan comes with his disciple Ḥusayn to the Oxus. The disciple suddenly disappears. Only after a while does the master notice that his disciple is already on the other side of the Oxus. He has crossed over the water in a miraculous manner. The master asks in astonishment: "By what means have you attained this charisma? You've actually learned this 'way' from me!" The disciple answers: "Oh master, I busied myself with making my heart white, whereas you've been busy writing on paper until it's black!" (IN 11/4, p. 172).

CHAPTER SEVEN

MEN OF POWER

The typical characteristics of worldly men are found in an intensified form within that social class which partakes of the bounty of this world's gifts to the fullest extent, which is able to experience the joys of the world with the least restrictions but, for this reason, is also most deeply entangled in the world's snares and most thoroughly enslaved by its own earthly desires, craving for power, possessions and pleasure in life, namely the class of rulers and the great in the world—the men of power.

In the period of Seljuk rule, during which ᶜAṭṭār lived, political dominion was most sharply distinguished both from the old Arab era when the tribal chief was only *primus inter pares*—Wellhausen even speaks of a "community without a supreme authority"—as well as from the early Islamic theocracy when the caliphs appeared as successors to the office of the Prophet. Although, of course, the caliphate in Baghdad theoretically still retained the theocratic character of its dominion over the Muslim community and laid claim to a legitimacy formulated according to religious constitutional law, real power had long since passed into the hands of rulers whose rule had come about through purely dynamic struggle and was based on brute force.

In the theoretical justification of the sultan's power, with which the celebrated Seljuk vizier Niẓām al-Mulk introduces his mirror for princes (*Siyāsatnāma*), there is no mention at all of the caliphate and the conditions of legitimacy laid down in constitutional legal writings. Indeed, the task of the ruler is described as being to restore peace, order, justice and prosperity, as well as the application of the holy law, yet the ruler does not owe his position of power to legitimate entitlements anchored in law but rather to the ordaining of God who in every age selects someone from among mankind, endows him with the necessary abilities for rule, provides him with prestige and respect in men's hearts, assures him of victory over his rivals in times of confusion, and bestows on him the good fortune of dominion (*dawlat u iqbāl*).

Cf. also C. H. Becker, "Bartholds Studien über Kalif und Sultan" in: *Der Islam* 6/1916/350 ff. Muḥammad Bazdawī, who died in 493 AH during the time of the Seljuks, says in his *Uṣūl al-dīn* (see *Oriens* 2/1949/305-08): "All followers of the *sunna* and the *jamāᶜa* teach that if someone overpowers the people and establishes himself through force and possesses princely prestige and power, he thereby becomes the *imām* whose orders and decisions are to be carried out. *Qāla ᶜāmmatu ahli'l-sunnati wa'l-jamāᶜati inna wāḥidan law ghalaba'l-nāsa wa-qaᶜada imāman bi'l-ghalabati wa-lahū shawkatun wa-quwwatun yaṣīru imāman yunfadhu aḥkāmuhū wa-qaḍāᵓuh* (fol. 66).

Stripped of its theological formulation, this is a purely dynamic theory of history and the state. Certainly, in the practical political life of the time there was no lack of other religious ideologies which rulers championed—the Seljuks considered themselves to be the protectors of the Sunna against the theocratic claims of the Ismāᶜīlī Shīᶜites—but their era, especially the later period in which ᶜAṭṭār lived, was in reality filled with sheer power struggles, in the midst of which one scarcely meets with an idea of justice other than that right is on the side of the strongest.

It is not surprising that in the eyes of the people, and in particular of the pious, the worldly rulers of these times lacked any consecrated status because of their office—in Persia it was only the Ṣafawids who once again surrounded themselves with an effective, religious aura—and that the religiously minded therefore viewed the rulers coolly, critically, indeed even with hostility.

Criticism is particularly levelled against the sultan's property. The possessions of the sultan are *ḥarām*, religiously forbidden. On this point Muḥammad Ghazzālī, who lived during the heyday of Seljuk dominion, teaches the following:

> The greater part of the possessions of sultans in these centuries is forbidden property (*ḥarām*). What is allowed (*ḥalāl*) is not found in their hands or very rarely.

Iḥyāᵓ 2/120, *al-Bāb al-khāmis fī idrārāt al-salāṭīn wa-ṣilātihim wa-mā yaḥillu minhu wa-mā yaḥram.* Similarly 2/122.

Utterly intransigent men of piety saw it as not permissible to make use of public facilities provided by *amīr*s, for example drinking, letting one's animals drink or irrigating land from a canal which an *amīr* had caused to be dug. (*Iḥyāᵓ* 2/87, *Darajāt al-ḥalāl wa'l-ḥarām*). Acceptance of government posts is shunned by many men of piety. Moreover, being unjustly incarcerated and put to death by the government, by the *sulṭān*—the word designates first and foremost the office—is spoken of as part of the natural course of events. The following saying is attributed to ᶜAlī: "Whenever the *sulṭān* imprisons a man unjustly and the man

dies in prison, then he's a martyr. And when the *sulṭān* has him beaten and he dies, he's also a martyr."

Tanbīh al-ghāfilīn 102a, *Bāb fī'l-ṣabr ᶜalā'l-shidda wa'l-balāʾ*. And aslo compare with this attitude A. S. Tritton, *Muslim Theology*, p. 11.

1

In ᶜAṭṭār rulers chiefly appear in a bad light. They extort or wheedle their possessions from others in an unjust manner, are blinded by greed and lust for domination. They are moody, excessively jealous, issue hasty orders for people's execution which they then occasionally regret when it's too late, and are a danger for their surroundings. They represent the type of worldly man in its most intensified form, and it must be impressed on them time and again that their power is ephemeral, that their possessions are unjust, that in reality they are not lords but slaves of their lusts and basically powerless and helpless creatures. The evidence of their virtuous behavior or of their goodwill is limited to the fact that on occasion they listen to the complaint of an old man or an old lady about some oppression the latter have suffered and bestow a present on them and provide a remedy for their difficulties, and likewise they listen with patience to sermons calling for repentance which are directed at them by "fools", wise representatives of the ordinary people and Ṣūfī shaykhs, and for a moment they are moved by such words.

Of all the historical figures of a ruler, Alexander, the world-conqueror, in particular appears as the example of excessive greed and lust for power. On the other hand, generally speaking, and in ᶜAṭṭār as well, an aura of wisdom and justice illuminates the Iranian Sassanid kings, and Chosroes Anōshirwān appears, as in the mirrors for princes, as the inimitable example of all the virtues a ruler may possess.

Cf. in this respect Nöldeke, *Geschichte der Araber und Persen*, Leyden 1879, pp. 160-62, ftn. 3, and A. Christensen, *L'Iran sous les Sassanides*, Copenhagen 1936, pp. 369 ff.

Of the Muslim rulers, it is above all the first four caliphs who cannot be sufficiently praised, and in the introduction of each of ᶜAṭṭār's epics a special section is devoted to their virtues. Among later rulers, Maḥmūd of Ghazna (388-421/998-1030), as we shall see, is particularly accorded a special place. Sultan Sanjar, during whose reign the life of our poet falls, appears rather pale by comparison.

In ᶜAṭṭār, as we know from other sources as well, society is divided in the following manner: at the summit stands the sultan with his governors and officials, and the Turkish military. In the cities there are the religious scholars, clergy, and shaykhs of Ṣūfī orders, as representatives of the intelligentsia, then the more or less well-off merchants, and next the artisans and tradesmen from the jeweller to the sewer-sweeper. In the countryside there are peasants who clearly live in poor circumstances, gatherers of firewood, etc. The lowest social class is made up of beggars with no means of support and the half mentally disturbed, the "fools" (*dēwānagān*). In ᶜAṭṭār the lowest social stratum quite frequently has occasion to speak. Since the rise of popular mysticism and Ṣūfī convents, where to some degree, as in the case of Abū Isḥāq Kāzarūnī (*Firdaws al-murshidiyya*, editor's Introduction) and Abū Saᶜīd from Mihna (Nicholson, *Studies in Islamic Mysticism* 1-76), care for the poor is more or less systematically carried out—during which these poor for the most part gather around the shaykh as disciples—this lower social stratum has acquired a new, religiously justified self-importance. The word "poverty" has acquired a new value under the influence of ascetic Ṣūfī ideals. In the pair of opposites "Prince and Beggar", which crops up so often in ᶜAṭṭār's epics, the beggar appears as the equal of the king, sometimes even as the higher, more worthwhile type, indeed as the actual true king. He feels free from the possessions of this world, by which the king is enslaved, and unburdened by any guilt for having robbed and oppressed the people. Moreover, thanks to his mystical experiences and his pious lifestyle he feels himself to be in a closer relationship to God than most people.

That a person feels himself to be the true king on the basis of inner, spiritual possessions is already an ancient attitude. According to the Socratic Antisthenes, the wise man alone is king. Cf. Olof Gigon, *Sokrates*, Bern 1947, p. 36.

And so in ᶜAṭṭār's stories criticism of the rulers arises from the Ṣūfī shaykhs, from the representatives of the poor people, and from the poorest of the poor, the "fools" who enjoy freedom of speech. The most famous of the "holy", or as the Arabs say, "wise" fools is Bahlūl (classical Arabic Buhlūl) who lived during the era of Hārūn al-Rashīd (see EI s.n. "Buhlūl") and whom we encounter several times in ᶜAṭṭār. Besides him, however, there is an unusually large number of other such fools (*dēwāna*) in ᶜAṭṭār who reprimand the rulers and worldly men. Some of them we have already had occasion to meet.

The conversation between king and beggar often begins when the latter refuses to show the king any normal respect, indeed even to greet him. When the ruler then questions the beggar, he comes to hear some bitter truths.

In the case of the only ruler of antiquity whose name was current in the Islamic Orient, Alexander of Macedonia, the place of the preaching beggars, fools and Ṣūfī shaykhs, is taken by the "wise men", Plato for instance, whose image is fused with that of the Cynic Diogenes or the doctor Hippocrates. In ᶜAṭṭār these ancient wise men are ascetics who have cut all their ties with the world and at times come before the ruler, as do the fools, with a disdain bordering on contempt.

Otherwise, the theologians regularly appear in literature as preachers addressing the ruler. On preaching before rulers cf. *Iḥyāʾ* 2/300 ff., 4th *Bāb fī amr al-umarāʾ wa'l-salāṭīn, etc.* Sermons delivered before rulers while the theologians stand are called *maqāmāt*. "Ḥasan al-Baṣrī" p. 53 and chpt. 2 of Ṭurṭūshī. Popular sermons, during which the preacher sits in the pulpit, are called *majālis*.

In their talks with the great of this world the arguments used by these beggars, fools and wise men in order to justify their judgement are those that we have already become familiar with: the frailty of worldly power, the transitoriness of earthly possessions, human impotence, the enslavement of the rulers by greed and lust for power, the illegality of their property, and the sinfulness of their actions.

Among those who criticize striving after royal power one finds as a rare exception in ᶜAṭṭār an actual king himself. This is the king in the *Ilāhīnāma* who seeks to dissuade his sons from striving after worldly goals, from yearning for kingly dominion. But he is a literary figure from the realm of fairy-tales, more a wise man than a king, and no typical representative of his class.

Let us now see what ᶜAṭṭār and his characters have to say about kingly dominion.

2

Kingly dominion is transitory and impermanent.

The fifth son of the king (above p. 7) wishes for the ring of Solomon, by means of which he hopes to attain dominion over human beings and spirits, and knowledge of the language of animals. The father replies to him: "The dominion of kings is worthless because it's transitory. The dominion of kings in past times depended on a piece of leather (the leather banner of the Sassanids) which no one but a shoemaker can take pleasure in. If you're striving after the eternal

kingdom, then a loaf of bread is enough for you from this world." (IN 15/0, p. 244).—The prince responds: "No human being is free from the desire for dominion. Only by means of royal power does a man attain real enjoyment of life." The father replies: "You only strive after transitory royal dominion in the here and now because you know nothing about the kingdom of the hereafter. The great who've known that kingdom have cast away this earthly realm." (IN 16/0, p. 258).—As an example, there follows the story of Sabtī, the son of Hārūn al-Rashīd. (See pp. 206 f. below).

A shaykh sees fastened to a triumphal arch the picture of the royal bird, the Humā, who chooses kings by means of his shadow, and scolds him with harsh words: "You shameless and untrue bird! How long will you first spread your wings over one man and then settle on the castle of someone else? You're not a loyal provider of shade for anyone. Indeed, fickleness is your true nature!"—The whole world is a fata morgana, dominion over the world a dream. (IN 15/2, p. 247).

The same royal bird doesn't want to accompany the hoopoe on the flight to the Sīmurgh. It's enough for him to choose kings by means of his shadow. He's won such high rank in this way that he only gives his carnal soul (*nafs*) bones to eat. (The Humā is known for nourishing himself with bones). In this way he's protected his spirit (*jān*, *rūḥ*) from everything lowly.—The hoopoe replies to him: "It would be better, oh arrogant bird, if you didn't cast your shadow over kings. For they must all separate from kingship again and on the day of reckoning they have something bad to fear." (MṬ 8/0, p. 35).

From among the great historical rulers it is precisely the most successful, the celebrated conquerors Alexander and Maḥmūd of Ghazna, through whose example the transitoriness of dominion and the meaninglessness of striving after it, and after wealth and power, most clearly come to light.

A wise man meets Alexander on a military campaign and says to him: "How much longer will you go on roaming through the world, while throwing the whole world into confusion?" Alexander answers: "I've already put one half of the world in order. Now I'm going to put the other half in order." The wise man replies: "Someone should put your head in order (*rag rāst kardan*, loosely: to bring someone back to his senses). How can you put the world in order? Surely you know you must leave it!" (IN 15/6, p. 251).

In the case of Maḥmūd of Ghazna, those who address him and point out to the sultan the transitoriness of his power are chiefly people from among the ordinary folk who meet him while he is out riding, for instance when he goes hunting. In the case of other rulers, it is particularly dervishes and fools who act as preachers, whereas, in the case of Hārūn al-Rashīd, the famous fool Bahlūl regularly assumes the role of preacher.

Maḥmūd meets a washerman who has hung up linen, and he clearly wishes to do him a favor by buying the whole lot. The washerman says: "Ten ells are enough for you (for a shroud). Why do you ask the price of the whole lot?" Maḥmūd weeps a little and rides on. Then he comes upon a brickmaker who has lined up his bricks along the road. Maḥmūd asks: "What do these bricks cost?" The brickmaker answers: "Ten bricks are enough for you (for the grave). Why do you ask the price of the whole row? Rather, give up your dominion and do works which are pleasing to God!" When Maḥmūd hears this, he throws himself down on the earth and weeps until he faints. In conclusion, he bestows a gift on both preachers and returns to the city. (IN 15/5, pp. 249-50).

Muḥammad Ghazzālī says to Sultan Sanjar: "If you close your eyes when awake or asleep, you don't see anything at all of your whole realm. How can you find joy in a kingdom which disappears as soon as you shut your eyes? Even if you were a Yazdigird, in the end you would still be killed in a mill. This wheel of the sky is nothing but such a rotating mill that will kill you, etc." (IN 15/3, p. 248).

In the year 651 the last of the Sassanid kings, Yazdigird III, while fleeing from the Arab conquerors, was allegedly killed in Marw by a greedy miller.

The dominion of kings comes to an end in the graveyard.

A king banishes a dervish from the country and threatens to have him killed if he ever resides in the country again. The dervish goes to the cemetery and sits down there. When the king learns of this and in anger asks the dervish how he can be so bold as to disobey his order, the dervish says: "In fact I've left your realm. Isn't the cemetery the first halting-station on the way to the hereafter? Here your rule stops." (IN 16/4, p. 268).

A king (*khusraw-ē*) rides out into the countryside with his army. On the wall of a ruin a fool is lying down. He doesn't move when the king draws near. The king reproaches him for failing to show proper respect. But the fool, without getting up, answers that the king has no cause to demand respect. If the king is rich like Qārūn (the Biblical Korah), his end will be as that of Qārūn (who was swallowed up by the earth). If he has an army and royal power like Nimrod, he'll lose his life because of a gnat like Nimrod did (above p. 75), etc. "But if you don't possess their faults", he continues, "then we're both equals. We both arose from a single drop, both came into the world by the same road and will both lie in the same ground. Thus I'm the same as you in everything. So why should I have to stand in your presence? Am I any less than you?" (MN 36/11).

The hope of long life which leads kings to build palaces is foolish and reprehensible. The world is a bridge which man walks across but doesn't build on (above p. 47).

Bahlūl is sitting on a bridge. Hārūn comes along and tells him he should get off the bridge, that it's no place to sit. Bahlūl replies: "You should tell this to yourself! The whole world is only a bridge. Why do you build palaces on it? And

don't sit underneath the bridge! For when it collapses, it will bury you under its débris." (MN 21/6).

In the face of death king and beggar are equal.

Maḥmūd, while hunting, meets an old bent-over, dust-laden man who is gathering wormwood, and asks him his name. The old man says: "My name is Maḥmūd and I'm your namesake. What more could I wish?" Maḥmūd replies: "But we're not equal because of that. You're one Maḥmūd and I'm another." The old man replies: "Oh king, when we both descend two ells deep into the ground, then we'll be equal." (IN 15/4, p. 248 = AN 17/4). There follows a long paraenetic passage about death and transitoriness).

A fool has placed a skull on the road. A king comes along on his horse and asks him what he's doing. The fool answers: "I'm thinking about whether this is the skull of a beggar like myself or a king like you." (AN 17/3).

As soon as the hour of death arrives, it becomes clear what worth all kingly magnificence really has.

Alexander has read in a book about three desirable things: the water of life, as well as a magic drum and a box with collyrium both made by Hermes Trismegistus. The effect of the water of life is immortality, and the magic drum is a remedy for colic. Whoever beats it breaks wind, which brings him a cure. Whoever uses the collyrium sees all that is in the heavens, on the earth and beneath the earth. After long travels Alexander finds the drum and the box of collyrium in a mountain cave. One of his generals beats the drum. He then breaks wind very loudly, and out of shame and anger he smashes the drum in two. Alexander goes to the land of darkness in search of the water of life but is forced to return without having found what he wanted. He goes to Babylon and there becomes mortally ill with colic. One of Plato's disciples, who's his table-companion, reproaches him, saying that if he hadn't turned over the magic drum at that time to an unworthy person, he wouldn't now die of colic. But he shouldn't be grieved. For what value can a dominion and a kingdom have, if its continuance is bound to an unclean wind. (IN 14/1, pp. 216-19).

According to ᶜAwfī, *Jāmiᶜ al-ḥikāyāt*, the marvelous drum was made during the time of the Sāmānids. It cured the *amīr* Tash of colic. The *amīr* gave the inventor five thousand dinars for it. Later it was passed on to Abū ᶜAlī Ilyās, the Sipahsālār of Khurasan, who destroyed it but was then very sorry to have done so. (Muḥammad Niẓām al-Dīn, *Introduction* 250). According to other reports, the Fāṭimid caliph al-Ḥāfiẓ (d. 544/1149), who suffered greatly from colic, had one of his doctors, Shīrmāh al-Daylamī or Mūsā al-Naṣrānī, make such a drum from seven metals, in each case when one of the seven planets reached the summit of the celestial pole. The drum had the characteristic that when it was beaten, it caused one to break wind. At the time that Saladin entered Cairo, it was still there in the same castle. Unaware of its special characteristic, a Kurd picked it up and when he drummed on it, it worked its effect on him. Out of shock and shame, he let it fall from his hands and it broke in pieces. Cf. Wüstenfeld, *Geschichte der Fatimidenchalifen*, Göttingen 1881, p. 310.

Otherwise, "wise men" are quite happy to give wise speeches at the death of Alexander:

One of them says: "If you were going to disappear under the earth like this, why did you give yourself over to enjoyment in life?" (IN *Khātima*/4, p. 371).— Another one says: "Oh king, you've made many journeys but not such a one as you've just begun. Indeed, you wandered about in the world like the rotating spheres but now you're free from the world's rotation. Why did you come, since you've now departed again?" (IN 11/10, p. 179).

"As long as you were alive, you were accustomed to give lessons", says Aristotle. "Today the lesson is enough for mankind." (MṬ *Khātima*/2, p. 177).

In an Arabic version: "Alexander was more eloquent (*anṭaq*) yesterday than to-day, but today he's a better preacher (*awᶜaẓ*) than yesterday." (Masᶜūdī, *Murūj* 7/186; cf. Chauvin 9/38).

Before the gallows on which Ḥasanak, the former vizier of Maḥmūd, was hanged (422/1031) by Maḥmūd's son and successor, Masᶜūd, a Ṣūfī holds forth in a similar manner.

When Sultan Masᶜūd, the son of Maḥmūd of Ghazna, ascends the throne, he has his father's vizier, Ḥasanak, hanged in front of the palace. The people gather around the corpse and take pleasure in reviling the dead man and enumerating his faults. Finally, a person wearing a Ṣūfī robe jumps up and says: "He had still another fault which is worse than what you've mentioned. He built mighty castles and water-channels and workshops in which silk clothes were woven. He had thousands of slaves. Of all these water-channels, five buckets of water are all he needs now to wash his corpse. Of all the cloth that he had woven, his share is ten ells. Of all the slaves, four are enough to carry his coffin. Of all the castles he built, his portion is now ten bricks. And from all the landed estates he called his own, only four ells have been left to him, the grave where he'll be buried. His fault was that he claimed to be intelligent and yet he didn't recognize the deficiency of the world." (MN 15/3; cf. Chauvin 8/135).

At the hour of their death, when it's too late, many rulers recognize that all their striving was vanity.

On his deathbed Alexander orders that they let his hand hang out of the coffin so everyone can see that it's now devoid of all property and all dominion. (MN 4/12.—*Qābūsnāma* 106, *Bāb* 29; Niẓāmī, *Sikandarnāma-i baḥrī* 170).

Someone sees Maḥmūd of Ghazna after his death in a dream and asks him how his situation is. The deceased sultan answers: "My dominion was only illusion and error. Only God is the ruler and worthy of dominion. Now that I've recognized my weakness and helplessness, I'm ashamed of my rule as sultan. God alone is sultan. It would have been better for me if I'd been a beggar on earth. For here I'm called to account regarding every grain. Cursed be that bird who caused me to be king by means of its shadow!" (MṬ 8/1, pp. 35-36).

ᶜAwfī transmits in the *Lubāb* (1/25) an alleged poem of Maḥmūd's in which the sultan expresses the same belated remorse.

3

How worthless worldly dominion is becomes clear through the human helplessness of those who possess it.

The caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd suffers thirst on a journey but there is no water to be found. A pious worshipper (*ᶜābid*) says to him: "If you didn't find any water now for ten days and someone demanded half your kingdom for a drink, would you give it to him?" Hārūn replies that he would. The person asks again: "If now the water found no entry into your body and you had need of a doctor, and the doctor asked for the other half of your kingdom, would you give this away as well?" Hārūn again replies that he would. The pious worshipper then says: "So don't attach your heart to a kingdom which is worth one liter of water!" (MN 7/1).

The worshipper is Abū Jaᶜfar ibn al-Sammāk, the teacher of Sarī al-Saqaṭī who died 257/871. Cf. Ibn al-Jawzī, *Ṣifat al-ṣafwa* 2/221. And see the Arabic version of the story in *Iḥyāʾ* 4/108, *Bayān al-sabab al-ṣārif, etc.*; *Stufen* 258 f./B.253; Ṭurṭūshī 7; *Kashkūl* 234.

Hārūn is out riding on a very hot day and seeks refuge in the shade of a milestone. Bahlūl appears from behind the milestone and calls to the caliph: "What good is all your magnificence? What good are all your gardens and pavilions, your halls and bodyguards, if now out of the whole a milestone is enough?" (MN 11/8).

Arabic version *Murūj* 2/239; there instead of Bahlūl, the poet Abū'l-ᶜAtāhiya appears. In Nīsābūrī, *ᶜUqalāʾ al-majānīn* 60, the fool is Saᶜdūn.

A madman is pursued by boys throwing stones and he takes refuge in the castle of the governor (*ᶜamīd*). There he sees how servants drive away the flies from the latter. The governor says gruffly to the fool: "Who allowed you to come in here?" The fool replies: "I wanted to ask you for protection from these boys. But how can you keep the boys from harming me? You need to have people to drive flies away from you!" (MN 24/6).

A king bestows a free wish on a fool. The fool asks the king to protect him from flies. The king declares that he's incapable of doing so. The fool responds: "If you can't even do that, shame on you for adopting the airs of a king!"

A king tells a fool to ask for a wish. The fool explains that he has two wishes which the king should grant him. Firstly, he should protect him from Hell. When the king says he can't do that, but that this is a matter for God, the fool asks for his second wish. The king should step a little to one side of the barrel in which the fool sleeps, so the barrel will be warmed by the sun. After not being

able to be of any use to him, surely he shouldn't make his barrel grow cold. (MN 24/5).

Only the first wish is found in Qushayrī, *Taḥbīr*, Ms. Ayasofya 1703, fol. 14a. Regarding the wise man in the barrel (Diogenes, Socrates), cf. P. Kraus, *Raziana* 1/305; F. Rosenthal, "On the Knowledge of Plato's Philosophy in the Islamic World" in: *Islamic Culture* 14/-1940/388; Chauvin 9/35.

The ruler does not even have control over what happens to himself.

Maḥmūd sits down next to a fool. The fool closes his eyes and doesn't look at the ruler at all. "Why do you do this?", asks Maḥmūd. The beggar says: "So as not to see your face."—"Do you think it's not right to look at the ruler of the world?"—"With us", says the fool, "it's not even allowed to see ourself (cf. Chpt. 28), much less other people!"—Maḥmūd replies: "I'm the commander of the world. Whatever I ordain concerning you will happen."—The fool says: "Just think a little! You don't even have control over yourself, much less over others. Drop these empty words and stop bothering me!" (IN 14/13, pp. 230-31).

The ruler is limited in his power because he is constantly threatened by rivals. The only true sovereign is a lord whose dominion no one can contest. The dominion of sultan remains in no one's hands. There is only one sultan: God.

A man observes a boy who is playing by himself with nuts. He asks the boy why he's playing by himself like this. The boy answers: "I like to be an *amīr* and since I have to give orders alone, I play by myself." (MN 24/7).

The ruler is helpless without his surroundings.

"You can't travel any road alone", says that namesake of Maḥmūd's (above p. 114) when he continues to speak. "You can't do anything without an army. You can't drink water without a taster, you can't sleep one night without guards. And the end of such a care-laden existence is death. You're no match for that *amīr*, foreordained death." (IN p. 249).

The very instruments of power which rulers pride themselves on are proofs of their weakness.

4

Thus there is no room for their claims to loftiness, and for their pride and arrogance.

The devil picks up a handful of sand in front of Pharaoh, changes it into pearls, and then changes it back again into sand. He challenges Pharaoh to do the same. When Pharaoh says he's unable to do so, the devil reproaches him asking how he can dare play God (surah 79/24), how he can attach to himself a beard

embellished with pearls, and lay claim to the crown and the throne. He's so repulsive and totally bald, the devil wouldn't even accept him as a slave. How could anyone acknowledge him as Lord (God), etc. (MN 17/5).

A well-known legend about Solomon is directed against the arrogance of rulers.

Solomon is travelling with his army across the country. He himself is seated on a precious carpet (and is carried by the wind). The complacent thought occurs to him: "Where on the earth today is there a king like me?" That very moment one corner of the carpet sags. Solomon addresses the wind: "Why have you done that to the carpet? Don't you know whom you are about to hurl to the ground?" But the wind replies: "I am commanded by God to look after your carpet as long as you keep your heart in order. If you don't do so, I'm not to obey you. Because you thought of your royal power, the corner of your carpet sagged." (IN 18/2).

Kisāʾī in G. Salzberger, *Die Salomo-Sage* 90-91; *Iḥyāʾ* 4/47, *Fī dawāʾ al-tawba*; *Stufen* 121/A.281; *Tibr* 101; Shayzarī 56.

The arrogance of rulers is connected with indomitable lust for riches, power and the subjugation of lands and peoples. At the same time, however, they are not capable of eating any more than an ordinary human being.

Alexander is a guest of the emperor of China. The emperor has him served jewels and pearls for dinner. Alexander says one can't eat such things. The Chinese emperor, apparently surprised, asks whether people in Greece don't eat jewels then. Alexander answers that he eats two loaves of bread a day and this is enough for him. The emperor replies: "If that's the case, are these two loaves of bread not to be found in Greece, so that you had to go off and subjugate so many countries?" Alexander is ashamed, sets out that very moment and says he's had enough of conquests. (MN 24/3).

Regarding the Jewish versions, see Georg Salzberger, *Die Salomo-Sage*, p. 51; the version of the *Midrāsh Rabbā* is printed in *Aramäische Dialektproben* by Gustaf Dalman, 2nd ed., Leipzig 1927, p. 26.

Maḥmūd, with his army and his elephants, passes by a ruin where a fool is sitting. The fool asks him: "Where do you want to go with such a procession?" Maḥmūd answers: "Little father (*bābā*), despite all this, I only eat one loaf of bread a day." The fool replies: "And I eat six loaves of bread without elephants and an army. So what's the point of gathering together so many things?" (MN 15/2).

5

The true kingdom of the soul is that which is won through contentedness.

Concerning this motif, the true and the false kingdom, see for example *Iḥyā'* 4/68-69, *Bayān dawā' al-ṣabr*; *Stufen* 174 f./B.281; and see Chpt. 14/2 below.

When the fifth prince asks his father to inform him about Solomon's ring, the king relates for him the legend of Buluqyā.

Buluqyā and ᶜAffān set out to seek the ring of Solomon which is to be found in a cave in the midst of seven seas. They cross the seas by rubbing a special juice on their feet which enables them to walk on the sea's surface and so to reach the cave. There they find a youth lying on a couch. He's wearing Solomon's ring on his finger. At his feet lies a serpent. The serpent spews forth fire, and Buluqyā is burnt into hot coals. ᶜAffān runs away in terror, and a voice calls to him: "If you wish to have the kingdom of Solomon, practice contentedness. For therein lies the true, eternal kingdom!" (IN 18/1, pp. 285-86).

Thaᶜlabī 220; *Tausendundeine Nacht* (Littmann) 3/804-46 which contains this episode 810-19; Chauvin 7/54-59. Of fundamental importance: Horovitz, ZDMG 55/1901/519-25; idem, "The Origin of the Arabian Nights" in: *Islamic Culture* 1/1917/52 ff. In addition: Vladimir Vikentiev, "Boulouqiya-Gilgamish-Naufragé. Rapports folkloriques arabes, babyloniens et égyptiens" in: *Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts*, Fouad I University, vol. X, Part 1, May 1948, pp. 1-54; Moshe Perlmann, "A Legendary Story of Kaᶜb al-Aḥbār's Conversion to Islam" in: *Joshua Starr Memorial Volume*, New York 1953, p. 89, ftn. 9.

The wise man, who has subjugated his lust to his will, stands in rank above a ruler who is a slave to this very lust. "The slave is free as long as he is satisfied, and the freeman is a slave as long as he has desires." (*Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 1/70).

Alexander hears about a famous wise man who lives in lonely seclusion. He sends a messenger to him with the order to appear before the king. But the wise man refuses to follow the command. He says to the messenger: "I'm master over that to which your king is a slave. How should I follow orders from him?" Insulted and enraged, Alexander goes himself to see the wise man in order to take him to task. He then comes to hear: "You're the slave of hope in a long life and of the craving of not being able to have enough. But I'm master over this, whereas you're its slave. So you're the slave of my slave." (IN 13/1, pp. 198-200).

Ḥuṣrī, *Jamᶜ al-jawāhir* 253; Qushayrī, *Taḥbīr*, Ms. Ayasofya 1703, fol. 36 (an *amīr*); *Iḥyā'* 4/68, *Bayān dawā' al-ṣabr*; *Stufen* 174 f./B.78; Niẓāmī, *Sikandarnāma-i baḥrī* 63; Ṭurṭūshī 21 (about Socrates); Amīr Ḥusaynī Harawī, *Zād al-musāfirīn* in Mureno, *Antologia* 93-94.

The beggar, being without any needs, is in truth the king, and the king in truth the beggar.

Ibn al-Mubārak is asked who are the kings. He answers: "Those who renounce the world (*al-zāhidūn*)." (*Qūt* 1/255; *Nahrung* 2/243/32.366).

Maḥmūd one day asks his teacher (*ustādh*) Sadīd ᶜAnbarī about the sense of the Koranic verse: "And You raise up whom You wish, and humiliate whom You wish" (3/26). Sadīd answers: "The verse is about you and me. My part is being raised up, your part is humiliation. For my needs are satisfied with a mat and a jug of water, but your needs know no limits. That's why you're in a lowlier situation." (MN 7/9).

Maḥmūd is separated from his retinue while out hunting and in a village he calls in on an old woman who is busy cooking beans. The sultan asks her: "Will you give me some of your beans?" (The same word *mulk* in Persain means "scarlet runner beans" and in Arabic "kingship". This gives the old woman the opportunity to compare the two *mulk*s with one another). She says: "I won't sell my *mulk* for your *mulk* because my *mulk* is better than yours. Your *mulk* is threatened by a world of enemies. My carefree *mulk* is preferable to me." Maḥmūd weeps but in the end is given somethng to eat, and he then rides home after having bestowed a purse of gold on the woman. (IN 15/1, p. 246).

If you don't possess one grain in the whole world, then you can be called a king. If you're not attached to one grain, then you can be called Chosroes. You're the slave of whatever has caught you in its bonds. Give up the world so you may become sultan. (MN, before the following story).

When the Ghuzz invade (in the year 548/1153), the complete population of a city along with the government authorities emigrate. A fool remains behind all alone, climbs onto a high roof, attaches his simple robe to a stick and swings it about in circles like a banner. He says: "Insanity was created for a day like this, because now I'm king of the country!" (MN 11/2).

6

The actions of rulers are judged as exceedingly negative. Their possessions constitute stolen or expropriated property which rightfully belongs to someone else. They are unaware of their responsibility toward their subjects. Since basically nothing of what they possess belongs to them, they are the actual beggars. Their policy of taxation is nothing other than begging.

Maḥmūd greets a dervish whom he meets, with the Islamic greeting. The dervish answers with the dismissive response "*ᶜalayk*" (which is used in addressing unbelievers). The sultan is incensed by the beggar's rude behavior but the latter replies: "You're the beggar! I've travelled through a hundred cities and in every mosque I witnessed your begging. There they were recording gifts for you by the grain and half-grain. I didn't see one market or shop where they didn't complain about you. Which of us two is the beggar, you or I?" (IN 15/9, p. 254).

A man from Kufa gives a similar standing-sermon to the caliph Hishām in the *Ḥadīqa* 565-68.

"God appointed you as shepherd, so don't behave like a wolf!"

Sultan Sanjar goes to see an ascetic and asks him to impart to him words of religious exhortation. The ascetic reproaches him, saying: "You destroy people's houses in order to gild your horse's harness. You shed people's blood for the sake of a mouthful which is illicit food moreover. You glean the corn in poor people's villages. You're a worse beggar than they are!" (MN 7/6).

An old man finds a tarnished silver coin in the street and resolves to give it to the neediest person. In the end, he bestows it on the king who is just then giving an audience. The king is enraged by this and shouts at him: "Am I supposed to be in need of such a coin?" But the old man says: "You're surely the neediest of all men. For there's no mosque and no market where money isn't requested for you. You beg at all doors to be able to play the king for a few days." (MN7/7).

Rukn al-Dīn Akkāf voices reproaches against Sultan Sanjar when the sultan visits him. "No old lady", he says, "can prepare herself a dish of onions and fat without you taking something from it. Begging is better than kingship like this!" (IN 15/10, p. 255).

In another story the same Akkāf says to Sanjar: "It's become a duty to pay you the alms-tax, because everything you own belongs to other people from whom you took it. You yourself have nothing. Although you appear to be the richest man, you're the poorest of all." (MN 7/8).

Bahlūl greets the caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd disrespectfully, saying simply: "Hārūn!" The caliph becomes angry at this impertinence and says: "Don't you know who I am? I'll have them shed your blood immediately." The fool answers: "I know you're able to do that. But if a woman in the east breaks her foot on a stone or a goat can't cross over a collapsed bridge, people will hold you responsible for it even if you're in the west." Hārūn weeps and asks Bahlūl whether he perchance has debts which the sultan can settle for him. But this only makes things worse. Bahlūl says: "Do you want to pay off debts with debts? You don't possess a single cent that's your own! What you have belongs to other people. Go give back the money of the Muslims. Who told you to take money from one person and give it to another?"—In the following conversation Bahlūl describes Hārūn as someone who's virtually condemned to Hell. Neither his lineage nor the intercession of the Prophet will afford him protection against damnation. (IN 16/2, p. 264).

Variants: Nīsābūrī, *ʿUqalāʾ al-majānīn*, ZAss 27, 1912, pp. 207-08; *Muḥāḍarāt al-udabāʾ*, third from last line; *Iḥyāʾ* 2/311, 4th *Bāb fī amr al-umarāʾ*, *etc.*; *Kashkūl* 234-35. Cf. *Ṣifat al-ṣafwa* 2/291.

Even Anōshirwān who was famous for his justice (above p. 109) can at times come off badly:

Anōshirwān meets a moaning fool in a ruin who has a jug of water beside him and a brick under his head. The fool asks the king whether he's the just

Anōshirwān. The king answers: "So the people call me." The fool says: "Fill their mouth with dirt so they stop telling such lies! Is it justice then that I've had to live here in this ruin for thirty years and nourish myself with leaves, while you sleep nights on a golden feather-bed with a hundred slave girls who wait upon you as the lord of all lands in candle light with rose-water in a beaker? Justice means to demand of yourself what is right, not to see some as noble and others as lesser, and to entertain the same wishes for your subjects as for yourself."—The king weeps and wants to have help given to the beggar but the beggar rejects his help. (MN 7/2).

A king (*khusraw-ē*) builds a castle. The hut of an old lady stands in the way of his building plans. If the hut remains standing, the castle won't have perfectly straight corners. The king tries in vain to get the woman to sell her hut. They wait until she's away and then they empty the house and pull it down. When the woman comes back and sees what's happened, she shouts a prayer to heaven and the castle immediately collapses and buries the unjust king beneath it. (MN 7/3).

This widely disseminated story has numerous variants. In the *Siyāsatnāma* (Tehran), p. 24, the violent ruler is the governor of Azerbayjan who is brought to account, however, by Anōshirwān; in Mas^cūdī, *Murūj* 2/197, Anōshirwān himself builds a palace and lets the hut of the woman remain so that the palace's shape is irregular which, by way of embellishment, stands as a sign of the king's justice. Cf. A. Christensen, *L'Iran sous les Sassanides* 369-72. Regarding this legend and its connection with the story of Fredrick II and the Windmill owner of Sanssouci, cf. Georg Jacob, "Wandersagen" in: *Der Islam* 18/1929/200-04; Otto Spies, *Der Orient in der deutschen Literatur*, Kevelaer, Rheinland 1949, pp. 14-15. It is transferred to the construction of the Ulu Cāmi[c] in Bursa in the *Risāle-i menāqib-i Emīr Sulṭān*, Istanbul 1290, p. 85; see also Muḥammad b. Ṭalḥa, *al-[c]Iqd al-farīd* 65.

We just saw how disrespectfully Hārūn al-Rashīd could be treated by Bahlūl. One time he rejects the food the caliph has sent him, with grave reproaches.

Bahlūl who hasn't eaten anything with fat in it for a long time, asks the caliph to sent him the fatty tail of a sheep. The caliph wishes to test him and, in place of a fatty tail, has him sent chopped up turnips. Bahlūl throws the dish on the ground in anger and calls out to the caliph: "Since you've been the ruler, there's no longer any fat in a sheep's fatty tail! Your tyranny has made food tasteless! A person simply has to emigrate now." (MN 7/4).

One morning a ruler has food given to Bahlūl. Bahlūl throws it to the dogs. When they tell him that it's improper to give the king's food to the dogs, he replies: "Be quiet! If the dogs hear that the food comes from this ruler, they won't touch it!" (MN 7/5).

It is uncertain whether this is an independent story or the continuation of the previous one.

The bad end which must inevitably befall the ruler is deduced by Bahlūl in a fool's way.

Bahlūl goes to see Hārūn and sits on the sultan's throne without any inhibitions. He's then beaten by the palace servants until he's bleeding. Then he says to the caliph: "I only sat here for one moment and they've beaten me till I bleed. In your case, you've sat on this throne during a whole lifetime. They will certainly break all your limbs." (MN 7/10).

The sultan's goods are *ḥarām*, religiously forbidden.

Maḥmūd, when he goes out with his army, meets an old man who's carrying a sack on his back. The sultan asks him what he has in the sack. The man answers: "I've been gathering grain all day and I'm taking home what I've gathered in order to bake barley bread for my family." The sultan asks in what fields he's been gathering the grain. The old man answers: "Naturally, not in the sultan's fields because that's stolen property and forbidden." Maḥmūd asks why he considers the sultan's property as forbidden. The old man then gives him a sermon: "Day and night you eat the goods of the poor and live from the blood of their heart. Sometimes you collect things in the village, other times in the city. You have money taken away from people with the strokes of a stick and you maintain this is your legitimate property! Take as an example for yourself Solomon who lived from the labor of his hands, from basket-weaving (above p. 54). Even if I were poor and in dire need, I'd consider it a disgrace to eat your bread. Look at your base striving and my lofty striving! You should burn your kingship and your property, and learn kingship from me!" Then the old man turns to go. The sultan looks after him in amazement and breaks into tears. (MN 13/2).

I know of no other Islamic writings in which social criticism of the rulers is expressed with such severity as in these stories of ᶜAṭṭār.

7

The rulers are far removed from knowledge of God.

True kingship consists of knowledge of God. Whoever is intoxicated by the world of divine knowledge (*ᶜirfān*) becomes sultan over all the people of the world. For him worldly kingship is only a contemptible thing. (Compare this to the wordplay with *mulk* above p. 120).

If the kings of the era were to experience the taste of a drink from the "ocean without shore" (knowledge of God, mysticism), they would all sit there grieving in pain and not look one another in the eye. (MṬ before 40/5, p. 141).

Maḥmūd comes to an old ruin and there finds a fool bent over under the burden of cares. When the latter catches sight of the ruler, he calls to him: "Keep away from me! You're no king, but a person of base striving and a denier of your God's good works (*kāfir-niᶜmat*)!" Maḥmūd replies: "Don't call me a denier (*kāfir*, unbeliever)! Tell me an instructive word and nothing further (don't abuse me anymore)!" The fool says: "Oh unsuspecting one, if you knew what it is that you're

so far from, you wouldn't pour dust and ashes, no you'd pour fire on your head!" (MṬ 40/5, p. 141).

A dervish asks a king: "What do you like better, gold or sins?" The king says: "Gold." The dervish: "Then why are you taking sins with you (to the hereafter) and leaving the gold behind?" (AN 20/3).

In the *Siyāsatnāma* 33-34 the person being questioned is Abū ᶜAlī Ilyās, the Sipahsālār of Khurasan, and the questioner is Abū ᶜAlī Daqqāq, Qushayrī's teacher. The story also appears, without anyone being named, in *Muntakhab kitāb Nūr al-ᶜulūm*, the *vita* of Kharaqānī, ed. Bertels in: *Iran* 3/183.

The path to the world of the poor man, the beggar, which in the religious sense is a higher world, is closed to the ruler.

Maḥmūd sees a "belt-player" sitting on the road. He wishes to be nice to him and invites him to teach him the game. But the poor man answers: "Go your way! The belt can't be joined together with the drum and banner of the king. Empty yourself and become poor. Then engage in this art!" (IN 18/9, p. 298).

Duwālakbāz. According to Vullers' Lexicon 917a, it seems to be a game of skill by means of which money is wheedled out of people, corresponding to games of skill one can observe in our fairs. *Duwālak* can also mean "little drum".

Suffering, which is the inseparable companion of the religious man, is incomprehensible and inacessible to the ruler who possesses all the goods of the world and does not have to deny himself any desire.

Maḥmūd meets a fool who lives in a ruin with a felt hat on his head and is so sunken in weltschmerz that he doesn't even condescend to look at the sultan. The sultan asks him: "What's this grief you're suffering? It's as if a hundred mountains lay on top of your soul!" The fool answers: "If you wore a felt hat like I do, then you'd find your way to this grief. But in the midst of royal luxury you can't imagine anything of this grief of separation." (IN 7/10, p. 118).

The world of lofty, authentic love, as we shall see later, is also inaccessible to the ruler, even the most famous royal lover, Maḥmūd.

8

Rulers behave toward their surroundings, their servants and slaves, in a moody manner, and pose a danger for them. They are exceedingly jealous, cannot control their anger and in their rage issue disastrous commands which they themselves then have reason to regret. (We shall eventually encounter several such stories). Consequently, warnings about serving rulers are not lacking in literature. (Cf. for example chpt. 44 of Ṭurṭūshī's Mirror for Princes). "Beware of the ruler (*sulṭān*) because he becomes en-

raged like a boy and then is good again like a boy, but he goes on the attack like a lion." (Ṭurṭūshī 97). "The companion of the ruler is like a man who is riding on a lion. People are afraid of him but he has even greater fear of his mount." (Ibid. 97).—The historian Ibn al-Athīr, after recounting how the vizier Ṣāḥib Ibn ᶜAbbād was treated by his master Fakhr al-Dawla, cannot refrain from crying out: "A curse upon (*qabaḥa'llāh*) serving kings! This is what they do to those who mean well toward them (*naṣaḥa lahum*), not to mention what they do to others!" (Sub anno 385).

Not even the slaves who are their favorites are safe from their moods.

When the hoopoe calls the birds to fly to the residence of the Sīmurgh, the hawk excuses himself because of being in the service of the king, whom he's attached to and whom he doesn't wish to leave (above p. 12).—The hoopoe instructs him that only the Sīmurgh is the true ruler. The worldly ruler is unfaithful and cruel. The person nearest him is the one most in danger. The ruler of this world is like fire from which one should keep as far away as possible. (MṬ 9/0, p. 36).

A king falls in love with a slave, doesn't let him leave his presence for a moment, and treats him far better than all the other attendants. But when the king amuses himself shooting his bow, the slave is gripped with terror. For it's the king's practice to place an apple on the slave's head and shoot at it with an arrow. When they ask the slave why he looks so pale and anxious despite the king's favor, he answers: "He shoots at the apple on my head. If he hits me, then he'll say: 'I suppose I never really owned this slave.' If he hits the apple, everyone says: 'This is the good fortune which smiles on the king!'" (MṬ 9/1, p. 37).

A Wilhelm Tell shooting scene like this is portrayed in one of the pictures in the *Kasseler Trachtenbuch*. Professor R. Tschudi of Basle possesses a copy of it.

ᶜAṭṭār, as we shall see, relates several stories in which kings kill favorites or have them executed. These stories are only made bearable through the symbolic meaning he endows them with.

Our poet himself disdained to serve rulers and prides himself on being independent of them. (See p. 156 below).

It is futile to wish to convince rulers who are blinded by ambition to have a sense of conscience.

Sultan Sanjar visits ᶜAbbāsa-i Ṭūsī but no fruitful conversation takes place and the sultan soon gets up and leaves. Afterwards they ask ᶜAbbāsa why he didn't speak at all with the sultan. He answers: "I beheld a world full of hard branches and there was only a small, dull sickle in my hand. I observed that I could only have a small effect and so I remained silent." (IN 10/1, p. 154).

9

And yet Sanjar and other rulers are always visiting pious shaykhs to have them preach to them and they listen patiently to their reproaches and are occasionally even moved to tears. This came to be considered good manners among Islamic rulers and many of them paid great respect to the shaykhs, to the point of humiliating themselves. It would be seen as bad for members of the religious classes to go to the courts of the *amīrs*, whereas it would be thought to be meritorious if the rulers went to visit religious scholars and men of God. A saying of the Prophet regarding this has been transmitted: "The worst of religious scholars is the one who visits the *amīrs*, and the best of *amīrs* is the one who visits the religious scholars. Excellent is the *amīr* at the door of the poor man, and abominable is the poor man at the door of the *amīr*." (Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī begins his *Fīhi mā fīh* with this *ḥadīth*). Already Ḥasan al-Baṣrī had railed against the Koran-reciters who went to visit rulers. ("Ḥasan al-Baṣrī" 46).

A man sees a *muftī* on the day of audience at the door of the sultan and asks him for a *fatwā*. The *muftī* replies: "Is this a place to be issuing a *fatwā*?" The questioner says: "Is this the place where a *muftī* should be sitting?" (MN 23/14).

And in reality the picture ᶜAṭṭār sketches of the ruler is not so thoroughly dark as the stories recounted up to now would make it appear. Even aside from the monarchs of the fairy-tales and novellas like Kaᶜb, the ruler of Balkh (see p. 369 below), and the wise king of the *Ilāhīnāma*, his rulers and kings display friendlier and more humane characteristics as well.

There are also more favorable statements about the government, "the *sulṭān*", on the part of men of piety and theologians, and some statements which forbid voicing abuse against the government. In the *ḥadīth* of Ibn ᶜUmar it says: "Do not hurl abuse against the government! And if it is absolutely necessary, then say: 'May God treat them the way they treat us!'" (*Lisān al-ᶜarab* 17/27). Among the Ṣūfī shaykhs, Sahl al-Tustarī (d. 283/896) and Ḥakīm Tirmidhī (d. circa 300/910) who still lived under relatively good caliphs, namely Muᶜtaḍid (279-289/892-902) and Muktafī (289-295/902-908), were especially friendly to the government. Sahl teaches: "This community consists of seventy-three sects, seventy-two of which hasten to destruction (*hālika*). They all hate the government. The one that finds salvation is the one that gets along with the government."—"The *sulṭān* is the best of human beings... Whoever doesn't recognize the imāmate of the *sulṭān* is a heretic (*zindīq*), and whoever doesn't accept his invitation is a heretical innovator. But whoever goes to him without being invited is an ignorant person (fool)."—The black pieces of wood which are hung from their gates are more useful for the Muslims than seventy *qāḍīs*. (*Qūt* 2/125; *Nahrung* 3/143/35.8). Ḥakīm Tirmidhī even wrote a section in which he describes the "useful arrangements of the

sulṭān" (*marāfiq al-sulṭān* in the *Kitāb al-Ḥuqūq*. Cf. *Oriens* 3/ 1950/34).—Already Jāḥiẓ says: "If the government (*al-sulṭān*) didn't exist, the people would devour one another." (*Al-Ḥāsid wa'l-maḥsūd*, in the margin of the *Kāmil*, Cairo 1323, 1/34). The Ṣūfī ᶜUmar al-Suhrawardī (d. 632/1235) was an outspoken supporter of the government. He lived under the energetic caliph Nāṣir (595-622/1180-1225), who shortly before the Mongol invasion endeavored to mobilize the Sunnī powers and was once more able to confer a real significance on the caliphate. Cf. my "Philologika IX" in: *Der Islam* 25/1939/36-37.—Ghazzālī as well recognized the government as the patron of religion and the protector of the Muslims. (*Iḥyā*ᵓ 4/86 [Sahl al-Tustarī], 90, 104, et passim; *Stufen* 213 f./B.150, 251/B.236; cf. also Shaᶜrānī, *Durar al-ghawwāṣ* 120).

Many *amīrs* show mercy when they are reminded of the Final Judgement.

The master instructs the world-traveller, when the latter returns from God's Throne, that the Throne is the place of divine mercy. Whoever shows mercy, light is imparted to him from the Throne. Whoever is merciful to his subordinates need be in no fear of Hell-fire. (MN 6/0).

Sultan Malikshāh is returning to Isfahan from hunting and stops along the way in a village. His slaves find a cow on the road, slaughter it and eat it. The cow belongs to an old woman and her children, and is their only means of sustenance. The woman positions herself on the bridge Malikshāh must pass over, begs him for justice and threatens him with an action on Judgement Day. The king gives her seventy cows as compensation. In thanks the woman prays for him. After his death Malikshāh is seen in a dream and explains that he was only saved through the old woman's prayer. (MN 6/1).

There is a similar story in the *Ḥadīqa* 557-61 in which a woman complains about stolen grapes, and another in which land is stolen from the woman, ibid. 545-48. The scene from Niẓāmī's *Makhzan al-asrār* in which an old woman complains to Sultan Sanjar about a drunken soldier is well known and has frequently been depicted in miniatures.

ᶜAbd Allāh ibn Ṭāhir (the famous general of Maᵓmūn and governor of Khurasan who died 230/844) is riding home after hunting. Suddenly an old woman jumps out from behind a bridge. The *amīr*'s horse shies to one side and causes the *amīr*'s hat to fall off. In anger he asks the woman what she's doing here. She begs for the release of her son who's languishing in prison. ᶜAbd Allāh swears he'll never release him. At that the woman threatens to bring her case before God. Her words make an impression on ᶜAbd Allāh and he promises that he won't ride over the bridge before her son is set free. The prisoner is brought, given gifts, and a crier walks before him calling out: "This is the one set free by God!" (MN 18/1).

ᶜAbd Allāh ibn Ṭāhir here exercises the ruler's virtue of forbearance, control over anger (*ḥilm*), whose cosmic representative is the earth which bears everything with forbearance. (MN 18/0). (See p. 331 below).

Maḥmūd of Ghazna, who has already been frequently mentioned, appears in a relatively favorable light in ᶜAṭṭār. The great conqueror was indeed popular, on the one hand, due to his zealous faith which, of course, primarily manifested itself in persecuting heretics and plundering Indian temples, and, on the other hand, because of his love affair with his slave, the *amīr* Ayās, the model of all courtiers, who has been the subject of many anecdotes, in fact of whole epics, and whom ᶜAṭṭār particularly makes use of by way of illustrating mystical truths. Finally, Maḥmūd, at least according to ᶜAṭṭār, displays a certain simple directness and affability in his dealings with the ordinary people, and this sympathy for the poor is described by the poet as the main reason for Maḥmūd's popularity.

Maḥmūd attained such popularity because his soul sensed something about poverty. If he'd been arrogant in his rule, the people wouldn't still be speaking about him. (IN 256, pp. 13-14). He's among those kings who "grasped the secret of poverty" (ibid. p. 16).

Concerning Sultan Maḥmūd of Ghazna (d. 421/1030), see EI s.n. and Muḥammad Nāẓim, *The Life and Times of Sulṭān Maḥmūd of Ghazna*, Cambridge 1931, especially pp. 151 ff.

Thus in ᶜAṭṭār, along with stories in which the gap between the sultan and a poor man is represented as insurmountable (above p. 124), there are also stories in which this gap, to a certain extent, appears to be bridged.

Maḥmūd throws his armband as a gift to a man who's sifting earth (MṬ 38/6, p. 131—On the symbolic meaning see p. 358 below).

He takes the burden from an old woman who's carrying a heavy sack to the mill and places it on his own horse. But when he rides off so fast that the old woman can't keep pace with him, she threatens him (perhaps she fears the rider is deserting her?), saying that if he doesn't ride slowly so she can keep up with him, she won't keep pace with him on Judgement Day and he'll be left behind her in that place. Thereupon the sultan weeps and reins in his horse. After a few verses in praise of Maḥmūd, ᶜAṭṭār continues: "Oh you beggar, learn how to do good and what beggary is from a sultan like this!" (IN 15/12, p. 257).

An old widow extends toward Maḥmūd, who's riding past with his retinue, her walking stick which has attached to it a written petition for help against an unjust oppressor. The sultan rides by without paying attention to the old woman. At night in a dream he sees himself fall into a whirlpool. The old woman of that day extends her walking stick to him and saves his life. When he sees the old woman again the following day, he relates his dream to his soldiers, has the woman sit down next to him on the throne and orders his soldiers to grip the woman's walking stick. Then he says to her (jokingly): "Oh weak woman, surely you can't pull all these people from their place!" She answers proudly:

"Whoever can pull Maḥmūd out of the water, can pull all people from their place." Perhaps this is supposed to mean that before God the woman is stronger than Maḥmūd and his army, and that she can save him and his retinue from destruction on Judgement Day. (IN 9/1, p. 140).

The method of holding up a stick with a written petition on it before a ruler on horseback is, according to Mr. Abdülvehhab Tarzî, still practiced in Afghanistan today.

Another person suffering from oppression takes hold of Maḥmūd's reins while asking for justice, and Maḥmūd stops his horse. A surprised courtier asks him why he stopped his horse, since shortly before he had ridden past the same petitioner without paying him attention. Maḥmūd answers: "At that time I was drunk, but now every hair of this oppressed person has become a hand which grips my reins, and I don't know how I can get loose from this crowd of restraining hands." (IN 14/22, p. 238).

Maḥmūd honors with his visits a man who lives in an ashhouse.

One evening Maḥmūd drops in on someone who lives in an ashhouse. The man offers him what he has: a couch of ashes and a piece of dry bread. The sultan is charmed by the man's natural behavior and says: "I'll kill him if he speaks of apologies this evening!" When saying goodbye, the host remarks: "You've seen what I'm able to offer you. You came uninvited. If you wish, come back and if not, don't come! I'm no more than what I am." The sultan is pleased by the man's speech and returns to visit the man in his ashhouse seven more times. On the final visit he tells him to wish for whatever he wants. But the man says: "I only have one wish: that the sultan may come to visit me from time to time. Then I won't change my house of ashes for a royal castle." (MṬ 33/3, pp. 112-13. On the story's symbolic meaning see p. 576 below).

Here the relationship between the ordinary people and the ruler is a completely different one from that in the stories recounted above where impolite fools roughly accost caliphs, sultans and *amīrs* and say coarse things to their face. The story is employed by [c]Aṭṭār to illustrate the goodness of God who willingly bestows His love on man, and it goes without saying that wherever the king is presented as the symbolic representative of the Ruler of the world, his image will be portrayed without criticism. And we shall frequently encounter the ruler in this role.

The king also appears differently when he is not presented in contrast to the ordinary poor folk who have been sucked dry by his tax-collectors, or as waging power-hungry wars of conquest, or when his false attachment to the "world" through gathering treasures and building palaces is not exposed to the criticism of the pious—but when he is instead seen lingering in the midst of his loyal supporters, his officers, his courtiers and his personal slaves. He does occasionally also give vent to his rage in senseless

cruelty against them but normally he is a source of sustenance and wealth for them, a nourisher and a protector, and as such the object of their respect, dependence and loyal love.

Moreover, many kings and princes completely renounce their kingship for religious reasons and become saints. More shall be said about this later (pp. 205-06).

10

In the end, the relation of the ordinary people to the ruler in ᶜAṭṭār is not wholly defined by a sense of oppression, by grievances and hardship, or by the contempt of "the noble beggar", if such an expression is permitted, who feels inwardly superior to him, but the image of the king in the eyes of the people is actually illuminated by a magic glow which is imparted by lofty good fortune, a ruler's dignity, possession of the highest earthly power, riches and a life surrounded with beauty and luxury. On occasions when this magic image is effective, and not too darkened by bad experiences, the ruler is neither criticized, nor envied, nor hated for his possession of these goods, but rather is admired, honored and loved. People are proud to know that he stands above them and they feel honored and blessed by his close proximity.

In Iran, as is well known, a king's magical good fortune and a ruler's radiance became hypostatized under the name *khvarena* (Neo-Persian *farr*).

Ernst Herzfeld, *Zoroaster and his World*, Princeton 1947, 1/179 ff.; Ringgren, *Fatalism* 94-99. For a similar idea among the northern Teutons (Nord-Germanen) see Wilhelm Grönbech, *Kultur und Religion der Germanen*, 1939, II, 202-03.

The belief in the blessed power of the king's presence still lives on in the Persian epics of the Islamic period.

The officer who invites Bahrām Gōr to his estate hopes that because of the king's visit the bees will produce an abundance of honey and the cows much milk. (Niẓāmī, *Heft Peiker* p. 94).

Maḥmūd also possesses magical good fortune.

Maḥmūd, while riding, becomes separated from his retinue and meets a boy who's sitting by a lake and has cast his fishing line in the water. Maḥmūd sits down with him and notices that the boy looks sad and troubled. When he asks the reason for his despondency, the boy says: "We are seven fatherless children and our mother is poor, and I must feed them all by fishing." Then Maḥmūd says: "Would you like me to be your partner?" The boy consents, and the sultan casts the fishing line into the lake. His kingly good fortune causes hundreds of fish to

be caught on the hook. The boy rejoices at his luck, but Maḥmūd says: "You owe your luck to me. Know that you've had the king as a fisherman!" At that he jumps onto his horse. The boy wants to give him his share but Maḥmūd says: "I don't want to divide up today's catch but tomorrow's catch will be mine. And tomorrow's catch is you." The following day Maḥmūd has an officer fetch the boy and sits him on the ruler's seat next to himself because the boy is indeed his partner, and he accords him a high position at his court. Maḥmūd's kingly good fortune has transformed the boy's grief into joy. (MṬ 17/1, p. 63-64).

Another time when Maḥmūd becomes separated from his retinue, he meets an old woman who's milking a cow. He asks her for some milk. The old woman says: "If my husband were here, he would slaughter the cow for you." Maḥmūd is charmed by this hospitality and gets down from his horse and begins to milk the cow. His kingly good fortune has the magical effect that the cow, while he milks it, gives as much milk as it normally gives in a whole month. In the meantime, his retinue arrives and surrounds him. The woman realizes who he is and says: "Now that I know who you are, I'd like to be your sacrifice myself!" (An expression of respect). Maḥmūd, who is pleased by the woman's behavior, tells her to ask for whatever she wants. She asks that the sultan return one time by himself as her guest because she's not up to dealing with the uproar of his retinue. Thereupon Maḥmūd bestows the whole village on her. (MN 24/1).

The magical good fortune of the ruler, however, is bound to his practicing justice.

Ibn ᶜAbbās relates: "The king is travelling about in his country in disguise and dismounts before a man who owns a cow. When the cow comes home evenings and is milked, she gives as much milk as thirty cows. The king then thinks to himself he will take her away. The next day the cow only gives half as much milk as before. The king asks whether she'd been grazing in a different meadow. The man says: 'No, but I think a king intends to take her away, because when the king acts unjustly or intends to do something unjust, the blessing disappears.' The king then swears by his God not to take away the cow, whereupon she once again produces as much milk as thirty cows. The king repents and commits himself before God to practice justice as long as he lives." (Ṭurṭūshī 37; ibid. several similar stories).

Examples are also found in Yāfiᶜī, *Mirʾāt al-janān* 3/139-40 sub anno 485. In addition, see G. van der Leeuw, *La Religion dans son essence et ses manifestations* 110-14.

Wherever the magical image of the king is effective, due to the touch of his hand the most banal object acquires immense value.

Maḥmūd becomes separated from his retinue and meets an old thorn-gatherer whose donkey has cast off its load. When the man sees the rider, he goes up to him and with polite words asks him for help. The sultan dismounts and helps the old man to pack the load of thorns on the donkey again. Afterwards Maḥmūd orders his soldiers to bring the thorn-gatherer before him. When the latter realizes

who Maḥmūd is, he becomes confused and ashamed, and he says: "Oh God, I've made Maḥmūd my porter!" The sultan asks him what he does for a living. The old man says: "As you saw, I gather thorns in the fields, sell them and buy bread with the money." The sultan says: "Then put a price on your thorns there! What should they cost?" The sly old man says: "I won't sell them for less than ten purses of gold." The army commanders say to him: "Hold your tongue, you fool! The thorns are worth two grains at the most. Set a cheaper price!" The old man then says: "The hand of a prince of good fortune has transformed the thorns into roses. Whoever wishes to buy them, let him give one dinar for every thorn." (MṬ 17/3, pp. 65-66).

In the end, this magical image of the king and of the king's young son, the prince, as possessor of all earthly perfection and beauty, can have the effect that, in place of the hostile relationship between the beggar and the prince, the opposite occurs, namely love. There then arise those stories, which one encounters in Persian literature so frequently since ᶜAṭṭār, about the beggar who falls in love with the prince. The loftiness and unattainability of the object of this love confers on it an incomparable intensity, selflessness, and willingness for self-sacrifice and death, thus at the same time making it suitable to serve as a model for the loftiest and thoroughly unattainable object, the absolute beauty of God. But that is a different subject which we shall not enter into just yet.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE EMOTIONAL ATTITUDE OF THE PIOUS

As for the critics of those worldly men who live an untroubled life, how do they behave in the same situation themselves? How do they respond to the transitoriness of the world and the pains and hardships to which they are exposed in this valley of tears? What effect does the threat of punishment in the hereafter have on them? And the consciousness of their impotence to conform to the divine commands, the uncertainty of their religious situation, the feeling of not being free in their actions but nonetheless accountable? How do they come to terms with the inscrutable nature of the world-ground?

The early men of piety and ascetics respond to the given situation with an emotional attitude of severity and sorrow, and in their opinion perseverance in this attitude is the behavior appropriate for the circumstances. Consequently, in the mystical textbooks sorrow or severity (*ḥuzn*) actually appears as one of the "halting-stations" (*maqāmāt*).

Qushayrī, *Risāla* 65; *Sendschreiben* 205/12.; *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 1/91; "Ḥasan al-Baṣrī" 17-19. Cf. also in this regard Tor Andrae, "Zuhd und Mönchtum" in: *Le Monde Oriental* 25, p. 299.

Similarly, ᶜAṭṭār's epics are to a great extent dominated by a mood of acute sorrow. But this is not only caused by the thought of death and fear of the final reckoning, which in Ḥasan stand in the foreground as causes of sorrow. Rather, the mood often expresses itself as a more general unspecific weltschmerz which occasionally imparts a somewhat self-pitying tone to these poems. The mood in ᶜAṭṭār is also determined by a sense of an inner rift, a "hybridity", as he likes to put it, a sense of being pulled back and forth between different states, of dissatisfaction with one's own behavior, and finally by an eternally unquenched yearning for God and knowledge of the world-ground, which is at times transformed into an almost violent impulse for self-surrender, for extinction in God, in the Universe.

1

Sorrow is one of the characteristics which distinguishes a pious man from worldly men who carry on living in cheerfulness.

Aḥmad-i Khiḍrōya says: "I've seen all the people. They all have one thought and all consume the same nourishment." (TA: They all eat like an ox and a donkey from one manger). A listener says: "Weren't you among them?" Aḥmad replies: "Yes, I was." The man asks: "So what's the difference between you and them?" The shaykh answers: "They eat and are happy and know nothing, and they're proud of their rank and their money. But I only eat to live. I know how matters stand. I weep showers of blood, nor do I laugh and act proudly because of worldly things." (MN 17/1; somewhat different and simpler in TA 1/292-93).

For the pious man joy in earthly pleasures is spoiled by the thought of death.

A certain pious man never drinks sherbet. When asked the reason for this, he answers: "I always see death standing next to me, who wants to snatch the drink from me as quickly as possible. For me this eternal observer transforms sherbet into poison and rose-water into fire." (MṬ 27/1, p. 93).

Sorrow in the face of thwarted desires is universally human. It paralyzes one's sense of initiative.

One of the birds complains to the hoopoe that his whole life has gone by in cares and sorrow. None of his desires was ever fulfilled. This sadness has so overwhelmed him that he's not fit for the flight to the Sīmurgh. (MṬ 27/0, p. 93). We shall hear the hoopoe's response later on (p. 256 below).

An old woman asks the Ṣūfī shaykh Abū Saʿīd to teach her a prayer which makes the heart happy. She has suffered so long from unfulfilled desires (*nāmurādī*) that she can't bear it any longer. The shaykh answers: "I myself have long sought after what you wish for but haven't found it." (MṬ 27/4, p. 94, following *Asrār al-tawḥīd* 177; O'Kane, *Secrets* 329).

Even the great Junayd cannot entertain hope.

Someone asks him: "When does a human being attain happiness of the heart?" He answers: "Then when he no longer has a heart." (MṬ 27/5, p. 95).

In his helpless situation man is afraid of what "time" (see above pp. 43 f.) will cause to befall him.

Once man has understood—and the poet is urging him to do so—that he's no more than a poor handful of earth, once he has recognized his helpless position between the wheel of heaven and the polo ball of the earth, he then gives up his arrogance and is afraid of the magic tricks (*ṭilsamāt*) of "time". He has no trust in peace.

A man stands on the shore of a peaceful ocean, whose end his thought cannot encompass, and says: "Oh you endless ocean! I feel great fear before your peace-

ful calm. If the wave arises from within you, you then smash many ships indeed." (AN 16/5).

In this world the believer feels as if he is in a prison. (Above pp. 51 f.). He feels confined in it like in a narrow pass.

A man meets a dervish in the desert and asks what he's doing. The dervish answers: "Shame on you for asking like this! I'm sitting in the narrow pass of the world, and the world is now confinement for me." The other says: "How can you talk about a narrow pass in this wide-open desert?" The dervish says: "If there were no narrow pass here, surely you wouldn't have come across me." (MṬ 24/4, p. 85).—(In the context the story is an amplification of the expression "not to fit in with the world", as here for instance (MṬ 24/3) through consciousness of "higher striving".

Sometimes the reason for sorrow is the daily grind and tribulations of life.

Someone asks Majnūn: "How are you?" He answers: "I'm an old pack-donkey whose body is worn out from bearing loads. My body is thin and weak and yet every day I must bear heavy loads. And when they remove the pack-saddle for me to rest, a thousand horseflies come and bite my wounds so that I say: 'Would that I were not honored with this rest period!'" (IN 14/23, p. 239).

Or the monotonous, never-ending and, in the last resort, futile treadmill of daily existence oppresses one's mood.

Ghazzālī visits a sick woodcutter and says to him: "You'll soon get better. Don't be so sad!" The poor woodcutter answers: "And if I were feeling better, I'd have to go back to chopping wood (and finally die)." (AN 16/1, after a long lament about the valley of tears of earthly existence and the wicked world, which is then elaborated further).

A baker actually goes crazy because of his endless work.

A baker goes crazy from baking bread, runs about in the city and begs for "bread without a (further) bread". Asked the reason for this strange request, he answers that as soon as he bakes a bread in the bakery, they immediately bring him a new one. There's been no end to this and it's driven him crazy. Then a divine voice had called out in his heart: "Don't bake hundreds of breads. Ask for only one bread. One bread is enough for you for one day. Hundreds of people are prepared to give you a bread." That's why he now walks in the street and asks for a bread without a (further) bread. (MN 21/11).—(In ᶜAṭṭār the story is simply an amplification of the thought that a person should be content with one bread).

A water-carrier sighs because of his never-ending work.

Isḥāq-i Nadīm has a slave whose task is to carry water from the Tigris into the house. But since no one's thirst grows less, nor does the water run out, he never has a moment's rest. One day his master asks him how he is. The slave says: "I'm caught between two torments. On one side the unending water, on the other

side the ungrateful thirsty. It's neither possible to empty the Tigris, nor to satisfy the thirsty. Thus I forever stand between the Tigris and the thirsty." (MN 12/8).—(In ᶜAṭṭār the story is an amplification of the concepts "endless ocean of love, unending thirst" and "a hybrid stance beween two things". See 8/5 below).

Would that one had never been born!

Fuḍayl ibn ᶜIyāḍ, known as "the cloud of tears", says: "I neither envy the prophets, because they have before them the grave and the resurrection and the bridge of trials and they're all helpless, nor the angels, because they don't know love (see p. 643 below). I only envy those who haven't been born. Would that my mother had never given birth to me!" (MN *Khātima*/11).

Iḥyāʾ 4/161, *Bayān aḥwāl al-ṣaḥāba, etc.*; *Stufen* 387/C.179; Ibn Abī Dunyā (d. 291/894) wrote a special work on the Companions of the Prophet, the Followers, and early men of piety who made statements of this kind, as for instance: "Would that my mother had never given birth to me!" "Would that I were ashes!" "Would that I were green herbs and eaten by camels!" And so on. *Kitāb al-Mutamannīn*, Ms. Lâleli 3664, fol. 122a-132b. Ibn al-Shibl (d. 474/1081) expresses himself in similar tones: "God curse such a lust as mothers and fathers enjoy to our misfortune! If there were no existence, we wouldn't find non-existence painful. The torment for us is that we've been called into existence!" (*Qabbaḥa'llāhu ladhdhatan li-shaqānā / nālahā'l-ummahātu wa'l-ābāʾu.—Naḥnu lawlā'l-wujūdu lam naᶜlami'l-faq / da fa-ījādunā ᶜalaynā'l-balāʾu.* Ṣarrāf 130. Cf. also ᶜUmar Khayyām, Rosen 159 *du dar.*—Much similar is also found in *Iḥyāʾ* 4/159-60, *Bayān al-aḥwāl, etc.*; *Stufen* 382 ff./C.171 ff.)

And the words: "Would that God hadn't called me into existence!" are even attributed to the Prophet.

Someone asks Muḥyī'l-Dīn Yaḥyā about the meaning of this saying which certainly sounds strange in the mouth of the Prophet on whose behalf the whole world was created (*Lawlāk la-mā khalaqnā'l-aflāk*). Yaḥyā answers with a story explaining that it was the temporary separation from God occasioned by the office of prophethood which caused the Prophet to utter such a desperate sigh.—(In this context ᶜAṭṭār is only concerned with the motif of separation, *firāq*).

Two Lurīs (members of an Iranian ethnic group) live together in the steppes and love one another. Their tents are located so close to one another that the lovers can meet together whenever they wish. Both of them come to be extraordinarily rich and finally attain the status of rulers. They move into two castles in the city but the new tasks which go with their position make it impossible for them to associate with one another in the old manner. They no longer see each other. Then their fortune is reversed and they both become poor as before. They head out into the steppes and thank God that they're together again like in the old days. They now curse their princely dominion which had separated them from one another. (MN 35/8).

Absolute sadness also prevails in the Prophet's house.

The description of the impoverished wedding of the Prophet's daughter, Fāṭima, overflows with tears and self-pity. (Pp. 236 f. below).

ᶜAlī entrusts his sorrow to a well.

While on one of his campaigns, Muḥammad sends a man to a well to fetch water for the troops. The man comes back and reports that the well is full of blood. Then the Prophet says: "I think ᶜAlī has spoken his painful secrets into the well." (MṬ 0/5, p. 20).

On this well see my article "Das Proömium des *Maṯnawī-i Maulawī*" in: ZDMG 93/1939/169-96.

The man of piety has a female mourner for the dead in his heart. (Cf. p. 257 below).

Shaykh Jurjānī is asked why he has no inclination for the musical parties of the Ṣūfīs. He answers: "I have a female mourner for the dead in my heart. If she were to emerge from my heart for one moment, the heavens and the earth would become mourners for the dead or be destroyed. What help to me is music and dancing if I have such a female mourner in my heart?"—"If I can't speak of my pain today", so continues the poet, "and can't tell the story of this grief and burning, then I'll be silent until death comes to me and that day dawns which is followed by no night." (MN 12/11).

An amplification of the previous motif:

Abū ᶜAlī Ṭūsī goes on uttering words like golden water on the subject of love until the day fades away. Finally, he must stop speaking and he says: "Night has arrived. I must stop speaking. A day which is followed by night is not suitable for such speech. One must wait until that day arrives which no night any longer follows (the Resurrection)." (MN 12/12).

The suffering of men of God is not acquired by themselves, it is given to them.

Someone says to a dervish who's excessively sorrowful: "Throw this grief out the door, as I've done!" The dervish replies: "I didn't bring it in, so I can't make it go outside. Only the one who brought it in can do that." (MN 35/7).

Nature as well, the mythical and the physical world, is submerged in this sorrow.

In the *Muṣībatnāma* ᶜAṭṭār has all the mythical and cosmic beings whom the traveller approaches for help and guidance strike up on each occasion a long lament about their own sorrowful situation. The whole cosmos is devoid of peace and joy, and filled with sorrow over its hopeless situation, just as man is. Among the prophets whom the traveller visits, Noah, as his name (*Nūḥ-nawḥa*) indicates, is the real representative of pain and lamentation. (Above p. 27).

Even among the part of creation devoid of reason there are creatures which, by their nature, are given to lamentation.

There's a bird (the owl) which hangs by one foot from a branch the whole night and emits tones of lamentation until blood drips from its beak. (MN 30/2).

It is also said that this bird, the *murgh-i shabāwēz*, utters the word *Ḥaqq* "God" all night long. See in dictionaries under *shabāwēz*.

2

Whoever has not experienced this grief himself has no understanding of it.

Maḥmūd has no access to the grief of "the fool". (Above p. 124).

A youth hit by a shot from a ballista is asked by his friend: "How are you?" The dying young man replies: "Are you out of your senses? Until you've been struck by a stone from a ballista yourself, you won't understand how your friend is. But how can you understand, since you haven't been struck by a stone?" Having said this, he dies. (IN 6/2, p. 102).—The poet then indulges in lamentation over his own situation.

According to the poet, the story of Majnūn who compares himself to a donkey (above p. 135) will appear quite absurd to someone who hasn't experienced grief himself and has only known a life of luxury and good fortune. But he's searching for someone who's experienced grief and mourns every day. (IN p. $239_{14\text{ ff.}}$).

An old woman's son is murdered. She beats herself until she bleeds and laments beyond measure. Someone says to her: "Cover yourself with a veil and stop this wailing!" She answers: "If a fire burned in your heart such as burns in mine, you'd consider this lamentation permissible. But since you're not the mother of a murdered son, you understand nothing of my grief." (MN 30/3).

"I knew a fool in Nēshāpūr", so relates ᶜAṭṭār, "who due to sickness and poverty suffered dreadfully for ten years. I asked him one time what had caused him to go insane. He replied: 'One day the sun came into my throat. That's what drove me crazy.' When he was on the point of dying, someone asked him: 'How are you now?' He said: 'What do you understand about this?', and died." (MN 30/4).

Moreover, it does no good to lament if there's no one present who can understand the pain.

A thief has his hand chopped off. He utters no cry of pain, picks up the hand and goes his way until he comes to a Ṣūfī hospice (*ribāṭ*). There all of a sudden he begins to cry out loud and wail. Someone asks him: "Why didn't you let out a cry earlier at the place of execution? Why are you wailing now?" He answers: "There was no one there with a chopped-off hand who would have understood me. My lamentation would have been empty wind to people. But here there's someone who's had his hand chopped off. Here I've found a companion in pain who understands why I'm crying." (MN 30/5—Chauvin 8/123).

3

The experience of God's inaccessibility, the impossibility of reaching the highest being who is separated by impenetrable partition walls, is combined with the unquenchable tormented longing for percisely this unattainable goal.

Somebody asks a mystic fool: "What's it like when you're in pain?" He answers: "It's like when someone who's had his hand chopped off misses his hand, or when someone who's gone thirsty for ten days absolutely must have water. In the same way people like myself are in need of God."—That's precisely what the pain consists of, namely that you absolutely must have something and you don't know where to find it, and everything you possess is completely unimportant because you only want that and nothing else. (IN 22/3, p. 356).

Thus a child that has lost its mother knows nothing else except that it needs its mother.

A child is separated from its mother in the bazaar and begins to weep bitterly. Good people who wish to help, ask it: "What's your mother's name?" The child answers: "I don't know."—"Then where's your house?"—"I don't know that either."—"What's the name of the street?"—"I don't know that either." Finally, the people say: "Well what are we to do with you?" The child says: "I only know one thing, that I want my mother. I don't know anything else." (IN 22/4, p. 356).

The feeling of not being able to fathom the world's secret and to know the world-ground, together with the yearning for this world-ground, finally causes a seeking without a clear object to arise, a sense of pain due to separation from something which one is unacquainted with, which one seeks without ever having first possessed and then lost.

Someone says to a man who's sifting earth: "It surprises me that you're looking for something you haven't lost." The man engaged in the sifting replies: "Even more strange than what you've said is that I'm so sad when I don't find what I haven't lost."—"One can neither find", the poet continues, "nor can one lose. Neither silence, nor speech, is correct. You should be neither the one, nor the other. You should be both at once. Whatever you do is wrong." (IN *Khātima*/5, p. 374).—The story of the suffering of Job and Zacharias then follows. The one is tormented to make him moan, while the other is forbidden to moan. (See above pp. 62-63).

A mother weeps over the grave of her daughter. A Ṣūfī passes by and says: "This woman is better off than us. At least she knows what she's lost and because of whose separation she should weep. Day and night I sit in sorrow but without knowing whom I'm weeping over like a rain cloud! I don't know whom I'm far away from. I've caught no scented whiff, and this perplexity has shed my

blood and killed me."—Understanding has lost the tip of the thread. (MṬ 43/2, p. 154).

A Ṣūfī calls to the man who lost his key to the door: "In any case be happy you know the door! I know neither the key, nor the door!" (Above p. 88).

4

The fact that both good and bad come from God (above p. 61) can arouse fear in the man of piety.

A sensible man visits a fool and finds him in a very sad mood. He asks him: "Who is it that's making you so sad?" The fool answers: "God. I'm at my wit's end worrying because of Him. I'm afraid of Him, and if the people possessed sight they would all be afraid of Him. How should one not be afraid of someone who lets the wolf loose on the herd and then sits down with the shepherd to share in his sorrow? Today He's caused me to be completely confused in my religion. What will He still do to me later on?" (MN 38/4).

We have already seen how painfully the problem of predestination, determinism and God's lack of need is experienced. We heard how Satan complained about this (above p. 73). The two images mentioned just before that, i.e. the shot arrow which the archer swears at and the man placed in the water with orders not to get wet (ibid.), the poet follows by grievous tones of complaint:

Who knows in what blood the men of God wander because of this suffering? If you were given suffering like this, it would cause a world of blood to stream from your heart. (IN p. $118_{12\text{-}13}$).—The men of God, who've seen God's lack of need, neither sleep at night, nor find rest during the day. (IN p. 114_{16}).

A fool weeps and sheds many tears. Someone asks him: "Why are you weeping like this?" He answers: "I'm weeping so that His heart may for once burn for me." Someone says: "He has no heart (anti-anthropomorphism). Whoever says such a thing isn't in his right mind." The fool answers: "He has all hearts, how can He have no heart? What way is that to talk?"—ᶜAṭṭār follows this with the observation that all things come from "there", not only hearts, everything else as well, all good and bad, damnation and mercy. (IN 9/7, pp. 146-47).

With the thought that God has no heart but possesses all human hearts, compare the verse:

Since You have no heart, how should Your heart burn in sorrow? What am I saying? Truly, You have all hearts! (AN in the *Munājāt*).

The primary cause of sorrow for the pious is fear of what will happen after death which is much worse than death itself (above pp. 41 f.), and fear of the destiny which God has imposed without any reason. Reading the Koran with its threatening verses

drives them further into fear and sorrow ("Ḥasan al-Baṣrī" 17). Whoever takes these verses seriously and feels their effect on himself will not be in a position to perform virtuoso recitations of the Holy Book.

Someone tells a shaykh about a man who has recited the whole of the Koran every day during his entire life. The shaykh remarks: "Then no verse has made any impression on him. Otherwise, he wouldn't be capable of reciting the Koran to the end." (MN 30/6).

There are numerous reports in literature about pious men who when reading or listening to a Koranic verse become gripped by fear, weep, fall unconscious or even die. (E.g. *Iḥyā'* 4/159-64, in the *Bayān aḥwāl al-ṣaḥāba... fī shiddat al-khawf*; *Stufen* 383/C.172). Thaʿlabī composed a special book on "those who were killed by the Koran", GAL[2] 1/149. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (d. 779/1377-78) experienced scenes of this kind during gatherings before preachers. (*Die Reise des I. B. durch Indien und China*, ed. by Hans von Mžik, p. 67). Ibn Rajab, *Dhayl* 1/88, also reports on a case of death resulting from a sermon.

The uncertainty of salvation, the fear of suddenly being summoned and called to account, deprives the pious man of his sleep.

Mālik ibn Dīnār enjoys no rest either night or day. On one occasion his daughter says to him: "Why don't you sleep just one night like other people?" He replies: "I can't sleep because I'm afraid of an attack by night. Whoever sleeps in a torrent's dry channel will cry out in grief when he wakes up." (MN 35/6).

Happy the dog that's released from all grief once it's dead! But what a bad situation man is in! No one would grieve over death if there were no resurrection after it. (IN p. 181_{14-15}).

One has no idea how one will stand up to the test in the hereafter.

A pious man meets a weeping boy on the way to school and asks him: "Why are you weeping?" The boy answers: "Today I'm supposed to recite what the teacher said during the whole past week, and I can't do it. So why shouldn't I weep!" The pious man then thinks of the test he himself has ahead of him, and his hope collapses because he's in the same situation as the schoolboy. (MN *Khātima*/13).

The self-sufficiency (*istighnā*) of God, who is indifferent to the destiny of man, causes a dying person to experience fear and terror.

"A traveller on the path" begins to tremble like a leaf on his deathbed and weeps. Someone says to him: "Why are you so upset on this day? Keep still and control yourself!" The dying man says: "I can't be still. I'm now about to come before someone for whom this world and the hereafter, existence and non-exis-

tence, faith and unbelief, good and evil, are all the same. So why shouldn't I be afraid?" (MN *Khātima*/12).

The uncertainty concerning the judgement of God who can reject every act of obedience and repudiate the most pious man and condemn him to Hell (*istidrāj* and *makr*, above pp. 73-74) prevents a pious person from abandoning fear and fills him with terror on his deathbed.

Abū Sulaymān al-Dārānī says: "Sometimes it's as if I was standing between two stones on one of the bridges of Hell. What sort of life does a person have who finds himself in this situation?" (*Taʾrīkh Dārayyā* 116).

A pious *pīr* neither sleeps at night, nor has any peace during the day. When they ask him why he doesn't sleep, he answers: "How should someone sleep who knows that Paradise is above him and below him is Hell? No one knows whether I'm destined for Paradise or for Hell." (AN 21/1, after a long paraenesis in which the reader is admonished not to sleep, to stay up all night worshipping, and to beseech God in the early morning when prayer is most effective, etc.).

It is completely uncertain whether God will accept man's works.

Ibrāhīm ibn Adham, after the ritual prayers, holds his hands in front of his face out of fear that God could bash him over the head with his prayers. (MN 36/3, after a warning about absent-minded and therefore invalid prayers).

Though I had a whole world full of acts of obedience to show, if You didn't want them they would all be in vain and for nothing. (MN in *Khātima*/14).

Nor does "knowledge and action" help. Everything depends on what is written on the Tablet of destiny. (Above p. 61).

What do you do if God suddenly rejects you?

Sufyān al-Thawrī even in his youth has a bent back. They ask him: "Why has your back become so bent even in your youth?" He answers: "When I was present at the deathbed of my teacher, I saw how he shook with fear and wept. When I asked him why he was so afraid, he said: 'My faith has turned out unfortunately. The divine voice said to me: "You've been rejected by Us. Go away from this door! You're not worthy of Us!"' When I heard this from my teacher, the hunch on my back appeared." (IN 17/10, pp. 280-81; TA 1/190$_{6\text{-}17}$).

Sufyān was well known for his fear of death. If he thought about death, there was nothing you could do with him the whole day. If a person then asked him something, he would say: "I don't know." (Ṣaffūrī 1/52$_{2\text{-}3}$).

Regarding his *khawf* see also *Qūt* 1/233$_{\text{1f.}}$; *Nahrung* 2/176/32.269.

A man who lies dying weeps. When they ask him why he's weeping, he says: "For almost a hundred years I've kicked against this door with my foot. Now that it's opening, I don't know where it leads, whether into blessedness or damna-

tion."—"It's the same for me", the poet continues, "as for the die that doesn't know which side it will fall on." (AN 23/4).

There are numerous sayings and stories about *khawf* in *Qūt* 1/101, 225-33; *Nahrung* 1/343/28.3-4, 2/151-178/32.232-271; *Iḥyā'* 4/159-64; *Stufen* 382-394/C.171-195. In addition see the textbooks on *taṣawwuf*.

How can one laugh when one must go before God with a heart which is empty of religion?

If your heart is empty of religion, how can you wish to go before God like that, without religion? When there's grief in your house, how can you be cheerful? (MN 17/5, final verse).

Amplification involving the fool:

A thief seeks something to steal in the house of a poor man, finds nothing, and so with a sigh says about the man: "Oh God (*lā ḥawl*)!" At that the poor man has to laugh. But the thief says: "How can you laugh with an empty house, you foolish person!" (MN 17/6).

The sense of uncertainty over one's destiny in the hereafter is still further increased and intensified by a consciousness of sins and consciousness that one's achievements are inadequate and deficient.

A pious man says to Mālik ibn Dīnār: "I don't know how things stand with me. How are things with you?" Mālik answers: "I eat from God's table and do what Satan orders me." (MṬ 22/2, p. 78).

And so ᶜAṭṭār confesses: "My life has passed by in frivolous negligence (*ghaflat*). I haven't accomplished any religious achievement. But what am I to do? I've spent my time in worldly play. How can I appear before God?" (MN *Khātima*/13).

ᶜAṭṭār asks his father on the latter's deathbed how he's doing. The dying man answers: "How should I be faring, my son? Out of perplexity (*ḥayrat*) I don't know where my head or where my foot is. My heart is lost, beyond that I know nothing... In frivolous negligence I've occupied my whole life with vain nonsense and useless chatter." (AN 23/7).

5

This awareness of sin and this inner uncertainty in ᶜAṭṭār pass over into a sense of an inner, religious-ethical rift, which he several times describes as a hybridity, a vacillation between faith and unbelief, between good and bad behavior. These are tones which outwardly remind one of those which resound in many of the quatrains attributed to ᶜUmar Khayyām.

With one hand we hold the Koran and with the other the wine-cup, one moment we're engaged in the permissible, the next in the forbidden. In this blue cupola we're neither completely infidels, nor completely Muslims. (*Quatrains*, Tehran 1306, no. 342 *ba-jām*).

However, tones such as these can produce a varying sound. They can be the expression of a desperate, painful mood. But they can also express an almost frivolous attitude to life which has inscribed on its banners an indifference toward faith and unbelief, the allowed and the forbidden, and which resolutely affirms a vacillation between the two. The latter is the case regarding the poetry of the *rind*s and *qalandar*s, to which ᶜAṭṭār in his lyric poetry has made his own contribution, and which we shall have to consider briefly later on (pp. 502 ff.). In the epics of ᶜAṭṭār this frivolous tone does not occur. The rift is perceived throughout as tormenting and painful.

One of the birds who's meant to join the hoopoe on the flight to the Sīmurgh, presents the excuse that he has a hybrid nature (*mukhannath-gawhar*) (see above p. 13): "One moment I'm given to life's pleasures and drink (*rind*), the next I'm an ascetic. One moment I am and I am not, the next I am not and I am. One moment the carnal soul drives me into the taverns, the next the spirit-soul makes me pray to God. One moment Satan leads me away from the path, the next the angel brings me back to the path. I stand confused between both. What am I to do?"—The hoopoe answers: "It's like that for everyone. Rarely is a person uniform in his being (*yak-ṣifat*). If all people were pure to begin with, there would have been no need to send the prophets. Obedience is the way out of this situation, and you shouldn't feed the dog-soul (pp. 212-14)." (MṬ 20/0, p. 73).

One day Shiblī disappears. After searching for him a long time, they find him seated and weeping in a *mukhannath-khāna* (house frequented by effeminate men). Surprised, they ask whether this is really the right place for him to stay. He answers: "These people are neither man nor woman on the path of the world, and I'm like them on the path of religion. I'm lost in my unmanliness and feel ashamed at being a man." (MṬ 20/1, p. 73; TA $2/172_{18\text{-}22}$).

The uncertainty as to one's destiny in the hereafter, the fear of perhaps belonging among those who will be rejected and of still not being free of sin despite all one's efforts, leads the pious man at the end of his life to a split judgement regarding himself.

Whoever has felt fear about his destiny... in the hereafter, experiences new sorrow every moment. He calls himself neither an infidel, nor a Muslim. He sits unhappily between unbelief and religion (waiting) for what will happen.

A shaykh is asked on his deathbed where they should bury him. He answers: "I don't want to be buried among the Muslims because I don't possess their light. I don't belong in the cemetery of the pious. But I don't want to have the Jews as

my neighbors either, because the Prophet had to endure so much from them. Bury me between the two cemeteries since I belong neither to the Muslims, nor to the Jews!" (IN 117/9, p. 279).

For many their certainty of faith is made to falter.

Shaykh Naṣrābādhī undertook forty pilgrimages without provisions for the road (*bar tawakkul*). But when he's become old and grey, a man sees him girded with the belt of the Magians performing a sacred circumambulation around a fire-temple. Surprised, the man asks him: "Aren't you ashamed? You made so many pilgrimages and you became so great a shaykh, but the end of all this is unbelief?" The shaykh answers: "Something bad has happened to me, fire (metaphorically) has consumed my house and possessions, cast my harvest (*khirman*) to the wind, and destroyed my name and honor. I've lost faith in myself and no longer know a way out. Since then a church and the Ka[c]ba are the same to me." (MṬ 43/4, p. 155).

The dead as well are helpless and in confusion.

In a dream a young novice sees his master who's died, and questions him, saying: "How are things for you there? I sit here in blood out of confusion. Separation from you has set my heart on fire. Since you departed, I've been burning in confusion and helplessness." The shaykh answers: "I too am helpless and confused, and bite the back of my hand with my teeth (gesture of impotence). In this ditch, in this prison (the grave) we're far more helpless than you. One atom of helplessness in the hereafter is worse than a hundred portions of helplessness in the earthly world." (MṬ 43/5, pp. 155-56).

The desperation which comes over the central figure in the *Muṣībatnāma* perhaps runs even more deeply than is the case with these shaykhs whose awareness of their own imperfection is expressed in split judgements about themselves or whose certainty of faith becomes lost. "The traveller" is not an ascetic who sees with sorrow that his achievements remain behind what is demanded of him, nor "a weak human being" pulled here and there between his pious and his impious impulses. Rather, for this youth the ideals and goals themselves have been shaken. None of the possibilities offered which would involve his decision satisfy or convince him. He is at odds with himself and the people around him. He no longer has any clear feelings and emotions, and his intellect shows no clear tendency toward certainty and doubt. He has no friends and confidants. The sense of life and death is hidden from him.—The passage is one of those grandiose depictions of the soul in which [c]Aṭṭār remains unsurpassed by any other Persian poet.

The traveller thought was wretched and soul-weary. His head hung down like the door-knocker on the door. Neither was he devoted to a *pīr*, nor was he pleased

with his own path. Neither was he satisfied with himself, nor with people. Neither was he happy with the belt of the Christians, nor with the Ṣūfī's robe. To himself he appeared no better than a dog. He saw no one poorer than himself. Neither all, nor nothing, neither a part, nor the whole, neither bad, nor good, neither honor, nor humiliation, neither crooked, nor straight, neither body, nor soul, neither belief in authority (*taqlīd*), nor profession of God's oneness (*tawḥīd*), neither delusion, nor certainty, nor doubt, neither very much, nor an intermediate degree, nor little, neither heart, nor eye, neither breast, nor body, neither love, nor hate, neither the good fortune of belief, nor unbelief, neither foot, nor head—did this confusion possess... Neither was his heart informed about the state of those who'd passed away, nor did his soul perceive a trace of how the deceased were doing.

The description of the traveller's state of soul then shifts to dealing with mankind, whose hopeless situation is likewise portrayed in a long series of antitheses.

But finally the traveller finds a *pīr* who orders him to travel "the path" and sends him on a journey. However, the youth has still not emerged from the painful rift. He's so bewildered that in the end he comes close to insanity. He addresses his suffering and complains that he receives confusing instructions from it: "If I weep, you say to me: 'How long will you still go on weeping?' If I laugh, you say: 'Weep! Don't laugh!' If I act, you say: 'Don't act!' And if I don't act, you say: 'Act!', etc." (MN 0, *Sharḥ-i kitāb*; above p. 22). (The poet reproaches his heart in a similar manner in IN p. 180_{17}-181).

An amplification of neither/nor:

A poor man asks Alexander for a coin (*dirham*). Alexander says: "Who will ask so great a king for so small a gift?" The poor man says: "Then give me cities and treasures!" Alexander answers: "That much one gives to the king of China. Who are you that one could give you so much?" (MN 0, *Sharḥ-i kitāb*/2).

The anecdote is a variant of the ancient story about a Cynic who asked Antigonus to give him a talent. "That's too much for a Cynic to ask for", replied Antigonus. When this was refused him, the Cynic asked for a dinar. "That's too little to be fitting for a king to give", was the answer. (*L. Annaei Senecae de Beneficiis* libri VII; II, 17, 1).

When in the end the traveller can neither go forward, nor backward, he ascends to the higher world and begins his journey through the cosmos. He addresses one being after another and asks it to help him find deliverance from his situation, but he's rejected by them all because they're even more perplexed than he is. (See above pp. 22 ff.).

From another story emerges hopelessness and disappointment which in the end sees only nothingness.

They sent you here for your good. I see no good for you except non-existence. Your portion of everything is nothing. That's why what falls to your lot from so

much tormenting effort is only torment. If you travel the path, you'll burn during your whole life. For, apart from nothingness, nothing will fall to your lot. (IN p. 188_{10-12}).

"A bewildered person" stands at the grave of a great man and says: "The man who sleeps here has nothing. I don't see anything that he possesses aside from this stone they've placed on his grave." People ask him to explain this further. He then says: "The man who rests here renounced this world and the world to come, and he has neither of the two. For he wanted something else (love's closeness to God). But what good did it do him? What he wanted has never fallen to anyone's lot and will never be obtained by anyone. That's why he's lost everything and has nothing." (IN 12/4, pp. 188-89).

The story gives the impression of being an extension of the story of Shiblī and the death's head (p. 541 below).

Sometimes the mood of desperation is combined with the desire for annihilation, for extinction. The hopeless state of soul which comes over a person who has given up all hope of reaching his goal leads to the desire to find deliverance by disappearing into nothingness.

Such a case is presented to us in a story which varies two old fairy-tale motifs, the motif of the crossroads and that of the iron shoes.

Cf. A. Christensen, *Märchen aus Iran* 45 and the comments on it p. 287; *Es war einmal. Neugriechische Volksmärchen.* Translated into German by Irene Naumann-Mavrokordato, Istanbul 1942, p. 11. Ignaz Kúnos, *Türkische Volksmärchen aus Stambul* p. 141.

A seeker "who has lost what he sought" travels through the whole world and in so doing wears out the iron shoes which he had made for himself. Finally, he comes to a crossroads where three roads branch off. On the first road is written: "Although this road is long and difficult, you will return by it in the end." On the second is: "If you travel this road, it could be that you return but it could also be that you do not return." On the third is written: "If you travel this road, you will not find your way back for all eternity." The seeker says: "Since there's really no hope of arrival (love's closeness, *wiṣāl*) but only eternal hopelessness, I'll travel the third road."—The first road is that of the holy law (*sharīᶜat*), the second that of mysticism (*ṭarīqat*), the third that of "truth" (*ḥaqīqat*). Whoever travels the third road, the first step takes him away from himself and the second step leads him to annihilation in God; so that he disappears into nothingness forever (*tā abad nābūdh gardadh wa'l-salām*). (MN 19/1. See p. 597 below).

Here annihilation is sought and striven after as deliverance, because no more hope exists. But this annihilation is at the same time extinction and leads to disappearance in God.

Attempts at extinction, whose first goal is the removal of a sense of ego, can cause one's certainty of self to be undermined, to become weak. This is precisely the effect of the monism of extinction represented by ᶜAṭṭār, as we shall see. All is God, man is nothing when thought of as apart from God—a mere drop that must disappear in the ocean. But once unified with God through extinction, or because the human soul is an offshoot of the Universal Soul (p. 637), he is everything. Then the mystic can enter states of soul in which he no longer knows whether he exists or does not exist.

In many of the *ghazals* of Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī such states of soul are expressed with impressive poetic effect. Cf. Nicholson's *Selected Poems from the Dīvāni Shamsi Tabrīz*, Cambridge 1898, p. 124, no. XXXI and the remarks about it on p. 281.

I don't know whether I exist or don't exist. Since everything is He, I don't know who I am. (MN 23/3, final verses. Cf. Chpt. 29/3).

ᶜAṭṭār illustrates this confusion with a well-known story about a fool.

A peasant comes to Marw and sleeps there in a mosque. So as not to get lost, he's attached a gourd to his leg. A prankster unties the gourd and attaches it to his own leg. When the peasant wakes up, he doesn't know whether he's the other person. And if he is the other person, what is he himself then?—The poet constantly feels himself caught between denying and confirming his self: "Action neither comes about with me, nor without me (cf. p. 68 f. above). I'm between this and that, in certainty and in doubt at the same time." (MN 23/4).

This is the story of the fool Habannaqa. Cf. Ibn al-Jawzī, *Ḥamqā* 22; Christensen, *Contes persans* 127; idem, *Märchen aus Iran* 190.

The expression of this rift, of this painful self-criticism, appears for the first time in Islamic literature, so it seems, in the man of letters Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī who died in 414/1023 (GAL², Suppl. 1/435), a man to whom life dealt one disappointment after another, who suffered continuously in eternal poverty and need, never found a position which corresponded to his great gifts—he must have possessed external and internal qualities which did not recommend him to the great of this world—who neither by requests nor threats, neither by praise nor abuse, managed to improve his situation, who felt himself to have been treated unfairly by both mankind and God, and never succeeded in making peace with society. He felt himself to be a *gharīb* in his own homeland, an isolated stranger, undertook desperate, almost shrieking attempts to find help and friendship, and yet apparently did not have the natural inner ability to achieve this.

Cf. in his *Ishārāt al-ilāhiyya*, ed. ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī, Cairo 1950, pp. 78 ff., the depiction, superb in its kind, of the *gharīb*, and his own self-representation, e.g. pp. 131, 135, 142, 176, et passim, as well as the editor's introduction where he is compared with Kafka.

In one of his own self-descriptions he says:

Blind delusion (passion, *hawā*) is my mount, right guidance (*hudā*) the goal of my striving. But I neither get down from my mount, nor do I reach the goal of my striving. That I'm cut off from the goal of my striving is perhaps simply because I cling to my mount (*Ishārāt* p. 131). A will that's not pure (*irāda mashūba*), a state which is forever changing, signs which appear suspicious, rest which is devoid of rest, knowledge which is falsified, a language which can't speak clearly, an eye which looks covetously, a manner of speech which is unpolished, a difficult character, a mind as turbid as sour milk, talk which as often as it strives to be bright only grows darker, a heart which in seeking to extinguish the fire only flares up all the more (pp. 135-36).

He too seeks deliverance in extinction, in the dissolution of the ego, and he too, despite everything, is a pious worshipper of God like ᶜAṭṭār.

Finally, bewilderment of the sense of self comes over a human being when the majesty of divine beauty, or its reflection in earthly beauty, reveals itself to him. Then he loses consciousness of himself, forgets his ego and feels completely annihilated. As we shall see, in some cases the final result is death. This becoming annihilated in a vision also has the force of a kind of extinction. (See pp. 436-44 below).

One of the valleys which must be traversed on the way to the Sīmurgh is "the Valley of Bewilderment" (*wādī-i ḥayrat*, above p. 16). Whoever has reached this valley, all his clear judgements concerning himself become confused. He doesn't know whether he exists or not, whether he's in the middle or on the edge, whether he's visible or hidden, whether he's extinct (*fānī*) or permanent (*bāqī*), or both of these at the same time. He doesn't know whether he is "I" or "you". He knows nothing, nor does he know whether he knows nothing. He's in love and doesn't know with whom. He doesn't know whether he's a believer or an unbeliever. His heart is full of love and yet empty at the same time (MṬ 43/0, p. 150).

The daughter of a king falls in love with the handsome slave of her father. She has ten serving maidens to whom she complains about her suffering in love. The latter promise to bring the slave to her in secret. They give him a sleeping potion and manage to bring him to the princess' room. When he wakes up, he sees himself surrounded by royal splendor and festive arrangements. The young women are playing music, incense is burning, and opposite him sits the most beautiful of all princesses who immediately overwhelms him with caresses. Drunken from abundant enjoyment of wine, in the morning he is taken back to

where he had been. He wakes up in a confused state and doesn't know what to answer to those who question him about his nocturnal experience, whether he experienced something real or dreamed a dream, whether he was drunk or sober. It was something that was neither visible, nor hidden. He can't say what it was, nor be silent. He saw a beauty before whom the sun is a mere mote, and yet he didn't see it. And between this and that he's now bewildered and helpless, and he feels he's at his wit's end. (MṬ 43/1, p. 151).

CHAPTER NINE

THE POET ON HIMSELF

If we examine the passages in ᶜAṭṭār's poetry where he talks about himself and gives expression to his own emotional attitude, it is clear that, to a great extent, the poet's basic mood is in agreement with what we have just been describing. His mood is predominantly sad, grief-stricken and pessimistic. He indulges in general lamentation, criticizes himself, maintains that he has senselessly wasted his life, complains about his "hybrid nature" when it comes to faith and action. With this alternate outbursts of an agnostic mood and utter hopelessness, even a sense of disgust with life. Similarly, one finds complaints about loneliness and other motifs such as criticism of his poetic activity which however he is unable to give up, and because of which he actually feels quite proud. All these motifs alternate with one another in a lively sequence.

1

I often said I belong to the people of "the inside". But like a fool I'm still standing outside before the door... We've flown on every wing a man can fly, we've walked with every kind of walk a man can walk. One moment we were in the wine-house with the drinker (*rind*), the next we placed our cheek against the door of the idol's temple. One moment we girded ourselves with the belt of the Christians (*tarsāyān*), the next we sat in the cloister of the Magians (?*tarsāyān*)... Sometimes we were drunk, sometimes sober... One time we rested our head against our knee (meditating), the next we made noise with complete abandon... Sometimes we existed, sometimes we didn't. At times we sowed, at times we reaped "nothingness"... Now we've turned back without hope...

We received quite a few slaps of months and days, and drank many brimming cups of poison. We talked a good deal but our heart found no peace. We travelled far and wide, but the road had no end. But now we've spoken enough about ourself, we've neglected action. (AN 13/9).

Amplification:

Someone asks an old woman to tell him about her experiences. She says: "I can't be concerned about anyone now because I've lost the tip of the thread" (as in spinning for instance). (AN 13/9).

Poor man that I am, I kept careful watch and pursued this matter a whole lifetime. I made my ship sail on this sea, but in the end I threw my goods overboard. I thought about it for years and experienced many states and occurrences. In this helplessness earlier and later people are all alike. No one understands the divine secrets. From heaven to earth we're all prisoners... This is indeed a strange, confused situation. I've already thought about it a whole lifetime. Now I've stopped all my running around because this river valley has no bottom. For a long time I dug up this mine with my fingernails. I found nothing but I tormented myself thus... I've never slept with a peaceful heart. This sorrow gripped me from the day I came into the world. When I read the sky's book of torments, streams of blood poured from my eyelids... On the market day of time my heart never hit the target with the arrow of fulfilled desire. If I drank one beaker of sweet drink, a thousand times I had to swallow poison. I spent my entire life with a heart burnt by grief. During my life I never drew one happy breath... My head is spinning about so much because of this sky with its bent back that I'd have gladly killed myself with my own hand (*khwadh-rā ham ba-dast-i khwadh bi-kushtam*). (There follows an address to the world, and then:) If I were to remove the seal from my heart's suffering, there would be no end to it...

How long I go on talking about myself though I know I know nothing! Who am I? No one, and even less than no one! I have many sins and few acts of obedience. In religion I'm behind, in worldliness ahead... One moment I shed tears in prayer (*munājāt*), the next I drink wine in the tavern. I'm neither a man with a Ṣūfī robe, nor a man with the Magian's belt. One time I'm in the mosque, the next with the tavern-keeper... I'm neither fit for myself, nor for others, neither for good, nor for bad...

I've squandered my whole life on something not worth a tuppence. Alas, my life's passed by in vain pursuits (*hawas*)! ...My hair's turned white like milk (*shīr*) and I'm still greedy like a lion (*shēr*). (AN 14/0).

There follows the story of a wise man who's reminded of the vanity of his efforts by a water-apparatus (AN 14/1; above p. 87). In the same way we're all marking time without advancing, we're prisoners of outward appearance and forms.

Our existence (*baqā*) is what torments us, extinction (*fanā*) is peace. All joy and all suffering comes from within us. Everything that happens to us comes from ourselves. If only our existence were not there! The fact of our existing is our humiliation... If our being didn't exist, we'd have rest from so much nothingness... I envy the lightning which appears late and dies early...

Neither body, nor soul, neither beginning, nor end, is visible in this ocean. Whether you're Frēdhūn or Afrāsiyāb (figures from heroic legend), in this ocean you're only a drop. If the wind carries off a straw from the harvest stack, why should you lament? (AN in 14/1).

ᶜAṭṭār complains about the "infidel" carnal soul (*nafs*) (p. 215 below) which will not obey him, and expresses self-hate and a sense of life's futility:

I test the obedience of the infidel carnal soul on an hourly basis. I see that it's drowning in a dangerous ocean. I see that things grow worse for it by the moment. What this disastrous dog does to me—I'll be an infidel if the infidels of Byzantium (cf. the expression "the dog of Rūm") do this (to the believers). No one is an enemy to himself as much as I am. Who's more removed from knowledge than I am? No one. Good fortune was like a dry cloud for me, the outcome of my life a sigh of regret (*darēgh*). How should we heal the suffering? Life is over, how should we mourn (adequately)? (MN in 17/5).

Futile effort, hoplessness, the inward rift, grief and suffering:

Much have I travelled but I'm still where I was. I don't know what benefit I've had from this travelling. (IN p. 368_{15}).—When I looked at the cash proceeds of my life, I gave up all hope for myself. (IN p. 371_{16}).—The world has taken my health and given me sickness in return, taken away my youth and accorded me old age. Now that I'm nothing as body and soul, I don't want to exist any longer. Death is all that's left for me. (IN p. 371_{19}-372_{2}).—My whole life has ended in fanciful fables. Who can aspire to a second life? My hands are empty because my pious behavior is full of defects. Out of bewilderment my soul's foot has remained stuck in the mud. Like the people of Moses I've ended up in a desert of error, by denying God's attributes (*taᶜṭīl*) I've ended up in anthropomorphism (*tashbīh*). I'm neither a chosen one, nor someone rejected. I stand in the middle between faith and unbelief. Now I sit helpless in a corner with my head propped in my hand. If you wish to have a world full of grief, sit for a while with my heart! I have so much grief and sorrow, it's as if a hundred mountains lay on my soul. Every hour I experience a thousand cares because suffering pours down on my heart like rain. (IN p. 372_{9-16}).

Apart from fear of death I have nothing in the world. I'm the mouthpiece of death's suffering. I've experienced no well-being (*bihbūdh*) in my life. I've had only injury and no benefit. That's why I'm ready to take leave of life... There's no unharmed spot to be seen on my body. (IN *Khātima*/11, p. 380_{3-6}).

Amplification:

A poor vagabond (*rind*) asks a shop-owner to give him a charitable gift. The latter says: "As long as you don't inflict a wound on yourself, I won't give you anything. Wound yourself and then you can ask me for money." The beggar uncovers his body and says: "If you find an unharmed spot on my body, show it to me and I'll inflict a wound on it. I know of no spot without a hundred wounds. So

give me something!" ᶜAṭṭār adds: "I'm like that beggar. There's no place on my body without a hundred wounds, etc." (IN *Khātima*/12, p. 380).

Regarding the method of Persian beggars to extort gifts by means of self-injury or the threat of such, see Vullers, *Lexicon Persico-Latinum* s.v. *shakhshāna*.

After the story about the youth who was struck by the ballista (above p. 138), the poet continues:

You don't know what suffering "the men" are afflicted with, but the deceased are acquainted with the suffering. If you know a remedy for my suffering, say what it is! Otherwise, go away and sit somewhere else! Since my moon is behind a cloud, my lot is only to cry out woefully (*darēgh*)." Here I have a hundred forms of grief, each one bigger than a hundred mountains. Were I to tell my grief to the mountain, it would become all tears like an ocean. (IN pp. 102-03).

Ignorance about one's destiny in the hereafter, a wasted life, awareness of one's sins, an inner rift, agnosticism, the yearning of love, and numbness in stupor:

In the end one must depart with no idea of what will come, nor of what was (determined) before... I'm between this and that, neither in this, nor in that, without knowledge of body and soul, neither of this, nor of that (do I have knowledge). Unbelief is in my blood (*bunyādh*), my faith weak, wicked drives dominant, the body strong, the soul weak. What am I to do then? What am I to do? Bewilderment was already there a long time. Now love as well has been combined with it. Now I'm in perplexity and hopeless yearning (*ḥasrat*) at the same time, I'm jealous of the ant's wings. Since I've come to know something, I know nothing... My knowledge is ignorance itself. All my ignorance is perplexity, all my perplexity is numbness (stupor), all my numbness is a state of death. (MN 17/6, at the end).

From a prayer addressed to God:

Oh Creator, for You I'm a helpless wayfarer, for You I'm a lame ant in the well! I don't know who my people are, where I am, what I am or who I am. Without a (healthy, strong) body, without good fortune, without anything in my hand, without possessions, without rest, without heart. I've spent my life in blood, I've had nothing from life. Everything I did was sinful action, my soul now wants to depart, life has come to the end. Religion has slipped from my hand, the world is lost to me... I'm neither an infidel, nor a Muslim. In bewilderment I stand between the two. Neither Muslim, nor infidel—what am I to do, etc.? (MṬ *Khātima*/6, p. 181, following the story).

After ᶜAṭṭār has told the story of the slave who complains about running back and forth between the house and the Tigris (above pp. 135 f.), he continues:

I stand between religion and the world... Neither does a full scented whiff from religion reach me, nor is my world put in order for one moment. (MN in 12/8).—

Then he compares himself to a dog that finds a piece of cake and at the same time sees the moon (which is often compared with a round cooky). The dog drops the cake and goes chasing after the moon. When it's unsuccessful, it goes back to get the cake but can't find it any longer. It then runs after the moon again. In the end it has nothing and remains bewildered in the middle of the road. (MN 12/9).

See also above pp. 143 f.

A friend tells ᶜAṭṭār about a man who holds the office of collecting the poll-tax from the Jews, and the friend thinks a more pleasant source of income can scarcely be imagined. The poet answers him: "I don't know about that. But I do know I'm the shame of the world (*nang-i jihān*) and that more than a hundred Jews should come and demand the tax on infidels from me." (IN 14/4, pp. 221-22).

A pious man says: "For thirty years I've spent my life without any power over myself like Ishmael (instead of Isaac among the Muhammadans) at the moment his father intended to cut off his head."—How must someone feel who spends his life like Ishmael at that moment! ...Sometimes I burn like a candle from waiting, at times I weep like a cloud in spring. You only see the fair glow of the candle-light. You don't see the fire that burns on its head. How can whoever only looks at me from outside have insight into my breast? Like the ball in the crook of the polo-stick I know neither where my head nor my foot is. I've had no form of benefit from my existence. Everything I've done and said (written) was all nothing. Alas, no one helps me, my life has been wasted without (pious) actions! When I still could, I didn't know how and when I knew how, I no longer could. Now I know no means, I only know impotence and helplessness. (MṬ *Khātima*/5, pp. 180-81; cf. also IN pp. 179-80, 388_{17}).

2

The poet, who kept far away from the courts of rulers and was too proud to expose himself to "the door-keeper's slaps on the back of the neck", complains about his loneliness. He finds no suitable companions.

For a whole lifetime now I've wanted to tell a secret (*ramz-ē*) to a companion (*hamdam*). I find no like-minded companion. Ah, away with these hypocrites I sit with! I suffer harm from those who sit with me, I undergo the torment of Hell from my wicked contemporary! Oh heart, be silent since you find no confidant! ...Like "the men" adopt three habits: silence, patience and contentedness! (AN in 15/3).

Who is so alone and lonely as I am, sunken in the lake with dry lips! I have no confidant and friend... My striving is too high to involve myself with a patron (*mamdūḥ*)... I neither have a desire for the sultan's delicacies, nor do I have a neck to support the door-keeper's slaps on the back of the neck. I can't endure

being alone for a moment, my heart isn't far from people for a moment. (MṬ *Khātima*/4, p. 180).

3

Precisely this psychological state of sorrow, perplexity and confusion, the loneliness, the lack of an understanding companion to whom he could pour out his heart, along with the irrepressible urge to speak, is, as ᶜAṭṭār says, the reason which caused him to write poetry. ᶜAṭṭār was no imitator of usual forms of poetry in his epics, and we would know that he never wrote poetry to win the favor of the powerful, even if he had not expressly said so:

How should a rich man who possesses such a treasure degrade himself by adopting a burden of gratitude toward every low-minded individual? Thank God that I'm not a courtier, that I'm not bound to every unworthy person! How should I attach my heart to someone[1] and call every lowly person master? I've never eaten a tyrant's bread, nor caused a book to sound forth praises of a ruler. My high striving is patron enough for me. My soul's strength is nourishment enough for my body. (MṬ in *Khātima*/3, p. 179; cf. p. 180, verse 4565).

We have already had occasion to observe in the chapter on men of power that ᶜAṭṭār's sympathies did not lie with the authorities in power but rather with ordinary poor people.

Of course, the simple pleasure of spinning a yarn, the joy of story-telling, was certainly one of the motives which impelled ᶜAṭṭār to write poetry. But we should likewise believe him that in his works of poetry he also sought to free himself from the inner tensions which he describes. In particular the figure of the world-traveller, who wanders through the cosmos in despair in order to find peace and a solution to the great riddle, displays characteristics which are in agreement with the self-portrait of the poet.

At the same time, in what ᶜAṭṭār says about his relationship to his poetic creativity there is again an echo of the inner rift about which he so often complains. He would prefer to act instead of talking, to behave as "the men" do instead of talking about them. The very fact that he speaks so much about the acts of "the men" shows, as he says, that he does not possess their actions. Thus an inner drive and natural temperament compel him to do something which, from the higher standpoint he himself acknowledges, he does not feel he can fully approve of. He exhorts himself to be

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1 Read: *zi-kas*.

silent and act, but in circumstances in which he is really unable to be silent and act.

The epilogue of the *Manṭiq al-ṭayr* (MṬ p. 175) begins with the statement that this work of poetry is a document of perplexity (*ḥayrānī*), the *dīwān* of bewilderment (*sargardānī*) (verse 4429). The poet presents his poem as being born from the very mood and state of mind which we have just witnessed.

"To understand it", so he says, "suffering is necessary. Whoever doesn't look at it from the point of view of suffering, will not understand anything of it (verse 4432). Don't look at the book as classical poetry (*shiʿr*) and gebr-literature (like the *Shāhnāma*), but as (the expression of) suffering! Perhaps then you will believe in one out of a hundred of my pains (4436-37)."

He then explains to us why he writes poetry even though he knows that being silent and acting is better than to speak and not to act:

I said to my heart: "Oh talkative one! How long will you go on talking. Be silent now and seek out secrets!" It answered: "I've dived into the fire, don't scold me! I burn if I don't speak words. The ocean of my soul stirs up hundreds and hundreds of waves. How can I be at rest for a moment! I don't boast about it to anyone, I keep myself busy with it." (MṬ p. 176, verses 4468-71).

It would certainly be better, however, not to occupy the heart with such useless fairy-tales, it would be better to ask God for forgiveness for all this futile nonsense, to surrender one's life and be silent. (MṬ pp. 176-77, verses 4472-76).

A pious man says on his deathbed: "If I'd known earlier that it's better to listen than to speak, I wouldn't have spent my life talking."—Though the word is as good as gold, if the word is not spoken that's better still. But this is what's sad: whereas "the men" have been allotted action, I've been allotted speech. (MṬ *Khātima*/1, p. 177).—Even if to the birds I'm no one on the path (to the Sīmurgh), I've at least told about them. Isn't that enough for me? (P. 178, verse 4515).

An old master says to a Ṣūfī: "How long will you go on talking about the men of God?" The Ṣūfī says: "It's sweet for the tongue to repeat what's told about these men." (MṬ *Khātima*/3, p. 178).

ʿAṭṭār could have given this answer himself. In the *Tadhkirat al-awliyāʾ* he also says about himself that he doesn't belong to the Ṣūfīs but from his youth on he has had a preference for them and he strives "to make himself like them" (*tashabbuh*) so as to be reckoned among them, and that he has taken it upon himself to publicize their words. (TA $1/4_{22\text{-}23}$; $5_{23\text{ ff.}}$).

The discrepancy between talking and action will not leave him in peace. Silence is better than speech.

If I also listened to words, then I wouldn't be intent on talking so much. If the path to God were open to me, how would I have the heart to compose works of poetry! (MN in *Khātima*/3).

A man reads out loud an elegantly composed sermon in rhymed prose about the Prophet and profession of God's oneness to Jurjānī and hopes to hear praise from the shaykh's mouth. But the latter says: "Only someone who's lacking in action can compose a work like this. A person who's alive in the faith isn't concerned with things like this." (MN *Khātima*/4).

A pious man says: "To speak about science and wisdom requires much. But understanding beyond limit is required for a wise man to be silent." (MN *Khātima*/5).—This highest level was attained by Plato who remained silent when Alexander visited him. (P. 229 below).

Anōshirwān says: "If you don't want your enemy to know your secret, don't tell it to your friend!" (MN *Khātima*/6).

Luqmān says to his son: "I've often regretted having spoken but never having been silent." (MN *Khātima*/7).

They ask Aristotle: "Who is it that, though innocent, deserves to be imprisoned?" He says: "He who can be locked up behind the teeth: the tongue." (MN *Khātima*/8).

Cf. the Arabic saying: "Nothing is in greater need of being locked up for a long time than the tongue." (*Laysa shay'un aḥwaja ilā ṭūli'l-sijni mina'l-lisān*).

But I can't be silent, because love makes me drunk! I wish to God my soul were at peace so I could always be silent! (MN *Khātima*/8)

Maqāla 22 of the *Asrārnāma* essentially consists of "*pand*", i.e. paraenesis and rules of wisdom for the (young) reader. It comes to an end with the recommendation to be silent:

If you spend your whole precious life talking, when will you do works? Make patience a rule for yourself, that is the Ṣūfī path (*ṭarīqat*). Make keeping silence (*ṣabūrī*) a rule for yourself, that is the Ṣūfī truth (*ḥaqīqat*)! (AN 22/0).

Someone asks a *pīr* in China about the Ṣūfī truth. The *pīr* answers: "It consists of ten parts. One part is to speak little and nine parts are silence."—Because he is silent, the hawk sits on the king's hand. Because the nightingale sings, he is locked in a cage... You were long enough a tongue, now become completely an ear! How long do you want to bubble up like a spring (and murmur)? When you're silent, you become the ocean. Whoever dives in this ocean to find pearls must hold his breath while diving. (AN 22/1).

In the following *maqāla* (23 = *Khātima*) ᶜAṭṭār addresses himself, describes how he composes poetry during sleepless nights, and praises his work. But then he admonishes himself to be silent and to be patient. He should keep himself in readiness (see p. 346 below) because he could indeed receive illumination at any mo-

ment. He could attain honor from a hundred things he possesses, therefore keeping oneself ready in expectation is the best attitude.

A fool asks a shopkeeper whether he has sugar and almonds. The shopkeeper answers: "I have quite a lot of both but I'm waiting for a customer to come." Then the fool says: "Why don't you eat the sugar and the almonds? Can you get anything still nicer by selling them?" (AN 23/1).

Cf. the quatrain allegedly by Khayyām: "I'm surprised by the wine-sellers. What can they buy that's better than what they sell?" (Ṣarrāf 103).

Just as the shopkeeper has sugar and almonds, every moment the poet has hundreds of oceans of secrets at his disposal. (I.e. he should be content with the awareness of these possessions and not reveal them prematurely by speaking and writing poetry). If you guard over your breaths, because of this (well-carried out) guard duty you will be allowed to attain the rank of sultan. (See p. 346 below). Recall God! How much longer these poems? Make silence a rule for yourself! How much longer this talking! Every letter of your book is an idol, and an idol without doubt holds one back from God... I should have kept all this talk to myself but alas, I didn't do what I knew, and I must beg God for forgiveness! Perhaps in His goodness He will forgive me.

He forgave Firdawsī, who for twenty-five years of his life sang the praises of the infidel gebrs (fire-worshippers), because of one verse in which he professed God's oneness. (AN 23/2; see pp. 283 f. below).

Death which undermines the value of all earthly things also renders speech meaningless.

Why speak so many words since we will have to sleep beneath the ground?

When ᶜAbbādī[2] who was famous for his eloquent speech is on his deathbed, ᶜAbbāsa visits him and—now that his "nightingale is mute" and he can no longer answer—says to him: "Oh you, who could speak so beautifully, whose tongue was sweet like sugar, who chained the hands of all speakers, why have you now become mute? What was all your great ambition to speak!" (AN 23/6).

Oh heart! My friends, companions and contemporaries have departed. How long will you go on in empty delusion "measuring the wind (with bushels)"? ...Do works, for today you still have time! Light the fire, for today you still have fire in you! ...You speak like Abraham, why do you behave like Nimrod? ...How long will you still circle around words (*qāl*)? Enter into "the state" of the mystics (*ḥāl*) if you're a man! If your heart finds peace in words (*qāl*), how can it then attain a name through "the state" (*ḥāl*) of "men"? You've spent your whole life talking. When will you undertake actions? I see that your poetry is an idol. You're only practicing idolatry. (IN pp. $368_{16\text{-}17a}$, $369_{1,\,4,\,6\text{-}7,\,9\text{-}10}$). Your poetry has become a barrier for you. Because of this idol you remain far from God.

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2 Vocalized this way.

Indeed, many idols existed which I destroyed but now I'm an idolater before my poetry. (IN p. 370_{12-13}).

Again there follow verses against the tongue (IN p. 371_{5-8}) and then:

On the Day of Judgement it will be your tongue, of all your limbs, which the Judge puts in chains. The lily has attained its freedom (in poetry it is described as *āzādh* "free") because, despite its ten tongues, it chose silence. (IN p. 371_{9-10}).

An inner compulsion forces him to speak:

You say to me: "Then stop speaking!" I don't want to speak anymore but what should I do? I burn if I don't speak! You all always want words from me. Aren't you afraid of my burning heat? (IN p. 373_{4-5}).

Sometimes he gives as the reason for his writing poetry that he has no companion to whom he can talk (see above p. 155).

Because I found no confidant in the world, I've said much of what's on my mind in my poetry. (MṬ *Khātima*/3 p. 179, verse 4528).—Since I don't see a kindred soul (*mard-i khwēsh*) in the world, I give expression to my suffering there. (MN *Khātima*/8, next to last verse).

Though the two worlds were a "City of Salvation", the show-place (*tamāshāgāh*) of my soul is enough for me... Such an (interior) Paradise and no companion! A heart full of love's secrets and no confidant! Every companion I behold is only a barrier. Therefore my constant companion is a book. Since I see no one fit to be my companion, I tell my sorrow in a book. In my heart I have a pain from which all these many words are born. Whether I speak much or little, why should I seek people? I speak to myself. Among all these people I find nowhere even a single hair of loyalty. But since I don't have an atom of loyalty (toward them), it's not right to expect it from others. Since I'm never a confidant to myself, who should be my confidant in the world? I've seen no one who travels the same road of religion with me, I haven't seen one mote of "the pure brethren" (*ikhwān-i ṣafā*). (IN *Khātima*/2, p. $368_{2,\ 4-8,\ 11-14}$).

One time he all of a sudden complains about the lack of understanding listeners.

I've spoken at great length in vain, no one has shown a desire for secrets. If you knew the secrets, you would understand me. Even though I talk this much again about the "path", they're all asleep. Where is the traveller on the path?

A *murīd* asks his master to tell him a fine word (*nukta*). The master replies: "Be gone! When you wash your face, then I'll tell you fine words. What good is musk in the midst of excrement. What good is it to speak fine words before the inebriated?" (MṬ 41/7, p. 146).

He seeks religious honor for his poetry.

The Prophet said: "Every day angels come down from heaven and observe where pious people gather and speak about God. Then they join the circle and listen."—Even if I'm not one of those familiar with divine secrets, I still recount (stories) about them. (See above p. 157). I speak about God and His action so that the angels listen to me, and so that people call me "the story-teller of God". (MN *Khātima*/9).

A street-sweeper always only sweeps the king's street. When they ask him why he only sweeps that place, he answers: "So that the people call me 'the street-sweeper of the king's street'." (MN *Khātima*/10).—The reader is then requested to pray for the poet and to shed a tear on his grave.

We know of no Persian poet who provides the reader with so deep an insight into the psychological background which affects his work as does ᶜAṭṭār.

4

ᶜAṭṭār distances himself from the art of the *qaṣīda*-poets and courtly men of letters. In his view panegyric is no longer held in high regard and has been abrogated, suspended (*mansūkh*).

The art of poetry only has a bad name in our time. The mature poets have all passed away, and those who are still here are immature. For that reason words no longer have a value. The eulogy is obsolete, and it's time for (poetry of) wisdom. My heart is disgusted by the obsolete and the patrons (*mamdūḥ*)... For me wisdom is forever sufficient as a patron. For my head and my soul this high striving is sufficient. (MN before 0/13).

He does not want to be a typical "poet" (*shāᶜir*).

Don't consider me to be among the poets, I'm not in agreement with that! I'm a man of mystical state, not a poet (like the poets) of olden days. (MN *Khātima*/2).

He beseeches the Prophet: "Don't consider me among the poets, don't look at me as one of the poets!" (AN 3, *Miᶜrāj*, line 14 from bot.).

He does not compose poetry for patrons and rulers. He offers his poetry to God Himself to whom he is grateful for the jewels of his poetic thoughts. He urges himself to ask God for jewels of poetry and then to scatter them before Him as a gift.

Since you have nothing worthy to offer the friend, ask Him for something of worth so you become an ocean in which you yourself sink! In love fill your heart with secrets so when you go to Him, you may scatter them as a gift for Him.

A dervish comes to the vizier Niẓām al-Mulk with a large begging bowl and asks him to fill the bowl with gold. The vizier thinks the bowl is rather large. But the dervish persists in his request and goes on asking until the vizier grants his wish. Thereupon the dervish is overcome with rapture (*ḥāl*), empties the

whole bowl over Niẓām al-Mulk's head and says: "For a long time I wanted to bring you this gift. But since I had nothing to give myself, I decided to ask you for the gold for this purpose." (AN 5/1).

Akhbār'ud-Dawlat'is-Saljūqiyya, ed. Muḥammad Iqbāl p. 70; ᶜAwfī, *Introduction* 192.

But then ᶜAṭṭār sings the praises of poetry in general and refers to how the Prophet, his Companions and other great men appreciated poetry.

Shiᶜr "poetry", *sharᶜ* "holy law" and *ᶜarsh* "the divine Throne" are made up of the same root letters. The names of the great poets all indicate lofty objects: Firdawsī (from *firdaws* "Paradise"), Azraqī (from *azraq* "celestial blue"), Anwarī (from *nūr* "light"), Shamsī (from *shams* "sun"), Khwarshēdhī (from *khwarshēdh* "sun"), Shihābī (from *shihāb* "meteor"), ᶜUnṣūrī (from *ᶜunṣūr* "element"), Khāqānī (from *khāqān* "ruler"). (MN before 0/8).

That *imām* of religion spoke the truth when he said: "'No one in the world finds such closeness (to God) as the people of fine nature (poetic sensibility). All tongues speak, but only the tongue of poets is harmonious (*mawzūn*, also rhythmic)."—The Prophet says: "God possesses many treasures that are hidden under the tongue of the poets." The Koran also contains rhymes, and the introduction of every speech or of a book (*khuṭba*) begins with rhymes. Of course, the rank of the Prophet was too high for the poetic art and for that reason he didn't compose poetry. (MN 0/8). Likewise, it's unworthy of a prince to have trivial things purchased for him, such as one grain of butter. (MN 0/9. See p. 319 below).

The Prophet had a pulpit built for his personal poet Ḥassān, from which the latter recited his poems. Abū Bakr, ᶜUmar, and especially ᶜAlī and his sons Ḥasan and Ḥusayn, composed poetry, as did Shāfiᶜī and other great religious teachers. (MN 0/10).

In the time of ᶜUmar a man recites poetry in front of the prayer-niche after the prayers. ᶜUmar has the poems recited to him, finds them edifying and has no objections to poetry being recited in the mosque. (MN 0/11).

Poetry becomes the topic of discussion at a gathering. Muḥammad ibn Khāzin says: "Poetry is the most beautiful of things because it even transfigures a lie which otherwise makes all things ugly." (MN 0/12).

Muḥammad ibn Khāzin was a Khurasanian mathematician who died in the middle of the 4th/10th century (GAL[2], Suppl. 1/387. Cf. Ibn Rashīq 1/6).

Verses praising "the word", i.e. poetic speech (*sukhun*), are also found in IN pp. 29-30.

5

ᶜAṭṭār's criticism of himself did not stop him from speaking of his poetry with pride and a considerable degree of self-importance. He was well aware of the undisputed originality of his poetry.

God knows whether in handling words (poetry) ᶜAṭṭār has had or has an equal. He is a wonder of the world in (the art of) words. He is absolutely "the last of the poets" (as Muḥammad was the last of the prophets). Whoever doesn't call me sultan (in the art) of the word, I call him a beggar. Who other than myself ever succeeded in acquiring a style (*shīwa*) which makes reason drunk with longing? ...Since I've expressed all poetic thoughts (motifs), what still remains for others? If a secret exists anywhere in the two worlds, it's contained in this *dīwān*. And you also find many stories in it, consider that as well, and no (foolish) stories either. Indeed, it's "the best of stories" (surah 12/3)... If you wish to have a much-knowing heart, read the *Muṣībatnāma* of ᶜAṭṭār... The musk-navel of secrets only begins to give off scent once the hand of the druggist (*ᶜaṭṭār*) has prepared it. (MN *Khātima*/0).

Amplification:

Someone takes the sword Dhū'l-faqār from ᶜAlī in order to fight with it. But being incapable of wielding it, he brings it back and starts to complain about it. ᶜAlī, however, says: "Without the strength of ᶜAlī no one is able to wield this sword." In the same way no one but ᶜAṭṭār can bring forth such a book.—For all eternity no one will possess this art of speech (*shīwa*)... Only three people should have a share in this Persian Psalter: the connoisseur, the calligrapher and the singer... My name is Muḥammad (like that of the Prophet), and just as Muḥammad put a seal on prophethood (was the last prophet), I've put a seal on this art of speech... If you've imbibed artistic taste with your mother's milk, then you can bring forth poetry as sweet as sugar. You can't make this happen by force. (MN *Khātima*/1).

The brother of Ḥātim al-Ṭāʾī could not emulate Ḥātim in generosity because it wasn't in his nature. This was already clear when the two of them were babies. (MN *Khātima*/2; see p. 328 below).

Only the connoisseur should praise him and not the fool.

They tell Plato that a man has greatly extolled him and praised him. Plato then breaks into tears and when asked why he's crying, he answers: "The man is an ignoramus. If only I knew what I've done (that's bad) which pleases an ignoramus! I don't know what pleased him, otherwise I'd renounce it immediately!" (MN *Khātima*/3).

The final chapter of the *Manṭiq al-ṭayr* contains a similar passage of self-praise.

Until the Resurrection no one will put pen to paper as ᶜAṭṭār has done. The art of poetry has been "sealed" by him, i.e. brought to a close. He will live on in

poetry until the Final Day. Up until then they will speak of him. His poetry has the peculiar quality of pleasing more with each new reading. Of course, he should not sing his own praises too much. The one who judges fairly will recognize his worth, for the light of his full moon is not hidden—we shall not hesitate to acknowledge his right in this.—He then requests that people remember him in their prayers and think well of him. (MṬ *Khātima* p. 176, verses 4450-51, 4455-56, 4447-48, 4452-53, 4459-60. A similar note is also struck in IN pp. 365-66).

CHAPTER TEN

STRIFE WITH GOD: THE FOOL[1]

The men of piety whom we became acquainted with in the previous chapters, in contrast to worldly people, perceive the gravity of their earthly and religious situation in its full urgency. They suffer from this world's transitoriness, from its torments and imperfections. They suffer as well from their own inadequacy or their inner rift. They are fearful of the hereafter and the final reckoning, and they await in terror what God will decide regarding their fate. They give expression to their grief-laden feelings in a more or less eloquent manner. Yet they still submit, piously and with patience, to whatever God ordains and imposes on them. None of them would be so presumptuous as to raise his voice accusingly against the creator of the world order, the author of their sufferings, the one who has determined their fate.

1

However, this boundary is occasionally crossed. Persons who have been driven insane by the world order, and such individuals as have suffered serious personal affliction, do allow themselves to be swept away into making bitter pronouncements about the Divinity and even lift their head toward the heavens to engage in strife with God Himself.

The earliest Muslim from whom a criticism of God's mercifulness has been handed down is the head of the sect of the Jahmiyya, Jahm ibn Ṣafwān (killed 128/745). The Ḥanbalite Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350) reports about him that he went outside with his companions and showed them the lepers and those afflicted with other torments, and said: "Behold! This is what the Most Merciful of the merciful does!" He, as well as his followers, denied God's mercifulness and wisdom. (*Ighāthat al-lahfān* 318).

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1 Cf. H. Ritter, "Muslim Mystics' Strife with God" in: *Oriens* 5/1952/1-15.

Ibn al-Qayyim's report, on the other hand, stands in isolation. From other sources we only know that Jahm denied those attributes of God which are also predicated about human beings, and put great emphasis on God's transcendence, whereas no mention is made of the demonstrations which are ascribed to him in this report.

Al-Farq bayn al-firaq 199; Watt, *Free Will* 102.

As second in the series one might cite "the heretic" (Manichaean, *zindīq*) Ibn al-Muqaffa[c] (killed 142/759) who levelled quite harsh attacks against Islam. Yet his attacks are directed more against Islam as such, not against the Divinity Himself.

Michelangelo Guidi, *La lotta tra l'Islam e il Manicheismo*, Roma 1927.

The apostate Muslim, Ibn al-Rēwandī (d. 298/910), went to great lengths in his criticism.

Cf. H. Ritter in: *Der Islam* 19/1931/1-17 and P. Kraus in: RSO 14/93-129, 335-79.

The surviving fragments of his books contain an exceedingly sharp criticism of the Koran, Islamic prophecy and the mercifulness of God. In the few verses which have been transmitted from him, he criticizes the distribution of goods in the world:

How many highly intelligent persons have striven in vain, and how many ignorant people gain their daily bread! This is what causes one to have second thoughts and makes a heretic out of a great religious scholar. ([c]Abbāsī, *Ma[c]āhid al-tanṣīṣ* 71; Houtsma in: WZKM 4/1890/233).

Even worse are two other of his verses in which he takes the liberty of speaking in a way which really brands him "an enemy of God", as Ibn al-Jawzī describes him. He not only has doubts about Islam but about God Himself:

You've distributed sustenance among human beings the way a drunken lout would do it. If a man were to distribute things this way, we'd say to him: "You've gone crazy! Get some treatment for yourself!"

Nicholson in: JRAS 1902, p. 356; Abū'l-[c]Alā[ɔ] al-Ma[c]arrī, *Risālat al-Ghufrān*, ed. Bint al-Shāṭi[ɔ], Cairo 1950, p. 442, with the correct text.

Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī (above p. 148) also occasionally engages in strife with God and feels himself to be in a state of war with Him:

God, I complain to You about what You've caused to befall me. I beg You to incline toward me in mercy. Verily, I swear by You, You've tied the rope firmly, tightened the choke cord and begun war between me and You. (*Ishārāt* p. 124).

Ibn al-Jawzī calls Ibn al-Rēwandī, Abū Ḥayyān and Abū'l-ᶜAlāᵓ (see below) the three heretics (*zanādiqa*) of Islam. Abū Ḥayyān is the worst of the three.

Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiᶜiyya* 4/3; cf. ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī in the introduction to the *Ishārāt al-ilāhiyya* pp. yw.

These doubting and desperate loners and non-conformists who were not firmly anchored in the faith of "the community" appeared to the orthodox, who did not suffer from problems of this kind, to be highly suspicious.

The Persian poet Daqīqī (murdered in the last quarter of the 4th/10th century) accuses "the world" because of its injustices:

For one person Paradise, for another Hell; for the one humiliation, for the other elevation! Why is sustenance so scarce for the intelligent? Why do the dumb have everything they need? Why is the life of peacocks and the bustard so short? Why do the snake and the vulture live so long, etc.? (*Majmaᶜ al-fuṣaḥāᵓ* 1/217$_{17\text{-}18}$).

The philosopher Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna) (d. 428/1037), in a treatise occasioned by a Muslim's complaint about the unjust distribution of goods between Muslims and Christians, sought to demonstrate the senselessness of this criticism by pointing out the infinity of human desires which would necessarily lead to absurd consequences.

Risālat al-arzāq, edited by myself in the *Majallat al-Majmaᶜ al-ᶜIlmī al-ᶜArabī* 25/1950/199-209.

Again ᶜUmar Khayyām gives voice to very critical and pessimistic sentiments. He too criticizes the distribution of goods and, if it were up to him, would have eliminated all cares from the world. He criticizes God's system of rewards and punishments.

Arberry 3 *chēz dihī*; 105 *muᶜtarifī*; 110 *qaḍā dāshtamē*; Rosen no. 66 *kujāst*; 265 *bi-gō*.

Doubt about God's mercy is also expressed by the blind poet Abū'l-ᶜAlāᵓ al-Maᶜarrī who died in 449/1057, for example in the answer he gives to Ibn Abī ᶜImrān in response to the latter's written question about the reason for Abū'l-ᶜAlāᵓ's vegetarian lifestyle.

If God wants nothing but the good, then one must say about evil: either He knows about it or He doesn't. If He knows about it, He must either want it or not want it. If He wants it, He is virtually the perpetrator. In the same way one says: "The *amīr* has cut off the hand of the thief", even though he didn't do it personally. If He doesn't want it, one must believe about Him what one wouldn't be-

lieve about an *amīr* on earth.[2] For if something is done which he disapproves of in his area of command, he expresses his displeasure and orders it to stop. But this is a knot which the dogmatists haven't succeeded in untying... Our lord (the correspondent), who has certainly read works of the ancients, knows quite well that views have been transmitted[3] from Galen and others which prove that they were at a loss (in this) matter. If one says the Creator is kind and merciful, why does He allow the lion to tear apart a tame creature that is harmless and in no way vicious, while many well-known people have died from the bite of snakes? And He has unleashed the falcon and the hawk on birds that are content if they can pick up a single grain! The moorhen leaves her thirsty chicks and in the early morning flies to where there's water to bring back (drink) in her crop, but before she reaches her young the falcon swoops down and devours her, and the chicks go thirsty." (*Irshād al-arīb*, Margoliouth 1/199-200; Cairo 3/184-86).

He reproaches God, saying: "You've forbidden murder, while You Yourself send two angels to carry it out." (JRAS 1902/293, 313).

In Abū'l-ᶜAlāᵓ many other statements also occur which are close to ᶜAṭṭār's pessimistic view of life or his pessimistic characters, especially in the *Luzūmiyyāt*. Here we cannot enter further into this subject.

Aḥmad Ghazzālī (d. 517/1123), according to Ibn al-Jawzī, said in a sermon:

When Moses was told (by God): "You will not see Me" (surah 7/143), Moses said: "This is how You behave! First You choose Adam, then You make 'his face black' and banish him from Paradise. As for me, You call me to Sinai and then cause my enemies to gloat over me! This is how You treat Your friends. Just imagine how You behave toward Your enemies!"

Wa-min kalāmihī annahū qāl: Lammā qīla li-Mūsā: Lan tarānī, qāla: Hādhā shaᵓnuk! Taṣṭafī Ādama thumma tusawwidu wajhahū wa-tukhrijuhū mina'l-jannati wa tadᶜūnī ilā'l-Ṭūri thumma tushmiṭu bī'l-aᶜdāᵓ! Hādhā fiᶜluka bi'l-aḥibbāᵓi fa-kayfa taṣnaᶜu bi'l-aᶜdāᵓ! (*Quṣṣāṣ* 77a-b).

In another place Ibn al-Jawzī reports:

And many of you say about your God: "How can He predetermine things and then punish people?" And many say: "Why does He make the pious man's daily sustenance scarce and that of the sinner abundant?"...And many say: "What's the wisdom in His tearing down these bodies? He torments them with destruction, after having previously built them up!" (*Talbīs* 416-17, trans. by Margoliouth in: *Islamic Culture* 12/1938/363).

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2 I read: *jāza ᶜalayhi mā lā yajūzu ᶜalā amīrin mithluhū* (how a Muhammadan could vocalize the word as *mithlihī* is puzzling to me) *fī'l-arḍi, innahū.*

3 I read *mā* instead of *wamā.*

Later as well there were people who entered into strife with God. Ibn al-Qayyim says in the above-quoted passage:

We have heard and even experienced for ourself how many of these people engage in strife with God (*al-taẓallum ᶜalā'l-rabb*) and are suspicious of Him, only as an enemy would be. (The passage about Jahm follows). And another eminent man among these people has said: "Nothing is more destructive for creatures than the Creator." One of them used to quote the verse: "If this is how He behaves with someone He loves, how will He treat His enemies?" One hears many people who have experienced misfortune say: "My God, what did I do that You've caused this to happen to me?" And more than one person has said to me: "If I repent and turn to God and do something good, he'll make my daily bread scarce and deny me my sustenance. But if I sin again, my daily bread and assistance returns." (*Ighātha* 318-19).

ᶜAṭṭār tells two stories in which harsh suffering causes two persons to utter similar bitter remarks about God's lack of mercy.

A Christian merchant's beautiful son dies at a young age. After the disconsolate father has laid his son to rest in the earth, he goes off and becomes a Muslim. For he says: "Now I recognize that the Muslims are right in their teaching that God has no son. Surely if He had a son, He'd never have done this to me." (IN 3/3, pp. 62-63).

A Muslim's only son dies. After he's buried him, he raises his eyes to heaven and cries: "Despite having done this to me, You're excused! You have no son and understand nothing of a father's grief!" (IN 3/4, p. 63).

With this one may compare the story of Ḥimār, a man whose ten sons are struck by lightning while hunting, and who then denies God and says: "I won't pray to someone who's done this to my sons!" In return he's severely punished by God. (*Muᶜallaqāt* ed. Arnold, Leipzig 1850, pp. 22-23).

2

The language which these people use goes beyond what is allowed to an ordinary person. Nonetheless, Islamic mysticism admits of cases in which talk of this kind, engaging in strife with God, is to a certain degree allowed. Such a free manner is permitted to "the Friends of God" (*awliyā'*, see pp. 582 f. below) who maintain a special intimate relationship with divinity, which is so secure that it is not endangered by occasional forms of boldness (*inbisāṭ, idlāl, ijtirā', kustākhī*), just as between lovers reproaches and love disputes (*ᶜitāb*) may well occur at times without the love relationship being disturbed.

Muḥammad Ghazzālī devotes a special chapter to this subject in his *Iḥyā'* (4/291-94, *Bayān maᶜnā'l-inbisāṭ, etc.*; *Stufen* 720-726/

F.232-245) and, by way of giving examples, in part relates stories about the prophets (Moses, Balaam, Jonah, etc.), and in part stories about men of piety from the early days of Islamic asceticism and mysticism, especially about persons who by vigorously reproaching God convince Him to do certain things and to stop doing others. (Pp. 583 ff. below).

With regard to prayers being miraculously answered, ᶜAṭṭār reveals himself to be rather sceptical in his epics. Only rarely in ᶜAṭṭār does God respond to a bold prayer of His Friends. Otherwise, He sometimes grants a request but in a peculiar way (above p. 57). And His Friends then give free rein to their indignation.

One of the birds declares that he's too weak to accompany the hoopoe on the journey to the Sīmurgh and that the road is too difficult. He would surely die along the way.—The hoopoe answers: "Even if we suffer death on this path, that's far better than to die in this impure world, etc. In the world one experiences nothing but torments and disappointments." (MṬ 18/0, p. 66. See above p. 13).

There then follow stories in which holy men and fools vent their ill humor toward God because of the tribulations of this existence, and engage in strife with Him.

Shaykh Kharaqānī arrives in Nēshāpūr after a difficult journey and lies down in a corner, hungry and exhausted. Finally, he asks God to give him a piece of bread. A voice answers that he should sweep up all the litter of the city's main square and sift through it. There he'll find half a grain of gold and he should buy bread with it. In ill humor the man of God replies: "I have no water left in my liver. So just give me a piece of bread without liver (suffering)!"

To devour one's liver, *jigar khwardan*, is a well-known metaphor for having to endure hardship and suffering.

The voice answers: "You wish to have it too easy. If you want bread, then you must sweep." With difficulty and distress the shaykh manages to borrow a broom and a sieve from someone. He sets about working, in the last of his siftings finds a gold coin and rushes to the baker in happiness to buy himself a piece of bread. But when he leaves the shop, he's forgotten where he put the broom and sieve and doesn't know how to replace them for the owner. Finally, he sinks down in a ruin and behold, the missing broom and sieve are there! He then cries out to God: "Why have You gone and made my life miserable? You've poisoned the bread for me with this suffering! Let me die, and take back the bread!" Then the voice calls to him: "Be thankful. We've given you this savory condiment for your dry bread (in the form of 'liver' which you must eat with it)." (MṬ 18/1, p. 67).

Sometimes the complaints remain without an answer.

Rābiᶜa travels the road to the Kaᶜba in seven years by rolling from her one side to the other (? Cf. TA 1/62$_{18-19}$). When she finally arrives at the Kaᶜba on the day of the pilgrimage, she's affected by the (monthly) impurity of women and can't perform the rites. She then turns about and reproaches God: "I've traversed this road in seven years lying on my side, and now You throw thorns such as these in my path! Either let me enter Your house, or leave me in my house!" (MṬ 18/3, pp. 68-69).

3

But beyond this type of Friends of God there is another class of persons who, on the basis of a special privilege as it were, enjoy a freedom to express themselves more boldly about God and to speak to Him with greater audacity than ordinary people. This is the class of "fools" (*dēwāna, majnūn*) who play a special and rather striking role in ᶜAṭṭār. We have already met a number of their representatives. The serious criticism of the world order, which we became familiar with in the previous chapters, almost always originates with them.

The figure of the so-called "wise fool" is well known in Islamic literature. There is even a series of special writings which deals with these fools or the stories told about them.

Macdonald's article "Buhlūl" in the EI; von Grunebaum, *Medieval Islam* 249; *Ṣifat al-ṣafwa* 2/288-93, 3/114-15, 4/34-35, 39-40, 45-46, 222-24, 265-66, 300-01, 313-14, 372-73; *Kashkūl* 4-6; *ᶜUqalāᵓ al-majānīn* of Ḥasan b. ᶜAlī al-Nīsābūrī (d. 406/1015), Damascus 1343/1924; cf. Paul Loosen, "Die weisen Narren des Naisābūrī" in: ZAss 17/1912/189 ff.

The pious fools and mad lovers presented to us there appear to be partially deranged persons, some of whom are confined inside madhouses or convents serving as such (Dayr Hizqil, Dayr ᶜĀqūl) and lie there in chains, while others go about freely, pass their time preferably in cemeteries and ruins, and are tormented by young boys throwing stones at them and playing all kinds of pranks on them.

Cf. a miniature which depicts such a scene in Pope, *Survey*, plate 910.

Occasionally they are visited by Ṣūfīs and men of letters and they then deliver quite pious admonitions or recite moving verses. Thus the grammarian Mubarrad, when called to the caliph Mutawakkil to settle a dispute between the latter and his favorite al-Fatḥ ibn Khāqān about the reading of a Koranic verse, stops off on the way in Dayr Hizqil and has verses recited to him by the insane who are locked up there.

Murūj al-dhahab, Cairo 1303, 2/263-64; cf. also *Irshād*, Margoliouth 7/139; *Mu*ᶜ*jam al-buldān* 2/706. Preaching fools appear several times in the *Ṣifat al-ṣafwa*. And see also the similar story in *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/62.

In their utterances very often love of God appears as the dominant element. These are persons who, because they appear to have a special relationship with God which is inaccessible and incomprehensible for most people, are shown respect and—even still today—are treated by adults with a certain timidity, consideration and reverence.

We cannot here enter into the stories about mad lovers that have been collected, not only by Nīsābūrī, but by Sarrāj in the *Maṣāri*ᶜ *al-*ᶜ*ushshāq*, and by other representatives of erotological literature.

The type of Christian holy fools which Ernst Benz deals with in his article "Heilige Narrheit" in *Kyrios, Vierteljahrsschrift für Kirche und Geistesgeschichte Osteuropas* 3/1938/1-55, has little to do with our fools. These Christian fools have more in common with the Malāmatī-type of Islamic piety.

In ᶜAṭṭār fools of this type are also represented but, as one might expect, they are more deeply conceived and glimpsed more from within than in Nīsābūrī and those like him, whose descriptions remain rather external.

The stories about fools which Yāfiᶜī relates in *Rawḍ al-rayāḥīn* no. 19 ff. come closer to those found in ᶜAṭṭār.

Moreover, with him the concept *dēwāna*, fool, is conceived in a much broader sense. ᶜAṭṭār applies this term to virtually everyone who expresses a view that deviates from the average view, nor does it carry any contemptuous connotation in him at all.

The relation of the fool to his fellow human being in ᶜAṭṭār is characterized, to a far greater extent than in the Arabic writers, by the fact that under the protection of a madman's freedom he is able to do and say things which would be forbidden for a normal person. No one does anything to him. "Be insane and abandon your reason", says Laylā to Majnūn, "then no one will do anything to you when you come to my village." (MN 27/1). Thus they appear as severe, often bitter critics of the rulers and all inauthentic, pseudo-pious behavior around them, as we have already seen in numerous examples. Their utterances in such cases are far more intense, bold and drastic than those of the much less harmful fools in the Arabic sources. Sometimes, as well, they are not aggressive and critical but completely absorbed in their strange activity which nevertheless conceals a deeper sense.

Their relationship with God is first of all characterized by the fact that "the reed pen has been removed from them". The recording angels do not write down their words and deeds. The fools are not subject to the law. The duty to follow the legal prescriptions (*taklīf*) does not apply to them.

Cf. the *ḥadīth*: *Rufiᶜa'l-qalamu ᶜan thalātha, ᶜani'l-majnūni'l-maghlūbi ᶜalā ᶜaqlihī, etc.*, *Fayḍ al-qadīr* no. 4463; Wensinck, *Concordance* 2/280.

How a madman of this sort acquires freedom from the law is vividly depicted in the biography of Luqmān Sarakhsī, a contemporary of Abū Saᶜīd ibn Abī'l-Khayr. Abū Saᶜīd relates:

In the beginning Luqmān was a man who practiced asceticism and guarded against doing anything illicit. Then madness came over him and he gave up this way of life. They said to him: "What was that earlier, and what is this now?" He answered: "The more slavery I undertook, the more there still remained to do, and I couldn't do any more. Then I said: 'Lord, kings bestow freedom on a slave when he grows old. You're a great king and I've grown old in Your service. So set me free!'" He then heard a voice: "Luqmān, I've set you free."—But the sign of his freedom was that God took away his reason. Our shaykh (Abū Saᶜīd) often used to say: "Luqmān is 'the one set free by God', because He has released him from commands and prohibitions."

Asrār al-tawḥīd 16; O'Kane, *Secrets* 88. And borrowed from the latter, *Nafaḥāt al-uns*, Lucknow 1323, 274; Lāmiᶜī's trans., 336; also translated by Nicholson, *Studies in Islamic Mysticism* 6-7.

In ᶜAṭṭār the story is characteristically altered:

Luqmān Sarakhsī says to God: "Lord, I've grown old and grey in Your service. An old slave is given a letter of manumission. Now I beg You also to give me, Your old slave, a letter of manumission!" The divine voice answers: "Whoever wishes to be freed from slavery to God, he also loses his reason as well as the obligation to follow the law. If you're willing to renounce both, then you'll be free." Luqmān replies: "I only want You. I have no need of reason and the obligation to follow the law." Both are then taken from him. He becomes insane and while dancing and clapping his hands, he cries out: "Now I no longer know who I am. I'm no longer a slave, so what am I then? Slavery is gone, nor has freedom remained either. Nothing of sorrow and of joy any longer remains in my heart. Now I'm without qualities but I'm not without quality. I'm a knower of God but I have no knowledge. I don't know whether You're me or I'm You. I've merged within You, and duality has disappeared." (MṬ 42/3, p. 148).

In the final words of Luqmān we encounter the motif of the paradoxical in-between state before extinction which we became acquainted with above (pp. 147 f.), and his speech ends with a

form of monism based on extinction which, as we shall see, is central in ᶜAṭṭār.

The latter motif (cf. pp. 595 f.) becomes even clearer in the speech of a madman bound in chains in the madhouse, whose secret talk with God is overheard by someone:

This Your fool was together with You for a while in the house. But since there wasn't room for You and me in the house at the same time, in accordance with Your will I've now left the house. Since You're there, madman that I am, I've gone. (IN 12/5, p. 611).

Another fool justifies his being mad in a similar way.

A madman is sitting in a ruin weeping. Someone asks him: "Why are you weeping like this? Has somebody died?" The fool answers: "My heart has died for me (heart is also reason). It was in pain longing for God and has gone away and left me here alone. I would also like to go where my heart is but the road passes through the bottom of the ocean. If I arrive there one day, then my suffering and my weeping will stop." (MN 22/7).

To the lost heart one may compare the following story:

A fool goes on crying out: "Where is my heart? Has anyone found my heart?" Then he observes a mother who beats her naughty young boy and puts him outside the door but when the child weeps and begs, she feels pity for him, brings him inside and treats him affectionately. The fool shouts out with enthusiasm: "Now I've found my heart, in such-and-such a street with such-and-such a woman!" (*Ṣifat al-ṣafwa* 4/300-01).

4

This freedom the fool enjoys, and likewise the intimate relationship of love he maintains with God, allow the fool to make statements about God which would be outrageous in anyone else's mouth. Indeed, he is able to employ an audacious language before God Himself and reproach Him with things which no one else would be allowed to mention.

One of the birds asks the hoopoe whether a person may allow himself to say something bold in the presence of the king, the Sīmurgh.—The hoopoe answers: "Whoever is in an intimate relationship with the king may indeed allow himself a bold remark, the way one overlooks an audacious word on the part of a page who loves his lord above everything else but is not yet familiar with proper speech and customs. The fool who's in love may say what he wishes." (MṬ 32/0, pp. 107-08; above p. 15).

When the world-traveller returns from his futile talk with the Spirits (*jinn*), the master instructs him about the nature of being possessed (*junūn*). His instruc-

tion concludes with his saying: "If the thread of speech is spun in the direction of boldness but the speaker is a madman, do not reprimand him." (MN 27/0).

An ascetic (*zāhid*) reproaches a madman because of his bold speech. The madman answers: "Since God has willed that I be insane, I can say whatever I want. People in their right mind are duty-bound to the law (*taklīf*), the insane are duty-bound to honor (*tashrīf*) love." (MN 27/2).

The criticism voiced by fools is at times directed against God's activity as Creator as such, and at other times against the way he takes care of His servants (above pp. 55-57), how He imposes meaningless suffering on them. The style and manner in which this criticism is voiced moves through a richly gradated scale. Sometimes what emerges is a sullen, miserable expression of a world-weary mood, other times a hopelessness caused by so many bad experiences and borne with an almost moving submission, and still other times these suffering human beings, who complain quietly or out loud, raise their eyes toward heaven itself and utter serious reproaches, indeed even threats, against the Divinity.

Despite everything, and this is the characteristic feature, a permanent, highly lively personal bond persists between them and their God who has driven them crazy, torments them and causes them to go hungry, and whose methods of treating human beings they know better than other people because of their own experience, whose action they sometimes bear with resignation, whom they at times reproach, at other times threaten, with whom they engage in strife, from whom they at times attempt to extort something and whom they occasionally try to outsmart. But whatever happens to them, in their view it is always God's direct intervention in their fate. They are always directly involved with God and in everything they see only Him.

Mediation is abolished for these people, that's why their speech is very straight (direct). Since apart from Him they consider things unreal (*majāz*), they hear everything from Him and say it from Him. (MN 22/10, at the end).

But precisely this direct relationship with God confers on them the rank of a true mystic who is in immediate contact with God, and this is one of the reasons why the madman is treated with a certain respect and the disorder he causes is even overlooked.

It cannot be ruled out that many of these fool figures with their bitter criticism of God's ordaining are literary fictions, that the poet has them utter ideas which he feels reluctant to say directly. But when one considers that until recent times similar stories were told about Bektashī dervishes, and that very daring statements of

this kind are actually found among Bektashī poets (pp. 186 f. below), one comes to the conclusion that these figures really did exist.

We have become acquainted with a series of stories in which fools utter their sceptical views about the sense of world events, the eternal round of births and deaths, or in which they report on the sorrowful experiences they have had with God. Those stories already contain, more or less clearly, a criticism of God as only the fool is allowed to voice. In the following stories this particular tone is even more clearly discernible. The tone is sometimes moving and sad, sometimes serious and bitter, and at other times it shifts into the comic, and the fool with his whimsical ideas makes the impression of being idiotic and ridiculous.

The fools know God only too well from their own sad experience.

A man said to Ibn Sayyāba, the *mawlā* of the Banū Asad: "It seems to me you don't know God." He replied: "How should I not know Him who causes me to suffer hunger and go naked and has brought disgrace and shame upon me?"

ᶜUyūn al-akhbār, ed. Brockelmann, pp. 435-36. Variants in Muḥammad b. Qāsim b. Yaᶜqūb, *Rawḍ al-akhyār*, Būlāq 1279, 134, l. 4 with the addition: "...and who has robbed me of my reason";[4] *Asrār al-tawḥīd* 213 (O'Kane, *Secrets* 387) about a bedouin with the addition: "This is what he used to say and he would dance" (*kāna yaqūlu hādhā wa-yatawājad*).

The corresponding story in ᶜAṭṭār expresses greater emotion. His fools, despite everything, love God.

Someone asks a fool whether he knows God. The fool answers: "How should I not know Him? Through Him I've ended up in misery! He's driven me out of my homeland, He's separated me from my relatives. He's taken away my heart (reason) and made me lonely and forlorn."—ᶜAṭṭār adds to this: "Love speaks from within these words. You shouldn't take offense at this, for the fool has been released from the holy law." (MN 27/9).

An Arabic story:

Shiblī goes into a madhouse and sees a negro there who has one hand chained to his neck and the other hand chained to a column, and two shackles attached to his feet. Shiblī relates: "When he saw me, he said: 'Oh Abū Bakr, tell your God for me: "Isn't it enough that You've driven me crazy in love for You? Must You also put me in chains?"' Then he began to recite the verses:

'One who was used to being close can't endure being far from You. He whom love has driven mad can't endure without Your closeness. Even if the eye hasn't beheld You, the heart has still seen You.'"

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4 A friendly communication from A. Spitaler.

Thereupon Shiblī fetched up a sigh and fainted. When he regained his senses, he saw that the chains had been cast off, and the foot-shackles and the negro were no longer there. (*Maṣāri^c al-^cushshāq* 112. Cf. the story above p. 56).

A fool, while out walking in the desert, is caught in a heavy storm. The lightning wants to burn him, the rain wants to drown him. He begins to be very frightened. A voice calls to him: "Don't be afraid! God is with you." He answers: "To tell the truth, I'm frightened for that very reason, because I don't know why He's with me! But He may do whatever He wishes as long as I'm alive! When I die, however, I'll grip Him by the hem of His skirts. Perhaps then His heart will burn for me!" (MN 38/5. Cf. the story about the frightened fool, above p. 140).

Luqmān Sarakhsī feels himself, crazily enough, to be in an outright state of war with God.

He rides on his hobby-horse like a young boy, with a stick in his hand, out into the fields to do battle. A Turk grabs hold of him, takes the stick away from him, and beats him with it till he bleeds. When he comes back to the city humiliated and covered in blood, someone from the gaping crowd asks him: "How did the battle turn out? Were you victorious or your opponent?" Luqmān replies: "Look at my bloody robe! He didn't dare do me any harm Himself. That's why He called a Turk to help Him. And naturally there was nothing I could do." (MN 33/8).

In an Arabic variant of the story Shiblī sees the fool Buhlūl ride off on a hobby-horse to God's troop review. He comes back with a broken stick and eyes swollen with tears. He had hoped to be taken on as a baggage attendant, but God had rejected him. (*Rawḍ al-rayāḥīn* no. 33).

Riding on a hobby-horse occurs in ^cAṭṭār in another fool-story but in a different connection. (P. 254 below).—On war with God see also Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī, above p. 166.

In the house of God, the Ka^cba, safety is in a bad way:

They say to a fool that everyone who comes to the Ka^cba finds safety there. He sets out on the road immediately. When he has not yet arrived at the door of the Ka^cba, his turban is stolen by a bedouin. He then says: "This makes it clear how things stand as far as safety is concerned. If my turban is already stolen before the door, once I'm inside my head won't be safe!"—^cAṭṭār follows this up with reflections on God's lack of need, for whom a thousand lives mean nothing and a thousand oceans are no more than a drop (cf. p. 569). Safety only exists after complete self-surrender, extinction. (AN 15/4).

This theme is also dealt with by a master's saying about *faqr* and *wajd* that then follows but which proves not to be very profitable. (AN 15/5).

A fool holds God responsible even for vermin:

A famous shaykh asks a fool who's squatting in a corner: "I see that you have dignity (*ahliyyat* 'capacity'). Do you also have composure of soul (*jam^ciyyat*)?"

The fool answers: "How can I have composure of soul? During the day mosquitoes torment me, and at night fleas. A tiny gnat tormented Nimrod to death. Apparently I'm the Nimrod of this era since I have only flies, fleas and gnats from the divine Friend." (MṬ 18/4, p. 69).—(ᶜAṭṭār wishes to illustrate the wretchedness of earthly existence from which one must detach oneself).

God has the fool eat snow in order to still his hunger.

A fool sits in the snow and eats snow with both hands. Someone says to him: "Why are you eating snow? Is this supposed to be food that's fatty and sweet?" The fool says: "What am I to do? My belly is hungry." The other person says: "But hunger doesn't become any less through snow!" The fool replies: "Tell that to God! He says to me: 'Eat snow, so your hunger diminishes.' No madman says things like this. He says: 'I'll make you full without bread.' He's made me full, that's true, but with snow!" (MN 27/7. Cf. above p. 55).

Mīr Kārēz (or an overseer of a water channel) considers God liable to pay compensation for the damage a wolf has caused.

A worker on a water-channel (*kārēz*) borrows a donkey from his neighbor. He goes to the mill and then lies down and sleeps. The donkey runs off and is eaten by a wolf. The neighbor demands compensation, and they both appeal to Mīr Kārēz for a decision. He should say who's to pay compensation. Mīr Kārēz says: "Clearly he who let the wolf run about freely in the fields."—ᶜAṭṭār excuses the odd judge by noting that in certain circumstances the fool everywhere sees only God and God's activity. As an example of such mental absorption he cites the Egyptian women who cut their hands when they beheld Joseph (p. 431 below). (MṬ 32/3, p. 109).

Mīr Kārēz = overseer of the water conduit, but here it may be the nickname of a Ṣūfī master, a contemporary of Abū ᶜAlī Ṭūsī. Cf. the story on p. 619.

It seems to a fool that dear bread, which the carnal soul strives after, is so much the central point of the world around which everything revolves that he has no compunction about designating the word "bread" as the highest name of God.

Someone is asked which is the highest name of God. He answers: "Bread." The questioner is appalled by this answer but the other person explains: "I was in Nēshāpūr during the time of the famine. I spent forty days and forty nights in hunger in the city. Nowhere did you hear the call to prayer, no mosque was open (and yet—one must add—people were continually crying out for bread). Since then I know that the highest name of God is 'bread'." (MN 29/6).—(In ᶜAṭṭār the story occurs in connection with discussions about the carnal soul, which for human beings is what the grain of wheat was for Adam, due to which he lost Paradise).

A fool simply cannot understand why God creates so many consumers of bread.

A fool who lives in the steppes sometimes comes into the city and gazes in speechlessness at the throng of people who run hither and thither for one purpose or another. When he's had his fill of looking at them, he goes away again and says: "Oh alas, alas, for these sacks and for the sack-maker! There are already so many sacks, and He's forever producing more! It will reach the point where whoever needs a leather sack can buy one for one grain." (MN 38/6).

ᶜAṭṭār gives a deeper meaning to this incomprehension of everyday events: everything they (the fools) see is only a dream to them. The people in the world are only a mirage, a world full of confusion and woeful wailing. To them they're all only like a leather sack full of air. (MN 38/5, the transition to 6).

5

The fools are not always content simply to express their view of God's ordaining before their fellow human beings, to relate to them the rather discouraging experiences they have had with God and to voice their pessimism regarding God's willingness to provide help. They quarrel with God, reproach Him, threaten Him, attempt to embarrass Him by pointing to the better behavior of people, do not accept what in their view was an unfair response to their prayers, indeed even threaten sanctions, confiscate objects as security, because this is the only language God understands. The madman whom Shiblī visited, at the last moment takes back the reproaches Shiblī was meant to pass on to God as being pointless (above p. 56). Other fools, however, are not shy about speaking their mind directly to God.

We have already seen above (p. 43) what the fools think about God's creating and destroying. Some of them openly reproach God for the purposelessness of this activity.

A famine breaks out in Egypt. People are devouring one another. A fool observes the great scale of death and cries toward heaven: "If You can't feed this many people, then produce fewer of them!" (MṬ 32/4, p. 109).

A fool for whom everything is getting worse from one day to the next, and who's disgusted with people and with himself and sees no way forward or backward, cries out to God: "This creating really has no end to it! How long will You still go on producing and removing? Aren't You fed up with this eternal creating?" (IN 11/11, p. 179).

Another fool turns his face toward heaven and says: "If You're not fed up with this activity, I'm fed up with it! How much longer is this to go on? Hasn't Your heart had its fill of this behavior." (MN 27/6).

A fool in the grip of long, severe death throes, weeps and says to God: "Why did You give me life, if You want to take it back again? If You hadn't called me

into life, I'd be spared life's hardship and the torment of dying, and You'd be spared having to give (life) and to take it away." (MN 4/4).

A fool says to God in prayer: "I don't want anything from You that You should or shouldn't give me. Instead, take away what You've given me! I don't want this life You've given me. Take it away!" (MN 22/3. Cf. above p. 136).

They also complain to God about the suffering they endure and the bad provision which falls to their lot.

A fool says to God: "Even if no one knows it, I know You know all (this). Go ahead and do all you can (to me)! Do You really have the heart to do what You're continually doing to me? You're after my life, You've stolen my heart (reason). I'll never forgive You (*ba-ḥil na-kunam*) for what You've done!" (MN 27/5).

A comical fool reproaches God for downright miserliness.

A fool who's suffering from harsh poverty enters the mosque and asks God to give him a hundred dinars immediately because he's in dire straits. When nothing happens, he cries out to God in anger: "If You don't want to give me the money, make the mosque come crashing down over my head right now!" Just then a piece of the mosque's damaged roof actually falls down. Then the fool says: "You're quick to grant the second but not the first wish, aren't You? If You kill me, You'll also make everyone wait before You pay the blood-price!" When other pieces of the roof begin to fall off, he departs in the greatest haste. (MN 27/14).

Another fool voices his annoyance in a drastic manner because of the distribution of goods:

A poor fool who has nothing to eat or chew on, and is suffering to the point of dying, comes to Nēshāpūr. Along the way he passes a meadow full of cows. He asks: "Who owns these cows then?" They answer: "The governor (*ᶜamīd*)." He walks on and comes to an open plain where horses are grazing. He asks: "Who owns these horses?" They answer: "The governor." Then he sees a herd of sheep in the plain and asks whom they belong to, and is given the answer: "The governor." After that he meets a group of young, good-looking and richly dressed Turkish slaves. He asks: "Who owns them?" He's told: "These are the personal attendants of the governor." Finally, he arrives in the city and there he sees a splendid palace. He asks: "Whose palace is that?" They answer: "But that's the palace of the governor! Who are you that you don't know this?" A rage now comes over the poor fool. He tears his ragged turban from his head, throws it toward the sky and shouts: "Here! Take this turban too and give it to Your governor! Since he's supposed to own everything, he can have this turban too!" (MN 27/13).

ᶜAmīd is the title of the highest government official in Iran and all the regions under Seljuk rule. (Claude Cahen, "Le recueil transcaucasien de Masᶜûd b. Nâmdâr" in: JA 1949/127).

Variants:

The governor of Khurasan has hundreds of elite, beautiful Turkish slaves who ride about on noble white horses with pearls in their ears, attired in splendid clothes, and girded with pearl-studded belts. A poor hungry fool, barefoot and wearing a ragged robe, sees these slaves and asks who they are. He's told: "These are the slaves of the governor." The fool then shouts to God: "Here! Learn from the governor how people treat their slaves!" (MṬ 33/1, p. 108).

The same story, apparently taken from ᶜAṭṭār, but more elaborately worked out, occurs in *Mathnawī* 5, pp. 202-03. See Nicholson's comments on it in volume 8.

The Turks today relate a story which exactly corresponds to this, about a *meczūb* (religious madman). He stopped in front of the konak of Zeyneb Hanım (the present-day burned down building of the Edebiyat Fakültesi of Istanbul University close to Bāyezīd Square) and, beholding the richly dressed servants of Zeyneb Hanım, he called out to God: "Look at how these servants are taken care of and how You take care of Your servant (me)!"—It is also told as a Bektashī story. A Bektashī has come to Cairo while on the pilgrimage and there, near the konak of the Khedive, he sees one of the latter's slaves ride by in a splendid outfit. He then shouts out to God: "I'm Your slave. Take a look at my outfit and take a look at the outfit of Mehmed Ali Paşa's slave. You should be ashamed of Yourself!" (Ziya Şakir, *Bektaşi Fıkraları*, Istanbul 1943, pp. 22-24).

So here God is being given lessons, and people are held up as shining examples for Him. Some fools hold up themselves as a model for God:

A merchant goes crazy. He becomes poor and wretched. He ends up in prison and grows old and helpless. One night he says to God: "If I were in Your place, and You were in mine, I wouldn't let You live in such sorrow. I'd take care of You better than You take care of me." (MN 22/2).

The same motif in connection with God's love makes a moving impression.

When overpowered by his madness, a fool in the desert says to God: "Though loving is not Your practice (*pēsha*), I still love You. You have many friends like me, but I hold no one dear besides You. How should I tell You this? For once learn how to love from me!" (IN 10/13, p. 168. Cf. pp. 546 f. below).

There are those who reproach God for clumsiness and ignorance:

A madman, half-naked and hungry, seeks shelter from rain and snow in a ruined building. There a brick falls on his head and causes him to bleed. He then looks up at the sky and cries: "You want to play at being ruler and can't throw a brick better than that?" (MṬ 32/2, pp. 108-09).

A fool of a peasant owns a few cattle. In his village a cattle disease breaks out. He sells the cattle and gets himself a donkey with the money. After ten days

a disease breaks out among donkeys. He then raises his gaze to the sky and shouts: "Oh You who know all secrets! Can't You tell the difference between cattle and a donkey?" (MN 27/15.—*Ḥadīqa* 647).

So the peasant, it would seem, wants to outsmart God. An innocuous fool-story, in which a variation of this motif of an absurd attempt at outsmarting God appears, can be included here:

A Ṣūfī wants to wash his clothes. However, as soon as he's ready to do so, a rain cloud arrives which frustrates his intention. One day he makes another attempt. He goes to the grocer and wants to buy soda (*ushnān*, actually an alkali plant), and already the cloud is there. He then cries to the cloud: "Go away! I want to buy raisins, not soda!" (MṬ 34/7, p. 117).—(For the context of this story see p. 356 below).

As we have already seen, Luqmān Sarakhsī feels himself to be in a state of war with God. Other fools also behave the same way and, while doing so, they reproach God for unfair methods of fighting.

Maḥmūd of Ghazna marches out with a big army and almost five hundred elephants. Along the way he meets a holy fool, dismounts from his horse and sits with him. When the fool sees the war equipment, elephants and soldiers of the sultan, he raises his eyes to the sky and cries: "Here You can learn what it is to be a king!" Maḥmūd says: "Don't say a thing like that!" The beggar replies: "When you take to the field with your army and elephants, would you engage in warfare with a beggar? No! You move against a king. A king wages war against a king, not against a beggar. But that one up there leaves you in peace to be sultan, and day and night wages war against a beggar like me. And I'm the weaker one!" (MN 22/1).

A madman is pursued by boys throwing stones. At the same time it begins to hail. The madman then cries out to heaven: "Isn't it enough that You've taken away my 'heart' (reason)? Do You also have to ally Yourself with these boys against me?" (AN 15/3).

In a variant of this story the fool mistakenly curses the boys and later excuses himself when he observes that it is not with them but with the Lord of the weather that he is dealing:

A fool who's pursued by boys throwing stones flees into the ashhouse of a bath. Through an opening in the roof it begins to hail. Since it's dark inside the ashhouse, the fool thinks the hail is stones thrown by the boys, and goes on hurling coarse abuse all about him. Then a gust of wind blows open the door and he perceives that it's hail from the sky, and not stones, falling down on him. He now feels anxious because of the bad names he used and calls out to God: "Lord, this ashhouse was dark. I was mistaken. All those bad names I said apply to myself!"—ᶜAṭṭār admonishes the reader to guard against the fool's ways of speaking. This is only allowed to fools. (MṬ 32/5, pp. 109-10).

Two fools find the clothing given them by God to be shabby.

A fool runs about naked and exposed, while all the people go about in their best finery. He says to God: "Lord, give me a robe! Make me as content as the other people!" A voice answers: "What do you want now? We've given you the warm sun, sit in the sun!" The fool says: "Lord, how long will You torment me? Do You really not have any better clothing than the sun?" The voice replies: "Wait another ten days, then I'll send you a robe." After ten days he receives a robe. But since the donor himself is poor, the gift is also poor: a ragged robe sewn from a hundred thousand scraps of material. The fool says to God: "So You stitched together these patches over the last ten days? The decent clothes in Your treasure-house are burned I suppose, so You had to sew together all these rags. You've stitched together a hundred thousand patches! Who taught You this tailoring?" (MṬ 18/2, p. 68).

During a holiday a fool sits in front of the city and sees all the people going about in fine new clothes. He's only wearing rags himself. He then goes inside a ruined house and begins to pray: "Give me shoes, a robe and a turban, then I won't ask You for anything else until the next holiday!" When nothing happens, he says: "Well, at least give me a turban! I'll do without the shoes and the robe." A prankster hears his prayer and throws an old dirty turban down from the roof. The fool examines the gift, becomes angry and throws the turban back onto the roof. "I won't wear a turban like this", he says. "You can give it to Your Gabriel, if You want!"—Such speech, ᶜAṭṭār adds, would be out of place in a sane person's mouth, but for the madman and the lover it's allowed. (MN 27/3).

There is also a story, though not in ᶜAṭṭār, in which impudence like this towards God is punished.

A man whose vineyards and fruit-trees have been destroyed by frost, hurls the key to his garden toward the sky and says: "You've destroyed my fruits, so take the key to the garden as well!" The key comes back as a black snake, winds itself around the man's neck and kills him after forty days. (Qalyūbī no. 29).

I am personally familiar with utterances by present-day dervishes which in their rudeness far exceed those mentioned above. I refrain from repeating them out of a sense of decency.

Finally, fools and lovers of God even proceed to voice threats against God.

One of the Friends of God threatens that he won't walk one step further if God doesn't bring back a runaway donkey. (P. 585 below).

Another person employs much coarser means and like the Friend of God above is successful:

A hermit lives without any resources trusting that God will look after him in his hermitage. One day two hungry guests visit him. He waits to see whether something to eat turns up so he can offer it to the visitors. But they both sit there until evening and nothing arrives, so that the hermit is put to shame. Fi-

nally, the hermit jumps up, turns toward the sky and says: "If You send me guests, then You must also provide me with something to offer them! If You send me some food now, I won't start arguing with You. But if You don't, I'll take this club and smash all the chandeliers in Your mosque!" Just then a slave appears with a well-provided platter of food. The two guests are shocked by the speech of their host. But he says: "You have to let Him see your teeth, nothing else helps!"—Only those who love God, the poet again remarks, are allowed to speak like this. (MN 22/5).

A splendid example from recent times of threatening God with sanctions is found in Giovannino Guareschi, *Mondo Piccolo "Don Camillo"*, Rizzoli/Milano 1948, p. XIX.

Fools occasionally go so far as to seize something as security.

A starving and freezing fool begs in vain at all doors for a piece of bread. Everyone says to him: "May God give you bread!" Finally, entering a mosque, he takes a porcelain bowl (*?maghfūrī*, dissimilation and popular etymology for *faghfūrī*), props it on his head and walks away with it. Outside someone grabs hold of him and asks him what he's doing. "The people always say to me: 'May God provide for you!' So I've taken this bowl (?) from Him so that He finally takes care of me for once." The man bursts into laughter at the fool's words, and provides the poor fellow with food and clothing. Afterwards a person sees the fool newly dressed in the street and asks him: "Where did you get this robe?" He says: "The robe comes from God." The person replies: "But you've been very lucky. God only bestows such an attractive robe on a person with exceptional luck." The fool answers: "Good luck has nothing to do with it. He only gave me this robe after a hundred torments. If I hadn't taken something from Him as security, my stomach wouldn't have received any bread, nor would my body have a new robe." (MN 22/4).

For the fool theft is not taken to be asocial behavior because he is always dealing directly with God. This naïvety is perhaps also reflected in the following story:

A young fool goes out into the street barefoot in cold foul weather. Someone says to him: "The street is dirty, seek (ask for *khwāh*) a pair of shoes and a cloak for yourself!" The fool answers: "How can I seek shoes for myself? Besides, at night the people take them inside with them (*khāṣṣa andar zīr mē-gīrand shab*, so they won't be stolen)." (MN 22/6).

Regarding this precautionary measure see Freya Stark, *Das Tal der Mörder* 23.

Perhaps the following story belongs in this category as well:

A bedouin, while performing the holy circumambulation, grasps the door of the Kaᶜba and asks God for clothing. The other pilgrims tell him to be quiet. But when they return home after completing the rites, they see the bedouin decked out in splendid clothes. They ask him who gave them to him. He says: "God. I

know Him better than you do." (MN 27/10). How the bedouin came by these clothes we never learn...

However, the fools also show gratitude when God actually does something good for them.

A fool, who otherwise never performs the ritual prayers, is one day seen praying. Someone remarks to him: "You appear to be satisfied with God today, seeing how assiduously you're praying." The fool says: "Indeed! I was as hungry as a lion, but today He's made me full. He's done something good for me. That's why I'm offering up a good prayer to Him. He should behave properly and then I'll also behave properly."—ᶜAṭṭār adds to this: "In forms of speech like this a relationship of love for God is revealed. Since the law has given the fool freedom, you shouldn't take offense at this." (MN 27/11).

Here both conditions for free speech toward God are joined together: freedom from the law because of being insane and the intimate relationship of the lover.

Of course, technically speaking, God's slave cannot do anything good for his Lord because God is elevated above the pleasure which for instance kings experience when they are thanked for something, and because, in the strictest sense, God is thanking Himself through the one offering thanks.

Cf. p. 345 below; *Iḥyā*ʾ 4/73-74, *Bayān ṭarīq, etc.*; *Stufen* 188 f./B.99-100.

Only a fool could think of such a thing as rewarding God for His good actions.

To conclude we will consider this more serious story about Bahlūl:

Bahlūl is badly tormented by nasty boys who throw stones at him. When they likewise begin to throw big stones at him which hurt him, he picks up a small stone from the ground and gives it to the boys, saying: "Please, throw these small stones at me! If you use such big stones, my foot will be hurt and I won't be able to perform the prayers."

This characteristic is already related about Uways al-Qaranī, the contemporary of the Prophet and precursor of the Ṣūfīs, who did not meet the Prophet, for which reason one calls a Ṣūfī who attains knowledge of mystical truths without a master Uwaysī-*madhhab*. Qushayrī, *Risāla* 110-111, *Bāb al-khuluq*; *Sendschreiben* 340/35.6; Ṭurṭūshī 119. Cf. also Fīrūzābādī, *Nasl*, fol. 88a.

However, the boys won't listen, and Bahlūl finally flees from Baghdad to Basra. He arrives there after nightfall and crawls into a corner where, unknown and unnoticed by Bahlūl, the body of someone just murdered is lying in its blood. In the morning, once discovered soaked in blood alongside the dead man, he's immediately arrested and brought before the judge. Bahlūl says to his heart: "You fled from the stones of the boys. If you'd resigned yourself to your lot, you wouldn't now have to fear for your life in Basra!" The case comes before the

ruler, and he gives the order to execute the supposed murderer. When they lead Bahlūl to the gallows and the executioner puts the noose around his neck, Bahlūl lifts his head toward the sky and whispers a few words. Just then a man leaps forth from a corner and cries out: "He's innocent! I killed the man, you must execute me!" Now they're both brought before the ruler. The ruler's vizier recognizes Bahlūl and introduces him to the ruler who's wanted to meet the famous man for a long time. The ruler is overcome with joy and heaps honors on Bahlūl. Then the ruler is told the story about the sudden appearance of the murderer who gave himself up. He orders that the man be executed. But Bahlūl intercedes for him: "He gave himself up voluntarily and saved my life by sacrificing his own." Thereupon the ruler has the relatives of the murdered man summoned and satisfies them by paying them blood-money. But he then asks the murderer: "How did you decide to give yourself up voluntarily?" The murderer answers: "All of a sudden I beheld a terrible dragon coming toward me with gaping, fiery jaws. It said to me: 'If you don't tell the truth now, I'll devour you, and you'll be damned for all eternity.' Out of fear of this dragon I confessed my deed." Then the ruler asks Bahlūl what he'd secretly whispered under the gallows. Bahlūl answers: "When I stood there prepared for death, I said to God: 'You've brought all this upon me. If they kill me now, I'll demand blood-money from You, not from them!' As soon as I said that, this youth stood up and confessed to having committed the murder." (IN 10/6, pp. 160-63).—There is a very similar story from Qayrawān in Ṭurṭūshī 134.

6

The Turkish Bektashī poets almost go further than our fools in the language they allow themselves to use before God.

Yūnus Emre criticizes the bridge which the dead must walk across and which is thinner than a hair, and the scales in which the deeds of human beings will be weighed. Let them build a bridge so that people can walk over it, not so that they fall off it. Scales are worthy of a grocer. God knows everything Yūnus has done and not done, so why the scales?

Another person, Kaygusuz Abdal, says: "You've built a bridge from hair, so that Your servant comes and walks across it. We want to stay where we are, and if You're a hero, God, then walk across it Yourself!"

This criticism is often joined with the demand for God to forgive human beings. Thus the poet says in the name of Behlūl:

"Are You a grocer? What do you want with scales? You have nothing to do and no work, You live pleasantly! Why do You weigh the sins of the servant? Forgive his guilt. What harm does it do You anyway? Empty out the cauldron of pitch (in Hell) so it disappears and the believing servants may come to behold

You! Order the serpent to swallow Hell, extinguish the fire. What harm does it do you anyway? Etc."

Abdülbâki Gölpınarlı, *Yunus Emre*, Istanbul 1936, pp. 171-73. See also pp. 335 f. below.

Not all ᶜAṭṭār's fools fight with their God like the ones we have met in this chapter. There are also fools who are happy in God, and ones whose love makes them endure and forget all the suffering they experience. More shall be said about them later on (pp. 546 f. and 585 ff.).

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE VALUE OF LIFE. THIS WORLD AND THE HEREAFTER. OVERCOMING FEAR OF DEATH

The melancholic reflections of ᶜAṭṭār and his characters about life in this vale of tears are not the final word regarding earthly existence and the world of the here and now. Along with the negative judgements about this world, about life and death, one finds more positive judgements, even if these are fewer in number. The fact that the poet constantly reproaches himself for having spent his life in vain, in itself implies the view that life possesses a high, irreplaceable value which should not be wasted.

In *ḥadīth*-collections positive statements about the world as a place of worship and preparation for the hereafter, and about worldly goods as a means of satisfying legitimate needs, stand in sharp contrast alongside completely negative judgements. Cf. for example the *ḥadīth*s cited in the *Fayḍ al-qadīr* under nos. 4268-85.

The *qalandarī* conclusion which ᶜUmar Khayyām draws from his insight into the transitoriness of life and man's hopeless situation in this world, namely that one ought to enjoy the present day and spend one's time with wine and the beloved wine-pourer, does not occur in ᶜAṭṭār's epics although such attitudes are to be found in his lyric poetry.

1

The irreplaceable and irretrievable character of life is set forth by ᶜAṭṭār in a series of parables and stories.

The (legendary) vizier of Khusraw Anōshirwān, Buzurgmihr, is languishing in prison, having fallen into disfavor and been blinded. The Greek emperor sends a legation with riddle-like questions which Khusraw is meant to solve. The only one who's capable of answering the questions is blind Buzurgmihr. They scratch the text of the questions in ice (in a kind of braille) so that he can read them, and he solves the riddles. The greatly pleased Khusraw grants the wise, one-time vizier a free wish. Buzurgmihr says: "Give me back the light of my eyes!" This the king is unable to do. The grey-haired vizier then admonishes him: "Don't

take anything away which you can't give back!"—In the same way a spent life is irretrievably gone and nothing can replace it. (IN 13/8, pp. 205-07).

Compare to this story A. Christensen, "La légende du sage Buzurjmihr" in: *Acta Orientalia* 8/1930/81-128, especially pp. 84-85. It is obviously an offshoot of the Aḥiḳar legend.

A man from abroad is made vizier by the king. When the man feels old age is approaching, he asks to be dismissed. He wants to go back to his own country and spend the rest of his life in ascetic practices. The king demands that he hand over everything he's acquired during his activity in office. He will have to leave as empty-handed as he arrived. The vizier replies: "The king forgets that I've spent the cash of a whole lifetime on his behalf. If he returns this to me, he may then take back his money!" (MN 36/6).

If you only have a few weeks left to live and you make a vow to repent—as people do at the end of their lives—can this bring back your lost life?

"If someone", so says a wise man, "has gambled away everything he owns as well as one of his eyes in a gambling den, he may then perhaps renounce games of chance, he may perhaps even keep his vow. But no penitent renunciation will bring back his lost eye for him."—Don't give up anything you can't get back again! (IN 13/7, p. 205).

Guard such a life well if you can, and be aware of its worth. For if it has once flown like an arrow from the archer's hand, you can never buy it back. It will never return. Whoever wastes his life, as it were drinks his own blood.

In this connection ᶜAṭṭār relates a rather far-fetched story.

A wise man named Marzubān, who lives in the time of Khusraw Anōshirwān, has a son who's killed. Someone encourages him to seek blood-revenge. He answers: "I don't want to do the same as that murderer and shed more blood." They say: "Then at least demand blood-money." Marzubān replies: "I can't set a price on my son. When I consumed the money, it would seem to me as if I were drinking my son's blood."—If it's not right to drink the blood of one's son, so continues ᶜAṭṭār with his strange argumentation, how can it not be wrong to drink one's own blood? Whoever wastes his life, it's as if he's drinking his own blood. (IN 13/6, pp. 204-05).

2

The earthly life exists so that one may prepare oneself for the hereafter, and its meaning and its value consist in this. The preparation consists in doing the works prescribed by God and in "recollecting" God. Whoever neglects this has wasted his life.

Do works because "here" you're able to do so. When you go "yonder", you'll be under a heavy burden... Oh woe, you've surrendered your life to the wind, you've not lived up to life's demands! Why do you ask God for further life when you don't know the value of the life you have? Don't give your life away for

nothing! ...No one will sell you a life, even if you want to pay for it with another life." (IN p. $202_{12, 14-15, 17a, 18}$).

There was the merchant who was willing to pay thousands of dinars to the angel of death if he would only let him live another day. He had to make do with just enough time to admonish those he was leaving behind to recognize the value of life and to act accordingly. (IN 13/5; see above p. 38).

In a dream someone sees a pious shaykh who's passed away. The person greets him with the Islamic greeting but receives no response. He says: "Why don't you reply to my greeting? After all, it's a religious duty to reply to someone's greeting!" The deceased answers: "I'm well aware of that. But the gate of acts of obedience is closed for us. If I were still in the earthly world, I wouldn't stop performing acts of obedience." (MN 36/7).

For the man of piety this world is a sowing field for the hereafter.

Ḥadīth: *Al-dunyā mazraᶜatu'l-ākhira*. A sermon on this theme is contained, for instance, in the *Rabābnāma* of Sulṭān Walad.

This world is a sowing field for the other world. Therefore sow this seed, for now is the time to sow! You have land and water, so scatter seeds abroad. Act like a farmer and be busy with this work! If you don't till the grainfield, then you won't be worth half a millet seed on that threshing floor. (AN in 10/0).

Adam already recognized the world as an arable field when he voluntarily renounced royal proximity to God and chose the state of slavery. The world is not bad if you behave well in it (*kār-ē kunī*). It is only bad if you wish to gather gold in it.

Someone reviles the world in the presence of ᶜAlī. ᶜAlī replies to him: "The world's not bad, you're bad. The world's like a sowing field which you must till. Whatever you sow today, you reap tomorrow." (MN 29/2).

This saying originally comes from a sermon in the *Nahj al-balāgha*. The sermon begins: *Yā dhāmma'l-dunyā*. *Al-Rawāʾiᶜ* 1, Beirut 1932, p. 42. The saying is cited in the rhetoricians as an example of the figure "*taghāyur*" or "*mughāyara*" which consists in praising something that everyone censures, and censuring something that others praise. Ibn Ḥijja al-Ḥamawī, *Taqdīm Abī Bakr* (incorrectly entitled *Khizānat al-adab* in the printed edition), Būlāq 1291, pp. 128-29.

Moreover, Ibn al-Jawzī also criticizes popular preachers who constantly talk about the wicked deeds of the world and revile *dahr*: *Wa-min al-quṣṣāṣi man yadhkuru fī majlisihī dhamma'l-dunyā wa-yaqūlu faᶜalat wa-faᶜalat wa-yubālighu fī dhammi'l-dahr, etc. Quṣṣāṣ*, fol. 84a.—Al-Fārūqī al-Chishtī wrote a special book on the subject. (GAL^2 2/553).

In place of the image of sowing and reaping the alternative often appears that one should send on ahead or bring with one good deeds, because one will only find there what one has sent on ahead or brought with one.

There you have neither belief nor unbelief, because there you only have what you bring with you from here. What you reap is what you've sown here. What you wear is what you've spun here. There you have the same loss and profit as you had here. You find no joy there if you don't bring joy with you. (IN p. 154_{14-17}).

God asks the new arrival in the hereafter: "What have you brought with you?" (See p. 279).

"Nothing remains except the good deed that you sent on ahead", says the princely poet Ibn al-Mu^c^tazz (*Dīwān* 4/218_{23a}).

One sometimes vizualizes this in a quite drastic form.

The travellers of a caravan which was plundered by bandits on the way to the Ka^c^ba come to the preaching assembly of Abū Sa^c^īd and ask him to collect provisions for them among his listeners. A woman brings a casket with gold and jewelry. Abū Sa^c^īd puts it aside to wait and see whether the donator may perhaps regret her donation. But three days later the woman brings her arm-bracelets as well, which are a memento from her mother. She'd beheld herself in Paradise in a dream surrounded by everything she gave away. Only the bracelets were missing. The maidens of Paradise said to her: "You only find here what you've sent. You didn't send the bracelets, so you won't find them here." That's why she's now brought the bracelets as well. (MN 29/4).

Collecting money after a sermon was apparently common practice with Ṣūfī shaykhs and popular preachers. Cf. Nicholson on Abū Sa^c^īd, *Studies in Islamic Mysticism*, Cambridge 1921, p. 41. The money was not always used, as in the above story, to alleviate a sudden emergency. A preaching Ṣūfī shaykh primarily used the donated money on behalf of his dervishes, and since it was a rule, if not with all, at least with many, not to set anything aside for another day (cf. Fritz Meier in the introduction to his edition of the *Firdaws al-murshidiyya* p. 59), this provision for the poor at times took the form of large banquets which scandalized the pious who followed a conservative line. (Cf. Nicholson, *Studies* 28-42). Ibn al-Jawzī in his criticism of preachers (*Akhbār al-quṣṣāṣ*) has a series of scandalous stories to tell about popular preachers (including Aḥmad al-Ghazzālī) who coaxed people's money out of their pockets. Cf. also Ḥarīrī's 1st *Maqāma*. I have published a relevant story from recent times in: *Der Islam* 11/1921/182-85.

3

One will also find oneself in the hereafter as one had been here below and then, perhaps with an unpleasant shock, come to know one's real character. Everyone dies in the state which he has reached here and is resurrected the same way.

When your life comes to an end, you'll be exactly the same in the other world (as you were here). (AN in 8/0. Similarly in a passage in MN 40/0).

You'll realize this then, and you'll feel like a person who was brought up under a mountain and was then suddenly set free from this oppressive confinement without sunlight. (AN in 8/0). (An echo of Plato's allegory of the cave).

If you've done wicked deeds, you'll suddenly recognize your true state as in a mirror.

A negro sees his reflection in the ocean. He thinks a black man is sitting in the water, and calls to him: "You hideous grotesque face, what devil placed you in the world? Come out of the water right now! You belong in fire, not in water!" He has no idea he's speaking to himself.—When the bird of the soul sheds its feathers, you too will see your face in the water of your deeds. (AN 8/1.—*Ḥadīqa* 290-91).

Or you'll experience what happened to the man who thought he was a valuable deposit.

A drinker has the wine-merchant serve him a jug of wine and promises to pay with a deposit. When he has drunk the wine, he's asked: "So where's the deposit?" "I'm the deposit", he says. They then throw him out, saying: "A fine deposit, indeed! Get up and clear out! You're not worth half a grain if anyone wanted to redeem you!" (AN 10/1).

Therefore one must cleanse oneself here below so as not to be resurrected in a dirty state and as a sinner. For you'll be woken up just as you are. No intelligent man dies as a fool, no sewer-sweeper as a learned jurist (the donkey-crier dies as a donkey-crier).

A man who's spent his life as a public crier announcing whenever a donkey gets lost, grows old and his time to die arrives. When the angel of death appears to him on his deathbed, he thinks it's a man who's lost his donkey. He jumps up, rushes to the window, and sticking his head outside, he shouts: "Oh friends, if one of you has seen a donkey with a saddle-blanket, send it over here!" (AN 9/1).

4

It is also taught that after death people will appear in a transformed shape, in fact in the shape which accords with their character.

The motif also occurs in paraenesis. It has acquired a special meaning in the sect of the Ḥurūfīs. Cf. H. Ritter, "Die Anfänge der Ḥurūfīsekte" in: *Oriens* 7/1954/42-43.

A person who was dominated by desire and passion will be seen in the form of a pig, and one who was dominated by rage in the form of a dog or a wolf. (*Elixir* 32; cf. above pp. 105 f.).

In ᶜAṭṭār:

Violent, arrogant people will be transformed on the Resurrection Day into ants (to demonstrate their powerlessness to them), the violent lower-level government officials (*ᶜawān*) into dogs. (AN in 6/4).

Thus the miser, after his death, must circle around his buried treasure in the form of a mouse (above p. 99), and Moses again meets his greedy student, even here on earth, as a pig (above p. 105).

On the other hand, the old women who enter Paradise are transformed back into virgins (AN in 6/4), and the men into beardless, smooth-faced youths (*jurd murd*). (Wensinck, *Concordance* 1/337).

Perhaps Iranian ideas lie behind this *ḥadīth*. The ideal age for the male among Iranians is fifteen. In the ideal kingdom of Jim (Jamshēdh) fathers cannot be distinguished from their sons. A. Christensen, *Les types du premier homme et du premier roi* II, p. 69.

5

Sometimes the idea is expressed—basically corresponding to the character of the notion of Paradise among all peoples but here in a very refined form—that existence in the hereafter represents a more perfect form of earthly existence and develops out of this life. The world of the hereafter, hidden and in embryo, is already at hand, but it will only evolve and develop to perfection after the earthly life. The body will there be transfigured into soul and knowledge will there reach its fulfilment. Consequently, here one must prepare as much as is possible that higher, lighter, spiritual state, free oneself from the world of physical things, detach oneself from it inwardly, already anticipate the body's transfiguration and die before actual death's arrival. "Die before you die (*mūtū qabla an tamūtū*)!" Death is then conceived of as a highest stage of extinction. (See pp. 601 ff. below).

Temporal life, which consists of nothing but individual breaths, i.e. moments of life, is a piecemeal advance, so to speak, drawn from the total, eternal life. This thought ᶜAṭṭār attaches to an elaborately spun out story about Maḥmūd, which he then interprets himself allegorically. To begin with, it is simply meant to represent symbolically recognition of the Creator behind His creation.

Sultan Maḥmūd comes back from hunting. The game they've caught is to be roasted. The sultan sees an old man on the road who's carrying a bundle of firewood and asks him the price for the bundle. The old man, who doesn't recognize the sultan, answers: "Two grains." The sultan opens his purse and places a piece of unminted gold in the old man's hand. "This is surely two grains", he says.

"Take it if you so wish!" The old man says: "Perhaps it's more than two grains. But I have no scales." Thereupon the sultan gives him another piece of gold. The old man says: "Surely this is heavier, I can tell even without any scales." The sultan then offers him a third piece of gold. But the old man describes it as also being too heavy. And so they try each of the pieces of gold in the purse. The sultan becomes tired of this bargaining. He throws the whole purse to the old man and says: "Take it all. In the city are scales. Weigh out the two grains and give the rest to the sultan's chamberlain!" The next day the firewood seller goes to the sultan's court and is greatly taken aback when he recognizes the sultan, who is sitting on the throne, as his client of the previous day. The sultan orders him to sit down and give him an account. The old man says: "I didn't sleep all night because of hunger since no sale was concluded. You took me to be a rich man like yourself, seeing that you left me to go hungry the whole night!" The sultan says: "Keep all the money. It belongs to you!" Then the old man asks: "Why didn't you give it to me yesterday instead of just putting single pieces in my hand?" The sultan: "I did that because you didn't recognize me. But I wanted you to learn that I'm master of the world."—"You're that firewood seller", explains ᶜAṭṭār, "and the light of God is the shah. Here you receive life one piece at a time, divided into separate breaths, like the old man received the pieces of gold. Yonder you'll find all at once the whole, eternal life. You'll find the whole purse at the foot of the divine Throne." (IN 4/5, pp. 85-87).

After a story in which the subject was the extinction of the ego, ᶜAṭṭār introduces reflections on the relation of the body to the soul.

The body in its darkness is the reverse side of the mirror. The soul is the bright side of the mirror. If one rubs away the coating on the back of the mirror, both sides become equally bright... No one since the time of Adam has coined a better simile for the resurrection of the body. I want to tell you a clear word about the resurrection. Listen to me! ...The body remains a body here in the world. But when the body cuts its bond with the soul, the whole body appears there as soul. It's the same body but transfigured (*munawwar*). If you're without good works, you have a turbid body... In Muḥammad the soul was body, and the body was soul. That's why he went on his heavenly ascension with the one as well as the other, etc. (AN 6/3).

Someone asks ᶜAlī whether there are days in Paradise. He answers: "There's no day there because there's no night either."—The same bodies which are here today will be light there. Bodies are like the back of the mirror here. There they will be pure like its front side. (AN 6/4).

Paradise is already here for the eye that can see. Indeed, Paradise and Hell are closer to you than the strap of your shoe. The Prophet beheld Heaven and Hell in a portion of the wall, ate grapes of Paradise while praying, and certainly always

beheld the Ḥūrīs. Since his eye could see the angel Gabriel, for him Paradise was certainly already present on earth, etc. (AN in 6/4).

Ḥadīth: Al-jannatu aqrabu ilā aḥadikum min shirāki naʿlihī wa'l-nāru mithlu dhālik. Fayḍ al-qadīr no. 3638; Wensinck, *Concordance* 1/376.

Ḥadīth: ʿUriḍat ʿalayya'l-jannatu wa'l-nāru ānifan fī ʿurḍi hādhā'l-ḥāʾiṭ, etc. Fayḍ al-qadīr no. 5419; Wensinck, *Concordance* 1/376.

Paradise only becomes perfected by means of the pious who enter it. But it is only there that they become real men.

A great man said: "Paradise is already created today but it only becomes perfected when those destined for Paradise have entered it... Now you're not capable of seeing the Ḥūrīs... there you'll have a hundred times your power (virility)... Here you're only a drop of semen, there you become a man... The layers of earth and sky are full of angels, only your dim eye can't see them. If you become free of turbidity, then you behold both worlds even now." (AN 6/5).

Regarding the increase of virility in Paradise, see Tirmidhī, *Ṣaḥīḥ* 10, Cairo 1934, pp. 9 f.; Alexander Rüstow, *Ortsbestimmung der Gegenwart* I, Erlenbach-Zurich 1950, p. 150.

Die here unto life like Jesus so that you don't die like a donkey! ...If you die here, you're born there... The friends of this world are a distress in that world. Lust and desire (in the world) are sickness there. See to it that when you die, sickness doesn't accompany you! If illness from the world is with you, you're a sick child in the hereafter from the moment you leave your mother's womb. If you're not a man of (pious) actions here, you enter eternity as a sick child.

From here one must bring along a clear eye, even if it's only as big as the eye of a needle. If from here you bring one atom of light with you, there it becomes a sun. If an atom of light accompanies you from here, you'll come to know secrets in accordance with its size. But then your light will increase, further doors will open for you. Your little will become much, your child will grow into an intelligent adult. But if you die without any light, you'll remain behind a hundred thousand curtains. (AN in 9/1).

6

Death as well may be looked at in such a way that it loses its horrors.

Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505) wrote a special work in which he portrays death, the period of residence in the grave, etc., in optimistic colors. (GAL², Suppl. 2/181 no. 30). The book consists of a compilation of *ḥadīths*.

Death is the gateway to a better world which only stirs up terror during the first moment.

"When a child comes into the world", the Prophet says to his Companions, "at first it's completely helpless and cries. But when it has seen the light of this

world and the expanse of earth and sky, then it certainly doesn't want to return to the narrow dark womb of the mother. Similarly, whoever goes from this narrow world over to that other world will no longer wish to return to this world." (IN 11/3, p. 171.—Suyūṭī, *Bushrā al-ka'īb*, GAL[2], Suppl. 2/182, line 3, *Bāb* 2).

This argumentation, which is put in the Prophet's mouth and has a somewhat rationalistic tinge to it, in reality originates in Late Antiquity. It is found in Kindī's treatise on the art of how to drive away sorrow, which has been shown to have an ancient origin. H. Ritter and R. Walzer, "Studi su al-Kindī II. Uno scritto morale di al-Kindī (Temistio Περὶ ἀλυπίας?)", Rome, RANL Serie VI, vol. VIII, fasc. I, 1938, chpt. XII, 4, p. 45).

Truly Islamic are the consolations regarding death which come to the man of piety from the certainty that it is not blind fate which kills human beings but that God's providence has fixed the occasion of his death (*ajal*, surah 7/34).

With regard to the dogmatic controversies in connection with this doctrine see Ashʿarī, *Maqālāt* 256-57, 296, and the literature referred to there.

Because of this he considers his life and death to be in God's hands and therefore looks upon death with an equanimity which from earliest times has been noted by European observers in Muhammadans' attitude toward death. Indeed, the doctrine of death determined by fate, of a death-day fixed in advance, is a teaching which has penetrated most deeply into the broad layers of the Muslim population. The fact that a person's hour of death (*ajal*) is concealed is considered a mercy from God. (*Qūt* 1/1207; *Nahrung* 2/91/32.145; *Iḥyā'* 4/111, *al-Rukn al-thālith min kitāb al-ṣabr wa'l-shukr*; *Stufen* 267 f./B.267).

Muḥammad Ghazzālī learns that "the heretics" are out to kill him and he no longer dares to leave his house due to fear. When his voluntary confinement has gone on a long time, he sends a messenger to Būshahdī (?) and asks his advice about what to do. The latter sends him the reply: "You don't know God's secrets. He didn't ask you before calling you to life, nor will He ask you when He wishes to have you die." This restores Ghazzālī's good spirits and he goes out of the house again. (IN 10/10, pp. 166-67).

Thus in this case knowledge of predetermination does not have a frightening effect but rather a calming one.

If this world is a prison for the believer (above p. 135), then death brings release from prison. (Suyūṭī, *Bushrā*, *Bāb* 1).

A man has a dream and sees Dāwūd al-Ṭā'ī running at the hour of his death. The man dreaming asks him: "Why are you running?" Dāwūd answers: "I've just been released from prison." When the dreamer wakes up, he hears the lamentation: "Dāwūd al-Ṭā'ī is dead!" (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 13, in Dāwūd's biography; *Sendschreiben* 48/1.8. Compare with this the very different version above pp. 39 f.).

"Sometimes when I think of dying", says the poet, "the world becomes black before my eyes. But there are moments when I begin to dance in joy over death. After all, I know that through death the pure soul will finally be released from the prison of earth!" (MN in 4/7).

A real man is not he who knows how to live in happiness but he who, free from the world, knows how to die in happiness. (MN 16/6).

Death is the means of purification and transfiguration.

A fool looks at the graves in the cemetery. They ask him: "What is in the graves?" He answers: "A handful of dirty people. But they've ended up in a salt pit. If they turn into earth beneath the earth, they become salted and completely clean. But if they don't possess the salt of belief, then the rotating sky will cast them into (Hell-)fire." (AN 9/2).

A fool sees a woman weeping at a grave and asks her the reason for her grief. She answers: "I'm weeping at the grave of my young man (husband) who lies here in the earth." The fool says: "You're in the earth, not him! Now he's nothing but pure, light soul. As long as the soul was in the body, it was earth. Now that it's dead, it's freed from the earth and pure." (MN 4/8).

Fortunate are those to whom it was granted to die right after having adopted the true faith, because they are no longer exposed to the temptation of sin. This good fortune was allotted to Pharaoh's magicians (p. 283 below). For this reason Bāyazīd on his deathbed has himself given a Zoroastrian's belt, girds himself with it and then tears it off again and pronounces the profession of faith, as if he were a Zoroastrian who has just now adopted the true faith.

In the end, for the lover of God death means that he at last reaches closeness to God and will gaze upon God's face which is elevated above all earthly beauty. (See Chpt. 27/14 below).

CHAPTER TWELVE

RENUNCIATION OF THE WORLD AND ASCETICISM

We have seen how the natural and religious situation of man presents itself to ᶜAṭṭār and his characters, how worldly men respond to it in practical terms, and what the frame of mind of the pious is in the face of this situation. What practical conclusions do ᶜAṭṭār's men of piety draw from their insight into this situation? Do they go beyond a merely emotional reaction and adopt a more active stance, a rule of behavior which determines their actions?

In answering this question we come up against one of the basic concepts of Islamic mysticism, the concept of *maqām* (a station). The *maqām*s of mystics are specific, permanent religious attitudes, outlooks on God and the world, which determine a person's behavior. Each one possesses a special color which characteristically distinguishes it from the others. In accordance with his temperament and talent, and depending on the level of maturity he has reached, one mystic is more prone to achieve this *maqām* and another that *maqām*. Meanwhile, an adept proceeds from one of these *maqām*s—which were early on ordered in various hierarchical categories—to the next highest stage. In so far as some men of piety are inclined to occupy the one while others occupy another "station", we might here speak of different types of piety. But by enumerating these types we would not exhaust the nature of Islamic mysticism, because the interior life of mystics is spent in still other forms, the so-called (spiritual) states (*aḥwāl*), which are of transitory nature and, in contrast to the *maqām*s, come over the mystic independently of his will. Moreover, certain forms of later mysticism, such as pantheism, cannot be classified within the traditional scheme of *maqāmāt* and *aḥwāl*. Finally, the representation of *maqām*s in the textbooks only pursues partially descriptive goals—who would expect in the early middle ages a purely descriptive outlook *vis-à-vis* religious phenomena?—but the description of *maqām*s at the same time always has a normative significance. Precisely this unavoidable normative treatment of the *maqām*s necessitates ordering them in a series which every

mystic is theoretically meant to pass through, even though the sources represent one mystic as more inclined to a particular *maqām* while another is more inclined to a different basic attitude. Likewise, this results in many virtues being included within the *maqām*s which one cannot properly designate as permanent characteristics, and which more rightly belong in a general catalogue of virtues.

Finally, there is not always a clear demarcation between *maqām*s. Definitions given by the great mystic writers have the tendency to overflow into one another. In fact, the last thing they aim for are precise conceptual categories or exhaustive descriptions of the position under discussion. Everyone uses his answer to the question of what this or that *maqām* is in order to emphasize what seems most important to himself, without being concerned about whether the recommended attitude would fit better under a different *maqām*, or whether his explanation is exhaustive or not. Ghazzālī introduces a list of the early mystics' definitions of flight from the world, *zuhd*, with the words: "What those who have spoken on the definition of *zuhd* have said only describes particular aspects of it. Everyone says what seems to fulfill himself or the individual he is addressing." (*Iḥyāʾ* 4/197; *Stufen* 478/D.168).

1

One of these basic attitudes which the mystic can adopt is renunciation of the world, flight from the world (*zuhd*). This is the earliest of these "stations", earlier than actual mysticism itself.

The worldly man who does not recognize or does not take seriously the transitoriness and worthlessness of this world, sets himself goals in the world. For him sensual love, wealth, honor, earthly power and prestige, are blessings in life which he attaches his heart to and sets his hopes on. The pious man considers these goals as base and worthless, and replaces them with higher goals for the sake of which he renounces the others. This renunciation of lower forms of good comprises the content of the religious attitude of *zuhd*, renunciation.

This is in accordance with the definition which Muḥammad Ghazzālī gives in the *Iḥyāʾ*. (*Bayān ḥaqīqat al-zuhd*, 4/182; *Stufen* 456/D.121).

Zuhd, as Ghazzālī says, consists of desire turning away from one thing for something else which is better, and it is especially the first part of the process which is described by this term. But

that which is given up for something better must itself be desirable in some respect. Renunciation of something which is not desirable is by no means *zuhd*. Ghazzālī explains this with images taken from the merchant's world. The merchant gives up something good for something which is more valuable to him. In other words, something which one loves is given up for something else one loves even more.

This general meaning of the word, however, is limited in religious usage to renunciation of the present world with its goods for the sake of the hereafter. On a higher, genuinely mystical level it means turning away from everything besides God and devotion to God as the only goal and worthwhile object for the mind to occupy itself with. The pre-condition for adopting such an attitude is first of all the conviction that the other world is more valuable and enduring than this world, just as a jewel is more valuable and enduring than snow.

Moreover, renunciation must be complete and for good, as in commerce the sold wares are given for the purchased ones for good. Renunciation can be partial in that some good things are renounced but not others, or it can be total, in that the world, be it the material world of goods or the subtler world of lust of the animal soul (*nafs*), is totally given up.

Renunciation is only possible if the possibility of ownership exists for the one undertaking renunciation. Someone who owns nothing cannot practice renunciation, because in his case renunciation has no object.

Furthermore, renunciation of possessions brought about through the virtues of generosity and chivalry (*sakhāʾ*, *futuwwa*) is not included in *zuhd*, because the motivation behind such action is not the conviction that this world and its goods are contemptible in comparison with the magnificence of the hereafter, and because the selfish motive of giving away goods in order to acquire the reputation of possessing these virtues cannot be ruled out.

Of course, the assumption behind this whole discussion is the conviction that striving for the hereafter is not compatible with striving after this world, which conviction is continually expressed in the literature in the most varied formulations.

This can be explained in part by the requirements of paraenesis which has the task of persuading people to undertake religious practices and to give up satisfying their earthly needs and desires. Belief in the existence of another happier world in the hereafter

was incessantly hammered home to the faithful by the Prophet who demanded from his followers substantial sacrifices and commitment of their goods and life, and by the preachers who came after him. "The prophets have only been sent in order to divert people from the world and to turn them toward the hereafter, and most of what they have said to mankind ultimately comes down to this." (*Iḥyāʾ* 4/193, *Bayān faḍīlat al-zuhd*; *Stufen* 470/D.146). Nor does Ghazzālī fail to report the relevant statements of the prophets, Companions of the Prophet, and the early men of piety (*Iḥyāʾ* 4/189-94; *Stufen* 462-473/D.132-152).

As to the question: Why not the one as well as the other?, the answer given by the mystics points to psychological experience. The economy of the human soul will not allow one to adopt both types of objective at the same time. Love of God displaces love of the world, just as water poured into a cup displaces the air inside the cup. "The people with divine knowledge say: 'When faith is attached to the outer (layer) of the heart, then (man) loves the world and the hereafter at the same time, and acts for the sake of both. But when belief penetrates to the interior of the heart and comes into contact with it, then he hates the world, refuses to look at it and will not act for its sake.'" (*Iḥyāʾ* 4/209, *Bayān ʿalāmāt al-zuhd*; *Stufen* 508/D.235).

Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī cites sayings of early authorities who were of a different opinion: "The best among you is not he who gives up this world for the hereafter, nor he who abandons the hereafter for this world, but the best among you is he who partakes of both this and that." "Work for your hereafter as if you were going to die tomorrow, and work for your present world as if you were going to live for eternity!" But he criticizes these pronouncements and contrasts them with an alleged saying of Jesus: "This world and the hereafter are like the east and the west. When you move away from the one, you draw nearer to the other, and when you draw nearer to the one, you move away from the other." (*Al-Imtāʿ wa'l-muʾānasa*, Cairo 1939, 1/15).

One of the chief means by which the mystics Sarrāj, Qushayrī and Ghazzālī systematize the various psychological attitudes of mysticism is gradation. Thus Ghazzālī distinguishes different stages of *zuhd* (*Bayān darajāt al-zuhd, etc. Iḥyāʾ* 4/194 ff.; *Stufen* 473 ff./D.153 ff.) and, primarily, stages based on the essence of *zuhd*, i.e. its intensity. The lowest level of *zuhd* is that of the *mutazāhid* who attempts to renounce the world but still remains attached to it and is not free of desire for it. The second

level is that in which the person pursuing renunciation renounces the world because for him what he gives up is worth less than what he stands to gain, but in so doing he still attributes a certain value to what he has given up and therefore is also conscious of a certain achievement through his renunciation. The third and highest level is that in which renunciation no longer enters one's consciousness because the person practicing renunciation does not feel he has given something up, like when someone throws away a broken piece of pottery in order to receive a jewel in his hand. An example of this stage is provided by Bāyazīd Bisṭāmī who when he hears that someone speaks (preaches) about renunciation of the world, makes a dismissive gesture with his hand and says: "I had thought that he spoke about something but the world is actually nothing! How can it be the object of renunciation?" (*Iḥyāʾ* 4/195; *Stufen* 474/D.156; *Nūr* 120).

In addition, there is a form of gradation based on what is desired in place of the thing given up. On the lowest level are those who are filled with fear about the hereafter. They desire something negative, namely not to be punished in the grave and in Hell-fire. The second level is that of those who desire Paradise with its pleasures, its Ḥūrīs and palaces. The third level is that of those who have their heart oriented only on God, who desire to reach Him and think of nothing else. This is the level of the lovers of God, for whom Paradise only means a distraction from God.

Just as gradated, finally, are the objects of renunciation, which are so numerous that they can only be mentioned summarily.

Here the highest level is renunciation of everything except God, including one's own ego. The next level down is renunciation of everything in which the carnal soul (*nafs*) finds delight, the sensation of pleasure. This includes the satisfaction of all natural drives, sensual pleasure, anger, arrogance, and desire for domination. On the next levels below these two are the means of acquiring property, honor and prestige: knowledge, power and money. (The division in the original is not entirely consistent.) Summing up, Ghazzālī then says that renunciation of the world (*zuhd*) consists in striving to shun the soul's pleasure in this world (*ḥuẓūẓ al-nafs fī'l-dunyā*). In fact, combatting the sensual impulses of the soul constitutes the principal content of the refined form of Islamic asceticism. And here apparently is also where the criticism against *zuhd* began which would later become a commonplace of mystically oriented love poetry. Indeed, this com-

batting of pleasure endows *zuhd* with that sour characteristic which Yaḥyā ibn Muᶜādh already criticizes: "The ascetic pours vinegar and mustard down your throat for the sake of God, the knower of God makes you inhale musk and ambergris." (*Iḥyā᾽* 4/209; *Stufen* 510/D.239). "The world is a bride. Whoever strives after her is like her handmaid (who prepares her clothes and make-up for the wedding). The ascetic blackens her face, pulls out her hair and tears her clothes. The knower of God has no concern for her at all." (*Iḥyā᾽* 4/209; *Stufen* 510/D.239).

The section containing these two passages deals with the signs of renunciation of the world (*Bayān ᶜalāmāt al-zuhd*). As such signs Ghazzālī mentions: "The one who renounces the world (*zāhid*) takes no pleasure in what is available and feels no sorrow over what is missing, i.e. he is indifferent to possessions. He is indifferent to whether he is praised or criticized (it doesn't matter to him whether he has prestige in people's eyes or not). He feels comfortably safe with God, and the sweetness of acts of obedience (meaning acts of religious devotion) fills his heart." (Ibid.).

This final level of renunciation of the world here passes over into actual mysticism, and the definition of *zuhd* offered by Abū Sulaymān al-Dārānī which Ghazzālī ultimately prizes above all others (p. 197, *Bayān darajāt al-zuhd*; *Stufen* 481/D.172): "We have heard a lot of talk about *zuhd* but for us *zuhd* is giving up all things which hold you back from God", no longer characterizes the ascetic but characterizes the mystic in the more narrow sense, i.e. the knower of God and the lover of God.

However, Ghazzālī does not let matters rest with these discussions about the nature of renunciation of the world and its grades. Basically, *zuhd*, on a normal level, is renunciation of all earthly goods which are not absolutely necessary to sustain life—a dead man cannot practice renunciation. Therefore Ghazzālī, in a very interesting chapter on the six basic needs of human existence, to wit, nourishment, clothing, shelter, household goods, *vita sexualis* and the means of acquiring these five things, property and personal status, presents the incredibly modest standard which in his view is still compatible with *zuhd*. (*Bayān tafṣīl al-zuhd fīmā hū fī ḍarūriyyāt al-ḥayāh*, pp. 198 ff.; *Stufen* 484 ff./D.178 ff.).

Sexual asceticism, to begin with, plays no especially prominent role because marriage belongs to "the *sunna*" of the Prophet. Nonetheless, to eliminate "the soul's lust" it is recommended to be satisfied with one wife, and then one who is not good-looking. In any case, Qushayrī says: "The novice (*murīd*), indeed anyone in

general who would travel this path, will make a point of not accepting the friendly behavior of women, much less do anything to encourage it." (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 186; *Sendschreiben* 547 f./54.28).

On this subject see also *Iḥyā'* 3/85-92, *al-Qawl fī shahwat al-farj*. A case of self-castration is mentioned in *Talbīs* 422 which is translated in: *Islamic Culture* 12/1938/450, and amputating a leg as self-punishment occurs in TA 1/115. On pederasty see 26/7-9 below. Moreover, cf. *Qūt* 1/242-71, *Sharḥ maqām al-zuhd*; *Nahrung* 2/205-290/32.308-438; Qushayrī, *Risāla* 55-57, *Bāb al-zuhd*; *Sendschreiben* 177-182/8. And see also Tor Andrae, "Zuhd und Mönchtum" in: *Le Monde Oriental* 25/1931/296-327; William Thomson, "The Ascetical-mystical Movement and Islam" in: *The Muslim World* 1949/282-91.

After this overview of doctrines of a typical representative of orthodox mysticism, a mysticism dominated by ideas about the hereafter, we now turn our attention to our poet.

2

ᶜAṭṭār too employs the image of commercial exchange, but in fact the wrong way round, an exchange in which one gives something good for something bad.

A vizier says on his deathbed: "Oh woe, oh misery! Out of vain striving (*gharaḍ*) I sold the hereafter for mercantile wealth (*khwājagī*)! I burned in desire for this world, and so I sold the other world for this world!" (MN 21/3).

Similarly, semi-mercantile is the image of good works which one should send on ahead, for example in the form of alms, because one will only find in the beyond what has been sent on ahead.

Everything you have, send it yonder, even if it's less than half a date. Because everything you send thither in advance is yours, whereas what you keep will entail punishment. (MN in 16/4).

We have already seen to what extent this was conceived in concrete terms (p. 191).

One should only acquire for oneself what is absolutely indispensable for life.

A king has a man of piety preach a sermon to him. The pious man says: "Consider what is absolutely indispensable for you in your earthly affairs and be satisfied with that! But then consider what you need for the hereafter and take the trouble to acquire it for yourself!"—Strive for the things of religion as well as for the things of the world to the extent to which you have need of them, etc. (Total renunciation cannot really be demanded of a king). (MN 16/5).

The king of the *Ilāhīnāma* instructs the second prince: "You should only strive after things which are upright before God and which you're worthy of. Otherwise the things you seek will lead you into destruction." (IN 7/0, p. 112).

A man persists in pressing Jesus with requests until Jesus teaches him the highest name of God, which can work miracles. The man, who is elated, wants to try its power and pronounces it over a bone he sees lying on the road. From the bone emerges a lion which tears the foolish man to pieces. He'd requested something which wasn't proper for him and which he wasn't worthy of. (IN 7/1, p. 113. Cf. *Mathnawī* 2/141-55, 457-60).

The world is a burden which one must reduce as much as possible. With each thing that you give away, the burden you have to carry is reduced.

A porter's carrying-strap breaks and he sits there inactively. A man says to him: "Why are you sitting there so inactive? You'll lose money!" The porter answers: "It may be that I forfeit a dirham, but in return a hundredweight drops from my back." (MN 16/3).

One should close the gate of desires.

A dervish tells ᶜAṭṭār that while circumambulating the Kaᶜba he had offered his wooden tooth-cleaner to an old man he met there. The old man replied: "I don't want to reopen the door (of desires) which I closed." (AN 20/13).

On wooden tooth-cleaners (*miswāk*) or toothpicks (*khilāl*) as a gift see also IN p. 192_4, as well as Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (Mžik) 111.

If in accordance with Ghazzālī's definition at the beginning we understand *zuhd* to be giving up lower, earthly goals in favor of higher ideals, then the efforts of the king in the *Ilāhīnāma* to dissuade his princes from their desires can be seen as a sermon on *zuhd*. The hoopoe conducts similar talks with the birds. (See above pp. 4-8 and 11-14).

3

The princes of the *Ilāhīnāma* do not allow themselves to be dissuaded from their youthful and princely desires by their father. They disagree with him, but let him have the final word and receive his instructions with modest propriety as befits a son. On the other hand, we are not told that they have taken their father's teachings to heart and acted in accordance with them.

But there are two famous princes in ᶜAṭṭār who renounce kingship and take up asceticism, namely Ibrāhīm ibn Adham and Sabtī, the son of Hārūn al-Rashīd.

The well-known legend of Ibrāhīm ibn Adham, the prince of Balkh who later became a famous ascetic, appears in our poet in the following form:

While the prince is sitting on the throne with the crown on his head, Khiḍr appears in the castle in the form of a camel-driver. The servants recoil before him in fear. The prince asks the intruder: "Who gave you permission, you beggar, to come inside here?" The camel-driver answers: "This is an inn where I have the right to alight." Ibrāhīm replies: "This is a king's palace, not an inn!" Thereupon Khiḍr poses the well-known question: "Who lived here before you?" Ibrāhīm enumerates his predecessors who held the kingship. Khiḍr then says: "A place where one person arrives and another departs is an inn. You'll have to leave it as well." And then Khiḍr departs. Struck by these words, the prince hastens after him and becomes an ascetic. (IN 15/8, p. 253. TA 1/86-87 gives a much more detailed version).

The literature on Ibrāhīm b. Adham is collected together by C. van Arendonk in the EI s.n. "Ibrāhīm b. Adham". Add to that: Sulamī, *Ṭabaqāt* 27-38; Ibn ᶜAsākir, *Taʾrīkh Dimashq*, Damascus 1329 ff., 2/167-96; Abū Nuᶜaym, *Ḥilya* no. 394, 7/367-68/58; *Ṣifat al-ṣafwa* 4/127-32; Ṭurṭūshī 9; *Mathnawī* 4/726, 829 ff. and Nicholson's *Commentary*; René Basset 3/300; Nabhānī, *Jāmiᶜ Karāmāt al-awliyāʾ* 1/232-33. His grave is pointed out in Jabla in the ᶜAlawite state; cf. Jacques Weulersee, *Le Pays des Alaouites*, Tours 1940, Institut Français de Damas, Album II, fig. 138.

The second famous case of a ruler's son suddenly becoming an ascetic is that of Sabtī, the son of the caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd. The transitoriness of human life suddenly enters his consciousness, he views his existence as a form of death, draws the consequences inexorably, abandons the trivial everyday life in the palace and becomes an ascetic. He is consumed by a feeling of guilt without, however, being guilty in any ordinary sense.

Zubayda, the consort of Hārūn al-Rashīd, has a son by the caliph and he's raised in the saray. When he asks his mother one day whether there's also a world beyond the saray, she sends him outside to ride about with a male slave and two eunuchs. There by chance he witnesses a funeral. This sight and the answer he receives to his question whether all people must die makes such a disturbing impression on him that the following morning he flees from the palace. A man who's commissioned to undertake earthworks in the saray and is seeking a worker finds him sitting on the road with a pickaxe and a basket and asks him whether he can build earthworks. The young man is willing to do the work on the condition that he only has to work Saturdays. The condition is accepted, the prince sets to work on Saturday and does the daily work of two men. The following Saturday he can't be found. After searching a long time, the foreman finds him lying in a ruin dying, and he takes him home with him. Before dying the young man asks the foreman to fulfill three requests. He should place a rope

around his neck as soon as he's dead, drag him through the bazaar and cry out: "This is the punishment of someone who was disobedient to God." Secondly, he should wrap his body in an old habit and bury him in it. Thirdly, he should take his Koran, which goes back to ᶜAbd Allāh b. ᶜAbbās, to Hārūn al-Rashīd and say to him: "The one who gave me this Koran sends you his greetings and says to you: 'See that you don't die like me in thoughtless negligence (*ghaflat*) and foolish conceit (*pindār*).'" But he should tell his mother not to forget him in her prayers.

While the foreman carries out the first task, a heavenly voice calls to him: "Aren't you ashamed of yourself to treat Our friend like this? We have forgiven him!" Next he carries out the second task, the burial, and then takes the Koran to Hārūn al-Rashīd who immediately recognizes the Koran of his disappeared son. As instructed, the foreman delivers a sermon before him about the transitoriness of the world, etc., and he is then conducted to Zubayda to whom he must relate everything through a curtain. She bursts into tears and rebukes the narrator because he treated her child this way. Finally, the foreman is dismissed with an expensive gift. (IN 16/1, pp. 258-64).

Abū'l-Layth al-Samarqandī, *Tanbīh al-ghāfilīn*, the last story of the book, fol. 238a-239b; Ibn al-Qaysarānī, *al-Ansāb al-muttafiqa* 198; Ibn al-Jawzī, *Ṣifat al-ṣafwa* 2/174-78; Ibn al-Athīr, *Mukhtār* (cf. Spies, "Drei biographische Werke über Ṣūfīs" in: *Le Monde Oriental* 1930, p. 43, l. 3); Ibn Khallikān under Aḥmad al-Sabtī, no. 66, Būlāq 1275, 1/75; Yāfiᶜī, *Rawḍ al-rayāḥīn* no. 18. Ibn ᶜArabī includes him in his richly built up mystical hierarchy. According to him, he belongs to "the men of six days" and in the year 599 AH he appeared to Ibn ᶜArabī in physical form while the latter was circumambulating the Kaᶜba. *Futūḥāt* 2/15, in *Bāb* 73; Miguel Asín Palacios, *El Islam cristianizado* 83. In addition: Vollers in: ZDMG 43/1889/115; Nöldeke, "As-Sabtî, der Sohn des Hârûn ar-Rašîd" in: ZDMG 43/1889/327 f.; cf. also ZDMG 53/1899/258; Schreiner, "Al-Sabtī, der Sohn des Hārūn al-Rašīd" in: ZDMG 45/1891/301 f.; Chauvin 6/193.—A story about a king in Yemen who renounces his dominion because of a pious man's sermon is related by Yāfiᶜī, *Nashr al-maḥāsin* 1/295-96.

Among the kings who realize the transitoriness and worthlessness of sovereignty, and draw practical conclusions from this, belongs Solomon as well in a certain sense, who had power over men and spirits conferred on him through a small stone in his signet-ring. He recognizes the worthlessness of kingly power which depends on a small stone, beseeches God never again to bestow such power on anyone, and decides to live from the work of his own hands, i.e. basket-weaving (MṬ 7/1, p. 34). What he then goes on to experience we have already seen (p. 54).

4

The model of abandonment of the world among the prophets is Jesus. He builds no house (MN 36/10; above p. 101), he throws away the brick on which he laid his head when sleeping because it belongs to the world, the fief of the devil (MN 16/7; above p. 53). According to Ghazzālī, or his sources, he only carries with him a comb and a jug. But he then throws away the comb when he sees a man combing out his beard with his fingers, as well as the jug when he observes how someone drinks from a stream with the hollow of his hand. (*Iḥyāʾ* 4/204, *al-Muhimm al-rābiᶜ*; *Stufen* 498/D.208).

One time Jesus comes upon a man sleeping in a cave and calls on him to get up and do good works. The man answers: "I did that earlier but now I'm no longer a child that spends its time in trifling pursuits and play. I give away the whole world for a loaf of bread and throw the bread to the dogs." Then Jesus says: "If you're so free from the world, go on sleeping in peace!" (MN 11/11).

In the shorter Arabic form:

And it was transmitted to us that Jesus while wandering about met a man who was sleeping wrapped up in a cloak. He woke him and said: "Get up, you sleeper, and recollect God!" The man said: "What do you want from me? I've given over the world to its people." Then Jesus said to him: "Sleep, my friend, sleep!" (*Qūt* 1/264; *Nahrung* 2/270/32.406; *Iḥyāʾ* 4/168, *Bayān faḍīlat al-faqr muṭlaqā*; *Stufen* 408/D.29).

Nevertheless, Jesus did not reach the highest level of denudation.

When Jesus was raised up to the heavens, the angels gathered and counted the patches on his patched frock. These came to three hundred patches. They said: "Lord, didn't Jesus deserve an entire robe?" God said: "No, the world didn't deserve to belong to him." They then examined his pocket and found a needle. Then God said: "By My majesty! If not for the needle, I'd have raised him up to My sacred garden. In this case, I will only let him enter the fourth heaven." He was kept out because of a needle.

Ibn al-Jawzī, *Quṣṣāṣ* fol. 77b. Printed in Massignon, *Recueil* 97;[1] *Ḥadīqa* 391-92; *Rawnaq al-majālis* 51.

ᶜAṭṭār occasionally alludes to this story (MṬ 0, verse 17, and IN p. $299_{8\text{-}9}$). There follows the story about Majnūn who also carried a needle with him and was scolded for this by Laylā. (See p. 413 below).

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1 Read *fa-ᶜaddū* instead of *qaᶜada*, *sāwā* instead of *yusāwī*, *sāwat* instead of *sawiyat*, *jaybahū* (Ms. *khaybahū*) instead of *ajbth*. With regard to Jesus residing in the fourth heaven, see Nicholson on *Mathnawī* 1/649.

5

For the highest level of abandonment of the world is denudation of all material possessions (*tajrīd, pākbāzī*).

As long as you have property in your hands it's a chain on your soul. When you have nothing, then everything is yours. Give up everything you have all at once so you may emerge from this distress!

A fool observes how dead people are continually brought to the cemetery and prayers for the dead are performed over each one of them. He thinks prayers for the dead should be performed for everyone all at once.—One should perform prayers for the dead over everything which is found in both worlds. (MN 11/3; see above p. 40).

One of the birds prides himself on having reached this stage. His heart is not engrossed in anything. Everything he has he gives away. Whatever he has in his hand he gives away immediately, as if it were a scorpion sitting in the palm of his hand.—The hoopoe praises this rare, valuable quality. "Tear apart what has been sewn together and don't sew what has been torn apart! Burn everything you have! When you've burnt everything with a fiery sigh, collect the ashes and sit down on top of them! Then you're truly free of everything." (MṬ 29/0, p. 99).

The fool, who hears a merchant praying and beseeching God for mercy, also demands complete denudation. He says to the merchant: "You won't hear anything of mercy with your life of luxury and your proud strutting about, with your pavilion done up in gold and your ten male and female slaves! When you only have one piece of bread to eat like me, then you're worthy of mercy."—Turn away from everything so you're free of everything like "the men". (MṬ 22/3, pp. 79-80).

ᶜAṭṭār loves to present sinners and people who are otherwise considered to be reprehensible as models or at least as symbolic representatives of Ṣūfī virtues. Thus the gambler who has gambled away everything (*pākbāz*) becomes the symbol of perfect denudation.

Abū Saᶜīd meets a group of rowdy companions (*rindān*) who are carrying one of their fellows on their shoulders. He asks who this man is and receives the answer that he's the *amīr* of the gamblers. The shaykh asks the man how he came to attain this rank. The man replies: "By gambling away everything (*pākbāzī*)." The shaykh shouts out and takes to heart the lesson that whoever "stakes everything", i.e. gives up everything, is the *amīr* of the world. (IN 18/10, pp. 298-99, taken from the *Asrār al-tawḥīd* 178; O'Kane, *Secrets* 330).

Gamble away everything and if you don't even have a shroud, that's alright!

Someone reproaches a man who has squandered all his possessions through immense generosity, saying that if he goes on like this he won't even have a

shroud left to be buried in. The squanderer answers: "When I die, beg a shroud from somewhere and then remove it again over my head once you've placed me in the grave!" (MN 21/8).

6

The transformation of interest which occurs in *zuhd* can also be described as a turning away from the external world with its deceptive forms, for the sake of building up an inner world.

The bird who maintains that he's attached to gold and can't give it up is rebuked by the hoopoe because like a child he's letting himself be deceived by external form. Gold is nothing more than a bright stone. It distracts one from God and is an idol which man must reject. He goes on to say that every possession is a barrier on the path and that in order to reach God one must divest oneself of all possessions. (MṬ 23/0, p. 80; above p. 14).

Looking after the body should be replaced by purifying the soul.

You've been told: "Purify the soul!" But you continually look after the body. You must honor the internal (*bāṭin*)! You do nothing but serve external appearance (*ẓāhir*). (IN p. $121_{1\text{-}2}$).

The bat, who is asked why he avoids the sun and loves the night, answers by abusing the external sun and praising the internal sun which rises at night. The one who stays up at night and sees the true sun of God rise renounces the sunshine of the day. (MN 13/3).

The virtue which manifests itself in this striving after higher goals, and gives a positive content to abandonment of the world, is the virtue of high aspiration (*ᶜuluww-i himmat*). (On this see pp. 319 ff. below).

7

Alongside renunciation of the world and its goods—*zuhd*—stands actual asceticism, the suppression of the vital instincts, the struggle against the animal soul and its lust and all egotistical impulses generally. This asceticism, seen from a deeper psychological perspective, is an extreme cultivation of the super-ego that controls the ego's impulses and vital drives. The prohibitions which the ascetic imposes on himself are in part seen as divine prescriptions, and in part are voluntarily adopted restraints on the ego's impulses, the need for admiration and possessions, and vitality. Hand in hand with this goes a strong devaluation of vital instincts and generally of all things which one suspects will give any kind

of pleasure to the soul. The *nafs*, considered the seat of the vital drives, i.e. the carnal soul, is therefore the real enemy, the constant vexation and hindrance to becoming detached from the earthly world, indeed the very place where egotistical impulses and vital drives find their satisfaction. The carnal soul does not want to give up its pleasure (*ḥuẓūẓ al-nafs*), its longing to satisfy its desires. Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī attempts to train it systematically by means of rational reproaches (*Ri*ᶜ*āya* and *Bad*ᵓ *man anāba*), whereas the Basrans chiefly employ ascetic practices, especially going without food for long periods.

And this is the manner of the Basrans with regard to breaking the strength (*isqāṭ al-quwwa*) by means of long fasting and much abstention from food, in order to weaken the carnal soul. For in their view the strength of the carnal soul is the strength of the lusts... and through this sins arise and numerous lusts and permanent desire for the world. (*Qūt* 2/233$_{1-33}$; *Nahrung* 2/358/32.541).

In addition, cf. Qushayrī, *Risāla* 71-72, *Bāb mukhālafat al-nafs*; *Sendschreiben* 221-225/15; *Iḥyā*ᵓ 3/68 ff., *Kitāb kasr al-shahwatayn*, 4/66 ff., *Bayān dawā*ᵓ *al-ṣabr*; *Stufen* 167 ff./B.66 ff. On humiliating the ego (*tadhlīl al-nafs*) cf. for example the incredible things Bāyazīd demands of a dignitary of his city (*Nūr* 86-87; *Iḥyā*ᵓ 4/306-07, *Bayān jumla min ḥikāyāt al-muḥibbīn, etc.*; *Stufen* 753 ff./F.311 ff.), and the story about Junayd's teacher who puts up with humiliating treatment on purpose to make his ego or carnal soul as humble as a dog, or the other story about the man who has a reputation for piety in his neighborhood and in order to destroy it and humiliate his ego, commits a theft in the bathhouse. (Ibid.; *Stufen* 759/D.322). The conscious endeavor to acquire a bad reputation was one of the chief preoccupations of the group of ascetics known as the Malāmatiyya.

The pedagogical attitude of the ascetic toward his carnal soul in many cases turns into a downright hostile relationship. The soul is punished and chastized for its desire. A tough struggle takes place in which there are defeats and triumphs. This struggle occurs, as is especially noticeable, in the area of ascetic fasting. In the following story the two adversaries, as it were, negotiate with one another.

Dhū'l-Nūn has been desiring groats with meat (*sikbā*) for ten years but will not allow it to his "soul". The day before the great festival (on which a Muslim must slaughter a sheep), the soul says to him: "Tomorrow is a holiday. You could at least grant me a bite of groats with meat!" Dhū'l-Nūn replies: "Alright, but then agree that tonight I recite the whole of the Koran in two *ra*ᶜ*ka*s (the bowing posture in prayer)!" The soul consents. The next day Dhū'l-Nūn prepares the desired meat dish. But when the soul says: "Now finally I'm to get what I've wanted for ten years", he says: "No! By God you won't get it!" Just then a man comes in and brings a bowl of groats with meat for Dhū'l-Nūn. The Prophet appeared to the donor in a dream and ordered him to bring the dish to Dhū'l-Nūn and tell him:

"Muḥammad intercedes with you on behalf of your soul, that you make peace with it for a moment and eat a few mouthfuls." The holy man, in tears, complies with the Prophet's wish. (TA 1/119-20).

On another occasion the ego is disappointed and the super-ego triumphs:

A pious man has desired meat for sixty years but he mistrusts his "soul" and gives it no meat to eat. One day he catches a whiff of roast meat. The soul weeps and says: "At last after sixty years ask for a piece of meat for me!" The man feels sorry for the soul and he walks in the direction of the aroma. The aroma is coming out of a prison. The pious man knocks at the door. When the door opens, he sees that they've just burnt a criminal with a branding iron. He says to his carnal soul triumphantly: "Here's your roast meat! Serve yourself!" (AN 7/7).

One should not scatter any grain to the bird of the soul. Adam gave the soul's bird grain (according to the Koran he eats a grain of wheat, not an apple) and because of this he lost Paradise for eternity. But eating wheat is still a good thing. If it were not for this, people would devour one another. As a result of man's eating animals, animals flee from him. (IN transition to 7/12, p. 119).

Ḥasan al-Baṣrī one day goes out into the countryside to visit the pious Rābiᶜa. Rābiᶜa is surrounded by tame game, mountain goats, gazelles and other wild animals. As Ḥasan approaches, the animals run off. Ḥasan is jealous of Rābiᶜa because of this and asks her why the animals run away from him but not from her. Rābiᶜa asks him what he's eaten. He admits to having eaten onions with fat. Rābiᶜa then says: "If you eat the fat of these poor animals, you shouldn't be surprised that they run away from you." (IN 7/12, p. 120; TA 1/64; Smith, *Rābiᶜa* 34-35).—There follow warnings about eating much and rendering service to the belly.

Kharaqānī takes the murder of his son to be punishment for his, Kharaqānī's, yielding to his appetite.

Kharaqānī for a long time has been desiring eggplant (aubergine). One day his mother compels him to eat half an eggplant. The same evening the decapitated head of his son is placed before his threshold. He says: "I knew I wouldn't go unpunished for eating eggplant." (MṬ 29/2, p. 100; TA $2/252_{3-13}$).

8

Man has animal drives in common with the beasts. Consequently, the carnal soul is readily compared with animals, especially with a lustful, dirty dog that bites.

The traveller in the *Muṣībatnāma* goes before the Tame Animals and asks them for help. The representative of the cattle answers him that he should not seek secrets from cattle devoid of understanding, etc.—The *pīr* instructs the

novice that an animal is the similitude for the "unbelieving" carnal soul. One should not spoil it by giving it good food. (MN 25/0).

Sufyān al-Thawrī says: "The difference between delicious food and not delicious food only exists within the short space from the lip to the gums. If you hold out during that short space, delicious and not delicious food is all the same for you."—Don't obey the dog within you lest on the Final Day you're resurrected as a dog! (MN 25/1).

Cf. the story which then follows about the disciple of Moses who was changed into a pig, above pp. 105-06.

You've been soiled by the dog of the soul and you're stuck in filth... You're a slave to your belly and your genitals... The dog of Hell, about which you've surely heard, is in reality asleep inside you... Just wait, tomorrow the dog of the soul and the ego, as your enemy, will stretch out its head to Hell. This dog is your enemy, yes even worse than an enemy. How much longer will you go on feeding it? Etc. (MN 17/0).

One must guard against the dog of the soul as much as the dog in the street, or even more so.

A shaykh doesn't withdraw the hem of his robe from a dog that befouls him. Someone asks him: "Why didn't you watch out for the dog?" He answers: "Why should I flee the foul dog outside when I have just as foul a dog inside me?" (MṬ 34/4, p. 116).

The voracious dog of the soul deserves to be beaten.

A cat snatches a piece of roast meat from the dinner table and runs off with it. Someone grabs hold of the cat and beats it. A pious man who sees this says: "Why are you beating the cat? Rather, beat the dog (of your soul) which takes the roast away from the cat!" (AN 20/10).

Ḥallāj advises his son to occupy the carnal soul with something, otherwise it becomes dangerous and prompts a person to do hundreds of improper things. One shouldn't let the dog of the soul become sated, because it will then turn into a lion and hunger after bad things (for example spreading defamation). (IN 19/12, p. 313).

The dog of the soul must be locked up, otherwise it causes damage.

Abū'l-Qāsim Hamadhānī comes to a hermitage where a monk has completely closed himself in so that there's only a window which connects him with the outside world. He calls the monk from all sides of the building and finally succeeds in getting the latter to stick his head out. The monk asks who it is that's disturbing his peace and what he wants. The shaykh says: "I beseech you, tell me what you're doing here." The monk answers gruffly: "I saw in myself a vicious dog that ran about in the city and did harm to people. I've locked it up in here. Lock up your own dog as well so it doesn't cause any harm!"—The carnal soul is the Turanian ruler and enemy of the Iranians, Afrāsiyāb, who throws the Bēzhan

of the soul into the well which the Dēw Akwān then covers over with a stone. Rustam, the director of the soul (*pīr*), must free you from the well and bring you back from the Turkestan of natural drives (*ṭabīʿat*) to the Iran of holy law, to the Kay-Khusraw of the spirit (*rūḥ*), who will then place in your hand Jam's magic cup in which you see all things as clearly as the sun. (IN 5/4, pp. 93-94).

The shortened Arabic version of this story is as follows:

Someone saw a monk and said to him: "You're a monk!" He replied: "No, a dog-keeper. My soul is a dog which attacks people's legs. I've removed it from them so they're safe from it." (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 50, *Bāb al-khalwa wa'l-ʿuzla*; *Sendschreiben* 160/5.4).

Through an allegorical interpretation of a well-known animal fable, the soul is one time described as a wolf which must be overcome with cunning.

A fox falls into a well which has a device for drawing water consisting of two buckets and a rope. He sits in the one bucket which is down inside the well and holds onto the rope which the bucket is attached to. The wolf comes to the edge of the well, sees the fox below and calls to him: "If you'd like to be together with me, I'll come down there with you or better yet, you come up here!" The fox says: "I'm lame. You have to come down here with me." The wolf then gets in the upper bucket and sinks downward since he's heavier than the fox. The fox rises. When they're face to face half-way down the well, the wolf says to the fox: "Don't leave me alone in here!" The fox says: "Just wait a little. I'll be right back." But the wolf will have a long wait after the fox has run off.—The well is the body in which the fox of the spirit (*jān*) has ended up, the wolf is the carnal soul (*nafs*), and the rope which rescues is "the rope of God" (surah 3/103). (AN 20/9).

Chauvin 3/78, no. 57; Brockelmann, "Fabel und Tiermärchen" 109.

The carnal soul is also described as a donkey or a pig.

A *pīr* asks a donkey boy what sort of work he does. The boy answers: "I'm a donkey boy and don't know any other kind of work." The *pīr* remarks: "May God cause your donkey to die this moment so that when your donkey's dead, your heart becomes alive, and from being a servant of a donkey, you're made into a servant of God!"—The reason why there are so few true believers in this world is because we carry this infidel soul within us. (AN 7/8).

After the story about the disciple of Moses who was transformed into a pig (pp. 105-06, 193), the poet continues:

How long will you still go on feeding your carnal soul? How long will you keep company with this pig? The donkey itself always flees from the pig.[2] If you don't flee from it, you're a downright donkey yourself!

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2 Up until now I have not had the opportunity to verify this assertion. According to *The Goal of the Wise Man* by Pseudo-Majrīṭī, one would in fact expect the opposite. Indeed,

A joke on the same theme:

Someone says to someone else in anger: "You've made me into a billy goat!" A fool remarks to the speaker: "In reality you're a donkey. Be happy if he just makes you into a billy goat!" (MN 25/3).

Buz giriftī = You took me for a fool. Cf. Nicholson's *Commentary* 8, p. 254, on *Mathnawī* 5/1364.

The dog of the soul is disobedient and difficult to tame.

One of the birds complains about his carnal soul to the hoopoe. It's his enemy and like a highwayman obstructs his path when he wishes to advance along it. "The dog of the soul", so he says, "doesn't want to listen to me. I don't know how to save myself from it."—The hoopoe replies that there's no prospect of it mending its ways if one has spent one's youth, adulthood and old age in ignorance and negligence. This dog has many servants. A hundred thousand hearts die, but this unbelieving dog doesn't die. (MṬ 21/0, pp. 75-76; above p. 14).

A man asks an old grave-digger whether he has experienced anything wondrous in his grave-digging. The old man answers: "The most wondrous thing I've seen is that this dog of the soul, though it has watched me dig graves for seventy years, nevertheless has neither died, nor learned to listen to me." (MṬ 21/1, p. 76).

ᶜAbbāsa says one evening (in a sermon): "It's possible that all the heathen Turkmen give up their unbelief and accept the true faith. But all 120,000 prophets who appeared haven't succeeded in causing the carnal soul either to accept the faith or to die. We're under the domination of this infidel soul and we nourish and take care of it in our interior. This soul is disobedient and an unbeliever. And how could one conquer it since it always maintains auxiliary troops in two different ways (the belly and the genitals)! The heart is the horseman in the kingdom of man and the dog is his constant companion. The horseman may make his steed gallop even faster, but the dog is always there during the hunt. Whoever succeeds in taming this dog, no one will reach him (in rank)." (MṬ 21/2, p. 76).

A king asks a man wearing a coarse robe: "Are you better or am I?" The pious man answers: "Though it's not right to praise oneself—I'm a thousand times better. Because the carnal soul has made you into a donkey on which it rides and which it steers as it wishes. But I've made the soul into my riding animal. Thus your rider is my riding animal. That's why I'm better than you." (Cf. the story above p. 120).—This dominion of the carnal soul, and everything you undertake in common with it, are only assistants of death which is always drawing closer

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there it is stated: "If you sit a pig on the back of a donkey and the latter urinates, the pig will die on the spot." P. 400 of my edition. Here a wild boar is certainly meant.

to you. In death you'll finally separate from this dog. But just wait, you'll meet him again in Hell! (MṬ 21/3, p. 77).

Amplification:

A fox and a vixen are sitting together. Then they hear the hunter approaching. They must separate. The vixen asks the fox: "When will we meet again?" The fox says: "In the fur merchant's shop." (MṬ 21/4, pp. 77-78).

ᶜAṭṭār as well complains that his unbelieving carnal soul doesn't want to listen to him (above p. 153) and despite all his admonitions shows no sign of mending its ways. (MṬ *Khātima*, before 2, p. 177).

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

TRUST IN GOD'S PROVIDENCE

Thus the practical response of the pious to the transitoriness of this world and its lack of worth compared with the hereafter is *zuhd*, worldly renunciation, an inner and to a great extent an outer detachment from earthly things. This detachment is likewise combined with the endeavor to raise oneself above the animal drives by extensively suppressing them and to construct, in face of the ephemeral and deceptive external world, a higher inner world which is oriented toward religious goals.

But this attitude as well is only possible if one can maintain one's physical life. A certain level of provision, even if freed of all unneccesary surplus, must and ought to be assured, and within this boundary earthly good and the satisfaction of natural needs are affirmed and considered permissible.

1

God has guaranteed this provision both for His bondsmen (surah 51/58) and for His creatures devoid of reason (surah 11/6). He provides for believers as well as unbelievers (cf. the story of Abraham and the gebr on p. 328 below), for the pious as well as the godless. Therefore man can and should put his trust (*tawakkul*) in the guarantee given by God and rely on the fact that God will confer on him life's bare necessities and nourishment for the body. In other words, he should not worry about acquiring his sustenance. Worrying is unbelief and a sin.

Wuhayb ibn Ward al-Makkī says: "If the sky were made of copper and the earth of lead, and I then worried about acquiring my sustenance, I'd consider myself to be a polytheist." (*Qūt* 2/9; *Nahrung* 2/312/32.471; *Iḥyāʾ* 4/236, *Bayān tawakkul al-muʿīl*; *Stufen* 585/E.161).

If someone worries about his sustenance for tomorrow while he has food to eat for today, that is a sin which will be recorded in his account. (*Qūt*, ibid.).

A man complains to Shiblī about his numerous family that he has to feed, and receives the answer: "Go home and throw away everything which you don't obtain through God's provision!" (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 77, *Bāb al-tawakkul*; *Sendschreiben* 241/19.12).

Even merely asking what a person lives from, for a pious man makes the questioner unfit to be prayer leader.

A prayer leader, after ending the prayers, asks a man who performed the prayers behind him and whose dress indicates that he's not gainfully employed: "Where do you get your food from?" The man replies: "First let me make up the prayer I performed behind you (which is now invalid), and then I'll answer you!" (*Qūt* 2/15; *Nahrung* 2/328/32.497; *Iḥyā*ᵓ 4/232, *Bayān a*ᶜ*māl al-mutawakkilīn*; *Stufen* 577/E.141).

The mystics, on the other hand, are not content to follow this general command to trust in God. Because it is not right to worry about tomorrow, the question arises as to whether it is permitted to store up provisions for the next day or even for longer periods. (*Qūt* 2/1-21; *Nahrung* 2/291-347/32.439-524; *Iḥyā*ᵓ 4/237-40, *al-Fann al-thānī, etc.*; *Stufen* 590-595/E.173-186). The answers take different forms and are classified by Ghazzālī in his manner. The highest level is that of spending the same day all income one receives, satisfying one's needs of the moment and immediately distributing the rest. Abū Jaᶜfar al-Ḥaddād, the teacher of Junayd, earns one dinar every day but spends it all before night falls. (*Iḥyā*ᵓ 4/231; *Stufen* 573/E.131).

This is also the practice of Abū Saᶜīd who consumed with his novices on the same day everything which was brought to him from his well-off supporters. The other extreme of this behavior is to store up provisions for a year which is incompatible with trust in God (*tawakkul*). Ibrāhīm Khawwāṣ had set the permissible limit at forty days, but objections were raised against this. (*Qūt* 2/20; *Nahrung* 2/344/32.521; *Iḥyā*ᵓ 4/238, *Stufen* 590/E.176). Furthermore, the question is discussed whether a secure income or secure provisions and property which one can count on (*ma*ᶜ*lūm*, surah 37/91) is compatible with trust in God (e.g. *Qūt* 2/16-19; *Nahrung* 2/339 f./32.515), while the Ṣūfīs frequently extend the concept of secure property (*ma*ᶜ*lūm*) to completely trivial things.

And in addition the view also prevails that the ration of provisions for every human being has been fixed and recorded on the Tablet of destiny from eternity (*Qūt* 2/7; *Nahrung* 2/304 f./32.459), or according to Ḥasan al-Baṣrī since two thousand years before the creation of the bodies ("Ḥasan al-Baṣrī" 26), and

the central rationing functions so securely that a person is as unlikely to escape his ration as he is to escape his fixed time of death. "The fixed daily sustenance seeks out a person, just as his fixed time of death seeks him out." "If a person wished to escape his fixed daily sustenance, it would seek him out just as his fixed time of death would reach him if he wished to escape it." (*Qūt* 2/7, 197; *Nahrung* 2/307/32.461, 3/407/41.20; *Iḥyāʾ* 4/230; *Stufen* 569/E.121).

To this ration fixed by God (*rizq*) belong all consumer goods which are allotted to a person, irrespective of whether they are produced by his own hand or by the hand of others, or whether they are conferred on him directly by God in a miraculous manner. (*Qūt* 2/27; *Nahrung* 2/372 f./32.556-557). Even illicit goods consumed by someone belong to *rizq*, according to orthodox doctrine (as opposed to the Muᶜtazila). (Ashᶜarī, *Maqālāt* 257).

Thus the pious man is to see God's gift in everything he receives and should not consider the means (*ruʾyat al-asbāb*, *Qūt* 2/5; *Nahrung* 2/300/32.452) or the human intermediaries through whom the gift reaches him. If someone says: "This man gave me, and that man refused me", this is covert polytheism (*shirk khafī*, *Qūt* 2/11; *Nahrung* 2/317/32.479).

Ibn Masᶜūd says: "If someone praises a person (thanks him) who gave him something and rebukes another because he refused him something, he praises and rebukes someone other than the one who gave and refused." (Ibid.).—Not to praise people when they give, and not to rebuke them when they refuse, is one of the signs of "certainty" (*yaqīn*). (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 83, *Bāb al-yaqīn*; *Sendschreiben* 259/21.5).

Human beings are pure tools of God. As Ghazzālī describes it in an elaborately drawn out fable (*Iḥyāʾ* 4/214 ff.; *Stufen* 527-536/E.30-46), one will not hold responsible the paper, the ink and the reed pen for what is written. Nor does one say: "The servant of the *amīr* gave me this and that, or bestowed on me a robe of honor", but one says: "The *amīr* gave me." (*Qūt* 2/13; *Nahrung* 2/325/32.491). On the basis of these views it is clear why in the Islamic Orient beggars sitting on the road mostly do not beseech the people but beseech Allāh for a gift.

As emerges from a long introduction of Ghazzālī's to the chapter on trust in God (*tawakkul*; *Iḥyāʾ* 4/211-23, *Bayān ḥaqīqat al-tawḥīd, etc.*; *Stufen* 520-551/E.9-76), this conception is connected with the dogmatic doctrine that there is no natural causality but that everything which happens is directly brought

about by God, a doctrine which is summarized in the concise sentence: "There is no active subject (at work) besides God" (*lā fāᶜila illā'llāh*). This doctrine is transposed by the Ṣūfīs into living pious practices and, as we shall see, applied far beyond the area of *tawakkul*. (See Chapt. 29 below).

The attitude of the pious man toward earning a living, toward economic activity generally, is extensively influenced by the views just described. Through the ideal of *zuhd*, acquisition for acquisition's sake, i.e. for the purpose of increased material gain, is ruled out in advance. But then the question arises as to whether gainful activity for the purpose of securing the minimum for existence is compatible with trust in God, whether and to what extent one should take economic measures for the future. As is well known, there were individual men of piety who went so far as to wander about in the desert or to set out on the pilgrimage without taking provisions with them.

Gainful employment in order to secure one's basic needs and the body's nourishment is approved by Makkī as well as Ghazzālī, and just as with *zuhd*, they discuss in detail which measures (*tadbīr*) are still compatible with trust in God (*tawakkul*) and which are not.

Ghazzālī again categorizes the forms of behavior transmitted by the early men of piety and the various attitudes toward God which they are based on, in accordance with the principle of gradation (*Iḥyā'* 4/225; *Stufen* 552 f./E.78-80):

The first stage of trust in God consists of behaving toward God as toward a reliable person in commercial or legal life. (The image suggests itself because of the etymological connection between *tawakkul* and *wakīl* "reliable person, representative"—*kafīl* "guarantor" is also employed). They ask Ḥabīb al-ᶜAjamī: "Why have you given up engaging in business?" He answers: "I found the guarantor reliable" (*Wajadtu'l-kafīla thiqa.* Qushayrī, *Risāla* 79; *Sendschreiben* 247/19.24). A person trusts that God will do what He has taken upon Himself to do as guarantor, just as one would trust one's reliable agent. In this case the actual activity is merely limited and not stopped altogether. This is the normal relationship.—The second stage is comparable to the child's relation to its mother. The child seeks refuge with no one but its mother, relies on her and clings to the hem of her skirt as soon as it sees her. If something happens to it, and its mother is not there, the first word it cries out is: "Mother!", and the first thought it has is for its mother. (Cf. the story on p. 139). This stage does not exclude prayer of supplication, calling upon God, but it does preclude turning to anyone other than God.—In the third stage, the person behaves toward God in accordance with the famous image of Sahl al-Tustarī (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 76;

Sendschreiben 237/19.4), i.e. like a corpse in the hands of a corpsewasher. This stage signifies complete passivity and waiting to see what God will do with one and excludes prayer of supplication, because one waits for God Himself to take the initiative to provide one's daily sustenance.

A person's economic behavior can also be classified in accordance with the particular means through which God's ordering on earth assures his livelihood. (*Iḥyāʾ* 4/228 ff., *Bayān aʿmāl al-mutawakkilīn*; *Stufen* 565 ff./E.112).

Those who go the furthest are the pious who like the birds beneath the sky rely on God for nourishment and travel in the desert without provisions. (*Iḥyāʾ* 4/230; *Stufen* 566/E.115. Cf. Ibrāhīm al-Khawwāṣ in Qushayrī, *Risāla* 84, *Bāb al-yaqīn*; *Sendschreiben* 261 f./21.10).—Next come those who live in human settlements but, without being gainfully employed, sit at home or in the mosque and rely on God to cause the inhabitants not to let them go hungry. In this case reliance on "the means" is even greater.—The third and normal stage, which is actually recommended by Ghazzālī with reference to the *sunna*, is to live from the work of one's hands, provided that in so doing one does not rely on oneself but on God (*Iḥyāʾ* 4/231; *Stufen* 571 f./ E.129). In the end this moderate position is also called for by Sahl al-Tustarī when he says: "Trust in God is the state (*ḥāl*) of the Prophet, whereas gainful employment is his *sunna*. Whoever dwells in 'the state' of the Prophet should nonetheless not neglect his *sunna*." (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 77; *Sendschreiben* 240/19.9). Whoever speaks out against work, speaks against the *sunna*, and whoever speaks out against trust in God, speaks against the faith. (Ibid.).

Overexertion with regard to trust in God is described by Jaʿfar al-Khuldī, the disciple of Junayd, as testing God, which is based on a hidden doubt.

A few followers put a series of questions to Junayd which Jaʿfar answers in the master's place, one of which is: "Should we ask God for our daily sustenance?" He says: "If you know that He has forgotten you, then remind Him!" And they also ask: "Should we stay at home and rely on God?" He answers: "Do you want to test God by means of *tawakkul*? That constitutes a doubt!" (*Taʾrīkh Baghdād* 7/227 bot.).

In one passage Makkī compares God's behavior toward men with that of an earthly master toward his slave (*Qūt* 2/30-31; *Nahrung* 2/380-82/32.569). The earthly master can either demand that his slave feed him—God is above that—or he can leave it to the slave to feed himself, turn over to him whatever the

latter earns and thereby assure his sustenance—that is the situation of most people—, or he can claim the slave's services for himself and guarantee his nourishment from his own resources—that is the highest situation, the situation of those who devote their life completely to serving God.

With this survey our topic is, of course, still not exhausted. Also included is the discussion as to how someone should behave who has a family to feed, what measures one may and should take to ward off harm and to protect one's property against loss and such eventualities. The attitude which accords with the *sunna* is illustrated by a saying from the Prophet. A bedouin comes before Muḥammad on a she-camel and declares: "I will leave her untied and trust in God." The Prophet says: "Tether her and trust in God!" (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 76; *Sendschreiben* 237/19.5; *Iḥyāʾ* 4/240, *Bayān aḥwāl al-mutawakkilīn*; *Stufen* 596/E.191). In addition, it is discussed how one should behave toward a thief (see p. 334 below), and finally, whether in the case of illnesses one should or should not seek help from a doctor or make use of incantations. (*Qūt* 2/28-34; *Nahrung* 2/374-393/32.559-585; *Iḥyāʾ* 4/234-52; *Stufen* 605-628/E.212-260).

Hans Wehr, *Al-Ġazzālī's Buch vom Gottvertrauen*, Halle 1940.

2

Many of the above-described views are reflected in ᶜAṭṭār's epics, even if he does not include all the subjects dealt with by Ghazzālī.

God provides for all creatures.

Rely on the Bestower of sustenance, have patience and be calm! For since He doesn't withhold bestowing nourishment on the unbeliever, He won't withhold it from the wise man. (IN p. $390_{13\text{-}14}$ = AN 20/10, final verse).

A man recounted to ᶜAṭṭār: "When I was drawing water from a well in the desert, my ring fell off my finger into the well. I sent a man down inside, had him fill the bucket with slime from the bottom and then hauled it up. Along with what was brought up in the bucket was a round, heavy black stone. I threw it on the ground and it broke apart. A little worm then appeared which had a tiny green leaf in its mouth."—Praise be to God the Benefactor who keeps a worm alive in the middle of a stone! (AN 20/11).

Cf. Chauvin 3/163; Albert Wesselski, *Märchen des Mittelalters*, p. 224.—The story appears in *Maẓhar al-ᶜajāʾib* combined with the famous tale about Ayāz whom Maḥmūd orders to smash a valuable jewel, and is there given an allegorical interpretation (Ms. Nuru Osmaniye 4199, fol. 181b). And cf. the worm in the rock in the Moses legend: Weil, *Biblische Legenden* 189.

An Arabic variant:

Dhū'l-Nūn relates that the cause of his turning to God was that in the desert he had experienced how a blind bird which fell out of its nest was nourished in a miraculous manner. The earth split open and from the rift emerged a golden bowl and a silver bowl. The one contained sesame seeds and the other water, and the little bird ate and drank from these. (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 8-9, *Bāb dhikr al-mashāyikh*; *Sendschreiben* 38/1.2).

God also feeds the voracious monster Halūᶜ (above p. 95).

A person should not presume to adopt the role of distributor.

Shiblī sees two boys who are fighting over a nut. He says: "Wait! I'll break the nut and divide the contents between you." When he cracks the nut, it turns out to be empty. Shiblī is then forced to think of his own emptiness and begins to weep. A voice cries to him: "If you're the distributor, then go ahead! Distribute things! But since you have no insight, don't presume to take on the role of distribution!" (MN 20/8; TA 2/172-73).—On the context see p. 605 below).

God looks after a baby.

When a child comes into the world, God causes milk to flow in the mother's breast in order to feed the baby.

ᶜUmar must leave Mecca to go on a journey. He has a pregnant wife at home. He says to God: "I'm going away and I entrust my child to You." When he comes home, the young mother has died and been buried. But ᶜUmar hears a voice from inside the grave, opens the grave and finds one half of the woman dead and the other half still alive breast-feeding the baby. He takes up the baby and hears a voice which calls to him: "What you entrusted to God, He has delivered to you. Since you didn't entrust the mother to Him, she is dead." (MN 23/9).

When the world-traveller returns from the archangel Michael, keeper of the key to God's storage chambers, the *pīr* instructs him that anyone who thinks someone other than God is a bestower of food thereby falls into idolatry. (MN 3/0. Cf. above p. 219).

A conversation about daily sustenance unfolds between Ḥātim al-Ṭāʾī, who is famous for his extravagant hospitality, and a certain man. The man asks Ḥātim where he acquires his daily food. Ḥātim answers: "From God's storehouse." The man replies: "No, you rob the property of the Muslims!" Ḥātim: "Have I ever taken anything away from you?" The man: "No!" Ḥātim: "Then are you no Muslim?"...The man: "But food doesn't fall out of the sky for you!" Ḥātim: "The nourishment for all creatures, not only for me, comes from the sky, as the Possessor of all has said Himself (surah 51/22)." The man: "But food doesn't just enter through the window for you!" Ḥātim: "In my mother's womb I was nourished through a window for nine months." The man: "Then lay down on your back now and make food come into your mouth!" Ḥātim: "I did that for two years in the cradle, and milk flowed into my mouth." The man: "Without sowing, you can't cut the corn." Ḥātim: "I even cut the hair on my head without having sown." The

man: "So let's see you eat without cooking then!" Ḥātim: "I could do like the birds that eat without cooking." The man: "Then go into the water and seek food there!" Ḥātim points to the fishes. Here the man concedes defeat and makes a vow of repentance. (MN 3/1).

Greed and acquisitiveness drop away from the person who knows that his ration is fixed.

"Since my ration has been allotted to me from the beginning", says Ja^cfar al-Ṣādiq, "neither greed nor acquisitiveness has remained in me." (IN p. 98_3).

Therefore, it's senseless and arises from pure madness when people fall upon one another for the sake of dear bread. Don't worry about the coming morning! (IN 7/12, p. $121_{12\text{-}14}$).

A silent man who doesn't talk to a soul is asked why he doesn't speak to anyone. He answers: "Because there are no people one can speak to." They rebuke him, saying there are people enough. He says: "Those aren't people. People are only those who don't worry about yesterday or about tomorrow, who don't think about what will come tomorrow and know they can't change the past. They don't worry about poverty and daily sustenance and only have one concern (for God)." (IN 7/14, pp. 121-22).

True trust in God is displayed by the woman whose husband is on a journey and whom they ask how she can live so alone, without money and bread. She answers: "I'm not alone. God is with me. I'm better looked after without a husband: a bread-eater has gone away, and a bestower of bread is on hand." (AN 20/12).

The highest stage of trust in God is to wait for God to take the initiative, for He knows what needs His slaves have.

Regarding this, ᶜAbd Allāh ibn Mubārak is taught a lesson by a slave whom he sees standing in a simple shirt, shivering in the snow and wind. He asks him: "Why don't you tell your master he should have clothes made for you?" The slave answers: "He sees me alright! What else should I say to him?" ᶜAbd Allāh lets out a cry and falls down unconscious. (IN 11/8, p. 176).

Whoever lays claim to the highest stage of trust in God should have no sure possessions (*maᶜlūm*) of his own which he can rely on in an emergency. With the Ṣūfīs the smallest sum of money, even one dirham, counts as *maᶜlūm*, in fact even a spare shoelace which someone takes along on a journey.

Cf. the conversation between Ibrāhīm Sitanba and his disciple Ibrāhīm Ribāṭī in Anṣārī, *Ṭabaqāt* 64, 5

Shaqīq Balkhī preaches in Baghdad about trust in God and presents himself as a shining example. He says: "I walked through the desert to the Kaᶜba with one dirham in my pocket and, thanks to my trust in God, did not have to spend it." A youth jumps up and asks the preacher: "Where was your trust in God when you stuck a dirham in your pocket? Were you actually not so sure of help from the un-

seen world?" Shaqīq then comes down from the pulpit shaking and concedes that the youth is right. (IN 9/5, p. 145).

3

However, one should also accept the ration which God has determined for one and not reject it. A person who receives his ration without asking for it and then rejects it, is rejecting a gift from God.

This is the view found in a story about Fatḥ al-Mawṣilī, *Qūt* 2/199; *Nahrung* 3/414/41.28; *Iḥyā'* 4/179, 180; *Stufen* 435/D.75; *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/33 (*Man atāhu rizquhū min ghayri mas'alatin fa-raddahū fa-innamā yaruddu ᶜalā'llāh*). The question as to how one should behave toward this ration is discussed in detail in *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/28-36 where comment is made on the saying: "Don't extend your hand to receive something from people unless you see your Lord as the bestower! And if you do behave like this, then receive what your knowledge (of the law) allows you (to receive)."

Moses asks God: "Who among the people is truly poor and in need of You?" God answers: "The person who has forfeited My favors, the person who rejects what We have allotted him. The one who flees from what We have allotted him is wretched day and night." (IN 13/10 bis, p. 209).

When Zubayda, the consort of Hārūn al-Rashīd, sends roast meat and sweets to the fool Bahlūl, he sits down and consumes the tasty meal with gusto. A person asks him: "Won't you give some of this to anyone?" The fool answers angrily: "But if God has now bestowed this food on me, how can I give it to someone else?" (IN 13/10, p. 208).

The story is originally meant to be amusing as a fool's behavior.

It is claimed that Bahlūl was greedy. Someone came along while he was eating a pudding made from dates, and said to him: "Give some of that to me as well!" He replied: "It doesn't belong to me."—"Who does it belong to, if you're eating it?"—"It belongs to ᶜĀtika, the daughter of the caliph. She sent it to me. I'm eating it for her sake, and thanks be to God!" (Note in the manuscript Feyzullah 1601, fol. 57b).

Qīla kāna'l-Buhlūlu bakhīlan fa-marra bihī baᶜḍuhum wahuwa ya'kulu khabīṣan fa-qāla lahū: Aṭᶜimnī minh! Qāla: Laysa huwa lī. Qāla: Wa-liman huwa wa-anta ta'kuluh? Qāla: Li-ᶜĀtikata binti'l-khalīfati baᶜathathu lī ākuluhū lahā wa'l-ḥamdu li'llāh.

One should not be too apprehensive in looking into where a gift originates. If to all appearances it is licit property, one should have no scruples about whether it is permitted or forbidden—by way of exaggerating the religious virtue of *waraᶜ*, the apprehensive avoidance of the forbidden, as for example illicitly acquired property.

Chun ba-ẓāhir rōẓiy-ē bīnī ḥalāl mē-makun az bāṭin-i rōzī suʾāl!
(MN in 29/7).

Ibn Adham asks a monk: "Where do you acquire your daily sustenance?" The monk answers: "Ask that question of the One who bestows nourishment!" (MN 29/7; TA $1/99_{9\text{-}11}$. In the latter an ascetic who puts his trust in God appears in place of the monk).

Some rules about proper behavior which pertain to this domain in IN 7/13, p. 121.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

CONTENTEDNESS AND POVERTY

Whoever only takes an amount of the goods of the world which is absolutely necessary to maintain life and perform the religious duties, in so doing practices the virtue of contentedness (*qanā*[c]*at*) and, on a higher level, fulfills the voluntarily adopted ideal of poverty (*faqr*).

The virtue of contentedness and the ideal of poverty do not have an exclusively Islamic religious origin. They already constitute elements in ethical philosophy in Late Antiquity. For this reason ancient wise men frequently appear as chief figures in the stories of [c]Aṭṭār which treat this subject, and furthermore it follows that the reward for virtue by no means always turns out to be religious gains such as eliminating one's ties with the present world in favor of the hereafter, or in mystical terms, diminishing the barriers separating the bondsman from God. Instead, the gains envisaged may well belong to the domain of general human or philosophical ideals of life. Among them is above all freedom from other people, remaining unencumbered by the burden of gratitude, a burden which benefactors impose on those who are dependent on them. In addition to this outward freedom there is also internal freedom. The contented and voluntarily poor man feels elevated above the lower drives of covetousness, acquisitiveness and greed which enthrall and dominate worldly men, and especially above the craving for power which preoccupies rulers. We have already seen in stories where at times ancient wise men, at times Ṣūfī shaykhs, beggars and fools, criticize the lords of the world, how the above views together with the ideals of Sufism, which is really the religion of the poor people, lend a new, heightened self-importance to the poor man, the beggar, who in the Ṣūfī poets for the first time comes to speak, in contrast to the aristocracy, the rulers and their followers—a self-importance which expresses itself in such pithy sentences as: "The beggar is the true king." (See above p. 119). The religious factor in these views emerges into the foreground at the point where the con-

tented poor man acquires religious gains (*dīn*) in place of the world (*dunyā*) and Paradise in the hereafter in place of earthly goods, and instead of concern for possessions and property is only concerned about God (cf. the story on p. 224 about the silent man), and finally there where the Prophet himself is held up as the model of poverty.

In this way poverty acquires a new dignity, a positive value, and thus one of the factors which at first caused man's situation in the world to appear so bleak is overcome.

Qūt 1/262-65, 2/192 ff. chpt. 41 *fī dhikr faḍāʾil al-faqr, etc.*; *Nahrung* 2/264-273/32.397-409, 3/391 ff./41; Qushayrī, *Risāla* 122-26, *Bāb al-faqr; Sendschreiben* 372-383/40; *Iḥyāʾ* 4/164-86, *Kitāb al-faqr wa'l-zuhd I*; *Stufen* 393-454/D.1-117; Abū'l-Layth al-Samarqandī, *Tanbīh al-ghāfilīn, Bāb faḍāʾil al-fuqarāʾ*.

1

The model of proper contentedness is the little bird which is satisfied with half a date.

Solomon walks past a little bird which is sitting on a branch contentedly chirping. He says to his companions: "Do you know what this little bird says to me? It says: 'Today I ate half a date. Now let dust cover this worthless earth!'" (MN 11/6).

Cf. Zamakhsharī and, following him, Bayḍāwī on surah 27/16; Thaᶜlabī 184; Qazwīnī, *ᶜAjāʾib* 1/426; Damīrī, *Ḥayāt al-ḥayawān* 2/88; M. Grünbaum, *Neue Beiträge zur semitischen Sagenkunde* 230; Georg Salzberger, *Die Salomo-Sage in der semitischen Literatur*, Berlin 1907, p. 82.

Pre-Islamic wise men:

It's not as bad to die trampled under the feet of elephants as to eat bread from the hand of a miserly man.

Anōshirwān says: "It's better to die under the sword of poverty than to eat one's fill from the hand of a lowly person." (IN 19/3, pp. 303-04).

Anōshirwān says to his singer Bārbud: "If you want to live without cares, empty your heart of envy. Then you'll be happy. Be satisfied with God and you're free!" (IN 13/11, p. 209).

Whoever is content becomes free from other people and has no need of the favor of kings and the rich.

Hippocrates walks in the street barefoot. Someone says to him: "The rulers all seek your company. Many people respect you. Let them give you a horse!" Hippocrates answers: "It's easier for me to bear the burden of my body with my feet than to have the burden of gratitude on the back of my neck." (MN 0/14).

A king (*khusraw-ē*) while hunting comes to a mountain where Hippocrates inhabits a cave, lives from plants like the animals and allows no one to visit him. Someone from the king's retinue who notices Hippocrates says to him: "For a long time the king's been looking for you to enjoy your company. But you flee from him and lock yourself up!" The wise man answers: "If like me you nourished your body with plants, you wouldn't have to make your free body into a slave of the king. What use is the king to someone who's content with so little?"—Being a beggar is true kingship for a free, contented soul. (MN 0/15).

A variant of this story, though far more fantastical and somber in mood than the above, is the amazing tale about Plato and Alexander, with which the king in the *Ilāhīnāma* introduces his explanation of the true elixir.

Plato succeeds in preparing an elixir from eggshells and human hair, which enables him to make gold from copper. But gold no longer has any value for him after he's tested his elixir for fifty years. He comes to the insight that it would be better to make a spiritual elixir for the substance of his soul. He succeeds in doing this as well: both worlds turn into light for him, and all divine secrets become visible to him. After that he settles in a mountain cave far from people and lives there a thousand years. He has a salve by means of which he grows himself a thick goat-skin in the winter and another salve he uses to remove it again in the summer. In addition, he possesses a drug which he only has to take once every six years so as not to need any further nourishment. Alexander and Aristotle, who have set out to visit him in order to receive instruction from him, find him like this. But Plato doesn't say a word. Finally, he lets it be known that silence possesses the color of eternity and to adopt this is the right thing. He refuses to eat the food they offer him because it turns to filth in the body. Nor does he wish to sleep because he has the sleep of eternity before him. After this talk he leaves his two visitors and retires into the mountains. Alexander and his adviser Aristotle can do nothing but weep... (IN 22/1, pp. 353-55).

According to Jīlī, *al-Insān al-kāmil* 2/75, Plato has drunk the water of life and is still alive today in a mountain named Darāwand (= Damāwand?).

2

Islamic tales:

ᶜAlī can't bear the burden of gratitude and for this reason hires himself out to a Jew as a day-laborer. Someone asks him why he's doing this. He answers with verses: "I prefer to carry down stones from the peaks of mountains than to owe gratitude to men. People say to me: 'Working for bread is a disgrace.' But I say it's a disgrace to humiliate oneself by begging." (IN pp. 27-28).

These verses are in ᶜAlī's *Dīwān*, Būlāq 1251, p. 46. Tales according to which ᶜAlī works for remuneration occur in *Ḥilya* 1/71. That he hired himself out to a Jew I have not found anywhere else.

A beggar is asked what he likes best. He answers: "The swear names people give me. Because everything else they give me leaves me with a debt of gratitude." (AN 20/3).

Aṣmaᶜī hears a street-sweeper say: "Dear soul, I've freed you from all lowly work. I've always valued you and been concerned for your good name." Aṣmaᶜī points out to him the inappropriateness of these words: "How can you talk like this? You're continually occupied with filth. What could be more humiliating?" The man replies: "There's something which is more humiliating: to come before the door of men like yourself. My activity is a hundred times better than playing the servant for other people. I don't have to carry around a debt of gratitude." (MN 0/13).

In Arabic in *Thamarāt al-awrāq*, Būlāq 1286, p. 32.

Someone asks why Ḥasan al-Baṣrī occupies the first position (*mihtarī*) in Basra. He's given the answer: "Because the people need his learning, whereas he doesn't need it."—Whoever only owns a piece of bread and an old robe, every one of his hairs is a sultan. (MN 0/16).

If I am king in the realm of contentedness, then I can do what I want all the time. (IN p. 366_{16}).

A great man walks past a school and observes a boy who only has dry bread to eat for breakfast. The latter asks another boy who has something to put on his bread (*Qābūsnāma*: halva, a sweet which is readily eaten with bread) to give him some of it. The second boy says: "If you're willing to be my dog and run as I wish, then you'll get something from me to put on your bread, otherwise you must eat dry bread." The first boy consents, lets his comrade put a rope around his neck and obeys his orders like a dog, in return for which he gets something to put on his bread. The observer calls out to him: "You dumb youth! If you were smart, you'd have been content with the bread and not had to play the dog!" (IN *Khātima*/1, pp. 366-67).

Qābūsnāma 191, *Bāb* 44. The story is recounted about Fatḥ Mawṣilī in the *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 1/71, as an illustration of the saying: "You're free from whatever you don't hope for, and a slave of whatever you desire and hope for." A whole series of similar stories is found there.

In connection with this story the poet thinks of Firdawsī who turned over Maḥmūd's gift to the millet-beer merchant, and for his own part considers himself as fortunate to be independent of people (through his apothecary) and to have more than he needs. (IN *Khātima*, p. 397_{11-15}). He had already voiced similar reflections in the above-recounted stories of the *Muṣībatnāma*. He frequently

boasts of not having sung the praises of rulers for the sake of despicable gain. (Above p. 156).

Whoever is content with what falls to his lot is no worse off than a king.

A beggar who's sleeping in a baker's oven sees a king go by in a furcoat. It's winter and very cold. The beggar says to the king: "Even if you didn't notice the cold at all—we also managed to get through this night." (AN 20/6).

Muḥammad ibn Wāsi[c] takes bread, moistens it with water, eats it with salt and says: "Whoever is content with this much of the world doesn't rely on anyone." (*Iḥyā*ʾ 4/173, *Bayān faḍīlat al-faqr*; *Stufen* 420/D.42).

[c]Āmir ibn [c]Abd al-Qays even thinks that with some leeks and salt he lives more luxuriously than worldly men. (Above p. 46).

Not to have is better than to have.

A pious man says: "Being free of all the things you have and wish to have is better than the things themselves. Not to have all the things in the two worlds is better than to have them." (IN *Khātima*/2, pp. 367-68).

Abū Sa[c]īd is together with an old man in a well-appointed bath. The old man says: "This is a lovely, delightful bath!" Abū Sa[c]īd says: "Do you know why?" The polite old man answers: "Because a shaykh such as you is in it." Abū Sa[c]īd replies: "Leave me out of the matter!" The old man: "Then you tell the reason!" Abū Sa[c]īd says: "The bath is so lovely because here you have nothing of the things of the world except a water-jug and a loincloth, and even these don't belong to you." (MN 11/7, from *Asrār al-tawḥīd* 174; O'Kane, *Secrets* 323-24).

Complete denudation sets one free.

A shaykh goes on a journey with a new novice. The novice has secretly brought some money with him, but the shaykh knows about it. They come to a dark valley with two roads. The novice is afraid because of his money and asks the shaykh: "Which road do we intend to take?" The shaykh says: "Throw away the *ma*[c]*lūm*. Then you'll be free to take any road you wish!" (MṬ 23/1, p. 81; cf. above p. 224).

Whoever owns possessions, his mind is no longer free. He is gripped by the fear of losing them.

Rābi[c]a recounts for Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, who asks her to tell him about something she's experienced herself, that one time she'd spun some yarn and sold it and received two pieces of silver for it. She then placed one piece of silver in her right hand and the other in her left, because if two pieces of silver were to come together in her one hand, due to this amassing of money she wouldn't be able to sleep for fear of a highway robber. (MṬ 32/2, pp. 81-82).

In TA 1/66$_{9-13}$ the end is different: She was afraid the money would lead her away from "the path". Perhaps the highway robber (*rāhzan*) in MṬ is meant symbolically.

3

In the light of these ideals, poverty acquires a special dignity. Poverty is a precious possession which one should not give up.

A man constantly complains about his poverty. Ibrāhīm ibn Adham, who voluntarily renounced his kingdom, says to him: "In fact you've bought poverty too cheaply." The man replies: "What kind of talk is that? Is one also supposed to buy poverty?" Ibrāhīm answers: "I purchased it for the price of world dominion which I renounced, and I even find that price cheap. Therefore I know its real value, but you don't. And I feel obliged to be grateful, but you don't." (MṬ 30/2, p. 102).

An Arabic variant:

A man brings 60,000 (10,000) dirhams to Ibrāhīm ibn Adham who has debts and needs money. Ibrāhīm refuses the money, and when the man rebukes him for this, Ibrāhīm says: "I don't want to strike my name from the list of the poor for 60,000 dirhams." (*Qūt* 2/195; *Nahrung* 3/402/41.13; *Iḥyā*ʾ 4/172, *Bayān faḍīlat al-faqr*, last story; *Stufen* 417/D.37).

A dervish leaves his dervish cloister and puts on a patched cap. Someone says mockingly: "How much is your cap worth if you sell it?" The dervish answers: "I have no intention of selling it. I've been offered the whole world for it. But I know it's more valuable than that. Just one of its sewn pleats is worth two worlds of jewels." (AN 20/1).

An Arabic version:

In the year 394 AH, a dervish (*faqīr*), dressed in rags and wearing a patched cap on his head, came before the master Abū ᶜAlī al-Daqqāq. As a joke, one of our people asked him: "How much did you pay for these rags?" He answered: "I bought them for the present world. And they wanted to buy it from me for the hereafter, but I refused to sell it." (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 123, *Bāb al-faqr*; *Sendschreiben* 373/40.4; TA 2/191$_{5\text{-}12}$ where the dervish, a wise fool, is called Abū'l-Ḥasan Burnawdhī).

A king observes in his neighborhood a poor widow who every day burns rue as protection against the evil eye. He's curious about what fortunate possessions the widow actually owns that she's engaged in warding off the evil eye. He sends a servant to her with a gift of a hundred dinars and has him ask her why she's burning rue. She answers that she's become satisfied with her poverty and wants to protect it from "the (evil) eye". But she hasn't succeeded in doing so because the king's eye has observed her and now through the king's gift she's forfeited it. (MN 24/2).

Already Saᶜīd ibn ᶜĀmir is very unhappy and weeps when the caliph ᶜUmar sends him a thousand dinars. He's heard the Prophet say that the poor of his community will enter Paradise five hundred years before the rich. (*Iḥyā*ʾ 4/171, *Bayān faḍīlat al-faqr*; *Stufen* 416/D.36).

Sa[c]īd is a Companion of the Prophet and does not belong to the Ṣūfīs. But one of the Ṣūfīs considers it to be an outright affliction that he has been given money.

Khayr al-Nassāj one time enters a mosque. A dervish is there. When the latter perceives the shaykh, he clings to him and says: "Oh shaykh, take me into your care (*ta[c]aṭṭaf [c]alayya*), for my affliction is great!" The shaykh says: "What does it consist of then?" The dervish answers: "I'm no longer in distress and have been given well-being!" (*Faqadtu'l-balā'a wa-fuztu bi'l-[c]āfiya*). "I then looked into his case", relates Khayr al-Nassāj, "and learned that he had acquired some worldly goods." (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 126, *Bāb al-faqr*, at the end; *Sendschreiben* 383/40.19; *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/16).

A pious man says: "The truly poor man is someone who enjoys his poverty and fears that it could be stolen from him, in the same way that the rich man enjoys his wealth and is afraid of becoming poor."

Qūt 1/249 and cf. 1/266, 2/194; *Nahrung* 2/226/32.337, 2/276/32.416, 3/397/41.7; and the saying of Ibn al-Kurrīnī in Qushayrī, *Risāla* 123, *Bāb al-faqr*; *Sendschreiben* 375/40.7.

The reason for Sa[c]īd ibn [c]Āmir preferring poverty is the hope of entering Paradise ahead of the rich. The refined mysticism of the Shādhiliyya strikes a completely different chord.

One of the sayings of Ibn [c]Aṭā' Allāh is as follows (freely translated):

"Days of deprivations are the holidays of the Ṣūfī novices." (*Wurūdu'l-fāqāti a[c]yādu'l-murīdīn*). The commentator Rundī says of this: "Holidays consist of regularly recurring times during which people enjoy themselves and are happy. But people behave differently on these occasions. For some the enjoyment and pleasure consists of finding what satisfies their lust and of attaining what they desire and strive after. This is the great mass of Muslims. But for others their enjoyment and pleasure consists of detaching themselves from their lust (craving) (*ḥuẓūẓ*), and of denying their desires and sought-after goals. These are the elite among the Ṣūfī novices. Because their complete striving is directed toward watching over their heart and the purification of their interior from any turbidity caused by things other than God. But this they only attain by experiencing and being overwhelmed by every form of distress, poverty and affliction, and for this reason you see that they prefer poverty to riches, a difficult time to a comfortable one, lowliness to honor, and illness to health. For due to this they are allotted an emotion and sweetness whose worth they alone appreciate, because when lust (craving) (*ḥaẓẓ*) is absent, they feel the closeness of the Lord and behold Him. And the more their affliction and torment increases, the closer they come to God and the more intimate His relationship with them becomes."—There then follows a story in which a man complains to God before the Ka[c]ba about his suffering in poverty. A person who pities him collects donations for

him, but the man refuses these with the explanation: "If I had something, I could no longer talk this way!" (*Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/15).

The story is the refinement of a more material story in *Qūt* 2/196 and *Iḥyā*ᵓ 4/180 (*Nahrung* 3/406/41.18 and *Stufen* 438 f./D.82). It could easily have one of ᶜAṭṭār's fools who love God as its protagonist.—The above-quoted passage of the *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam*, as well as all the passages of that work referred to in the following chapter are dealt with in detail by M. Asín Palacios, "Šadilīes y Alumbrados" in: *Al-Andalus* 11/39-48.

"Sometimes you find in deprivations (*al-fāqāt*) an (internal) gain (*mazīd*), which you don't find in fasting or in praying." (*Ḥikma* of Ibn ᶜAṭāᵓ Allāh). Rundī says about this: "Through deprivations a number of gains arise for the Ṣūfī (*murīd*): an unadulterated heart, purity of the innermost soul. Sometimes this is not attained through fasting and prayer because lust and vain desires may be hidden in the latter, as we have already said. Whoever travels that path (prayer, etc.) is not sure that harmful things (*āfāt*) will not occur... in contrast to the experience of deprivations, because the latter are separate from vain desires and lusts in all circumstances, etc."

"Deprivations are a conferral of gifts" (*Ḥikma*). Rundī: "Deprivations bring him together with God, etc."

"If you want gifts to come to you, establish real poverty and deprivation in yourself. Because alms only exist for the poor." (*Ḥikma*). (*Sharḥ al-Ḥikma* 2/16).

4

The doctrine that poverty is better than wealth has not been propounded by all Ṣūfīs. Abū'l-ᶜAbbās Aḥmad ibn ᶜAṭāᵓ (d. 309/922) considered wealth to be higher than poverty, supposedly because it is an attribute of God, and taught that a grateful rich man was better than a patient poor one. Junayd is meant to have cursed him for this so that he lost his children, his property and for fourteen years his reason. (*Qūt* 1/201, 264; *Nahrung* 2/74 /32.117, 2/271/32.407; *Iḥyā*ᵓ 4/122, 173-74; *Stufen* 291/B.310, 421/D.45). According to Ghazzālī, from the outset the argument of Ibn ᶜAṭāᵓ is not compelling because those things associated with being a bondsman are more fitting for man as a slave of God, rather than those associated with God's lordliness and which man should not presume to compete with. (*Iḥyā*ᵓ 4/174 with additional counter-arguments; *Stufen* 421 f./D.46 ff.; *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/17).

On the controversy over preferring wealth or poverty see the texts cited above pp. 228 f., especially *Qūt* 1/262-65; *Nahrung* 2/264-273/32.397-409; *Iḥyā*ᵓ 4/173-77, *Bayān faḍīlat al-faqr*, 4/117-23, *Bayān al-afḍal min al-ṣabr wa'l-shukr*; *Stufen* 421-431/D.45-66, 282-293/

E.292-313.—On the use of wealth cf. *Iḥyāʾ* 4/90, *Bayān ḥaqīqat al-niᶜma*; *Stufen* 215/ B.152; *Tanbīh al-ghāfilīn*, *Bāb fī faḍāʾil al-fuqarāʾ*, fol. 93 ff.

Some *ḥadīth*s have also been transmitted in which poverty is judged very negatively: "Poverty is almost unbelief."

Kāda'l-faqru an yakūna kufrā. *Fayḍ al-qadīr* no. 6199; *Iḥyāʾ* 3/163, 4/167; *Stufen* 404/ D.16; Qushayrī, *Risāla* 125; *Sendschreiben* 379/40.13; *Mathnawī* 2/517 in connection with poor Ṣūfīs who sell their guest's donkey in order to arrange a dancing party; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ p. 144.

The Prophet says: "I seek refuge with You from poverty!" (*Mukhtalif al-ḥadīth* 208; *Iḥyāʾ* 4/167; *Stufen* 404/D.16). "Poverty entails a blackened face (shame) in both worlds."

These *ḥadīth*s reflect old controversies and perhaps express the experience that a person without means is more easily inclined to crimes or arguing with God than someone who is affluent. Dhū'l-Nūn says: "The poor man who has no patience is the closest to unbelief." (*Iḥyāʾ* 4/173; *Stufen* 420/D.43).

The sixth prince defends his desire to possess elixir by referring to the first of these *ḥadīth*s. (IN 20/0, p. 314).

According to ᶜAṭṭār, Kharaqānī also expressed himself in similar terms: "Completely poor is the man whose heart is black in poverty." (AN 13/8). In the next verse he cites the *ḥadīth*: "Poverty is a blackened face in both worlds" (*al-faqru sawādu'l-wajhi fī'l-dārayn*). He appears to expect the reader to disagree, because he tells him not to argue. Another time he interprets the *ḥadīth* differently: "Poverty is the black beauty mark on the face" (*khāl al-wajh*). (AN 3, in the *Miᶜrāj*).

The concept of poverty is spiritualized in a saying of ᶜAlī.

A poor man comes from a long way off to ᶜAlī and asks him three questions: "What is poverty? What is illness? What is death?" ᶜAlī answers: "Your poverty is ignorance. If you're learned, you bear poverty lightly. Illness is envy, and death is bad character." (MN 21/9).

A bedouin comes to ᶜAlī and says to him: "I suffer from three illnesses, the illness of the carnal soul, the illness of poverty, and the illness of ignorance." ᶜAlī says: "The illness of the carnal soul requires a doctor, the illness of ignorance a learned person, and the illness of poverty a noble generous man." The bedouin says: "Oh Amīr of the faithful, you're the noble generous man and you're the learned person and you're a doctor." ᶜAlī then sees to it that three thousand dirhams are paid out to him from the treasure-chamber and says to him: "Spend a thousand on the illness of the carnal soul, a thousand on the illness of ignorance, and a thousand on the illness of poverty!" (*Biḥār al-anwār* 9/517-18).

5

The model of ideal poverty is the Prophet. He is represented as saying: "Poverty is my pride, and I boast of it" (AN 3 in the *Mi*ᶜ*rāj*), and as asking God: "Let me live in poverty and die in poverty, and be resurrected with the group of the poor!"

On the Prophet's poverty: "Ḥasan al-Baṣrī" 49-50; *Mukhtalif al-ḥadīth* 399-400. *Al-faqru fakhrī wa-aftakhiru bih*: Ibn al-Daybaᶜ 138; *Mathnawī* 1/2342. Kamāl Paşazāde wrote a treatise on the subject: GAL², 2/599 no. 39—*Tawaffanī faqīran, Aḥyinī miskīnan, etc.*: among others, *Mukhtalif al-ḥadīth* 208; *Qūt* 1/263; *Nahrung* 2/269/32.403-404; *Iḥyā*ᵓ 4/167; *Stufen* 404/D.16.—On the historical aspect: Ivan Hrbek, "Muhammeds Nachlass und die Aliden" in: *Archiv Orientální.* 18, no. 3, pp. 143-49.

There is no doubt that the lifestyle of the Prophet was modest, but the Ṣūfīs and ascetics gladly underline all the transmitted traits of his "poverty", elaborate upon them (*Iḥyā*ᵓ 4/191, *Bayān faḍīlat al-zuhd*; *Stufen* 462 ff./D.132 ff.) and have him willingly renounce, just like Jesus, the keys which were given to him to the treasures of the world. (*Iḥyā*ᵓ 4/193; *Stufen* 468/D.144; Aḥmad Ghazzālī in Massignon, *Recueil* 97).

He is so poor that even after the night of his Ascension he has to borrow something from a Jew.

When Muṣṭafā returned from the Ascension, he borrowed barley from a Jew, and the dog of a Jew demanded a deposit for it as well! That night he had seen both worlds no larger than a millet seed and the next day he didn't have one bushel of barley! (MN 35/1).

The weak *ḥadīth*, which this story is based on, states that one time when a guest came to Muḥammad, the Prophet sent Abū Rāfiᶜ, the transmitter of the *ḥadīth*, to a Jew in Khaybar to have the latter advance him some flour until the beginning of the month of Rajab. The Jew said he wouldn't give him anything without a deposit, and the Prophet then gave him a suit of armor as security. (*Iḥyā*ᵓ 4/169; *Stufen* 408/D.25). When Muḥammad died, a suit of armor of his was still supposed to be held by a Jew as security. (*Mukhtalif al-ḥadīth* 176).

The humble poverty in which the family of the Prophet lives is strikingly revealed in the celebrations of his daughter Fāṭima's marriage to ᶜAlī. ᶜAṭṭār portrays this sorrowful wedding with great sentimentality so that it makes more the impression of being a funeral than a wedding.

It is of no importance for our purpose what details in the reports about Fāṭima's wedding could be historical. On the problems to do with evaluating the relevant sources, see Lammens, *Fāṭima et les filles de Mahomet, notes critiques pour l'étude de la Sīra*, Rome, Pontif. Inst. Bibl. 1912; idem: the article "Fāṭima" in the EI. Gertrude Stern, after careful critical research, has concluded that in any case the bride-money and the dowry were very modest,

Marriage in Early Islam, London 1939, pp. 47-48. Regarding the leather cushion and the mats mentioned in ᶜAṭṭār cf. ibid. pp. 55-56. One finds a treatise on this marriage in the Ẓāhiriyya, see al-ᶜIshsh, *Fihris* p. 70.

Usāma (ibn Zayd, the favorite of the Prophet) relates how the Prophet ordered him to summon Abū Bakr and ᶜUmar, and how he told Fāṭima to bring her dowry because he wanted to marry her to ᶜAlī. She then brought out a hand-mill, an old mat of palm leaves, a piece of wood for rubbing the teeth, a pair of decorated slippers, a wooden bowl, a leather cushion and a cloak made of seven shreds of cloth. The Prophet himself loads the millstone on his back, Abū Bakr carries the mats and ᶜUmar the leather cushion. Fāṭima dons the tattered cloak, puts on the old slippers and carries in her hand the piece of wood for rubbing the teeth. Usāma carries the wooden bowl. "And so we came to ᶜAlī's abode", relates Usāma. "I could not see the people because of my tears over the fact that the daughter of the lord of both worlds was so poorly outfitted, while Caesar and Chosroes live sumptuous, rich lives. But the Prophet instructed me: 'Since we must die, even this is too much.'" (IN 17/6, p. 274-75).

The Prophet has an immense amount of booty available to him but when his daughter Fāṭima asks him for a female slave because her hands have become callused from turning the hand-mill, he doesn't grant her wish. Instead, he teaches her a prayer. (MN 0/6).

Cf. *Ḥilya* 1/70.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

THE INTERPRETATION OF SUFFERING. PATIENCE—GRATITUDE—CONTENTMENT

1

Islamic piety, broadly speaking, has developed the following conceptual motifs for interpreting the suffering with which human beings are afflicted on this earth:

1) Suffering is perdetermined and fixed in writing, i.e. "recorded". It will occur whatever the circumstances. "What has not struck them was unable to strike them, and what has struck them was unable not to strike them." A person should therefore be glad once it has run its course. This is one of the religious foundations for the attitude known as Oriental fatalism.

Ashᶜarī, *Maqālāt* $293_{5\text{-}6}$; *Qūt* $1/211_7$; *Nahrung* 2/102 f./32.162; *Iḥyāʾ* $4/112_{25}$, *al-Rukn al-thālith min kitāb al-ṣabr, etc.*; *Stufen* 266 ff./B.263 ff. I have not consulted the special treatise of ᶜIzz al-Dīn Maqdisī (d. 687/1279), Ms. Berlin, Ahlwardt 8786, 2, and the numerous sermon-books that exist. Belief in providence and the attitude toward death among different classes of the population in Egypt are vividly described by M. al-Muwayliḥī in *Ḥadīth ᶜĪsā b. Hishām*, Cairo 1330, pp. 185-91.

One is obliged to surrender (*taslīm*) to this predetermination.

A ship is caught in a violent storm. A gebr is aboard. He's gripped by great fear and calls out to the fire that he worships: "Come and help me!" The captain says: "Be quiet, you fool! What help can fire give you here?" The gebr: "Then what should we do?" The skipper: "Surrender ourselves to what has been determined for us." (MN 2/1).

When the ocean of predetermination is raging, then the lion is silent just like the mouse.

During a shipwreck a cat and a mouse save themselves on a board. At that moment the mouse no longer fears the cat, nor does the cat think of catching the mouse. Both have forgotten themselves. (MN 2/2).

2) It has simply been ordained by God that the pious must suffer. The prophets suffer the worst, then the pious, etc., according to a gradated scale.

Tanbīh al-ghāfilīn 104a, *al-Ṣabr ʿalā'l-shidda*; *Qūt* 1/196$_{32}$; *Nahrung* 2/61/32.98.

The Prophet says: "...If you love me, prepare yourself a robe to wrap yourself in (*jilbāb*) for affliction, because by God affliction descends on him who loves me more quickly than a torrent from a mountain peak." (*Tanbīh* 104a).

On the suffering of the prophets in ʿAṭṭār see above pp. 62-63.

3) Every form of suffering and misfortune could always be worse.

Qūt 1/211$_{6-7}$; *Nahrung* 2/102/32.162. Cf. the Turkish expression: *Allah betterinden saklasin!* "May God preserve us from even worse!", after which people normally have graphic stories to recount.

Someone complains about his poverty. A wise man answers: "Would you like to be blind and have 10,000 dirhams?" The poor man: "No."—"Would you like to be mute and have 10,000 dirhams?"—"No."—"Would you like it if your arms and legs were amputated, and you had 20,000 dirhams?"—"No."—"Would you like to be insane and have 10,000 dirhams?"—"No."—"Aren't you ashamed to complain about a lord when you're in possession of goods worth 50,000 dirhams?" (*Iḥyā'* 4/107$_{30}$, *Bayān al-sabab al-ṣārif, etc.*; *Stufen* 258/B.252).

4) One might well deserve much worse.

When Abū ʿUthmān al-Ḥīrī walks down the street during the noonday heat, someone empties out a bowl of ashes over his head from the roof. His companions become very angry at this and verbally abuse the person who emptied out the ashes. But Abū ʿUthmān remarks: "Don't say a thing! Someone who deserves to have fire poured over him, and is then let off with ashes, is not allowed to become angry."

Qushayrī, *Risāla* 111, *Bāb al-khuluq*; *Sendschreiben* 342/35.9; *Iḥyā'* 4/112$_{13}$; *Stufen* 269/B.271. About Abū Saʿīd in *Asrār al-tawḥīd* 172; O'Kane, *Secrets* 321; and ascribed to Bāyazīd in Saʿdī's *Būstān*, *Bāb* 4.

During a time of drought they ask a man whether he wishes to come along into the countryside to pray for rain. He answers: "You think that rain (water) has been a long time coming. I think the raining down of stones has been a long time coming." (*Iḥyā'* 4/112$_{15-16}$; *Stufen* 269/B.271; cf. the story about Ṭāwūs, IN 13/3; and above pp. 102 f.).

5) Other people are even worse off. Therefore in making comparisons one should look below and not above.

One of the Ṣūfīs practiced this systematically by going every day to the hospital, to the cemeteries and places of execution where people are tortured, maimed and executed. (*Iḥyā'* 4/110$_{2ff.}$; *Stufen* 263 f./B.261).—But otherwise, given the choice, almost no one would change places with someone else (*Iḥyā'* 4/108; *Stufen* 257 f./B.251-252).

6) Even worse than bodily suffering or material losses is the religious misfortune which could befall someone. (*Qūt* 1/211$_6$; *Nahrung* 2/102/32.162). Satan might corrupt a person's religion.

A man tells Sahl al-Tustarī that a thief came into his house and stole his possessions. Sahl answers: "Thank God! If Satan had come into your heart and corrupted your profession of God's oneness, what would you have done then?" (*Iḥyā*ᵓ 4/112; *Stufen* 269/B.269).

An impoverished Koran-reader is asked in a dream: "Would you like it if We caused you to forget the surah *al-An*ᶜ*ām* and gave you 10,000 dinars?" He answers: "No!"—"Or perhaps the surah *Hūd*?"—"No!"—"Or perhaps the surah about Joseph?"—"No!"—In this way the voice enumerates a series of surahs, and the Koran-reader refuses the exchange each time. Then the voice says: "So you possess a value of 100,000 dinars and you still complain?" The Koran-reader wakes up feeling consoled. (*Iḥyā*ᵓ 4/107-08; *Stufen* 258/B.252).

In the same way the vexation disappears which is aroused by things going well for an infidel and badly for a believer. Because punishment in the hereafter awaits the infidel, and all his goods and his good fortune will not help him at all.

*Iḥyā*ᵓ 4/114-15; *Stufen* 275/B.281; *Tanbīh al-ghāfilīn* 103a; in great detail in *Ighāthat al-lahfān* 324-32.

An infidel and a believer go fishing together. The infidel calls upon his gods, casts his net and catches many fish. The believer says God's name but no fish come into his net. Only at sunset does he catch a fish but the fish jumps back in the water. So he returns home with empty hands, whereas the infidel goes home with a full fish-basket. The protecting angel of the believer is saddened by this. When the angel flies up to heaven, God shows him the destined abode of the believer in Paradise and the infidel's abode in Hell, and thereby convinces the angel that the one man's misfortune causes the man no harm, and the other man's good luck is no help to him. (*Tanbīh* 103b, *al-Ṣabr* ᶜ*alā'l-shidda*).

A story in ᶜAṭṭār:

A poor shaykh encounters a Christian who's riding through the bazaar on a richly caparisoned horse and accompanied by slaves, and the shaykh says to God: "I'm one of Your friends, he's one of Your enemies. You give neither bread nor clothing to the one You've accepted, and to the one You've rejected You give a horse and a turban!" A voice calls to him: "If you wish, you can trade places with him. Give away your faith and take unbelief in its place! Give away poverty and take wealth in its place!" At that the shaykh falls to the ground unconscious and when he regains his senses, he vows repentance. (IN 20/1, pp. 315-16).

A similar complaint of a Muslim induced Ibn Sīnā to write his *Risālat al-arzāq*. See above p. 167.

7) Suffering is a temporary punishment for sins one has committed.

Iḥyā᾽ 4/47, *Dawā᾽ al-tawba, rukn 4, nawᶜ* 3; *Stufen* 122/A.285.

8) Through suffering one atones for sins one has committed.

Qūt 1/211$_{17}$, 2/24$_{17}$; *Nahrung* 2/103/32.164, 2/361/32.544; *Tanbīh* 103a; *Iḥyā᾽* 4/114-15; *Stufen* 275/B.281; *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 1/115. ᶜAlī al-Qāri᾽, *al-Aḥādīth al-qudsiyya* 4).

Even for a thorn that has caused him harm, a person will have a sin removed. (*Tanbīh* 105b).—One day of fever atones for the sins of a year. (*Qūt* 2/24$_{18}$; *Nahrung* 2/361/32.544).

God does not punish twice. If a sinner is punished here through suffering, he will not be punished there another time. God is too noble for that.

Iḥyā᾽ 4/112, 115; *Stufen* 270/B.27, 276/B.283; *Tanbīh* 102a-b, 105b.

For "the people of affliction" no scales will be set up on the Final Day and no register will be unrolled (and they'll be as richly showered with rewards as they were showered with affliction in the here and now). (*Tanbīh* 103a-b; *Iḥyā᾽* 4/63, 113, 114; *Stufen* 163/B.56, 271 f./B.274, 274/B.280-281.).—It's better to be punished here than there. (*Qūt* 1/21$_{7-8,\ 18}$; *Nahrung* 2/113 f./32.164-166).—If God intends good for his bondsman, He punishes him for his sins in the here and now. (*Iḥyā᾽* 4/115; *Stufen* 276/B.282).

It is even rather disturbing if a person does not undergo some illness.

The Prophet is speaking about bodily pains, headaches and such things. A man says: "What's headache? I don't know what it is." Then the Prophet says: "Be gone from my presence! If anyone wants to see a person who belongs to the people of Hell, let him look at this man!" For according to tradition, fever is what's allotted to the believer from the fire of Hell. (*Qūt* 2/26$_{21-23}$; *Nahrung* 2/368/32.552).—Sickness is the believer's share in Hell-fire. (ᶜAlī al-Qāri᾽ 4).

9) Those who suffer here will be amply compensated in the hereafter so that they forget their sufferings.

On the Final Day the man who's enjoyed the most earthly good fortune of all human beings will be plunged once into Hell and come out burnt black. Then he'll be asked: "Have you ever enjoyed good fortune (*naᶜīm*)?" He answers: "No, I've been in this torment from eternity." Then the most tormented man in this world will be plunged once into Paradise and come out like the moon on a night of the full moon. They ask him: "Have you ever experienced anything bad?" He answers: "No, I've been in this good fortune (*naᶜīm*) from eternity." (*Tanbīh* 102b).

For his suffering, or for the patience displayed during suffering, a person is allotted a great reward. When someone has lost a relative, people say to him: "God give you a great reward (i.e. for

your patiently bearing this grief)!" This is still a practice today. (*Muséon* 1949, p. 157).

They said the same to the poet Jarīr when his son Sawāda died. (*Aghānī*[3] 8/10).—Ibn al-Muqaffaᶜ, in the letter of condolence to a father who has lost his son, wishes the man a great reward. (*Rasāʾil al-bulaghāʾ* 132).—The death of Hārūn al-Rashīd is announced to Bakr b. al-Muᶜtamir with the words: *Aᶜẓama'llāhu ajraka fī amīri'l-muʾminīn!* (Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarāʾ* 275_{16}). The prince Ibn al-Muᶜtazz writes in a similar manner to ᶜUbayd Allāh b. ᶜAbd Allāh b. Ṭāhir when the latter has lost the passionately loved mother of his children, Shājī. (Shābushtī, *Diyārāt* 73-74).—When Jāḥiẓ pays a visit of condolence to a teacher who, as he thinks, has lost a relative, the first thing he says to him is: "God give you a great reward!" (*Thamarāt al-awrāq*, Cairo 1300, *al-Dhayl al-awwal* 179).—When the believer sees how richly he's rewarded for his sufferings, he wishes that all his relatives and children had died. (*Tanbīh al-ghāfilīn* 108a, *al-Ṣabr ᶜalā'l-muṣība*).—Ibn ᶜAsākir wrote a book with the title *Thawāb al-ṣabr ᶜalā'l-muṣāb bi'l-walad. Taʾrīkh Dimashq* I, Damascus 1951, page y.

Unjust suffering helps one win the martyr's crown.

ᶜAlī says: "The man whom the government unjustly imprisons and who then dies in prison, is a martyr. And if they have him beaten to death, he is also a martyr." (See above pp. 108-09).

For every torment which we've suffered here, for every pain and every care we've experienced, there we'll find a hundredfold recompense. Come, let us hasten thither!—There then follows a description of how wonderful it is in Paradise. (AN 11/0.—Compare as well the story of Ibrāhīm ibn Adham, above p. 39).

10) The works which a sick person is hindered from undertaking because of his suffering are not only not lost but are credited to him in full and are of higher worth than they would be if they had actually been carried out.

The recording angels write down as many good works for a sick person as he would have performed in a healthy state. But this is better for him because works he would actually have carried out may perhaps not have been without some flaw. (*Qūt* 2/25_{3-5}; *Nahrung* 2/363/32.547).

When Tirmidhī recovers from an illness, he calculates in his imagination the works of worship (*ᶜibāda*) of human beings and spirits during the duration of his illness in comparison with what God has allotted him during his illness and finds that the latter has far greater value than if all those works of worship were his own. Because whatever God does is free of any impure addition. What God does to save you is better than what you do to bring about your salvation. (*Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 1/13-14).

The above idea accords well with Shādhilī thought, since the Shādhilīs never tire of representing the activity of human beings as of lesser worth compared with God's activity.

11) Suffering is a test.

Man is put to the test, just as gold is tested by means of fire. (*Qūt* 2/25$_1$; *Nahrung* 2/363/32.546; *Iḥyā*ʾ 4/116; *Stufen* 278/B.287).

12) Suffering hinders one from committing sins.

The things which are taken away from man, wealth, property, relatives, bodily limbs, even an eye, indeed reason itself, can cast man into eternal damnation because they cause him to commit sins. On the Final Day the heretics will wish they had been insane or children because then they wouldn't have been led into error by the false use of their full reason. (*Iḥyā*ʾ 4/111, 112; *Stufen* 271/B.273. On the dangers of earthly good fortune see ibid. 4/60-61; *Stufen* 134 f./B.323.—Illness, like going hungry, weakens the animal soul and keeps one from committing sins. (*Qūt* 2/23$_{33}$; *Nahrung* 2/358 f./32.541).—God puts chains on His bondsman by means of illnesses so that he can't commit sins. God says: "Poverty is My prison and illness is My chain. In this way I detain those who love Me." If he has himself treated and becomes healthy, he's not safe from the possibility that the carnal soul grows strong and its lusts cause him harm. For sins are committed during the period of good health. (Thus sickness functions as a form of preventative criminal detention). (*Qūt* 2/24; *Nahrung* 2/360/32.543; cf. *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 1/113).

13) Suffering has an educational effect.

It's a chastisement from God (*ta*ʾ*dīb*). On the Final Day the bondsmen of God will thank their God for chastising them, just as a child, when it grows up and acquires understanding, thanks its teacher and its father for the chastisement and the blows it received from them. (*Iḥyā*ʾ 4/112-13; *Stufen* 271/B.273).—Health and prosperity turn people's heart toward the world, whereas suffering and misfortune draw it away from the world. (*Iḥyā*ʾ 4/113; *Stufen* 271 f./B.274; cf. *Qūt* 2/24$_{13}$; *Nahrung* 2/360/32.543).—Suffering makes one think about death and causes men to renew their vow of repentance, fulfil their obligations toward other people, and rectify the injustice they've done to them. (*Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 1/117; cf. *Qūt* 2/26$_{16}$; *Nahrung* 2/367/32.551).

Among the Shādhiliyya this idea is connected with a principle they take to be fundamental, namely that whatever originates from God by way of making Himself known to His bondsman and causing the bondsman to become acquainted with Him (*ta*ᶜ*arruf*) is always of greater worth than anything which originates from the bondsman. Because the gift of God is always purer than human works which may not always be unadulterated (see above p. 242).

An example of this is the torments and forms of distress that befall a person and which spoil the joys of the world for him and hinder him from undertaking many pious works. He wants to live his life in prosperity and happiness. With regard to striving after the hereafter, he behaves like people in comfortable circumstances who (at most) refrain from unallowed property. His carnal soul will

only approve external works which don't cost him much and don't demand any effort, and in the performance of which he doesn't have to give up his pleasures and his desires don't elude him. But God wishes to cleanse him of his bad character and separate him from his reprehensible qualities and lead him forth from the imprisonment of his (ego-)existence into the expanse of beholding God. He can only fully reach this halting-station, however, by means of something that's opposed to his will and throws his accustomed life into confusion. He then enters into the state of inward dealings (with God) (*al-muʿāmala bi'l-bāṭin*) which has nothing to do with external works. When he's understood this, then he knows that whatever God chooses for him and wants from him is better than what he chooses for himself and wants. (A few lines later [p. 232] the story follows which has already been related about Tirmidhī). (*Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 1/13; cf. ibid. 2/15).

Thus by means of suffering and sickness a purification is effected and at the same time a turning away not only from worldly pleasure, but from external achievements as well, for the sake of an internal encounter with God.

In another passage it is argued that suffering which one must endure from others has the favorable pedagogical effect of making one stop trusting people and brings God's bondsman to the point of not relying on anyone or seeking refuge with anyone other than God.

God causes you to suffer at the hands of people so that you don't seek your peace with them. He wants to detach you from all things so that nothing any longer holds you back from Him. (*Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/81 with numerous relevant stories).

The pedagogical effect of hunger:

God causes His friend to go hungry until he's become completely fed up (disgusted) with his soul. Then when he's fed up with his soul, he becomes hungry for the divine beloved. (MN 2/6, after the story about the fool who knows that God will make him go hungry. Above p. 56).

14) One should bear in mind that it is God who sends suffering, God who after all means well toward His bondsman.

The pain of your suffering should be made less through the knowledge that it's He who sends the suffering. The one who's behind the harsh events that have befallen you is the same one who (otherwise always) made you feel that He seeks what's best for you. (*Ḥikma* of Ibn ʿAṭāʾ Allāh). On this Rundī says: "If the bondsman knows that God is merciful and friendly to him and watches him, then he should not care and worry about the various sufferings and blows of misfortune which He causes to befall him. Indeed, he's only used to what is good from Him. For this reason he should think and believe good of God, knowing that He has sought this for him and that it contains a hidden good (*maṣāliḥ khafiyya*) for

him which only He is acquainted with. Just as God says: 'Perhaps you destest a thing, whereas it is actually better for you.' (Surah 2/216)." (*Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 1/112; cf. *Qūt* 2/24$_4$; *Nahrung* 2/360/32.543; *Iḥyā*ʾ 4/113$_2$; *Stufen* 271/B.273).

15) Thus there are innumerable mercies and favors concealed within suffering. What these consist of we have already learned in part. Sometimes individual suffering men of piety receive special mercies.

These are systematically enumerated in *Qūt* 1/211; *Nahrung* 2/102/32.162; *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 1/113-18.

ᶜImrān ibn al-Ḥusayn (d. 52/672), who's laid low with dropsy, is visited by the angels. (*Elixir* 173 et passim).

Under every torment which He sends to these people God has placed (concealed) a treasure of kindness (*karam*). (MN 2/5, final verse).

16) Therefore suffering is a sign of God's mercifulness and love.

Sahl al-Tustarī says: "The illnesses of your body are mercifulness, the illnesses of the heart are punishment." (*Qūt* 2/23 bot.; *Nahrung* 2/359/32.541).—Moses sees a sorely afflicted man and says: "Oh God, have mercy on him!" God answers: "How should I have mercy on him regarding something with which I show him My mercy?"

Kayfa arḥamuhū mimmā bihī arḥamuh? Qūt 2/24$_{29}$; *Nahrung* 2/362/32.546; cf. *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 1/13.

When God loves a bondsman, he afflicts him with difficulty (He tests him, *ibtalāhu*), and when He loves him very much, he buys him up, i.e. He leaves him neither family, nor possessions. (*Qūt* 2/53$_{5-6}$; *Nahrung* 2/458/32.674).

17) Ghazzālī's arguments deal more with the surface of the issue. He maintains that the same thing from one point of view is a hardship, from another point of view a benefit, and that much suffering, though not useful for the sufferer, is quite useful for others, as for example the punishment of the infidels in Hell-fire is a misfortune for them but is a benefit for the believers because they thereby learn to appreciate benefits and because the joy of the dwellers in Paradise is doubled when they think of the suffering of the dwellers in Hell, and much else. (*Iḥyā*ʾ 4/111, *al-Rukn al-thālith, etc.*; *Stufen* 268/B.268).

18) Another transformation of the value of suffering develops in mystical love. We shall be taking up that subject later on.

Thus, through teachings such as these, Islamic monotheism attempts to make up for the lived experience that affliction inexorably befalls man, with the idea of a kind and merciful God who at the same time is still the source of this affliction.

2

What then is the inner attitude with which the pious man confronts the joy and especially the suffering that are allotted to him? Three halting-stations (*maqāmāt*) are mentioned which God's bondsman can adopt in the face of what happens to him. These are patience (*ṣabr*), gratitude (*shukr*) and internal agreement, i.e. contentment (*riḍā*).

In order to bear suffering and affliction what is chiefly required is patience.

Whoever might be inclined to conceive of trust in God (*tawakkul*) as if he henceforth expects God to fulfil his hopes and wishes, and to protect him from all distress and hardship, would indeed soon be disappointed.

"The religious scholars", as Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī says, "haven't put their trust in God so that He obtains worldly goods for them, or so that He helps them attain their desires, or with the proviso that He brings about, in the friendliest manner, what they find pleasant. Nor do they expect Him to alter the previous decisions of His will according to the demands of their understanding, or that He make an exception of them as far as His practice of afflicting and testing His bondsmen. He's too lofty in their eyes for that, and they're too intelligent and know Him too well to do such a thing. If a knower of God conceived such an idea while putting his trust in God, he would be committing a great sin for which he would have to repent, and his trust in God would be disobedience. Rather, they imposed on their souls steadfast patience in bearing God's established order, however it may turn out, and demanded of their hearts inner agreement with Him..." (*Qūt* 2/36$_{20\text{-}25}$; *Nahrung* 2/398/32.592).

Ṣabr "patience" means steadfast endurance in a situation which is difficult to bear, putting up with pain and suffering without complaint, and accepting that one's desires remain unfulfilled.

Ṣabr fī, *ṣabr ʿan* means the patient renunciation of something enticing, putting up with separation from a beloved person, whereas *ṣabr ʿalā* means endurance in undertaking difficult acts of obedience, as well as holding out in religiously dangerous situations like health and affluence. (*Qūt* 1/199$_{18}$, 1/197$_{22}$; *Nahrung* 2/68/32.109, 2/63/32.102). Moreover, compare to this *maqām*: *Qūt* 1/193-202; *Nahrung* 2/53-79/32.80-125; Qushayrī, *Risāla* 84-87; *Sendschreiben* 263/263-270/22; *Iḥyāʾ* 4/53-69, 110-23; *Stufen* 140-177/B.3-81, 266-293/B.263-313. Due to the breadth of the concept, virtues are here included which we would classify under other categories.

The early men of piety thought it reprehensible if a sick person moaned because that would imply a complaint. (*Qūt* 2/28$_{23}$; *Nahrung* 2/375/32.560).—Moaning during sickness and suffering means that one is complaining about God to His creatures. God reveals to the prophet ʿUzayr: "When torment comes

over you, don't complain about Me to My creatures!" (*Iḥyāʾ* 4/116$_{13}$; *Stufen* 278 f./B.287).

When Jacob is asked what the cause of his blindness is, he answers: "The passage (read: *marr*) of time and long grief." Then God reveals to him: "So you have nothing better to do than complain about Me to My creatures!" (*Qūt* 2/28$_{20}$; *Nahrung* 2/375/32.560).

In ᶜAṭṭār:

When Jacob, who has gone blind from so much weeping, constantly repeats the name of his missing Joseph, God has Gabriel tell him that if he doesn't pull himself together, he'll be removed from the list of prophets. Jacob then gets control of himself and no longer utters his beloved son's name. But one time when he sees Joseph in a dream, he can't refrain from letting out a sigh. Gabriel thereupon reproaches him for having broken his vow of repentance. (MṬ 12/1; above pp. 62 f.).

When Zacharias is discovered having taken refuge from Jewish infidels in a hollow tree and the infidels begin to saw through the tree from above, he lets out a moan when the saw touches his head. God then reveals to him: "If you let out a second moan, I'll strike you from the list of prophets." At that Zacharias pulls himself together and lets himself be sawn apart in silence. (*Iḥyāʾ* 4/116; *Stufen* 278/B.286).

We have already seen (p. 63) how ᶜAṭṭār uses this story to express his misgivings about God's arbitrary behavior.

The Companion of the Prophet, Bilāl, can serve as a model for steadfast endurance of pain. He receives a hundred blows with a stick and whip, but with each blow he only says "one" (*aḥad*). (MṬ 0/7, p. 21; *Mathnawī* 6/888 ff.).

See for instance Ibn Ḥajar, *Iṣāba* 1/171; Dhahabī, *Taʾrīkh al-islām* 2/31.

Abū Bakr suffers from toothache for ten years but doesn't inform the Prophet about it. When the Prophet learns of this from God, he asks Abū Bakr why he hasn't said anything about it. Abū Bakr answers: "It's not good to complain about God." (IN p. 22$_{3\text{-}5}$; cf. above p. 62).

On the other hand, fastidious men of piety also consider it inappropriate to play at being steadfast and strong before God the All-powerful. (*Qūt* 2/29$_5$; *Nahrung* 2/377/32.562).—Perhaps this opposition is reflected in ᶜAṭṭār in God's contradictory directives to His saints to cry out and not to cry out (above pp. 62-63).

3

The counterpart to endurance in hardship (*ṣabr*) is gratitude for the benefits bestowed by God (*shukr*).

Shukr is treated after *ṣabr* in the *Qūt* and *Iḥyā*ʾ, and at the same time the question is discussed as to which of the two *maqāms* is more valuable. (*Qūt* 1/203-13; *Nahrung* 2/81-107/32.126-171; Qushayrī, *Risāla* 80-82; *Sendschreiben* 250-256/20; *Iḥyā*ʾ 4/69-123; *Stufen* 139-293/B).

Saᶜdī's *Rosegarden* begins with a description of God's benefits for which man owes Him thanks: "Every breath which is inhaled bestows new life, and every breath exhaled gives pleasure. For this reason every act of breathing contains two benefits, and we are obliged to give thanks for every benefit, etc."

Cf. Seneca, *De beneficiis* 4/5-6.

Saᶜdī here touches on a religious motif which is dealt with readily and frequently, and not only in Islamic literary circles: man's duty of gratitude for his existence, for the miraculous construction of his body, his nourishment, health, possession of the true faith, etc.

Makkī begins his presentation of God's benefits with the words: "The first benefit we know of is that God made us exist in contrast to non-existent things." Then he enumerates other benefits of a similar sort: that one is a living creature as opposed to non-living nature, that one is a man and not a woman, that one is well-formed, that God protects one from straying from "the sunna" and against the impulses of the carnal soul, that He has made the whole of creation between the heavens and earth subservient to man, etc. (*Qūt* 1/208$_{24}$; *Nahrung* 2/95/32.151).—Ghazzālī begins the subject with a broad description (*Iḥyā*ʾ 4/94-106; *Stufen* 233 ff./B.193 ff.) but, despite the large space he devotes to it, comes to the conclusion that to present God's benefits in detail would far exceed the scope of his book, and promises to compose a special work on the subject entitled *The Wonders of God's Action*. (*Iḥyā*ʾ 4/106$_{24}$; *Stufen* 257/B.249).

In ᶜAṭṭār:

From head to foot (you're covered with) His benefits. Bear in mind the benefits of the Friend... God has cherished and nourished you with hundreds of honors and indulgences, and out of ignorance you remain turned toward someone else! (MṬ before 25/3, p. 87, verses 2237, 2239).

We have already seen that one should also consider the benefits bestowed on one by other people as direct gifts of mercy from God (above p. 219). The fools, who in any case always have direct dealings with God (above p. 175), thank God for the food which is sent them by compassionate people, of course in the fool's naïve manner, in accordance with the principle: "Give, then you will receive as well!" A fool performs his prayers with great enthusiasm because God, contrary to His habit, has for once made him completely full. (Above p. 185).

Another fool eats food (bestowed on him by someone) with great gusto and constantly gives thanks to God: "Oh Lord, from whom the soul and the body originate! Gratitude toward You comes from me and food for me comes from You. Keep on sending me food, and I will send gratitude to You!" (MN 22/11).

Since affliction for those who see beneath the surface is in reality a benefit or in any case guarantees one's reward in the hereafter, many pious persons go so far as to rejoice because of it and to experience it as an honor and a distinction, and in return offer up thanks, just as in the case of an unfulfilled request.

Numerous sayings on the subject in Qushayrī, *Risāla* 80-82, *Bāb al-shukr*; *Sendschreiben* 250-256/20.

Some examples:

The wife of Fatḥ al-Mawṣilī stumbles and tears one of her nails in two. She laughs and when they ask her whether she doesn't feel pain, she answers: "The joy at the reward removed the pain from my heart." (*Iḥyā*ʾ 4/63; *Stufen* 163/B.56; *Elixir* 169-70).—Fatḥ al-Mawṣilī himself says when he and his family experience serious difficulties: "My God! If only I knew which good work You've honored me for so I could do more such works!" (*Tanbīh* 104b).

The pious feel dejected if a year goes by without them suffering some lack or loss. (*Qūt* 2/26$_{17}$; *Nahrung* 2/368/32.552; *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 1/118).

ᶜAmmār marries, but divorces his wife when she doesn't become sick.—The Prophet is supposed to have abandoned a plan to marry when they boasted about the woman he intended to marry that she had never been sick. (*Qūt* 2/26$_{19}$; *Nahrung* 2/368/32.552).

ᶜAṭṭār does not deal with gratitude on behalf of suffering that befalls one but he does illustrate with a story the idea that one must accept a certain bitterness along with so many benefits.

Don't forget that every moment hundreds of favors (*ᶜināyat*) are also bestowed on you! You only see the afflictions which are so few in number compared with the favors!

A king gives his slave a fruit to eat. The slave eats it with visible relish and praises its sweetness. The king then has himself given half the fruit and discovers that it's completely bitter. When he asks the slave why he acted as if the fruit were sweet, the latter answers: "It wouldn't be right for me to find fault with the fruit. I received it from a hand which has bestowed on me thousands of benefits and acts of kindness! In face of such an abundance of good, this one bitterness doesn't enter my consciousness." (MṬ 27/2, p. 94.—*Asrār al-tawḥīd* 62, with a *dihqān* instead of a king; O'Kane, *Secrets* 158).

4

The other attitude, which according to Makkī's explanations (above p. 246) must be joined with trust in God, is that of contentment, of inner agreement with God's ordaining (*riḍā*).

Qūt 2/38-50; *Nahrung* 2/405-450/32.602-659; Qushayrī, *Risāla* 88-90; *Sendschreiben* 275-280/24; *Iḥyā᾽* 4/294-300; *Stufen* 727-753/F.247-310; *Elixir* 164-77.

All three, patience, contentment and gratitude, appear together in a saying of God: "Whoever does not bear My affliction patiently, is not content with My ruling, and doesn't show gratitude for My benefits, let him take someone other than Me as his lord!" (*Qūt* 2/26$_8$, 41$_{14}$; *Nahrung* 2/267/32.550, 2/415/32.615. Similar *ḥadīths* are found in *Elixir* 167). *Riḍā*, inner acceptance, has a warmer feel to it than the two other *maqāms* and is considered a higher level. In one *ḥadīth* it says: "Serve God with inner acceptance and if you cannot do that, then there is much good in patiently bearing what you find disagreeable." (*Qūt* 2/38-39; *Nahrung* 2/406/32.604; *Iḥyā᾽* 4/60; *Stufen* 154/B.38).

Makkī says about contentment:

It is part of contentment that the heart is happy with what is determined by God in all matters, that the soul is cheerful and at peace in all circumstances, that the heart remains still and at peace in everything which causes fear and creates disturbance about things of this world, that the bondsman is satisfied with everything and pleased with what his Lord has allotted him... that the bondsman is subservient to his Lord in all things... and leaves to His discretion all arrangements and decisions in the firm belief that He will look after matters as is right, etc. (*Qūt* 2/40$_{12}$; *Nahrung* 2/411/32.611.—Cf. above p. 224).

According to Fuḍayl, contentment consists of it being the same for the pious man whether the gift is given or the gift is refused. (*Qūt* 2/45$_{17}$; *Nahrung* 2/428/32.632).

The learned disputed among themselves which of three attitudes is preferable: one person loves death out of his yearning to reach God, another loves life in order to exert himself in God's service, and a third says: "I make no choice at all but am in agreement with whatever my Lord chooses for me. If He wishes, let Him make me live for eternity, and if He wishes, let Him make me die tomorrow." They called a knower of God to be the arbitrator and he decided that pre-eminence should go to the third man. (*Qūt* 2/44$_{19}$; *Nahrung* 2/425/32.628).

One may consider the dying out of the human race and one's own death as desirable, but one must never pre-empt God's decision by means of suicide.

Someone asks a Ṣūfī what he wishes for. The Ṣūfī answers: "I would like a great flood to sweep away the people of this world who are all caught up in illu-

sion, heretical innovations and polytheism." They say to him: "But then you would be destroyed as well!" He answers: "That's okay with me. The flood can sweep me away before the others." They say to him: "If that's what you want, throw yourself in the sea and then you'll have what you desire!" He answers: "It isn't good for me to kill myself, if the divine Friend doesn't want to kill me."— In the verses which follow this submission to God's will is then justified on the basis of mystical love. (IN 14/7, pp. 223-24).

One cannot shift the moment in time when the divinely determined ration will be bestowed but must leave this to God.

A man is scolded by the Ṣūfīs because he comes back so late from fetching water. Shaykh Abū Saᶜīd says: "How could he bring the water earlier? The water determined for us arrives when it's the proper time. Only then can he draw water from the well. How can one drink water at the wrong time? The decision lies in God's hands. It's He who provides." (MN 23/8.—*Asrār al-tawḥīd* 162-63; O'Kane, *Secrets* 305).

5

On the practical level agreement with God's ordering is put into effect by avoiding any criticism of the way things are (*tark ᶜayb al-ashyāʾ*). The pious man will not say: "This is a very hot day", or "This is a very cold day", or "Poverty is an affliction", or "Feeding the family causes worry and difficulty", etc. (*Qūt* $2/40_{17}$; *Nahrung* 2/411/32.611). Criticism of things means speaking slander (*ghība*) about the Creator who has made them the way they are. (*Qūt* $2/42_{7}$; *Nahrung* 2/416 f./32.617). Likewise, "reproaching the world" (*dhamm al-dunyā*) then also stops as well.

Abū Ḥafṣ al-Nīsābūrī hears one of his companions reproaching the world and worldly people, and says to him: "Now what you used to be silent about has been revealed! You may no longer sit with us and may no longer accompany us!"

Sulamī, *Risālat al-malāmatiyya* in ᶜAfīfī: *Majallat Kulliyyat al-Ādāb Jāmiᶜat Fārūq al-awwal* 1/1943/15.

One will leave things as they are and not change anything unnecessarily.

An extreme example: A man accompanies a knower of God on a journey. Along the way he plays with a certain object and moves it from one place to another. The knower of God says: "What are you doing there? You've altered something in the realm of this world (*mulk*) without necessity and without a prescription of the *sunna* as a reason! You can no longer be my companion!" (*Qūt* 2/ 42_{22}; *Nahrung* 2/419/32.619).

Reviling oppressors, for example Ḥajjāj the cruel governor of ᶜIrāq, and uttering curses against them is disapproved of by the early men of piety.

Cf. already "Ḥasan al-Baṣrī" p. 51; *Qūt* 2/34$_{17}$; *Nahrung* 2/392/32.584. Cf. also Abū Saᶜīd al-Kharrāz (d. probably 256/899) in Watt, *Free Will* 127.

One should also avoid imagining how much better things would be if only...

It's deemed to be polytheism if God's bondsman says: "If this were not the case, then this wouldn't be so" (*Lawlā kadhā mā kāna kadhā*). In Tradition it says: "Avoid using *law* 'if... were', because it prompts the work of Satan." (*Qūt* 2/4$_{19}$; *Nahrung* 2/296/447).

As an example of not criticizing things in the world, the famous story about Jesus and the dead dog is told which is also depicted in miniature painting. (*Qūt* 2/42$_{14}$; *Nahrung* 2/417 f./61). ᶜAṭṭār relates it for a somewhat different reason:

When the world-traveller returns to his *pīr* after visiting Jesus, the *pīr* instructs him that Jesus has pre-eminence in nobility (*karam*), kindness (*luṭf*) and purity (*pākī*). Because he was pure himself, he saw everything purely.

Jesus walks past a dead dog whose mouth is open and from which the stench of a carcass emerges. He says to his companion: "This dog belongs to Him. Look at how white its teeth are!" (MN 34/1).

The story appears in Indian literature and is told by Haribhadra, a Jain monk from the second half of the 9th century. The one who utters the final remark is Vasādeva. (M. Winternitz, *Geschichte der indischen Literatur* II 322; Thomas Arnold, *Painting in Islam*, Oxford 1928, p. 101; A. Zieseniss, "Zwei indische Lehrerzählungen im Islam" in: ZDMG 99/ 1950/272-73). Around the same time it shows up in Arabic literature in Jāḥiẓ (d. 255/868), *Ḥayawān* II, Cairo 1357, p. 163. It is also found in Niẓāmī's *Makhzan al-asrār*. Two miniatures based on the story appear in Arnold, *Painting*, plates 27 and 28. Additional references in M. Asín Palacios, *Logia et Agrapha Domini Jesu apud moslemicos scriptores*, Paris 1916, p. 365.— Cf. Goethe, *West-östlicher Divan* 166.

Together with acceptance of things as they are one can also include not asking for the reasons behind God's ordaining. (Above p. 83).

A fool says: "What makes men unhappy is (searching for) the reason. Happy one that I am, I come from the world devoid of reasons. I've been brought forth by way of non-causality (*bē-ᶜillatī*). Along with my madness I've had happiness conferred on me. But no one knows the secret of my madness." (MN 8/2).

Another man displays complete agreement with what happens to him:

A man has the nickname "Khwash" because in face of everything that befalls him, he always says: "*Khwash, khwash!*" (Wonderful, wonderful!) Even when his

house collapses, and his wife and children are buried under it, he only says: "Wonderful, wonderful!" For he sees everything as being predetermined by God. (MN 8/3).

6

Finally, as a logical consequence of contentment, one comes to renounce prayer aimed at relieving suffering, in fact one renounces prayer of supplication in general unless its meaning is transformed (above pp. 56-57).

Cf. in this regard Smith, *Rābi^{c}a* 24-25; *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/11-14. For a typical story see ibid. 1/77. Here as well Ghazzālī avoids adopting a radical position: *Iḥyāʾ* 4/300 ff., *Bayān anna'l-du^{c}āʾ ghayr munāqiḍ li'l-riḍā*; *Stufen* 744 ff./F.292 ff.; *Elixir* 176.

For the same reasons many pious persons renounce medical treatment and fleeing from a plague-infested city.

Qūt 2/22, 43; *Nahrung* 2/352/534, 2/420 f./32.622-623; *Iḥyāʾ* 4/246 ff., *Bayān tark al-tadāwī*; *Stufen* 611 ff./E.225 ff.

A story involving an extreme case:

^{c}Abd al-Wāḥid ibn Zayd, together with his companions, comes across a leper in a mountian cave near Basra who's covered with festering sores, and says to him: "You should go to Basra and receive treatment!" The sick man then raises his head toward the heavens and says: "Lord, what sin have I committed that You've sent to me these people as a burden, who want to make me angry with You and convince me to avoid Your judgement? Lord, I beg You to pardon that sin! Be good to me once more and I'll never do it again." Thereupon the visitors leave him to himself. (*Qūt* 2/24$_{31}$; *Nahrung* 2/363/32.546).

Laka'l-^{c}utbā innī lā a^{c}ūdu fīhi abadā. For this expression cf. Maydānī, *Majma^c al-amthāl*, Būlāq 1284, 2/130, (Cairo 1310) 2/102 and *Mufaḍḍaliyyāt* 851, l. 6.

To be perfectly consistent, the person who is content with God should not even ask God to be content with him because he must also be in agreement with God's rejecting him.

A pious man prays to God: "I'm content with You. You be content with me!" He then hears a voice which calls to him: "You're a liar! If you were content with Me, you wouldn't ask Me to be content with you!" (IN 13/12, p. 209).

The story is perhaps an echo of a conversation of Sufyān al-Thawrī with Rābi^{c}a:

Sufyān said in the presence of Rābi^{c}a: "May God be content with me!" She then said: "Aren't you ashamed of yourself before God, asking Him to be content with you when you yourself aren't content with Him?" He said: "I ask God for forgiveness!" (*Qūt* 2/40$_{26}$; *Nahrung* 2/412/32.612; *Ta^{c}arruf* 73; Smith, *Rābi^{c}a* 16).

Abū Sulaymān al-Dārānī explains: "Contentment with God consists of your not asking God for Paradise and not asking to be protected from Hell-fire."—Another time he says: "If He sent me to Hell, I would be content with this." (Qushayrī, *Risāla* $90_{1,\ 12}$; *Sendschreiben* 278/24.7, 24.8).

However, the highest level of *riḍā*, of agreement with whatever God does, is reached in mystical love. This shall be discussed later on (pp. 520 ff.).

7

In contrast to the category of pious men who quarrel with God and the fools who complain to God about their difficult lot, one finds in ᶜAṭṭār a category of persons who, despite all their afflictions, in the midst of their difficult existence, even in face of death, maintain an agreeable mood and a cheerful heart. Sometimes this cheerful mood is a form of fool's euphoria in which fools give themselves over to the fleeting moment and happily enjoy the good fortune they have been allotted. At other times the happiness has a more clearly religious justification such as being joyful in God. At still other times they apply a philosophy of life which demands that one not spend the short period of life one is given to enjoy in sadness and grief but with a happy spirit. This philosophy of life even became the motto of a particular branch of Sufism, the Qalandariyya, for whom maintaining "the cheerfulness of hearts" stands at the center of their objectives. They have left behind important traces in Persian poetry. But this subject shall be discussed later on (pp. 502 ff.).

After the story about the porter who is glad to be free of his load (above p. 205), the poet continues:

How long will you still go on carrying the load? Be unencumbered! Enjoy the moment during which you're alive!

A murderer is led to the gallows but on the way to the place of execution he laughs in good spirits. Someone asks him: "How can you be so cheerful at the moment when you're about to be killed?" He answers: "If fate has only left me so short a time to live, why should I spend it in sadness?" (MN 16/4).

In the *Ilāhīnāma* the poet exhorts the reader not to forget God's kindness (*luṭf*) above His harshness (*qahr*), to go his way lightly and cheerfully, and not to mourn over the world. In this connection he recounts the following story about a fool:

A fool rides about on a hobby-horse with a smile on his face and cheerfully singing like a nightingale. Someone asks him: "Why are you riding around so quickly?" He answers: "I have a craving to ride all over the world before they

chain my hands and feet, and not a hair on my body can raise itself any longer."—"In this way", ᶜAṭṭār continues, "one should exploit and enjoy the present like 'a son of the moment' (*ibn al-waqt*), and not worry about the past and the future." (IN 14/20, p. 237).

Abū Bakr al-Wāsiṭī visits a madhouse and finds a madman there who's in chains but who nonetheless dances and claps his hands in delight. The shaykh is surprised by this behavior and asks: "How is it you're so cheerful though you're in chains?" The fool answers: "Even if my foot is chained, my heart is still free!" (IN 9/8, pp. 147-48; TA 2/267).

After the story about the fool who boasts that he comes from the world devoid of causality (above p. 252), the poet continues: "Whoever has come under God's ruling devoid of reasons has entered eternal happiness." (MN 8/2).

The next story, about the man who always only says "Wonderful, wonderful!" to everything that befalls him (above pp. 252 f.), ᶜAṭṭār brings to a close with the verse: "If the sky falls down upon the earth, you just be concerned with your happiness." (MN 8/3).

As an illustration of this attitude he then recounts a story which has no trace of any religious basis:

A fool in Baghdad throws a stone into a shop selling glasses and all the glasses shatter with a great crash. When they ask him why he's caused such damage, he answers: "I so enjoyed the crash and tinkling sound. Whether it causes damage or is of any use, that has nothing to do with me as a fool." (MN 8/4).—We have already seen what melancholic thoughts ᶜAṭṭār then attaches to the story (above p. 90).

One of the birds asks the hoopoe what a person can find pleasure in during the journey to the Sīmurgh.—The hoopoe admonishes him to find pleasure in God. (MṬ 35/0, p. 117. See above p. 15 and p. 587 below).

The poet next relates the following story:

A strange fool lives on a mountain among the wild animals. When someone comes to see him, he enters a cheerful mood, dances for twenty days in a row from morning to night, and says: "The two of us are completely alone. No one can disturb us! Oh what joyfulness devoid of all cares!" (MṬ 35/1, p. 118).

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

THE TRANSFORMATION AND CONQUEST OF SORROW AND SUFFERING

We saw in Chapter Eight that the emotional frame of mind of pious men is predominantly one of sorrow, and we became acquainted with the reasons for this. However, sorrow is susceptible to being evaluated two different ways.

1

If sorrow is brought about by the loss of earthly things, by failure to attain one's worldly desires, then it is foolish and reprehensible. For the things of this world are transitory and they are not worth attaching one's heart to and mourning over.

One of the birds the hoopoe invites on the journey to the Sīmurgh's court complains that none of his desires has ever been fulfilled and so he's spent his entire life in sorrow and grief, and never once in his life been happy. If he were not burdened with such sorrow, his heart would certainly find joy in this journey. (Above pp. 14 and 134).—The hoopoe answers him: "You're foolish. Both fulfilment and denial of desires in this world are temporary and don't even last a moment. The world is transitory, therefore give it up and pay no attention to it. Whoever attaches his heart to something transitory, his heart is not alive." (MṬ 27/0, p. 93).

The argument that it is foolish to grieve over transitory things forms the basic theme in Kindī's treatise *On the Art of Dispelling Sorrow*, from which treatise we have previously encountered a parable (above p. 196). Thus the argument is already found in Late Antiquity.

The story of a tent of crystal which is given as a gift to the emperor Nero and which a wise man describes as a great misfortune for him because if it is destroyed, he will suffer an irreparable loss (H. Ritter and R. Walzer, "Uno scritto morale inedito di al-Kindī") is also found in the *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/64 where the tent is replaced by a goblet.

2

On the other hand, if sorrow, gravity and suffering have a deeper reason than loss of transitory goods or failure to attain earthly desires, then they are not at all an evil which must be eliminated or overcome, but a good which is necessary, worthwhile and pleasing to God, indeed a sign of God's love.

It is stated in the Torah: "If God loves a person, He places a female mourner for the dead in his heart. And when God hates a bondsman, he places a flute in his heart."

Sharḥ al-Ḥikam 1/91; Qushayrī, *Risāla* 65, *Bāb al-ḥuzn*; *Sendschreiben* 205/12.2. Cf. above p. 132 and *Asrār al-tawḥīd* 243; O'Kane, *Secrets* 441.

Suffering is the inseparable companion of men of piety, indispensable for anyone who wants to become "a man on this path".

Uways al-Qaranī says to a disciple: "As long as you don't experience suffering as if you feared you had killed all the people in the world, you're not worthy of being called 'a man'." (MN 12/10).

As long as you're not a man of suffering, you won't find a place among "the men". (MṬ 37/1 p. 126, verse 3166).

This suffering cannot be cured with medicine.

When Shiblī becomes insane, the caliph sends him to the madhouse and issues instructions about what medicine he's to be given. But Shiblī says: "Don't trouble yourselves in vain! This is no madness one can cure with drugs. Leave me in peace! Perhaps stomach pain can be cured. But if I have no life (*jān*), the (divine) Beloved (*jānān*) is enough for me. Suffering for which there's no cure is remedy enough for me." (MN 22/8).

If you wish to become a man, my son, there's no way but suffering.

A pious man says: "If all the Jews adopted the true faith, it wouldn't please me as much as a man who willingly travels this painful road of suffering and goes to his grave with this suffering so that he's lived in suffering, died in suffering, and gone from this world to the next in suffering." (MN 30/1).

Anyone who does not experience suffering cannot find a cure.

If you don't experience suffering, how is the remedy meant to arrive? If you're not a slave, how is the command meant to arrive? If you don't burn like tinder (*sōkhta*) in bloody suffering, how is the fire meant to cause you to light up? (MN 0, in the discussion about the necessity of a *pīr*).

Through suffering the heart becomes alive.

Your heart is dead if it's free from this suffering. For only what is living feels pain. You're still inexperienced, you don't like this talk. But fire will only fall on tinder. Burn like the candle day and night so that the fire gives off light! (IN p. $292_{12\text{-}14}$).—As long as you don't burn in your pain, how is the fire meant to

illuminate you? When you experience suffering, then you're provided with the cure. (MN *Sharḥ-i kitāb*).—As long as denial of desires is not your nourishment, how is a stupid heart meant to come alive? (MṬ p. 175, verse 4434).

There is a saying in Qushayrī which goes:

If there's no sorrow in the heart, the heart becomes a ruin just as a house becomes a ruin if no one lives in it. (*Risāla* 65, *Bāb al-ḥuzn*; *Sendschreiben* 205/12.3).

Incurable suffering is precisely the right cure.

Abū ᶜAlī Ṭūsī says: "If you've made your heart completely into suffering,[1] then you'll turn into a cure completely and become 'a man'." (IN p. 355_{18}).

Suffering is the true elixir of the men of God.

Make your body (entirely) into heart and the heart (entirely) into suffering. This is how "the men" prepare the elixir. (IN p. 355_{12}). This is how the king answers his son's question about what the elixir is.

Cf. Pseudo-Ḥāfiẓ: "The elixir of pining in love for you transforms the body into pure gold, even if it was previously like lead." (The first *ghazal* of the letter *ṣād*).

Whoever is gripped by this suffering doesn't cease to do "work".

A rich man has a black slave who stays up all night praying. His master notices this and wants to be woken up by him at night to pray with him. But the slave answers: "Whoever doesn't feel[2] the suffering of 'the way' doesn't deserve to be woken up. If you were in pain, you would do 'works' day and night. If you need someone else to wake you, then you need someone else to do the works for you. Whoever doesn't have this longing and suffering, let earth (of the grave) be poured over his head. He's no 'man'!" (MṬ 37/2, p. 126).

Whoever has been wounded must submit to the branding iron (to stop the bleeding).

A man asks the Prophet for permission to perform the prayers on a prayer rug. The Prophet doesn't allow it but orders him to prostrate himself in the hot sand. For if a man has been wounded (by the pain of God's love), the branding iron is required.—As long as you don't bear the mark of the brand in your heart, how should anyone cast a glance on you? Display the brand in your heart, because by means of the brand "the people of the heart" recognize "the man"! (MṬ 37/4, p. 127).

This suffering must be affirmed with complete acceptance.

Whoever undergoes suffering is not allowed to find a cure, and whoever wishes to have a cure is not allowed to live! "The man" must be thirsty, and

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1 This is the sense if one reads *kardī* in accordance with the meter (*ᶜarūḍ*) of the verse.

2 Read: *ān kas-rā ki dard-i rah na-khāst.*

without food and sleep. The thirsty man should not reach water for all eternity! (MṬ *Khātima*/0 p. 175, verses 4440-41).

Suffering as a guide to the hereafter and an educator also occurs in Sanāʾī, *Ḥadīqa* 320.

3

What kind of suffering is meant in these statements is not clear in all passages. The suffering which is required of the men of God ᶜAṭṭār particularly likes to refer to as *dard-i dīn* "suffering of religion", "religious suffering", or indeed *dard-i khudhā* "suffering for God's sake", "suffering for God". This is first of all a question of a general mood of sorrow which is based on fear of what is to come after death, and is a sign that the man of piety takes God's threats seriously. Connected with this is obviously the suffering due to one's own inadequacy with regard to having wasted one's life, and due to the failings which one is responsible for. More properly mystical is the suffering caused by longing for God which remains unsatisfied, the sorrow of restlessly seeking knowledge of God, the love pangs of the lover of God who is separated from God.

What hearts experience of grief and sadness comes from the fact that they are denied direct vision. (*Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/60).

The inability to find peace, the restlessness of a heart which cannot and will not find peace in what this world has to offer, is worthwhile because it forces a person to give up living his life in complacency and being satisfied with everyday purposes, and leads him to higher, religious goals. In ᶜAṭṭār such praise of suffering stands conspicuously in the foreground, and we should certainly assume that this is an expression of a peculiarity of his personal temperament and character. This deep unrest, in my opinion, is not to be found with the same intensity in other religious authors of his epoch and cultural milieu.

The poet interrupts the story about the soldier standing guard at the tent of Sultan Malikshāh (p. 346 below) with the remark: "I don't know whether you have stood this way by a king's tent because of 'the suffering of religion'. If you had one atom of burning in the heart, the same would surely be allotted to you (throughout) the night." (IN p. 191_{6-7}).

If you actually possessed religious suffering, you would not continually incur loss in religion. (IN p. 202_{11}).

The king responds to the prince who wants to learn magic: "Wise people are gripped by religious suffering, and you want to see yourself in the midst of magic? ...Do you possess one moment of religious suffering? You do not... If

you knew one atom of religious suffering, you would die from longing for the (real) life." (IN p. $102_{3, 5a, 6}$).

ᶜAṭṭār asks God for suffering "for the sake of God".

Whoever's heart isn't happy in suffering for You, his heart shouldn't be happy! Because he's not Your man. Give me one atom of suffering, oh You my cure, because without suffering for Your sake my soul dies! Give unbelief to the unbelievers and give belief to the believer. But to ᶜAṭṭār's heart give suffering for Your sake! (MṬ p. 9, verses 229-31).

If the whole night is to become day for you, then you must possess the suffering which burns (every) means. Given that I possess the suffering of love in my soul, for me, oh miracle, suffering is a cure. I don't find what I'm seeking, nor does this seeking grow calm for one moment. (MN in 12/7).

Drink dry the seven seas and then die in torment out of yearning for one more drop! ...Don't lick the cup so much, you wondrous one! When you've drunk a cup, then ask for another one! Whoever doesn't become pregnant with the suffering of religion, he's a woman and not a man of religion. One atom of suffering in your heart for the sake of God is better for you than possessing both worlds... In these depths I live continually with this suffering so that tomorrow this suffering will be my comrade. I'm alive through this suffering every moment in the world, in the grave this suffering is companion enough. On the Resurrection let this suffering be my intimate friend! ...Whether I'm destined for Paradise or for Hell, may my soul be intoxicated with this suffering! Whoever doesn't possess this suffering is not a man. There's no cure for you if you don't possess this suffering... Oh You for whose sake a whole world of suffering is my companion on the road, I pray You to give me further suffering as a loan! Undergoing effort in Your street is a beautiful effort, suffering for You in the depths of the soul is a beautiful treasure. You can do whatever You want, let this suffering go on increasing! If ᶜAṭṭār no longer possesses suffering for Your sake, then he doesn't want either unbelievers or men of piety. Suffering for Your sake must burn up his soul... My heart wants suffering for Your sake, suffering for Your sake! (MN in 0/1).

Even if I'm all suffering from head to foot, may I be an infidel if I become sated on suffering. I want to possess sorrow from Your world. I have no sorrows when I have sorrow for Your sake. Ah, if only I had a hundred thousand lives, to pour them out like bursts of rain at the feet of sorrow for Your sake. (IN p. 381_{3-5}).

He alone is a human being who has one care alone (care for God). (IN p. $122_{1a, 4b}$).

Whoever can endure without God is happy, whoever cannot is caught up in sorrow.

It is transmitted in tradition that every day seventy clouds appear between heaven and earth. On the heart which possesses sorrow for God's sake sixty-nine

of these clouds rain down cares, but on the heart which can endure far from God, one cloud rains down pure happiness. (IN p. 103_{2-5}).

Perhaps the source of this "tradition" is what one reads in Thaᶜlabī's *ᶜArāʾis*, pp. 17-18: "It is transmitted in tradition that the body of Adam lay on the earth for forty days and was rained on for the same amount of time by the rain of sorrow, and that then for one year it was rained upon by happiness. For this reason the cares of his children are many but in the end become transformed into joy."

Sorrow for the sake of God is better than all the goods of the world.

Rābiᶜa hasn't eaten anything for a week but spent her time praying and fasting. When she's very weakened from hunger, a female neighbor brings her a bowl with food. She goes off to fetch a lamp. When she comes back, a cat has turned over the bowl. She then goes to get a jug of water to break her fast with. The jug falls from her hand and breaks. Then she emits a sigh and says: "My God, what do you want from me that You confuse me like this and cause me distress?" The divine voice answers her: "If you want, I'll give you the goods of the whole world. But then remove sorrow for my sake from your heart because you can only have one of these two." (Thereupon Rābiᶜa turns her heart away from the world completely). (IN 10/5, pp. 159-60; TA 1/68-69; and Smith, *Rābiᶜa* 21-22, following TA).

The prophet Shuᶜayb (Jethro) weeps for ten years out of longing for God, until he becomes blind. God bestows his sight on him once again. But he weeps for another ten years and once again becomes blind. God then has him told: "If you're weeping out of fear of Hell—I have freed you from Hell. If you're weeping for the sake of Paradise, I'll bestow on you Paradise with its Ḥūrīs." Then Shuᶜayb speaks: "I weep neither because of Paradise, nor because of Hell. I'm weeping out of longing for You and Your proximity." The divine voice says: "If you're weeping out of longing for Us, just go on weeping because your case is a difficult one!" Then Shuᶜayb says: "Don't give me back my sight. Because until I can see You, it doesn't matter to me that I can see!" (IN 20/9, p. 326).

Qushayrī, *Risāla* 150_3, *Bāb al-shawq*; *Sendschreiben* 457/49.8. The feature that God describes suffering and weeping as incurable, i.e. that longing for God is necessarily connected with suffering, as well as the other feature, that Shuᶜayb doesn't want his sight back until he can see God, are introduced into the story by ᶜAṭṭār. In Qushayrī God simply answers: "Because of your longing for Me, I made Moses serve you for ten years."

Blessedness, though it may have different external forms, is only based on seeing God and nearness to Him. The torment of Hell, though it may have different external forms, is only based on being excluded from Him. The cause of the torment is the fact of being excluded. Blessedness reaches perfection by means of gazing at His noble face. (*Ḥikma* of Ibn ᶜAṭāʾ Allāh; *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/60).

In tradition it says: "On the Final Day some people from Muḥammad's community will be condemned to Hell. When they come to the edge of Hell, they attain a delay of three thousand years from God, and during this period they weep incessantly. No one asks them why. A great man remarked about this: 'May a hundred lives such as mine be sacrificed for the tears of these people! Because they alone possess suffering for God's sake for which there's no remedy.'"—As long as you don't possess suffering for which there's no remedy, you'll never be allotted the remedy. A pain suffered for His sake is better for you than a hundred lives. Pain suffered for Him is better than all remedies. (IN 20/10, p. 327).

4

Suffering is pleasing to God. Abū Saᶜīd quotes the Koranic verse: "Do not be happy, for God does not love the happy" (28/76, in the context what is meant is being happy with treasures) and the *ḥadīth*: "God loves every sorrowful heart" (*Asrār al-tawḥīd* 243; O'Kane, *Secrets* 441). A burning soul and a heart filled with suffering are readily accepted by God. God says: "I am with those who have broken hearts."

Anā ᶜinda'l-munkasirati qulūbuhum. Ibn al-Daybaᶜ, *Tamyīz* 41; Nicholson on *Mathnawī* 1/532.

Bāyazīd hears a voice in his innermost interior: "Our treasure-chambers are filled with acts of worship. If you want Us, adopt humility and need!" (*Ḥilya* 10/40; *Nūr* 70; *Shadharāt* 2/243-44).

In ᶜAṭṭār:

They called to me in my innermost interior: "Oh Bāyazīd, Our treasure-chambers are filled with approved deeds of obedience and pleasing acts of worship. If you want Us, offer up something which We don't have!" I said: "What is it that You don't have?" The voice said: "Helplessness and impotence, need and humility, and a broken spirit." (TA 1/155$_{6\text{-}9}$)

One of the birds asks the hoopoe what merchandise is desirable in the land of the Sīmurgh. One must appear before the king with a precious gift. The hoopoe answers: "Knowledge and secrets and absolute obedience are found in sufficiency. Bring a burning soul and a heart filled with suffering. No one has that there!"—A cry of woe fetched up from the depths of the soul penetrates all the way to God's Throne and brings liberation. (MṬ 37/0, p. 125; above p. 15).

But it must be a genuine cry of woe.

When Zulaykhā is still in possession of regal power and honor, and lets Joseph waste away in prison, one day she orders the guardian of the prison to strike Joseph fifty times with a stick so that she can hear his woeful cry from a distance. The guard can't bring himself to beat the beautiful Joseph and strikes

an animal hide in his place, and has Joseph let out woeful cries. But Zulaykhā is not satisfied with that and calls to the guard that he should strike him harder. The guard fears that she'll discover the deception if Joseph doesn't show any marks from the beating, and now strikes Joseph with a hefty blow. Joseph shouts out, and Zulaykhā orders the guard to stop, because now she has heard a proper cry of woe. (MṬ 37/1, p. 125).

The angels jostle among themselves to get hold of a sigh emitted by someone suffering in pain and a tear that he lets fall.

A *pīr* while travelling about meets a group of angels who are struggling to wrest a valuable object from one another. He asks what sort of a thing it is that they're fighting over and is given the answer: "Someone weighed down with suffering passed by here and uttered a sigh and shed tears. We're now fighting among ourselves for this sigh and these tears." (MṬ *Khātima*/7, p. 182).

The suffering due to having omitted a duty is precious. Not only acts of obedience are accepted, "bought", but impotence and weakness as well.

A young man fails to go on the pilgrimage and because of this emits a sigh. Sufyān al-Thawrī who's present says to him: "For this sigh I'll sell you the four pilgrimages I've accomplished." The young man accepts the exchange. That night God appears to Sufyān in a dream and says to him: "Your exchange brought you good profit. All four pilgrimages have (now) been accepted." (MN 34/8; TA 1/191).

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

GOD'S MERCY AND KINDNESS

To be sure, fear (*khawf*) of eternal punishment, of being predestined for damnation, is not by any means eliminated but it does find a counterbalance in hope (*rajāʾ*) in God's mercy. Alongside God's harsh violence (*qahr, jalāl*) stands His kindness, grace and mercy (*luṭf, jamāl, ʿināyat, raḥmat*), alongside His threat (*waʿīd*) there is His promise (*waʿd*) and, according to a divine saying, God's mercy has precedence over His wrath.

Sabaqat raḥmatī ghaḍabī. Wensinck, *Concordance* 2/239b; *Mathnawī* 1/2672 and Nicholson's *Commentary* p. 168.—Regarding the equivalent of this double modality of divine manifestation in Philo see I. Goldziher, *Die Richtungen der islamischen Koranauslegung* 211-13.

On the *maqām* of *rajāʾ* cf. the textbooks, e.g. *Qūt* 1/213-25; *Nahrung* 2/298-325/32.172-231; *Iḥyāʾ* 4/123-35; *Stufen* 298-325/C.1-50.

If You trample me with the foot of harshness, (at the same time) You scatter hundreds of kindnesses over my head. If You wound me with the sword of justice, (at the same time) You make Your grace a balsam for my soul. (MN 0/2, in a long prayer to the Godhead).

It is not permitted to ask the question why God now turns one side of His being toward man and now the other. God's action is inscrutable.

Since nothing that You do happens for a reason, forgive me without a reason, oh Creator! If You give me an atom of good fortune (*dawlat*), then give it to me. For You give without reason! (MN in *Khātima*/16).

But if the question is posed, it is answered by referring to God's essential nature. God behaves this way in order to manifest His essential nature as lord and ruler over His creatures and slaves. We have already seen that ʿAṭṭār has an answer for why suffering and injustice exist in the world. It is contained in the story about Sultan Maḥmūd and his vizier, in which Maḥmūd laments that his kingly hall is empty of people with complaints, and to remedy this he sends out soldiers to create a cause for complaint themselves so that the kingly hall will become filled as is proper (above p. 64).

1

But God also wishes to put in operation the other side of His nature, His kingly mercy, and for this reason He practices compassion.

Before His majesty all sin disappears.

Dhū'l-Nūn says: "When God spreads out the carpet of His glory, all sins in the heavens and on earth disappear in the margin of this carpet. When the sun rises, then hundreds of worlds of darkness disappear. If a drop of water is soiled by sin, it will not be perceived in that ocean." (MN 34/7; TA $1/126_{9-11}$).[1]

Like a king, He bestows His grace for free.

A Ṣūfī in Baghdad hears a man who's selling honey cry out: "I have honey and am selling it cheaply!" The Ṣūfī shaykh asks: "Do you also give it away for free?" The seller answers: "What, are you a fool?" The divine voice then calls out to the Ṣūfī: "Come to Us! We give you everything for free." (MṬ 19/3, p. 71).

In order to be able to display His mercy, God causes people to commit sins. If people were sinless, He would be unable to apply this side of His nature.

In a *ḥadīth* it says: "If you didn't commit sins, God would do away with you and bring forth people who did sin, in order to forgive them."

Law lam tudhnibū la-dhahaba'llāhu bikum wala-jāʾa bi-qawmin yudhnibūna li-yaghfira lahum. (*Fayḍ al-qadīr* no. 7487). Ayyūb al-Qurashī wrote a special treatise on this *ḥadīth*: GAL[2] 2/449-50).

Ibrāhīm ibn Adham stands in front of the Kaᶜba and says to God: "Let me be protected from sin and preserve me from it!" The divine voice answers: "The sinlessness you've requested from Me, all people have wished to have. But if I grant your wish and theirs, you'll all be deprived of My mercy." (IN *Khātima*/11, pp. 379-80; TA 1/92).

The Arabic version:

"My God, protect me from sin so that I'm never again disobedient to You!" Then I heard a voice from within "the house" say: "Oh Ibrāhīm, you pray that I should preserve you from sin, and all mankind asks Me for sinlessness. But if I preserve them from sin, on whom shall I practice My mercy and whom shall I forgive?"

Qūt $1/220_{19}$, $2/62_{23}$; *Nahrung* 2/134/32.20, 2/524 f./32.763; Qushayrī, *Risāla* 64; *Sendschreiben* 201/11.13; *Iḥyāʾ* 4/132, *Kitāb al-khawf wa'l-rajāʾ*; *Stufen* 320/C.41.

Thus God actually seeks sinners to be able to make use of His forgiveness, and precisely for this reason ᶜAṭṭār does not hesitate to hope for His forgiveness.

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1 Read *majd* in line 10 instead of *Muḥammad*.

The eye of Your forgiveness sought after a sinner. For this reason I took up my position in the field of sin. (MN 0/2).

Būdh ᶜayn-i ᶜafw-i tū ᶜāṣī-ṭalab ᶜarṣa-i ᶜiṣyān giriftam z-īn sabab.

Ḥasan al-Baṣrī presents a completely different justification for the positive value of sin:

If the believer did not commit sins, he would fly in the air (due to arrogance). But God has forced him downwards with sins.

Qūt 1/220; *Nahrung* 2/220. *Law lam yudhnibi'l-muᵓminu la-kāna yaṭīru ṭayran wa-lākinna'llāha qamaᶜahū bi'l-dhunūb.*—Cf. also ᶜAbd al-Razzāq Qāshānī, *Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, Cairo 1321, p. 16.

God's grace (*ᶜināyat*) can pardon a sinner from pre-eternity and remove him from the sight of the punishing angels on the Final Day, because a hidden relationship of familiarity exists between Him and the sinner from pre-eternity, which suddenly becomes apparent, just as a recognition between Joseph and Benjamin in Egypt suddenly occurred, a renewal of their old acquaintance. (IN 3/7, pp. 68-70; the Joseph-Benjamin story in IN 3/6, pp. 65-68).

I will not paraphrase this broadly elaborated story in which once again conversations of God with the angels occupy a large space. On the Joseph story see pp. 374 f. below. The senti-mentality of stories like these actually stems from their sermon style. The audience is moved to weep.

God does not renounce someone who renounces Him. He overlooks the proud speech of the fools who quarrel with Him.

Moses meets an ascetic (*zāhid*) on the way to Mt Sinai. The ascetic asks him to tell God: "Your orders have been carried out, therefore display mercy!" When Moses travels on, he meets a lover of God (*ᶜāshiq*). The latter asks him to say to God: "I, who am now no more than skin and bones, love You. Love me also!" Continuing on this way, Moses finally meets a fool who is barefoot and with bare head. The fool says to Moses in an impudent manner: "Tell God: 'How long are You going to leave me in this confused state? I have no more strength to bear this misery. I'm disgusted with life. Cheerful day has turned into night for me. I renounce You. You too renounce me as well!'" Moses on Mt Sinai only dares to communicate to the Lord the messages of the first two persons who spoke to him. God grants them their requests. When the prophet of God turns to go, the Lord says: "You've concealed from Me the message of the fool!" Moses replies that he didn't think it correct to repeat the fool's rude speech. But God says: "Tell him: 'Even if you renounce Me, I still won't renounce you!'" MN 33/7).

When God must impose punishment, He feels sorry for those who are punished.

Noah is sitting on a mountain with forty saved persons after the Flood. One of those saved is a potter and he opens a pottery workshop. Gabriel then delivers the order to Noah to smash to pieces all the pots. Noah says: "They were produced with so much effort, how can I smash them to pieces?" God gives him the answer: "You feel sorry about smashing a pot but through your prayer of execration you killed all of humanity! How much My kindness has wept over them!" (MN 4/9).

God's kindness here appears oddly hypostatized. In a story we shall become familiar with (p. 584), God's kindness laughs three times a day at the strange behavior of His foolish friends. On this hypostatization see Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums* 350. On Noah's prayer see Tha^clabī 35_5 (*da^cā ^calayhim*).

2

One ought not to ask for a reason, but it is possible for someone to be allotted unexpected good fortune.

Even if one can't find anything by means of a cause, one can still find good fortune. If good fortune helps a little, it can lead you along the path to the sun. But one can't say anything about it in advance.

A man asks a shaykh: "What will you do if good fortune favors you?" The shaykh replies: "If good fortune comes, it will say what to do and what not to do." (IN 10/14, p. 168).

The poet asks God for this kind of good fortune without a reason (above p. 264).

Good fortune can consist of a single glance. A person who has the good fortune that the glance of the king or of a holy man falls on him by chance, will find favor, will in fact attain honors and high positions.

Sultan Maḥmūd passes by a place of execution where a criminal is about to be hanged. The poor sinner cries out at once: "The king's eye has seen me. Wherever the king's eye alights, there's no longer any sin!" Maḥmūd buys his freedom. But not satisfied with this, the newly freed man clings to the sultan's saddle-blanket and won't let go when Maḥmūd tells him to depart. The man says: "You've given me my life. How can I leave you? If you don't wish to keep me with you, then let me be hanged again! I'm the one whose freedom was purchased by your (palace) gate. As long as I live, I won't abandon your gate!" (MN 3/4).

A murderer is executed. Afterwards a Ṣūfī sees him in a dream strolling about in Paradise and asks him how he, a murderer, has come to be honored like this. The man answers: "When my blood spilled onto the ground, Shaykh Ḥabīb al-^cAjamī walked past and cast a fleeting glance on me. By means of that glance I've been allotted this honorary rank." (MṬ 17/2, p. 64).

On the effects of a shaykh's glance see e.g. *Asrār al-tawḥīd* 81_2; O'Kane, *Secrets* 185.

And one on whom God's glance falls is also allotted favor.

If God loves a bondsman, then He looks at him, and if God looks at a bondsman, He will surely not punish him. (*Qūt* $2/53_{4\text{-}5}$; *Nahrung* 2/458/32.674).

Yet whoever wishes to drink the wine of God's favor must first traverse the valley of His harshness, but once the glance of kindness falls upon you, you receive new life every moment. (MN 3/3).

The honorary rank which one attains through the glance of favor cannot be acquired by means of any act of obedience. On the other hand, whoever thinks that acts of obedience are unnecessary will be overwhelmed by a downpour of curses.

One of the birds asks the hoopoe: "How is it that you've attained a higher rank than we have?" He answers: "Solomon one time let his glance fall on me. I reached this good fortune by means of a glance. This can't be acquired through acts of obedience. For Satan accomplished many acts of obedience and still came to be cursed. But whoever says that obedience is not necessary, he should know that curses will rain down on him hourly. Perform works of obedience during a whole lifetime, so that Solomon casts a glance upon you!" (MṬ 17/0, p. 63; above p. 13). (There then follows the story about Sultan Maḥmūd and the boy who is fishing, above pp. 130-31).

3

The question as to why God causes a person to be guilty and then holds him responsible, which has disturbed ᶜAṭṭār so earnestly (pp. 72-73), is in one place answered by him in a very remarkable way in accordance with mystical love.

He sends a child forth in the dark night with a lamp and dispatches a wind to blow out the lamp, and then reproaches the child in a friendly way[2] for letting the lamp go out. If all people were sinless, His wisdom would be devoid of loveplay (*ḥikmatash-rā ᶜishqbāzī nēstē*). (MṬ in 19/5, p. 72).

God takes pity on the sinner the way a mother pigeon takes pity on her young.

A bedouin comes to the Prophet and says to him: "I'll adopt Islam if you tell me what I have here under my cloak." The Prophet says: "You have a pigeon with two little baby pigeons." The bedouin who's convinced by the miracle accepts the true faith. The Arabs who are present gaze in admiration[3] at the pigeon which is protecting her young with her wings.—The Prophet says: "By Him who has

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2 Read *shafqat* in verse 1861.

3 Read: *zi-mihr*.

sent me to mankind, God takes pity on the sinner a hundred times more than this mother takes pity on her two young." (IN *Khātima*/7, p. 375).

4

God is more merciful than human beings.

God reproaches Moses that he didn't give an answer to Qārūn (Korah) who called him seventy times. "If he'd called Me only once", so says God, "I would have removed the unbelief from his heart and dressed him in faith's robe of honor." (MṬ 19/4, p. 71).

A pious ascetic encounters the funeral procession of a sinner and takes a different route to avoid having to say prayers for the dead over him. At night in a dream he sees the deceased walking about in Paradise and asks him how he came to receive this honor. The sinner answers: "Because you were so unmerciful toward me, God had mercy on me." (MṬ 19/5, p. 72).

One will recall the well-known stories, according to which the pious refuse to perform the prayer for the dead over the corpse of the poet Firdawsī or Ḥāfiẓ, and then experience similar occurrences in dreams. (See pp. 283 f. below).

Stories of this kind are already old. In them a deeper insight into the human heart with its afflictions and a greater sense of mercy are contrasted with the hard vulgar morality.

ᶜAbd al-Wahhāb al-Thaqafī (d. 194/810) relates: "I saw that a coffin was being carried by three men and a woman. I took the place of the woman, and we walked out to the cemetery, performed the prayers over the dead man, and buried him. Then I said to the woman: 'What relation was he to you?' She said: 'My son.' I said: 'Didn't you have some neighbors?' She replied: 'Yes, but they despised him.' I said: 'What was he like then?' She said: 'He was a *mukhannath* (a young man who sells sexual favors).' Then I felt sorry for her, and I took her into my house and gave her money, grain and clothing. That same night I saw an apparition, as if a moon-like person came to me wearing white clothes on the night of the full moon, and thanked me. 'Who are you then?', I asked. He replied: 'I'm the male prostitute whom you buried today. God took pity on me because the people despised me.'" (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 64, *Bāb al-rajāʾ*; *Sendschreiben* 203/11.17; *Iḥyāʾ* 4/134, *Bayān faḍīlat al-rajāʾ*; *Stufen* 324 f./C.49).

Abū ᶜAlī al-Daqqāq relates: "Abū ᶜAmr al-Baykandī was once walking down the street and saw people who wanted to drive a young man out of their neighborhood because of his bad lifestyle. And his mother was there weeping. Abū ᶜAmr felt sorry for the mother and interceded with the people on behalf of the young man, saying: 'Let him go free this time for my sake, and if he behaves badly again, then do as you wish!' They set the young man free as a gift to him (i.e. left him alone to please Abū ᶜAmr), and Abū ᶜAmr went off. A few days later he was walking down that street and he heard the old woman crying behind her

door. He thought to himself: 'Perhaps the young man has gone back to his bad lifestyle and been banned from the neighborhood.' He knocked at the woman's door and asked her about the young man. She came out and said: 'He's died.' Abū ᶜAmr asked further about the circumstances of his death. She said: 'When his end was near, he said: "Don't tell the neighbors of my death! I've offended them. They'll revile me and won't come to my funeral. When you bury me, place in the grave with me this signet-ring which has written on it: *In the name of God!* And when you finish burying me, intercede with my Lord on my behalf." I did this as he requested and when I was leaving the grave, I heard his voice call out: "Go your way, dear mother! I've come before a kind Lord."'" (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 65; *Sendschreiben* 203/11.17).

5

Sometimes God's kindness manifests itself where one least expects it: among the unbelievers and idolaters.

Gabriel hears the Lord say: "Here I am (*labbayk*)!" He takes this to mean that God is answering someone's prayers and flies throughout the whole world to find the person but is unable to do so. When he flies back to heaven, once again he hears God's voice answer someone's prayers and again he searches through the world in vain. Finally, he asks God whom He's speaking to. The Lord says: "Go to Asia Minor to such-and-such a cloister!" Gabriel goes off and finds a man who's calling on "the idol" (the crucifix). In amazement Gabriel asks God how He could answer an idol-worshipper. God says: "He's someone gone astray for whom I wish to open the path to Me. This is what My kindness wants." After that He opens the man's heart to the true faith. (MṬ 19/2, p. 70).

A similar story: An Indian three times requests something from an idol but it doesn't respond. He then calls upon Allah, and Allah responds to him the first time with *labbayk!* (*Rawnaq al-majālis*, *Bāb* 1).

God makes free the way to the Prophet's table for a Jew.

An old Jew in Syria whenever he comes upon the Prophet's name while reading the Torah writes over it or cuts it out. But when he opens the Torah the following day, he always finds the Prophet's name undamaged in its proper place. Doubt then comes over him as to whether the newly appeared prophet is not perhaps in the right. He sets out and goes to Medina. There he finds the Companions of Muḥammad weeping and in deep grief. The Prophet has just died. He then tears his clothes out of grief and longing, and his weeping renews the grief of the Prophet's Companions. Finally, he asks them at least to bring him a garment that the Prophet wore. The Companions go to the house of Fāṭima who since the death of her father has not spoken a word and kept the door of her house locked. When they tell her the Jew's request, she remembers that before his death the Prophet predicted that a man who loves him would arrive. He would not find

the Prophet still among the living, but they should give him such-and-such a patched robe as well as the Prophet's greeting. The Jew takes the robe, inhales Muḥammad's scent, becomes a believer and dies at the Prophet's grave.—You're no less than a Jew... If you're a lover, then you must die like this out of longing for the Beloved! (IN 17/11, pp. 282-84).

See the supplement to Kisāʾī's *ʿArāʾis*, Ms. Yeni Cami 881, fol. 243a-b; Ṣaffūrī 2/74.

He takes pity on the unbeliever and admits him to His favor even when the latter is late in converting.

A fire-worshipper named Shamʿūn (Simeon), who is a neighbor of Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, is fatally ill. Ḥasan considers it his neighborly duty to visit the sick man and uses the opportunity to point out to the unbeliever the foolishness of his false belief. To prove that fire can neither help nor do harm, he places his hand in a fire, and behold, his hand suffers no damage! Because of this the fire-worshipper is convinced and declares he's ready to accept the true faith if Ḥasan gives him a witnessed document attesting that God will forgive him and accept him into Paradise. Ḥasan acquiesces to his request and when the fire-worshipper dies, the document is placed in his hand in the grave. Ḥasan later has doubts as to whether he was really authorized to issue such a document. Then the former fire-worshipper appears to him in a dream walking about in Paradise and dressed in an honorary robe and wearing a crown on his head. He says to Ḥasan that God has given him a home in Paradise and he has no further need of that written document. He gives it back to Ḥasan, and when Ḥasan wakes up in the morning he finds the document in his hand. (IN 11/12, pp. 181-84.—TA 1/33-34).

Translated by F. Gabrielli, *Storia e civiltà musulmana* 227. On the context see p. 295 below. Cf. also a conversion story which is meant to illustrate God's inscrutable kindness, pp. 286 f. below.

"The morning of acquaintance with God (or knowledge of God, *āshnāʾī*) shone from behind the curtain" for the fire-worshipper. God can send His light wherever He will, and this light then transforms people for their salvation. This light is the true elixir which changes objects into gold.

If it shines for an unbeliever, through him the whole world turns into light. When it shone for the magicians of Pharaoh, those who were so far from God were deemed worthy of closeness to God (surahs 7/121-22, 26/47-48). By means of this light an old woman became the saint Rābiʿa. It makes the man with the spade (Kharaqānī, cf. TA $2/202_{11}$) into a famous man of God. By means of its power the Christian Maʿrūf (al-Karkhī) becomes a Muslim, the highwayman Fuḍayl a guide to mysteries. When it shines within the heart of an Ibn Adham, he becomes sultan of both worlds. And when the soul is completely destroyed by this light (in extinction), it then comes forth with "I am sublime!" (Bāyazīd) and "I am God" (Ḥallāj). (IN p. 361_{17}-362_{8}).

The blood of the musk gazelle, after it has eaten special herbs for forty days, is transformed into aromatic musk by the breath of the morning breeze. In this way man who consists of earth can also become soul. If the light of God enters the soul, then the body takes on the color of the soul. If you wish to produce an elixir, let it be this elixir! (IN 22/11, p. 364).

ᶜAṭṭār occasionally likes to illustrate serious things with comic stories.

A man presents a kelim (coarse garment) to a merchant for sale. The merchant denigrates the kelim: "It's as rough as a porcupine's back, etc." Finally, he pays out a really low price for it and puts it in his chest. Shortly thereafter a customer comes and requests a really soft kelim. The merchant brings out the kelim he just bought and now praises it in the highest terms. The kelim is incomparable, as smooth as silk, etc. A Ṣūfī sees and hears all this. He lets out a cry the way Ṣūfīs do when the symbolic meaning of a banal event becomes clear, and he says to the merchant: "Ah, put me in your magic chest that transforms the coarse into silk and earth into pearls! Perhaps I too will become transformed in it!" (IN 14/14, p. 231).

Satan himself, the exemplar of depravity, who has been cursed for eternity, still maintains hope in God's inscrutable action which is independent of everything that happens. In the same way that He cursed him without reason, He can favor him again without reason.

Shiblī encounters Satan among the Mecca-pilgrims by ᶜArafāt and asks him in astonishment what he, the cursed one, wants among the servants of God. Can he still entertain hope in God's mercy? The cursed one answers: "I worshipped God for 100,000 years between fear and hope. I showed the angels the way to His presence. I opened the door for every person who had lost his way to God. My heart was filled with His sublimity. I professed His oneness. If He sent me away from His door for no reason despite all these acts of obedience—no one can ask why He does anything—then He can also accept me again without any reason. Since there's no 'how' and 'why' in God's action, one should never abandon hope in God. His harshness (*qahr*) has rejected me, but His kindness (*luṭf*) can call me back." (IN *Khātima*/9, pp. 376-77).

Satan, one might say, was basing himself on the Koranic verse: "Never despair of God's mercy! God forgives all sins." There is no sin which could not be forgiven, except for turning away from the profession of God's oneness.

There are, of course, *ḥadīths* in which Satan is expressly excluded from the ranks of those whose remorseful repentance will be accepted. Cf. *Tanbīh al-ghāfilīn* 46b, *Bāb ākhar min al-tawba*.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

THE MEANS OF MERCY

It does not follow, however, from God's willingness to forgive sins that His forgiveness will be granted without any conditions. ᶜAṭṭār's pious do not simply carry on committing sins because they are sure of God's forgiveness. They take measures to attain God's mercy and compassion, and through acts of obedience they endeavor to show themselves worthy of God's glance of mercy. For, as the hoopoe informs the birds, whoever says that acts of obedience are not necessary is cursed. According to orthodox doctrine, this makes him an unbeliever.

You must perform acts of obedience a whole lifetime so that Solomon casts a glance upon you. (See above p. 268).

The first concern of the pious man will be to attain forgiveness for sins of commission and omission, and secondly to undertake acts of obedience.

Islam does not recognize the idea of an expiatory sacrifice, by means of which the sins of the world are atoned for and undone, nor does it recognize a church which presides over the means of grace and through whose intervention forgiveness for sins is granted to the sinner. Only the scholar of religious law or the mystical psychic guide can offer him personal help in shaping his religious life in accordance with the law or putting his relationship with God in order. But basically in Islam a human being views himself as standing alone and directly before His God.

1

The first step on the path to redemption, the first of "the redeeming things!" (*munjiyāt* in Ghazzālī), is remorseful repentance (*tawba*) for one's life of sins, accompanied by the firm intention never to fall into the old sins again.

The threshold to this is waking from the sleep of indifference, the sleep of a life devoid of cares, and the realization of how badly matters stand for one.

See e.g. *Qūt* 1/178-93; *Nahrung* 2/9-52/32.2-79; Qushayrī, *Risāla* 45-48; *Sendschreiben* 146-154/3; *Iḥyā'* 4/1-53; *Stufen* 21-53/A.1-326.—Qāsim Ghanī, *Ḥāfiẓ* 2/217-29; Qushayrī, *Risāla* 46, *Bāb al-tawba*.

We have already seen that in ᶜAṭṭār there is no lack of exhortations to repentance (see pp. 92-93).

Whoever gives himself over to the indolent sleep of indifference will encounter the same experience as the deaf man who didn't notice the caravan pass him by (above p. 92) or will undergo what happened to Abū'l-Qishr Chaghānī whom they shouted at to drive on his donkey so as not to be surprised by nightfall in the desert. (AN 7/10).

When the world-traveller returns from the realm of minerals, the *pīr* admonishes him to shake off the deadly rigidity in which the mineral realm is caught. (MN 21/0).

Aren't you afraid of sinking in the world, being laden with a heavy load?

Travelling on a ship is one merchant who's transporting iron and another who's transporting down quilts. The ship sinks. The ironmonger is dragged down by his load, while the other merchant reaches the shore of salvation on his down quilts.—The load of iron is the burden of sins, etc. (MN 21/1).

One must undergo a conversion before it's too late.

A pious man says it's foolish to turn a person's face in the right direction (the direction of prayer) only once he's dying. This should have been done earlier. To plant a branch in the earth when it's already losing its leaves makes no sense. (MṬ 22/4, p. 80).

Listen to the admonition now before it's too late! If you're lying in the grave, you can't hear any longer.

A pious fool observes how someone recites the profession of faith over a dead Turk. He says to the man: "This Turk was already deaf even during his lifetime. Do you think that now that he's in his grave he'll hear and understand your Arabic words?" (AN 10/2).

It is part of the burial rites to recite the profession of faith over a dead or dying person (*talqīn*). Cf. Mevqūfātī, *Sharḥ Multaqā'l-abḥur*, Istanbul 1309, 1/128, *Bāb ṣalāt al-janā'iz*.

One must listen to the call of God.—Camels that let themselves be driven forward by the song of the camel-driver can serve as a model for this.

Aṣmaᶜī relates: "Once in the desert I stopped with a bedouin as a guest. In front of his tent I came upon a moaning negro lying on the ground in chains. When I asked him why he was in this state, he answered: 'Because of an offense I made myself guilty of. The guest enjoys great privileges with his host. If you ask him to set me free, he'll forgive me for the guest's sake.'" When the food is served, Aṣmaᶜī doesn't touch it and says to the bedouin: "I'll only eat your bread once you've forgiven this negro." Then the bedouin recounts the crime the negro

committed. "During a great heat, he so enchanted four hundred heavily loaded camels with his singing—he has a very beautiful voice—and drove them on in such haste that they accomplished a ten-day march in one day. When the loads were removed from them, they collapsed and died." (IN 18/4, pp. 289-91).

The story is recounted in Sarrāj, *Lumaᶜ* 270; *Schlaglichter* 393 f./95.8; Qushayrī, *Risāla* 153; *Sendschreiben* 465 f./51.9 and Ghazzālī, *Iḥyāᵓ* 2/243 (= Macdonald in: JRAS 1901/219) as an example of the effect of music in the chapter on listening to music (*samāᶜ*). The narrator is Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Dāwūd al-Duqqī (d. 360/970, Ṣafadī, *al-Wāfī* 3/63). ᶜAṭṭār has transferred it to the famous collector of bedouin stories, the grammarian Aṣmaᶜī (d. 213/828).

A person may let himself be led astray by Satan for a certain amount of time, but when the call of God then reaches him, he must separate from Satan.

On a mountain slope at the border with Syria, there lives a bird that only lays eggs once every year during forty days but then abandons them and disappears. A foreign bird arrives that hatches the eggs and feeds the chicks until they're fledged.

Then suddenly the mother bird appears, settles on a mountain and lets sound forth a special call. The instant the chicks hear this call, they abandon the foreign foster-mother and hasten to their true mother.—If Satan takes you under his wing for a few days, this does no harm as long as you turn toward God as soon as He addresses you. (IN 13/9, pp. 207-08).

The story originates in Barlaam and Josaphat. Cf. Hommel in *Verhandlungen des VII. Internationalen Orientalistenkongresses 1886*, Semitische Sektion, p. 153. It is there applied to the Prophet's call to the faith. Only those who belong to him hear the call.

For since the souls were with God in pre-existence and had already acknowledged Him then as their Lord (the *alast*-bond, surah 7/172), hearing this call of God is a matter of recollection, an *anamnēsis*. Between God and man there exists a secret primordial acquaintance (*āshnāᵓī*) which, though hidden and only potentially present so to speak, can suddenly become activated and bring about a human being's return to God. (Cf. IN p. 207_8. More on this subject is found on pp. 521 ff. below).

The Indian king hears the call to God too late and only converts to the true faith when Maḥmūd of Ghazna with his army goes to war against him and takes him prisoner. Now he sits in his tent weeping, filled with fear about how to answer God on the Final Day when God will interrogate him about his faithlessness (his behavior is designated as such by ᶜAṭṭār). (MṬ 31/2, pp. 104-05).

Men of violence capture someone, throw ice-cold water over him and beat him with clubs. The tortured man cries out: "Help me, oh Lord and Creator!" Abū Saᶜīd is walking past. His servant says to him he ought to intercede for the poor man.

But the shaykh says: "How can I do that when it's only occurred to him now to think of God? Whoever only remembers Him at such a moment, let his heart be torn asunder and his head cut off!" (MN 1/2).

2

A sin one has committed can be undone by means of remorseful repentance (*tawba*), according to the *ḥadīth*: "The one who repents in remorse is the friend of God, and whoever repents of a sin with remorse, it is as if he had not committed a sin."

Al-tāʾibu ḥabību'llāhi wa'l-tāʾibu mina'l-dhanbi ka-man lā dhanba lah. According to Ibn Māja; cf. *Qūt* 1/179$_{13}$; *Nahrung* 2/10/32.3; *Iḥyāʾ* 4/4, *Bayān wujūb al-tawba*; *Stufen* 27/A.16.

Tawba consists of feeling remorse for the sin one has committed, sorrow for what one did, the firm intention never again to commit the sin to the end of one's life, admitting to the sin, the request for forgiveness, and the effort to make good again what one did and to make up what one omitted, or to atone for wicked deeds through good works and thereby to establish a predominance of good works over bad deeds.

Surahs 11/114, 13/22, 9/102. ZDMG 11/1857/440-41. *Ḥadīth*: "If you have perpetrated a bad deed, see that you follow it by a good deed which will atone for it." *Idhā ʿamilta sayyiʾatan fa-atbiʿhā bi-ḥasanatin tukaffirhā. Qūt* 1/180, 190; *Nahrung* 2/11 f./32.7, 2/42/32.63; *Iḥyāʾ* 4/11, 32; *Stufen* 38/A.48, 88/A.185.

A great part of the good works undertaken by rulers, the creation of pious foundations, and copying out manuscripts of the Koran (*Iḥyāʾ* 4/32), etc., probably go back to this motive. If all the conditions are fulfilled, there can be no doubt that a remorseful repentance will be accepted by God (*Iḥyāʾ* 4/11; *Stufen* 43/A.61). This is also true for sinners who repeat their sins.

One of the birds who's invited on the journey to the Sīmurgh presents the excuse that he's too burdened with sins to be deemed worthy of closeness to the king. The hoopoe replies: "The gate of remorseful repentance is open for you." (MṬ 19/0, p. 69; above p. 14).

A man has committed many sins and finally makes a vow to repent. But then he breaks his vow and falls back into his old vices. Remorse comes over him again but he doesn't dare make a vow of repentance because he fears his repentance won't be accepted. The divine voice says to him: "I've granted you a new period of grace and am not angry. Come back! We've opened the door for you once more." (MṬ 19/1, pp. 69-70).

God does even more. For every sin which one repents of, He causes ten good works to be recorded.

"On the Final Day", so said the Prophet, "God will have the list of a man's good and bad deeds handed over to him. The man finds nothing but sins recorded on it and is convinced he'll have to descend to Hell. Then God orders him to turn over the page. There it's written: 'Since he has repented, ten good works will be credited to him for every sin.' The elated sinner is bold enough to exploit the situation immediately. He says: 'The recording angels have actually made a mistake. I've committed far more sins than are recorded here...'" The Prophet laughed when telling this story "so that one could see his back teeth". (IN 9/12, pp. 151-52).

Regarding the Babylonian-Iranian forerunners of the idea of recording deeds, cf. E. Herzfeld, *Zoroaster and his World* 305 ff.

Remorseful repentance should not be postponed because no one knows how much longer he still has to live. (*Iḥyāʾ* 4/7; *Stufen* 32/A.31).

Earlier in the Ayasofya Mosque there hung on a column the saying: "Make haste performing the prayers before they escape you! Make haste to repent before death!"

ʿAjjilū bi'l-ṣalāti qabla'l-fawt, ʿajjilū bi'l-tawba qabla'l-mawt.

The second prince in the *Ilāhīnāma*, who thinks he can practice a little magic without any danger as long as he undertakes "*tawba*" afterwards, is reprimanded by his father. (IN 6/0, p. 100; see above pp. 5 f.).

True grief over the injustice he committed, and an endeavor to make good again as far as possible what he did, is displayed by the young man who through a cold response had caused his lover's death. He's inconsolable and attempts to make up for his wrong by undertaking a yearly pilgrimage on the dead person's behalf. (IN p. 297_{11-18}. Cf. p. 407 below).

3

Heart-felt contrition, remorse, and shame over the sin he committed is sometimes the only thing a dying person has to pin his hopes on.

A man says on his deathbed: "I have nothing in the way of provisions for this journey. But with the sweat of shame I've kneaded a handful of clay and made a brick from it. I've filled a bottle with tears and from old rags patched together a shirt as a shroud. You should perform the washing of my corpse with my tears, place the brick beneath my head, and lay me in the earth wrapped in the pieced-together shroud which is drenched with my tears." (MṬ *Khātima*/4, p. 180).

ʿAṭṭār once asked a dying man what he'd prepared as provisions (good deeds) for the road to the hereafter. The dying person answered: "I've prepared for God a full heart and an empty hand."—"I'm the same as this man", says the poet. "I too

have an empty hand, but a heart full of hope in God's mercy." He then asks God not to disappoint him in this hope. (AN 23/3).

Some sinners die from a sense of shame.

An Abyssinian comes to the Prophet and says: "I've committed wicked sins (*fawāḥish*). Is remorseful repentance possible for me?" The Prophet answers: "Yes!" The Abyssinian turns to go but then looks back again and asks: "Did God see me when I committed those sins?" The Prophet answers his question in the affirmative. At that the Abyssinian lets out a cry and falls to the ground dead. (IN 11/9, pp. 176-77).

Elaborated on the basis of an Arabic story, *Iḥyā'* 4/12; *Stufen* 46/A.70.

A man finds that the woman he has married is not a virgin. Although he forgives her and promises to keep the matter a secret and not say anything to her parents—he has failings enough himself which he must pray God to cover up in His mercy—the young woman is inconsolable, falls ill and finally dies of shame. (IN 12/9 bis, pp. 177-78).

Naturally, confessing a sin before the authorities cannot protect one from legal punishment.

A woman commits adultery, experiences intense remorse and presents herself before the Prophet to be stoned to death. The Prophet, who at first turns away so as not to hear her confession, says: "Now is not the time for this. You must first give birth." She gives birth to a boy and once more presents herself before the Prophet. The Prophet sends her away again because she must first breast-feed the child. When the boy is weaned, the woman returns. The Prophet says: "You must look after the child until it's seven years old." When the seven years are up, someone comes and takes the child under his protection. Now the punishment must be carried out. After her execution, she appears to ᶜAlī in a dream and in reply to his question as to what God did with her, she says He told her that it's the duty of the prophets to carry out the law but that because of her great penance she's forgiven. If she'd turned directly to God instead of to the Prophet, He would have acquitted her of the sin. (MN 34/5).

This is an embellished rendition of the *ḥadīth al-Ghāmidiyya* which is found together with the closely analogous *ḥadīth Māᶜiz ibn Mālik*, for example, in the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of Muslim, *Kitāb al-ḥudūd, bāb man iᶜtarafa ᶜalā nafsih bi'l-zinā*, Istanbul 1331, 5/119; Ibn Qutayba, *Mukhtalif al-ḥadīth* 240; *Tanbīh al-ghāfilīn* 143a; *Iḥyā'* 4/33, *al-Rukn al-thālith*, etc.; *Stufen* 90/A.191. Moreover, Ghazzālī explains that it is not necessary to denounce oneself to the authorities because of an offense for which there are punishments (*ḥudūd*) in the Koran. This corresponds to the trend which became prevalent to limit as much as possible the application of Koranic punishments. Nöldeke-Schwally, *Geschichte des Qorâns* 1/250 and J. Schacht, *The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence* pp. 73-74, 106.

4

Admitting one has fallen short of what is required and seeking forgiveness combine with acknowledgement of one's own weakness, paucity of works, perplexity and helplessness, and an appeal to God's compassion and a request for help. These motifs are found in ᶜAṭṭār chiefly where he addresses the Godhead through direct speech (*munājāt*), that is to say in the beginning and at the end of his epics. These passages are in part very beautiful examples of religious poetry. Here we must content ourselves with only a few indications.

When I was still able, I was ignorant, and when I became knowing, I was no longer able. Now in my weakness and helplessness I know no remedy other than sorrow. (MṬ *Khātima* p. 181, verses 4580-81).

Even if the sin of the sinner is as big as a hundred worlds, one atom of Your mercy is enough to outweigh it. Since I have nothing but a lack of acts of obedience, what sort of weight can we bring along with us? A handful of trivial wares! (IN pp. 386_{18}-387_{1}).

Shiblī is seen in a dream after his death and asked what God has done with him. He answers: "The final reckoning was difficult but when God saw how much of an enemy I was to my self, how weak, desperate and helpless I was, He took pity on my helplessness and He forgave me in His magnanimity."—"I too am weak and helpless, like a lame ant in a well", the poet continues by way of addressing God.—He then complains of his internal rift, his being neither a believer nor an infidel, etc., in the manner we have already become familiar with (pp. 151 ff.). (MṬ *Khātima*/6, p. 181).

I come before You as a beggar. Am I to go away again devoid of hope? (MṬ *Khātima*/17, transition to 18).

Cf. as well IN pp. 10_{8-10}, 379_{6-14}; MṬ in 0/1, pp. 8-9; MN after 0/2.

5

The pious sometimes support their request for mercy with a peculiar argumentation, on the basis of which, by their citing human relations and customs, by their referring to precedents in the human sphere, God is meant to be persuaded to bestow His mercy.

A beggar is seen in a dream after his death and asked what God has done with him. He says: "He asked me what I'd brought with me for Him. I answered: 'For fifty years I've gone from house to house begging for a little bread. No one gave me anything, everyone referred me to You. And now You want something from me, a beggar?'" (MN *Khātima*/14).

One still says today to a beggar one wants to get rid of: *Allah versin!* "God give you something!"

Anṣārī Harawī relates a similar story about Bāyazīd Bisṭāmī (*Ṭabaqāt* 107). Someone saw him in a dream after his death and asked: "How did things go for you?" He replied: "I was asked: 'What have you brought with you, oh shaykh?' I said: 'When a poor man comes before a king's gate, then one asks him: "What do you want?", not: "What have you brought with you?"'"

Anṣārī adds to this a whole series of similar stories about other pious men. Immediately after our story comes an anecdote which he claims to have heard from ᶜAlī al-Sharīfī who died 436 AH.

In Nēshāpūr there lives a poor old woman named ᶜIrāqiyya who has begged at people's door her whole life long. After her death she is seen in a dream and the question we're familiar with by now is put to her. She answers: "I was asked: 'What have you brought with you?' I then said: 'Oh woe! My whole life long I've been referred to this door and told: "May God give you something!"', and now I'm asked: 'What have you brought with you?'" Then someone said: "She's right, leave her in peace!"

Both stories occur in Jāmī, *Nafaḥāt*, in Bāyazīd's biography.

In an address to God the poet says: "I've lain in chains in a pit and in prison. Who can extend a hand to me in such a pit other than You? My imprisoned body became dirtied, my tormented heart trampled. If I arrive so dirty from the road, forgive me! I've come forth from prison and a pit." (MṬ *Khātima*, transition to 8, p. 182).

A pious man says: "If on the Final Day God asks me: 'What have you brought with you?', I'll answer: 'What does one bring with one when coming out of prison?'" (MṬ *Khātima*/8, p. 182).

Niẓām al-Mulk, the great Seljuk vizier, famous as a friend and patron of religious scholars, says on his deathbed: "Since I was always a buyer and a helper to anyone who spoke to me of You, and I've always 'bought' You and never 'sold' You, I now also ask You to buy me and to help me." (MṬ *Khātima*/9, p. 183).

The poet asks God not to hold up his sin before him, and then relates the following story:

A bath attendant collects before Shaykh Abū Saᶜīd the dirt he's rubbed off of him. In the meantime he asks the shaykh what nobility is, and the shaykh answers: "That you hide the dirt and never hold it up before people's sight." Thereupon the bath attendant falls at the shaykh's feet and begs for forgiveness.—The poet begs God to display nobility to him as well and not to hold up his dirt before him. (MṬ *Khātima*/11, pp. 183-84.—*Asrār al-tawḥīd* 223; O'Kane, *Secrets* 406).

A bedouin leads a miserable life in a salt desert where there's only brackish water. A year of famine forces him to leave the area and go to another region.

There he finds sweet water for the first time. Convinced that this is the water of Paradise, he fills a skin with it, lifts the skin onto his shoulder and sets out, intending to bestow this water as a gift from Paradise on the caliph, who, so he hopes, will surely give him a handsome reward. He meets the caliph Maʾmūn just as the latter is returning from the hunt and says, when asked what he wants, that he's brought the caliph a gift from Paradise. The caliph asks what it is. "Water of Paradise", replies the bedouin, and he offers Maʾmūn a cup of warm, foul-smelling water. Maʾmūn, who grasps the man's situation, drinks a little of the water and bestows a thousand dinars on the bedouin, but he sets one condition on the gift, that the man must immediately turn around and go home. Later when they ask the caliph why he imposed this condition on the man, he says: "If he'd travelled on ahead, he would have reached the Euphrates and been forced to recognize the worthlessness of his gift. I wanted to save him from undergoing this shame. He came from far-off to see me and gave me what he was able to give. For this reason I wanted to treat him with nobility."—The poet continues: "You, God, gave the caliph this nobility which in comparison with Your nobility is only one drop of dew. I come from the salt flats of this world. The drought of time has only caused few acts of obedience to flourish on my part. I come from a far distance with a skin full of tears of longing on my shoulder so You may perhaps bestow on me the gift of Your mercy."—Then, as so often, he describes his confused and helpless state, from which only the helping hand of God can save him. (MN, final story.—*Mathnawī* 1/2703 ff.).

A robber captures a man, takes him back to his house, and goes to get a sword intending to kill the prisoner. In the meantime the robber's wife gives the prisoner a piece of bread to eat. When the robber returns with the sword and sees this, he asks: "Who gave you the bread?" The prisoner answers: "Your wife." When the robber hears this, he says: "Now I can no longer kill you. Whoever has eaten our bread, we don't kill." "I too, oh Creator", says the poet, "have eaten Your bread, therefore confer on me the right of having consumed bread (with You)!" (MṬ 0/1, p. 8).

ᶜAbd Allāh ibn Masᶜūd has a female slave who's grown old in his service. When he's in need, he decides to sell her. She weeps and complains because she'll be sent away from the master in whose service she's grown grey. Then, at Gabriel's command, the Prophet causes Ibn Masᶜūd to set the old slave woman free since she's grown grey in Islam.—In the same way the poet asks God not to sell him (to give him away) even though he has no acts of obedience to show, since he too has grown grey in Islam. (IN *Khātima*/13, pp. 381-83).

A man relates: "I beheld Yaḥyā ibn Aktham in a dream and asked him: 'What has God done with you?' He answered: 'He called me and said to me: "You bad shaykh! You did this and did that!" Then I said: "Lord, this isn't what's been transmitted to me about You." God said: "And what's been transmitted to you about Me?" I replied: "It's been transmitted to us from ᶜAbd al-Razzāq, from

Ma^c^mar, from Zuhrī, from ^c^Urwa, from ^c^Ā^ɔ^isha, from the Prophet, and from Gabriel, that You said: 'Whenever a Muslim grows old in the faith, I'm ashamed to punish him.' But I'm an old man." Then God said: "^c^Abd al-Razzāq spoke the truth, as did Ma^c^mar and Zuhrī, ^c^Urwa and ^c^Ā^ɔ^isha, the Prophet and Gabriel, and I Myself." And He then ordered that I be admitted to Paradise.'" (*Tanbīh al-ghāfilīn* 38a, *Bāb mā yurjā min raḥmat Allāh*; *Ta^ɔ^rīkh Baghdād* 14/203).

Bishr al-Ḥāfī, one time before his conversion, sees a sheet of paper on which the name of God is written, picks it up and wipes aromatic musk over it. In return, it's predicted to him in a dream that he'll become a great saint.—^c^Aṭṭār says: "I, the dealer in spices, have endeavored to honor God's name with a fine scent by means of my poems. For this reason I beg for mercy, etc." (IN *Khātima*/14, pp. 383-84; TA 1/107.—See p. 307 below).

For ^c^Aṭṭār a still more strongly convincing precedent is the forgiveness God bestowed on the poet Firdawsī for a single verse which he devoted to *tawḥīd*, the profession of God's oneness (see pp. 283 f. below).—^c^Aṭṭār has dedicated his whole art of poetry to the service of *tawḥīd* and may therefore entertain hope in Paradise like that "man of Paradise" Firdawsī. (AN 23/2).

It is a customary practice on earth to set free an evil-doer for the sake of the person who intercedes on his behalf.

The father of the poet said as his last word on his deathbed: "God, look after Muḥammad (the poet) (*nekū dār*)!", and his mother said amen to this. So ^c^Aṭṭār now begs God to set him free for the sake of the two old people who had prayed for him in this way. (AN 23/7, final story).

6

The inscrutable mercy of God is the only thing on which the poet pins his hope in these stories and verses. But as was explained earlier (p. 67), the doctrine had become established in Islam that profession of the true faith by itself already protects one from punishment in Hell, or in any case eternal damnation. In support of this doctrine one has recourse to the Koranic verse: "God does not forgive that others (gods) are associated with Him but He forgives anything else to whomever He wishes" (6/116). As in the original Islam, in later times as well profession of the true faith is the most important religious achievement. This conception is expressed in pseudo-*ḥadīth*s such as:

God says: "My bondsman, as long as you serve Me and have hope in Me and do not associate anything as a companion with Me, I shall forgive whatever you have done. And if you come to Me with as many sins as the whole earth, I shall come to you with just as much forgiveness and pardon you, without worrying Myself about it..." God says on the Final Day: "Bring forth from Hell those in

whose heart there is as much faith as the weight of a grain of barley!" Then He says: "Bring forth from Hell those in whose heart there is as much faith as the weight of a mustard seed!" Then He says: "By My honor and loftiness! I will not allow a person who has believed in Me for even one hour in the night or in the day to be treated like someone who has not believed in Me!" (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 62, *Bāb al-rajā*ʾ; *Sendschreiben* 197/11.1, 2).

As is well known, the Murjiʾites went the furthest in this respect. Muqātil ibn Sulaymān taught that faith balanced out sins because it is heavier than sins (Ashʿarī, *Maqālāt* 151), whereas Muʿtazilites like Jubbāʾī taught the opposite, that the reward for faith was annulled by great sins. (Ibid. 270).

Cf. Maʾmūn's dream about the weighing of his deeds on the Final Day where the wavering scales are finally made to come out in his favor because of the addition of a sheet of paper bearing the profession of faith. *Islamic Culture* 3/1929/ 267-69.

However, whereas in Islam the common man feels quite safe from punishment in Hell because of his belonging to the Islamic community, among the early ascetics and Ṣūfīs the commandment was in force that a pious man should not feel safe, that he must be in fear for himself and harbor hope for others (above pp. 71 f.). As we have seen (pp. 73-76), ʿAṭṭār as well is familiar with this uncertainty concerning salvation. And yet at times the thought is expressed in him that the act of conversion, as the most pleasing of works to God, is especially effective in bringing salvation. Whoever dies immediately after converting has the greatest prospect of being received into the mercy of God.

In a context in which ʿAṭṭār is talking about extinction in God through physical death (cf. pp. 601 ff. below), he says: "I know of no greater good fortune than that which was allotted to the magicians of Pharaoh who died immediately after accepting the true faith." (MṬ 29/4, p. 101; above p. 197).

The magicians are executed by Pharaoh. Surah 20/71; Thaʿlabī 116.

If Pharaoh had succeeded in pronouncing the whole profession of faith before drowning in the sea, and not only half of it—Gabriel hindered him from completing it—, then four hundred years of a sinful life and unbelief would have been forgiven him. (MN 0/2; above p. 76).

Abū'l-Qāsim Jurjānī refuses to perform the prayers for the dead over the corpse of Firdawsī, the author of *The Book of Kings*, because the poet had spent his life composing eulogies on behalf of the unbelieving gebrs. At night Firdawsī appears to him in a dream with an emerald crown on his head and wearing green clothes, and says to him: "You didn't want to pronounce the prayers for the dead over my corpse but God had His angels perform the prayer over me and

had them give me a written document, to the effect that I, Firdawsī, am worthy of Paradise (*firdaws*)." Then God said to me: "That shaykh from Ṭōs has rejected you, but I've accepted you in mercy because of that one verse in which you professed belief in My oneness. Don't give up hope in My mercy! You shouldn't say I'm stingy (like Sultan Maḥmūd who withheld from the poet the proper reward for his work)!" (AN 23/2; see above pp. 159 and 282.—E. G. Browne, *A Literary History of Persia* 2/138).

Bāyazīd, to the horror of his disciples, on his deathbed has himself given a Magian's belt, the symbol of unbelief, and girds his waist with it. He then tears it apart and says: "Oh God, don't You receive into Your mercy a gebr who converts on his deathbed? Consider me to be such a seventy-year-old gebr who now accepts the true faith!" Then he pronounces the profession of faith and dies. (IN *Khātima*/10, pp. 378-79; TA 1/177).—ᶜAṭṭār repeats after Bāyazīd: "Assume I'm a repentant like that unbeliever, view me as a new convert!" (IN p. 387_7).

The story is fashioned out of sayings such as those in *Nūr* 64, 69, 126. Cf. also H. Ritter: "Die aussprüche des Bāyezīd Bisṭāmī" in: *Westöstliche Abhandlungen, Rudolf Tschudi zum 70. Geburtstag überreicht*, Wiesbaden 1954, p. 236.

7

Finally, the believer has an intercessor in the Prophet, on whom has been conferred the privilege to intercede for his community, especially for sinners who have committed big sins, and to exempt them from punishment in Hell. (MṬ pp. 22-23; IN p. $18_{2\text{-}6}$. See above pp. 19-20).

When the Prophet returns from his Ascension, ᶜĀʾisha asks him to tell her what God said to him. The Prophet answers: "God said to me: 'Oh prophet, for your sake someone from your community worthy of Hell is more dear to me than a hundred persons worthy of Paradise from another religious community.'" (MN 0/4 in the *Miᶜrāj*).

Thus ᶜAṭṭār turns toward the Prophet in prayer and asks for his intercession (MṬ p. 14, from verse 369; MN after 0/4; AN 3 in *Miᶜrāj*), for a glance of mercy.

The Prophet can save him from the dark water of sin in which he's in danger of drowning, like the mother who bravely jumped in the water and saved her child from certain death when the child fell in the mill-stream and was about to be swept away, and then lovingly nursed it at her breast. (MN 0/2, p. 15).

CHAPTER NINETEEN

WORKS: BEING GOD'S SLAVE

Despite the fact that self-justification through works was denied, the idea that performing works is meritorious was never abandoned in Islam. In this regard one could also have recourse to the Koran: "Whoever has done an ant's weight of good shall see (the reward for) it, and whoever has done an ant's weight of bad shall see (the punishment for) it" (99/7-8).

The idea of reward is fully alive in Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī. The soul will easily bear the laboriousness of performing its duties toward God if it thinks of the sweetness of the reward which awaits it, and Ḥārith does not hesitate to point to the same psychological experience in worldly affairs. The merchant, the architect, etc., undergo difficulty and hardship for the sake of a reward. (*Riᶜāya* 40-41). In popular Islam the attitude supported by the Koran that for every pious act, whether it consists of social works or worship, one may expect a reward (*thawāb*) in the hereafter, has firmly established itself. Where we say "something for God's sake", i.e. without worldly reward, the Turk says "*sevab için*" "for reward in the hereafter". One takes an orphan child into one's house under the designation "*ahiretlik*", i.e. for the sake of reward in the hereafter, or pays the school fees (*okutmak*) of poor children for reward in the hereafter. One "sends ahead" to the hereafter pious works and is sure that one will find them there as the only good one can possess beyond the grave. (Cf. above pp. 190-91).

1

Paraenesis, and Tradition (*ḥadīth*) that caters to its needs, happily hold out the prospect of forgiveness of sins and other rewards in the hereafter for completely trivial works, as if this were an interpretation of the Koranic verse cited above. In the pious literature this often takes the form that someone to his amazement sees in a dream vision a deceased sinner who is walking about contentedly

in Paradise, and then in response to his astonished question is informed about the good deed which helped the person be admitted to Paradise. Thus, as we have seen, Malikshāh explains that he was only saved because he gave an old woman ample recompense for a cow which his slaves had stolen from her. (MN 6/1; above p. 127).

Even displaying mercy toward animals is rewarded in the hereafter.

The Prophet relates: "A great female sinner came across a dog in the desert that was dying of thirst by a well with its tongue hanging out. The woman took pity on the dog, lowered her shoe into the well and brought up some water for the dog." And the Prophet relates: "On my Ascension I saw her in Paradise." (IN *Khātima*/8, pp. 375-76).

The story originates in the *ḥadīth*. Bukhārī, ed. Krehl, vol. 2, pp. 77-78; *Sunan Abī Dāwūd*, Delhi 1318, 1/352; cf. Georg Jacob, *Unio mystica*, Hanover 1922, p. 55. It is rendered in verse in Saᶜdī's *Būstān*, *Bāb* 2. EI s.v. "Kalb".

An Arabic variant:

God gives Moses the task of burying one of the Friends of God who has just died. As it turns out, the man in question is a sinner (*fāsiq*) whom his neighbors didn't want to bury and therefore threw him down a well. After Moses has completed the burial rites over him, he asks God how this man, whose sinful life is attested by the believers, can be a Friend of God. God answers: "I know ten times more sins of this man than these people do. But he did a good deed, for the sake of which I've forgiven him. He gave a thirsty dog water to drink from a well by lowering his handkerchief in it and then squeezing it out so the dog could drink." (*Rawnaq al-majālis*, *Bāb* 9/2).

The grains one scatters to the hungry birds are seeds which bear fruit in the hereafter.

A man sweeps away the snow in the winter and scatters grain for the birds. A fool says to him: "Now isn't the season to be sowing! Only a madman would sow seeds at this time!" The man replies: "My son, this is precisely the right sowing, and now is the time for me to sow seeds. When the harvest season arrives, I'll lead the threshing oxen to the threshing floor." (MN 36/2).

God in His inscrutable ordaining can accept such an act from an unbeliever as well.

After the world-traveller comes back from visiting "the Well-preserved Tablet", he's instructed by the *pīr* that affliction and good fortune are inscribed on the tablet without any reason. (MN 8/0).

One day when snow has fallen, Dhū'l-Nūn sees a gebr out in the field who sweeps away the snow and scatters millet seed, and he asks him why he's doing this. The fire-worshipper says: "I scatter millet seed for the birds so that God

will have mercy on me." The shaykh replies: "How will God accept your act since you're a gebr?" The gebr says: "Even if God doesn't accept my act, He'll see it won't He?" Dhū'l-Nūn: "Yes." The gebr: "That's enough for me." Later Dhū'l-Nūn sees the gebr circumambulating the Ka[c]ba. The latter explains that God accepted him and received him into the true faith. At that Dhū'l-Nūn looks up to heaven and says: "You sell at a low price indeed! Forty years of his being a gebr for one handful of millet seed!" A voice answers him: "God calls whom He calls without reason, and rejects whom He rejects without reason." (MN 8/1; TA 1/123-24. *Ḥadīqa* 107; *Rawnaq al-majālis*, *Bāb* 9/5).

The Islamic religion knows no church which claims the right to distribute the treasure of good works which has accumulated through the pious deeds of the saints. However, on the Final Day, in accordance with His judgement, God can bestow the works of the angels on the sinners.

[c]Abbāsa-i Ṭūsī says: "When on the Final Day the sinners stand there with blackened faces awaiting their judgement, God will cast upon them a hundred thousand years of the angels' acts of obedience. Then in astonishment the angels ask what this means and God answers them: "Your acts of obedience cause you no benefit or harm, but they benefit human beings. Bread exists for the sake of the hungry." (MṬ 19/6, p. 73).

2

The servant of God of lower rank, the naïve man of piety, naturally expects an appropriate reward for his achievements.

A king passes by a man sifting earth and hears him say: "My God, when I was supposed to go to work—I've been busy now incessantly—when it was important to set out early, I got up early for work. I've done my part, now it's up to You to do Your part." The king is pleased by the words of the man sifting earth. He bestows on him a purse with gold coins and says: "Since you hastened to work so early, you've received more than you wished for." (MN 13/5).

In the prayer to the Godhead in the final chapter of the *Muṣībatnāma* [c]Aṭṭār gives voice to the thought that he, [c]Aṭṭār, is indeed laden with sins and has done what a base person would do, but God is noble and may therefore do what the noble are accustomed to do. (MN *Khātima*/15, final verse). He has done good and bad, whatever he was in a position to do. Now it is God's turn to do His part. (MN *Khātima*/16, verses 8 and 9).

He then recounts the following about a simple bedouin who speaks less modestly than the man sifting earth above:

A bedouin who has performed the pilgrimage rites takes hold of the door-ring of the Ka[c]ba and says: "I've done my part, where's Your part then? When You or-

dered me to do the pilgrimage, I did it. When I was supposed to undertake the (holy) standing (a part of the rite) at ᶜArafa, I undertook it. And I also performed the holy running and slaughtered a sacrifice and circumambulated the Kaᶜba. What more can I still do?" (MN *Khātima*/16).

We saw earlier in the story about the representatives of the three types of piety who have Moses present their actions to God (p. 266) that God in His kindness grants the requested reward to the saint who performs works.

3

But God is in no way obliged by such achievements to accept into Paradise saints who perform works. If He does, He only does so out of pure mercy. The amount of benefits which God bestows on human beings every day is infinitely greater than all that a person can achieve. It is therefore very foolish for someone to emphasize his works.

A bondsman of God serves God for five hundred years on a mountain surrounded by the sea. When he dies, God says to the angels: "Lead My bondsman into Paradise because of My mercy (*bi-raḥmatī*)." The bondsman of God says: "No, because of my works (*bi-ᶜamalī*)." God then orders a reckoning to be made for him. It turns out that the benefit of the gift of sight alone weighs as much as five hundred years of worship. But that still leaves the benefit of the rest of the body. After that God orders him to be brought into Hell. Then the man cries out: "Lord, convey me into Paradise out of mercy!" They bring him back, and God points out to him that He bestowed on him the power to perform five hundred years of worship and nourished him on the mountain by means of a spring and a pomegranate-tree. Did all this happen because of his works then? The bondsman of God must confess that he owes everything to God's mercy and not to his own works, and thereupon he's conducted into Paradise. (*Tanbīh al-ghāfilīn* 36b-37a, *Bāb mā yurjā min raḥmat Allāh*).

In a variant of this legend God causes a vein of the servant of God to beat in such a way that he has no more peace and must abandon his pious practices, and makes him admit because of this that all his worship is only worth a peaceful vein. (*Qūt* 1/210$_2$; *Nahrung* 2/100/32.156).

In another variant the servant of God is in danger of dying of thirst and must pay for a drink of water with the reward of two hundred years of worship. After he has done this, he falls ill and must pay for the remedy with the remaining two hundred years that he served God. Then God takes him to task because of his illusion as above. (Pseudo-ᶜAṭṭār, *Kanz al-baḥr*).

Apparently ᶜAṭṭār behaves properly when he says in one of his addresses to God:

Since you've no need of our good and bad deeds, You'll overlook them and give me help. Although I'm bound by good and bad (acts), I don't say anything good or bad about the good and bad (which I've done). But You frequently bestow good fortune without reason, so You'll also bestow it now without reason. Since You've given me existence without reason, pour Your generosity over me now without reason! (IN pp. 377_{16}-378_{1}).

On the other hand, it is presumptuous to maintain hope in God's mercy without works. Earthly existence exists as an opportunity for man to undertake works, in order to sow for the hereafter. (Above pp. 189-90).

Ibrāhīm ibn Adham wishes to visit a bathhouse. He's asked for the bathing-fee at the entrance. He then falls into a mystic "state" and says: "If one can't even enter the devil's house without paying, how is one meant to enter God's house for free?" (MN 29/3; TA 1/102).

An Arabic variant: *Tanbīh al-ghāfilīn* 34a, *Bāb ṣifat ahl al-janna.*

Of course one cannot force good fortune to arrive but one can behave in such a way as to be worthy of good fortune. The king's glance of favor will perhaps fall on the person who fulfills his duty.

Perform acts of obedience during a whole lifetime so that Solomon casts a glance upon you! (MṬ 17/0 p. 63. See above p. 268).

Even if He confers good fortune without reason, obedience toward God is nonetheless the affair of a person blessed with good fortune (*ṣāḥib dawlat*). If you're a man of good fortune (*dawlatī*), you perform works of obedience, and if not, you also do it for a while. Because this is the *sunna*, perform works, and not a few but many! If day and night you prove to be a man of works, this striving will soon open the doors for you. (MN in 31/0).

A master says: "Get up before dawn and pray, and also perform the evening prayer and everything you've been ordered to do. Then you'll have done your part. If a hawk then comes and settles on your shoulder, take hold of it by the foot. For this is pure profit!" (AN 7/5).

4

For the true man of piety, however, the thought of a reward is by no means the reason which impels him to perform works of obedience. God as his creator and master has a rightful claim to the service of His slave. After all, He has only created human beings and genies so that they serve Him (surah 51/56).

In the stories about David it says: "The dearest to Me of the lovers is the one who doesn't serve Me for a gift but in order to honor My right as Master (*li-*

yu^cṭiya'l-rubūbiyyata ḥaqqahā. Qūt 2/56$_{12}$; *Nahrung* 2/478/32.702; *Elixir* 161).—Wahb ibn Munabbih transmits from the Psalter: "Who acts more wrongly than he who serves Me because of Paradise and Hell? If I had not created Paradise and Hell, would I then not be worthy of being obeyed?" (*Qūt* 2/56$_{13}$; *Nahrung* 2/478/32.702).

In [c]Aṭṭār:

God says to David: "Tell My slaves: 'If I possessed no Hell and no heaven, it would still be fitting for you to serve Me. Would you have nothing to do with Me if there were no Paradise and Hell-fire? I've a right to your service. Therefore serve Me without hope (of Paradise) and without fear (of Hell-fire)! ...Because I am the Lord it's proper that you honor Me voluntarily.'" (MṬ 36/2, p. 121).

He (man) must know that he's a slave and that he has a slave's legal status and is subject to the master's rights and has no legal claim on God. Because the slave of God is His creation and His work, and God is his creator and owner. (*Qūt* 1/205$_{10}$; *Nahrung* 2/86/32.136; cf. *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 1/101-02).

The man of piety must incorporate this within his feelings, keep it present in his consciousness and behave accordingly.

Cf. the continuation of the cited passage in the *Qūt*.

This fundamental relationship must be fulfilled in the practices of religious life. In a *ḥadīth* it says: "Don't be like a bad slave who only works when he's afraid, nor like a bad hireling who doesn't work if he doesn't receive wages." (*Qūt* 2/56$_{24}$; *Nahrung* 2/478/32.702).

For this reason Rābi[c]a says: "A bad slave of God serves his Master out of fear or because he desires a wage." They asked her: "Why do you serve God then?" She answers (with a proverb): "First the neighbor (God), then the house (Paradise)! Isn't it enough that we're allowed to serve Him? If there were no Heaven and Hell, wouldn't we have to obey Him? Wouldn't He have a right to our service without any secondary reasons?" (TA 1/69$_{20\text{-}24}$; Smith 100).

Regarding the prayer of supplication as a demonstration of a slave relationship, see above pp. 56-57

The idea of a reward is also invalidated because work is actually a gift which God, who causes everything, gives to the person performing the work.

How can you want remuneration for a work which He gives you as alms, or how can you want a reward for honest behavior which He bestows on you? (*Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/107; cf. also Abū Sa[c]īd on himself in *Asrār al-tawḥīd* 25-26; O'Kane, *Secrets* 113 ff.).

5

Through awareness of being the slave of an almighty, strict, but also kind, master, the need for support from a powerful and certain, absolute personality is satisfied, which need is perhaps the basis for a great part of religious behavior in general. The stronger and more powerful this ideal personality is, the more protected the person feels who seeks support from it. The two great symbols of power, strength and protection, the father and the master, are allocated somewhat differently in both great monotheistic religions, in Islam which in this case continues the ancient Semitic tradition and in Christianity. The other need connected with this need for support, namely the need for ready-made judgements concerning what one should and should not do, which are based on an authority that one is meant to obey with confidence, is satisfied in Islam by means of the law which has been revealed and brought by the founder of the religion.

Thus the slave relationship with God is nothing less than an urgently felt compulsion.

As the *pīr* explains to the world-traveller who returns from visiting Adam, Adam gave up Paradise voluntarily and chose the state of slavery. (MN 29/0).

Being a slave of God is no humiliation for a human being, but an adornment and title to honor for him.

According to Abū Ḥafṣ, being a slave is an adornment of God's bondsman, and whoever gives it up divests himself of this adornment. (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 91, *Bāb al-ᶜubūdiyya*; *Sendschreiben* 283/25.6).

There is nothing more honorable than being a slave of God and no more perfect name for the believer than that of slave. During the most honorable hour which was allotted to the Prophet on earth, that of his Ascension, God designated him with the name: "Lofty is He who caused *His slave* to travel at night" (surah 17/1).

Abū ᶜAlī al-Daqqāq in Qushayrī, *Risāla* 91-92, *Bāb al-ᶜubūdiyya*; *Sendschreiben* 284/25.7.

Thus the great men of piety have chosen to be slaves of God and by this means have become sultans.

The perfect... have undertaken the service of the slave and satisfied (God's) rightful claim. That's why even in slavery they became sultans, they became the best of human beings. (MN in 34/2).

One day ᶜUtba al-Ghulām appears before Rābiᶜa wearing a new garment and walking about proudly as he never did before. Rābiᶜa asks him: "What is this pride and vanity I've never obseved in you before?" ᶜUtba answers: "Oh Rābiᶜa,

who has a greater right to pride? He has become my Master and I His slave!" (*Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/128.—And a similar story in the same place).

In ᶜAṭṭār a pious man says: "I've been happy and high-spirited for seventy years because I have so fine a Master." (MṬ 35/3, p. 119).

The story about the old man who lets himself be sold as a slave by the young man he loves (see pp. 391 f. below) is interrupted by ᶜAṭṭār with the verses: "What greater gift of good fortune do you know than that the Creator calls you His slave! You then acquire a living heart through God when you become His slave for all eternity with a hundred souls." (IN p. $225_{19\text{-}20}$).

6

Emancipation from the relationship of slave, crossing the boundaries established by command and prohibition, is out of the question as long as man is on earth and thereby subject to the holy law.

If a person thinks that the slave can at some point cast off the bridle of slavery and gaze out across the boundaries of commands and prohibitions—as long as he is subject to the law on this earth with a clear faculty of discrimination (being an adult and in possession of his mental faculties), such behavior amounts to detaching oneself from religion. (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 100, *Bāb al-ḥurriyya*; *Sendschreiben* 311/31.3).

In the earliest stages of Islamic mysticism there were already groups which attempted to go beyond the slave relationship with God and to attain a freer relationship which allowed them to free themselves from the law, i.e. chiefly from the ritual duties. They are rejected by the strict Ṣūfīs. Junayd, who even on his deathbed does not stop his devotional practices, distances himself from them (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 19; *Sendschreiben* 66 f./1.23), and Ghazzālī writes a work against them (*Kitāb yudhkar fīh ḥamāqat ahl al-ibāḥa*). The rejection of the strict, legalistic orthodoxy and its representatives by the Ṣufīs, which still continues in many Ṣūfī circles, should in no way be conceived of as a standpoint of unbridled libertinism. Their mode of life offers no justification for this. Rather, it corresponds to a different type of piety for which salvation consists not in fulfilling the prescribed rites (these are for the most part neglected), but in achieving personal closeness to God in feeling and consciousness, or in the realization of a certain religious behavior or philosophy of life.

This latter point particularly applies to the *qalandar* dervishes and in a somewhat different way to the Ḥurūfīs. Cf. H. Ritter, "Die Anfänge der Ḥurūfīsekte" in: *Oriens* 7/1954/44-48.

In one story of ᶜAṭṭār, loyally maintaining obedience is presented as the higher standpoint in contrast to the pure mysticism of love.

Akkāfī in a dream beholds the famous mystics Bāyazīd and Tirmidhī walking along a road and sees himself walking in front of them. The reason for this distinction is the following. Akkāfī had once been informed by God that Bāyāzīd was superior to all other pious men because he did not, like the others, wish for something from God but he wished for God Himself. Akkāfī had then said: "Neither of these attitudes suits me. How should I want something from You or want You? I will obey Your command and do what You order me." Because of these words both shaykhs let him go first. (MṬ 28/2, pp. 97-98).

7

It would take us too far afield to examine all the passages in which ᶜAṭṭār speaks of the necessity to follow God's commandments (*ṭāᶜat*), to walk in accordance with the command (*ba-farmān raftan*), and to undertake work (*kār kardan*).

A series of passages in the *Ilāhīnāma* are collected in the Index under *ṭāᶜat*.

Only a few examples are cited here.

In contrast to his third son's inordinate ambition, the kingly father presents obedience to God as the proper means of reaching a truly higher status. (IN 10/0, p. 153).—One should not follow the lusts of one's own soul like the wasp, but one must proceed in obedience like the ant. (IN 13/14, p. 211. Cf. above p. 94).

After ᶜAṭṭār has related the story of ᶜAlī who due to a careless step injured an ant (see p. 338 below), he states that one should not set down one's steps at random but in accordance with God's command. To direct one's steps inattentively and not in conformity with God's command, leads to misfortune. (IN 2/4, p. $54_{9\text{-}15}$). To this he adds the general demand not to stop doing work and illustrates how such work receives its reward through the story about Anōshirwān and the old man who plants a tree. (2/5 p. 55. See p. 326 below).

No one can do someone else's work.

This is the answer Jaᶜfar al-Ṣādiq gives the dervish who asks him why he's so assiduous in worshipping. (IN 5/8, pp. 97-98).

One must do the work with one's own hand.

A man specifies in his will that his money should be given to the village elder because he knows better the poor who are worthy of assistance. The village elder says, picking up a grain of gold in his hand: "It would have been better for

him if he had given this one grain to the poor with his own hand, rather than all his money to the village elder." (AN 17/5).

In the hoopoe's discussion with the birds, after those who present all sorts of poor excuses for their lack of enthusiasm to participate in the dangerous journey and are then reprimanded by the hoopoe, a series of other birds speak who are able to boast of certain virtues and for this reason are praised. One of these birds says he wishes to be obedient and wait until he receives a command. The hoopoe praises him for this attitude. One act of obedience which is done under an order is better than a lifetime of good acts without an order. (MṬ 28/0, p. 96; above pp. 14-15).

It could be that this refers to the necessity not to neglect the prescribed prayers for the sake of voluntary acts of worship. Cf. Ibn ᶜAṭāᵓ: "One of the signs of a person following his lusts is that he is eager to perform voluntary good works and loath to perform prescribed works." (*Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 241 and the ensuing sayings cited in the same commentary). ᶜAṭṭār's text, of course, offers no justification for this kind of interpretation.

A king comes back to his capital city. The people decorate the city for his reception. Everyone contributes the best he has. Only the prison inmates have nothing to exhibit other than cut-off heads, and hands and feet. When the king passes by the prison which has been decorated this way, he dismounts and confers more tokens of his favor on the prison inmates than on the others. In surprise his companion asks him why he doesn't consider the rich gifts of the population but has distinguished the prison inmates. The king answers: "What the others have done is merely a trifle, they have only put themselves and their goods on display. But here, in the prison, I have seen the sign that my orders have been carried out. Because without my orders these heads, these hands and feet, wouldn't have been separated from their bodies. That's why this prison is dearer to me than the houses of the others who only wish to show themselves." (MṬ 28/1, pp. 96-97).

8

Sometimes adhering to the law, following the commands of God and His Apostle, appears to be a way out of a confused and uncertain situation. When it is no longer clear what to do, one then adheres to the commands of God and the guidance of the Prophet.

After he has the sailor describe his helpless situation on the storm-tossed ship where no one knows what will happen because no one knows what's written on the eternal Tablet (above p. 61), the poet continues: "That's why your path is to proceed according to the command... The best slave is the one who proceeds according to the command, just as God wishes." (MN 23/6).

After the story about the fool who calls out asking God whether He's not tired of eternally creating and destroying (above p. 179), ᶜAṭṭār presents one of those descriptions of his own helpless and confused state which we have already become familiar with (above pp. 151 ff.). "But from this confusion", so he exhorts himself at the end of the passage, "you'll find deliverance through Muṣṭafā the Prophet. If you're an unbeliever, he'll bestow the faith on you, if you're weak and without strength, he'll bestow on you the remedy. For you he's like a helpful *pīr* who leads along the right path. You be his *murīd*, for he has been sent by God as the absolute guide of the soul (*murshid*). His action is the action of God." (IN 11/11, p. 181). (As an amplification of this last idea there follows the story about Ḥasan al-Baṣrī who also does what is really up to God to do when he promises Paradise to the gebr. Above p. 271).

Proceeding in accordance with the command of God and the Prophet is also the way out of the errors of heathen philosophy. (Above pp. 83-84).

9

Seen in this light, the theological sciences, the study of the law (*fiqh*), Koranic interpretation (*tafsīr*) and the Traditions from the Prophet (*ḥadīth*), which otherwise the mystics have little interest in (above pp. 104-06), also appear to be useful and salutary. ᶜAṭṭār sings their praises after speaking about how philosophy leads one astray (MN 0; above p. 83).—Without knowledge piety is of no value, just as knowledge is of no value if one does not act on the basis of it.

Don't go astray on the path without knowledge. For the path is long and dark and full of pits with water. Hold the lamp of knowledge and science before you, otherwise you'll fall head first into the pit! ...But if you possess knowledge and no action, then access (to God) will neither be granted to you, nor to your knowledge... If you pile up a hundred acts of piety on top of one another—, if you have no knowledge, how will you find deliverance? The ascetic without knowledge becomes a laughing-stock of the devil.

A religious scholar (*ᶜālim*) is sleeping in a mosque. An ignorant person performs his prayers there. Someone sees the devil standing nearby and asks him what he's doing here. The cursed one answers: "I want to lead this ignorant person astray but I can't because I'm afraid of the sleeping religious scholar. If the latter didn't chain my foot, the ignorant man would be like wax in my hand." (AN 9/3).

Whoever has knowledge but doesn't act in accordance with it, one must weep over this person because he's making a laughing-stock of himself. What matters is not to revere the pious but to do their deeds.

A man visits the graves of the pious with great enthusiasm. One night a voice calls to him: "How long will you still go on revering the graves of the men of God? Instead, do the deeds of 'the men'. Then you'll find deliverance!" (AN 9/4).

If you know nothing of the search for knowledge, be ashamed of yourself! How long will you still be like a donkey without a halter. It says among the sayings of the Prophet: "Seek knowledge even if it be in China!" (*Fayḍ al-qadīr* no. 1110). But only very few display a high striving after knowledge.

On a mountain in China there is a petrified man,[1] from whose eyes tears continually flow. When the tears flow onto the ground, they immediately turn to stone as well. That man[2] is science. He has turned to stone out of sorrow for the people who possess no high striving.—This house of trials is absolutely dark. Inside it knowledge is like a lamp which lights the way. (MṬ 40/1, pp. 138-39).

The weeping idol actually stems from Asadī's *Garshāspnāma*, Tehran 1317, pp. 163-64.

10

Along with professing belief in God's oneness and His Prophet, the acts of obedience prescribed by the holy law of Islam to a disproportionate degree consist of works of worship, rituals and devotional exercises: prayers five times a day, fasting during the month of Ramaḍān, the pilgrimage to the Kaᶜba. In addition there are also social actions such as alms-giving, the duty to refrain from certain coarse sins, and complying with the law concerning foods. But under "work" (*kār*), as ᶜAṭṭār puts it, or "act of obedience" (*ṭāᶜat*), what is chiefly understood, though not of course exclusively, are the practices of worship.

As in Western monasticism, so too in Islam there developed a type of pious man who seeks to increase these devotional practices beyond what is strictly commanded, "the worshipper of God" (*ᶜābid*), from whom the Ṣūfī is distinguished in that in his case the personal closeness to God (*taqarrub*) sought by means of devotional works consists chiefly of special spiritual states of soul, whereas the *ᶜābid* is concerned to accomplish a maximum of possible works for which he hopes to receive a reward from God (cf. the story about the three types of pious men Moses meets, above p. 266), without however being certain of this reward. Naturally, the two types cannot always be clearly distinguished from one another.

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[1] Read: *sang shudh*.
[2] Read in verse 3485a: *ān mard*.

The self-discipline based on such practices is intensified by means of a scrupulous examination (*murāqaba*) of every moment, as to whether just then the fulfilment of a strictly prescribed duty is required, or the performance of voluntary devotional exercises, or an allowed action which is necessary for maintaining the health of body and soul. (*Qūt* 1/88, *Faṣl* 26; *Nahrung* 1/307/26). For the complete amount of time which is at the disposal of a human being falls under one of these three categories. Thus, in reality, all of an *ᶜābid*'s time which is left over after "allowed action", i.e. eating and drinking, etc., is filled with religious practices (*ḥashw al-awqāt bi-mā yanbaghī an tamlaʾ bih*, *Qūt* $1/89_{16}$; *Nahrung* 1/310/26.5). Indeed, one praises a pious man by saying he is *maᶜmūr al-awqāt*, i.e. "his times are thriving" or "well cultivated".

The time which must be devoted to eating and drinking is naturally the most worthless. In reducing this time to a minimum, the pious man who only partakes of food which he doesn't have to chew, without a doubt, has advanced especially far and thus saved enough time for praising God seventy times... (*Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/52).

Thus the zealous worshipper of God (*ᶜābid*) cannot do enough by way of performing works of service to God (*ᶜibādāt*)), although, as we have seen, he is by no means sure that God will even accept his works, and waits for God's judgement in trembling and apprehension. But the most accomplished worshipper of God is clearly someone who goes on performing pious works even when he knows that God has rejected him.

You don't know whether you've been rejected or not, whether you've been designated for blessedness by God's eternal decision or not. But this you do know that it's best for you, as long as you live, to act according to the command. This you know, whereas that you don't. And one shouldn't make the certain depend on what is uncertain.

A worshipper of God (*ᶜābid*) goes on performing devotional religious works without interruption. Moses is commissioned by God to tell him: "What is all your worship supposed to mean? Your name is not in the book of the blessed." Moses delivers the message, but the pious man simply redoubles his enthusiasm for performing religious devotions. Moses asks him: "Why do you undertake all these acts of obedience since you belong to those who've been rejected?" The worshipper of God answers: "Until now I had believed that I'm nothing and have no meaning, but now I know that generally I'm counted (and receive attention). For that reason I perform even more acts of obedience. Whether the light (of Paradise) or Hell-fire is my lot, He's the Lord, and I'm the slave."—But such loyalty

in obedience does find its reward: God erases his name from the list of the damned and transfers him to the class of the blessed. (IN 10/8, pp. 164-65).

11

However, the religious practices of human beings only have worth if they come from a sincere heart. Imperfect and impure, and hence of no value, are the acts of obedience which are performed so as to be seen by people (*riyāʾ*), or in which religious vanity and self-admiration (*ᶜujb*) are mixed. (Cf. e.g. *Riᶜāya* 84-93).

A baker who has great love and reverence for Shiblī, whom he has never actually seen, denies him a piece of bread when he comes to his shop unrecognized as a beggar. Once he's made aware of his mistake, he rushes after the holy man, asks him humbly for forgiveness and invites him to a banquet which he intends to give especially for him and to which he invites many other people. During the banquet, which has been prepared with great effort and cost, someone asks Shiblī who is destined for blessedness and who is destined for damnation. Shiblī answers: "If you want to see someone condemned to Hell, look at our host! To give away a piece of bread for God's sake was too much for him, but for Shiblī he spends hundreds of dinars!" (IN 5/1, pp. 88-89; TA 2/170[3]).

In Isfahan there's a muezzin with a beautiful voice who lets his voice resound with beautiful modulations when he calls to prayer from a high cupola. A fool, who walks by the cupola while the muezzin is singing, is asked what the caller to prayer is saying. He answers: "He's throwing hollow nuts on the cupola (is making an unnecessary noise)." (IN 7/16, p. 123).

On this expression in the *Shāhnāma* see Ringgren, *Fatalism* 85.

One time it is a dog that unmasks the hypocrite.

A pious man goes to the mosque in the evening to perform devotional prayers there until the morning. When it becomes dark, he hears a noise. He thinks another pious man has come in to pray, and since he now thinks he's being observed, he redoubles his enthusiasm. At daybreak it turns out that the other visitor to the mosque is a dog that came into the mosque to find a place to sleep. The pious man has prayed the whole night for a dog and now reproaches himself bitterly. (IN 5/2, pp. 89-90).

As is well known, there was a type of pious men in Islam, the so-called Malāmatiyya, who in order to escape from the danger of hypocrisy, purposely led a life which was outwardly offensive. Only at their death was it then made known that these people

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3 In line 16 one should read: *nānbā-ē*.

were great saints, despite their offensive way of life. Only God knew how matters stood with them.

Cf. Richard Hartmann, "As-Sulamī's *Risālat al-Malāmatīya*" in: *Der Islam* 8/1918/157-203; Abū'l-ᶜIlā ᶜAfīfī, *al-Malāmatiyya wa'l-ṣūfiyya wa-ahl al-futuwwa*, cf. *Oriens* 1/1948/373-76. For the later development among the Turks: Abdülbâki Gölpınarlı, *Melâmîlik ve Melâmîler*, Istanbul 1931. For the corresponding phenomenon in the Eastern Church see Ernst Benz, "Heilige Narrheit" in *Kyrios, Vierteljahrsschrift für Kirchen- und Geistesgeschichte Osteuropas* 3/1938/1-55.

A Malāmatī story is also found in ᶜAṭṭār.

A *pīr* receives the command from God to go to a wine-tavern where he can see a Friend of God. The *pīr* goes there and finds a white-haired man who died the day before in the tavern, who had carried the wine for the wine-house but had never touched a drop himself. He used to say: "Oh You who have both the world and religion, forgive someone who possesses neither the one nor the other!" (AN 9/5).

Thus the typical Malāmatī story appears in ᶜAṭṭār as a story about a sinner asking for forgiveness. The actual Malāmatī motif of the hidden saint who only appears as a sinner in the eyes of the world is somewhat obscured.

12

Moreover, not only the secret wish to be seen by people, but also self-admiration, pride in oneself for one's religious achievement, makes pious devotional practices worthless.

A pious man says: "I've endeavored all my life that the alms I give to the poor shouldn't be seen by anyone." A voice then calls to him: "You shouldn't see it yourself either!" (IN 14/3, p. 221).

Spiritual pride makes one ritually unclean.

A shaykh who's proud of his celebrity sits down before the prayer-niche. An old lady then enters the mosque and calls to him: "You're dirty and claim to be clean. You're vain because of your prestige as a shaykh. Leave the prayer-niche, you're ritually unclean!" (IN 14/5, p. 222).

Whoever looks upon his work with complacency has lost his reward.

A young man who has tormented himself for a long time with ascetic practices complains to Shaykh Ḥulwānī (?) that he hasn't attained anything with all his asceticism. The shaykh says: "You've looked upon your action with complacency and thereby found what you were looking for." (MN 29/5).

A man performed the pilgrimage forty times on foot and without provisions. One day he catches himself in the midst of vain feelings regarding this achievement, has the forty pilgrimages sold through a broker for some bread and gives

the bread to a dog to eat. Then he suddenly receives a slap on the back of the neck from a *pīr* and is soundly scolded by him: "You donkey! You think you've done something special with this sale? Adam sold all of Paradise for two grains of wheat!" (AN 10/4).

Whoever boasts too soon of having reached the highest level of mysticism, i.e. love of God and being free from oneself, must be reminded of his sins.

Khālū-i Sarakhsī keeps company with Khiḍr. The latter visits him one day and brings with him a young man who's a zealous lover of God. When the young man is seated, the shaykh asks him about what he does and avoids doing for religious reasons. The young man answers: "For the last ten years I've thought so much about the divine Friend that I know nothing about myself (and have nothing to report)." Sarakhsī says: "I can't think of Him because for sixty years I've been so engaged in my shortcomings that out of shame I don't dare to think about Him." When the young man hears this, a trembling comes over him. Khiḍr then says: "You shouldn't put such high demands on this youth. What you demand is a matter for the great. One must give an archer a bow which is suitable for the strength of his arm." (IN 18/6, pp. 293-94).

Fear of vanity, however, should not lead one to stop undertaking works completely.

I don't say: "Stop doing your works!" But neither do I say: "Do them badly!" Now sow good seed on a small scale so that in the future you find yourself with good works on a large scale! Do every act of obedience you can now do—yet even this much you neglect!

A parable:

A man sits down in a tavern and says: "I want satin and a horse with fittings!" They say to him: "First wish for a shirt of linen while you're waiting for the satin!" But the obstinate man in the tavern swears: "If I don't get the satin, I'll go on sitting in this tavern till I die." (AN 10/5).

But if you only do your work for the sake of the animal soul (bread), you're no better than a dog.

Sanāʾī sees a sweeper engaged in his work. At the same time a muezzin sounds the call to prayer. Sanāʾī says: "Both of them are the same. The one is as ignorant as the other. They both work for bread. Perhaps the sweeper is actually engaged in work for God, and the muezzin is blinded by hypocrisy and dissimulation." (MN 25/5).

Even to feel some pleasure in carrying out an act of obedience is questionable.

Wāsiṭī says: "Guard against feeling pleasure when doing acts of obedience, because they're (then) deadly poison!"

Iyyākum wa'stiḥlāʾa'l-ṭāʿāti fa-innahā sumūmun qātila. Qushayrī, *Risāla* 89, *Bāb al-riḍā; Sendschreiben* 277/24.6; Anṣārī, *Ṭabaqāt* 226.

Fāris Baghdādī says: "The sweetness of acts of obedience and polytheism resemble one another." (Anṣārī, *Ṭabaqāt* 226).

Of course, others have taught the opposite of this, that finding works sweet is a sign that the works have been accepted and will be rewarded in the hereafter. Thus the sweetness experienced is the reward for the work in this world. How these viewpoints can be harmonized by means of distinguishing two kinds of pleasure in works is illustrated by the *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 1/88-89.

Impure impulses in the soul appear so regularly when one undertakes a pious work, that Ibn ᶜAṭāᵓ Allāh can say: "If He didn't cover up (the shortcomings) in His kindness, no work would be worthy of being accepted." (*Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 1/143).

In fact, he goes so far as to say: "You're more in need of His forbearance when you obey Him than when you disobey Him." (*Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 1/143. More in the same passage.)

Yaḥyā ibn Muᶜādh says in a prayer: "My hope in You is almost greater when I sin than my hope in You when I do works. For when it comes to works, I rely on the purity of intention with which I do them. And how should I attain this purity since it's well known that all my works are corrupted in some way (*wa-anā bi'l-āfati maᶜrūf*), but when it comes to sins I feel I rely on Your forgiveness, and how would You not forgive since You possess the characteristic of generosity!"

...*wa-anta bi'l-jūdi mawṣūf!*—*Iḥyāᵓ* 4/134, *Bayān dawāᵓ al-rajāᵓ*; *Stufen* 323/C.46.

Since the works of sincere men of piety (*mukhliṣān*) are dangerous, sinners win the ball of victory. Those who see themselves don't see the king. God wants the moaning of sinners (*anīn al-mudhnibīn*). It's not seeing oneself that brings good fortune on this path, but an emaciated body and a broken heart. (AN in 9/4.—Cf. above pp. 265 f. There then follows the Malāmatī story related above on p. 299).

Many men of piety suddenly come to the view that their action has been mixed with conceit and has been dishonest and mere pretention (*daᶜwā*). Admittedly, the pious man above (pp. 299 f.) who sells his pilgrimages immediately falls into a new conceit, but in the case of others the renunciation of vanity is genuine.

A Ṣūfī who travelled in the desert for years without provisions and implements in order to practice absolute renunciation of worldly goods (*tajrīd*) finally abandons this way of life and continually carries a piece of bread with him. When asked why he abandoned this strict *tajrīd*, he says he realized that his earlier way of life had only been hypocritical conceit and pretention. He therefore renounced this way of life in remorse and seeks to atone for it. (IN 11/1, p. 169). So even practicing obedience can cut one off from God (IN p. 169_8).

One of the birds believes he's attained perfection by means of strict ascetic practices. The hoopoe reprimands him for his arrogant delusion. (MṬ 34/0, pp. 113-14; above p. 15)

Abū Bakr Nēshāpūrī rides forth from his convent with his disciples. His donkey suddenly breaks wind. He enters a state of rapture and tears his clothes. His disciples and the others present are extremely perplexed by this behavior. But the shaykh explains that as he was riding forth surrounded by his disciples the thought occurred to him: "Truly I'm no less than Bāyazīd! Surely the way I ride about in splendor with my disciples today, is how I'll appear on the Day of Resurrection." He reports: "I had scarcely completed this thought when the donkey broke wind in response. Then it was as if fire overwhelmed my heart." (MṬ 34/1, pp. 114-15).

13

Just as worthless as the pious deeds carried out with hypocrisy and vanity are those which are performed mechanically without the heart's participation.

On the Final Day a person will offer his prayers of ten years for sale through a broker and not even receive a loaf of bread for them. (IN 5/9, pp. 98-99).

This is the sense of the story. In its details it is not completely clear. The response of the fool must in fact represent an intensification of what preceded or contain an answer. Perhaps one must read *bikhradh* at p. 98_{19a} and add a question mark after *ān*. The fool's view is that prayer which must be sold off through a broker cannot actually be worth a loaf of bread.

A fool in Ray never takes part in the Friday prayers. After long persuasion, he finally lets himself be moved to come to the prayers one Friday. Once the *imām* has begun the ritual, the fool suddenly starts mooing like a cow. Reprimanded by the indignant participants in the prayers, he says: "My duty when praying behind the *imām* is to do everything he does. Since during the *Al-ḥamdu li'llāh* he sold a cow, I couldn't do anything better than to moo like a cow." The *imām* confesses that at that moment he had in fact been thinking of selling a cow. (IN 5/10, p. 99).

A fool observes in a mosque that someone performing the prayers completes his task with exceptional speed. The fool asks him: "For whom did you perform these prayers?" The one who's been praying answers: "For God." The fool says: "I just wanted to know. Because if by chance you'd performed them for me, I'd have thrown this stone at your head." The man makes excuses, saying: "It was getting late. That's why my prayers came out rather short." To this the fool answers: "Mustn't one pay the debt at the right time, when it's due? Life is short and what remains to be done is much, etc." (MN 36/4).

A peasant has heard that ambergris is an excretion of sea cows (of the sperm whale). He then goes and puts his cow in the water and collects its dung. But the

ambergris merchant laughs at him and says: "You can anoint your beard with this!"—That's all the prayer is worth which is performed quickly and thoughtlessly, or in a state of complacency. (AN 10/3).

Like all action done merely out of habit, praying merely out of habit is also worthless.

Satan, the cursed one, performs a prostration. Jesus says to him: "What are you doing there?" Satan says: "I've long since made it a habit to prostrate myself in prayer before you. It has become a habit, that's why I do it." Jesus says: "You're caught up in error. This is unworthy of God. What takes place out of habit has nothing to do with 'the truth'." (MN 8/7).—(With this story ᶜAṭṭār wants to denounce lazy attachment to a habit. Breaking with old habits is one of the first requirements the beginner Ṣūfī has to fulfill).

14

Insincerity in faith (*nifāq*) corresponds to hypocrisy in works (*riyā*ᵓ). Adopting half-measures in matters of faith is criticized by ᶜAṭṭār in a series of verses and stories.

How long will you go on being like the constellations with two bodies (e.g. Gemini, Pisces), standing in the middle between faith and unbelief?

A Christian converts to Islam but already the next day violates the prohibition against wine and gets drunk. When his mother sees him in this state, she says: "Oh son, what have you done? You've made Jesus sad, and you haven't done right by Muḥammad either." (IN 5/5, p. 95).

In Arabic: *Aslama naṣrāniyyun fa-qālat ummuh: Sakhinat ᶜaynāk! Muḥammadun lam yaᶜrifka wa'l-Masīḥu tabarraᵓa mink!* (*Muḥāḍarāt al-udabā*ᵓ, Cairo 1326, 2/184).—The popularity of this story is indicated by the fact that any reference to it is still immediately understood today. A newspaper complains about Turkish radio's music programs that they don't satisfy the listeners either with *alafranga* or with *alaturka* performances: *Radyomuzun durumu acınacak bir haldedir. Alafrangalarile İsayı memnun edemezken Muhammadi de darıltmıştır.* "Our radio is in a deplorable state. With its European programs it can't satisfy Jesus and it has also made Muḥammad disgruntled."

It's not good to travel the path like an effeminate man... Travel the path like a real man in the religion to which you belong! Unmanliness in religion is idolatry. (IN p. $95_{9\text{-}10}$).

For this reason one should not be occupied with the scriptures of other religions.

When ᶜUmar one time picked up a portion of the Torah in his hand, the Prophet said to him: "One shouldn't play around with the Torah. You might just turn yourself into a Jew with it!" (IN 5/6, p. 95).

This is based on a *hadīth* transmitted by Dārimī: "ᶜUmar came to the Prophet with a copy of the Torah and said: 'Oh Apostle of God, this is a copy of the Torah.' The Apostle of God remained silent. But when ᶜUmar began to read it, the Apostle of God was displeased with him and made a cross face. Then Abū Bakr said: 'May your mother lose you! Don't you see the expression on the Apostle of God's face?' ᶜUmar then looked at the Apostle of God's face and said: 'I seek refuge from the wrath of God and His Apostle! We are content with God as the Lord and Islam as religion and Muḥammad as the Prophet.' Then the Apostle of God said: 'By Him in whose hand Muḥammad's life rests, if Moses appeared to all of you and you followed him and abandoned me, you would stray from the right path. But if he were alive and experienced my prophethood, he would follow me.'" (*Mishkāt al-maṣābīḥ, Kitāb al-ᶜilm, bāb al-iᶜtiṣām bi'l-kitāb wa'l-sunna, faṣl* 3, *ḥadīth* no. 7).[4]

The proper slave serves no other master. He knows only one master and has enough in him. The heart of the slave of God is free of associate gods.

Kharaqānī says on his deathbed: "I would like them to split open my heart and to show it to people so they see that one can't worship any idols alongside God." (MṬ 28/3, p. 98; TA 2/254).

Maḥmūd of Ghazna is glorified as a great hero of the faith. His behavior during his pious raids for plunder into India is proof for ᶜAṭṭār of the sincerity of his faith and his loyalty to God which will be richly rewarded.

When Maḥmūd's soldiers conquer the Indian holy shrine of Sawmanāt and find there the idol called Lāt (a lingam) and are about to destroy it, the Indians offer the conqueror ten times the idol's weight in gold. But the sultan will not sell it. On the Final Day, God won't be able to say: "Guard well for Me Āzar (the father of Abraham, who fabricated idols) and Maḥmūd. The one is a maker of idols and the other sells them!" Thus Maḥmūd has the idol burned and behold, he's immediately rewarded for this loyal act of faith! From the interior of the idol come forth twenty hundred-weights of jewels. Maḥmūd says: "Burning was what was fitting for the idol, and this is God's reward!"—Don't deny the vow you swore in pre-existence, namely to acknowledge God as your Lord (surah 7/172)! (MṬ 36/6, p. 123).

Maḥmūd keeps his vow.

Maḥmūd vows before a battle with the Indians which promises to be very difficult that if he wins he'll have all the booty distributed among the poor. The sultan is victorious, and the booty is far greater than one expected. Maḥmūd's order to distribute the booty among the poor meets with opposition. It should be used to pay the army or stored in the treasure-chamber. The sultan leaves the decision to the pious fool Abū'l-Ḥusaynī. The latter says: "If you're not going[5] to

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4 I owe thanks to M. Ḥamīdullāh for kindly providing me with this reference.

5 Read: *na-khwāhī* in verse 3135a.

have anything to do with God later, don't worry about your vow. But if you're going to have dealings with Him, then don't take anything from this booty!" Thereupon the sultan has the booty distributed among the poor. (MṬ 36/7, pp. 124-25).

ᶜAṭṭār has a certain preference for finding the examples he wishes to hold up for his readers, among unbelievers and sinners.

The Muslims can learn proper loyalty in belief from a gebr (fire-worshipper).

A gebr named Pīr, who was very serious about his Magian faith, had a bridge built from his own resources for the sake of God and the greater good of travellers. Sultan Maḥmūd one day comes to this bridge, admires it and asks who constructed it. When he's told that the gebr Pīr had it built, his jealousy allows him no peace. He has Pīr summoned and says to him: "You're an enemy of the Muslims. It's not fitting that you, a damned person, should undertake such a work. Let me pay you the cost of the bridge. If not, you'll have to reckon with me!" The pious gebr answers: "Even if you tear me into a hundred pieces, I still won't sell the bridge or accept any money, for I built this bridge for the sake of religion." Maḥmūd then has the gebr locked up in the hunger tower until, apparently, he's ready to make the transaction and has the sultan informed that he should come and bring a master-builder with him to assess the worth of the bridge. The sultan is greatly pleased and positions himself alongside the bridge with a large retinue. But the gebr doesn't wait for the bridge to be assessed. He calls to the sultan: "Ask me now what the worth of this bridge is! On this bridge-head I will go to my death and on that bridge-head (in the hereafter) I will give you the answer." Having said this, he throws himself into the stream.—"A fire-worshipper", so ᶜAṭṭār continues, "throws himself into the water so that his faith suffers no injury. Learn the true way of being a Muslim from a gebr! One can't appear before God in the hereafter with false coins, etc." (IN 5/7, pp. 95-97).

A Jew gambles away everything he owns in a gambling den: his money, his house, his garden, in the end even one of his eyes. Somebody suggests to him he should gamble away his religion and become a Muhammadan. At that the Jew strikes the man with his fist and says: "Do what you want to me, but don't speak about my faith!" (AN 18/4).

A descendant of ᶜAlī, as well as a religious scholar and a young man who accepts money for sexual favors (*mukhannath*), are taken prisoners while on an expedition against the Byzantines. The unbelievers take them before "the idol" (*but*, the Crucifix) and give them the choice either to prostrate themselves before it or to die. They're given one night to think it over. The ᶜAlid says: "I'll gird myself with the Christian belt before the idol because my ancestor will intercede with God on my behalf." The religious scholar says: "I don't want to die either. And even if I prostrate myself before the idol now, my religious learning will

provide counsel on my behalf." But the young man says: "You have intercessors, whereas I have none. Therefore I can't prostrate myself before the idol. Let them go ahead and kill me!"—Thus, from among the three, the one who is apparently the worst maintains loyalty to religion. (IN 2/2, pp. 51-52.—*Ḥadīqa* 461-62).

15

Honoring God's name is also part of the reverence which human beings owe to their Creator and Lord. Islam has not, like Judaism, gone so far as to declare God's name taboo, but the holy name (*lafẓ al-jalāla*) is nonetheless treated by Muhammadans with special respect.

A shaykh reprimands a *murīd* who uses God's name too frequently (MN 0/1; see above p. 81).—The archangel Gabriel out of reverence was silent for 70,000 years before daring to pronounce the name of God. (MN 0/1; see above p. 22).

God does not have only one name but several which He makes use of Himself in the Koran. Special powers are ascribed to these names. Whoever knows the greatest name of God can perform miracles and bring the dead back to life.

See above p. 205. On the greatest name of God cf. Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums* 309, 340. Fritz Meier has written me on 1/7/1952: "Silvestre de Sacy in his *Exposé de la religion des Druzes*, Paris 1838, XLVIII, ftn., had accepted that the concept of God's greatest name in Islam originated in Judaism. He was followed by Theodor Nöldeke in the latter's Ṭabarī translation (143-44) and by Israel Friedländer, 'The Heterodoxies of the Shiites' in: JAOS 29/1908/82. But the concept μέγιστον ὄνομα was far more widely known, in particular in the magic literature of Hellenistic Egypt, and appears for instance in the Leyden papyrus V and the Berlin papyrus II 128. More precise details can be found in my book on Kubrā (*Die Fawāʾiḥ al-ǧamāl wa-fawātiḥ al-ǧalāl des Naǧm ad-dīn al-Kubrā* 137 ff.)."

Animals can also be rendered tame with the name of God. If the snake allows itself to be lured forth from its hole, it does so out of awe and reverence for the holy name.

The snake-tamer sits in front of a snake's hole in order to lure it forth and into his basket. Jesus then comes along. The snake says to him: "Oh spirit of God, I am three hundred years old, and this thrity-year-old thinks he can lure me from my hole with his magic!" Jesus continues on his way. When after some time he returns to the same spot, he asks the snake-tamer: "How did it go?" The man answers: "I have the snake in the basket." Jesus says to the snake: "But you were so brave at first and said he couldn't do anything to you?" The snake replies: "I didn't allow myself to be deceived by his magic sayings, but when he pronounced the name of God so many times, he lured me into the net. I entered his

net because of the name of God. A hundred lives like mine should be sacrificed for His name!" (MN 1/3).

Still today pious Muhammadans will not allow someone to step on paper that contains writing or to soil it, because the name of God could be written on it. Ibn al-Fuwaṭī (*al-Ḥawādith al-jāmiᶜa*, Baghdad 1351, p. 179) tells about a person who died in the year 640 AH that he collected all thrown away pieces of paper which contained God's name.

Regarding the cause of Bishr the Barefoot's (al-Ḥāfī) conversion to a pious lifestyle—he had until then been a drunkard—, it's related: "One time he finds in the street a piece of paper with the name of God written on it. He then buys perfumes with the money he has left, applies them to God's name and keeps the paper in his house. At night in a dream the divine voice calls to him: "Because you perfumed Our name, We've caused you to have a fragrant scent and purified you, and you will become 'a seeker of truth' (a man of God)." (IN *Khātima*/14, pp. 383-84; TA 1/107).

Mukhtaṣar Ṣafwat al-ṣafwa 206; *Rawḍ al-rayāḥīn* no. 233. Cf. above p. 282.

16

The pious can learn the proper form of slavery to God from the behavior of many earthly slaves. ᶜAbd Allāh ibn Mubārak learns from a slave how to wait for God's providence (above p. 224). Ibrāhīm ibn Adham lets himself be instructed by the behavior of a slave about surrendering to God's will.

He relates: "Once I bought a slave and asked him: 'What's your name?' He said: 'Whatever you call me.' I asked: 'What do you eat?' He said: 'Whatever you give me.' I asked: 'What do you wear?' He said: 'Whatever you give me to wear.' I asked: 'What do you do?' He said: 'Whatever you order me.' I asked: 'Do you have a wish?' He said: 'What wish does a slave have?' Then I said to myself: 'You poor wretch! Have you ever in your life been a slave like this for God? Here you can learn slavery!' I wept until I lost consciousness." (TA $1/99_{11\text{-}16}$).

However, the slave of God has a more noble status than the slaves with whom these two famous mystics had dealings.

God is the absolute and omnipotent ruler of both worlds. He created human beings and spirits in order that they serve Him. The decisions of His will are to be accepted without one asking about the reasons behind them. He is a hard but at the same time kind and merciful lord. He causes His creatures to suffer, but He nonetheless supports and nourishes them, and overwhelms them with benefits. He demands obedience, rewards whoever obeys Him and punishes whoever is disobedient, in accordance with His

own free discretion. He calls into His proximity chosen ones on whom His glance alights and others He bans from His presence. His power is elevated above all imagining, He has no need of anything, and He sits enthroned in the splendor of majestic loftiness.

The earthly symbol for this God, as we have already seen in many of the recounted symbolic stories, is the king. And it then follows that the symbol for the slave of God who is worthy of God's proximity is the king's slave.

ᶜAṭṭār has treated the theme of the king and the king's slave with a certain predilection. With his stories about the slaves of kings he illustrates the false and the correct relationship of man to God, as well as all possible virtues and shortcomings. At the same time the stories are often clearly an end in themselves and when recounting them, he gives himself over to "the pleasure of storytelling". Moreover, it does not occur to him to idealize his kings in order to make them more like God. They remain real, human despots with all their virtues and weaknesses. He can renounce an idealization of this kind because in every story it always only comes down to a single characteristic which he wants to illustrate. He is not concerned, or only very rarely, with formulating detailed similitudes which would allow each characteristic to bear a symbolic interpretation. Rather, his whole technique of illustration is based on isolating by means of a story one particular motif in the spotlight's beam. Moreover, apparently he was not troubled by the despotic character of the rulers he presents. He knows this is simply the way rulers are.

We have already related several stories about slaves of kings and will be relating additional ones in the most varied contexts throughout this book. Here we are only interested in those stories in which slaves (and servants of the king) behave falsely or correctly *vis-à-vis* their masters.

Adam voluntarily gave up his position of honor in Paradise and chose slavery, accepting it happily—thus being a model for his descendants.

A slave must know the limits, otherwise he will be punished.

A king says to his slave in order to test him: "Come with me under my garment and stick your head out of the same collar with me, so the duality between the two of us is removed!" When the foolish slave takes up the invitation and shows he doesn't know the limits and rules of propriety for a king's slave, the king has him executed. (MN 29/1).

The king's servant must maintain the proper reverential attitude toward his master. Whoever does not do this is punished by the king.

After ᶜAṭṭār has admonished the reader to be a proper slave of God and not to be lacking in the necessary reverence (MṬ 28/3, transition to 4), he recounts an example of how a disrespectful slave is punished.

A king bestows a robe of honor on one of his servants. After leaving the king's court the servant wipes dust off himself with the robe that was bestowed on him, and he's punished with death for his lack of reverence. (MṬ 28/4, p. 99).

In the biography of Shiblī in TA 2/161, ᶜAṭṭār relates this story in the following manner: "Shiblī was the *amīr* of Damāwand and was summoned to Baghdad along with the *amīr* of Ray. There the caliph conferred on them robes of honor. On the return journey from the caliph, the *amīr* of Ray had to sneeze and wiped his nose and mouth with the newly awarded robe of honor. Thereupon the *amīr* was deposed and received a number of slaps on the back of the neck. This was the cause of Shiblī's conversion. He went to the caliph and told him: "If you, an earthly creature, don't tolerate that a robe of honor awarded by you is used as a handkerchief, how much less will the Lord of the worlds who has given me the honorary robe of divine love and knowledge of God tolerate my using it as a handkerchief in the service of an earthly creature!" He then quit his official post and went among the Ṣūfīs.

According to the *Taʾrīkh Baghdād* 14/389, Shiblī was a chamberlain of Muwaffaq who gave him Damāwand as a fief. A sermon by Khayr al-Nassāj caused him to convert to being a Ṣufī.

The unequalled paragon and exemplar for the correct behavior of a king's slave is a historically palpable personality who was the Turkish favorite slave of Maḥmūd of Ghazna (389-421/999-1030), Abū'l-Najm Aḥmad Ayāz-i Oymaq. His master's love for him and his own ideal behavior toward the latter apparently caught the popular imagination early on and became the object of a large series of anecdotes in Persian literature. A series of epics even came into existence which depict the relationship between the two of them. (*Grundriss der iranischen Philologie* 2/250, 251, 300, 312). ᶜArūḍī-i Samarqandī, who relates one of these anecdotes, says Ayāz was perhaps not so good-looking but had come to possess to an extraordinary degree the *ādāb al-mulūk*, the refined rules for keeping company with kings. (*Chahār Maqāla* 34). In the anecdotes which ᶜAṭṭār relates, the demands that can be made of a king's slave and a courtier are fulfilled by Ayāz in an ideal manner. He is very well aware of the power he has over Maḥmūd's heart but never forgets his position as a slave, and when he actually does exploit this power, he does it in so delicate

a way and in such perfect courtly forms that he never offends but provides delight. He is loyally devoted to his master and gives proof of this devotion in so impressive a way that he continually carries off the palm before all the other courtiers. Naturally, the Ayāz anecdotes are for the greatest part creations of the popular imagination or perhaps of the popular preachers. One such preacher was Aḥmad Ghazzālī (d. 520/1126), in whose *Sawāniḥ* such anecdotes for the first time become attested in literature (*Faṣl* 39/5-8, 61/2). The love relationship between Maḥmūd and Ayāz, as we shall see, is employed by ᶜAṭṭār in numerous anecdotes as an allegory and illustration for the most sublime impulses of mystical love. Here we are only interested in the stories in which Ayāz fulfills and gives proof of his slavery in an ideal way, and thus becomes the model for the slave of God, for a human being, in his relationship with God.

Ayāz was apparently a military slave, and under Maḥmūd's son and successor, Masᶜūd, he attained the rank of *amīr*. The earliest information we have about him has to do with the time immediately after Maḥmūd's death on 23 Rabīᶜ II, 421/30 April, 1030. After Maḥmūd's death the prominent men of the realm in Ghazna, at the head of whom is the chamberlain ᶜAlī b. Il Arslan, summon Maḥmūd's youngest son Muḥammad, who is lingering in Gūzgānān, to come to the capital and they have him ascend the throne. Muḥammad attempts to win sympathy by giving presents to the important men and the army, and by reducing taxes and similar measures, but the majority of the military and the court side with his brother Masᶜūd who, having set out for ᶜIrāq, is lingering in Nēshāpūr. Fifty days after Maḥmūd's death Ayāz assumes the leadership of this opposition party, gathers around him those of similar attitude, among whom is ᶜAlī Dāya, and leaves Ghazna on horseback fully armed with his like-minded comrades to join Masᶜūd. Muḥammad sends troops after him under an Indian general but they are defeated by Ayāz and his followers. The Indian leader dies and along with him a great number of soldiers. Ayāz and ᶜAlī Dāya ride on to Nēshāpūr and pay homage to Masᶜūd. Muḥammad who is depicted as an effeminate wine-drinker allows four months to go by before he rouses himself to take action against his brother. When he arrives in Takīnābād with his troops, the generals refuse to follow him any further and declare themselves for his brother. Muḥammad is confined in a fortress, and as soon as a certificate of appointment from the caliph Qādir arrives for Masᶜūd, the latter becomes the uncontested ruler of the Ghaznawid empire. (Gardēzī 93-95). Maḥmūd's last vizier, Ḥasan ibn Muḥammad al-Mīkālī, known as little Ḥasan (Ḥasanak), is hanged in the following year, and the famous Aḥmad ibn Ḥasan al-Maymandī, who had fallen into disfavor with Maḥmūd, is brought from his fortress where he was imprisoned and is made vizier again.

A *qaṣīda* on Ayāz by Farrukhī alludes to these events, being the only contemporary document about Ayāz which has been preserved for us. (*Dīwān* 163-65). It is clear from the poem, among other things, that Masᶜūd richly rewarded Ayāz for the services he rendered him. The *qaṣīda* was evidently written shortly after Ḥasanak's execution (422 AH) which is

referred to in the last verse. The most important verses of the poem are as follows in translation:

The warrior *amīr* Ayāz-i Oymaq, the heart and arm of the king on the day of battle! When high upon his steed he rides through the gate of the square, the hearts of the onlookers fly toward him. One person says: "This is a cypress on a mountain", another says: "This is a fresh rose on a rose-sprig." Pious women, for the price of their bride-gift, purchase from their husbands permission to behold him. On the battle-day the brave tremble before his attack like leaves of the willow. If he shoots an arrow at a stone, it penetrates the stone up to its feathers. He sends his spear clear through the hunted game. I've seen this myself, not just once but a hundred times. Not for nothing did Maḥmūd bestow his heart on him, and don't think Maḥmūd's heart was a toy! There were certainly plenty of others in the sultan's entourage, he had many more slaves. Had one of them been like the *amīr*, the latter wouldn't have stood so high in worth. The master of the world, Mas[c]ūd ibn Maḥmūd, who bestowed on him ass-loads of gold: to what other *amīr* would he have given forty ass-loads of gold as a gift? He wouldn't have been given this much if he were not worthy of it, indeed worthy of a hundred times more. Yet the worth of the *amīr* is so high, and the magnanimity of the shah so great, that you can consider this amount as trivial. The Chosroes will raise him to such a position that the generals will be made generals through him. He bestowed on him the income of the region of Bust, the tax-proceeds of the region of Makrān and Quzdār. How can it ever be forgotten what the *amīr* did as service to the world-ruling king! That sun of free men maintained his loyalty and duty amid a mutinous army. He went forth from Ghazna in the bright day and fought with a world of enemies into the dark night. At the time of evening prayers he didn't sleep until (text uncertain) the plains became as high as the mountains with the quantity of dead. He killed a host of those warrior-lions and pardoned the rest. Who in the world has done this besides him? Only read the book of kings and history and the traditions. God, You be his helper and in accordance with Your judgement let his raiding bands overtake the sun! Empty the world of those who wish him ill, as was the case with "the little shaykh" (Ḥasanak), the shameless deceiver!

V. Minorsky has written me on 25/4/47: "*Oymaq* must be a reference to Ayaz's tribe. Of course *oymaq* itself means 'a tribe' but even now in Central Afghanistan there are four tribes called Čahār Oymaq (namely Hazāri, Taymani, Jamshedi, etc.). These speak mostly Persian but they seem to be of Turkish origin and their name must be due to some special tribal or territorial divisions of the time of Turko-Mongol invasions. Practically Ayaz Oymaq might mean 'Ayaz from (the tribe organized as an) oymaq' (?). In any case, among the *Qara Qalpaq* of Turkestan there is a section even now called *oymaut*, i.e. *oyma-ut* with the Mongol plural in *-ut*."

According to [c]Awfī's *Jāmi[c] al-ḥikāyāt*, Maḥmūd married Ayāz's sister or intended to marry her (*Introduction* 209). According to the *Tārīkh-i Bayhaqī*, Tehran 1324, p. 186, a certain Mīkā[ɔ]īl had a sister of Ayāz as his wife.

Ayāz never forgets that he is a slave.

Sultan Maḥmūd buys slaves. The slaves are asked individually about their abilities and skills. Each one boasts of a different skill. Ayāz says: "I possess a

virtue (*hunar*) which is better than both worlds." These words are reported to Maḥmūd. He has the slave brought before him and asks him what this virtue is. Ayāz answers: "If you set your crown on my head and offer me a seat on your throne and place the seven countries under my command and make me master over the whole world, I'll still never forget that I'm a slave."—The true slave of God never forgets humility and proper manners. (MN 32/2).

The same story, without anyone being named, occurs in Qushayrī:

A slave is offered in sale to an *amīr* for 1000 dirhams. When the price is meant to be paid out, the *amīr* feels it's too high, changes his mind, and the sum of money is brought back to the treasury. Then the slave says: "Master, buy me because for every one of these dirhams I possess a quality which is worth more than a 1000 dirhams." "And what kind of qualities are these?"—"The smallest and most trivial is this: If you buy me and put me in charge of all your slaves, I still won't fall into error about myself and will know that I'm your slave." He then buys him. (*Risāla* 70, *Bāb al-khushū*ᶜ).

Ayāz has a room in which he keeps his earlier poor clothing. He looks at it every day before he goes to serve the ruler, in order not to forget his humble origin. (MN 10/11).

Mathnawī 5/1857 ff. and *Translation* pp. 111-29, 196, 201, 218, which is very elaborate, drawn out and allegorically interpreted. Cf. also a similar story about a weaver who has attained the status of vizier, *Asrār al-tawḥīd* 209-10; O'Kane, *Secrets* 381.

The command of the sultan is worth more to him than the most costly treasure.

Ayāz holds in his hand a ruby cup of immense value. Maḥmūd orders him to smash the cup on the ground. The slave immediately throws the drinking-cup on the ground without a moment's hesitation so that it breaks into a hundred pieces. The courtiers reproach him for having destroyed such a precious object but he answers: "The king's command is worth more to me than this cup." (MN 33/3).

In the *Mathnawī* 5/4035 ff. about a pearl instead of a cup. According to Furūzānfar, *Mawlānā Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī* p. 98, ftn. 1, it also appears in the *Maqālāt* of Shams-i Tabrīz.

A variant:

Sultan Maḥmūd possesses a secret treasure which goes back to Solomon. In it lives a little worm with a small leaf in its mouth which is the nourishment that God has designated for it. The treasure is called *wakhkhāṣ* (that which moves itself). The sultan wants to reveal the secret and orders Ayāz to smash the treasure. Ayāz does this and defends himself against the courtiers in the way we have already seen. The story is then interpreted allegorically: the treasure is the body, the worm reason, the leaf love. (*Maẓhar al-ᶜajāʾib*; see above p. 222).—And involving Hārūn al-Rashīd and a female black slave: Qalyūbī, *Nawādir* no. 6; Ṣaffūrī 1/47.

CHAPTER TWENTY

VIRTUES OF THE INNER ATTITUDE

1

Ayāz, in his attitude toward his master, gives proof of two virtues which above all others are expected from the slave of a king: proper manners and humility.

These two virtues are closely bound up with one another. Good manners require that one should appear modest, accord fewer rights to oneself than to others, and ascribe guilt to oneself even when it is not clear how responsibility is to be meted out.

It is this attitude which in practice provides Islamic piety with the means to eliminate the problem of predestination and responsibility, which has not been theoretically resolved in a satisfying manner. Muḥammad Ghazzālī says the following:

And he will not make predestination reponsible because no one is allowed to talk this way. Even if he knows it is part of the faith that nothing happens which God has not previously determined, he still upholds the *sunna* of his father Adam who, when he noticed that he had violated a commandment, ascribed the guilt to himself and said: "Lord, we ourself have done wrong, and if You do not forgive us and take pity on us, then we are lost." (Surah 7/23).

Wa-hēch iḍāfat bā taqdīr nakunadh az ān ki hēch kas-rā musallam nakardand ki bar īn ᶜibārat sukhun gōyadh, wa-agarchi iᶜtiqād dānadh ki ba-juz az ān nabāshadh ki Ḥaqq taᶜālā taqdīr karda ast, wa-lēkin sunnat-i pidhar-i khwēsh Ādam ṣalawātu'llāhi ᶜalayh nigāh dāradh ki chun bar mukhālafat-i amr wāqif gasht iḍāfat-i jurm ba-khwadh kard u guft: Rabbanā ẓalamnā anfusanā wa-in lam taghfir lanā wa-tarḥamnā la-nakūnanna mina'l-khāsirīn. M. Ghazzālī, *Miᵓrāt al-sālikīn wa-mirqāt al-ᶜārifīn*, Ms. Ayasofya 2061, fol. 3b. Cf. Bāqillānī, *Inṣāf* 133, 139; *Mathnawī* 1/1490-93.

Ḥāfiẓ expresses the same idea:

Even if the sin was not of my free will, oh Ḥāfiẓ, keep to the path of proper manners and say: "It's my sin!"

Gunāh garchi nabūdh ikhtiyār-i man, Ḥāfiẓ tu bar ṭarīq-i adab bāsh u gō: gunāh-i man ast.

2

But here we wish to deal with the virtues one must display in connection with one's fellow human beings.

One should not imagine oneself to be better than they are. Good manners and modesty demand this. Their lowest level consists of fairness (*inṣāf*) which willingly acknowledges another person's merits, the rights and rank he may properly claim.

One of the birds, in the hoopoe's presence, boasts of the virtues of fairness (and loyalty) and is praised for this by the hoopoe. (MṬ 31/0, p. 104; see above p. 15).

The famous jurist and traditionist Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal is reprimanded because he associates with the Ṣūfī Bishr al-Ḥāfī. He answers: "I know the *ḥadīth* and *sunna* better than he does, but he knows God better than I do." (MṬ 31/1, p. 104).

The same basic attitude is expressed in an Arabic story in the form of courtly modesty:

A man walks past a pious shaykh. The shaykh gathers in his clothes. The other says to him: "Why are you gathering in your robe? My clothes aren't dirty!" The shaykh replies: "You've misunderstood. My clothes are dirty, and I've gathered them in so that yours don't get dirty, not so that mine don't get dirty." (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 50, *Bāb al-khalwa wa'l-ᶜuzla*; *Sendschreiben* 219/14.16).

Calumny, speaking maliciously about other people, is reprehensible.

According to the Torah, the person who speaks badly about others, and then renounces this in remorse, will be the very last to enter Paradise. If he doesn't feel remorse, he'll end up in Hell-fire. (IN 19/13, p. 313).

ᶜAlī is much too immersed in God to be able to find fault with the Companions of the Prophet. (MṬ 0/9, p. 22).

A man who has travelled widely in the world is asked what noteworthy people he's seen on his journeys. He answers that he's only seen one and a half men throughout the seven climes. The one whole man was someone who never said anything good or bad about other people because he was engaged with the secrets of holiness. The half man was someone who only had good things to say about people. (IN 19/14, p. 314).

The person who plays at being a disciplinarian may well have many bad things on his own record.

A police official (*muḥtasib*) has a drinker whipped. The man who was punished says to him: "If unjust bread made one drunk, you'd be a lot more drunk than I am. But naturally people don't see this form of drunkenness! Instead of tormenting me, punish yourself a little!" (MṬ 35/6, p. 120).

It is utterly ridiculous to dwell on other people's shortcomings if one has exactly the same shortcomings oneself.

The bird who asks the hoopoe how he can amuse himself on the journey to the Sīmurgh thus accuses himself of the fault of having fun at other people's expense. He lacks the required maturity (*rushd*), and for this reason he's always made fun of other people. (MṬ 35/0, pp. 117-18; above p. 15).

A drinker is so drunk he has to be carried home in a sack. On the journey home he meets another drunk who's at the stage of kicking up a row, annoying passers-by and starting a fight with people. The first drunk calls to him from inside his sack: "You shouldn't have drunk so much, then you'd also travel freely and undisturbed like me!" (MṬ 35/4, p. 119).

3

But the humility of the pious has a still deeper religious basis.

On this subject cf. *Iḥyā*ʾ 3/289-326, *Kitāb dhamm al-kibr wa'l-ʿujb.*

They demand of themselves the fulfilment of duties toward God, avoidance of what He has forbidden and the loyal performance of what He has commanded, as well as awareness of having fallen behind the requirements of achieving work. But despite all this they are the ones who hope the most for other people and fear the most for themselves, as if the threat of punishment only counted for them, and God's promise only counted for others. (*Taʿarruf* p. 31_{3-6}.—Cf. above pp. 71-72).

When Abū'l-Faḍl (Muḥammad ibn) Ḥasan (al-Sarakhsī) is lying on his deathbed, one of his companions says to him: "When you're dead, we'll bury you in such-and-such a place." The shaykh replies: "No, I don't want that! That's the burial place of the great men of piety." They ask him: "Where would you like to be buried then?" He says: "On the hill where the drinkers, thieves, gamblers and sinners lie. That's where I belong. I don't have the strength to be with those perfect men. Moreover, the sinners there are closer to God's mercy." (IN 2/9, pp. 58-59).

Jāmī, *Nafaḥāt*, in Abū'l-Faḍl's biography; Turkish translation p. 326. Cf. also above pp. 144-45.

The awareness that "we are all sinners", at least potentially, preserves the pious man from imagining he is better than the sinners.

While Rukn al-Dīn Akkāfī is preaching, a disturbance takes place in the midst of his listeners. When he asks what happened, he's told that someone has caught a thief who stole a pair of shoes (they'd been left before the door). The shaykh says: "If God were to remove the protective cover from our sins, then I would be the first shoe thief." (MN 23/10).

Since no one knows whether he is accepted or rejected by God, no room remains for arrogant behavior toward "the sinners".

A shaykh from Bukhara meets a young man who sells sexual favors for money (*mukhannath*), and gathers in the hem of his robe to avoid having any contact with him. But the young man scolds him, saying: "Whatever credit you and I have with God hasn't been revealed yet. Tomorrow on the Final Day it will be revealed. As long as it's still not clear who's accepted and who's rejected, you have no profit from yourself and no harm from me." The shaykh, deeply affected, falls to the ground. (IN 10/9, pp. 165-66).

In TA 1/35 about Ḥasan al-Baṣrī; Gabrieli, *Storia e civiltà* 229.

The Arabic version: Yūsuf ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Rāzī saw a *mukhannath* and turned away from him in contempt. The *mukhannath* then turned to him and said: "You're no angel either (*Wa-anta ayḍan yakfīka mā bik*)!" Yūsuf was shocked by this remark and said: "What do you know (about me) then?" The fellow replied: "Because you think you're better." At that Yūsuf admitted that the *mukhannath* was right, vowed to repent and asked God for forgiveness. (*Qūt* $1/220_{29}$; *Nahrung* 2/135/32.210).—In this version there is no allusion to the action of God's mercy. As we have seen, this was of great concern to ᶜAṭṭār.

A similar story about a *mukhannath* and Bunān al-Ḥammāl occurs in Ibn al-Jawzī, *Ẓirāf* 85.

Pious deeds are annulled by means of this kind of religious vanity (*ᶜujb*).

Cf. *Qūt* 1/220; *Nahrung* 2/134/32.210. And more is found there on the same subject.

This idea emerges into the foreground in an Arabic story:

Among the Children of Israel is a man who bears the nickname "the Reprobate of the Children of Israel" (*khalīᶜ Banī Isrāʾīl*) because of his debauchery. He comes across a worshipper of God whose head is continuously shaded by a cloud. The sinner thinks: "I'm 'the Reprobate of the Children of Israel' and this is 'the Worshipper of God of the Children of Israel'! If I sit down with him, perhaps God will have mercy on me." But the worshipper of God thinks: "I'm 'the Worshipper of God of the Children of Israel' and this is 'the Reprobate of the Children of Israel'. He wants to sit down with me!" He draws away from him and says: "Be gone from me!" Then God reveals to the prophet of the time: "Order both of them to begin all over again with their works! I've forgiven the reprobate and annulled the works of the worshipper of God." One tradition has it that the cloud then changes its place accordingly. (*Riᶜāya* 242-43, $234_{11\text{-}12}$. The same story transferred to Jesus, a disciple and a robber occurs in *Iḥyāʾ* 4/133, *Bayān faḍīlat al-rajāʾ*; *Stufen* 321/C.43).

4

A truly humble person will not even show contempt for an unclean animal like a dog because, as a creature of God, it shares the same origin with himself. (See p. 337 below).

A dog may be outwardly unclean but it has qualities which asssure it a high rank. There are many hidden things in a dog, even if outwardly the opposite appears to be the case. (IN p. 57_1).[1]

Ḥasan al-Baṣrī is supposed to have taken the dog as a model for the believer.

"Ḥasan al-Baṣrī" 27, ftn. 1; *Rawḍ al-rayāḥīn* no. 142. Ibn al-Marzubān (d. 309/921) even wrote a special work to show that the dog is in several respects better than many people. (GAL[2], Suppl. 1/189-90).

We have become acquainted with the story in which a shaykh does not gather in the hem of his robe before a dog because he also has a dog inside himself. (MṬ 34/4; above p. 213).

Bāyazīd is obliged to learn lessons from a dog.

When he went out one day, a dog attached itself to him. The shaykh gathered in his skirts. The dog said: "If I'm dry, then there's no harm whatsoever. But if I'm wet, then seven times water and (one time) earth will make peace between us. But if you draw your skirts in upon yourself, you won't make them clean, not even if you wash them with seven seas." Bāyazīd said: "You're unclean outside and I'm unclean inside. Come, we'll put the two together. Perhaps by putting the two together purity will come about between us. For when the quantity of two *qulla*s is mixed with unclean water, the unclean water becomes pure." (This sentence from MN). The dog said: "You're not suitable for being my fellow-traveller and companion because I'm repudiated by people, whereas you're well liked among them. Everyone who meets me, throws a stone at my flanks. Everyone who meets you, says: 'Greetings unto you, you prince of those with knowledge of God!' I've never put aside a bone for tomorrow (I practice *tawakkul*), whereas you have a provision jar of wheat." Bāyazīd said: "Thus I'm not fit to be the travelling companion of a dog. How should I be the travelling companion of the Eternal? Praise be to God who causes His best creature to be taught by His least creature!" (TA 1/145-46; MN 35/3).

A vessel which has been licked by a dog must be washed seven times, and one of those times with earth (sand). See the *ḥadīth* on the subject e.g. in Damīrī, *Ḥayāt al-ḥayawān* 2/264 bot. The doctrine that a dog is ritually unclean is of Jewish origin. The strictest of the four jurists in this matter was Shāfiʿī; cf. J. Schacht, *The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence* p.

[1] Read: *jāyash buland ast* and *ḍidd-i ān ast.*

216. On the jurists' doctrines regarding what quantity of water can no longer become ritually unclean, see Dimashqī, *Raḥmat al-umma* 1/5-6.

A very similar story is recounted about a hermit in the Lebanon Mountains. He has begged two loaves of bread from a Christian whose dog runs after him and so annoys him that he tries to get rid of it by throwing it the two loaves of bread. But when the dog still doesn't leave him alone, the hermit describes it as shameless and then comes to hear a sermon from the dog which is exactly like the one above. (*Kashkūl* 13-14).

Jundī is asked by a mocker: "Are you better than a dog?" His disciples want to attack the mocker and tear him to pieces. But the shaykh orders them not to and answers the questioner: "I don't know what God's decision is and therefore can't give you any information. If I have a better faith than bad people, then I can say that I'm better than a dog. Otherwise, I'm only worth as much as one hair of the dog." (IN 2/6, p. 56).

Something similar about Ḥasan al-Baṣrī in TA 1/35$_{14-17}$. F. Gabrielli, *Storia e civiltà* 229.

To imagine oneself as better than a dog is forbidden. If you imagine yourself to be better than a dog, know this comes from your dog-like nature! (IN p. 58$_{5b-6}$).

An Arabic story:

On a winter day when the streets are dirty, a shaykh lets a dog walk ahead of him on a narrow road and leaves the higher, more dry part of the street to the dog because, being aware of his sins, he doesn't want to raise himself above a sinless animal. In so doing, he's practicing the virtue of humility (*tawāḍu*ᶜ). (*Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/87-88).

Additional stories of the same or similar kind occur in *Rawḍ al-rayāḥīn* no. 143-45; Tor Andrae, *Die person Muhammeds* pp. 50-51.

5

Sinners and criminals, in their sphere, can even become a model for perfect behavior. The thief who remains true to his profession up until death, that other man who wishes to bear the blemish of his trade alone, in their way fulfill the ideal of perfect behavior, behavior devoid of half-measures, the ideal of committing oneself completely, even if it involves commitment to a bad activity.

A thief who has committed many robberies is finally caught and hanged. at the command of the chaliph. Shiblī walks by the gallows and sees the punished criminal. Tears pour from his eyes. Letting out a cry, he runs up to him and kisses the hanged man's feet. Someone asks him in astonishment what this behavior means. Shiblī answers: "He was perfect in stealing, so much so that he even gave his life for it. Whoever is perfect in what he does, stakes his life for it. To be sure, he was only an ignorant thief but in what he did he was a perfect

man, not like I am, a half-man who does everything only halfway. He wasn't attached to his life. He wasn't like me. I tremble for my life." (MN 9/2; TA 2/18 about Junayd).

Perfect behavior even in a bad activity can lead to deliverance.

A counterfeiter who wears a Ṣūfī robe is caught and is about to have his hand chopped off. Before the punishment is carried out, he asks to be first taken back to his house because he wants to reveal hidden money he has there. Having arrived home, he removes his Ṣūfī robe and presents himself for punishment naked. The king asks why he lied. He answers: "To hide my defect I donned the robe of the pious. Now that my defect has come to light, I take off the robe so a bad light doesn't fall on the pious who wear such a robe. To wish those people to have a bad reputation would be unbelief." At that, the king forgives him his crime because of his honesty. (MN 9/3).

The *mukhannath* who is despised by the people proves himself to be more true to the faith than the learned religious scholar and the descendant of ᶜAlī, and the gambler who gambles away everything becomes the model for Ṣūfī total poverty (above pp. 209 and 305-06).

6

A virtue related to striving after pefection, which is frequently praised in ᶜAṭṭār, is that of high aspiration (*ᶜuluww-i himmat*). It consists in setting oneself high goals and not being satisfied with trivial things. Therefore, properly speaking, it is a royal virtue because it is fitting for a king to set himself high goals.

Thus a chapter in Ghazzālī's Mirror for Princes also deals with "the high aspiration" of kings. *Tibr*, chpt. 4. Cf. also Jīlī, *al-Insān al-kāmil*, *Bāb* 55.

If a king undertakes something, it must be something great. If he confers a present, it must be a great gift. The king should not know any number under a thousand (*Tibr* 110). He must also apply this kingly attitude in his housekeeping. For this reason Maᵓmūn divested his son ᶜAbbās of the succession to the throne.

Maᵓmūn one time walked past the door of ᶜAbbās' room and heard him say to a servant: "I saw an attractive sweet in Ruṣāfa and want to eat some of it. Take half a dirham and get me some of it!" Maᵓmūn then called out to him: "Now for the first time I've learned that there's such a thing as a half-dirham! Be gone, you're unworthy of the succession to the throne!" (*Tibr* 111).

On ᶜAbbās b. al-Maᵓmūn see EI s.n. This story is not found in the historical sources.

In ᶜAṭṭār the story appears in the following form:

In the presence of his father a prince orders his servant to buy him a half-grain of butter. When the king hears this, he says in anger: "You're unworthy of the royal throne. Go become a dealer in butter!" (MN 0/9).—(As we have seen on p. 162, ᶜAṭṭār uses this story to explain how composing poetry would have been an unworthy activity for the Prophet).

The high aspiration of kings is different from that of pious beggars.

Shaykh Gōrī sits under a bridge with a band of "fools". Sultan Sanjar rides over the bridge and asks what sort of people these are. The shaykh answers: "We're people 'without head and foot' (poor people). If you love us, we'll quickly free you from your world. If you're hostile to us, we'll quickly bring you forth from your religion. If you join us under the bridge, you'll be free of all this empty pomp and vain striving." The sultan answers: "I have nothing to do with hate or love for you. You can bring me neither glory nor shame. I have no business with you." (MṬ 30/3, p. 103).

The sense of the story is not entirely clear. Perhaps it is simply an outward amplification of verse 2605: "The bird of your high aspiration ever lingers in (God's) presence. It has flown beyond *the world* and *religion*."

The poet Firdawsī displayed high aspiration when he handed over the petty gift of the stingy Maḥmūd to a seller of millet-beer. (IN p. $367_{11\text{-}13}$).

The pride of the king's slave before the king is a sign of high aspiration.

When the world-traveller has visited the sun on his journey through the cosmos and been rejected by it, he returns to the *pīr* and the latter explains that the sun is the royal court of high aspiration. And he illustrates this virtue by means of a series of stories. (MN 13/0; above p. 25).

A king buys a very good-looking slave (his beauty is described in detail) who is meant to lend splendor to the king's banquet. On a fine spring day the king arranges a garden party. During the banquet he wishes that the slave would behave more boldly. He orders his cupbearer to provide him with a cup of wine. But the slave doesn't accept the cup. The king then orders the chamberlain to offer the cup to the slave. But he doesn't take it from him, nor from the vizier who offers it to him next. Then the king himself stands up and with his own hand proffers the cup to the slave. But the king as well has no better luck. This is too much in the eyes of the vizier. He reprimands the slave, saying: "So you won't accept the cup from the king either? No one in the whole army is as ill-bred as you! The king stands before you, and still you toss your head back (gesture of refusal)? Aren't you a worthy servant of the king!" Then the slave says: "This shall remain my title to glory for all eternity that the king stood before me and offered me the cup in vain. If I had straightway accepted the cup, the king wouldn't now be standing over me. Now let him have me killed or grant me life. It's enough for

me for all eternity to have had the king as my cupbearer." The king acknowledges that he's right: "He is indeed a worthy slave. His character is even more handsome than his appearance. Handsome and of high aspiration! I wish to sit forever with this kind of a drinking partner!"—Whoever treads the path of higher aspiration will become a king even if he's a beggar. (MN 13/1).

We have already become acquainted with the next stories, namely the story about Maḥmūd and the gleaner who doesn't want to take anything from the sultan's fields and explains to him that his, the gleaner's, aspiration is high, whereas that of the sultan is low (p. 123), as well as the story about the bat who prefers the internal sun to the external one (p. 210).

If like the hawk you have high aspiration, then the king's hand is your place. If your aspiration is lowly like an insect, you will not attain any rank.

An insect that sat upon a plane-tree excuses itself for the trouble it has caused when it departs. The plane-tree says: "I hadn't really noticed that you'd come and gone." (MN 13/4).

Stith Thompson: *Motif-Index of Folk-Literature* IV, Helsinki 1934. Motif 953, 10. Gnats apologize for lighting on bull's horn; Derenbourg, *Fables de Loqmân le Sage*, Berlin 1850, no. 13; Chauvin 3/30; C. Brockelmann, "Fabel und Tiermärchen" in: *Islamica* 2/1926/106.

A person borne aloft on the wings of high aspiration is not afraid to set himself goals which completely exceed the powers of his striving. Striving by itself already has great value.

Ut desint vires, tamen est laudanda voluntas. If one wishes, one can consider this high, albeit futile, aspiration as an extention of *intentio* (*niyya*). On this point cf. A. J. Wensinck, "De Intentie in recht, ethiek en mystiek der semietische volken" in: *Semietische studien uit de nalatenschap van Prof. Dr. A. J. Wensinck*, Leyden 1941, pp. 74-76.

One of the birds boasts of the virtue of high aspiration and is praised for this by the hoopoe. (MṬ 30/0, p. 101; above p. 15).

When Joseph is put up for sale in Egypt and enormous prices are offered, an old woman offers ten spools of yarn that she's spun. The slave-dealer laughs in her face. But she says: "I'm well aware that he can't be bought for this price and yet I wanted my name to be mentioned among those who bid for Joseph." (MṬ 30/1, p. 102).

The high goals which pious men and mystics strive after are naturally of a different kind than those of worldly kings and persons who imitate the latter. They belong to an inner world which is higher than the earthly external world and everything it can offer. When the six princes present the not unkingly goals they strive after to their father—who resembles a Ṣūfī shaykh in a king's cloak more than a real king—he places higher goals before their eyes which originate in the world of piety and mysticism.

A form of high aspiration of this kind is shown by Ibrāhīm b. Adham who gives up his kingdom in order to acquire poverty. (MṬ 30/2, p. 102; above p. 232).

The highest aspiration, however, is displayed by the birds who, undeterred either by the length or the danger of the journey, set out to find the king of kings, the Sīmurgh—Divinity itself. And even if they should never find him, it is enough for them to have sought him.

When the thirty birds arrive at the court of the Sīmurgh, they're made to realize that the Sīmurgh has no need of them. He's king whether they choose Him as their king or not. Indeed, a hundred thousand worlds filled with heavenly hosts mean no more than an ant at the door of this king. They should return tō where they came from. The birds feel utterly demoralized by this answer and are close to death. But finally they say: "Even if He looks upon us with contempt, contempt from Him is the greatest of honors for us." The palace attendant answers: "When the lightning of lordliness flashes forth, it kills everyone in an instant. What does honor and contempt still mean then?" They reply: "We don't recoil from this. Does the moth ever recoil from the flame? And even if we don't find the way to His proximity, we won't stop asking for the way that leads there." (MṬ 45/0, pp. 164-65; above p. 17).

The animals with wings reproach the moth for risking his life for the sake of the candle. He will surely not attain union with her. The moth answers: "Even if I don't find the way to her, it's enough for me just to ask the way to her." (MṬ 45/2, p. 165).

High aspiration is the wing which raises one above all horizons and is loftier than drunkenness and sobriety. (MṬ 30/3, last verse p. 103).

At death it will be revealed whether someone can call the wing of higher aspiration his own or not.

A fool, while weeping, reflects on the world and says: "This world is a sealed bottle and out of ignorance we're attached to vain wishes inside it. When death opens the bottle's seal, then whoever has wings flies forth into eternity. But whoever is without wings remains in the bottle caught in a hundred torments."—Therefore, provide the bird of high aspiration with wings before the bottle is opened, etc. (MṬ 30/4, p. 103).

High aspiration can give proof of itself in love as well. But this shall be discussed later on.

7

Other inner virtues like the ones just discussed are occasionally mentioned in ᶜAṭṭār—for instance AN 22/0 contains all kinds of general rules of wisdom and virtue—but they are not considered

in special stories. Only the virtue of moderation, of maintaining the proper measure (*i^{c}tidāl*), is discussed in a few stories after being introduced in a completely abrupt manner.

An echo from Antiquity:

These words are transmitted from Alexander: "Whatever you take (engage in), you must take with measure. Walk in the middle, (seek) neither honor nor humiliation, because practicing moderation is part of universal intellect! Don't approach too closely, nor stay too far away. Walk in the middle. For that's the best of things! (*Khayru'l-umūri awsaṭuhā*). If a cord is twisted with measure, a rope is made from a hundred threads, but if you twist it too hard, it tears apart." (MN 20/1).

Shaykh Akkāfī (i.e. the shoemaker) preaches so vehemently that the audience goes wild and some of them even fall down unconscious. Someone walks by the gathering and says: "Show what the shoemaker does (*pēsh ārīdh kār-i kashfgar*)!" Akkāfī is very upset by this remark. He realizes that he has spoken on too high a level. "Don't burn the travellers like birds, instead patch the travellers' shoes! You attribute an elephant's strength to the gnat. You bring an ant together with Gabriel, etc." (MN 20/2).

The ghastly story which then follows about the boy who cuts out his heart through an excess of love we shall become acquainted with later on (p. 408).

On praising silence see above pp. 157-58.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

SOCIAL VIRTUES

Essentially the Islamic social ethic arises from two sources. One source is the ancient Arabian, heathen *virtus*, i.e. *muruwwa*. This consists in part of a typical morality of solidarity: one is duty-bound to support one's fellow-tribesman in battle, irrespective of whether he is in the right or in the wrong. The other constituent part appears to have its origin in the special economic relations and requirements of life in the desert, such as the famous Arab hospitality and the duty to protect a person who seeks refuge or a visiting guest. Generally, travelling and living in the desert is only possible if one can count on finding accommodation, provisions and protection in the few places where people reside. Moreover, the nourishment which the desert provides is in such short supply that only someone possessing a greater quantity of livestock is in a position to survive through the winter. The poor and the economically weak must be carried along by the well-off. Thus a duty arises for the latter to practice extensive hospitality and generosity. This becomes the primary virtue of the great lords, on which they pride themselves in their own poetry and for which they have others praise them. Accordingly, in the ancient Arabic eulogies praise of the lauded person's generosity occupies an unusually large space, and conversely, in defamatory poems of the old days, the chief reproach made against a slandered person regularly appears to be a lack of generosity and bad treatment of his guests. (As a typical example see: Ḥuṭayʾa). Furthermore, these virtues still continue to have validity even after earlier economic and social foundations have changed.

The second principal source of the Islamic social ethic is a religious one. How Islamic solidarity, which had been recently created through religion, emerged in contrast to the old heathen solidarity and its concomitant duties has been described by Goldziher and need not be repeated here. ("*Muruwwa* und *Dîn*", *Muhammedanische Studien* 1/1-39). His presentation is chiefly concerned with the early period of Islam. The refined religious

ethic, as Ghazzālī has systematized it in his monumental work (especially *Iḥyā*ʾ 2/138-97, *Kitāb ādāb al-ulfa wa'l-ukhuwwa wa'l-ṣuḥba*, translated *Elixir* 57-135), arises from the spirit of Islamic mysticism. Its sociological foundation is established by Ṣūfīs living together who had formed communal groups among themselves before the emergence of actual Ṣūfī orders. The theoretical-literary definition of ethical doctrines here as well readily occurs in the form of pseudo-*ḥadīth*s. The ethical dogmas developed in the early period of Islam were not adequate to cover later refined attitudes in which Christian traditions often live on. In addition to the *ḥadīth*s one finds a treasure of legends about the Prophet, the sources of which have not been studied, and sayings of early Ṣūfī masters.

Within the Ṣūfī community *ukhuwwa* "brotherliness" predominates, often with an element of refined eroticism and ethics (*Elixir* 57-110), as well as the first signs of communal property. But brotherliness is further expanded to include the Muslim brethren in the faith, among whom relatives, neighbors and slaves again form a special group with a claim to higher rights (*Elixir* 110-35). At a certain distance the unbeliever is then also included in the ethical community. (E.g. *Elixir* 130; *Firdaws al-murshidiyya*, Introduction 43).

Many Ṣūfī shaykhs developed a practical social effectiveness in the area of caring for the poor (*khidmat al-fuqarā*ʾ). Abū Saʿīd ibn Abī'l-Khayr appears basically to have limited the provision of food to his followers (Nicholson, *Studies in Islamic Mysticism* pp. 29 ff.), whereas Kāzarūnī goes beyond this narrow circle with his hospices and kitchens for the poor (*Firdaws al-murshidiyya* 45-53). Thus ancient Arabian hospitality experiences a renewal on a religious basis.

A particular combination of ancient Arabian and Ṣūfī virtues comes to be practiced in the later Islamic "chivalrous orders" (*futuwwa*).

Alongside these two sources of the Islamic ethic, the ethics of Antiquity transmitted by literary means (as the first part of practical philosophy) to a great extent recedes into the background.

Moreover, in literature dealing with princely ethics, the Persian Sassanid kings still provide a shining model of wise statesmanship and justice. This may go back to the fact that Persian literature at the time of this dynasty's rule possessed a remarkable treasure of political-ethical treatises, which in part passed into Arabic literature. But it may also be due to the fact that in the Sassanid period

unbridled political power struggles were actually restricted through the idea of legitimacy and that legal institutions existed which set certain limits to the absolute power of rulers. Both these characteristics were to a great degree absent in the period during which the Islamic mirrors for princes arose.

Let us now consider what sort of socio-ethical ideas are reflected in ᶜAṭṭār's epics.

1

The universal virtue of social behavior, i.e. being active for the benefit of others, is illustrated by a frequently recounted story from the time of the just king Anōshirwān.

Anōshirwān sees an old man plant a tree and asks him what benefit he expects for himself from this since he only has a few more days to live. The old man answers: "Those who died before us worked for us, and today we enjoy the fruits of their activity. Therefore we work now on behalf of others after us." The king, who's pleased by this answer, bestows a handful of gold coins on the old man. The old man then says: "As you see, I've received a benefit from my action! I didn't have to wait long for the reward." (IN 2/5, p. 55. On the context see above p. 282).

Siyāsatnāma, Tehran, 93-94; ᶜAwfī, *Introduction* 176; *Rawnaq al-majālis*, *Bāb* 8/9; Chauvin 2/208, no. 75.

Respect on the part of the young for aged persons is illustrated by a story set in the childhood of the famous vizier, Niẓām al-Mulk:

Shaykh Gurgānī passes by a group of boys who are playing. Among them is the future vizier Niẓām al-Mulk. He makes his playmates stop playing so the shaykh is not annoyed by the stirred-up dust, for otherwise they may suffer some calamity because of this. The shaykh then predicts the great future in store for the boy. (MN 29/8).

According to the *Asrār al-tawḥīd* 45 (O'Kane, *Secrets* 135; Nicholson, *Studies in Islamic Mysticism* 27), it is Abū Saᶜīd who predicts the boy's coming greatness. The motif of the future vizier's good behavior is lacking. Cf. also *Asrār al-tawḥīd* 146-48; O'Kane, *Secrets* 280-83.

2

Loyalty to a fellow human being also means maintaining a relationship of obligation to him even when it would be opportune to do the opposite.

The robber who will not kill his prisoner because the latter has eaten bread in his house is faithfully fulfilling his duty toward a guest. (Above p. 281).

A thief sneaks into a house with a comrade in order to steal something. Suddenly he calls to his companion: "Let's turn around quickly and leave the house!" The other asks: "But why? No one's awake!" The first thief answers: "While looking for something we could steal, I accidentally came upon some bread and ate it without thinking. I've now eaten bread and salt in this house and therefore shouldn't rob it." (MN 34/2).—(In ᶜAṭṭār the story illustrates the duty one has to be thankful for a benefit one has enjoyed).

A warrior for the faith (*ghāzī*) asks an infidel who has defeated him in battle for a period of grace to perform the prayers and the time is granted him. Afterwards the fortunes of war change and the infidel is taken prisoner by the Muslim and for his part asks for a period of grace to be able to perform his prayers. The warrior for the faith wants to take the opportunity to slaughter him during the prayer. A voice then admonishes him to remember the Koranic verse: "Fulfill the obligations you have entered into!" (surah 17/34), and not to behave worse than the infidel. When the *ghāzī* hears this, he breaks into a sweat and weeps. The infidel asks him why he's weeping. When he learns the reason, it makes such a great impression on him that he converts to Islam. (MṬ 31/3, pp. 105-06).

According to Qushayrī, *Risāla* 64, *Bāb al-rajāʾ* (*Sendschreiben* 202/11.6) and Ṣaffūrī 2/3, the Muslim is ᶜAbd Allāh b. Mubārak and the infidel is a Persian. Cf. also F. Taeschner, *Die Psychologie Qazwînîs* 42-43.

On the other hand, the brothers of Joseph must put up with the reproach of disloyalty. When they go to Joseph in Egypt, he strikes a bowl in their presence and, pretending to understand its tone, recounts for them everything they did to their brother.—How will it stand with you when the bowl is struck on the Final Day? (MṬ 31/4, p. 106).

The story stems from the *Midrāsh Rabbā* on *Genesis* 42/3. Cf. Artur Christensen, *Les types du premier homme et du permier roi* II, p. 132. The famous drinking-cup of Jamshēdh originates in the same source.

3

The hero of the ancient Arabian virtue of generosity, Ḥātim Ṭāʾī, is represented in ᶜAṭṭār with a childhood story.

When Ḥātim dies, his brother wants to imitate him in practicing generosity. His mother says to him: "You can't do that, it's not in your nature. When Ḥātim was an infant, he wouldn't breastfeed until there was another baby sucking at the second breast. When you were breastfeeding, you kept the other breast closed so no other baby could drink from it." (MN *Khātima*/2).—(Of course, the story is not told by ᶜAṭṭār to illustrate the virtue of generosity but to show that if one is to enjoy his poetry, one must have acquired a taste for it along with one's mother's milk. Above p. 163).

In the *Aghānī*, as a grown up boy Ḥātim first develops the habit of only eating if he finds another person to eat with (2nd edition 16/94). In the Ḥātim Ṭāʾī romance he already does this as an infant. When the story is then transferred to the feeder of the poor, Kāzarūnī (*Firdaws al-murshidiyya* 44), this also shows that Islamic virtue is perceived as a continuation of ancient Arabian virtue. Conversely, the *ḥadīth* at the beginning of Ḥātim's biography, *Aghānī* vol. 16, shows how the ideal of generosity represented by Ḥātim is taken over and viewed as an Islamic virtue.

Hospitality toward unbelievers is taught to Abraham by Gabriel.

An unbeliever asks Abraham for a piece of bread. Abraham says: "If you become a believer, you can have everything you wish." The hungry man has scarcely departed when Gabriel appears and says to Abraham: "Who has given the unbeliever bread up until now? God! Since you're 'the Friend of God' (Abraham's honorary title), you must also be generous." (MN 34/6).

An Arabic version in Qushayrī:

I heard from one of the religious scholars: "A Magian asked Abraham for hospitality. Abraham said: 'On condition that you become a Muslim.' The Magian then went away. God revealed to Abraham: 'I've already nourished him for fifty years, despite his unbelief. Will you not give him a little food without demanding that he change his religion?' Then Abraham walked after the man until he caught up with him, and begged his forgiveness. When the man asked him the reason for his behavior, Abraham told him what had happened, and the Magian accepted the true faith." (*Risāla* 104, *Bāb al-futuwwa*; *Sendschreiben* 200/11.9).

Also found in Ṣaffūrī 1/181; Saᶜdī, *Būstān*, *Bāb* 2; miniature in Arnold, *Painting in Islam*, Oxford 1928, plate 30.

4

According to the Islamic view, it is permitted to bestow on someone the reward in the hereafter (*thawāb*) for good works, the emancipation of a slave (see the third story in 25/5 below), works of worship, etc. In particular the reward for reciting the *Fātiḥa* is readily bestowed upon the souls of the dead. If the traveller who visits a grave is frequently requested by the inscription on Muhammadan tombstones to pray a *Fātiḥa* for the soul of the deceased, it is to be understood in this sense. Children who have lost their parents position themselves by a fountain in order to give water to the thirsty and to have the reward in the hereafter for their good deed conferred on the souls of their parents. In the same way one can bestow on someone a pilgrimage to Mecca.

A young man has not had the opportunity to perform the pilgrimage and due to pain because of this he fetches up a sigh. Sufyān hears him sigh and bestows on him the four pilgrimages he has made. (MN 34/8; above p. 263).

Rabāḥ (Riyāḥ) al-Qaysī, from his many pilgrimages, bestows a certain number on the Prophet, ten on the ten Companions of the Prophet (whose admittance to Paradise was foretold), two on his parents and the rest on the other believers. (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 64, *Bāb al-rajāʾ*; *Sendschreiben* 202/11.6).

5

Within the Ṣūfī communities brotherliness (*ukhuwwa*) and solidarity prevails.

Ṣūfīs do not quarrel, they are one heart and one soul.

Two Ṣūfīs have a fight with one another and bring their contention before the judge. He reproaches them, saying that the Ṣūfīs who wear the robe of humility ought not to quarrel with one another. The judge, though he's not a Ṣūfī, feels shame on behalf of the Ṣūfī dress the two of them are wearing. (MṬ 20/2, p. 74).

The solidarity within the Ṣūfī community makes Ṣūfīs unfit to be objective witnesses in a trial.

A Ṣūfī brings a complaint against a man before the judge. The judge demands that he present witnesses. The Ṣūfī first presents a few and then eventually ten Ṣūfīs as witnesses. But the judge rejects the witnesses because Ṣūfīs are all one body and one soul. The testimony of ten Ṣūfīs has the same weight as the testimony of a single Ṣūfī. Among them there exists no "we" and no "I". (According to law, however, there must be at least two witnesses). (MN 35/4).—(In ʿAṭṭār the story serves as a parable about extinction, the elimination of "I" and "we").

The true Ṣūfī is also prepared to sacrifice his life for his brother.

Well known is the story about Abū'l-Ḥusayn al-Nūrī in which he is condemned to death with other Ṣūfīs and presents himself as first to the executioner in order to place the life of his companions above his own for at least a short span of time. (*Taʾrīkh Baghdād* 5/134; *Elixir* 79; *Thamarāt* 1/312).

ᶜAlī voluntarily exposes himself to the vengeance of the Quraysh by remaining reclined on Muḥammad's bed when the Prophet has fled to Medina. (MṬ 0/8, pp. 21-22).

6

Service to the poor is one of the duties of the Ṣūfīs (*khidmat al-fuqarāʾ*). In contrast to the slave and the hireling's service, it is voluntary service by a free man, and apparently for this reason is dealt with by Qushayrī in the chapter on "freedom".

Risāla p. 100, and cf. also p. 185; *Sendschreiben* 312/31.5, 539/54.6.

Of course, to begin with by "poor" one has in mind the brethren of the Ṣūfī order, but the circle is also expanded to include all poor people. Thus in several orders there arises organized care for the poor, first of all in the order of the Kāzarūniyya which in its home province of Fārs alone founded sixty-five hospices (above p. 325). The Prophet was naturally taken to be the model, about whom ᶜAṭṭār again recounts a rather touching story:

Salmān Fārisī relates: "While the Prophet is sitting in the mosque, an Abyssinian female slave comes and grips the hem of his skirts and begs him to help her. The Prophet stands up without asking anything further. The black woman takes him to a grain merchant. There he should buy grain for her with some wool she has spun. He also places the sack of grain on his back and carries it all the way to the Abyssinian woman's home. Then he returns to the mosque and asks God to forgive him if there was anything he did not do properly during this service." (IN 13/15, pp. 212-13).

A similar story about ᶜUmar occurs in the *Siyāsatnāma*, *Faṣl* 41.

7

The story is related by ᶜAṭṭār as an example of practicing the virtue of forbearance (*ḥilm*). This is primarily a virtue of rulers which consists in the ruler or another person of high position pa-

tiently putting up with rude behavior, forms of boldness, annoyances and vexations, without losing his temper. The caliph Muᶜāwiya and the general Aḥnaf ibn Qays (d. circa 70 AH) were famous for this virtue.

The Mirror for Princes by Ṭurṭūshī has a special chapter on the subject. *Sirāj al-mulūk*, *Bāb* 28. Ghazzālī as well deals with the subject in *Iḥyā*ʾ 3/153, *Bayān faḍīlat al-ḥilm*. Cf. also the preceding chapters in *Kitāb dhamm al-ghaḍab*; *Faḍīlat kaẓm al-ghayẓ* and the two which follow: *Faḍīlat al-ᶜafw wa'l-iḥsān*, *Faḍīlat al-rifq*.

In the *Muṣībatnāma* the earth which bears everything and puts up with everything is the cosmic symbol for this virtue (MN 18/0; above p. 25). As examples, two stories are immediately recounted in which persons of authority at first become angry because of more or less impudent demands by subordinates but then control themselves and give in.

The first, which is about ᶜAbd Allāh ibn Ṭāhir, we have already become acquainted with (p. 127). In the second one, a Sāmānid ruler puts up with interference in his pleasures by the censor of morals.

The Sāmānid ruler Naṣr ibn Aḥmad in the spring wishes to hold a banquet in the garden and sends on ahead the musicians and the wine-pourers. The chief of the marketplace and censor of morals (*muḥtasib*), Ilyās, meets the latter and breaks their instruments and pours out the wine. The *muḥtasib* is summoned by the *amīr*, and the following conversation develops. The *amīr*: "Oh you foolish little Ilyās (Ilyāsak)!" The *muḥtasib*: "Oh you small Naṣr (Naṣrak), what is wrong?" Naṣr: "Who ordered you to carry out these police regulations (*ḥisba*)?" Ilyās: "Who ordered you to play the king?" Naṣr: "The ruler of the believers." Ilyās: "And I hold my office from the Lord of the worlds." Naṣr: "Aren't you afraid?" Ilyās: "No. If someone kills me, I will be pleased for in that way he conveys me to God. You're only so pleased with the scent of musk because you perceive blood in it."—This brave speech makes an impression on the *amīr* and he invites the *muḥtasib* to ask him for a favor. After resisting a long time, the latter finally asks for eighteen bushels of wheat which he owes in Samarqand. Naṣr orders this quantity of the best wheat to be sought and transported to Samarqand on a beast of burden. But Ilyās demands that the *amīr* himself should carry the wheat to Samarqand on his back. Naṣr: "I get sore feet when I walk two steps too far in my garden. How can I carry the wheat to Samarqand?" Ilyās: "So you're incapable of carrying so small a load to Samarqand and yet you have to drag the whole weight of Khurasan on your neck into eternity! How do you expect to get across the celestial bridge with this?" Naṣr repents, renounces his kingship and becomes an ascetic. (MN 18/2).

In reality Naṣr ibn Aḥmad (301-331/914-943) had to renounce the throne because he had given into Ismāᶜīlī propaganda and thereby aroused the displeasure of the orthodox. See

Zetterstéen in the EI under "Naṣr b. Aḥmad b. Ismāᶜīl" and Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*, London 1928, pp. 243-44, where moreover doubts are raised about Naṣr's heresy.

Aḥnaf ibn Qays gives proof of his forbearance in conversation with an ill-bred person.

A fool says to Aḥnaf: "If you say a word, I'll give you ten answers!" Aḥnaf replies: "And if you say ten words, I won't answer one of them." (MN 18/3.—Ṭurṭūshī 68).

A person with forbearance even puts up with physical torments.

A poor old man goes to the vizier Faḍl ibn Rabīᶜ to present him with a request. In the confusion he plants his walking stick, which has a sharp point at one end, on the vizier's foot and causes his foot to bleed. But Faḍl endures the pain patiently and lets the man finish speaking. Later when they ask him why he behaved like this, he says: "I didn't want the old man to feel shame and possibly refrain from making his request." (IN 13/16, pp. 213-14).

Faḍl is the vizier of Hārūn al-Rashīd and of his son Amīn. See the EI under "al-Faḍl b. al-Rabīᶜ".

Less significant is the achievement of the Seljuk vizier Niẓām al-Mulk who, out of affable kindness (*shafqat*), eats by himself three bitter cucumbers which a gardener has given him as a gift so as not to expose the donor to embarrassment, and he even has him paid thirty dinars. (MN 6/3. Cf. the story above p. 249).

Pharaoh too gives proof of the same kindness of a great lord who does not wish to disappoint people's hopes.

When the box that little Moses is in is carried off by the water, he promises to set free whichever of his four hundred slave women catches the box and brings it to him. Afterwards he not only bestows freedom on the slave woman who brings the box but on all the others as well so as not to disappoint them in their hopes. (MN 6/5).

Compassion, magnanimity and kindness cause the noble man to forgive wrong which has been done.

One of Maḥmūd's revenue officials misappropriates money the sultan entrusted to him. Called to account, the man confesses his crime and says he had thought that he is poor whereas the sultan is rich, and he put his trust in the sultan's kindness. Now may the sultan forgive him or punish him, as he wishes. Thereupon Maḥmūd forgives his offense. (MN 6/4.—Chauvin 2/126).

The great lords in these stories give proof of royal virtues which are not necessarily based on religious principles. In other stories according forgiveness is based on religion.

A king takes many prisoners in a victorious battle and asks his vizier what he should do with them. The vizier says: "Since God gave you what was dearest to you, now you also do what is dearest to God: grant them all amnesty!" (MN 34/4).

In a variant of the story about Ibrāhīm ibn Adham and the horseman who gives him a sound thrashing, the saint requests Paradise on behalf of his tormentor. He justifies this in good Islamic terms referring to the idea of a reward. He knows he'll be rewarded for the pain he suffered and doesn't want to acquire benefit from the beating, while the horseman suffers harm on his account. (See above p. 39).

Patiently putting up with mistreatment is also justified by the fact that the believer knows everything which happens to him, the good and the bad, is directly caused by God.

Layth-i Būshanja is given a slap on the back of the neck by a Turk. When it's made clear to the Turk whom he struck, the Turk asks to be pardoned and says it was an error. The shaykh answers: "If I view this as your action, then it's an impropriety. But there whence the blow arose, it's no error." (IN 10/7, pp. 163-64; TA 2/90$_{5-9}$. Cf. pp. 617 ff. below).

The Christian virtue of repaying bad behavior with good has also not remained foreign to Islamic piety. An alleged saying of the Prophet goes: "Maintain contact with someone who breaks with you, give to him who refuses you, and forgive him who does wrong to you!"

Iḥyā' 4/62, *Kitāb al-ṣabr wa'l-shukr, al-qism al-thānī*; *Stufen* 160/B.54.

Ghazzālī cites directly Matthew 5:38-41: "Earlier you were told: a tooth for a tooth, a nose for a nose. But I say to you: do not repay evil with evil but if someone strikes you on the right cheek, turn your left cheek toward him. If someone takes your upper garment, give him your undergarment as well. And if someone obliges you to walk a mile, walk two miles with him!"—Jesus himself is cited as the example for the *Maledicimur et benedicimus* (First Corinthians 4/12).

Jesus has abusive names heaped upon him by the Jews but he prays for good on their behalf. When he's asked why he does this, he answers: "Each person gives of what he has." (IN 14/18, pp. 235-36).

Similarly, in the *Ushturnāma*, AS 1659, 28a; *Iḥyā'* 3/155, *Faḍīlat al-ḥilm*; Ṭurṭūshī 68; F. Taeschner, *Die Psychologie Qazwînîs* 36.

When the caliph ᶜAlī has received the fatal blow from his murderer, they prepare a drink for him. He orders them first to give some of it to his murderer to drink. If he drinks it, ᶜAlī wants to take him along into Paradise. Of course, the murderer refuses out of fear of being poisoned. (MṬ 0/4, p. 20).

8

One's relation to a thief presents a special ethical problem. It is discussed in detail by Makkī and Ghazzālī

Qūt 2/32-33; *Nahrung* 2/385/32.574 ff.; *Iḥyā'* 4/242-43; *Stufen* 600/E.199 ff. Treated in both authors in a special section in the Book on trust in God; Wehr's German translation of Ghazzālī p. 87.

Whoever leaves the house should lock up everything well and not leave any objects which would tempt a thief. But then he should undertake to be satisfied with whatever God decides. If a thief steals something from him, he should let the thief have it as his legitimate property, and if the thief is poor, consider it as alms that are given him. In so doing, he transforms the thief's sin into legitimate action, perhaps hinders him from stealing more since his needs are covered, and likewise saves the goods of another Muslim which now will not be stolen.

This is how Junayd acts in ᶜAṭṭār.

A thief steals a shirt from Junayd, which was the only object that could be found in his house. The thief gives the shirt to a broker to sell. Someone wants to buy the shirt but seeks a person who's familiar with it (and who can recommend the sale as unobjectionable). Junayd comes along, observes what's going on, and says: "I know the shirt (you can buy it with no worries)." (MN 18/4).

Aḥmad ibn Khiḍrōya, who is famous for his chivalrous generosity (*futuwwa*), acts in a similar way.

One night a thief sneaks into Aḥmad ibn Khiḍrōya's house but, despite all his searching, finds nothing to steal. When he's about to leave, Aḥmad calls him back and says to him: "You mustn't go away disappointed! Meanwhile, draw some water from the well with the bucket, perform your ablutions and pray!" The thief does what he's told. In the morning a merchant sends the shaykh a hundred dinars as a gift. Aḥmad says: "This belongs to our guest." He gives the money to the thief and says: "Here's the reward for the faith you gave proof of this night." The thief falls at his feet, repents and becomes his disciple. (MN 16/2; TA 1/290-91).

A pious man leaves the house with a purse full of money in his sleeve. Suddenly he realizes the purse is missing, and it turns out that someone has stolen the money from his sleeve. He says: "God cause it to be a blessing for him! Perhaps he needs it more urgently than I do." (*Iḥyā'* 4/64, *Bayān maẓānn al-ḥāja, etc.*; *Stufen* 155 ff./B.40 ff.).

Cf. also the story about Abū Saᶜīd in the *Asrār al-tawḥīd* 176-77; O'Kane, *Secrets* 327-28.

9

This kindness then expands to become a universal love of mankind based on compassion and extends beyond the boundaries of the religious community.

Wāsiṭī walks by a Jewish cemetery and says: "These Jews are pardoned, but one shouldn't say this out loud." Because of these words he's reported to the *qāḍī* and called to account by the latter. He answers the *qāḍī*: "If these people aren't pardoned in accordance with your judgement, they're pardoned in accordance with the judgement of God." (MṬ 32/6, p. 110; TA 2/267).

Bāyazīd walks by a Jewish cemetery and says to God: "What are these people now that You torment them with punishment? A handful of bones which were subjected to predestination!"

Talbīs 359_{10-11}; Massignon, *Recueil* 31; Dhahabī, *Mīzān* s.n. Ṭayfūr. Similarly: *Lumaᶜ* 391_{14-15}; *Schlaglichter* 532/127.4; *Talbīs* 359_{20-21}; H. Ritter, "Die aussprüche des Bāyezīd Bisṭāmī" in: *Westöstliche Abhandlungen Rudolf Tschudi zum siebzigsten Geburtstag überreicht von Freunden und Schülern*. Edited by Fritz Meier, Wiesbaden 1954, pp. 237-38.

Variant: "My God, if You forgave mankind from Adam up to the Final Day, You would only forgive a handful of dust. And if You burned them in Hell-fire from Adam up to the Final Day, You would only burn a handful of dust."

Nūr 22, 80; Massignon, *Recueil* 31.

Love of mankind can become intensified to the point of wishing to deliver human beings from Hell.

Shiblī, in contrast to the Prophet, wishes to intercede on behalf of the non-Muslims as well:

"Muḥammad interceded on behalf of his community. But after him I will intercede so that no one at all remains in Hell." (Massignon, *Recueil* 78).

Similarly, Bāyazīd in *Nūr* 22.

A pious man speaks to God in prayer: "On the Final Day I'll sit on the edge of Hell and drive all the people out of Hell with a dagger of light, so that they take up residence in Paradise." The divine voice answers: "Be silent! Otherwise I'll make what is bad in you so apparent that the people will stone you!" The pious man replies: "You'll bring things to the point where I tell people so much about Your kindness that no human being prostrates himself before You any more!" (MN *Khātima*/15).

Perhaps this story also goes back to Bāyazīd.

Bāyazīd said: "I wish the Final Day had already arrived so I could set up my tent by the gate of Hell." A man asked him: "And why do you wish this, oh Bāyazīd?" He said: "I know that if Hell-fire sees me, it will go out and I'll become a good deed for humanity."

Nūr 114; *Talbīs* 365; TA $1/153_{22\text{-}34}$; cf. a similar saying in *Nūr* 76.

The heightened self-importance which provides the foundation for this saying emerges even more clearly in another of Bāyazīd's sayings:

"What is Hell-fire then? By God, if I see it, I'll put it out with the tip of my robe!" Or however he expressed it. (*Talbīs* 367).

Similarly: "What is Hell-fire then? 'Tomorrow' I'll go and stand by Hell-fire and say (to God): 'Make me the ransom for the damned or I'll swallow up Hell!'" (Dhahabī, *Mīzān* [Ṭayfūr]; Massignon, *Recueil* 32).

Here we already have an indication of the motif of self-sacrifice on behalf of human beings. This is even clearer in another story:

They asked a knower of God: "Have you attained the furthest stage of contentment with God's will (*riḍā*)?" He said: "Not the furthest stage but nonetheless a certain station. If God stretched me across Hell like a bridge over which human beings could enter Paradise, and then filled up Hell with me alone in order to fulfill his vow (to punish the evil-doers), and in this way I became a substitute for His creatures, I would happily wish for a dispensation of this kind."

Qūt 2/42 bot.; *Nahrung* 2/420/32.621; *Iḥyā*ʾ 4/117, *Bayān faḍl al-niᶜma ᶜalā'l-balā*ʾ, 4/299, *Bayān ḥaqīqat al-riḍā*; *Stufen* 280/B.290, 739 f./F.281; *Elixir* 173.

Bāyazīd says: "My God, if it has been fixed in Your decision from eternity that You wish to torment with Hell-fire one of the people You've created, then make my body so big that there's no room for anyone in Hell except me!" (*Nūr* 115; *Asrār al-tawḥīd* 187; O'Kane, *Secrets* 343).

If God tormented me in Hell-fire instead of all human beings, this wouldn't be anything special for me since I maintain that I love Him... (*Nūr* 79).

A good many Ṣūfīs, out of compassion for humanity, reproach God for His having imposed punishment in Hell.

The saying is already attributed to Rābiᶜa: "My God, did You have no other punishment and reprimand than Hell-fire?" (Munāwī, *Ṭabaqāt al-awliyā*ʾ in ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī, *Shaṭaḥāt al-ṣūfiyya*; *Nūr* 19).

Abū Saᶜīd asks God to fill up Hell with stones and spare the wretched human beings. (Nicholson, *Studies* 56).

We have already seen that reproachful utterances of this kind appear at a much later date among the Bektashīs. (Above p. 186).

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

THE RELATIONSHIP WITH ANIMALS

As is known, dogmatic tenets which are friendly toward animals are found within the doctrinal school of the Muᶜtazila. This school teaches that animals which have suffered in the here and now, especially because of other animals, will be compensated for their suffering in the hereafter. And there were many who taught that retribution would be exacted from the wicked animals for what they have done to the good ones. (Ashᶜarī, *Maqālāt* 254-55).

The Ṣūfīs have not speculated on these matters but they maintain the principle that a Ṣūfī should not torment a person or an animal. In this way they have developed an especially friendly relationship with animals, which is reflected in a great number of their stories.

Humility itself already demands that the Ṣūfī does not imagine himself to be so much higher than animals. The dog has the same origin as he does. (Above pp. 317 f.).

Maᶜshūq Ṭūsī, not completely in control of himself because of the great heat, throws a stone at a dog. Then a horseman in green clothes appears, strikes him with a whip and shouts at him: "Don't you know whom you've thrown a stone at? Doesn't he have the same origin as you? Why do you take him to be lesser than yourself?" (IN 2/7, pp. 56-57).

A Ṣūfī will not kill and torment an animal.

Abū Isḥāq al-Kāzarūnī is preaching. A sparrow flies down and perches on the shaykh's hand. The shaykh says: "Do you know why the bird has perched on my hand in particular? He knows I won't kill him and eat him and torment him." Then he says to the little bird: "Oh sparrow, don't be afraid! I'll neither kill you, nor torment you, but I'll let you go." (*Firdaws al-murshidiyya* 165-66).

A disciple of Abū Saᶜīd strikes a dog on its front leg with a stick. The dog runs to Abū Saᶜīd howling and whimpering, and shows him the limb where it was struck. The shaykh takes the Ṣūfī to task. The Ṣūfī says: "The dog itself is guilty. Why did it soil my robe?" The dog goes on howling. The shaykh says to the dog: "Say what I should do, and don't postpone the reckoning until judgement on the Final Day. If you want, I'll punish him. For you must be made con-

tent." The dog says: "When I saw the Ṣūfī robe he was wearing, I thought he surely wouldn't do anything to me. If he were wearing the clothing of a soldier, I'd have kept away from him. If you wish to punish him, remove his Ṣūfī robe so people will be on guard against him." (IN 2/8, pp. 57-58).

In Gurgānī's cloister there's a very well-trained cat that has access to all the rooms, as well as the kitchen and the shaykh's prayer rug. So that she doesn't dirty anything, they've made little boots for her which they dress her in if she wants to go outside. She never touches the meat in the kitchen. But one day, contrary to her habit, she does steal a piece of meat. The servant strikes her. After that she withdraws into a corner brooding and no longer goes to visit the shaykh. Reprimanded by the latter, she carries forth three kittens in her mouth and sets them down before the shaykh. She'd stolen the meat for their sake. She then climbs up a tree and refuses to come down, even when the servant, at the shaykh's order, begs her for forgiveness. Only when the shaykh undertakes intercession on behalf of the sinner, does she come down. (IN 3/2, pp. 60-61).—(With this story ᶜAṭṭār wants to illustrate that even the most perfect ascetic, if he has children, will be obliged to give up his ascetic lifestyle. See p. 373 below).

Another story involving the protection of animals takes place during the time of the Prophet and is distinguished by the extravagance and sentimentality we have frequently observed in ᶜAṭṭār's stories which are set in the early days of Islam.

While walking, ᶜAlī inadvertently injures an ant. He's extremely upset because of this, weeps and attempts to set things right again. At night in a dream he hears reproaches from the Prophet: he should be careful when he walks, for two days now the whole of heaven has been in sorrow over the ant. Ants are continually engaged in giving praise to God. A trembling comes over ᶜAlī, but finally the Prophet is able to console him by informing him that the ant itself has interceded on his behalf. (IN 2/4, pp. 53-54).

There is a similar story about Wāsiṭī and a bird in TA 2/266. The *qaṣīda* by the poet Ẓāhir al-Dīn Fāryābī (d. 589 AH), in which he rebukes man for how he exploits and torments animals (ᶜAwfī, *Lubāb al-albāb* 2/299-300), is thoroughly permeated by the spirit of Ṣūfī piety.

A dove seeks refuge from a hawk in the sleeve of Moses. The hawk asks the prophet of God to turn over to him his prey because this is the daily sustenance which has been allotted him. Moses doesn't want to hand over the dove but doesn't want to cause the hawk to go hungry either. He therefore cuts off a piece of flesh from his own body to satisfy the bird of prey's hunger. Both animals turn out to be transformed angels. (MN 34/3).

The story is of Indian origin. Cf. Johannes Hertel, *Tantrākhyāyika*, II 122-23; Grünbaum, *Neue Beiträge* 283. An Arabic version occurs in Qalyūbī, pp. 144-45, no. 215. And in the context of a longer story about "a prophet", *Tanbīh al-ghāfilīn*, 70b-71a, the last story of the

Bāb al-ghība. Cf. also the Persian *vita* of Kharaqānī, ed. E. Bertels in: *Iran* 3, Leningrad 1929, p. 184. A story about a dove which seeks refuge in the sleeve of Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī is found in the *Dīwān* of Ibn ᶜUnayn, p. 94.

We have already heard above about Kāzarūnī's love of animals. In another story a gazelle pursued by a dog seeks refuge with him in his mosque while he's preaching. The dog remains outside before the door. The shaykh pets the gazelle, which is trembling in fear, and says: "This animal has reached a safe place like the animals that come into the Kaᶜba's courtyard seeking safety." (*Firdaws al-murshidiyya* 179-80, two versions).

The pious treat hungry and thirsty animals as their guests and help them.

Someone asks God to please send him a guest. He receives the answer that a guest will come to him tomorrow. The man makes all the preparations but no guest arrives. Only a dog arrives running and is driven away by the man. After waiting all day in vain, the man lies down to sleep. He's reproached in a dream for not having received the dog which was sent to him as a guest. Upset, he rushes after the dog and excuses himself. The dog says: "You shouldn't ask God for guests but for eyes." (MN 10/8; TA 1/315. According to the latter source, the man is ᶜAlī Sīrgānī who used to distribute bread in the mausoleum of Shāh Shujāᶜ-i Kirmānī).—(In this story in MN ᶜAṭṭār elaborates upon the idea that one should ask God for eyes to see the guest).

We have already seen what a high value is given to providing water to a thirsty dog and food to the birds (p. 286). The people engaged with *futuwwa* are also hospitable toward animals.

When Aḥmad b. Khiḍrōya holds a banquet, he also has meat provided for the street dogs. (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 104, *Bāb al-futuwwa*; *Sendschreiben* 322/33.6).—At another banquet which is held by "a *fatā*", serving the meal is delayed because an ant has settled on the food. The servant said to himself: "To serve the food with the ant is contrary to proper manners. To chase away the ant is contrary to *futuwwa*." And so he waited until the ant crept off of its own accord. (Ibid. 105; *Sendschreiben* 324/33.11).—A black slave throws his whole daily ration of bread to a hungry dog and would rather go hungry than drive the animal away. (Ibid. 113, *Bāb al-jūd wa'l-sakhāʾ*; *Sendschreiben* 347/36.6).

The pious set free captured animals.

Sufyān buys a nightingale for a dinar from a boy who has caught the bird, and then lets it go free. After that the nightingale visits him every night and watches him perform his pious devotions. After his death, it flies about his corpse in confusion and finally dies on his grave.—From this bird you can learn loyalty! (MN 6/2; TA 1/195-96).

The attachment of birds to the great Ṣūfīs is also reflected in a story about Junayd's burial.

When they wish to bury Junayd's corpse, a white dove arrives flying (clearly a transformed angel) and lands on the dead man. They try in vain to drive it away. The bird says to the assembled people: "I'm attached to Junayd by the spike of love until the Final Day. His body (*qālab*) belongs to the Cherubim. If you didn't hinder it, his body would fly away with us in the air." (MN 5/2; TA 2/36).

See also pp. 641 ff. below. A story about a nightingale which dies at the same time as its master, Sufyān al-Thawrī, occurs in *Tazyīn al-aswāq* 2/33.

A hunter catches thirty partridges for Kāzarūnī. The shaykh accepts the gift with thanks. But instead of having them slaughtered, he sets them all free. "It could be", he says, "that one of these birds has conceived love for his mate, and now he has been taken away and can no longer return to his mate. It could also be that one or another of these birds has flown out to find a little grain for his brood, and now his young ones are waiting for him, etc." (*Firdaws al-murshidiyya* 166, translated by editor in Introduction p. 45).

Some time ago a Turkish scholar who comes from a Ṣūfī family told me that once as a boy he placed a bird in a cage. Then no one in the house would speak a word to him until he set the bird free again.

Rābiᶜa doesn't eat the flesh of animals and therefore they are tame in her presence, whereas they flee from Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (above p. 212).

Ibrāhīm al-Khawwāṣ recounts a variant from the Andronicus saga about himself.

In the desert Ibrāhīm cuts open a tumor on the paw of a lame lion and binds it up with a piece of his robe. Then the lion brings his young into Ibrāhīm's presence. They encircle him, wag their tails and bring him a loaf of bread to eat. (TA $2/149_{17\text{-}23}$)

A story about protection of an animal involving a sick dog occurs in the *Siyāsatnāma*, p. 105, *Faṣl* 41. And well known is the story about the old donkey who pulled on Anōshirwān's chain of complaints, ibid. p. 28, *Faṣl* 5. Cf. also *Asrār al-tawḥīd* 210-11; O'Kane, *Secrets* 382.

Protecting animals is a specifically Buddhist motif (Salzberger, *Salomo-Sage* p. 62). Whether one should consider this to be Buddhist influence among the Ṣūfīs, I would not venture to judge.

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

SEEKING CLOSENESS TO GOD

In the Islamic world it was mysticism which developed or in fact gave depth to the religious-ethical character of relationships with one's fellow human beings and fellow creatures. Yet this social ethics is not the primary goal, not the point on which mysticism focuses its real interest. The soul of the mystic is not turned toward mankind or created beings, but toward God. Indeed, for the mystic God Himself is the highest value which cannot be replaced by anything else.

God says to David: "All things of the world, whether beautiful or ugly, visible or hidden, can be replaced by something of similar kind. I alone am not like that. Therefore be satisfied with Me and desire nothing else but Me!" (MṬ 36/5, p. 123).

A symbolic story:

Maḥmūd boasts of his power before Ayāz: Sind and Hind, Turkland and Rūm, belong to me, seven hundred kings obey my command. I have soldiers and elephants too numerous to be counted. No sultan is as famous as I am." At that Ayāz jumps up and asks to be able to speak. The sultan consents. Then the slave says: "Even if you possess a world full of warriors, you don't have a Maḥmūd like I have." (MN 10/7).

The mystic's deep yearning is to enter personally into the most intimate and permanent possible contact with God. In the high states in which he feels close to this goal, humanity and all created beings sink to the level of insubstantial forms which, as long as they draw attention to themselves, are barriers between the soul and God which must be removed.

The paths which mystics travel in order to reach this goal are numerous: "The paths to God are as many in number as the breaths of human beings." The states of soul which come over mystics when they are seeking God are manifold, and the halting-stations they must traverse are great in number.

These are time and again described and treated in one or another systematic ordering in the textbooks of mysticism as *maqāmāt*, *manāzil* and *ḥālāt*.

We will search in vain in our poet for this kind of systematic treatment of halting-stations, way-stations and states. He is neither a systematizer and theoretician of mysticism, nor generally speaking an actual "specialist". He himself admits that he does not belong to the Ṣūfīs and only acts like them so as to be reckoned among them (above p. 157). We will not, therefore, encounter in ᶜAṭṭār all the inner attitudes and states that the textbooks talk about. On the other hand, we will see that ᶜAṭṭār handles certain of these with a special predilection, in particular extinction and *tawḥīd*, the mystical profession of God's oneness, which in him already clearly flows into *waḥdat al-wujūd*—pantheistic monism.

1

From among the consciously employed means which are meant to create a feeling of closeness to God, ᶜAṭṭār is familiar with "drawing near through voluntary acts of obedience" (*al-taqarrub bi'l-nawāfil*; above p. 28, ftn. 17; and pp. 521, 576 below). As for *dhikr*, the systematic suppression of all content of the consciousness in favor of the idea of God through continuous repetition of God's name or the profession of faith, and vigils and other ascetic practices like praying and fasting, we only hear about these occasionally and more indirectly. Meditation comes out of *dhikr* (above p. 21). In the darkness of a night passed in wakefulness the internal sun dawns for the mystic (p. 210), and we hear about *murīds* who attempt to reach the goal through ascetic practices, i.e. to be allotted a revelation from God in their heart. For one of them vanity bars the way to God (p. 299), while another only attains his desire after he actually stops his pious practices on the advice of his master.

A *murīd* of Dhū'l-Nūn who has undertaken forty terms of spiritual withdrawal and has prayed, fasted, stayed awake and remained silent for forty years, complains to his master that, despite all his acts of obedience, he hasn't been allotted any kind of illumination or any kind of joy in his soul. Certainly he doesn't want to complain but he no longer knows what he should do. Dhū'l-Nūn says: "If God doesn't look at you in kindness, perhaps He'll look at you in anger and reproach you. Stop praying and fasting altogether, and sleep and eat all you want." The dervish does what he's been told and behold, the Prophet appears to him in a dream and gives him a message from God: "How can someone suffer loss through contact with Us! (TA: No real man arrives before Our gate and then becomes fed up so quickly. It's steadfastness that counts, not raising complaints!) But your high aspiration has not been in vain. We now pour in your lap

everything you desired." But God has Dhū'l-Nūn told: "You wicked hypocrite! You're frightening those who love Me from the road that leads to Me. I'll make you pay dearly if you don't stop acting like a highwayman!" Dhū'l-Nūn is greatly pleased by this message. (MN 9/1; TA 1/121-22).

But otherwise "work" is the indispensable pre-condition for being admitted to God's proximity.

As long as a fresh branch of your being is not joined with the root of work, you remain cut off from the root of all things... Therefore attach the branch firmly now... How can you find access to His door if, because of inactivity, you perform no actions! (MN in 8/5).

2

There are other motifs which one finds illustrated more frequently.

A universal closeness to God already exists because of the ubiquitous presence of God. Awareness of this ubiquitous presence, to the extent that it signifies that man is continuously observed and watched over by God, is designated by Qushayrī as *murāqaba* "watching over" and is treated by him in a special chapter of his *Risāla* (pp. 87-88; *Sendschreiben* 23/271-74). One should serve God and worship Him as if one sees Him before oneself.

This kind of worship is called *iḥsān* in accordance with the *ḥadīth*: *"Al-iḥsānu an ta*ᶜ*buda'llāha ka*ʾ*annaka tarāh."* (Wensinck, *Concordance* 1/476b).

Even if you don't see Him, He sees you.

ᶜAṭṭār illustrates this conceptual motif with several stories.

A man annoys a woman with his gaze while she's circumambulating the Kaᶜba. She rebukes him, saying he should remember that he's come here for religious gain and not to cause himself loss.—The Lord of the world watches you continuously. You are far from Him (in thought) and He is present. Since God is with you in every place, don't take one step without being aware of His presence (*ḥuḍūr*). If you take one step without Him, you'll be allotted much perplexity "yonder". (IN 14/15, p. 232.—Cf. *Ḥadīqa* 398).

Sanjar's female singer Mahsatī has kept company with the sultan through the day and withdraws to her tent. Besides the beloved singer Mahsatī, the sultan also possesses a handsome cupbearer who, for his part, has an amorous liaison with Mahsatī. When the sultan wakes up at night, he finds that the cupbearer is not in his accustomed place. He becomes suspicious and, with sword in hand, goes off to search for him. When he comes to the tent of Mahsatī, he finds the cupbearer sitting with her in the tent. The songstress sings a verse for him:

"At the edge of the cornfield I'll take you in my arms, even if tonight I must spin for others."

Sanjar controls himself and doesn't interrupt them. He takes note of the verse he heard and returns to his tent. After ten days a feast is held at which Mahsatī is meant to sing and the cupbearer to perform his function. The sultan then asks the songstress to sing: "At the edge of the cornfield, etc." Mahsatī is paralyzed with fear. The harp slips from her hand and she falls to the ground unconscious. When she regains her senses, she explains her fear to the ruler. She had sung the verse one night and obviously the sultan had heard it. But that's not why she's so afraid. She knows that even if the shah drove her away, he would still call her back because his heart couldn't bear the separation. But hearing the shah's words, she realized that God knows the most secret of her breaths. Were He to shed light on all her secrets the way the sultan today shed light on one of her secrets, she wouldn't know what she should answer. (IN 14/16, pp. 232-34; *Majālis al-ᶜushshāq*, *majlis* 66).

Some of Mahsatī's verses are found in Shams al-Qays, *Muᶜjam* 219_2. More of her verses are in the collection of quatrains, *Nuzhat al-majālis*, Ms. Carullah 1676, and in a manuscript I have described in "Philologika XI", *Der Islam* 26/1942/246. Cf. Fritz Meier, *Die schöne Mahsatī*, Wiesbaden, 1963.

God is, of course, elevated above His creatures in His lordliness, but human beings are nonetheless in His presence if only as dust on the robe of His majesty.

A preacher is speaking from the pulpit about the majesty of God: "On the hem of the robe of His majesty the dust of lowliness has never settled, nor will it ever settle there because He is pure and exists only for Himself." A fool calls out to the preacher: "You ignorant man! The dust of lowliness always remains on the hem of the robe of His majesty! Don't you see all these people who've been formed from earth? They're the dust of lowliness for all eternity. They take hold of the hem of that majesty with their hand and sit on that hem like dust."—Thus God is indeed unique and has no equal, but they're all involved with Him. (MN 10/6). (There then follows the Maḥmūd-Ayāz story recounted above p. 341).

3

God is present in the heart of the mystic. He is within when one imagines Him to be outside.

The king has a passageway to every heart, whereas the confused heart has no path. If outside the king was alien (far-off), don't grieve. He's inside in the chamber!

Ayāz becomes sick. Maḥmūd hears of this and instructs his servant to visit the slave and tell him how worried the sultan is because of his favorite's illness. Even though he lingers far from him, with his soul he's still in his presence. He

impresses on his servant that he should make haste and stop nowhere along the way. The servant goes immediately to the room of the sick person but, to his shock, sees that the sultan is already there sitting by the sickbed. He trembles out of fear that he will be punished for negligence. But the sultan reassures him: "I have a secret passageway to Ayāz by means of which I can see him at any time. Although outwardly I had someone ask about him, I actually know all about him from behind the curtain. My soul is with him." (MṬ 13/3, p. 44 = MN 28/1).

This presence of God has a reassuring and pleasing effect.

If the heart enters the state of being present, it will be happy for all eternity.

A young man comes upon a *pīr* who lives all alone in a corner without a soul as a companion, and he asks him: "Don't you feel dejected being so alone?" The old man answers: "How can I feel dejected when I'm always in the presence of God!" (MN 30/10).

A symbolic story:

Maḥmūd's army captures a little Indian boy and brings him to the sultan. He finds great pleasure in the small boy, shows him all kinds of friendliness and lets him sit alongside himself on the throne. The little boy weeps. The sultan asks him why he's weeping. The child says: "Because my mother, who always used to frighten me by invoking Maḥmūd, can't see me now that I'm sitting on the throne alongside the shah!" (MN 30/11).

Mathnawī 6/1382 ff. Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī specifically says that the story comes from ʿAṭṭār. He has taken it from here and not from MṬ pp. 121-22, as I erroneously stated in OLZ 1935, 244. Cf. Nicholson on the passage, *Commentary*, vol. 8, p. 337.

This feeling of intimacy in the presence of God the Arab mystics call "*uns*". (On the term see p. 585 below). Among the Persians the word *ḥuḍūr* "being present" in fact means: "happiness of heart, peace of soul, inner peace, internal composure." In this connection one perhaps thinks of personal closeness to a real or ideal personality which delivers one from the anxiety of solitude. But in the sense of inner composure the word at the same time means the opposite of distractedness, "to have one's thoughts clearly ordered, to be mentally focused on something, without digression and deviation".

4

Consequently, this term is also used to designate an internal attitude. As an attitude of a human being *vis-à-vis* God, "being present" consists of the full orientation of the soul toward God, combined with the inner "absence" (*ghayba*) from people and creation in general, during which "thinking of God entirely oc-

cupies the heart so that a person is present with his heart before God".

Qushayrī, *Risāla* 38, *al-Ḥuḍūr*; *Sendschreiben* 124/2.9.—Cf. also on *ḥuḍūr* Hujwīrī, Nicholson's translation, 1st ed., pp. 248-51.

The spatial and the psychological concept merge into one another. This inner composure focused on God is necessary for "the path" to God.

Go on, oh friend, and keep your heart composed today so that tomorrow you don't enter the heat and fire... Be not distracted so you don't remain behind. Seek "presence" so you don't remain alone! I don't know whether even a heart at peace attained life's salvation. But how can you expect to take a distracted heart there? (AN in 11/2).

An arrow that's been shot straight hits the target. The one who succeeds in "presence" travels straight on this path like an arrow. Always make an effort regarding your "presence", don't sell the present heart for both worlds. (AN in 11/3).

You have need of "presence" as your fellow-traveller so it becomes a light on your dark path. If "presence" is your travelling-companion, then your heart becomes worthy of the king's court. (AN in 11/2).

In this last verse one already perceives still another semantic nuance of the word. *Ḥuḍūr* also means "to be ready", "to be prepared", namely for service at the court of the king, ready in attendance, waiting in readiness, until the king perhaps notices the ready person and grants him access to his proximity.

In this sense the poet interprets the concept with images from life at the court or in the military camp.

Remain always at this door, then the king will give you distinction through his closeness! If you're present at the king's tent, you become one of those who are admitted to the king's proximity.

One winter night the tent of Sultan Malikshāh is snowed in. The sultan wishes to know what his corps of guards do in this cold and to confirm that someone is mounting guard by the entrance to his tent. He steps outside the tent and finds a single guard who, despite the cold, is standing at his post. The sultan asks him who he is and where his home is located. The soldier answers: "I'm a foreigner without a home. I have no other home but the king's tent. As long as I live, my head will be where the king's foot is." Malikshāh is delighted by this answer and later makes the man governor (*ᶜamīd*) of Khurasan.—And so the mystic who stands by in such readiness in attendance on God will also attain the highest honors with God. (IN 12/6, pp. 190-91).

It is said about Khālū-i Sarakhsī (above p. 300) that all his action consisted of *ḥuḍūr*, of being ready (IN p. 293_4). The rejected worshipper (above pp. 297 f.) persists in this attitude, although he has been rejected (IN p. 165_7), and Satan

behaves the same way despite his having been cursed. (IN p. 137_{19}. See Chpt. 27/15 below).

Of course, no person can acquire access to God's proximity by force but he can keep himself ready. Then perhaps the eye of God will fall upon him.

Whoever wishes to catch a glimpse of the king's daughter must reside in proximity to the king's court, although he can't do anyhing to influence the king's daughter. The watchword is to keep oneself ready. (MN in 1/6).

This motif is closely related to another motif which we became acquainted with above (p. 298): One cannot compel happiness by means of works of obedience but one must do one's part. Perhaps then "the king's hawk will settle on your shoulder". "Being prepared is everything."

Likewise, one can't acquire Sufism by one's own power. The Ṣūfī robe must be sewn in eternity.

An old woman brings her son to Abū Saᶜīd so her son becomes his *murīd*. But the young man can't sustain a Ṣūfī's life, he doesn't have the strength to put up with the deprivation, the divesting of self and the humiliation. He says to Abū Saᶜīd: "You wanted to make me into a Ṣūfī but you brought me close to death!"—If Abū Saᶜīd makes a Ṣūfī, he'll be like you, oh *murīd*. But if God makes a Ṣūfī, he becomes an Abū Saᶜīd. Undertaking effort will certainly be rewarded but making a Ṣūfī comes from another world.—The Ṣūfī is like a man who unexpectedly comes upon a treasure, but he must travel the designated path. Therefore, undertake effort day and night there where the treasure lies so that, if fortune smiles on you, you may perhaps suddenly catch sight of it one time. (MN 1/6).

The source for this last motif is a saying of Bāyazīd: *Bi'l-kasbi lā taḥṣulu'l-qurba... fa'l-ᶜabdu'l-jawhariyyu man yamshī fa-taghūru rijlāhu fī kanz. Nūr* 94; Persian in TA $1/155_{13\text{-}14}$).

5

Closeness to the divine king is the highest value. It should not be given up for anything else. ᶜAṭṭār illustrates this with his stories about royal slaves.

A king gives over the treasures of his palace to be plundered by his soldiers. A slave stands before the king and doesn't move from his place. When asked why he doesn't participate since he could gain something in the plundering, he laughs and replies: "This isn't allowed for me. For me the king's countenance is enough." The king, who's delighted by this answer, wishes to give him jewels with his own hand, but the slave clasps the king's finger and says: "What concerns me is this hand, jewels and treasures are all wind. As long as you exist, I have everything. May the day never appear which separates me from you!"—

Don't let yourself be led astray by Paradise and Ḥūrīs because without God Paradise is devoid of light. (AN 7/1 and the preceding verse).

In Sa^cdī's *Būstān*, Bombay 1892, pp. 149-50, *Bāb* 3, the story is already transferred to Ayāz, whereas in Qalyūbī no. 6 it is recounted about Hārūn's female slave.—As father and provider of nourishment the Khāqān must now and then turn over a table of foods to his people (*khwān-e yaghma*). Cf. Osman Turan in *Revue des Études Islamiques* 1948, p. 45.

Sultan Maḥmūd sits Ayāz on the throne and gives him the kingdom and the army so he may be ruler from then on. The courtiers and generals envy Ayāz because of this favor, but the slave weeps bitterly when he hears the sultan's order. They take him to task for this and ask whether he's an idiot to weep at such good fortune. Ayāz answers: "I sense that the sultan no longer wants anything to do with me. He gives me an occupation to be rid of me and distract me from him. I wish to do whatever he commands. There is only one thing that I don't want: to be far from his presence. What do I care for this kingdom? His glance is kingdom enough for me."—Thus, oh disciple, you can learn how to be a slave of God from Ayāz. (MṬ 36/3, pp. 121-22).

Cf. Sahl al-Tustarī's remark about saints' miracles: A person relates to him how when washing for the prayers the water that flows off him sometimes changes into bars of gold and silver. Sahl then says: "Dear friend, don't you know they place a poppy's head (as a rattle) in the hands of children who are crying in order to distract them with this? Watch what you're doing there!" (*Luma*^c 325 top; *Schlaglichter* 460 f./459 f.).

The world-traveller comes back to the *pīr* after visiting the second of the four elements, the air or the air's breath (above p. 25). The *pīr* praises the gentle breeze as the breath of life, the servant of the living soul. It's the bearer of scent which brings joy and comfort to the soul (as the morning breeze brought the scent of Joseph to his blind father. Tha^clabī 86).

The poet then compares with Joseph the divinity or divine substance which secretly resides in the believer's heart. Man has lost this or cast it in the well and sold it (cf. MṬ p. 166, verses 4196-98), and must search for it again.

Whoever doesn't have a lost Joseph has no faith, even if he's recited the profession of the faith. You have a Joseph who's living in the Egypt of your soul. At all times a scented breeze from him reaches you... Even if both worlds are hostile to you, the breath of your Joseph is enough for you. If the whole world becomes topsy-turvy, don't abandon the shadow of Joseph! (MN 16/0).

This is then illustrated with an additional story about Ayāz:

One day the royal bird, the Humā, flies over the army of Maḥmūd. All those who see it, rush forward and jostle one another so its shadow, which confers kingship, will fall on them. Only Ayāz pays no attention to the bird and positions himself in the shadow of Maḥmūd. Someone says to Ayāz: "Isn't that the

shadow of the Humā over there?" He replies: "For me the sultan is enough as my Humā... I shall never abandon his threshold." (MN 16/1.—ᶜAwfī, *Introduction* 258).

God wants the bondsman of God to seek His proximity and comes to meet him halfway. A divine saying goes:

If the bondsman approaches Me by a span, I approach him by a cubit. If he approaches Me by a cubit, I approach him by a fathom. And if he comes to Me walking, I come toward him running. (Wensinck, *Concordance* 2/176a; IN p. 289_{13}).

But He is a jealous lord who does not want His creatures, whom He has created for Himself, to turn to anyone else.

God has created you for Himself, has created you for His proximity. That's why He doesn't allow you to turn to anything else for one moment. (IN p. 289_{9-10}).

The king's slave who prefers a position of honor far from the court of the king's proximity is punished.

The caliph Maᵓmūn wants to test whether one of the handsome slaves he loves is loyal and true to him in love, and merits his privileged position. An opportunity to do so presents itself when a delegation of Basrans comes to him to complain about the injustice of the *amīr* of Basra. Maᵓmūn is prepared to give them another governor and leaves it to their discretion to request that slave as *amīr*. This they do, and Maᵓmūn asks the slave whether he would accept the post. The slave makes it known through his silence that he wouldn't refuse the job. Because of this Maᵓmūn recognizes that the slave doesn't love him, that he prefers the governorship to personal closeness to him. The caliph turns his heart away from him and sends him with a Uriah-letter to the governor of Basra who must poison him and publicize his punishment through a town-crier. (IN 18/3, pp. 287-89).

The story occurs in Ṣaffūrī 1/47-48 without the erotic element. One could also cite the story as an example of excessive royal jealousy. But ᶜAṭṭār is as little offended by the king's behavior as is Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī at the behavior of the king who puts to death the goldsmith whom his beloved slave girl has fallen in love with. (*Mathnawī* 1/216 ff.).

God is jealous: "No one is more jealous than God." He wants all the mystic's thoughts to be directed toward Himself.

Lā aḥada aghyaru mina'llāh. Sharḥ al-Ḥikam 1/136.

Rundī also relates the above story and introduces it with very nuanced discussions about subtle impulses of soul which infringe on the proper relationship with God:

For this reason, among them (the Ṣūfīs) the subtlest impulses of lust and the most hidden drives of vain striving and everything which determines the maintenance and persistence of the soul's pleasure, that is to say, being pleased with

the mystic stations (*maqāmāt*), holding in esteem gifts of grace and miracles (cf. p. 348), are viewed as the greatest sins and as reprehensible, base character traits which interfere with sincere slavery and pure acknowledgement of God's lordliness. (*Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 1/136-37).

Indeed, if the king's slave, instead of looking at his lord, considers himself with complacency and is occupied with his own beauty, then he is absolutely unfit for serving the king.

Slaves were valued according to their beauty. The most beautiful slaves brought the highest prices and were actually only affordable for rulers. David Ayalon, *L'Esclavage du Mamelouk* 6-9.

A king has an exceptionally handsome slave as a valet (long description of his beauty) who attends on him during his morning toilet, and whom he loves and honors. One morning when the vizier comes in to see the king, he finds him in tears sitting before the chopped-off head of the slave. When in amazement he asks what has happened, the king relates that the slave was supposed to bring him the mirror this morning, but along the way he looked into the mirror himself. The face of the king was not mirror enough for him and therefore he had to die. (MN 31/3).

Similarly:

A king has a very handsome slave. One day he observes how the slave looks at himself with complacency. One moment he looks at the insignia on his sleeve, the next moment at his hair, his pretty shoes, his finger-ring. Now he shifts his cap forward and now backward. The king then stabs him. He has no use for a slave who's in love with himself. He's not serving the king but himself. (MN 2/3).

6

To this story ᶜAṭṭār appends observations about the danger involved in being in the king's proximity. (See above pp. 124 f.).

The situation of those who are close is very dangerous. How can someone strive to attain closeness?

The king's slave dies for fear of committing an error and he is overwhelmed by awe in the presence of his lord.

Maḥmūd has a recalcitrant, nasty slave. When the slave finally becomes guilty of theft, Maḥmūd gives the order for his execution. But before this he sends Ayāz away because the latter, who is accustomed to the king's kindness, could be emotionally upset by his severity. However, Ayāz says: "The person killed is fortunate because for all time he's freed from grief and worries. But how many times a day am I killed by the sword of awe! To stand in proper silence before the king is worse than being decapitated. Day and night 'I burn' in the

king's severity, and yet people refer to me as cherished and fostered with kindness (*parwarda-i luṭf*)!" (MN 2/4).

The story occurs in the chapter in which the world-traveller visits the angel Asrāfīl who will sound the final clarion (above pp. 22-23). He is the biggest of the angels and yet every day, out of fear, he becomes smaller than a bird. (MN 2/0).

The awe on this path is a difficult matter, hundreds of worlds are filled with blood because of this arrow. The closer one is, the more confused and bewildered (*ḥayrān*) one is. Those far away have it easier. (MN 2/2 conclusion).

Only a few of those who are admitted to God's proximity will be granted a more intimate relationship with Him which permits them to speak to Him freely and even impudently. These persons shall be discussed later on.

7

Not everyone is successful at attaining the rank of an Ayāz who is known as a darling and favorite of his master. But even the smallest connection with the king brings honor, though it only consists of a word of abuse which is directly aimed at his servant.

A king lets a servant who has served him loyally for a long time ask for a wish. The servant asks the king to call him to his side during a big audience when the court, the army and all the people are on hand, and to say something in his ear, even if it's a word of abuse. Because then the people will call him the king's confidant. (MN 33/5).

Another man is still more modest:

A street-sweeper only sweeps out the street of the king. They ask him why he only sweeps there. He answers: "So that people call me the street-sweeper of the king's street." (MN *Khātima*/10. Cf. above p. 161).

A fool who's a lover of God sits smiling contentedly on a heap of ashes and gnaws on a bone. He says: "I've lived for seventy years 'in blood'. Now He has finally seated me on a heap of ashes and let me sit before His door like a dog with a bone. Even if, like a dog, I have no access to Him, I'm happy to be a dog of His street." (MN 33/4).

Rūdhabārī says: "To be a Ṣūfī means to sit at the door of the Beloved, even if one is driven from the spot." (Smith, *Rābiʿa* 27, ftn. 2).

8

The idea frequently appears in mystical literature that the souls had enjoyed closeness to God in pre-existence but then became

entangled in the world and forgot their earlier home, the honorary rank they held there and their primeval acquaintance with God (*āshnāʾī*). Through paraenesis or their own understanding they must be induced to travel the path back to the summit. (See also pp. 641 ff. below). They are damned if they do not do this and remain caught in the depths of the world.

The thought is already found among the Neo-Platonists and the Gnostics. Man's existential situation in the world, irrespective of his action, is bad, and he must be delivered from it. The idea appears in Islamic mysticism but is not dominant. Perfectly Islamic is the other conception that the wretched fate of man in the hereafter is the consequence of his bad behavior and that he must be protected against this consequence, i.e. Hell.

The idea of pre-existence is connected by Muhammadans with the so-called *alast*-covenant. Surah 7/172 says: "And your Lord brought forth their descendants from the loins of Adam's children and made them testify against themselves. He said: 'Am I not your Lord?' They replied: 'Yes, You are!'" Thus already in pre-existence human beings acknowledge the master-slave relationship between God and themselves.

We shall not here enter into the doctrine of pre-existence and that of the fall of the soul among the Islamic philosophers, and the question of the origins of these doctrines. On this subject see Nallino, *Raccolta* 2/214; H. H. Schaeder, "Die islamische Lehre vom vollkommenen Menschen" in: ZDMG 79/233 f.; S. Pines, *Beiträge zur islamischen Atomlehre* 59 ff.; *Abī Bakr Mohammadi filii Zachariae Rhagensis (Razis) Opera Philosophica...* ed. Paul Kraus I, Cairo 1939, pp. 205-07, 284-85. The famous *qaṣīda* of Ibn Sīnā on this subject (*ʿAyniyya*) has now been inscribed on the cupola of his funerary vault in Hamadan. See the recent publication *Sharḥ-i qaṣīda-i ʿAyniyya-i Ibn-i Sīnā dar aḥwāl-i nafs ba-zabān-i fārisī az qarn-i haftum-i hijrī*, ed. ʿAbbās Iqbāl, Tehran 1333. From *Majalla-i Dānishkada-i Adabiyyāt* no. 4. On forgetting one's origin: Plotinus, *Enneads* V, 1, 1.

If you recognize the covenant in pre-eternity, why do you keep yourself far from that presence? Make the hawk of the soul familiar again with the (deeper) sense, make it worthy of the hand of the king, so that when the drum beats again, it once more flies upward in yearning... If your hawk remains here below with the hood on his head, then the king will not call it to himself. (AN, in 11/11).

A king's hawk falls into the hands of an old woman. She chains its foot, cuts its claws, and when it wants to fly away, she clips its wings. One day the king passes by with his retinue. They tell him about the hawk. But the king doesn't wish to hear about it anymore because it's become involved with an old woman.—Your hawk has also fallen into the hands of an old woman (the world).

I'm waiting for them to reinstate your honor with the king. (AN 11/12.—*Mathnawī* 2/323 ff.; *Mecālis-i sebᶜa* 67).

The image is also found in Ḥāfiẓ:

You upward-looking hawk of a king whose perch is in the tree of Paradise, your perch is not this corner of the place of torments. They whistle to you from the ledge of the throne. I don't know what has happened to you in this place of hawk traps.

The beginning of the *ghazal* is: *Biyā ki qaṣr-i amal sakht sust uftādhast.*

A king has a very spoiled hunting dog. It wears a blanket of silk and satin, has a jewel necklace around its neck, gold bangles on its feet, and is led about on a leash made of silk. One day the king rides out to hunt with the dog on the leash. The dog sees a bone on the road and, ignoring the king, stops and doesn't want to run on any further. The king drops the leash in anger and says: "Let this ill-bred creature go its own way!" The dog-keeper thinks the royal jewelry should first be removed, but the king says: "No! Let it go just as it is! Perhaps one day it will look at its jewelry and recall having once enjoyed our acquaintance (*āshnāʾī*) and realize it has separated from a king such as me."

ᶜAṭṭār introduces the story as an example of ingratitude for benefits enjoyed but afterwards gives it a deeper meaning: "You too have enjoyed acquaintance with God (*āshnāʾī*) and given it up foolishly and thoughtlessly. Therefore, now place your foot on the path of love of God!" (MṬ 25/3, p. 88).

9

But let us return for a moment to the psychological aspect of "presence".

Focusing all one's thoughts on God and divine matters, occupying one's heart entirely with remembering God, can sometimes cause a Ṣūfī, consciously or unconsciously, to reinterpret occurrences in daily life as events belonging to the religious sphere. Any banal event which he reinterprets this way can trigger "a state" (*ḥāl*), an emotional shock, an ecstasy. He cries out, falls in a swoon and only when asked does he explain the significance of his strange behavior that astonishes those around him. We have already become familiar with a series of cases like this.

In a certain sense one could also consider our poet as belonging to these Ṣūfīs because he too understands how to extract a mystical meaning from banal stories.

It is a similar situation when a Ṣūfī hears some banal remark in a conversation between two people or the cry of a street-vendor, which can be understood differently than was intended.

Ibrāhīm ibn Adham overhears two people who are haggling over some article. The one wants to buy something from the other for one grain, but the other finds the price offered too low, and says: "I won't give it to you for one grain (*Ba-yak jaw īn binadham*)." Ibrāhīm understands: "*Ba-yak jaw īn Bin Adham* (This Ibn Adham is worth one grain)", and he's very emotionally shaken by this communication. (IN 12/12, pp. 196-97).

There are several stories of this kind.

Shiblī hears a millet-beer vendor in Baghdad cry: "*Lam yabqa illā wāḥid!* (There's only still one [cupful] left!)" Shiblī lets out a shout and says: "*Hal yabqā illā wāḥid wa'l-salām?* (Does nothing remain except the One?)" God alone remains, whereas everything other than Him passes away. (TA $2/172_{10\text{-}12}$).

Abū Ḥulmān al-Dimashqī hears a street-vendor call out: "*Yā saᶜtar barrī!* (Wild thyme!)" He understands: "*Isᶜa tara birrī!* (Strive and you will see My kindness!)", and falls to the ground unconscious. (*Lumaᶜ* 289; *Schlaglichter* 416 f./102.3; Qushayrī, *Risāla* 156, *Bāb fī'l-samāᶜ*;[1] *Sendschreiben* 475/51.22; *Iḥyāʾ*, *Bāb al-samāᶜ*, *Itḥāf al-sāda* 6/509; Macdonald in JRAS 1901/238; cf. *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/26).

Abū ᶜUthmān al-Maghribī hears a creaking device which draws up water call out: "Allāh, Allāh!" (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 157; *Sendschreiben* 477/51.23).

Shiblī hears a street-vendor call out: "*Al-khiyāru ᶜasharatun bi-dānaq!* (Ten cucumbers for one grain!)" He understands: "Ten good persons for one grain!", and says: "If ten good persons are only worth one grain, then what are the wicked worth?" (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 157; *Sendschreiben* 477/51.24; *Iḥyāʾ*, *Bāb al-samāᶜ*; *Itḥāf al-sāda* 6/509).

Abū Ḥamza hears a crow caw and cries out: "At your service!" (Cf. p. 470 below).

A Turkish peasant offers a fox for sale and cries: "*Dilgü!* (A fox!)" Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī understands: "*Dil kū?* (Where is the heart?)" (Abdülbâki Gölpınarlı, *Mevlânâ Celâleddîn*², Istanbul 1952, p. 214).

10

Qushayrī, in his definition of *ḥuḍūr*, adds that "presence" increases in proportion to how much the mystic detaches himself from creation (*Risāla* 38; *Sendschreiben* 124/2.9). It is clear from this that all creation, all things outside of God, hold one back from God. They constitute barriers (*ḥijāb*) which separate man from God. All things which a person occupies himself with and

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[1] Here incorrectly attached to Abū Salmān. Abū Ḥulmān is the head of the Hulmāniyya. See below p. 466.

which make demands on his attention can become barriers of this kind.

Earthly possessions can hold one back from God (above p. 52). Wife and child can hold one back from God. For this reason Ibrāhīm ibn Adham asks God not to let his son become an obstacle of separation, and God hears his prayer and causes the boy to die. (See pp. 373 f. below).

Cf. also the story about Fuḍayl b. ᶜIyāḍ, TA $1/79_{12-18}$.

The things which hold one back from God are in fact designated as secondary gods, as idols.

One of the birds who tell the hoopoe about their virtues says he doesn't attach his heart to anything and is prepared to sacrifice everything. The hoopoe praises him for this. One must free oneself from all ties before setting out on the path. One must first die unto the world, gamble away everything, before the journey to God becomes possible and allowed. (MṬ 29/0, p. 99; above p. 14).

The *pīr* from Turkestan knows that his horse and his son hold him back from God and therefore he wishes to give his horse as a reward to the messenger who brings news of his son's death. (MṬ 29/1, pp. 99-100).

It is not only worldly goods and family ties, however, which can hold one back from God but many other things as well. It is his beard which becomes the undoing of a worshipper of God.

A pious worshipper of God (*ᶜābid*) is occupied day and night with works of worship. But he receives no illuminations and states. He has a handsome beard which he's used to combing frequently. One time he meets Moses, complains to him of his suffering and begs him to ask God why no joys of the soul are allotted to him. The next time Moses goes to Sinai, he asks the Lord what he's been commissioned to ask. God answers: "He has no part in closeness to Me because he's always engaged with his beard." Moses looks for the man and transmits the message to him, whereupon the latter, in tears, pulls out his beard. But Gabriel says to Moses: "He's still engaged with his beard..." (MṬ 34/5, p. 116).

The motif of the danger of the beard is then amplified by ᶜAṭṭār in a somewhat simpler anecdote:

A foolish man with a long beard (long beards are always considered foolish) falls in the water and is on the point of drowning. A person on the shore calls to him: "Throw away the nosebag!" The drowning man says: "This is no nosebag, this is my beard. In fact it's no beard, it's my torment (confusion, *tashwīsh*)." The person on the shore says: "Then there's no helping you. Surrender to it! The beard will kill you." (MṬ 34/6, p. 117).

The poet then goes on playing for a few verses with the word "beard" and ends with an observation about the state of someone who completely gives up his ego and everything on

the path of religion and love of God so that he has nothing left. If he's a washerman, he has no sun, and if he's a farmer, he has no rain.

Tired of his dry tone, he then amplifies this thought with the story about the Ṣūfī who wants to wash his laundry and tries to outsmart the clouds. (See above p. 181).

But there are more subtle partitions of separation. Pious devotional exercises, even meditating on death which in itself is good, can turn into a barrier for a man of piety.

They tell Uways al-Qaranī about a man who's dug himself a grave and prepared himself a shroud, and for thirty years has spent his time, sleepless and in tears—filled with fear about his destiny in the hereafter—sitting alongside the grave he himself dug. Uways has them bring him to the man and sees a man more dead than alive, thinner than the new moon, who sits with his shroud in tears by the grave he himself dug. Uways says to him: "This grave and this shroud are your idols which you worship." When the man hears this, he lets out a shout and falls down dead in the grave. (IN *Khātima*/3, pp. 369-71).

In the same way for ᶜAṭṭār his poetry is an idol. (Above p. 160).

Sectarian fanaticism is also one of the things which must disappear from the mystic who seeks God.

If the pain of God has gripped your soul, how can this (Shīᶜite) fanaticism grip you? Intimate closeness to God is enough for you then. As long as you live, God is enough for you.

A Kufan (Shīᶜite) is asked about his religious rite. He answers: "Does one ask about such things, you repulsive man? May my God remain for evermore!" (MN 0/7).

The elimination of everything other than God is also finally directed against religious achievements, indeed against the mystical states themselves. As soon as these draw attention to themselves and become perceived as activities and states of the human subject, they can all become separating barriers.

The chief representative of this attitude is Bāyazīd al-Bisṭāmī. Cf. H. Ritter, "Die aussprüche des Bāyezīd Bisṭāmī" in: *Westöstliche Abhandlungen, Rudolf Tschudi zum siebzigsten Geburtstag überreicht von Freunden und Schülern*, ed. by Fritz Meier, Wiesbaden 1954, pp. 231-43.

Mimshād al-Dīnāwarī enumerates the idols which are worshipped by people: the carnal soul, children, money and goods, women, prayer, fasting, alms-giving, and mystical states. (TA 2/158).

Becoming content with mystic states is also described in Qushayrī as a barrier before God.

Risāla 89 bot., *Bāb al-riḍā*; *Sendschreiben* 27/24.6. Cf. also *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/58.

How the mystic intensifies his goal, i.e. closeness to God, into an absorption in God and seeks to attain this by eliminating his own ego, we shall have occasion to discuss later on.

11

Whoever wishes to be admitted to God's proximity must, as we have seen, maintain himself in readiness before God's door so that when good fortune is bestowed on him and the glance of God's grace falls on him, he will be granted admittance to the king's court. But ᶜAṭṭār is not only aware of this expectant, passive behavior. He also knows about the active striving of the seeker of God who, impelled by yearning, wanders through the whole world, the whole cosmos, to find the divinity hidden in inaccessible remoteness, the primordial ground of all being. Thus the birds undertake the long and perilous journey in order to reach their Sīmurgh, and likewise the unclear longing of the traveller through the cosmos, who hastens from one being to another and asks each one in vain for help and deliverance from his torment, is in the end directed toward the world-ground.

This unrelenting, patient seeking, impelled by yearning and inspired by "high aspiration", which will not allow itself to be frightened off by anything, is described in a passage of the *Manṭiq al-ṭayr.*

The birds on their way to the Sīmurgh must pass through seven valleys. The first of these valleys is "the Valley of Seeking" (*wādī-i ṭalab*, above pp. 15-16).

When you enter the Valley of Seeking, hundreds of efforts stand before you. Hundreds of torments are here contained in every moment. You must struggle here for years. Here you must give away possessions and gamble away everything you have. You must enter into blood—and come forth from everything. When you no longer have any sure possession (*maᶜlūm*) in your hand, you must also free your heart from everything there is. When your heart is then pure, the pure light of God begins to shine for it. And when this light shines upon the heart, the seeking in your heart becomes a thousandfold. When fire and abysses appear to the seeker on the path, out of longing for Him he plunges like the moth into the flame in the manner of a madman. He asks for a drink from the wine-pourer, and when he's imbibed a drink from that wine, he forgets both worlds. With parched lips he goes down in the sea, seeks with the soul the secret of the Beloved. In his desire to find out the secret, he doesn't recoil in fear before the murderous dragon. Unbelief and faith are then the same to him. He accepts them both if only one door opens for him. Once the door opens, what do unbelief and religion then mean?" (MṬ 38/0, p. 128).

The moth forever asks the way to the candle, even when it knows it can't reach it. This is truly lofty aspiration. (Above p. 322).

Someone observes how Majnūn is sifting earth on the street, and says to him: "What are you looking for there?" Majnūn says: "I'm looking in here for Laylā." The other: "How can you find Laylā in the earth? How can pure pearls come out of earth of the street?" Majnūn replies: "I look for her everywhere. Perhaps I'll even find her somewhere." (MṬ 38/3, p. 130).

Yūsuf-i Hamadhānī says: "Everything that exists as far as the eye can see, every atom consists of a Jacob who asks after his lost Joseph."—Suffering is necessary on this path and long waiting... You must have patience, whether you want or not. Perhaps then someone will show you the way... In this manner the child sits in blood in its mother's womb and nourishes itself from blood, until the time arrives. (MṬ 38/4, p. 130).

The old farmer Abū Saᶜīd starts a conversation with says: "God is so far away that before a scented whiff of Him reaches the soul, the amount of time elapses that it takes for a bird to carry off a world full of millet seeds one hundred times, if he takes away one seed every thousand years." (Above p. 88).—For this reason seekers must be patient and shouldn't abandon their seeking. (MṬ 38/5, p. 131).

One evening Maḥmūd sees a man sifting the earth. Maḥmūd throws a golden bracelet on the heap of earth and rides off. The next day he returns again and sees that the sifter of earth is still busy sifting. He says to him: "Why are you still sifting? You've already become rich like a king!" The sifter replies: "I found this treasure by sifting and so I'll never stop seeking again." (MṬ 38/6, p. 131; see above p. 128).

For the door is open. Only your two eyes are closed.

Rābiᶜa hears a man pray: "God, open the door for me!" She says: "You fool, when was the door ever closed?" (MṬ 38/7, p. 132).

This is the positive answer to the agnosticism full of despair of the Ṣūfīs and fools whom we became acquainted with above (pp. 77 ff.).

The virtues that enable these seekers of God to travel the long and arduous path to God's proximity are high aspiration and persevering patience which are activated by means of unquenchable yearning to penetrate to the primordial ground of being, to come into contact with the supreme being.

But there is a spiritual power which is suited above all others to promote the soul's concentration on another being, to suppress and eliminate all other ties and interests, to make that being into the center of one's feelings, and from within this emotionally laden center to dominate all aspects of life and to determine all expression in life; a power which is more effective than any other

efforts at overcoming restraints and hindrances, which can traverse the distance of a day's travel in minutes and performs achievements of high aspiration where all other efforts fail. The power in question is love. It provides the mystic with assistance to attain his goal, closeness to God, and to achieve union with Him.

In the case of the lover the intensity of feeling is stronger, the capacity for suffering and enduring is greater, the happiness of proximity is higher than with the world-renouncing ascetic and the saint of actions who sees the purpose of his existence in acts of obedience. But even beyond this, love has its own laws and specific qualities of emotion which makes it more than simply a means of intensifying other spiritual emotions. We shall therefore have to devote special attention to this subject.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

EARTHLY LOVE WITH SOCIAL AND LEGAL TIES

The peculiarities and special characteristics of love of God are explained and made comprehensible by ᶜAṭṭār, as had been customary from olden times, by means of examples from earthly love, love of "a creature". Thus in his epics we find a very great number of worldly love stories which—and this is the right of the poet who delights in spinning a good yarn—are also quite often recounted for their own sake and possess their own intrinsic literary worth, independent of the illustrative or symbolic significance given to them. Therefore, it will also be permitted for us, before speaking about actual love of God, to group and present these earthly love stories according to their specific contents and only secondarily to draw attention to their didactic and symbolic significance. In this way we are unlikely to stray very far from the spirit of the poems themselves. For on a purely external level the stories in them take up so much space that one can be certain that their narrative content was at least as important to the poet as their symbolic meaning.

1

The emotion of love, with regard to its form of manifestation, its effect and its function, displays a great variability and causes love to appear in a series of different aspects which, for our purposes, can be grouped in the following categories:

I. Purely sensual love with the purpose of physical unburdening and release, and of sensual pleasure. The partners involved can be a) of the opposite or b) of the same sex.

II. Love in its biological function as a means of propagating the species, i.e. for a) reproduction, b) the preservation of one's offspring.

III. Love with the sociological function of establishing firm relations between members of the two families involved. This in-

cludes, in connection with II, a) marriage, as well as b) legal concubinage.

IV. Love, for the most part, but not exclusively, sublimated as a means of consolidating relations between members of the same sex. The relations in question include those of a) military, chivalrous, pedagogical and religious associations, b) individùal friendships inside or outside these associations, c) the relationship between master and slave, when it extends beyond pure exploitation of a slave's capacity for work.

V. Love of a beautiful, youthful person whether a) of the opposite or b) the same sex, as an independent emotion which overwhelms, constricts and torments the soul, while at the same time making it happy, and which is valued and enjoyed for its own sake, or endured as one's spiritual destiny.

VI. "Adorational" love for a beautiful person as the place where absolute beauty (of God) manifests itself.

VII. Pure mystical love of an object which is no longer visible to the senses, love of Divinity.

These forms and aspects can combine with one another in different ways but can also enter into conflict with one another. Their evaluation normally varies in accordance with the character and individuality of the evaluating subject or the evaluating social group, and even in accordance with peoples and periods in time. This can lead to conflicts of value which occur on the theoretical level in discussions over superiority or in paraenesis, etc., or on the practical level in life. The latter case provides innumerable subjects for more or less dramatic, i.e. tragic, stories in prose or in poetry.

Within individual forms there are also grades of value and extreme final forms conceived as an ideal and which are more commonly longed for in fantasy and depicted in poetry than actually attained in reality.

Form IIIa, i.e. marriage, which is sociologically and, in connection with II, biologically the most important, enjoys the especially strong protection of the community, of the customs and traditions which regulate social life, of the authorities and religions, as well as secular legislation among modern peoples, and frequently appears with the rights of a monopoly. Ia and II are then only recognized in connection with marriage. Va is approved of and tolerated as a preliminary phase, but disapproved of if a transition to III does not appear to be intended, desirable or, where a IIIa already exists, appears to be superfluous. And the

same is the case with voluntary love relationships where marriage is either not considered an eventual prospect or for various reasons such as family politics, too great a social gap between the partners, etc., appears to be undesirable.

Category I can be enjoyed seriously, as well as playfully and frivolously. For the first case, there are the relevant branches of medical-hygienic literature, for the second case, an erotic wit exists in a refined and a coarse form, suggestive erotic symbols and metaphors which are richly developed in Oriental languages, as well as a special, low genre of literature, known as *mujūn*-poetry.

At certain stages of asceticism and religious legalism, the animal activities of category I are morally devalued with the most varied justifications and limited in the extreme, or even in their legally sanctioned forms IIIa or II are totally rejected.

Under II we combine love which serves a) to produce descendants and b) love which, in the form of the human impulse to look after offspring, serves as the basis for raising the latter. IIa (at least in the history of humanity up until very recently) is normally joined with I and mostly, though not always, with IIIa. IIb is usually carried out by both parents, though in the early years of childhood more directly by the mother. If the father is a wandering hero—we are not here concerned with exogamous relations—it then happens that he turns over care for the child entirely to the mother and is only concerned with the child once it has grown up. Motherly care can be transferred to the wet-nurse who in literature, especially in the case of girls, enjoys even later in life a position of trust with the child she has raised. In connection with the moral and technical training of the growing boy and young man, professional pedagogues and pedagogical institutions such as the associations mentioned under IV can also play a role alongside the father. In the religious orders the pedagogical influence of the shaykhs of the orders on the novices is stronger than all other pedagogical effects.

As an ethical ideal, fidelity during the partner's absence is required in IIIa, whether after the contraction of marriage or in the preceding phase. To the first case belongs the story of the pious, much sought after woman who maintains fidelity to her far-off husband despite all temptations, and to the second case belongs the typical tale of love in which a young love couple, due to adverse fortune, become separated and must go through numerous adventures and trials before they either find one another again or are only re-united in a common grave (epics like ᶜAṭṭār's *Gul u*

Khusraw and Turkish chapbooks). The demands for fidelity which are imposed on the woman are greater than the observances in this respect which one expects from the man.

The ethical ideal for IIIb and IVc is the fidelity of the female or male slave to the master which corresponds to the affectionate, friendly behavior on the master's part toward the male or female slave. In Islamic literature the relationship with a slave frequently appears joined with V, i.e. with the most intense emotions of love.

IVa attains its highest ethical intensity in self-sacrifice for a member of the association. Examples of this are the story about Abū'l-Ḥusayn Nūrī who wishes to be executed ahead of the brethren in order to allow them a brief space of life (*Elixir* 79), and the story about the member of the Akhī-association who has his hand chopped off in place of his younger brother (Duda in *Archiv Orientální* 6/112-24. The technical term for this behavior is *al-īthār ᶜalā'l-nafs*). The classical example from Antiquity is well known from Schiller's *Die Bürgschaft* (*The Pledge*).

The tale in *Die Bürgschaft* goes back to Aristoxenus who was originally a Pythagorean in Tarentum and then a student of Aristotle in Athens. He had heard the story from Dionysius II personally. Edited with critical apparatus by Diels-Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 6th ed., vol. I, Berlin 1951, pp. 471 ff. and 504. One finds very altered versions of this story later on among the Romans: Hyginus, 1st cent. AD, which is the source for Schiller's ballad, and Valerius Maximus. Medieval versions from the 15th cent. occur in "Der Seele Tod", *Kürschners Nationalliteratur* XII, 1, p. 477. Very probably in the Middle Ages there were completely different versions in the West as well. (A friendly communication from Prof. W. Kranz). The most detailed Arabic version is found in Bakrī's commentary to the *Amthāl* of Abū ᶜUbayd, Ms. Lâleli 1795, fol. 135a-136a. The tyrant is Nuᶜmān I (ruler in Ḥīra until 418 AD), the candidate for execution ᶜAmr ibn al-Akhnas al-Ṭāᵓī, the guarantor Sharīk ibn ᶜUmayr. Cf. also *Aghānī* 19/87, where the candidate for execution is Ḥanẓala ibn Abī ᶜAfrāᵓ and the guarantor Sharīk ibn ᶜAmr. And then Caussin de Perceval, *Essai sur l'histoire des Arabes*, Paris 1847, 2/107 ff.; O. Rescher, *Abriss der arabischen Litteraturgeschichte*, Stuttgart 1925, 1/60; Chauvin 3 no. 113, 5 no. 124, *Mille et une Nuits*; Otto Spies, *Der Orient in der deutschen Literatur* I, Berckers Kleine Volksbibliothek, Kevelaer Rheinland 1950, pp. 16-17; Rudolf Sellheim, *Die klassisch-arabischen Sprichwörtersammlungen, insbesondere die des Abū ᶜUbaid*, 's-Gravenhage 1954, pp. 41-43 (translation of the Bakrī text).

The emotion of love in its intrinsic value (V) provides inspiration for artistic achievements and is the object of a considerable part of all *belles-lettres*. As far as Va and Vb are concerned, both in Antiquity and in Islamic *belles-lettres*, at the latest from around the 9th century after Arab contact with Indo-European peoples (Greeks and Persians), no value judgement was made in favor of Va.

In lyrical poetry in the Iranian and Turkish, and to some extent in the Arabic domain as well, Vb is predominant, whereas epic poetry favors Va.

How mutually unintelligible the conceptions of lyrical poetry still are in the beginning is illustrated by the story about the visit of the Arabic poet Ṭulayḥa to the court of the Sassanid king. The Arab does not understand how the king can become enthusiastic about a poem which describes a beautiful boy with a rose in his hand. It is incomprehensible to the Persian king how anyone can weep over the traces of the beloved's tent. Naturally the story may be invented. (*Khizānat al-adab*, 1st printing, 4/157).

In Zoroastrian literature fifteen is considered the male age of youthful bloom (H. H. Schaeder in: ZDMG 95/1941/287). In the Iranian *var*, a kind of location of the blessed, the men are all fifteen years old so that one cannot tell fathers and sons apart. According to a *ḥadīth*, the dwellers in Paradise are smooth-skinned and beardless. (Above p. 193).

The lyric poetry belonging to Vb sometimes even serves to camouflage Va relationships, male forms of address being employed, whereas the beloved is a girl. This form of expression seems to be of relatively recent origin and of course takes for granted that Vb is in no way defamatory. Adopting this disguise the other way round does not occur.

I asked an Arab folksinger who used male forms of address while he claimed to refer to a girl, why he did not use the female pronouns. He told me it would be improper (*ᶜayb*).

Vb in early Arab times is not acceptable in literature. Law-revering circles inveigh against it. This polemic finds its support in the Koran and the Sunna which for their part are dependent on Old-Testament attitudes, the influence of which was so strong in Christian Europe that there the branches of literature dealing with this form of love withered or were only able to develop sporadically.

The extreme form of Va among the Arabs is so-called ᶜUdhrite love, ascribed to the South-Arabian tribe the ᶜUdhra, in which the emotion of love in its most intensified form is associated with total renunciation of any sensual contact (I).

Among the mystics love of type V undergoes a peculiar process of deepening and internalization, and in accordance with purely mystical concepts its highest stage appears as mystical absorption in the partner. With this love is associated a poetry of elevated style, a style which is likewise characteristic of the poetry of our ᶜAṭṭār.

If love is not taken too seriously but is enjoyed half-playfully with amorous sighs behind which thrives a cheerful vitality, then

a kind of gallantry of love emerges which finds literary expression for instance in the poetry of the Qurayshī, ᶜUmar ibn Abī Rabīᶜa, and later to some extent in that of the ᶜAbbāsid prince, Ibn al-Muᶜtazz.

VI. The love which sees a reflection of God's absolute beauty in the beautiful person is so similar to the teachings of Plato, which he developed in the *Symposium* and especially in the *Phaedrus*, that it becomes rather difficult to reject the idea of a historical connection, even if in fact it is scarcely possible to demonstrate such a connection.

VII. When every tie to a manifestation of the world of the senses ceases, then pure mystical love arises. Its object is hypostatized absolute beauty, and this can now be conceived as something which is no longer simply formal but is likewise ethical. In Islamic theism this object is then God. The love songs this mysticism sings frequently describe their object as if the songs were about a beautiful young man, and to these should be added certain alleged sayings of Muḥammad that describe God's form, which the Prophet beheld on the night of his heavenly journey, as that of a beautiful youth (pp. 489 ff.). More rarely the divine object of mystical love, following classical Arabic lyric poetry, is spoken of with feminine verb forms and pronouns (ᶜUmar Ibn al-Fāriḍ in the *Tāʾiyya*, Ibn al-ᶜArabī).

Naturally, this is not to be understood in the sense of a kind of mysticism of the Virgin Mary.

The mystical poets, with their descriptions, come into conflict with orthodoxy which shuns any form of anthropomorphism, but the latter, not being supported by any authoritative organization like the Church, were unable to hinder the development of this literature. The orthodox find it easier to tolerate when the descriptions of beauty in mystical poetry are interpreted allegorically.

Discussion occurs as to whether it is possible to link the higher forms of love with sensuality (I). There are those who believe that the sexual act destroys love, others maintain the opposite.

Cf. discussions, stories and poems in *Rawḍat al-muḥibbīn* 90-99; *Wāḍiḥ* 1/56 ff.; *Muwashshā* 77 ff.; Sharīshī 2/207, beginning of *maqāma* 42. The ᶜUdhrites are naturally of the first opinion.

On one occasion a mystic even dares to go so far as to affirm the joining of I with VI (see p. 473 below), but in this respect he stands alone. Otherwise, the higher forms of love in the utterances

of mystics appear to be free of sensuality, or sensuality is denied by them and combatted.

Only someone whose love is not characterized by sensual desires is considered a sincere lover (*ᶜāshiq-i ṣādiq*).

2

After these preliminary remarks we now turn to ᶜAṭṭār to see what he says about love and indeed, to begin with, what he has to say about the forms of love manifested in categories I-IV.

The series of conversations between the king and the princes in the *Ilāhīnāma* begins with a discussion of the value of sensual love (I). The oldest prince designates as the highest goal of his desires possession of the fairy king's daughter. The father in his reply singles out the sensual desire connected with this wish and reproaches his son for *shahwatparastī*, worshipping lust (above p. 5). As a shining example of overcoming sensual temptations, he sets before his eyes the behavior of a pious woman who resists her numerous admirers' attempts at seduction. She is likewise a shining model for the highest virtue of IIIa, marital fidelity.

A man has a wife who's distinguished both for extreme beauty and for piety.[1] One day he goes on the pilgrimage and charges his brother with taking care of his wife. The brother does as he was told and sends to his sister-in-law's house everything she needs. But one time he casts a glance at her and sees her wondrously beautiful face. He falls in love and, being a wicked person, attempts to seduce the sister-in-law with force, gold and supplication. She shows him the door with insults. He threatens her and says he'll cast her into destruction. But she replies: "I'm not afraid of death. Better to be destroyed in this world than to be lost in the world to come." The brother-in-law then pays four false witnesses and has them testify before the judge that the woman has committed adultery. The judge accepts their testimony and condemns her to be stoned. They lead her out into an open field and hurl stones at her. She's left lying in the dust of the steppe, covered in blood.

When the night has elapsed, she regains consciousness a bit and a bedouin who passes by the place of execution with his camel notices her. He dismounts and when he sees her condition, he lifts her onto his camel and takes her home with him. There he has her looked after until she recovers. When her beauty blossoms once again, he falls in love with her and makes her a marriage proposal. The woman says: "I have a husband, how can I belong to another?" But love allows the bedouin no peace and he tries to call her to him secretly. She

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1 Read IN 32_{8b}: *Marjūma*, the One Pelted with Stones.

says: "You looked after me for the sake of God. Do you now wish to obey Satan? Don't rob your good deed of its value! And if you tear me to pieces, this pure body won't become stained." Moved by the woman's honesty and fidelity, the bedouin accepts her as a sister.

The bedouin has a black slave. One day when the latter returns from a trip and catches sight of the woman, he falls in love with her and makes her a proposal. She rejects him. He then plots revenge. He kills the bedouin's small child in its cradle and hides the bloody knife under the woman's pillow. The knife is discovered, and everyone is convinced that the woman killed the child. The bedouin says: "Woman, what did I do bad to you to make you kill this little child?" She answers: "Do you really believe I'd repay good with evil. But think how foolish this accusation is!" The bedouin who's an intelligent man sees that the woman is right but he says: "My wife has now pinned this suspicion on you and whenever she sees you will think of her murdered child. You must depart from here." Secretly he gives her three hundred dirhams and says: "Take this for provisions!" She accepts the money and sets out on the road.

When she's gone a certain way, she sees a village before her. At the edge of the road a gallows is set up. A young man is to be hanged on it. The woman asks what crime he committed. They tell her: "The village belongs to a cruel *amīr* who hangs everyone who doesn't pay the tax. The young man couldn't pay the tax and for this reason is now to be hanged. The woman asks: "How much does he owe as tax?" She's told: "Three hundred dirhams." She pays the three hundred dirhams and buys the young man's freedom. The young man attaches himself to her and when he sees her beauty, declares his love to her. Nor will he stop annoying her when she says: "Is this my reward for what I did for you?" Together they come to the sea-shore where a ship lies at anchor ready to set sail. The young man approaches one of the merchants and explains that the woman is his slave but he wants to sell her because of her recalcitrant nature. The merchant buys her for a hundred dinars, despite her protest that she's a free, married woman. She's dragged aboard the ship by force and they weigh anchor. The purchaser who's fallen in love at first sight wishes to force himself on the woman immediately. She cries out for help: "You people, you're Muslims like me. God is my witness I'm a married woman and have a husband. But you also have mothers and sisters, and perhaps a daughter in the women's quarters. Would you want this to happen to them?" The men of the ship are moved with compassion and protect her from her intrusive lover. But then they themselves all fall in love with the woman's beautiful face. In the end they agree to catch her off guard and satisfy their desire for her by force. The woman prays to God and asks Him to bestow on her deliverance or death, because she has no strength left to endure this suffering. Fire then arises from the waves of the sea, surrounds the ship's crew and burns them to ashes. A wind drives the ship with the woman and the undamaged goods of the merchants to a seaport. She sweeps the ashes from the deck

and makes herself a man's suit of clothes to be safe from the eternal annoyances. Once arrived in the port, she's surrounded by the astonished inhabitants and questioned about how she's come there all alone with this ship. She explains that she wishes to tell her story to the king alone. She then tells the king that she travelled over the sea with comrades, that the lust of love was aroused in them, and that in the end God preserved her from the wicked intentions of these bad people. A fire came and burned them all. She asks the king to take the merchandise himself but to have a house of prayer built for her on the shore where she can serve God day and night, undisturbed by the people. Her wish is carried out for her.

After some time the king feels his end is near and designates the pious, supposed young man as his successor. A delegation goes to him and reveals what the king has ordained. The supposed young man says: "If this must be, then I need a wife because I'm tired of being alone. Send me a hundred maidens with their mothers so I can choose the one I like." The same day the great men of the realm happily send her a hundred beautiful maidens with their mothers. She reveals her sex to these maidens and says: "Is kingship proper for a woman?" In amazement the women set out for home and inform the great men of the realm. The latter send a woman back to her to request that she appoint someone else to the office of king. She does this and then withdraws in her house of prayer to serve God.

Her reputation spreads throughout the whole world and the gift of "having her prayers heard" is ascribed to her. In reality, many cripples do regain a sound body through her prayers.

In the meantime, the woman's husband returns home from the pilgrimage. He finds his house fallen into ruin and his brother in a bad state. He's paralyzed and can't move hand or foot. Questioned by his returned brother, he says the woman committed adultery with a soldier and was stoned to death. The abandoned husband is grieved by her death, and even more so by her infidelity. But when he sees how wretched his brother is, that he can't move any part of his body, he says to him: "I've heard that in such-and-such a place there lives a woman whose prayers are heard by God. I want to take you to her, perhaps she'll make you well again." He ties his brother firmly onto a donkey and sets off down the road with him. In the evening their road brings them to the dwelling of the bedouin. The hospitable Arab accords them a friendly reception and in the course of the conversation learns the purpose of their journey. He says: "I have a slave who's also lame and blind. He once mistreated a clever woman who stayed with us, and became lame and blind because of his wicked behavior. I want to take him and travel with you. Perhaps he can also become healthy through such a prayer." Thus they set out together on the road, come to the village where the young man was meant to be hanged, and there in the inn find the same young man who's likewise paralyzed and has lost the use of his limbs and his sight. They take him

along as well and finally one morning they arrive at the woman's house of prayer. She sees her husband from afar and out of joy throws herself to the ground to perform a prayer of thanks. Then she veils herself and asks the new arrivals what they wish. The husband says: "I've come here to ask you for a prayer. I have a sick blind man with me." The wife says: "This man is a great sinner. If he confesses his sin, he can attain a cure, if not, he'll remain blind and sick as before." For a long time the untrue brother doesn't want to speak but at last he confesses everything he did from beginning to end and says to his brother: "If you wish, kill me, if you wish, forgive me!" The brother reflects a long time. He finds it difficult to forgive him. But in the end he thinks: "I've lost my wife, let me at least redeem my brother!" So he forgives him, the wife says a prayer, and the sick man is immediately cured. Next the slave of the bedouin and the faithless young man must confess their sins, and they become cured.

Now the wife sends everyone outside, telling only her husband to remain. She then unveils her face. The husband lets out a shout and falls unconscious. When he regains his senses and she asks what came over him, he says: "I had a wife that you resemble in every detail. If she weren't in her grave, this grieving man would call you his wife." She then reveals who she is and relates what happened to her. She also has the others come inside and tells them how God has changed their wicked action into good. Finally, she makes her husband king of the city and appoints the good bedouin vizier. (IN 1/1, pp. 31-47).

Two other versions of the story occur in T. Menzel, *Der Zauberspiegel* pp. 102-08; *1001 Nacht*, Breslauer Text, vol. 11, pp. 190 ff.; Chauvin 6/154-58; a version which differs in details is also found in Ṣaffūrī 1/83-84. There the husband is an Israelite judge which points to a Jewish origin for the story.

The ideal of a marriage tie befitting one's social status (IIIa), upheld not by the female partner herself but by her brother, and how it comes into conflict with the pure emotion of love (Va) or symbolical love of human beauty (VI), is the subject of the long story about the poetess Rābiᶜa, the daughter of Kaᶜb the *amīr* of Balkh, and her love of the slave Bektash. The final outcome, in contrast to the previous story, is tragic for all the parties involved.

In Balkh there rules a high-minded *amīr* by the name of Kaᶜb who's distinguished by all the virtues appropriate to a ruler. He has a son named Ḥārith and a daughter whose name is Zayn al-ᶜArab. This daughter is not only endowed with famous beauty but she's also poetically gifted and even as a child could effortlessly render into verse whatever was recounted to her. Her father loves her very much and looks after her with tender, fatherly care.

When the *amīr* feels death is near, he summons his son and entrusting his sister to him, says: "Indeed, many suitors of royal descent have asked me for her hand in marriage but I've given her to none. You give her to a worthy suitor if you find such a one!" He makes his son swear an oath to fulfill faithfully this fi-

nal request, and then dies. His son Ḥārith succeeds him on the throne. He rules with justice, pays the functionaries and the army, suppresses wrongdoers and frees many hearts from their cares. He looks after his sister and protects her good reputation.

Now hear what kind of trick this revolving circle (the heavenly wheel) played on her!

Ḥārith has a slave (*ghulām*) by the name of Bektash who's the guardian of his treasure-house and possesses unique beauty.

In front of the *amīr*'s castle is a beautiful garden with roses that are serenaded by nightingales. Before the garden is a high balcony on which stands Ḥārith's throne. There he sits like the sun and resembles Solomon. In front of him in a row stand his Turkish slaves, their hands folded over one another in respect. There the *amīr* holds feasts with his aristocratic table-companions and the nobles of the land. One day the maiden went onto the roof of the women's quarters to gaze upon one such splendid feast. She then saw Bektash standing before the king as his cupbearer, his face warmed by the wine and so even more handsome. One moment he pours wine, the next he sings to the lute for the entertainment of the king and his guests. She falls madly in love with him, weeps and laments the whole night through. This situation goes on so long that she becomes ill. The doctors whom her brother, the king, summons can't do anything. No one knows what's wrong with her until finally her old wet-nurse, after much coaxing, manages to elicit her secret from her. At the end of the poetic narration in which she describes what came over her on that day, she asks her wet-nurse to act as her messenger of love. She writes a letter which the wet-nurse is to deliver to the beloved: "Oh you who are present but so far, where are you? You're not with me, only where are you? My two eyes have light through you, my heart has tidings of you. Oh come and make eye and heart your guest! But if you wish not to, then take my life with the sword! From all this kingly wealth only half a life is still mine. Why shouldn't I sacrifice this half-life for your sake? For without you a hundred lives are worth nothing to me. You've stolen my heart, and if I had a thousand lives, I'd scatter them to the wind for your sake... Without your face neither heart nor faith in God remained to me. Why should you cause such confusion in me? I saw you, saw that you have no peer. If you come to me, I'm delivered, and if you don't, I'll set out and seek you with a lamp in the mountains and fields. If you appear before me like a candle... if not, then consider me extinguished like the lamp!"

She includes a picture of herself in the letter. The wet-nurse brings the letter to Bektash who's deeply moved by it and becomes gripped with love and yearning for the author. He assures her of his reciprocal love through the wet-nurse. The maiden is delighted and now sends her beloved countless poems.

One day by chance he meets her in an entrance hall to the palace. He recognizes her and clasps the hem of her robe. In a rage she shouts at him: "What im-

pudence, you shameless one! You're no more than a fox, how can you presume to occupy the lion's position? Who are you that you dare to touch my hem?" The slave answers: "Oh you for whom I'm only a speck of dust on your street, why do you cover your face before me? Why have you sent me poems day and night? Why have you driven me mad, if you now wish to treat me as a stranger?" She replies that her love is mystical, that he has merely been the medium which triggers this love, "the pretext", whereas he has sensual desires.—Shaykh Abū Saᶜīd was in Balkh and inquired after the daughter of Kaᶜb. It was clear to him, so ᶜAṭṭār informs us, that her poems were an expression not of earthly but of heavenly love.

She continues to compose poems and one day she sings one of them while walking over the garden meadow. She alludes in the poem to a water-carrier who used to bring her water every day, and she replaces the Turkish slave with him. The brother begins to mistrust her.

One day war breaks out, and Ḥārith departs with his soldiers to do battle. Bektash is also among his warriors. He receives a sword blow on the head and narrowly escapes being captured. Also in the battle ranks, disguised as a knight, is the daughter of Kaᶜb. She springs forth, boasts with proud words about her invincibility in combat, wounds ten enemies, frees Bektash, brings him back and then disappears unrecognized. The ruler of Bukhara comes to Ḥārith's aid, and victory is won. The poetess sends Bektash, who's wounded in the head, a glowing love poem (in which ᶜAṭṭār makes use of all his rhetorical skill in repeating the word *sar* "head"). Bektash is comforted by this poem and set afire with new love.

One day she enters into a poetry contest with the famous Rūdakī. In the course of the contest the latter learns of her love for Bektash. He goes to the court of the ruler of Bukhara. There a festivity is under way at which Ḥārith is also present. The blind poet recites poems by the Daughter of Kaᶜb, and when he's asked who composed the poems, he reveals the love affair between her and Bektash. Ḥārith is beside himself but doesn't let his feelings show. After his return home, however, he watches his sister all the more closely so he can catch her. He succeeds at this only too soon. Bektash has kept in a little box the poems Ḥārith's sister sent him. A friend of his opens the box thinking it contains pearls, finds the letters and hands them over to Ḥārith who now carries out his plan to kill his sister. First he has Bektash arrested and held prisoner in a well, then he has the sister locked in a bath with her veins opened. When the bath is unlocked again, they find the corpse of the poetess who has bled to death. But everywhere the walls of the bath are covered with poems written in blood. Bektash manages to escape. He kills Ḥārith and then kills himself at the beloved's grave. (IN 21/1, pp. 330-52).

In the Islamic world up until recent times it was still customary for brothers to kill a sister who had committed an offense.

According to ᶜAwfī, *Lubāb* 2/61, the actual name of the poetess is Rābiᶜa bint Kaᶜb al-Quzdārī. Quzdār is a city in Baluchistan, called Khuzdār today. (Minorsky, *Ḥudūd al-ᶜālam 'The Regions of the World'*, translated, p. 373; Le Strange, *The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate*, Cambridge 1905, p. 331; Yāqūt, *Muᶜjam al-buldān* s.n.). Riḍā Qulī Khān maintains in *Majmaᶜ al-fuṣaḥā᾿* 1/222 that her father, an Arab, ruled over Balkh, Quzdār and Bust, which is scarcely believable. Here it is a question of a local ruler of Quzdār about whom nothing has been transmitted by the historians. That Balkh was the capital of his realm is perhaps an invention of ᶜAṭṭār. In the *Muᶜjam fī maᶜāyīr ashᶜār al-ᶜAjam* p. 121, a verse of hers is preserved and several of her verses are found in the *Lubāb* of ᶜAwfī 2/61-62, in Ms. British Museum 27.261, fol. 161a, and in the *Majmaᶜ al-fuṣaḥā᾿* 1/222. She also composed *Mulammaᶜāt*, i.e. poems half in Persian and half in Arabic. According to ᶜAwfī, she was *shāhidbāz* (see 26/8 below), i.e. she revered heavenly beauty in earthly beauty which agrees with Abū Saᶜīd's statement in ᶜAṭṭār. She was referred to as "the Iron Fly" because of the following verse: "They report that locusts with golden heads rained down from the sky on Job. If golden locusts rained down on him because of his patience, it would then be fair if an iron fly rained down on me." What Jāmī has to say about her in the *Nafaḥāt*, in the chapter on women poets, apparently goes back to ᶜAṭṭār. Riḍā Quli Khān was inspired to produce his epic entitled *Gulistān-i Iram* by ᶜAṭṭār's account of her tragic end. (*Majmaᶜ al-fuṣaḥā᾿* 1/222).

A criticism of sensual love (I), despite its function to produce descendants (II), is expressed in the king's conversation with his son in the *Ilāhīnāma*. The father has rebuked the prince for worshipping lust (*shahwatparastī*). In reply to his father's reproaches the prince says: "Without sensual ties between man and woman, neither you nor I would be in the world (II)." The father acknowledges his objection but assigns sensual love the low place in the hierarchy which it deserves according to ᶜAṭṭār and at the same time holds up to his view the higher form of love. Furthermore, another, higher form of association exists, association with Jesus. This association can endure for eternity, whereas that between man and woman only lasts for a moment. And again the purpose of sensuality is not the kind of association between man and woman that the son has in mind. The sensual instinct is there in order to produce the higher form of love (*ᶜishq*) (V). Out of *ᶜishq* there develops the still higher form of *maḥabba* which leads to extinction in the beloved. To die for or through the beloved is worth more than the sensual instinct. (IN 2/0, pp. 47-48). There follows the story about the woman who, condemned to death because of her love for a prince, wants to have herself dragged to death by her beloved's horse. (See the next chapter).

Thus ᶜAṭṭār places the higher form of V above I, II and III. This is justified on the grounds that only V is capable of leading

one on to pure love of God (VII) and can serve as the symbol for such love.

In a story which is related to the Alexius legend an open conflict occurs between III and VII. God's absolute claim on the emotional life of a lover of God tolerates no other emotional ties.

Shaykh Murtaᶜish at first sight falls in love with a girl who gives him a sip of water to drink. The father gives the girl to him in marriage. But on the wedding night Murtaᶜish suddenly lets out a shout, demands his ascetic robe again which he had exchanged for wedding clothes, pronounces the formula of divorce and walks away. He heard a voice in his heart which said to him: "For the sake of one glance which you cast on a creature other than Me, I've removed the garment of the pious from your external body. At the second glance, We'll tear away the garment of acquaintance (knowledge of God, *āshnāʾī*) from your internal body." (TA 2/86).

After the speech of the king the prince repeats his objections, only this time he places more in the foreground the happiness of having children. The son keeps alive the memory of the father and on the Final Day undertakes intercession on his behalf. To this objection the father answers: "For the beginner on the religious path it's dangerous to have children. They draw the father away from knowledge of God. Abraham acts in an exemplary way when he's ordered to sacrifice his son for the sake of God." (IN 3/0, p. 59). Providing food and clothing for his wife and child also makes too great a demand on him.

Ibrāhīm ibn Adham asks a dervish: "Do you have a wife?" The dervish says: "No." Ibrāhīm: "Do you have children?" The dervish: "No." Then Ibrāhīm says: "That's very good." The dervish asks: "Why?" Ibrāhīm answers: "The dervish who takes a wife is like a man who sits on a ship. When a child arrives as well, he sinks in the water." (IN 3/1, p. 60; TA 1/93$_{3\text{-}6}$).

The conflict between II and VII becomes more clear in another story:

When the prince Ibrāhīm ibn Adham fled from Balkh in order to devote himself to an ascetic life, he left behind a wife and a son who was a suckling babe. When the son grows up, he wants to see his father. The royal mother sets out with the son to make the pilgrimage to Mecca. There they meet the father surrounded by his disciples in the poorest circumstances. Ibrāhīm recognizes his son, asks him whether he's a Muhammadan and has learned the Koran and religious science. He's then about to go off. But the boy clings to him and doesn't want to let him leave. Ibrāhīm raises his eyes to heaven and says: "Help me!" Thereupon the boy dies in his father's arms. He explains to his companions: "When I sat the boy on my lap, love for him arose in my heart. Then I heard a voice call: 'Oh Ibrāhīm! You claim to love Us and you love someone else along

with Us?'"—Ibrāhīm ibn Adham sacrificed the son like the other Ibrāhīm (Abraham) did before him. (Recounted with many touching details in TA 1/90-92).

Qushayrī *Taḥbīr*; *Rawḍ al-rayāḥīn* no. 85. A similar story about Sumnūn in TA 2/83$_{7\text{-}20}$. The beginnings of such attitudes in the Koran are dealt with by Charles C. Torrey, "A Strange Reading in the Qur'ān" in: *Ignace Goldziher Memorial Volume* I, Budapest 1949, pp. 39-45.

In the conversation between the king and the first prince the subject of "having children" is spun out for some time. Providing for the child compels one to do improper things which one would otherwise shun. As an illustration of how an ascetic is forced by a child to give up his way of life, ᶜAṭṭār relates the story about Gurgānī and the cat which steals meat from the kitchen to feed her young. (IN 3/2; above p. 338).

Only God, the childless, is free of such attachments. This is illustrated by the story about the Christian who recognizes that the Muhammadans are right in their claim that God has no children (IN 3/3), and the other story about the Muhammadan who, when his son dies, calls out to God: "You're excused! Indeed, You have no children and don't know what a father's pain is!" (IN 3/4; above p. 169). What difficult trials the father-son relationship entails is also demonstrated in the story about Jacob and Joseph.

After they're reunited, Jacob reproaches Joseph for not having written him a letter during the whole time of their separation. Joseph then has his servant bring a bundle of thousands of letters which he had written to his father. Nothing remains to be seen in them except the beginning: "In the name of God", the rest of the page is as white as snow. Gabriel forbade him to write letters to his father. Were he to do so, Gabriel told him, the writing would disappear and the page would become as white as snow. God didn't want the correspondence. (Cf. Thaᶜlabī, 87$_{21\text{-}26}$).—If you have a son like Joseph, you'll always have cares like Jacob. If you're a son, your father causes you pain. If you're a father, the son causes you pain. (IN 3/5, pp. 64-65).

The Joseph story is the classical sentimental family romance of the Jews and Muhammadans. This emotional sentimentality is especially intense in the following story, in which alongside love between father and son love between brothers also appears.

When Joseph receives his brothers in Egypt, he sits Benjamin, who has no idea whom he's dealing with, on a golden throne and asks him about his father Jacob. Benjamin shows him a letter in which Jacob expresses his grief. Joseph goes to his family in the inner chambers where the letter is read with many tears. Then he returns to the brothers. He seats them in pairs at separate tables. Only Benjamin is left alone and he weeps bitterly, recalling his distant brother. Asked

why he's weeping, he explains the reason to Joseph. Joseph says he should console himself and assume that his host is his lost brother. He wishes to eat with him from the same bowl. The chief steward then points out to Joseph that Benjamin's bowl is already full of blood from his weeping. Joseph indulges in lengthy reflections about this blood. The brothers attempt to make excuses for Benjamin: he's still young and isn't familiar with the rules of etiquette for associating with kings. Now Joseph converses with the brother and asks him why he looks so grieved. Benjamin answers: because he has lost his brother and his mother has died. Joseph asks him about his father. Benjamin informs him of the old man's grief and relates how he presses him, Benjamin, to his heart when he recalls Joseph, and how he's forever weeping. Joseph weeps so much that the veil, which he's still wearing, becomes drenched with tears. Finally, Gabriel transmits to him the order to remove his veil. When Benjamin now sees the face of his host, he lets out a shout and falls unconscious. When, with great difficulty, they bring him back to his senses and ask why he was so upset, he answers: "You resemble Joseph so much that one could think you're really him. I must have seen you once before. But if you're Joseph, why do you torment me so?"—(For ᶜAṭṭār the hint of recognition is at the same time a symbol for man's secret primeval acquaintance with God [*āshnāʾī*]. We shall have more to say about this later). (IN 3/6, pp. 65-68. The source of the story is Thaᶜlabī $82_{6ff.}$).

3

Islamic domestic slavery (above pp. 307 ff.) has been judged more favorably by those who observed it than slavery on American plantations for instance. If one bears in mind that very many caliphs were the sons of female slaves, that slaves in Persia and Egypt managed to attain the highest government offices, that in the old Ottoman empire a considerable part of the higher bureaucracy stood in the relation of a slave to the sultan and, moveover, if one takes into account that a Muslim conceives of his own relation to God as one of a slave to his master (above pp. 289 f.), one will understand that the status of slave in the Islamic Orient was not unconditionally and always a status of oppressed pariahs who were excluded from society and every form of social advancement.

More recently Snouck-Hurgronje in particular has contributed to the revision of views concerning the slave's status in the Islamic Orient. On the literature and on the legal and social position of the slave in Islam see the article by Juynboll in the EI s.v. "ᶜAbd" and that of Brunschvig in the second edition; A. Mez, *Die Renaissance des Islāms*, Heidelberg 1922, chpt. 11; von Grunebaum, *Medieval Islam* 176. On the development of a religious ethical awareness regarding the relationship cf. *Elixir* 134-35.

Furthermore, male and female slaves in innumberable stories and poems are the object of the highest passionate love. It can happen that the master, out of economic necessity, sells a male or female slave, and both parties feel deeply unhappy because of this.

Sharīshī 2/117-18; a complete romance based on this subject: *"Ḥadīth Ṭalḥa b. Qāḍī Miṣr wa-mā tamma lahū maʿa jāriyatihī Tuḥfa"* in: *al-Ḥikāyāt al-ʿajība wa'l-akhbār al-gharība* 25-44. See also the story from *Ṭawq al-ḥamāma* p. 405 below.

ʿAṭṭār also tells a story about how a female slave, whose master wishes to sell her out of economic necessity, is inconsolable because she must leave her master.

ʿAbd Allāh ibn Masʿūd, because of lack of money, is forced to sell his well-tried, faithful female slave. He says to her: "Go and dress yourself properly, bathe and comb your hair, for I must sell you—necessity forces me to do so." The slave woman does as she is told but when she notices, while combing her hair, that many of her hairs have turned white, she begins to weep bitterly. When ʿAbd Allāh sees this, he says: "Don't cry. I promise not to sell you!" The slave woman replies: "I'm not weeping because I could be sold by you but because I'm rejected by a master in whose service I've grown grey. Why have I sacrificed my youth to a master who in the end sells me? Why have I faithfully served in a house where the reward for my service is only to be sold?" Then Gabriel becomes involved and has the Prophet tell ʿAbd Allāh that he should bestow freedom on the slave woman whose hair has grown grey in Islam. (IN *Khātima*/13, pp. 381-82).—(ʿAṭṭār does not, of course, recount the story in order to describe the slave woman's fidelity. Cf. above p. 281).

As mentioned, it also happens that for one reason or another a man actually sells a female slave he is in love with, becomes extremely unhappy because of this and tries to buy her back, sometimes with success, sometimes without.

An example recounted by Mubarrad occurs in *Rawḍat al-muḥibbīn* 413-14. Ghazzālī treats the subject in *Iḥyāʾ* 4/176 top, *Bayān faḍīlat al-faqr*; *Stufen* 426/D.56.

A rich merchant sells a beautiful slave woman, regrets having sold her, and offers the buyer an enormous sum to get her back again. But the new master won't hand her over. The merchant becomes utterly distraught and reproaches himself bitterly for his foolishness. (MṬ 25/2, p. 87).—(ʿAṭṭār tells the story to illustrate that love of ephemeral creatures one must lose only leads to unhappiness, and that it is better to love God who does not pass away).

In urban society, a relationship of free emotional love often arose for another person's female slaves, especially for those with gifts for poetry and a training in music who, since they went

about unveiled, were more accessible to view than the rather strictly secluded and veiled free women and girls.

Jāḥiẓ, *al-Nisā*ʾ, in the margin of Mubarrad's *Kāmil*, 1/162.—Love stories involving slave women are found in great quantity in Arabic literature. To name only a few places: *Maṣāri*ᶜ *al-*ᶜ*ushshāq* 69, 75, 106-07; *Tazyīn al-aswāq* 1/140 ff.; *Rawḍat al-muḥibbīn* 246, 416; *Iḥyā*ʾ 4/300; *Elixir* 175.

4

Love between men and youths as a community-building bond of sociological and pedagogical significance (IVa) can be recognized in the Islamic *futuwwa*-associations and their Anatolian variant, the Akhī-associations, as well as in the dervish orders but, being an offspring of non-Semitic origin, it is not acknowledged as a binding force of this kind, either legally or theoretically. On the contrary, frequently we can only infer that this form of love is present in the associations in question because of the vehement polemic directed against it by the law-revering orthodoxy. In ᶜAṭṭār's works these associations are never mentioned and consequently we have no reason to delve further into the subject. On the other hand, later, because of its significance for VI, we shall have occasion to examine the characteristic practice in many Ṣūfī circles of gathering for a musical event and then communally gazing upon the beauty of a youth who has been especially adorned for this purpose as a *shāhid* (26/8), whose beauty in their eyes represents the beauty of God—a practice whose worldly counterpart, enjoying communally the dancing of good-looking boys and youths, still lives on here and there in Islamic countries.

Love relationships between masters and male slaves (IVb) are quite frequently attested. In many cases there is as little cause for doubting the sincerity and depth of this love, as there is in the case of love for female slaves. The first of two verses by the Būyid vizier Ibn al-ᶜAmīd which serve as a school example for a rhetorical figure they contain, and are on behalf of a male slave who blocks the sun from him while he reads letters, begins: "A soul shades me from the sun, who is more dear to me than my own soul (my own life)" (*Asrār al-balāgha* ed. H. Ritter, p. 280), and the Maḥmūd-Ayāz stories, which we shall become acquainted with, likewise presuppose a genuine, noble love between master and slave. The beloved who is idolized in the *ghazal*s of Persian poets, "the Turk", should in very many cases be conceived of as unfree.

Here as well one deeply regrets it if one has given away a beloved male slave, and likewise one falls in love with other people's male slaves.

Cf. for example *Tazyīn al-aswāq* 2/20, 21-24. Less noble stories are contained, for instance, in the biography of the poet Abū Tammām.

A story of this kind has been included in ᶜAṭṭār's *Ilāhīnāma*. It is the dreadful story about Fakhr al-Dīn Gurgānī, the poet of the Persian epic *Wēs u Rāmīn*, and the *amīr*'s slave who was given to him.

The poet Fakhr al-Dīn Gurgānī falls in love with a slave of the ruler of Gurgān at whose court he lives. During a wine-drinking party the ruler notices that the poet is in love with his slave and bestows the slave on him. Fakhr al-Dīn is extremely happy, but doesn't dare take the slave home because he fears that the next day the ruler will regret the gift he made while intoxicated. He has the slave sleep in a vault, lights two candles in his honor, locks up the vault and hands over the key to the court attendants. If the next day the ruler confirms the gift, he'll take the slave home, if not, he's safe from any suspicion which could arouse the prince's jealousy. The next day the prince confirms the gift. But when Fakhr al-Dīn, highly pleased, rushes to the vault, he finds the slave burnt to death. The candles had fallen over and the unfortunate youth in his deep drunken sleep hadn't noticed in time that his bedding was on fire. In insane grief the poet afterwards writes a great epic. (IN 6/4, pp. 103-07).

Genuine love inwardly annuls the slave relationship, in fact reverses it. V comes into conflict with IVc.

Aḥmad Ghazzālī discusses the subject in the *Sawāniḥ*.

Cf. also *Wāḍiḥ* 1/54-55.

If for instance you should fall into the error of thinking the lover can be an owner and the beloved a possession (*mamlūk*) such that the former when they're together might lie in the arms of the latter, this is a great error indeed. Because genuine love places a collar of honor around the beloved's neck and removes the ear-ring of slavery. For the beloved can never become a possession. (*Faṣl* 44/2).

The same lesson occurs as a banal everyday item of wisdom in Saᶜdī, *Gulistān*, *Bāb* 5, the story.

In another passage Aḥmad Ghazzālī has Ayāz impart a similar lesson to Maḥmūd.

Maḥmūd is sitting together with Ayāz one day. Maḥmūd says: "Oh Ayāz! The more I suffer for you and the more perfect my love for you becomes, the more foreign you become to me. Why is this so? ...Oh Ayāz! I want that intimacy and bold frankness again that existed between us before this love, when there were still no barriers between us. Now everything is one barrier after another. Why is this so?" Ayāz answers: "At that time my part was lowliness and slavery, and

your part the power and majesty of dominion. Then came the chariot of love and undid the fetters of a slave's status. And when they became undone, then the freedom in behavior that the owner has toward his property, the slave, disappeared, and the true relationship of lover and beloved was established. But to be a lover means to be a prisoner (slave), to be a beloved to be a master. How can there be bold behavior between master and slave, etc.?" (*Sawāniḥ*, *Faṣl* 61/2).

In ᶜAṭṭār, Ayāz, who is well aware of the power he has over the sultan's heart, gives similar lessons to Maḥmūd but in a polite, refined form and through images and parables.

One evening Maḥmūd sets free a great number of slaves and asks Ayāz whether he should also set him free. Ayāz takes hold of his locks of hair and says: "First set yourself free from these fetters!" (MN 37/8).

Maḥmūd one day asks Ayāz: "Do you know any king who's greater and more powerful than I am?" The slave answers: "Yes. I'm a greater king than you." Maḥmūd asks: "What reason do you have for saying this?" Ayāz answers: "Why do you ask? You know it yourself. You're king alright, but your king is your heart. And I'm king over your heart. The sky itself must envy me for my high rank. Because I'm forever king over the king." (IN 14/11, p. 229).

With this story ᶜAṭṭār wishes to illustrate "the miracles of the heart". To amplify the theme "the importance of the heart" he uses the story of the fox in the trap which comes from the *Sindbādnāma*:

A fox, which has entered the trap, pretends to be dead in the hope of becoming free in this way. The hunter arrives, believes the trapped animal is really dead, and cuts off its ear. The fox doesn't move: better to be without an ear than dead. Then someone else comes and cuts out its tongue. The fox doesn't move. A third person pulls out its teeth. The fox puts up with this as well: better to be toothless than dead. Finally, someone comes and says: "A fox's heart is a good cure for illnesses." When the fox hears the word "heart", it summons up its last force, tears itself loose and runs away. Because when it comes to the heart, that's a different matter! (IN 14/10, pp. 227-28).

Sindbādnāma 326-29; *1001 Nacht* (Littmann) 4/383; Chauvin 8/64-65, 2/155.

Maḥmūd one night visits the sleeping Ayāz. He uncovers Ayāz's foot, washes it with rose-water and tears, and lays his cheek against it. He goes on doing this through the whole night. When Ayāz wakes up, he finds the sultan lying unconscious on the floor with his, Ayāz's, foot on his face. He doesn't withdraw his foot. When the sultan wakes up, he finds the behavior of his slave inappropriate. However, Ayāz answers: "You didn't come to me as a king but as a slave, and you rendered me a slave's service. Your heart was fed up with being master, that's why it made you become a bondsman. Settle this matter with your heart. Stand up, for slavery doesn't suit you! I'm the slave, not the sultan." (MN 52/5).

The story is found in a variant form in Hilālī's *Ṣifat al-ᶜāshiqīn*.

The story appears in Ibn ᶜArabī with a somewhat different twist. Ibn ᶜArabī explains with subtle observation that the lover, the person in love, actually loves his own feelings, and all his striving is in fact on behalf of himself (*al-muḥibbu fī ḥaqqi nafsihī yasᶜā*). In connection with this he relates:

A king had a slave whom he loved, by the name of Ayās. Once one of his courtiers entered and saw the king holding the slave's feet in his lap and carressing them. The courtier was astonished at this. But Ayās said: "These are not Ayās's feet. This is the heart of the king which he has in his lap and is caressing." (*Futūḥāt*, Cairo 1329, 2/353, *Bāb* 178).

In another Ayāz-Maḥmūd story the roles are reversed:

Throw yourself at his feet! Perhaps the beloved will then lift you out of the dust.

Maḥmūd one time asks Ayāz what he's most jealous of in the whole world. The slave replies: "Of that stone you use to rub down your foot, because it can press its cheek against your foot. I would esteem myself lucky if my cheek were continually the place where your foot stood." (IN 20/11, p. 328).

The internal annulment of slavery by way of love is again expressed in the following stories through Ayāz's mouth:

Maḥmūd invites Ayāz to go hunting. The slave answers: "I've already caught my game." The sultan asks: "What kind of game is that?" Ayāz: "It's called Maḥmūd." The sultan: "What did you catch it with?" Ayāz: "With the lasso of my locks." Maḥmūd is annoyed by this answer, orders Ayāz to be bound with a lasso and says to him: "Which of us two is caught in the lasso now?" Ayāz says: "Even if you throw me in eternal prison and even if you shed my blood, you'll always remain my bagged game. It's not a question of the body but of the heart. Your heart has entered into my net. You can kill me but I'll drink the blood of your heart, whether I'm there or not. So I'm the heart-stealer, the ruler, the king, etc." (IN 7/18, pp. 125-26).—(With this story ᶜAṭṭār wishes to illustrate that the lover may be sure of the beloved because the beloved has need of the lover. We shall discuss this motif later on.)

With regard to the lasso, it is worth noting that metaphors taken from the military sphere are especially frequent in Persian love poetry. The eyebrow is a bow, the eyelashes are arrows, the locks a lasso used as a chain for those gone mad in love, etc. This is the case apparently because the objects of love were chiefly young soldiers, military slaves.

When Maḥmūd wishes to assert his rights of master over his slave, he makes himself guilty of a serious offense against the commandments of love.

Maḥmūd one time becomes angry with Ayāz, calls the vizier Ḥasan to consult with him about whether he should imprison the slave, kill him, set him free or drive him away. Ḥasan's advice is to sell him. That would certainly be the worst

punishment for him. Ayāz is brought to the marketplace and a buyer acquires him for a thousand pieces of gold. After a few days Maḥmūd feels regret, has the buyer brought to him and shouts at him: "You've dared to buy the king's favorite! Whoever does that is worthy of death!" Then Ayāz becomes involved in the discussion and says: "Whoever buys the beloved is worthy of death. Then tell me, oh shah, what does someone deserve who sells the beloved?" (MN 39/3).

Ayāz is proud that he has bagged game like Maḥmūd, and for this reason he remains true to his master:

On his deathbed Maḥmūd asks Ayāz not to serve any other master after him. For the sultan's love as well will remain unchanged for eternity. Ayāz answers: "How could I, who have hunted game like Maḥmūd, lower myself to the level of serving anyone else?" (In 8/6, p. 133).

The Ayāz of these stories is one of the few *amati* of Persian literature who display individual traits. Of course, this individuality for the most part was originally a literary creation. Maḥmūd and Ayāz have become the literary ideal type for the exemplary relationship between master and slave, as in the case with Majnūn for a love of women which becomes intensified to the point of monomania, Ḥātim Ṭāʾī for extreme generosity, ʿUmar Khayyām for a particular pessimistic attitude toward life, etc. In discussing love's individual aspects and forms of manifestation in the next sections, we shall have occasion to encounter this famous love pair quite frequently.

We shall become acquainted further below (pp. 391 f.) with an example of voluntary slavery due to love.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE

EARTHLY LOVE AS FREE EMOTION

The conception of love we encounter in ᶜAṭṭār's worldly love stories differs considerably from that which appears in old Arabic poetry, i.e. in the gallant love adventures of the aristocratic Arab world of pre-Islamic times (e.g. Imraᵓ al-Qays) or of the Umayyad period (e.g. ᶜUmar ibn Abī Rabīᶜa); and no less so from the sentimental effusions which were commonplace in Baghdad circles of the later caliphate, and the anacreontic poetry of the feudal period of the Sāmānids and the following centuries. Similarly, his conception of love differs from the "bourgeois" version of this anacreontic poetry whose representatives (*rindī*-poets), being more exposed to the criticism of law-revering circles than was the feudal class, seek forbidden drink and the beloved wine-pourer in Magian wine-taverns in the ruins outside the city, are obliged to defend their mode of life against the moralists, and oppose to the moralists' views an ideal of free enjoyment of life which had perhaps been developed by the *qalandar* dervishes. But the atmosphere of the famous book on love *The Dove's Neck-Ring* by the Andalusian Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064) is also different from the world of ᶜAṭṭār. Here a person of great humanity speaks who, from clear observation of reality and personal experience, knows the heights and depths of the human soul, the tribulations of the human heart, its joy and its suffering, who praises one kind of behavior of lovers and reproaches another, examines the causes of love and describes their strongest forms, but also enters into the reasons for love's decline and exhibits understanding for this as well; all in all a man who has taken up a stance outside the magic circle of passion and passes judgements as an informed connoisseur. (Cf. *Sawāniḥ* pp. II-III).

ᶜAṭṭār in his stories is not out to depict various empirically attested experiences of the human heart in order then to pronounce judgement on the behavior of the subjects and objects of these experiences. His stories are allegorical and serve solely to proclaim a unique love which alone deserves the name, a love for

which relief from the violence of emotion, deliverance from the fire of passion, is not a consideration, for which there is only the path forward, whose end, the annihilation of the ego, is not a limit to be avoided but the real goal, or not that either, but a transitional stage to a new form in which the ego is extinguished and after the command "Die!" a new existence arises on an entirely different basis.

On love in general see AN 5 and MṬ 39/0, p. 132, where the second valley which the birds must travel through is described.

Consequently, the type of sentimental love which would most readily be comparable, the type of ᶜUdhrite love involving death from a broken heart, is also ultimately different from ᶜAṭṭār's world of ideas. In the stories which belong to that category people recount sad, tragic events which they have witnessed without any other emotions being expressed than a deep feeling of sympathy for the victim of passion and amazement at the power of an emotion which is capable of driving flourishing youth into death's arms.

In ᶜAṭṭār the inborn yearning of human beings to surrender to undiluted feeling in its absolute intensity, to sink utterly into a sea of sensation and allow it to submerge consciousness of individual personality, indeed even life itself, breaks through in an entirely different manner. Total surrender to love in ᶜAṭṭār is not so much an object of observation and amazed contemplation, but rather an ideal requirement whose fulfilment alone supports one's claim to the title of true, genuine lover. Only the writings of the mystics strike chords which one again hears in ᶜAṭṭār. The mystics are in fact the great virtuosos of feeling, psychic states, internal attitudes, and at the same time professional investigators and interpreters of these. They were also the first to create a language by means of which a richer and more differentiated psychic life could be expressed.

Love of a visible person is for them always parallel to love of God who is invisible or only appears in the heart, the highest and in their view the only object worthy of love. The rules of love are for the most part the same whether it is a question of a human or superhuman object of love. In fact, Aḥmad Ghazzālī explicitly rejects making a choice between the two. (*Sawāniḥ* p. I).

This constant parallelism brings about in earthly love a far-reaching internalization, spiritualization or process of ethereal transformation of love's emotion, and its elevation above everything animal. In the case of heavenly love, it signifies an intensi-

fication of fervor and emotional warmth which are not attained by the ascetic and law-revering performer of pious works.

The conception of love of the mystics finds its first worldly ideal type in the famous monomaniac lover of the Umayyad period, Majnūn of the Banū ᶜĀmir.

On him now cf. the monograph in Russian by I. Krachkovsky, "The Early History of the Tale of Majnūn and Laylā in Arabic Literature"; it has also appeared in German translation in *Oriens* 8/1955/1-50.

In him were found traits which corresponded to the ideals of the mystics: the soul's being completely filled with an object of extreme love and the internalization of the emotion of love, i.e. detachment from everything "external" and the construction of an inner psychic world of love which was independent of the visibility of its object, Laylā, and her perceptible presence. In this way Majnūn became the model and ideal of mystical love.

...Someone saw Majnūn of the Banū ᶜĀmir in a dream and asked him: "What has God the Sublime done with you?" He said: "He has forgiven me and made me the ideal for lovers." (Qushayrī, *Risāla* p. 145, *Bāb al-maḥabba*; *Sendschreiben* 444/48.9).

...*jaᶜalanī ḥujjatan ᶜalā'l-muḥibbīn*, which actually means: "He made me the proof which one can display before the lovers (of God)."

Later on Maḥmūd and Ayāz were added to this love couple. In their case the roles appear strangely reversed. Whereas with the couple Majnūn and Laylā the figure of the beloved recedes into the background and the lover, Majnūn, attracts the main interest, and through him the symptoms and rules of love are demonstrated, in the case of the couple Maḥmūd and Ayāz it is from the beloved slave that love's rules are to be learned and these are chiefly presented through the refined answers and instructions which he gives to his royal lover. In addition his status as a slave gave the narrator the opportunity to treat allegorically many didactic themes concerning the proper attitude of the mystic toward God, his relationship with God in fact being that of a slave to his master. We shall frequently encounter both these love couples in what follows below. It goes without saying that the stories related about the two couples only have very little in common with the actual historical persons. Certain signs would indicate that stories of this kind arose in circles of mystical folk-preachers, to which Aḥmad Ghazzālī belonged as well.

Along with these two famous love couples a great number of other such couples also appear in ᶜAṭṭār. He took his stories from

the most varied sources which are only rarely known to us. What he invented himself, or how he may have reworked the models he had before him, can only be judged in cases where we know the earlier versions of the stories. He almost always reshaped his original models to some degree, often conferring on them an epic breadth—which results in a strong stylistic contrast with the Arabic stories which are related with a minimum of words of the greatest terseness—and at times extending them in length and supplementing them, often with forms of extreme intensification.

1

Inborn in man is a yearning for powerful, undiluted feelings. Total immersion in a sea of feeling means for him a rare or never attained state of happiness. What life denies him, he seeks in his fantasy and its creations, poetry and art for instance. And it is certainly one of art's functions to make the undiluted experience of emotion possible for man without danger. For after all, total involvement in emotion to the utmost extent can lead to the destruction of life itself. On the other hand, it is precisely the mystics who actually endeavor systematically to intensify in the extreme their feelings and their psychic experiences. They in fact outdo themselves in pushing forward their spiritual attitudes to the most extreme consequences. In this way their utterances often take on that characteristic quality of exaggeration, of hyper-intensity, but of grandeur as well, which raises them above the speech of the simple, ordinary person.

Thus ᶜAṭṭār's lovers as well are strangers to any form of compromise. They will not sidestep love's absolute demand, even if love's path leads them to destruction—just as the moth does not recoil from the beloved flame which means death for him. And their title to glory consists precisely in this.

But let us turn to the stories themselves.

The classical story of yearning to be completely overwhelmed by the emotion of love is the story about Majnūn at the Kaᶜba. He does not pray for the quenching of his destructive passion but, on the contrary, for its highest intensification.

Majnūn's father brings his love-sick son to the Kaᶜba so he may there pray for release from his hopeless passion for Laylā. But instead Majnūn prays that God make his love a hundred times greater than it is now. (MN 30/9).

Aghānī, 3rd printing, 2/21-22; Niẓāmī, *Laylī u Majnūn*, Tehran 1313, 79-81.

When you have love, ask Him for still more! Don't ever let this hem slip from your hand! Old love wants new love. (MṬ 33/3, p. 113 at the end, transition to 33/4).

Amplification:

A water vendor asks another water vendor for a drink of water. The other says in surprise: "You have the same water yourself! Why do you want water from me?" The first man answers: "But just give me some of your water! I'm fed up with my own water."—ᶜAṭṭār goes on, freely adding at the end: "In this way the heart of Adam became sated with the old (Paradise) and gave it away for the (new) grain of wheat." (MṬ 33/4, p. 113. Cf. pp. 540 f. below).

Love burns like fire. Lovers are deserving of pity.

Yaḥyā ibn Muᶜādh says: "If I were given Hell, I wouldn't leave any lover burning in it because the lover has already burned enough." A person replies: "But in some circumstances the lover commits many sins. Won't you leave such a one to burn either?" The shaykh replies: "No. Because this sin is not committed voluntarily. What the lover does, he does unwillingly under compulsion, out of immense love. One shouldn't rebuke him and let him burn in Hell." (MN 37/4; TA 1/301).

The worldly poet, Muᵓammal ibn Umayl, a contemporary of the caliph Mahdī, thinks the same way: "Their torment in this world is enough for lovers. By God, Hell-fire shouldn't torment them afterwards as well!"

Yakfī'l-muḥibbīna fī'l-dunyā ᶜadhābuhumū wa'llāhi lā ᶜadhdhabathum baᶜdahā Saqaru. (*Khizānat al-adab*, *shāhid* 629).

No fire, no glowing coal, can burn with such heat as love. The fire of a glowing coal is extinguished before love's heat.

Someone visits Majnūn who in the desert, during hottest summer, is sitting in front of a burning fire. A visitor asks him: "What have you heard from Laylā?" He answers: "The news I have from her is that she doesn't know what torment I'm undergoing." Having said this, he holds glowing coals in his hand until they turn to ashes. (MN 32/13).

Perhaps a bold reworking of *Aghānī*, 3rd printing, 2/325-8; O. Rescher, *Abriss* 1/212.

When Joseph rides out to meet his father who wishes to visit him, Zulaykhā is sitting on the road. He sees her and shakes his whip at her. She lets out a woeful sigh with such fiery breath that the whip begins to burn, and Joseph has to throw it away. Zulaykhā then says: "I've had this fire in my soul for years. You can't even bear its breath on your hand! And you're a man, whereas I'm a woman!" (MN 32/4).

2

There are, of course, people who know nothing of love. They are to be considered similar to animals.

In Ghazna there lives a famous preacher named Ibn (*maywa-i*) ᶜAbd al-Salām, to whose sermons the people stream in such large groups that if someone has lost something, he goes there to ask whether anyone has found it. One time the preacher is talking about love. A man then comes in and asks whether anyone has perhaps seen his run-away donkey. The preacher tells him to have patience and continues with his sermon. "Is anyone here", he asks, "who has never felt any trace of love?" A silly fool who doesn't realize this is a rhetorical question stands up. The preacher calls to the man who lost his donkey: "Bring the bridle. Here's the donkey you're looking for!" (MN 9/4).

ᶜIrāqī, *Dah faṣl* in *Kulliyyāt* 229-30, printed in A. Tarzî and A. Ateş, *Farsça grameri*, Istanbul 1942, pp. 189-91. In this connection cf. the verse recited by Shaᶜbī in Nuwayrī 2/139.

But there are animals that know quite a lot about love. Sumnūn is giving a sermon speaking before an assembly about love. A little bird enters the room, flies toward him and comes very close until it finally sits on his hand. Then it strikes the earth with its beak until its blood begins to flow and it dies. (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 146, *Bāb al-maḥabba*; *Sendschreiben* 447/48.12; *Iḥyāᵓ* 4/308, *Khātimat kitāb al-maḥabba*; *Stufen* 764/F.330; *Futūḥāt* 2/346; TA 2/83). A pigeon dies when it sees its mate slaughtered by a hunter. (*Futūḥāt* 2/236). In addition *Tazyīn al-aswāq* 2/31-35. We shall hear of still other animals that experience love.

Only a few people have understanding of the suffering of love.

Majnūn says: "Only one woman has done justice by me. She came to me while I was sitting on the ground in blood and asked me why I was so miserable. I said: 'I saw Laylā and have exchanged my reason for misery. Love for her has caused me to be in this state.' Then she said: 'I was just with Laylā and, indeed, her beauty is so great that you must become still more miserable and you must die.'" (IN 14/9, pp. 226-27).

A man in Cairo says: "It's not amazing that those in love die because of love's grief. The only thing that's amazing is that they live." (IN 6/3, p. 103).

ᶜUmar has no understanding of the emotion of love, but the Prophet certainly does.

ᶜUmar has concluded a victorious campaign against the infidels. The prisoners are given the choice of accepting Islam or dying. Among the prisoners is also a young man in love who, as often as they ask him to accept the faith, professes belief in love rather than in the true faith. After he has given the same answer three times, ᶜUmar has them chop off his head. When the Prophet hears of this, he reproaches the zealot: "Did you really have the heart to kill the unhappy lover? The suffering of love had already killed him! It's not right to kill again someone who's already been killed." (IN 14/6, p. 223).

Otherwise, ᶜUmar also appears in literature as the typical police inspector regarding III, without any understanding for V. He forbids the *tashbīb* (the love poem) celebrating women (*Irshād al-arīb* 11/10; *Aghānī*, 3rd printing, 4/356), and bans from Medina, after attempting in vain to disfigure him by cutting off his splendid hair, a handsome, completely innocent young man, Naṣr ibn al-Ḥajjāj, simply because a woman had fallen in love with him. (*Khizānat al-adab*, 2nd printing, 4/60-66, *Ḥadīth al-Mutamanniya*; Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt* 1/147-49). Regarding the influence of Islam on people's love life and on love poetry under the Orthodox Caliphs, cf. also A. K. Kinany, *The Development of Gazal in Arabic Literature*, Damascus 1951, pp. 115 ff.

The above story is an elaboration of a *ḥadīth*:

The Prophet sent out a raiding party. They captured booty. Among the prisoners was a man who said to them: "I don't belong to them (the tribe against whom the raid was directed). I love a woman (from among them) and had followed after her. Let her see me one more time and then do with me whatever you wish! On hand was a woman who was quite tall and of dark complexion. He said to her: "Live well now, oh Ḥubaysha, before life is over!" She said: "Yes! Would that I were your ransom money!" Then he was led away and decapitated. The woman then came and threw herself on him, and having sobbed once or twice, she then died. When they came to the Prophet and told him of this, he said: "Was there no merciful man among you?"

Wāḍiḥ 1/142. As sources, Nasāʾī, *Sunan*, and al-Ḥākim, *Mustadrak*, are given. See also the note of the editor. Treated in detail in *Aghānī*, 3rd printing, 7/282-85. The leader of the raiding party is Khālid ibn al-Walīd, the lover ᶜAbd Allāh ibn ᶜAlqama.

God Himself defends the cause of lovers.

Joseph asks God to free him from blind old Zulaykhā who's in love with him. But God sends the message: "I will not take her away, because she loves him who loves Us." (IN 20/7, pp. 323-24; p. 581 below).

3

The lover must achieve certain states of soul that are expected of him and fulfill a series of required duties, if he wishes to become worthy of the name of a sincere lover. The grades of love, its symptoms, as well as the psychic states of lovers, are more or less systematically treated in most of the theoretical works about love.

I have before me in fragmentary form a special Persian work that deals with the duties of the lover and the beloved. The author remains unknown to me, and it is in a recent handwriting on blue paper. I refer to it in what follows as the *Blue Anonymous*.

The first duty of the lover is that he have honorable intentions, remain absolutely true to the beloved and not have eyes for any

other good-looking person. The sword of jealousy watches alertly lest the lover looks around him at others.

A king has Majnūn summoned and presents him with a number of beautiful girls in the hope that when he sees them, he'll forget his insane love for Laylā. Majnūn doesn't deign to look upon the girls, and says: "Love stands upright in my soul with a drawn sword in its hand and threatens to kill me if I cast a glance at anyone but Laylā." (MN 31/2.—Saᶜdī, *Gulistān* 5/18).

Qushayrī relates: "A man maintained that he was on the point of dying out of love for a youth. The youth said to him: 'How can that be possible since my brother has a lovelier face than I have and is of more perfect beauty!' The man raised his head to look about him. They were both standing on a roof. The youth then threw him down from the roof and said: 'This is the punishment for someone who claims he loves us and looks at others!'"

Risāla 147, *Bāb al-maḥabba*; *Sendschreiben* 449/48.16. A girl takes the place of the boy and a sister replaces the brother in Ibn al-Dabbāgh, fol. 29a; *Muḥāḍarāt al-udabāʾ*, Cairo 1326, 2/21; Yāfiᶜī, *Mirʾāt al-janān* 3/157. *Ḥadīqa* 332-41 only involves a slap.

In ᶜAṭṭār the story appears in the following form:

A Ṣūfī sees a beautiful princess in a caravan halting-station and becomes completely bewildered through love for her. The princess notices this and, calling him to her howdah, she asks why he looks so disturbed. He confesses his love for her. She says: "It may be that I'm beautiful, but you should see my sister! She possesses absolutely the beauty which the Ṣūfīs love. Look there, she's coming just behind me!" When the Ṣūfī looks about him, the princess has his head chopped off. (MN in 26/1). (Satan relates the story to a man who asks him why he didn't bow down before Adam. Satan didn't want to bow down before anyone but God. Pp. 554 ff. below).

4

Among the necessary symptoms of love's situation is the fact that the lover cannot tolerate the absence of the beloved, that he weeps and moans, cannot sleep at night, and is constantly in a tormented, restless state.

The thirteenth condition is that the lover continually lament and wail. As one says: "Patient acceptance (*ṣabūrī*) is far from the path of love. A patient person is no lover." (*Blue Anonymous*).

An irresolute person is a bad lover.

A lover wants to visit his beloved who, after he has been waiting a long time in vain, has allowed him to visit him that evening. Before the door he feels some doubts about how he should answer the question: "Who's there?" If he says: "I", the other will respond: "Go away and seek amorous pursuits with your-

self!" (For the lover ought never to say "I"). But if he says: "Not I, it's you!", then the other will say: "Then go away, you!" He remains standing at the door in these doubts until morning. A person who hears the story says: "This was no lover (*ᶜāshiq*), this was a man of intellect (*ᶜāqil*). If he had been a lover, he'd have broken down the door and entered unto the beloved. The lover doesn't reflect for a long time whether this or that suits his purpose." (MN 39/1.—With a different twist in *Mathnawī* 1/3056 ff., regarding which see p. 426 below).

Whoever does not care about the beloved is a false lover.

Abū ᶜAbd Allāh al-Rūdhabārī relates: "I entered Zaᶜfarānī Street in Baghdad and saw a youth who had thrown an old man down on the ground and bit him and hit him with his fists. I said: "Don't do this to your father!" For I believed that this was his father. The youth said: "Just let me finish my business and then I'll explain matters!" When he'd finished, he turned to me and said: "This shaykh claims to love me and hasn't visited me for three days!"

Maṣāriᶜ 214; *Aswāq*, Reʾis ül-küttab 745, fol. 188b; *Tazyīn al-aswāq* 2/19; a different version occurs in Qushayrī, *Risāla* 86, *Bāb al-ṣabr*; *Sendschreiben* 268/22.12; Fīrūzābādī, *Nasl* 75b; *Ḥayāt al-qulūb* 2/218-19.

The story appears in ᶜAṭṭār in the following form:

A king observes from the roof of his castle that a boy is hitting an old man with his fists. He comes down from the roof and asks the boy why he's hitting the man. The boy says: "He's a liar! He claims to love me and has paid no attention to me for the last three days." The king agrees with him and is of the opinion that the false lover deserved an even more sound thrashing.—A lover who can endure without the beloved deserves several slaps on the back of the neck. (MN 28/4).

Amplification of the motif "slaps on the back of the neck":

A Ṣūfī receives a slap on the back of the neck from a man. When he turns around, the man snaps at him: "Why are you turning around? As long as you're alive, you'll get slaps like this." (MN 28/5).

The beloved cannot and should not sleep.

A lover is sleeping on the ground. His beloved comes along. When the latter sees his lover sleeping, he writes a note and attaches it to the sleeper's pillow. When the lover wakes up, he finds the note and the following written on it: "If you're a merchant, get up and work to earn money! If you're an ascetic, stay awake nights and perform devotional exercises! But if you're a lover, be ashamed of yourself and don't tell lies to me about love! The one in love who sleeps—unless it's in his shroud—is perhaps in love but with himself. You've become involved with love without knowing anything about it. Sleep well! You're unworthy!" (MṬ 40/2, p. 139).

The one for whom it's especially hard is the night-watchman who's in love. He's not allowed to sleep in any case but must walk through the narrow streets

and strike the flagstones with his staff. He has two reasons why he can't sleep. (MṬ 40/3, p. 140).

In Turkey today the well-known tapping with a stick has been replaced by blowing a whistle.

5

Love requires sacrificing what money and goods you possess to the point of complete destitution.

A jeweller falls in love with a princess in Khurasan after only hearing about her. He employs all possible forms of cunning and spends much money in order to see her. But he's not successful. Finally, he's told she's accustomed to sit at a window which looks out onto her garden. He then arranges to get inside the garden, seats himself opposite the princess' window and takes one jewel after another out of a jewel case he's brought with him and smashes it with a stone. At last, when he's about to smash a particularly expensive pearl, the princess, who's observing his behavior from behind her curtains, can no longer hold back. She lifts up the curtains and calls to him: "Why are you doing this?" When the jeweller hears her voice, he falls to the ground unconscious. She orders her eunuch to take the jewels in safekeeping and says to the jeweller when he regains his senses: "Why are you smashing the jewels?" He answers: "For this reason: in order to see you and speak with you." (Fīrūzābādī, *Nasl* 83a).

A merchant loves a young millet-beer vendor, spends his entire fortune and sells all his possessions to be able to buy the boy's wares. Finally he's destitute. People with compassion give him some bread. But he remains hungry because he gives away the bread as well to buy millet-beer. One time a person asks him what love is. He answers: "That you give away a hundred worlds of money and possessions for millet-beer." (MṬ 39/1, p. 133).

Concerning a governor (*ᶜāmil*) who spends 30,000 pieces of gold on a youth he loves—but is disappointed according to verses he wrote on the wall—see *Aswāq al-ashwāq*, Ms. Reʾis ül-küttab 745, 188a.

An old man falls in love with a young washerman, does all the work for him, and gives the young man everything he earns. One day the youth says to the old man: "I need more money, I'm fed up with these few pennies!" The old man says: "You know I don't have any more but you can sell me as a slave." Then the youth brings his lover to the slave-market in Cairo. A raised seat is located there on which people are wont to sit who wish to sell a slave. The youth sits on this seat. "I'll never forget", so recounts the old man, "the moment that a man came and asked the youth: 'Is this your slave?', and he answered: 'He's my slave.'" (ᶜAṭṭār does not neglect to refer to the happiness which a person experiences when God calls him His slave). A man who promised his father on his deathbed

to free a slave at his grave, buys the old man and lets him go free, whereupon the freed slave immediately goes to his youth and remains his inseparable companion. The people confer on him the honorary title "the upright lover". (IN 14/8, pp. 224-26).

An alternative example:

Zubayda, the wife of Hārūn al-Rashīd, undertakes the pilgrimage to Mecca in a camel howdah. When the wind for one moment raises the howdah's curtain, a Ṣūfī catches sight of her and immediately begins a lamentation of love. Zubayda signals to her harem guard to come and orders him: "Buy me free from this wailing!" The harem guard gives the Ṣūfī a purse full of gold, whereupon the Ṣūfī stops wailing and, satisfied with the gift, marches off from the spot. Zubayda then orders the Ṣūfī to be given a slap and says to him, when he doesn't understand why he was struck: "You're a liar. You claim to love me but when you saw the gold, I was already forgotten!" (IN 20/3, pp. 316-17. The story, from a literary point of view, is closely related to the one recounted above on p. 389).

But the classical tale which demonstrates that true love is incompatible with earthly wealth and possessions, at least with possessing the beloved as his owner, is the frequently told story about Maḥmūd and the salt vendor, in which Maḥmūd must submit to being given a lesson by a beggar about the requirements of true love. It is already found in Aḥmad Ghazzālī:

When Maḥmūd is holding a public audience, a salt vendor pushes his way through the crowd and calls out that he has salt for sale. Once the audience is over, Maḥmūd has the man summoned and reproaches him for his bold behavior. The man replies: "The salt was only a pretext. I love Ayāz (who stood beside you during the audience)." Maḥmūd gets angry and says: "How can a beggar like you dare extend your hand to the same bowl as Maḥmūd? I have 7,000 elephants and a great empire. You don't have bread to eat for one night!" The man replies: "Don't start a long speech! What you possess and have enumerated is the means of love's union but not the means of love. The means of love is a burning heart. I have that on a perfect level. Do you know what this salt means? In the bowl of your love the salt of self-destitution and humiliation is missing, etc." (*Sawāniḥ* pp. 62-65).

The story appears in ᶜAṭṭār in several variants.

A young salt vendor falls so deeply in love with Ayāz that he collapses on the ground in a flood of tears when Ayāz passes by. This is reported to Maḥmūd. He has the salt vendor summoned and threatens him with death if he doesn't abandon his shameful love for the sultan's favorite. A long conversation unfolds in which the beggar contrasts his genuine love which is full of self-denial and entertains no hope of union (*wiṣāl*), with that of the sultan's. The sultan, because of his possessing elephants, soldiers and courtiers, isn't capable of becoming a diver in the sea of true love. He's lacking in salt. When he says Ayāz

is his property, he's no lover. For as lover, it's he who must be the slave. (IN 14/24, pp. 240-44).

A fool appears before Maḥmūd and declares he's in love with Ayāz. The sultan asks him how he can dare compete with him, given that he possesses such wealth and power. The fool replies that the sultan is by no means a proper lover, because he loves thousands of other things as well. By contrast, he, the fool, has bestowed his whole heart on Ayāz. (AN 12/2).

A beggar falls in love with Ayāz. Maḥmūd hears of this and summons the beggar. He informs him that he shouldn't have anything more to do with Ayāz who belongs to him, the sultan. Otherwise he'll have the beggar killed. The beggar answers: "Ayāz may be with you, but love is not yours. If you kill me, I'll take love with me. Because you can't remove love for Ayāz from my heart." (MN 5/9).

Maḥmūd hears about a love-struck dervish (or a poor man) and has him summoned to interrogate him on the subject of love. The dervish declares he has no desire to tell Maḥmūd about love, he won't understand anything about it. Maḥmūd, next to whom stands Ayāz, objects that he too is a lover. The dervish then replies: "If you were a lover, you wouldn't sit there so peacefully. How can a lover sit in peace and allow his beloved to stand beside him? If you were really in love, your beloved wouldn't be standing there like that. You love all the business of a sultan's dominion and wish to possess love as the crowning glory of the whole. Love is given to poverty and lowliness. Be satisfied with sovereignty, leave love and poverty to me!" (MN 37/3).

A beggar falls in love with Maḥmūd's favorite, Ayāz. He follows him to the polo grounds and gazes after the balls struck by Ayāz's polo-stick. The sultan has him summoned and asks him how he can dare be the sultan's rival in love. The beggar answers: "My love is not less, nay it's even better, than yours. Poverty, sacrificing the last one has (*iflās*) and love are neighbors. You, the world's possessor, have a satisfied heart. A heart burning with pain, the way my heart is, befits the lover. You can have the beloved with you as often as you wish. If you're a man of love, learn to endure pain and separation!" The sultan asks him why he always gazes after the polo balls on the playing field. The beggar explains in metaphorical language that his situation is like that of the polo ball, but the ball is more fortunate than he: from time to time it kisses the hoof of the horse Ayāz is riding. Yes, sometimes it's struck with the polo-stick, but then Ayāz often rides directly after it. Sometimes it's close to Ayāz, I'm always far from him. The sultan then questions him about his claim to have sacrificed everything. The beggar answers: "Of course, my claim is only true once I've sacrificed my life as well." Having spoken, he falls to the ground dead. (MṬ 39/3, pp. 134-35).—At the end of the story ᶜAṭṭār adds reflections about sacrificing all one's possessions as well as one's life on the path of love: "Whoever

hears the call: 'Come in!', must be prepared to sacrifice and gamble away everything." He then amplifies this motif with a burlesque story:

An Arab comes to Persia and there he arrives at a *qalandarkhāna*, i.e. a gambling den and tavern, an institution which he doesn't know from Arabia. Out of curiosity he looks inside and is immediately invited to come in by the drinkers and gamblers. He goes in, is given something to drink, loses all his money gambling and is then thrown outside. He returns to Arabia as a beggar. At home when people ask him in surprise how he lost his money and ended up in this state, he answers: "I only know that I ended up in a *qalandarkhāna* and lost all my money." When they ask him to describe the *qalandarkhāna*, his only answer is that they said to him: "Come in!" (MṬ 39/4, pp. 135-36).

Another time it's a woman who falls in love with Ayāz.

A woman who's a neighbor of Maḥmūd's falls in love with Ayāz. She continually sits at the window in the hope of seeing the handsome favorite of the sultan. One time when Maḥmūd rides by the woman's window with his retinue, she lets out a loud woeful cry. The sultan hears the woeful cry and asks her what's wrong. She answers: "On the basis of a neighbor's rights, I ask the shah for a delight-bestowing drink."[1] The sultan has her served a delight-bestowing drink by Ayāz. In the conversation which now unfolds between her and the sultan, she says she's alive not due to her life but due to love. Maḥmūd says he doesn't understand how someone can be alive due to love. To this the woman replies: "I thought you were a lover. Now I see you don't understand a thing about love." Thereupon she dies, and Maḥmūd has Ayāz bury her. (MN 30/8).

6

Jealousy is part of love.

Cf. the chapter on the levels of jealousy in *Tazyīn al-aswāq* 2/43-44.

It goes without saying that there is no question here of bad jealousy which takes the form of surveillance and punishment of the beloved person. A right of punishment is only allowed when the bond is also one of a legal kind. Thus we have already become acquainted with several examples where kings made use of their power of life and death over their slaves and courtiers whose lack of loyalty they thought they had discovered. (Above p. 349). But kings are hasty to become angry and in their anger issue commands which they then regret afterwards. Those in a

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[1] *Mufarriḥ*. Ground up jewels are among its ingredients. Instructions on how to prepare this drink are contained in the work *Mufarriḥ al-nafs* by Majd al-Dīn ᶜAbd al-Wahhāb al-Tanūkhī (GAL[2], Suppl. 1/901, where the manuscript Köprülü 982 should be added).

king's company sometimes do not carry out his order and protect him from his own outbursts of rage. Thus Ardashīr's order to have his unfaithful wife executed is thwarted by a *mūbad* (see pp. 526 f. below) because the wife is pregnant with a successor to the throne. Bahrām Gōr's order to kill his female harp player is not carried out because it was known that he would regret the order. (Niẓāmī, *Heft Peiker*, pp. 90-91).

The bad and improper jealousy of a king is depicted by ᶜAṭṭār in an elaborately spun out story about the king who loves his vizier's son and in jealousy issues the order for his execution. (See pp. 653 f. below, the last story of this book).

The jealousy of the genuine lover only wishes that the beloved is not profaned by the sham love of unworthy and false lovers, lest false lovers, charlatans and people who have "no firm foot in realities" appear as his lovers. (Ibn al-Dabbāgh fol. 26a).

When Majnūn is brought the news of Laylā's death, he cries out: "Thank God!" He explains to the messenger who's very surprised by this: "Since nothing of Laylā was allotted to me, no person of ill will should have anything of her either!" (IN 8/9, p. 135).

The lover's jealousy can go so far that in the end he also includes himself among those whom he considers unworthy and to whom he will not grant the beloved.

Someone says to a lover: "Would you like to see him?" He answers: "No!"—"Why?"—"I find that perfection too sublime for the likes of me to gaze upon."

Unazzihu dhālika'l-kamāla ᶜan naẓari mithlī. Ibn al-Dabbāgh fol. 26a.

A frequently quoted verse goes: "I so much begrudge my eye the sight of you that when I see you, I close my eyes." (Ibn al-Dabbāgh 26a; Hujwīrī 435). And Aḥmad Ghazzālī teaches:

It can reach the point that the lover harbors jealousy toward himself and is jealous of his own eye... And sometimes this goes so far that if one day the beloved is more handsome than usual, the lover becomes irritated and angry. But for someone who cannot feel this, it's difficult to understand. (*Sawāniḥ*, *Faṣl* 15).

The moon is asked what she would like best. She answers: "I would like best for the sun to be eclipsed so he would remain eternally behind the curtain. His face should forever be under the clouds, because he's too good for my own eye as well!" (IN 8/8, p. 135).

Concerning the moon's love for the sun, compare also *Sohrawardī d'Alep, fondateur de la doctrine illuminative (ishrāqī)* by Henry Corbin (Publication de la Société des Études Iraniennes No. 16, Paris 1939) p. 37.

Someone visiting Majnūn offers to take a message for him to Laylā. Majnūn answers: "Don't mention my name in the beloved's presence! For to speak of me where she is would be a shame." (Saᶜdī, *Būstān*, *Bāb* 3).

Here as well one can also include the duty to guard the secret of the beloved, not to make known the love relationship and not to put the beloved on view and expose her.

The ninth requirement is that the lover, even when keeping love a secret is impossible, endeavors to the extent of his powers to hide the secret of love from people so that not even the dust of a suspicion settles on the hem of the beloved's robe and the mirror of his soul is not darkened by the dust of this street. Because if the secret is not guarded, the beloved can acquire a bad reputation. (*Blue Anonymous*).

In this connection, the author relates the story of a young man who, in order to see his uncle's daughter whom he's in love with, climbs onto the roof of the house where the beloved lives. He's caught and arrested as a thief. To avoid exposing the beloved, he confesses to a theft which he didn't commit and his hand is chopped off. But finally the truth emerges, and the sultan joins the two lovers in marriage.

The same story occurs in greater detail in Fīrūzābādī, *Nasl*, fol. 77a. A similar story of quite recent times was carried in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (*The New Zurich Newpaper*) of 30/3/1948 under the title "Der bayerische Kavalier" (The Bavarian Cavalier).

Nor does one put the beloved on display.

Maḥmūd holds a troop parade. Ayāz doesn't appear. The sultan sends a messenger to fetch him. But the messenger returns without having accomplished his task. Ayāz has the sultan informed: "One doesn't put the beloved on display in a parade." (IN 9/13, pp. 152-53).—(For the symbolic meaning of the story see p. 579 below).

There is also a friendly jealousy of the beloved's on behalf of the lover.

One of the strongest manifestations of love is that the beloved, out of loyalty to the lover, feels jealousy toward his heart, not wanting it to turn to anyone else... Thus one of the people who understand something about love related that he once heard a beloved overwhelm his lover with reproaches which were so harsh it moved the listener's heart. After the incident, the latter wished to reprimand the beloved for the way he had treated the lover. But when the beloved came outside before him, he was veiled (*fa-kharaja ilayhi'l-maḥbūbu wa-huwa mubarqaᶜ*). When he asked him what this meant, the beloved said: "He's put up with my harsh reproaches. He's emigrated from his homeland to be able to see my face. Therefore I don't let anyone but him see my face." (Ibn al-Dabbāgh 26a).

The best-known story of this kind is that about Muḥammad ibn Jāmiᶜ al-Ṣaydalānī and his lover, the famous Ẓāhirite religious scholar Muḥammad ibn Dāwūd (d. 297/909). His school of religious jurisprudence considers "gazing on unbearded youths" as allowed. He himself died out of love for the young Ibn Jāmiᶜ—as a martyr of chaste love.

It is related: "Muḥammad ibn Jāmiᶜ went into the bath, tidied up his face nicely, took hold of the mirror and saw his countenance in it. He then covered his face and rode to Muḥammad ibn Dāwūd. When the latter saw his covered face, he feared that he'd had an accident and asked: 'What happened?' The youth said: 'I just saw my face in the mirror and covered it up so no one else would see it prior to you.' Muḥammad ibn Dāwūd then lost consciousness."

Tarʾīkh Baghdād 5/260; Massignon, *Recueil* 240; *Maṣāriᶜ al-ᶜushshāq* 76; *Tazyīn al-aswāq* 2/3; *Dīwān al-ṣabāba* 2/58-59; *Rawḍat al-muḥibbīn* 128-30.

A variant:

Ibn Jāmiᶜ related in the presence of the caliph al-Muttaqī: "I went into the bath and found my face was more handsome than usual. I then covered my face and swore no one should see it before him (Muḥammad ibn Dāwūd). I went to him quickly. He uncovered my face and said: 'Praise be to God who created it and formed it, etc.!'" (Massignon, *Recueil* 240).

Aḥmad Ghazzālī in his sermons has almost reversed the sense of the story through overrefinement.

One of the lovers had attached his heart to a handsome youth and the youth was well disposed toward him. One morning the youth came to him and said: "Look at my face, I'm more handsome today than usual!" The lover replied: "What do you mean?" He said: "I looked in the mirror and felt my face was handsome and I wanted you to see me." The other said: "After you've gazed at your face before me, you're of no use to me." (Ibn al-Jawzī, *Quṣṣāṣ*, in Massignon, *Recueil* 98).

ᶜAṭṭār has taken it over in this form.

A good-looking boy has a perfect lover prepared to make sacrifices. The boy one time goes into the bath, sees his handsome face in the mirror, covers it and runs to his lover to tell him that he's found his face so handsome in the mirror that he resolved to show it to no one but him, his lover. But the latter says: "I loved you because you were unaware of your beauty. Now that you find yourself good-looking, you've become a flawed beloved, and I don't want anything more to do with you. Pursue love by yourself!"—The beloved shouldn't see himself, he must see the lover. Only the beloved whose gaze is fixed on the lover is worthy of self-sacrificing love. (MN 28/3).

What ᶜAṭṭār means can be inferred from the context: turning to one's own ego destroys the inner unity between the lover and

beloved, an idea which has its place in pure mysticism. (Cf. pp. 596 ff. below).

If the beloved is a king's slave and the lover is the king, vain gazing at oneself will cost the slave his life. (Above p. 350).

7

But let us return to the duties of the lover.

The higher level of love consists of giving up all selfish desires for the sake of the beloved, within whose will the individual's will disappears. On the lower level the lover is a subject that wills, he wants something. On the higher level he is the object of the beloved's will.

The eleventh requirement is that the lover give up all goals of the will and renounce his lust and desires so that he is admitted to the register of lovers and it says there: "This person was sincere and not mendacious on the path of love..." Nor should he avoid giving his life for the beloved. He must sacrifice his body and soul for him and even be grateful to him for this. (*Blue Anonymous*).

The beginning of love is such that the lover wants to have the beloved for himself. A person like this loves himself through the medium of the beloved but doesn't realize it. Because he wishes to use the other for his own purposes... But when perfect love begins to be kindled, its least aspect is that he commits himself to the other and considers sacrificing his life, if it pleases the other (*dar rāh-i riḍā-i ō*), to be a game. This is love. Everything else is empty talk and deficiency. (*Sawāniḥ*, *Faṣl* 34).

On obedience to the beloved see also chpt. 14 of Ibn Ḥazm's *Ṭawq al-ḥamāma*; Weisweiler, *Halsband der Taube* pp. 73 ff.

The simplest form of obedience to the beloved is the willing acceptance of enormous tasks, even when they are impossible to carry out. In so doing, the lover is practicing the frequently praised virtue of "high aspiration" (*ᶜuluww-i himmat*, above pp. 319-22), the setting of high goals, which possesses the same worth as actually carrying out a task. In ᶜAṭṭār this virtue is readily illustrated by means of animal stories, a few of which we have already become familiar with above.

Solomon rides past a nation of ants. All the ants hasten to attend upon him, only one remains behind. It's engaged in clearing away a great hill in front of its house. Solomon summons the ant before him and reproaches it for the uselessness of its efforts. Even if it lived as long as Noah, with its weak powers it would never be able to make the hill disappear. The ant replies: "Don't look at my weak power, look at my high aspiration! I'm in love with an ant which promised me it will clear away the boulder of rejection (*hijrān*) if I get rid of this

hill. Now all my mind and effort is directed to this work. If I succeed, I'll win closeness to the beloved, if not, at least I won't be a liar and a false lover." (IN 2/3, pp. 52-53).

Solomon observes a little pair of finches engaged in love talk. The lover finch says to his beloved: "I'll do everything you order me to do. If you wish, I'll kick Solomon's pavilion to the ground with one kick!" Solomon has the bird summoned and reproaches him for his nonsensical words. The bird says: "The book of lovers bears the seal: 'Fold it up and say no more!'" (*Yuṭwā wa-lā yuḥkā*). (MN 37/5).

Qushayrī, *Risāla* 148, *Bāb al-maḥabba*; *Sendschreiben* 451/48.19; *Iḥyā*ᵓ 4/117, *Bayān faḍl al-niᶜma*; *Stufen* 281/B.291; *Wāḍiḥ* 1/15; Ibn ᶜArabī, *Futūḥāt* 2/358, *Bāb* 178; Fīrūzābādī, *Nasl* 78b; Ḥakīmī, *Rumūz al-ᶜāshiqīn*, Ms. Istanbul Uni. Libr. F 214, fol. 821a-b; alluded to in Rōzbihān Baqlī, *Sharḥ al-Shaṭhiyyāt* 24a.

The lover's "high aspiration" also consists in not directing his love to a lowly object but rather to a high, even an unattainable object, the way the mote in the sunbeam loves no one less than the sun. (*Blue Anonymous*, 1st requirement).

Love possesses high aspiration. This consists in love's wanting a beloved with lofty qualities and therefore it's not pleased with every beloved whose intimate closeness is available. (*Sawāniḥ*, *Faṣl* 64).

As an example Aḥmad Ghazzālī cites Satan who had loved no less than the lofty majesty of God. Many lovers in ᶜAṭṭār fall in love with princes and princesses. But the only worthy object of the mystic's love is God.

Time and again in his epics ᶜAṭṭār admonishes one to give away everything for love, to sacrifice possessions and life, and he relates stories in which lovers make this sacrifice.

A famous shaykh of an order abandons his position of honor and his good name for the sake of love, and lowers himself to becoming a dog-keeper.

A famous Ṣūfī shaykh falls in love with the daughter of a dog-keeper. In order to see her he sleeps at night among the dogs of her street. When the girl's mother notices he loves her daughter, she says to him: "If you wish to have our daughter—we're dog-keepers. You must acquire our color and become a dog-keeper, then you can have her after a year." The shaykh does as he's told. He throws off his Ṣūfī robe and goes to the market with a dog on a leash. He does the same for a whole year. Another Ṣūfī, who sees him do this, reproaches him, saying: "You were a famous man of God for thirty years. Why are you doing this? Who would ever do a thing like this?" The shaykh answers: "Beware of drawing back the curtain from this matter! God knows the secrets. If He sees how you're reviling me, He could easily remove the dog from my hand and place it in yours!" (MṬ 41/6, pp. 145-46).

Religion as well is sacrificed in love.

If someone's foot is caught in love, he goes beyond religion and Islam... March forward like men do and don't be afraid! Go beyond unbelief and faith, and don't be afraid! (MṬ 14/0 p. 45, verses 1152 and 1156).

There is a series of stories which attest to this abandoning of the faith for the sake of love.

The most famous story of this kind is the one about Shaykh Ṣanᶜān which is related by ᶜAṭṭār in detail and with great love.

Shaykh Ṣanᶜān lives with the greatest asceticism within the sanctuary of Mecca. One night in a dream he sees that he travels to Rūm, the Land of the Byzantines, and prostrates himself before "the idol" (the crucifix). After this, with four hundred disciples, he sets out to travel to Rūm. There he sees a beautiful Greek girl on a balcony and falls in love with her to the point of complete destruction. His friends' exhortations remain ineffective. He sits down on the road of her neighborhood and finally becomes ill. The girl notices him, speaks to him, and he confesses to her his all-consuming love. She demands that he prostrate himself before "the graven image", burn the Koran, drink wine, and renounce his faith. He's prepared to drink wine but nothing more. She invites him in and gives him a wine-cup. When he wants to touch her, she pushes him away and once again demands he change his faith. Now he acquiesces and must gird himself with the Christian belt in a monastery. And now she demands a high bride-price which the poor dervish can't afford. She finally takes pity on him and promises to be his if he looks after the pigs for her for one year. He then has his disciples depart and becomes a swineherd. In consternation and shame the disciples return to Mecca. There the shaykh has a loyal disciple who by chance was absent when the others set out for Rūm. When he hears what's happened, he scolds his fellow-disciples for their disloyalty. It's precisely now that the master has need of loyal help. He prevails on them to return to the shaykh once more and lay siege to heaven with prayers and ascetic exercises. On the fortieth night the disciple sees the Prophet in a dream. The Prophet announces to him that he's procured deliverance for the shaykh. Now they look for their shaykh among the pigs and find him sitting on the ground in deep shame, having removed his Christian clothes. He does penance, performs the ablutions of conversion, and sets out with his disciples on the return journey. The girl beholds a vision in a dream. The sun falls on her lap, begins to speak and orders her to follow after the shaykh. Having woken from the dream, she has no more peace and hastens after her former lover. She converts at the hand of the shaykh, asks him for forgiveness and dies. (MṬ 14/1, pp. 46-60).

The Arabic form of the story, which differs in detail, is found in Ibshīhī's *Mustaṭraf* 1/183-85. There the hero of the story is a shaykh in Baghdad by the name of Abū ᶜAbd Allāh al-Andalusī, while the loyal disciple, who is also the narrator of the story, is none other than the famous al-Shiblī.—Sūdī in his Ḥāfiẓ commentary (Brockhaus 1/52 and 280-81) names

our shaykh ᶜAbd al-Razzāq al-Yamanī. If he means by this the traditionist ᶜAbd al-Razzāq ibn Hammām al-Ṣanᶜānī who died 211 AH, no such adventures are to be found in the latter's biography in Ibn Saᶜd 5/399, or in its alphabetical place in Ibn Khallikān and in the *Tahdhīb al-Tahdhīb*. Sūdī also refers to a Turkish book in which this story is related. Such a book exists as Lâleli 1939, but only contains, as far as I could discover on the basis of a cursory examination, a reworking of ᶜAṭṭār's story. The details which Sūdī recounts on p. 281 are not found in ᶜAṭṭār. Did he know another source? A *mathnawī* has recently been found in Iran in which the same subject is treated by the previously unknown poet Waḥdat. Cf. *Yādgār* 3/1-/1946, pp. 59-70 (*Oriens* 7/1954/203). Regarding a Turkish version see *Oriens* 7/1954/ 253.

Two analogous stories occur in the *Rawnaq al-majālis* of Nīsābūrī (*Bāb* 12, nos. 5 and 6).

A man who bears the nickname Rāqid al-Layl ends up as a prisoner of the Byzantines, converts to Christianity out of love for a Christian girl and also looks after the pigs. When during an ensuing campaign he's found by his former co-religionists, he refuses to give up his new faith.

A man named ᶜAlī al-Muqriᵓ sets out from Samarqand on the pilgrimage with two friends. On the way, in Armenia, he falls in love with a Christian woman, becomes a Christian and marries her. He as well doesn't give up his new faith.

These two stories are related as frightful examples of "the deceit" (*makr*) of God (cf. p. 73 above) which can inflict tardy ruin on people.

Two additional stories from Ibn al-Jawzī's *Dhamm al-hawā* occur in Nuwayrī 2/173-75.

Another story which Muḥammad Zangī relates in his *Nuzhat al-ᶜāshiqīn* (*Der Islam* 21/1933/109) also ends with the beloved's conversion to Islam.

A shaykh sends a *murīd* to another city on an errand. There the *murīd* falls in love with a Christian boy (*tarsābacha*) and forgets about his errand. When he doesn't return, the shaykh sends after him one of his brethren of the order. The *murīd* who has fallen in love tells him about his situation. After a few days the *murīd* meets the young Christian, can't endure any longer and confesses his love to him. The Christian boy demands that his lover convert to Christianity. In obedience the dervish goes to the market to buy himself a Chrstian belt. On the way he meets his fellow-Ṣūfī and tells him of his intention. His fellow-Ṣūfī says: "Our brotherhood requires that I do the same as you. Go and buy me a Christian belt as well!" The dervish who's in love does this and appears before his beloved with two belts. When the beloved asks in surprise what he's doing with two belts, he tells him his whole story, including the act of loyalty on the part of his brother from the Ṣūfī order, whereupon the young Christian, deeply moved, accepts Islam.

One will remember that the motif frequently occurs in Persian lyrical poetry that faith and religion become unimportant before

the forum of love and no longer have any meaning. This motif is certainly connected with the views depicted here, with the absolute claim of love. Much of this, however, is possibly to be ascribed to the influence of the Qalandariyya which shall be discussed in the following chapter (pp. 502 ff.).

Religious conversion was frequently found to have occurred when prisoners were exchanged. Several examples are given in A. A. Vasiliev, *Byzance et les Arabes. I. La Dynastie d'Amorium*. French edition, Brussels 1935.

8

It becomes difficult to conform to the beloved's will when this means suffering or even death on the part of the lover. For the suffering which the beloved imposes on the lover, in particular through rejection (*hajr*), there is a special expression: *jafāʾ*, meaning more or less "harshness". This counts as a fixed attribute of the beloved or at least as an attitude (*maqām*) which he adopts at the beginning of the love affair and perhaps must adopt. It is the custom of the beloved only to bestow his favor on the lover after first having been brusque, cold and harsh toward him.

In love sometimes there's tenderness, sometimes one's melted in fire like a candle. Before you experience being melted, it's not possible to be treated with tenderness. (MN 9/4, conclusion).

To this behavior of the beloved Aḥmad Ghazzālī attributes various effects on the lover. As long as love is in the process of growing, harshness and rejection bring about a reinforcement of the bond between lover and beloved. But if love is already declining, this can release the lover in one stroke from the slavery of love. (*Sawāniḥ*, *Faṣl* 67). But it is also firewood which nourishes all the more the fire of love and causes love to burst into flame. (*Faṣl* 53). Its curative, pedagogical effect consists in the destruction of the lover's egotistical impulses. (*Faṣl* 20/1).

As for the lover's attitude to the suffering caused by the beloved, this is discussed by Muḥammad Ghazzālī, and after him by Ibn al-Dabbāgh, under the heading of *riḍā*, "consent, contentment". To begin with Muḥammad Ghazzālī (*Elixir* 168 ff.) enters into polemics against those who maintain that there can only be a putting up with pain (*ṣabr*), not an inner consent and contentment with it. Then he presents three kinds of such consent. Firstly, the feeling of pain can be removed by engaging the soul's attention through something else, e.g. the sight of the beloved (we shall hear about this later). Secondly, one can will-

ingly take the pain upon oneself when the reward for it beckons in the distance, the way a sick person accepts the pain of an operation for the sake of being cured, etc. Finally, however, the lover's will is so completely merged in the will of the beloved that there is no greater pleasure for him than that the beloved feels happy and satisfied, and that his will be done even if for him, the lover, it means pain and death (*Elixir* 174). Ibn al-Dabbāgh adopts this argumentation with some small changes. According to him, *riḍā* consists of not feeling the pain while its "form" in nature remains latent (*kumūn*, like fire in a flint stone). *Ṣabr* in his view is putting up with hardship in face of a goal one wishes to reach. But both these cut one off (*ḥijāb*) from genuine love, because the latter consists of the lover enjoying everything which issues from the beloved, even rejection (*hajr*)—not in so far as this means being distant from the beloved but in so far as this is an expression of the beloved's will (fol. 24a, b). In this connection a verse is quoted:

"I want closeness to him in love and he wants to shun me, but I will give up what I want for what he wants."

Urīdu wiṣālahū wa-yurīdu hajrī fa-atruku mā urīdu limā yurīdu.

And the Persian version in Ḥāfiẓ's *Dīwān*, Tehran 1306, p. 15:

Qaṣd-i man sūy-i wiṣāl u qaṣd-i ō sūy-i firāq. tark-i kām-i khwadh giriftam tā bar āyadh kām-i dōst.

Muḥammad Ghazzālī, who cites this verse in the *Iḥyāʾ* (4/117, *Faḍl al-niᶜma, etc.*; *Stufen* 281/B.291), states to begin with that it is absurd because it means: "I want what I do not want", but then goes on to give a psychological interpretation.

Verses of a similar content in *Yatīma* 2/350; *Rawḍat al-muḥibbīn* 297-98. The problem is discussed by Ibn ᶜArabī in the *Kitāb al-Ḥujub* 33-34 and *Futūḥāt* 2/327; Asín, *El Islam cristianizado* 466-67.

In any case it is the duty of the lover to put up with the injustice and cruelty committed against him by the beloved. The mystic Junayd cites the verse: "Endure the great misdeed of the person you love. And even if you suffer injustice, say: 'I've done wrong!'"

Taḥammal ᶜaẓīma'l-jurmi mimman tuḥibbuhū wa-in kunta maẓlūman fa-qul: Anā ẓālimu. *Ḥilya* 10/269.

In fact what is easiest to bear are words of abuse from the beloved, especially as secret affection can be concealed behind words of abuse. (*Al-maḥbūb masbūb*).

Abū ᶜAlī (al-Daqqāq) had a slave woman named Fīrūz. He loved her because she had served him very much. "I heard him say (so relates Qushayrī): 'Fīrūz one time tormented me and unleashed her tongue against me. Then Abū'l-Ḥasan al-Qāriᵓ said to her: "Why do you torment this shaykh?" She replied: "Because I love him."'" (*Risāla* 147, *Bāb al-maḥabba*; *Sendschreiben* 448/48.14).

Majnūn declares that if all the people of the earth praised him, he wouldn't want to know anything about it. The abusive names Laylā gives him are enough for him. (MṬ 45/1, p. 165).

"No" from the lips of the beloved is more precious to him than all the words in the world:

Someone asks Majnūn what is the dearest word for him. He says: "The word 'no'." The person asks: "Why?" Majnūn says: "One time I asked Laylā whether she loved me. She said: 'No.' Since I heard this 'no' from her lips, I love this word more than all other words." (MN 39/4).

Perhaps the story is an elaboration of the verses of Majnūn: "May her vituperation be allowed (forgiven) to Laylā and her belittling us, and may it do her good! And may her sins be forgiven Laylā!"

Ḥalālun li-Laylā shatmuhā wa-ntiqāṣunā hanīᵓan, wa-maghfūrun li-Laylā dhunūbuhā.

Aghānī, 3rd printing, 2/85.

Whoever cannot endure the suffering which the beloved causes him is a false lover.

Some people visit Shiblī in the house for the insane. Asked who they are, they answer: "We're your friends who have nothing in mind but love for you." Then Shiblī throws stones at them, and when they run away in consternation, he cries after them: "You liars! You claim to love but aren't willing to endure what the one you claim to love inflicts on you!" (IN 8/12, p. 137; TA 2/163$_{9-12}$).

Lumaᶜ 50; *Schlaglichter* 97/25.2; Qushayrī, *Risāla* 146, *Bāb al-maḥabba; Sendschreiben* 447/48.12; *Iḥyāᵓ* 4/63, *Bayān maẓānn al-ḥāja ilā'l-ṣabr*, 4/299, *Bayān ḥaqīqat al-riḍā*; *Stufen* 162/B.56, 742/F.286; *Elixir* 174.

How the proper lover behaves is illustrated by the following story:

A lover is on the point of going on the pilgrimage and asks his beloved before setting out whether he has instructions for him. Instead of giving any answer, the latter throws a brick at his head. The lover picks up the brick in silence, makes a hole in it and hangs it around his neck on a string as a memento. (MN 33/6).

At the same time harsh treatment is a means for the beloved to distinguish between the genuine and the false lover.

The third requirement is that the poor lover doesn't withdraw from affliction when the beloved, at the initial stage of love, adopts an attitude of harshness, as is the beloved's custom, but considers it to be a benefit (*ᶜayn-i rāḥat*) and puts up

with it. For this takes place in order to distinguish between the lover and the non-lover, between the faithful and the unfaithful person. (*Blue Anonymous*).

A dervish falls in love with a good-looking boy and when he can no longer endure, declares his love for him, saying: "My suffering has no remedy. I can't live without you. Now do whatever you want. If you wish to bestow life on me, I lie at your feet. If you wish to kill me, I'm prepared to die." The boy answers: "I'll test whether your love is real." He mounts a horse, throws a rope around the dervish's neck and gallops over a field of thorns, dragging the dervish behind him. When the lover willingly allows this to happen, the boy finally dismounts, takes in his lap the lover's feet which are full of thorns and plucks out the thorns with his own hand. But the dervish thinks: "For the sake of this reward a hundred times as many thorns should have stuck in my feet!" (IN 6/7, pp. 108-10).

I would give up a hundred lives for an arrow's sake, if you would pluck out the arrowhead with your own hand. (MN after 0/2, before the *na*[c]*t*).

Sometimes the one in love is expected to undergo even more harsh trials.

Ibn Ḥazm relates: "An Andalusian out of need sells a slave girl whom he loves very dearly but he can't bear separation from her and attempts to buy her back, offering everything he possesses. (See above p. 376). The new owner is not persuaded. Then the man turns to the king of the country. The king summons the buyer and tries to convince him to return the slave—but to no avail. The new master claims to love the girl more than the previous master did. The latter then throws himself from the balcony where these negotiations were taking place, but lands on the ground without suffering any harm. He's restrained from attempting suicide a second time. The king then has an idea: he asks the buyer to prove his love by throwing himself from the balcony like his rival did. If he dies, the foreordained hour of his death will have overtaken him. If he remains alive, the slave girl should belong to him. If he refuses, the slave girl will be taken from him and given to the first owner. The man gets ready to jump several times but recoils at the last moment. He's then forced to sell the girl to her previous owner." (*Ṭawq* 112-14; Nykl 173-75; Weisweiler 185-87).

In the *Ṣifat al-*[c]*āshiqīn* of Hilālī youths test their lovers in the same way, expecting them to throw themselves down into a ravine. (*Bāb* 2).

9

For lovers are even prepared to give their lives for the beloved's sake.

I heard a lover, who was alone with his beloved, say: "By God, I love you with all my heart but you turn your face away from me!" Then the beloved said to

> him: "If you love me, what will you pay for me?" The lover said: "Oh my master, I'll give you for your own everything that's mine and then I'll sacrifice my life for you." (*Qūt* $2/55_{31}$; *Nahrung* 2/473/32.694).

Even the austere Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya knows of this kind of obedience:

> And this obedience goes so far in the case of many of these depraved ones that they sacrifice their life in obedience to their beloved, like the warrior for the faith sacrifices his life for his God and lets himself be killed on the path of God. (*Ighāthat al-lahfān* 304).

Truly strange are the stories in which those in love die at the mere command of their beloved.

> Sulamī relates from the Ṣūfī Abū'l-Ḥusayn ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad al-Qazwīnī who heard it from Abū'l-Ḥusayn al-Mālikī: "Nūrī came to Abū'l-Qāsim al-Junayd ibn Muḥammad and said: 'I've heard that you speak about everything. Speak about whatever you wish and I'll speak about it even better.' Abū'l-Qāsim said: 'What should I speak about to you?' Nūrī said: 'About love.' Junayd: 'I'll tell you a story. I was with some of my companions in a garden. The man who was meant to bring us what we needed was late in coming, and we went up onto the garden's terrace. Then we noticed a blind man with a good-looking boy (and heard) the blind man say: "Oh you, you ordered me to do this and I obeyed. And you forbade me to do that and I abstained from it. I don't contradict you regarding anything you want. What (more) do you want from me?" The youth said: "That you die!" The blind man said: "Behold, I die!", and he stretched out (on the ground) and covered his face. I said to my companions: "One can't demand more from this blind man. But he can't really be dead. Surely he only appears to be dead." We came down and went outside to him and shook him. And he was indeed dead.'—Nūrī then stood up and went away." (Sulamī, *Kitāb al-Futuwwa*, Ms. Ayasofya 2049, fol. 83b).

This story, as we see, is set in the time of Junayd (d. 298/910), the head of the Baghdad school of Ṣūfīs. His disciple Jaʿfar al-Khuldī relates a very similar story.

It is found in the old book by Daylamī (d. circa 400 AH) about love, the *ʿAṭf al-alif al-maʾlūf ʿalā'l-lām al-maʿṭūf* (see *Der Islam* 21/1923/91), in chpt. 22.

> We were told by Abū ʿAbd Allāh Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Hāshimī who heard Jaʿfar al-Khuldī relate: "One day I walked past the entrance gate of the bath in the fief of Zubayda (Qaṭīʿa, *Muʿjam al-buldān* 4/141). Two young men were standing there at the bath's entrance arguing with one another (*yataʿātabān*) in a loud voice. The one said to the other: 'So what is it you want from me?' The other said: 'Your life (*rūḥak*)!' Then the young man let out a cry and fell down dead. The other ran off in haste. The people gathered together, recognized him (the dead youth) and carried him into his house. Six years later I

went on the pilgrimage. While I was circumambulating the Ka^c^ba, I saw the second youth and recognized him. Drawing him to me, I said to him: 'Aren't you the one to whom such-and-such happened?' He replied: 'Yes!' and, gripping my hand, he drew me aside from those performing the circumambulation and said: 'Did you observe me on that day?' 'Yes', I replied. He began weeping wretchedly and said: 'Know this! That young man loved me and I hated him. All his life it was his wish to go on the pilgrimage, but I was the reason he was hindered from making the journey. Now I've made the pilgrimage five times for him, and this is the sixth time. But the day before yesterday I wept profusely until my eyes were overcome with sleep. Then I saw him in a dream and greeted him, but he didn't return my greeting. When I didn't leave him alone and wept before him, he recited the verses: "Do you weep for me after having killed me and treated me so badly before my death? Oh you moon, who caused my body and heart to waste away and reviled me and didn't spare me! Stop this weeping and weep no more! For I don't see that you've done anything (which would cause your deed to be forgotten)."'"

A-tabkī ba^c^da qatlika lī ^c^alayyā *wa-min qabli'l-mamāti tusī ilayyā?*
Fa-yā qamaran barā jismī wa-qalbī *wa-qādhafanī*[2] *wa-mā abqā ^c^alayyā!*
Tajāfa ^c^ani'l-bukā^ɔ^i wa-lā tazidhu *fa-innī lā arāka ṣana^c^ta shayyā.*

The story appears in ^c^Aṭṭār in the following form:

Abū ^c^Alī Rūdhabārī observes in the bath a handsome youth and a dervish. The dervish waits upon the youth like a slave. He washes him, dries him off, gives him sherbet, spreads out his prayer rug under his feet, dresses him, lights incense, sprinkles him with rose-water, etc. But the youth doesn't deign to look at him. The dervish says: "How long are you still going to be angry at me?" The youth says: "Die! Then you'll be set free from my aloof behavior!" The dervish lets out a sigh and dies. Abū ^c^Alī buries the dead man. Years later in the desert he meets the youth who's care-worn and dressed in a Ṣūfī robe. To atone for the injustice he committed he's vowed to make the pilgrimage to Mecca every year for the slain lover. He'd been blind not to recognize the man's perfection. He feels bitter regret over him. (IN 18/8, pp. 295-97).

A shorter version:

Junayd relates: "I saw a man who hung on a boy's sleeve, while humbly beseeching him, and declared his love for him. The boy turned to him and said: 'How long will you go on playing this hypocritical game?' The man replied: 'God knows I'm honest in what I say. If you order me to die, I'll die.' The boy said: 'So die then, if you're honest!' The man went to one side, closed his eyes and was dead." (*Iḥyā^ɔ^* 4/300, *Bāb al-riḍā*; *Stufen* 744/F.289; *Elixir* 175).

A similar story, in which a young man dies at the order of a slave girl singer whom he loves, occurs in the same place.

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2 Ms. *wa-mā dmnī.*

With regard to the boy's behavior the following verse of Junayd is quoted:

And if I say: "What sin have I committed", she replies: "Your existence is a sin to which no other sin can be compared!"

Wa-in qultu mā adhnabtu qālat mujībatan: wujūduka dhanbun lā yuqāsu bihī dhanbu. *Shadharāt* 2/229; *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 1/137 with a mystical interpretation.

Moreover, the great Bērūnī has also read about Ṣūfīs dying by merely willing it—without an erotic motive:

It's recounted in their books about one of the Ṣūfīs: "A group of Ṣūfīs came to us and sat down at a certain distance from us. One of them rose to perform the prayers. When he was finished, he turned to me and said: 'Oh shaykh, is there a place here where a person can die?' I thought he meant a place to sleep and I showed him a spot. He went there and lay down on his back. When I went up to him and shook him, he had already grown cold." (*Mā li'l-Hind* 40).

Abū Saʿīd Tirmidhī dies in a similar way in the presence of ʿAyn al-Quḍāt, the latter's father, and Aḥmad Ghazzālī during a mystical circle dance. (*Zubda*, *Tamhīd* 9, my Ms. 121a-b; *Ṭarāʾiq al-ḥaqāʾiq* 2/254).

A gruesome death among schoolmates because of love:

"In the school of a city", so relates Shiblī, "there was an *amīr*'s son of exceptional beauty. The son of a shoemaker fell in love with him. One day a higher official visits the school and finds fault with the fact that a shoemaker's son is sitting next to the *amīr*'s son. Thereupon the teacher dismisses the shoemaker's son from the school. The latter becomes ill and is on the point of dying. The *amīr*'s son sends someone to him to ask how he's doing. The messenger returns with the message that the shoemaker's son has given him, the *amīr*'s son, his heart. Then the *amīr*'s son has his admirer informed that if this is true, he should send him his heart. The boy then cuts the heart out of his body and sends it to the friend on a platter. The *amīr*'s son only realizes what he has brought about when it's too late, and grieves at the grave of his young admirer." (MN 20/3. On the context see above p. 323).

This story, as is clear, also comes from Ṣūfī circles in Baghdad.

Even today immoderate feelings of being in love occur among schoolmates. They are also attested in literature.

Aḥmad Ghazzālī stresses rather emphatically the viewpoint that the beloved's cruelty, because it entails active attention given to the lover, must signify happiness and joy for the latter. Indeed, the beloved, when he punishes the lover, confers distinction on him by being attentive to him, whereas he may be utterly indifferent toward others. Bad treatment, after all, amounts to establishing a relationship. If the archer wishes to hit you with his ar-

row, he must turn his face toward you completely. To hit you he must focus his mind on you completely.

How can such a connective bond not be enough for you? After all, in this way he has given preference to one above all the others. (Verse:) "Take an arrow with my name out of the quiver and draw it on your strong bow! Are you looking for a target? Here's my heart! Your part is to strike hard, my part is to cry: 'Woe!'" (*Sawāniḥ, Faṣl* $20_{8\text{-}12}$).

ᶜAṭṭār has taken over this whole train of thought of Aḥmad Ghazzālī. Like Ghazzālī, he also develops it most clearly in his depiction of Satan's love of God (see pp. 557 ff. below) but by way of clarifying that love he likewise relates a series of earthly love stories.

To be killed by the hand of the beloved is, in the realm of love, a title to glory. Moreover, death often offers the only possibility of coming into contact with the beloved or his sphere.

A man falls in love with the good-looking son of a Turkish *amīr*. Since he has no hope at all of ever attaining closeness to him, he hides himself on the boy's shooting range at the spot where the archer's arrow must penetrate the ground. The boy shoots, and the earth is stained red with the struck lover's blood. The young archer rushes to the target and sees what he has hit. He asks the dying man: "Why have you done this?" He answers: "For this reason, that you should ask me: 'Why have you done this?' I've loved you for a long time but I had no confidant I could entrust with my love and so I made this arrow into my messenger of love. Would to God I had a hundred lives so I could sacrifice them to your arrow!" Having spoken, he dies. (MN 32/1).

The story occurs with some discrepancies in ᶜIrāqī, *Dahnāma, Kulliyyāt* 208-11; *Majālis al-ᶜushshāq, majlis* 62. According to the latter work, the young hunter was Muḥammad, the son of Maḥmūd of Ghazna. The author calls the dervish *rind-i gulkhantāb*.

A weak variant of the story, transferred to the fawning, courtly domain, is presented by ᶜAṭṭār in a Maḥmūd-Ayāz story:

Maḥmūd allows his courtiers to ask for whatever they wish. They ask for cities, money, property, high office and suchlike. When it's Ayāz's turn, he says he only has one wish: to be the target for Maḥmūd's arrow. When the courtiers express their amazement at this strange desire, Ayāz explains: "You understand nothing about this secret. You see only the shot which hits me, you don't see Maḥmūd's gaze which must be fixed on me before he releases the arrow." (IN 8/11, p. 136).

A woman from the ordinary folk falls in love with a prince and walks after him when he rides out to play polo. Nor does she let herself be stopped by the blows she must endure from the prince's guardians. The matter circulates in the mouth of the people and finally becomes so well known that the prince feels an-

noyed and asks his father to remove this woman from his back who is causing his name to be discussed. The angered king orders that the woman be tied by her hair to the feet of a horse and dragged to death. On the day of the public execution the woman falls at the king's feet and begs him for a final favor. The king says: "If you wish to ask for your life or a postponement of the punishment, your request will be in vain. And it's the same if you ask for a different form of death or if you desire to be together with the prince." The woman answers: "I don't ask for any of those things. I beseech you for something else." The king says: "If it's something other than the four things mentioned, your request will be granted." The woman then says: "If you wish to have me dragged to death today by a horse, I beg you to have my hair tied to the feet of his horse so I may be killed by him. To be killed by the beloved is the highest degree of love that can be apportioned to me." The stern king is moved by these words, forgives the woman and sends her into the prince's palace. (IN 2/1, pp. 48-51).

The false lover recoils from death.

A beggar in Cairo falls in love with a king (a prince). The latter summons him and presents him with the choice of either leaving the country or dying. The beggar chooses to leave the country. Then the king orders that his head be chopped off because he's a false lover. He says: "If he had chosen to be killed by me, whom he claims to love, he would have attained high honor. I myself would have rendered him service like a slave. But he must atone for his hypocritical love." (MṬ 20/3, p. 75).

To all these stories of ᶜAṭṭār about death at the beloved's hand, which are easily elevated to the symbolical and unreal sphere, may here be added the narrative of a true event which took place in the Ottoman cultural domain in the 16th century and which, strangely enough, is recounted by the very youth himself who killed his lover. The story in question is that concerning Meḥmed Mukhliṣ who bore the *nom de plume* Ferdī and was known as *ᶜāşıqküş* (ἐραστοκτόνος, "he who kills his lover"). It is recorded by ᶜĀşıq Çelebi (d. 980/1572, cf. *İslâm Ansiklopedisi* 1/ 695 ff.) in his famous collection of biographies of poets, in a peculiar but delightful mixed style consisting of simple, realistic, vividly concrete narrative and artistic prose of elevated diction with rich imagery and interspersed verses.

Meşāᶜir eş-şuᶜarāʾ (Ms. of Istanbul Uni. Libr., T 2406, fol. 238 ff.). The story has been told in verse by Nevᶜīzāde ᶜAṭāʾī (d. 1044/1634) in his *mathnawī*, *Ṣoḥbetü'l-ebkār*. (Ms. Istanbul Uni. Libr., T 437, fol. 262a-65a).

ᶜĀşıq Çelebi has previously recounted the story of the insane love which the agha of the Janissaries, Muṣṭafā, had for Ferdī, and which cost him his life because he neglected his duties as leader of the Janissary corps, while engaging in wine parties with

his favorite. When a mutiny broke out in this corps, because of his drunken condition he was incapable of restoring order, and was consequently executed at the orders of the sultan. ᶜĀşıq Çelebi, whose report we give in a shortened form, then continues:

Ferdī killed a lover once again. He used to relate himself:

"I had a lover openly known about town for his inclination for men, but he was cultured and well educated. Only he was impatient and an irritating nuisance. He wasn't satisfied with merely watching like the moon. I never found myself with wine and a candle without his appearing as fourth in the company. During the day he followed me like my shadow and nights he stationed himself before me and stood there from evening to morning. If at home I chased him out the door, he came down the chimney again like the moon. If I was invited somewhere, he always heard about it and showed up without being asked. If I meant to go on an excursion, he'd set out before me and I'd find him there already. Finally, one day I went up to him, gave him a thrashing, beat his head bloody and poked out one of his eyes. Then he swore: 'May I no longer look at the world "with two eyes" if I don't gladly let you poke out my other eye, and if I don't gaze at you "with four eyes" or regard you like other good-looking men.' Wherever I looked I saw him standing there, staring at me. If I went to a party on my own without him, he'd come there as well. What things he did! He would swear solemn, dreadful oaths: 'Either you must kill me or I'll kill you!' One time I woke up around midnight, alone in my room with the doors locked. I saw him standing over me in readiness with a sharp dagger—I don't understand, did he pass through the window panes like moonlight? Another time I got up in the morning and there he was above my pillow, ready to kill me, with a drawn sword in his hand, looking like he was Mars who'd come down from the roof. I realized that if I didn't kill him, he'd surely kill me. Finally, I decided that just as I'd struck his eye out, I'd cast him forth from this world and kill him before he found the chance to kill me. So I fixed a time to go with him to the village Shaykh Sinān (in ᶜAṭāʾī: Bābā Naqqāsh) in the vicinity of Istanbul, as if we'd make an excursion. The fellow immediately performed a major ritual ablution, dressed in pure white linen, said goodbye to all the friends he met, and was pleased in the extreme. He began to sing and dance, and said: 'Today is our holiday!' It was then autumn (a poetic depiction of the autumn landscape follows). We walked over hills and glens and open countryside until we came to the place which is known as the Cloister's Fountain (Teke pınarı), a cheerful, level spot, always green and fresh, as if it were a sanctuary of Khiḍr where verdure has sprung up and due to the saint's footsteps high trees with thick foliage have arisen (poetic description). At the head of the clearing there was a spring and at its foot a deep penetrating glen. The two of us went into the glen together, alone. He removed a sword-belt from around his neck and drew a deadly dagger from his side. Then he swore by the thousand and one names of God—heaven and earth shook at this

oath—: 'If you don't kill me, I'll kill you this very instant. Come here immediately!' I realized that killing him would be an act of self-defense. I bound his hands, looked in his face and wept. He said: 'Your killing me is surely good for you and for me. One of us two must kill the other.' Then he indicated the well-sharpened dagger. I took it and with it I slit his throat. Looking me in the eyes, he gave up the ghost. Slain by the sword of love, he attained the goal of his desires. I wept a while, moaned a while, and finally I carried him away and placed him with his clothes in a crevice in the earth. Then I headed for the city and prayed many *Fātiḥa*s for his soul.

In accordance with his final instructions, I had taken his kerchief with me. When I opened it, I found a scroll with writing on it and twenty heavy gold coins in a folded-up piece of paper. In the testament it said: 'If you wish, you may use some of the gold coins you find here for your expenses. Some of them should be used to bestow alms for the sake of my soul, and with some you should have halva (candy) prepared. Then assemble friends, and with conviviality and wine may you remember me, pray for my soul and gladden my departed spirit!'"

After these events—so the biographer continues his report—Ferdī went to the Janissary scribe, Shihāb al-Dīn Bey, and it was he who enjoyed the period of Ferdī's final youthful bloom. When Shihāb al-Dīn died, Ferdī had no further good fortune. For a while he was pleased to study and exchanged the soldier's cap for the turban of a student. But here as well he had no success and finally gave himself over to the pleasure of opium. In this state, one time when he wished to mount a horse and already had one foot in the stirrup, death came upon him. Killing his lover brought him no blessings. He died when he was still young.

Perhaps this insane lover with a death-wish did not behave according to the rules of love which we have become acquainted with but in the light of this incident many extreme stories of ᶜAṭṭār no longer appear so implausible. The scene where the lover has himself slaughtered by the beloved while looking fixedly at his face, recalls to some extent, despite its pathological gruesomeness, the answer which ᶜAyn al-Quḍāt in his *Lawāʾiḥ* (*Der Islam* 21/1933/95) has Ḥallāj give to the question: "When does the lover's pleasure reach its highest point?"—"When the beloved has spread out the leather mat for execution and has prepared the lover for being killed. The latter is admiringly absorbed in his beauty and says: 'He is readying himself to kill me but I only admire how handsome he looks brandishing the sword!'" (*Lawāʾiḥ* 80a-b).

Verses in which joy is expressed during suffering are also found in Ibn ᶜArabī, *Kitāb al-Ḥujub* in *Majmūᶜ al-rasāʾil al-ilāhiyya*. There as well Ḥallāj is also dealt with in this connection.

10

The suffering in question does not have to emanate directly from the beloved. It can be suffering which is not through the beloved, but for his sake and the sake of love. In many stories, however, this suffering is considered by the beloved person to be fair and proper and a sign of real love.

One day Majnūn is allowed to sit with Laylā. She says: "Show me what you've brought with you!" He answers: "You know I don't possess anything but my life. If you want that, I'm ready to give it to you." But Laylā wants a more concrete gift. He then gives her a needle, the only object that he carries with him. It served him for removing the thorns which stuck in his feet when he was looking for Laylā in the desert. But she answers: "That you remove the thorn that sticks in your foot on the path of love is a sign of imperfect love. A thorn in the foot for Laylā's sake is better than a hundred roses made into a bouquet for you by others." (IN 19/11, pp. 299-300. Cf. above p. 208).

The genuine lover must be utterly distraught and emaciated so his bones show, the way Majnūn is represented in miniatures.

As a reward for a service Junayd has done, Sarī al-Saqaṭī gives him a piece of paper on which the followng verses are written:

"And when I complained to her of my love, she said: 'You've lied to me! Why do I see your bones covered (with flesh)? Love is only (present) if the skin clings to the innards and you become mute and don't respond to someone who calls you, and you've grown so weak that love leaves you nothing but an eye to weep with and secretive speech.'"

Tazyīn al-aswāq 1/29; Qushayrī, *Risāla* 146, *Bāb al-maḥabba* with often corrupt text of verses; *Sendschreiben* 446/48.11.

Suffering is borne gladly and with pride. To a certain extent it is actually a form of sacrifice which is offered up to the beloved person. It is enough for the lover if the beloved knows about his suffering.

Because of his insane love for Laylā, Majnūn is afflicted with misery and contempt. One time his father says to him: "You've made yourself despicable. No one will sell you a piece of bread any more." Majnūn replies: "I suffer all this for the beloved's sake. Does she know I suffer this for her sake?" The father says: "She knows." Then Majnūn says: "That's enough for me until the Final Day." (MN 5/8).

In some regions of Anatolia there are still customs which recall the old practices of bride abduction (*kız kaçırmak*). Whoever kidnaps a girl is punished with imprisonment. But the authorities complain that the punishment has little effect on the offenders because it raises a lover's value in the eyes of the girl.

The desire to be punished for the sake of the beloved appears intensified to the level of madness in the following story:

A lover hears that his beloved lies dying. He then takes hold of a knife and wants to go and murder the beloved so that he doesn't die a natural death.[3] Criticized for this strange intention, he says: "If I kill him now, I'll suffer death for his sake here and Hell-fire in the hereafter, and people will call me the one who was killed or burned for his sake, and thus my name will remain bound to his for eternity." (MṬ 39/5, p. 136).

Ibn al-Jawzī relates a story about a Ṣūfī in Baghdad who kills a boy he loves when he's accused of wicked things and the boy is separated from him. Afterwards he offers himself to the father as an expiatory sacrifice. The father, however, forgives him, and now he undertakes the pilgrimage every year and bestows the reward for it on the boy. (*Talbīs* 291). I believe it is not wholly impossible that this story already existed in an earlier source and has been adapted by ᶜAṭṭār.

A poet gives a somewhat different justification for a murder of this kind:

I want to kill her out of love so that on the Resurrection she becomes my adversary in a legal action, and we stand together a long time on the bridge of trials and my eyes can feast on the sight of her. (*Anwār al-rabīᶜ* 755).

11

Still more difficult to bear than the cruelty directed against the lover by the beloved is the latter's complete indifference, his lack of need (*istighnā*, *bē-niyāzī*), due to which everything the lover does, his fate and his existence or non-existence, means nothing to the beloved. "To love means to do what one can, while the beloved does as he pleases."

Al-maḥabbatu badhlu'l-majhūd wa'l-ḥabību yafᶜalu mā yashā' (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 146, *Bāb al-maḥabba; Sendschreiben* 446/48.22).

The prototype for beauty which is sufficient unto itself, and disdains love offered to it, is Joseph in his relationship with Zulaykhā. We have already seen (p. 386) how he held off her modest advances with a crack of his whip.

Yūsuf-i Hamadhānī relates: "One time somebody attempted to put in a good word for Zulaykhā with Joseph: 'You've ravished the heart of this helpless woman without friends. Surely you can give her back her heart!' Joseph answers: 'I never ravished this old woman's heart, I know nothing about her heart being

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[3] *tā ba-marg-i khwadh na-mīradh.* On the grammatical aspect cf. H. H. Schaeder, "Des eigenen Todes sterben" in: *Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen*, Phil.-hist. Klasse, 1946-47, pp. 24-36.

ravished, nor have I ever aspired to the role of heart-ravisher. I've had nothing to do with her heart and never thought of (being involved with it).'" (IN 7/6, pp. 116-17).

But neither does Zulaykhā know what's happened to her heart and so can't ask for it back from Joseph. She doesn't know why it's fallen in love or where it is. "If Joseph doesn't have it, Zulaykhā doesn't have it either." (IN 7/7, p. 117).—(ᶜAṭṭār adds a melancholic thought concerning the difficult position of man who's held responsible for something he can't do anything about. The polo-stick drives the ball from east to west. The ball can't run any other way than the polostick drives it, and yet they call to it: "Watch out you don't fall in a hole in the ground! If you run crookedly, you'll end up in Hell-fire for all eternity and in the pit of prison!"—We have already dealt with this motif above, pp. 72-73).

The rose laughs at her lover the nightingale and the latter, foolishly enough, lets himself be deceived. (MṬ 3/0, pp. 28-29; above p. 11). And matters turned out the same way for a dervish who fell in love with a princess.

A dervish by chance sees a wondrously beautiful daughter of a king. In shock he lets his bread fall from his hand. The princess quickly rides past and smiles at him in a friendly manner, or so he thinks. The sweet smile of the princess won't leave the dervish's mind. He weeps because of being in love and spends seven years among the dogs of the street where she lives. When the princess' servants come to realize what his situation is, they want to kill him. The princess then has him come to her in secret. She warns him and says that if he values his life, he should go away very quickly. The dervish begs her to allow him to ask a question: "If I'm now to be killed, why did you smile at me that time?" She answers: "I didn't smile at you. I laughed at you because you're such an imbecile!" (MṬ 3/1, pp. 29-30).

ᶜAṭṭār treats *istighnā*, lack of need, more forcefully in connection with love of God (p. 568 below). In Aḥmad Ghazzālī the subject is dealt with on several occasions. The beloved demands that the lover become the beloved completely. Then when only the beloved still remains, need ceases and only lack of need is still left over. (See pp. 422 f. below). When an antithetical division of characteristics distinguishing the lover from the beloved is formulated, lack of need stands on the side of the beloved. (*Sawāniḥ*, *Faṣl* 42 and 44). The beloved has neither gain nor loss from love. (*Faṣl* 41_3 and 62).

12

But this lack of need, which is so discouraging for the lover, is limited and mitigated by another factor: beauty is in need of be-

ing loved in order to become aware of itself and take pleasure in itself.

Since the beloved was unique in beauty, without a doubt he required a yearning lover... If the beloved had no lover, he wouldn't be worthy of being a beloved. The state of lover is never denied to a created being (man), because only the lover knows the beloved's worth. All that beauty only appears on market day due to the lover's longing. The beloved himself brings forth his lover. For this reason he sees no one who's as worthy of him as the lover... The beloved's heart is in the lover's hand. (IN pp. 124_{15}, $_{17\text{-}20}$, 125_{4b}).

The eye of beauty is closed unto itself. It can only perceive the perfection of its own beauty in the mirror of the lover's love. Therefore beauty has need of a lover so that the beloved can enjoy his own beauty in the mirror of love and the lover's desire... The lover is thus closer to the beloved's beauty than the beloved himself, because through him alone the beloved enjoys his own beauty. (*Sawāniḥ*, *Faṣl* $13_{1\text{-}7}$).

A little earlier one finds this put somewhat differently:

Beauty's displaying itself (*kirishma*) is one thing, while displaying that one is a beloved (*maʿshūqī*) is something else. Beauty's displaying itself has no connection to anyone else and no tie with the outside. But displaying that one is a beloved, flirting and acting coyly: this receives support from the lover and cannot come about without him. Here the beloved is in need of the lover. It's one thing to be beautiful, it's something else to be loved.

A man who lives in an ashhouse fell in love with a prince (*malik*, king). The prince wanted to punish him but the vizier said: "You're known for being upright. It's not fitting to punish someone for an offense which isn't subject to the free will." The prince's road took him past the beggar's ashhouse, and it was the beggar's wont to sit on the street every day waiting for the prince to pass by. When the prince went past, "the display of being loved" would join with "the display of beauty". On that day, however, the beggar was not sitting there when the prince arrived. "The display of being loved", which the prince had initiated, was in need of the needful gaze of love. When this was lacking, it hung void in the air because there was nothing to receive it. Clearly the prince was annoyed. The clever vizier understood why and remarked: "If earlier we said punishment makes no sense because the beggar is harmless, now we've come to see that his needy longing is actually necessary..." (*Sawāniḥ*, *Faṣl* 11/1).

Here the beggar escapes death. Otherwise, of course, the lover has little gain from the beautiful person's need to be admired and to arouse love.

A young man falls in love with a beautiful woman whom he sees walk past and he follows after her. She asks him what he wants, and he declares his love for her. Thereupon she lifts her veil, lets him see her face and then rushes home. The young man, in utter confusion, walks after her and throws a stone against

her closed door (i.e. thinks she's accessible). The woman comes outside and shouts at him: "Are you out of your senses? Do you want them to cut off your head?" He replies: "If you didn't want to be mine, why did you lift your veil?" She answers: "Because I like it that someone likes me." (MN 37/9. Cf. the story MṬ 3/1, above p. 415).

The last sentence recalls the answer which the beautiful ᶜĀᵓisha bint Ṭalḥa, who always went about unveiled, gave to Muṣᶜab ibn al-Zubayr when he reproached her for this behavior: "God has distinguished me with the sign of beauty and I want the people to see it." (*Zahr al-ādāb* 1/231; Kinany, *Development* 183).

What does Jāmī have to say?

A beautiful face can't bear being covered up. If you shut the door, it sticks its head out the window!

Nikūrū tāb-i mastūrī na-dāradh. chu dar bandī sar az rōzan bar āradh.

Yūsuf u Zulaykhā, p. 23.

Rōzbihān Baqlī hears a mother say to her beautiful daughter: "Child, don't show your beauty to anyone, otherwise you'll debase yourself and people will not respect you anymore!" The shaykh says: "Oh woman, beauty doesn't agree that it should be for itself alone and remain for itself. Love and beauty have concluded a pact in eternity that they will never willingly separate from one another."

Jāmī, *Nafaḥāt al-uns* in Rōzbihān Baqlī's biography; *Tercüme* 299; Jāmī, *Tuḥfat al-aḥrār* 38; Moreno, *Antologia* 129-30.

There is the idea which goes one step further, namely that generally speaking love first of all issues from the beloved. This idea is also developed by Aḥmad Ghazzālī with the support of the Koranic verse: "He loves them and they love Him" (surah 5/54), but only in connection with love of God. For this reason it is only mentioned here in passing.

In a Turkish verse it says:

Love's fire first falls upon the beloved and from there upon the lover. Look at the candle: Only if it burns itself does it then burn the moth!

Aşqın odu evvel düşer maᶜşūqa ondan ᶜāşıqa. semᶜi gör kim yanmadan yandırmadı pervāneyi.

13

Love sheds light over the beloved person's form so that the lover does not see his faults.

The fifth requirement is that the eye of the lover doesn't fall upon the beloved's faults and that every part of him that the lover looks at pleases him. (*Blue Anonymous*).

The classic story which customarily illustrates this point makes the impression of being a "spiritualized" version of the Hero-Leander legend which was in fact known in a vague form in the Orient.

A man from Nahr al-Muᶜallā (east side of Baghdad) loved a woman in Karkh (west side of Baghdad) and dove in the water every night and swam to her. When one night he noticed a mark on her face, he said: "Where does this mark come from?" She said: "I was born with this mark, but don't go in the water today!" When he nevertheless entered the water, he perished from the cold. For he had come back to himself and had seen the mark.

Sawāniḥ, Faṣl 48; ᶜAyn al-Quḍāt, *Lawā'iḥ* fol. 77b-78a, there instead of the Tigris the Rūd-i Sind is mentioned. Rendered in verse in Sanā'ī's *Ḥadīqa* 331-32, printed in Tarzî-Ateş, *Farsça Grameri* 170-71.—In the *Blue Anonymous*, as in ᶜAṭṭār, the mark is replaced by a white spot in the eye.

In ᶜAṭṭār's version swimming across the Tigris and the lover's death are missing.

For five years a man loves a woman who has a white spot on her eye which he doesn't notice in his love. When his love cools, he suddenly sees his beloved's beauty flaw and asks her: "Since when have you had this white spot?" She answers: "Since the day you stopped loving me." (MṬ 35/5, p. 119; similar in Ibn Dabbāgh 29a).

In the eye of the lover even what is ugly appears beautiful because he loves the beloved person entirely, not just a part of him.

Whoever only sees beauty from one side, his gaze is imperfect. One must look at the beautiful and the ugly together... When you see the ugly, it's beautiful because it belongs to Him. (IN p. 173_{11}, $_{12a}$, $_{14}$, before the following story).

By no means should you only look at one limb of the beloved, you must look at him entirely.

One day it's reported to Maḥmūd that Ayāz entered the bath. The sultan hastens after him and now sees the youth in his full beauty due to which "the wall of the bath was full of fire, and everything from the roof to the door began to dance", and he falls to the ground unconscious. The slave falls at his master's feet and says: "Oh my shah, what's come over you that your perfect reason (your consciousness) has left you?" Maḥmūd answers: "As long as I only saw your face, I knew nothing of your limbs. Now that I see all your limbs, I've become utterly wretched. My soul already burned out of love for your face, but now a hundred new fires have been kindled in me, and I don't know which of your limbs I should love more." (IN 11/6, p. 174).

14

Love transfers itself from the beloved object to everything which in any way is connected with him.

One of the ancients says: "When a believer loves a believer, he even loves his dog." And it's as he says. Experience based on the behavior of those in love testifies to this, and the works of the poets prove it. The lover therefore keeps a beloved person's clothing and cherishes it as a souvenir from him, and loves his house, even the neighborhood in which he lives, and his neighbors. And thus Majnūn says (verse):

"I pass by the house, the house of Laylā, and I kiss this wall and that wall. It wasn't love for the house that wounded my heart, no, it was love for her who lives in the house."

Thus evidence and experience demonstrate that love from the beloved person can overflow into everything that lies in his surroundings, comes in contact with him or even has a distant connection with him. On the other hand, this is a matter of an exceptionally exuberant love. Simple love isn't capable of this. But how far the stream of this overflowing love extends to the beloved's surroundings and what comes into contact with him depends on the degree of love's exuberance and strength. (*Elixir* 69).

Cf. also the verses in *Luma^c* 386; *Schlaglichter* 526/125.5; *Dīwān al-ṣabāba* 1/16; and Ibn al-Dabbāgh 28a-b.

Majnūn gives a piece of bread to a dog because one time it passed through Laylā's neighborhood. (*Nuzhat al-^{c}āshiqīn* 18).

He no longer wishes to be separated from the sheepskin he wrapped around him when he hid among a herd of sheep in order to draw near to Laylā's forbidden dwelling-place. (MṬ 39/2, p. 133).

The name of the beloved person enjoys special reverence.

Majnūn can't have Laylā's name repeated to him often enough.

Someone asks Majnūn: "What do you say about Laylā?" (He wants to hear poems which Majnūn has composed about Laylā). Majnūn then falls down on the ground and says: "Say once more: 'Laylā!' How long will you go on wanting verses (*ma^{c}nā*) from me? It's enough that you pronounce Laylā's name! No matter how many verses are recited about Laylā, it's not the same as if one says 'Laylā'. One can always say 'Laylā' and thus it seems like unbelief to me to speak of anyone else."—If someone uttered Laylā's name in Majnūn's presence, he would come back to his senses. But if they spoke about anything else, he would become crazy and moan. (IN 7/15, pp. 122-23).

A thief has his hand chopped off as punishment for his stealing. He immediately picks up the chopped-off hand in his other hand and takes it with him. They ask him: "What are you going to do with the chopped-off hand?" He an-

swers: "I had my beloved's name tatooed on it and as long as I live, I won't be apart from it. Even if I've had nothing but pain from the hand, since my girl friend's name is on it, it causes no harm." (IN 8/7, p. 134).

15

Concentrating one's awareness and feeling on a single object increases one's sensitivity to it and establishes a secret rapport between lover and beloved. The lover "senses" the nearness of the beloved person without seeing him.

Ayāz contracts an illness in his eyes and must stay in bed. After ten days the sultan visits him at his bedside but when he enters the room, he presses his finger to his lips so that no one informs Ayāz of his presence. But the ill slave straightway jumps up. He's perceived the sultan's presence through the sense of smell "in the soul". (IN 20/5, pp. 321-22).

Laylā dies far from Majnūn. Someone wants to show him the grave. But Majnūn says: "It's not necessary. I can perceive Laylā's grave by the scent of the earth." He dies on top of the grave and is buried alongside Laylā. (MN 30/7).

16

The result of completely filling the consciousness with the idea of the beloved person is that in the end the lover sees only him everywhere.

Whoever has absolute self-composure sees his beloved in everything and hears him speak from within everything. (Ibn al-Dabbāgh 28a).

This state of affairs first becomes fully developed in mysticism proper, whereas for profane love the example of Majnūn, the monomaniac lover, is always cited. (Cf. *Luma*[c] 360_{17}; *Schlaglichter* 498/120.106; Hujwīrī 331).

We have already heard how Majnūn even seeks Laylā in the earth of the street (p. 358).

Ibn al-Dabbāgh recalls (28b) the well-known story about how Majnūn releases the captured gazelle, i.e. buys its freedom from the hunter, because it resembles Laylā. Aḥmad Ghazzālī relates the same story to illustrate that the lover takes everything which resembles the beloved object to be that object itself, but explains that this is an initial stage (*Sawāniḥ*, *Faṣl* 23/1).

[c]Aṭṭār has elaborated a story on the basis of the verses cited above (p. 419):

Majnūn enters Laylā's village and there kisses every wall and every door. Asked about this, he explains that he saw Laylā's face everywhere. (MN 10/4).

Sarrāj already cites the same verses and says beforehand:

When the innermost soul and heart of the one in love is completely overwhelmed by thought of the person he's in love with, he describes all his situations with the characteristics of the beloved. As was the case with Majnūn of the Banū ᶜĀmir: if he looked at the wild animals, he would say: "Laylā", if he looked at the mountains, he would say: "Laylā", if he looked at the people, he would say: "Laylā", and if anyone asked him: "What's your name and how are you?", he would say: "Laylā." (*Lumaᶜ* 386; *Schlaglichter* 526/125.5; *Nūr* 68).

In fact the earliest reports about Majnūn say that in general it was only possible to establish a rapport with him through the name Laylā and that he was only capable of coherent speech when he spoke about Laylā. His deranged spirit was entirely confined to this one idea.

The relevant passages in the *Aghānī* are found in O. Rescher, *Abriss der arabischen Litteraturgeschichte* 1/210. Cf. also Ibn Qutayba, *Shiᶜr* 356.

17

In the concluding words of the passage in Sarrāj's *Lumaᶜ* another motif of the psychology of love is touched upon: the self-identification of the lover with the beloved object. This feeling of total identification is at the same time the only path to true union in love, to becoming one with the beloved.

The following saying is already attributed by Junayd to Sarī al-Saqaṭī: "A real love doesn't exist between two persons until the one says to the other: 'Oh I!'" (*Lumaᶜ* 384; *Schlaglichter* 524/124.6; Qushayrī, *Risāla* 146; *Sendschreiben* 445/48.10; Fīrūzābādī, *Nasl* 90a).

In this connection two verses are very frequently cited, at times as anonymous, at times attributed to Majnūn or to Ḥallāj, which according to Sarrāj's explicit testimony refer to love of a created being, i.e. to earthly love:

I'm he whom I love, and he whom I love is I. We're two souls which have taken up residence in one body. If you see me, you see him, and if you see him, you see us (me). (Massignon, "Le Dîwân d'al-Ḥallâj", *Journal Asiatique* 1931, p. 93; *Sharḥ al-Shaṭḥiyyāt* 18b. Similar in the *Sindbādnāma* 229).

And similarly:

Oh you (unattainable) desired goal of those who desire! Through yourself you've made me disappear unto myself (*afnaytanī bika ᶜannī*). You've made me come so close to you that I thought I was you! (*Lumaᶜ* 361; *Schlaglichter* 498/106; a variant in Ibn al-Dabbāgh 3a).

Thaᶜālibī says about Abū Sulaymān al-Khaṭṭābī (d. 388/998) in a poem:

Abū Sulaymān! Travel about or remain here, you're with me whether your dwelling is near or far. You're none other than I, so that I had to fear you might lose me. I give up my life for your life, no, for my life—for you are I. (*Irshād*, Cairo, 4/254).

A letter containing the same idea by a secretary to a friend is found in Masᶜūdī, *Murūj* 6/384; Cairo, 2/204.

Kalābādhī deals with this phenomenon in the *Baḥr al-maᶜānī*:

For if the bond has become firm and the friendship (*mawadda*) sincere, and the love is untroubled... then the action of each of the two persons joined in this way becomes identical with the action of the other, and the characteristics of the one become those of the other.—Verses by Ṣūfīs follow which express the same thought. (Ms. Fatih 697, fol. 181a).

Cf. also *Asrār al-tawḥīd* 74_{24}; O'Kane, *Secrets* 176; Qāsim Ghanī, *Ḥāfiẓ* 2/145. And Ibn ᶜArabī deals with the subject, *Futūḥāt* 2/334, 361, in the beautiful chapter on love, *Bāb* 178.

Aḥmad Ghazzālī in the second aphorism describes how the lover sees the beloved in place of his own self so that now he can only find a way to himself by a detour via love and the beloved. In this connection he cites a variant of the above-quoted verse but criticizes the half-line in which "two souls" are referred to because here there is still talk of duality. He then cites a Persian quatrain:

I said: "You picture of divinity! Perhaps you're my beloved. But now as I look carefully, you're my own soul (I myself)." (*Sawāniḥ*, p. 7).

In the fourteenth aphorism the invitation to become one with him is placed in the beloved's mouth:

The beloved says to the lover: "Come and become me! For if I become you, then there will be need of a beloved; the lover receives an increase, and the lack and need become greater. But if you become me, then the beloved receives an increase. Everything becomes the beloved, and no lover exists any longer. Everything becomes non-need (*nāz*) and no need (*niyāz*) exists any longer. Everything becomes wealth, and no poverty exists any longer. Everything becomes help, and no helplessness exists any longer." (P. 31).

In the thirteenth aphorism it says:

Here where the lover is "he" for the beloved to a greater extent than the beloved is himself, strange attachments result—assuming that the lover has no attachment to himself—and this to a degree that the lover believes he himself is the beloved. And when he finds himself in the midst of rejection and separation and non-attainment of his desires, he still believes absolutely that he himself is the beloved. (P. 30).

Ibn al-Dabbāgh discusses this self-identification with the beloved in connection with the Platonic teaching of the primeval bond, the pre-established harmony between the lover and beloved (*al-munāsaba al-qadīma*, *al-munāsaba bi'l-fiṭra al-ūlā*). In theoretical writings on love as early as Jāḥiẓ (*Qiyān* 68-90), the bond is presented as one of the causes of love and brought in to explain love relationships which are difficult to understand, and even more frequently is illustrated by means of the Platonic myth of the halving of the sphere-shaped original human being (*Symposium*):

God created all souls round in the shape of a sphere and then sliced them into two halves and gave each half a body. Now if a body meets its other half from that sphere, love arises between the two of them.

Masᶜūdī, *Murūj* 6/379; Cairo 1303, 2/203; *Zahra* 15; Ibn al-Dabbāgh 18a; *Elixir* 62; *Rawḍat al-muḥibbīn* 87; without the myth: *Dīwān al-ṣabāba* 16; *Rawḍat al-muḥibbīn* 154; Ibn al-Dabbāgh 3a.

After he has explained the primeval unity of substance of the souls which are only differentiated in corporeality, the way one and the same figure appears to be different in different mirrors, Ibn Dabbāgh goes on to say:

And in accordance with the extent of this connection there then arises love of one of the two souls for the other, while the soul of the lover imagines that it is itself the beloved and that when it perceives its beloved, it perceives itself. And this is the meaning of becoming one. (3a).

Somewhat later he adds:

For union of the souls in love is their becoming one. And this means that the connection between the two souls becomes so tight that it doesn't occur in the mind of the lover that his person could be anything but the person of his beloved. Indeed, he believes he is the other. When this becoming one takes place, separation, which is the torment of souls, ceases. (6a).

A symptom of this inner unity and identity between the lover and beloved is first of all that they think and speak the same way, and that when the one becomes ill, the other falls ill as well.

Among the signs of love is that the same incident manifests itself simultaneously in the lover and beloved, especially when the love in question is a love based on similarity and harmony (*mushākala wa-munāsaba*). Then the beloved often says something or wants to say something, and the lover says exactly the same. Frequently the lover becomes ill because his beloved has become ill. This happened several times to Sultan al-Malik al-Nāṣir Aḥmad, when he was in Karak, with his beloved, Shahīb. He used to fall ill when his beloved was ill, and would become healthy again when the latter became healthy. This was told to me

by someone who was in his service for a long time and concerning whose testimony I have no doubts. (*Dīwān al-ṣabāba* 1/16).

It is here a question of the Mamlūk prince Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Qalāʾūn, born 716/1316 and killed 745/1344, who was raised in the fortress Karak, east of the Dead Sea. There he fell in love with the above-mentioned Shahīb, squandered immense sums on him and would not abandon this love either because of threats from his father or the latter's offer to give him a hundred of his own slaves or the imprisonment of the youth, but threatened suicide, hunger strikes and suchlike. Finally, Shahīb was murdered by Aḥmad's *mamlūks*. (*Al-Durar al-kāmina* 1/294-96, no. 745).

A similar story is presented about the famous poet Abū Nuwās. He falls sick when the slave girl ᶜInān whom he loves becomes sick, without his knowing of her sickness, and regains his health once she becomes healthy again. (*Tazyīn al-aswāq* 1/20; *Dīwān al-ṣabāba* 1/16; *Rawḍat al-muḥibbīn* 84, without naming persons; *Wāḍiḥ* 1/37).

And an additional such story occurs in Ibn al-Jawzī's *Dhamm al-hawā*:

Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Ghanawī relates: "When I came to Kūfa, the people of good society (*al-ẓurafāʾ*) paid me a visit and said: 'Here there are two young persons who love each other. The one has fallen ill, and we wish to visit him.' I went with them. They meant to visit the sick one and I wished to visit the healthy one. We found a youth lying on a bed and another one who leaned on the bed and brushed the flies away from the first and gazed into his face. When the latter saw us, he made room for us so we could come before his friend. Those accompanying me sat down around the sick person, and I sat opposite the healthy one. Whenever the sick fellow let out a plaintive moan, the healthy one did the same. And when the sick one said: 'Oh my foot!', the healthy one also said: 'Oh my foot!', and when the one said: 'Oh my hand!, the other said: 'Oh my hand!', until finally my companions said: 'His suffering has come to an end. God have mercy on him!' My companions then bound the jaw of the sick man, and I bound the jaw of the healthy man, and we didn't leave until we had buried the two of them." (Following the *Dīwān al-ṣabāba* 2/77; *Wāḍiḥ* 1/95).

On this subject ᶜAṭṭār contributes a Maḥmūd-Ayāz story:

Maḥmūd becomes ill and loses his consciousness for three days. At the same moment Ayāz also falls unconscious and only comes to once Maḥmūd has regained his senses, so as to be ready to serve him immediately. He says: "I have no existence of my own. My being comes from the ruler, without him it doesn't exist. I, the slave, am only here through you. In fact, who's a slave? There's only Maḥmūd." (MN 31/4).—(Here on a symbolic level one already catches a glimpse of mystical-pantheistic ideas).

And again another story which belongs in this category goes back to Shiblī:

Shiblī relates: "Two lovers were travelling over the sea. One of them fell in the water and sank. Then the other threw himself in the sea. Divers dove in and brought both of them out alive. The first one said to the second: 'I fell in the sea. But why did you throw yourself in the sea?' The second said: 'Through you I was absent from myself and thought I was you.'" (*Lumaᶜ* 360-61; *Schlaglichter* 498/120.106; *Asrār al-tawḥīd* 203-04; O'Kane, *Secrets* 370; Ibn al-Dabbāgh 3a; and a variant in Fīrūzābādī, *Nasl* 82b; Ibn Taymiyya, *al-Radd ᶜalā Ibn ᶜArabī wa'l-ṣūfiyya* 46).

Ibn Taymiyya continues: "In this connection the Ṣūfīs cite the verse (of Ṣāḥib Ibn ᶜAbbād): 'The glass was transparent and the wine was transparent, and so they took on the same form, and one could no longer tell the difference—as if there was only wine but no cup, and only a cup but no wine.'"

Raqqa'l-zujāju wa-raqqati'l-khamru *wa-tashākalā fa-tashābaha'l-amru*
Faka-annamā khamrun wa-lā qadaḥun *waka-annamā qadaḥun wa-lā khamru.*

The story about the friend jumping into the sea is taken over by ᶜAṭṭār as an illustration of mystical union with God. (MṬ 42/4, pp. 148-49).

But the prototype of the lover whose consciousness is so competely filled with the beloved person that he feels identical with the person in all respects is once again Majnūn. The first to represent him as the model for this state of feeling seems to have been Shiblī.

With regard to one person saying to another: "I am you and you are I!", the speaker means by this what Shiblī meant when he said in a sermon: "Oh people! When he was asked about Laylā, Majnūn of the Banū ᶜĀmir used to answer: 'I am Laylā!'" (*Lumaᶜ* $360_{13\text{-}16}$;[4] *Schlaglichter* 498/120.106; *Nūr* 68).

The story is frequently found in variant and more elaborate versions.

Informers speak about Laylā in Majnūn's presence. Majnūn becomes angry and says: "We haven't separated from one another. I'm Laylā and Laylā is I. How can one forget oneself? To speak in someone's presence as if the person's absent is improper. For that gives the impression that a separation has taken place. But that's impossible." (Ibn al-Dabbāgh 27b).

A friend asks Majnūn how much he likes Laylā. He answers: "I swear by the celestial Throne and the celestial Footstool, (this and that should happen to me) if I like her." The surprised friend says: "And all these poems you composed, this not eating and sleeping, this lying in the dust and in blood, all this is meant to have happened without love?"[5] Majnūn answers: "That (was once and) is now over, because Majnūn is (now) Laylā and Laylā is Majnūn. Duality has disappeared now. Everything is Laylā, Majnūn is gone." (IN 22/8, pp. 360-61).

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4 The first *fakāna* in line 16 should be removed.
5 Read *bē* instead of *bar* in line 16b.

The doctor counsels Majnūn to have himself bled. The sick man goes to the bleeder. But when the latter is about to open a vein, Majnūn cries; "Stop! Don't shed Laylā's blood—for through love I've become Laylā completely!" (Sulṭān Walad, *Rabābnāma*, fol. 202a; *Mathnawī* 5/1999-2019).

As long as Majnūn still circles round Laylā's dwelling, Laylā thinks he's no real lover. When he goes into the desert, she says the same thing. When he becomes so weak that he falls asleep amid "thorns and earth", she says: "A true lover doesn't sleep." Only when he's become completely still and calm, and lost consciousness of himself, has completely become Laylā and no longer emits any sound except Laylā's name even in the prayers, does she acknowledge his love.—Only someone whose self has become extinguished is a real lover. If one atom of a Ṣūfī's being still exists, he's distant from true Sufism. (MN 1/5; similarly in *Jawhar al-dhāt* 304a).

A parallel to this story is the *Mathnawī* version of the account about the hesitating lover (above p. 390).

A lover knocks on his beloved's door and answers the question: "Who's there?" by saying: "I!" Then his beloved sends him away as being still immature. After a long while the man, who in the meantime has become mature, knocks at his beloved's door again and now answers the question: "Who's there?" by saying: "You!" Then he's admitted. (*Mathnawī* 1/3056).

One night Majnūn beholds Laylā in a dream, jumps up and clings to the hem of her skirts. When he wakes up, he observes that he's holding onto the hem of his own garment. (Zulālī, *Maḥmūd u Ayāz* 79-80).

A variant:

A lover sees the beloved in a dream and takes hold of his ear. When he wakes up, he's holding his own ear in his hand. (*Jawhar al-dhāt* 158b).

In ᶜAṭṭār stories about Maḥmūd and Ayāz which deal with this theme are not lacking.

Maḥmūd and Ayāz are playing polo. After the game is over, the sultan asks Ayāz: "Who plays better, you or I?" The slave answers: "The shah himself should decide that." Maḥmūd asks a spectator. The person asked replies: "I didn't see any difference between the two of you. When I looked at Maḥmūd, he was completely Ayāz, and when I observed Ayāz, from head to foot he was Maḥmūd. If I had seen two different persons, I could decide between them, but since they're both one, I can't make a decision." (MN 28/2).—(The story symbolizes the mystic's oneness with the divine beloved).

Combined with extremely skilful courtly flattery as only an Ayāz understands, the motif appears in the following story:

Maḥmūd asks Ayāz, who one morning is radiating exceptional beauty, whether he finds himself or the sultan more handsome. Ayāz answers: "I'm more handsome." The sultan says: "Bring a mirror!" Ayāz: "It's judgement is distorted." The sultan: "Whom should we call then as a judge?" Ayāz says: "The

heart's mirror." The sultan: "Then ask your heart which of us two is more handsome!" After a moment Ayāz says: "I'm more handsome." Maḥmūd asks: "And what proof do you have?" Ayāz answers: "When I look at myself, I see only the sultan and nothing of myself. Since I've become Maḥmūd completely, I'm necessarily more handsome." (MN 38/9). (In reality Maḥmūd was extremely ugly. *Siyāsatnāma*, Tehran, 34, *Faṣl* 7).

Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī finds again in himself the disappeared Shams-i Tabrīzī and uses his name as his *nom de plume* for his own *ghazals*. (*Der Islam* 26/1940/123-24).

18

In many theoreticians of love, as we have seen (p. 422), the feeling of being identical with the beloved is brought into connection with the Platonic doctrine of the primeval affinity of souls which are in love with one another. The mystics apply to this same psychic occurrence the concept of *fanāʾ*, self-extinction. The lowest, ethical level of *fanāʾ* is giving up egotism, renunciation of all selfish impulses (above p. 398), the merging of the individual's will with the will of the beloved. The next level is the disappearance of the lover's characteristics which become replaced by those of the beloved. Thus Junayd defines love as the replacement of the lover's characteristics by those of the beloved (*Lumaᶜ* $59_{16\text{-}17}$; *Schlaglichter* 110/30.4), and Ḥallāj defines love as "being with the beloved by removing one's own characteristics".

Qiyāmuka maᶜa maḥbūbika bi-khalᶜi awṣāfik. Qushayrī, *Risāla* 145, *Bāb al-maḥabba*; *Sendschreiben* 444/48.9).

From there it is only one further step to the disappearance of a sense of ego, of consciousness of personality itself. (See above pp. 425 f.). That is what Junayd means when, at the end of a poetic stichomythia between himself and the beloved, he says: "And when I ask: 'What sin have I committed?', she says: 'Your existence is a sin to which no other sin can be compared' (above p. 408). But if one wishes, one can also understand the female beloved's answer as demanding the physical death of the male beloved (p. 406). On the other hand, physical death is also interpreted as a supreme, elevated form of extinction.

This is already suggested by the famous image of the moth which flutters into the beloved flame, becomes the flame for the space of one moment and in death achieves the desired union of love.

For the space of one moment he becomes his beloved. This is his fulfilment, and all this flying and circling about (the flame) is for this moment—when he actually enters into it. And we have already said that this is the real union of love. For a span of time the state of being fire accepts him as its guest and then quickly puts him outside the door of the ashhouse. (*Sawāniḥ* p. 60).

But generally *fanā*ᵓ only consists in altering the awareness of one's ego. Concerning the details of the state of consciousness in these hybrid situations, one should not in fact argue too precisely with Ṣūfīs and mystical lovers. Strictly speaking, Majnūn ought not to say: "I am Laylā", because then he is actually still conscious of his ego, but he will only have attained real extinction those moments when he says nothing except: "Laylā", and the lover ought not to say to the other, as Junayd demands (p. 421): "Oh I!", but must say to himself: "Oh you!" or "Oh He!" This is also not so important in the case of profane love, whereas, while disappearance in God can still be viewed as tolerable, saying: "I am God" can be interpreted as heresy.

As we shall come to see, ᶜAṭṭār uses images for these situations which suggest the merging of the mystical lover's individual existence in the beloved's person which has been expanded to include a universal dimension. The drop disappears in the ocean, or to remain in the human domain: the lover becomes a hair among the locks of the beloved. (Cf. in this regard *Sawāniḥ*, *Faṣl* 19/4).

Maᶜshūq Ṭūsī says to a novice: "Melt away! For when you've utterly melted away in love and become as thin as a hair, then you'll have a place among the beloved's locks." (MṬ 44/1, pp. 156-57).

The man in love must be hot (joyfully willing) for destruction, he must become completely annihilated in the beloved. Become without trace on the path of your beloved so that in eternity you may be the beloved completely!

The following is a rather extreme story dealing with this theme:

Maḥmūd is pursuing a wild boar. Ayāz weeps. The sultan asks him why he's weeping. The slave says: "Out of jealousy that you pursue a creature which flees from you." Maḥmūd: "I do this in order to catch it and lay it low." Ayāz says: "Now my jealousy is a thousand times greater because you don't catch me but the animal which flees from you." The sultan: "But I'll kill it afterwards." Ayāz says: "Now my jealousy has become a hundred thousand times greater. Why don't you kill me?" Maḥmūd: "But then I'll eat it!" Ayāz says: "Now my jealousy knows no bounds. If you took me as your food, I'd disappear entirely and become Maḥmūd entirely, whereas now I'm only a poor slave." (MN 39/6).

A purely symbolic story:

Maḥmūd visits Ayāz who's asleep, kisses him and caresses his feet. When Ayāz revives from sleep's unconsciousness, the sultan withdraws.—The beloved

is only there, appearing in the place of the extinct lover, as long as the consciousness of self, of the ego, is submerged. When consciousness returns to the ego again, the beloved disappears. (See Chpt. 28/7).

The two following stories are also allegorical:

The self of the lover is the barrier, the partition wall, which separates him from the beloved. If your "you" disappears from the middle, then you remain without any partition wall for all eternity.

Ayāz comes to Maḥmūd, pale and devoid of his usual charm. The sultan asks him what's wrong with him. The slave replies that he can't say as long as the people standing around them form a partition wall between him and the sultan. Maḥmūd dismisses the courtiers, but Ayāz doesn't reveal his feelings now either, for he says: "Now I'm the partition wall myself. As long as I'm not gone myself, the secret can't be told. If I'm no longer there and only you alone are there, then my secret bubbles up from the earth." (MN 20/4).

Maḥmūd holds a review of his troops with the vizier Ḥasan and Ayāz. After the huge army, the troops and the elephants have marched past, Mahmūd says to Ayāz: "All these elephants and soldiers of mine are your property. You're my sultan." Ayāz appears not to pay any attention to the words and doesn't answer. The vizier reproaches him, saying he really should show respect and thank the sultan for this display of favor. Ayāz replies: "There are two answers to what you say. The first is this. If I'd prostrated myself before the sultan or said something to him, I'd have made myself noticeable as an active, independent person along with him. But I'm only a slave. For the kindness he shows me every day and the favor he's shown me today, there's no conceivable service I may render in return. Not to make myself noticeable was the correct behavior for me in this case." The vizier admits that Ayāz is right but asks for the second reason. Ayāz replies that this can't be spoken in the vizier's presence. Maḥmūd dismisses Ḥasan and asks to hear the second secret answer. Ayāz says: "Whenever the shah looks at me with perfect kindness, my whole being is submerged in the splendor of this look. But after I myself have completely disappeared, I can't still prostrate myself before him. Then I'm no longer there, only the shah is there. You're only practicing your lordliness toward yourself. I'm only a shadow that's disappeared in the sun." (MṬ 42/3, pp. 149-50.—See 28/7 below).

Saᶜdī presents a story which belongs in this category and is perhaps closer to reality:

A beggar falls in love with a prince, nor does he stop constantly turning up in his vicinity despite the blows he receives from the prince's guards. He says that even if they placed a noose around his head like a tent peg, he wouldn't go away. And to die by the prince's sword wouldn't make any difference to him either. One day he kisses the prince's stirrup. The prince becomes furious and turns his horse away from him. The beggar says: "Don't turn your horse away! Because a sultan doesn't turn his horse away from a nothing. Alongside your be-

ing I have no being... If you see that I've committed an offense, don't rebuke me, for you 'stick your head out of my collar' (you are me). That's why I touched your stirrup, because I considered myself as non-existent." (Sa^c^dī, *Būstān*, *Bāb* 3, 1st story).

The poet ^c^Irāqī wishes to clasp the beloved in his arms but to disappear at the same time.

Myself having disappeared and the beloved in my arms—that's how I wish to enjoy life with that beautiful picture.

Man rafta az miyāna u ō dar kanār-i man bā ān nigār ^c^aysh badhīn sān-am ārzūst. Dīwān 80.

Will it ever happen that good fortune sees me asleep one night, and he's in my arms, while I've disappeared?

Āyā buwadh ki bakhtam yak shab ba-khwāb bīnadh ō dar kanār u ān gah man rafta az miyāna? (Ibid. 151).

If ^c^Irāqī disappeared, I'd have the beloved in my arms!

Gar ^c^Irāqī birūn shudhē zi-miyān way-rā andar kanār dāshtamē. (Ibid. 175).

19

Closeness to the beloved is the highest good for the lover. Real life for him is only such life as he has spent in the beloved's presence. In measuring it, a completely different scale of magnitude is employed than in ordinary life.

A dervish asks Majnūn how old he is. He answers: "One thousand and forty years." The questioner says: "What did you say? Have you gone mad?" Majnūn answers: "The supreme time, when Laylā showed me her face for one moment, constitutes a thousand years, and my own natural age, to be reckoned as pure loss, amounts to forty years." (IN 3/9, p. 71).

A method of calculating a person's age different from the normal way forms the basis for a Bektashī story: Someone visits a Bektashī cemetery and sees written on the gravestones: Ahmed Dede, died at the age of 3; Ismail Dede, died at the age of 5, etc. When in surprise he asks what this form of calculation means, he's told that only those years are given during which the person in question had been alive in the religious sense.

But closeness to the beloved is rather rare. There is a proverb which says: "More rare than being together with the beloved and the absence of the guardian."

Andaru min waṣli'l-ḥabīb wa-ghaybati'l-raqīb.

Majnūn sees painted on a wall a picture of Majnūn and Laylā sitting together. He cries out: "Now at last I see them actually together! Am I not dreaming? Laylā

and Majnūn sitting together! Who has ever seen them together?" (IN 20/12, pp. 328-29).

Closeness to the beloved can in fact have various strange effects.

As we saw above (p. 402), of the three different ways the lover manages to put up with suffering Muḥammad Ghazzālī cites in the first instance the one according to which the perception of pain is submerged in the sensation of love and disappears. The presence of the beloved person causes the sensation of pain to disappear.

The anaesthesia caused by beholding beauty is already mentioned in the Koran. The women, who behold Joseph's beauty while peeling oranges, cut their fingers without noticing it. (Surah 12/31).

In the same category as well is the saying of the early mystic Sarī al-Saqaṭī (d. 257/871) which Junayd relates:

I asked Sarī al-Saqaṭī: "Does the lover feel the pain of suffering?" He said: "No." I said: "And if someone struck him with a sword?" He said: "No, not even if someone struck him with a sword seventy times in a row." (*Elixir* 171; *Iḥyāʾ* 4/298; *Stufen* 737/F.274; Ibn al-Dabbāgh 24a).

The classic story regarding anaesthesia produced by the presence of the beloved is the one about the flogged lover. It appears in ᶜAṭṭār in the following form:

One day Bāyazīd goes to the market of the money-changers to attend to some business. Along the way he sees a sinner, a wine-drinker, who's being punished by flogging and who's covered in streams of blood. Despite his torment, the man emits no cry in pain but laughs and says: "Oh, if only they always whipped me like this and struck me with a fiery sword!" When the flogging is over, Bāyazīd asks him how he managed to bear the torment with such a cheerful spirit. He answers: "My beloved was standing close by and was looking at me. When I saw him standing there, I felt nothing of the pain. If my beloved stands there for my sake, how should I not remain steadfast?" When Bāyazīd hears this, he weeps and says to himself: "You poor old man! Learn the path of religion from this drinker! Who are you and who is he?" (IN 11/7, pp. 175-76).

In the variants of the story anaesthesia does not always appear. But then the one who is flogged receives help to bear the pain through the presence of the beloved.

In the Sharqiyya[6] quarter of Baghdad they meted out a thousand lashes to a drinker who was in love. He didn't lose his composure and didn't break down. An ascetic went to him and asked how he achieved this. He said: "My beloved was on hand, and through the power of his gaze I endured this." (ᶜAyn al-Quḍāt, *Lawāʾiḥ*, *Der Islam* 21/1933/94-95. And a similar version in *al-ᶜIqd al-farīd* of Muḥammad b. Ṭalḥa, Cairo 1283, p. 29).

A robber had a hand and foot chopped off. He took no note of it. Someone came to him and saw him happily laughing in this situation. He asked: "How can you be in such a happy mood?" The robber said: "It's nothing surprising. My beloved is here and is looking at me in a friendly way. The power of his gaze has overwhelmed me and his strong presence has cut me off from myself." (*Der Islam* 21/1933/95).

It's related that one time Shiblī saw a crowd of people and beheld a young man who was stretched out and subjected to a hundred lashes. But he made no sound indicating pain, nor did he call out for help or say one word. And yet he was of paltry build and weak physique. Then he received one more lash. At that he cried out for help and was clearly in pain. Then they let him go. Shiblī was amazed by his behavior, walked a few paces after him and said to him: "I was amazed at the strength with which you endured this, despite the weakness of your body." The young man said to him: "Oh Shaykh, high aspiration (*al-himam*), and not the body, is what withstands the torment." The shaykh said: "I noticed that you endured the hundred lashes but you couldn't endure the last one and lost your steadfastness." The man said: "Yes, my brother. The eye for whose sake I was punished looked at me during the hundred lashes, and I enjoyed what happened to me because I was submerged in his gaze. But during the final stroke the eye was veiled from me and I was left alone with myself. Then I felt the pain." (Ibn al-ᶜArīf 84).

Ibn al-Marʾa, the commentator on Ibn al-ᶜArīf, relates the story with somewhat different words. *Al-Qawānīn*, Ms. Veliyeddin 1828, fol. 111a. In a shorter form in Ibn al-Dabbāgh 24a.

A variant that involves turning toward God:

Bishr ibn al-Ḥārith, the Barefoot, relates: "In the Sharqiyya quarter of Baghdad I came upon a man who'd been punished with a thousand lashes and hadn't emitted any cry during the whipping. Afterwards he was taken off to prison, and I followed him and asked him: 'Why were you whipped like this?' He said: 'Because I'm in love (with someone).' I said: 'And why were you silent while they whipped you?' He said: 'My beloved stood opposite me and looked at me.' Then I said: 'What if you were to see the Great Beloved?' The man then let out a

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6 This word is unfortunately missing in my article. The Sharqiyya quarter is located on the west bank of the Tigris. Cf. M. Canard, *Histoire de la dynastie des Hʾamdanides* 1/157.

cry and fell to the ground dead." (*Iḥyāʾ* 4/298, *Bayān ḥaqīqat al-riḍā*; *Stufen* 737/F.274; *Elixir* 171).

Two variants occur in Qushayrī:

Abū Jaᶜfar al-Faraj relates: "I saw how a man who was known by the name of 'the camel of ᶜĀʾisha', a robber, was whipped and I spoke to him, saying: 'When is the pain of the lashes easiest for you to bear?' He said: 'When the person for whose sake we're being whipped sees us.'" (*Risāla* 76, *Bāb al-tawakkul*; *Sendschreiben* 238 f./19.7; Fīrūzābādī, *Nasl* fol. 77b).

Manṣūr ibn Khalaf al-Maghribī relates: "They stripped a man naked for flogging. When he was being led back to prison, he called one of his companions to him and spit out in his hand small pieces of silver. When they asked him about this, he said: 'I had two silver coins in my mouth, and near the group (of onlookers) was an eye on account of which I didn't want to cry out because it saw me. Then I bit on the two silver coins, and they broke in pieces in my mouth.'" (*Risāla* 86, *Bāb al-ṣabr*; *Sendschreiben* 267/22.10).

Moreover, it was considered a glorious feat among members of the robber gangs to endure a whipping without letting out a cry of pain.

Talbīs 421, translated by Margoliouth in *Islamic Culture* 12/1938/449-50. Regarding these gangs cf. for example Massignon, *Recueil* 69, ftn.

Another rather improbable case of anaesthesia:

Sumnūn al-Muḥibb relates: "A man from our neighborhood had a slave girl whom he loved dearly. She fell ill. Then he set about cooking her a preparation of dates (*ḥays*). While he was stirring the kettle, the slave girl cried out: 'Ah!' In confusion he dropped the ladle and went on stirring with his fingers until they fell off (without his noticing it). The slave girl said: 'What's this?' He replied: 'This is because of your "Ah!"'" (*Iḥyāʾ* 4/300, *Bayān ḥaqīqat al-riḍā*; *Stufen* 744/F.290; Ibn al-Dabbāgh 28b; Fīrūzābādī, *Nasl* 82a).

Cf. also the story about Majnūn above p. 386.

20

However, closeness to the beloved, although it hovers before the lover's sight as the highest good fortune, is by no means always calming and a cause of happiness. Indeed, real merging in oneness cannot be attained by means of external union. In fact, closeness to the beloved only increases longing. And longing can only be quenched through extinction of the ego.

Aḥmad Ghazzālī describes in detail the psychic events which occur in close proximity to the beloved:

Any longing which can decrease by means of communion in love (*wiṣāl*) is deficient and mixed with the false. Communion in love must be firewood for the fire of longing. Longing becomes greater through the communion of love. And this is the level at which the lover attributes perfection to the beloved and strives to become one with him. Nothing but that can quench his thirst. He even perceives his own existence as a burden. (*Sawāniḥ*, *Faṣl* 23/3).

Similar, though somewhat more sensual, sensations already find expression in four famous verses of Ibn al-Rūmī (d. 283/896):

I embrace him (her) and my soul still goes on longing for him (her). Yet is there a more intimate way of being close than embracing? I kiss his (her) mouth, so that my ardor may die but the thirst of love which I feel only burns even more. The amount of ardor within me is too great to be healed by what the lips drink in. As if the thirst of my heart could not be quenched by anything but our two souls melting into one.

Uʿāniquhū(hā) wa'l-nafsu baʿdu mashūqatun ilayhi(hā) wa-hal baʿda'l-ʿināqi tadānī...
Al-ʿUbaydī, *Sharḥ al-Maḍnūn bih ʿalā ghayr ahlih*, p. 279; *Wāḍiḥ* 1/59 et passim.

When the lover sees the beloved, he's overcome with tormenting unrest. For his Being is only a borrowed Being and it keeps its gaze fixed on the *qibla* of becoming nothing. His Being is uneasy in the sensation of love and wishes to find peace in true union. But he's not yet fully mature. When he is completely mature and they then meet, he loses consciousness of himself. For once the lover has become mature in love, love has already conquered his very foundations. And when the chariot of love's intimacy appears, his Being then sets out and is gone. (*Sawāniḥ*, *Faṣl* 25_{1-6}).

Thus proximity to the beloved for the lover who has not yet reached the final level of extinction is not calming and a cause of happiness, but tormenting, even unbearable. The sole path to peace, to breathing a sigh of relief, is the path which leads to annihilation, a path which is closed, however, with the result that a tormenting, unbearable intermediary state arises which is characterized by a longing to be merged with the beloved, while a personal existence still remains.

The sign of perfect love consists in the beloved becoming a torment for the lover so that he has no strength at all to put up with him and to bear his burden, and he stands waiting at the door of annihilation. As long as the beloved's presence continues, the torment doesn't let up. He then finds no place to breathe a sigh of relief except in annihilation, but the door of annihilation is shut because by virtue of his existence he still remains. Here eternal pain prevails. Only if extinction casts its shadow for a moment and receives him as a guest in the shadow of disappearance without trace, can he then find peace for a moment. (*Sawāniḥ*, *Faṣl* 59).

The annihilating torment of the beloved's presence, the desire to melt into nothingness and yet being unable to do so, is here depicted with great vividness. The *Blue Anonymous* expresses this in simpler terms:

...and if he finds himself in the communion of love (*wiṣāl*), the same torment and agitation still continues. (The 13th requirement).

A few verses of ᶜAṭṭār handle the same motif:

The torment of the lover's soul comes from the beauty which is impossible for the soul to bear in the case of one like you (?). If he becomes extinguished, he then finds release from it. In extinction alone is their further life (*baqāʾ*). The *pīr* of the Companions of the Prophet formulated a similitude for this: as if you poured a sea over someone who is thirsty. Another similitude is the moth and the flame. The moth happily gives up its life in the burning glow of the fire. (AN in 6/7).

Dhū'l-Nūn, while circumambulating the Kaᶜba, meets an emaciated, pale-looking bedouin and asks him: "Are you a lover?" The bedouin answers: "Yes." Dhū'l-Nūn: "Is the object of your love near or far?" The bedouin: "He's near." Dhū'l-Nūn: "Is he favorably inclined toward you?" The bedouin: "Yes." Dhū'l-Nūn: "God is sublime! The object of your love is near, and you're so wretched and emaciated?" The bedouin then says: "Oh ignorant one! Don't you know that the torment of proximity and favorable inclination is a thousand times worse than the torment of remoteness and reluctance?" (TA $1/123_{1\text{-}8}$).

As an example of the overwhelming effect of the beloved person appearing and inability to endure seeing the beloved, Manṣūr al-Maghribī in Qushayrī recounts another bedouin story.

A Ṣūfī (*baᶜḍ al-fuqarāʾ*) came to a bedouin tribe and was received by a young man as a guest. While the young man was waiting upon the Ṣūfī, he suddenly lost consciousness. The Ṣūfī asked what happened to him, and the man said it was a female cousin of his whom he was in love with. She had walked about in her tent and the young man had seen the dust of her hem and lost consciousness. The Ṣūfī went to the door of the tent and said: "As a guest of yours I have the right to respect and hospitality. I've come to intercede with you on behalf of this young man. Be friendly to him since he loves you so much!" She answered: "God is sublime! Do you have all your wits about you? He doesn't even have strength enough to look at the dust of my robe's hem. How should he have the strength to endure being together with me?" (*Risāla* 29, *al-Satr wa'l-tajallī*; *Sendschreiben* 130/2.13; in Persian in ᶜAyn al-Quḍāt, *Lawāʾiḥ* 21b).

The anecdote appears in Aḥmad Ghazzālī as a story about Majnūn and Laylā:

The people of Majnūn's tribe came together and said to Laylā's people: "This man will be destroyed out of love. What harm would it do if he were allowed to see Laylā once?" They answered: "We've nothing against this, but Majnūn him-

self doesn't have the strength to endure seeing her." They brought Majnūn and lifted the curtain over the door of Laylā's tent. One could still scarcely make out Laylā's shadow, when Majnūn, true to his name (the madman), collapsed by the door. They said: "It's just as we told you. He doesn't have the strength to see her." (*Sawāniḥ*, *Faṣl* $25_{9\text{-}14}$).

The story, as it appears again in ᶜAṭṭār, seems somewhat weaker:

As soon as Majnūn saw the tent of Laylā, he ran away. He couldn't endure looking at it. He turned yellow like saffron, his hair stood on end, and a trembling came over his limbs, as happens to the fox when it sees the wolf.—The power of love is so great it makes the bravest weak and defenseless. (IN 6/6, p. 108).

Only someone accustomed to the light of beauty is able to endure it. Thus the diver first accustoms his child to the water until, being used to swimming and diving, it's capable of seeking pearls. The women in Egypt, who weren't used to the sight of Joseph, cut their hands with the knife for peeling oranges when they suddenly saw him. And they forgot to eat and drink for forty days. Zulaykhā didn't fall into such a state because she'd grown accustomed to the sight of Joseph. (AN in 6/7).

21

In the same category clearly belong those stories in which the unexpected and unaccustomed proximity of the beloved person, having suddenly been granted, actually leads to the lover's death. A theory on death caused by emotion of this kind is attributed to Pythagoras (*Wāḍiḥ* $1/27_6$) or "one of the medical doctors" (*Zahra* 1/17).

ᶜAṭṭār recounts a whole series of such stories. For the most part he explains this "psychic death" as due to the weakness of the lover who is incapable of bearing the presence and splendor of the beautiful beloved's manifestation, just as the moon disappears in the splendor of the sun whom she loves. He also uses images for this which he otherwise employs for extinction (*fanā*), such as the disappearance of the drop in the ocean and of the shadow in the sun so that physical death appears as the highest level of extinction. Sometimes this death while beholding beauty is also presented as the exemplary ideal case of perfect love.

Sultan Sanjar has a beautiful sister named Ṣafiyya Khātūn who lives in Marw. An Arab prince by the name of Sharaf al-Dawla sees her one Friday after the prayers and becomes half-crazed out of love for her. The princess notices how he falls to the ground unconscious because of her, but she doesn't say a word. When

Sultan Sanjar comes back from the hunt, Sharaf al-Dawla asks him in Arabic for his sister's hand in marriage. The sultan, who doesn't understand any Arabic, asks Mīr Ṭāhir what the man wants. Mīr Ṭāhir says to himself: "If I tell the truth, the sultan will have his head chopped off." And so he says: "He's a mentally deranged person who asks the sultan to pronounce a blessing on him." The sultan has the unfortunate man bound in chains and thrown in prison so he may perhaps come to his senses there. The following Friday the princess looks about in vain for her admirer and learns that he's sitting in prison. She has herself carried to the prison in a litter under the pretext that she wishes to distribute alms there. In the prison she shows her face to the unfortunate lover who immediately faints. At night she has him brought into the castle in a sack. But again the Arab shows himself incapable of bearing the beauty of the princess and behaves so foolishly that she now sends him to a mosque school (*madrasa*) in the hope that he can be brought back to his senses. There the Arab becomes ill and is close to death. The princess hears of this and visits him in order to help him. But the sick man himself asks her to leave him alone because he doesn't have the strength to endure seeing her. To thank her for her visit, however, he wants to give her the only gift he has—the half-life which still remains to him. Having spoken thus, he dies. The princess addresses these words to the dead man: "Oh you who were destroyed through your weakness, three times I came outside to you and all three times you weren't man enough to endure my proximity. With so weak a heart you began this love-play with me!" Then she has him dressed in a shroud and buried. A drop had disappeared in the ocean. (MN 14/1).—The story is related after the world-traveller visits the moon in vain. The moon is in fact itself an example of a weak lover. She loves the sun but doesn't have the strength to endure his proximity and disappears in him. (MN 14/0).

This story is followed by a few short anecdotes which simply amplify the particular motif "weakness and unmanliness".

An effeminate youth (*mukhannath*), fleeing from a snake, jumps onto a roof and cries out: "Oh woe! Where is there a man and a stone?" (MN 14/2).—A man names his son Rustam, but he grows up to be a weakling. (MN 14/3).—A gebr gives his son the name "eternally living" but the boy dies the very next day. (MN 14/4. Cf. above p. 41).

The beautiful daughter of a king—her beauty is described in great detail—has a garden and engages workers to cultivate it. One day while she's walking in the garden, a young lad among the gardeners sees her and is so overwhelmed by her beauty that he falls to the ground and he continues to lie there, out of his senses, until midnight. The princess noticed his state, has him brought to her and arranges a banquet for him with wine and music. A trembling comes over the young man and he weeps so much that he can scarcely see the princess' beauty. When finally the princess offers him a cup of wine and puts a lock of her hair in

his hand, he falls to the ground dead. He wasn't man enough to endure her beauty. (MN 39/2).

The story is introduced with the remark that in contrast to the behavior of the hesitator who spends the whole night before the beloved's door in doubt about whether he should knock or not (above pp. 389 f.), true love consists in becoming completely an eye and then sacrificing one's life. Thus, plunging headlong into death, the way the moth rushes into the flame, is here demanded as the ideal behavior. (It is of no concern to the poet that he one moment interprets his stories this way and the next another way).

If without having the eye for it you seek the king's proximity, you bring about your own murder yourself.

An officer falls in love with the handsome son of the king. When the prince is sent against the enemy at the head of an army, the officer procures a horse for himself and attaches himself to the army to be able to look at the prince to his heart's content. The prince's army is defeated, and the prince is taken prisoner. The officer arranges it so that he's captured along with the prince. They're both held in the same prison with chains around their feet. When the prince asks this officer, who until then was unknown to him, who he actually is, the officer confesses his love and relates why he went on campaign as a volunteer with the prince's army.

The officer is in bliss to be together with the prince and to be able to lighten his lot as a prisoner by attending upon him. He prays to God every day to make this imprisonment last as long as possible. The king, however, makes peace with his enemy and it's agreed in contracting peace that the prince should marry the daughter of his former adversary. The prisoners are set free, and during the forty days of marriage festivities the officer remains separated from his prince. After the fortieth day the prince ascends the throne in the full splendor of his regalia and surrounded by his retinue. He remembers his admirer and has him summoned. The officer, upon seeing the young king, faints. When he comes to his senses again, the prince asks him why he lost consciousness like this. The officer answers: "In that prison it didn't enter my mind who you really are. Now, after forty days of separation, when you appear in such splendor and power, I can't endure beholding you. If you were to appear again in your ordinary clothes, then I could be the way I was before, but this wealth of radiance goes beyond my strength." Having spoken thus, he dies. (IN 4/4, pp. 80-84).—The pantheistic idea, which this story is likewise meant to illustrate, shall occupy our attention later on (29/6 below).

The Sāmānid ruler Nūḥ ibn Manṣūr (366-87/977-97) has a handsome son.—The beauty of the son is described in numerous verses.—A soldier from the king's army falls in love with him. The ruler hears of this, arranges a troop review and orders the prince to dress up in his best possible finery. The ruler sta-

tions himself with the prince and an intelligence officer in readiness to view the parade. The intelligence officer has been ordered to give the ruler a secret sign as soon as the man in love with the prince appears among the troops marching past. The soldier passes by and looks at the prince with furtive glances. He's an impeccable soldier as far as his physique, appearance and equipment. The ruler then orders the handsome son to undo his cloak, to go to the soldier, and clasp him in his arms and press his face against the soldier's face. He should only release him once he himself, the ruler, gives him the sign to do so. The prince does what he's been ordered. But when he releases the soldier upon a sign from his father, the soldier falls to the ground dead. Nūḥ ibn Manṣūr has the dead man buried in his own family tomb. When they ask him why he has done all this, he answers: "I wanted to test whether his love was true, and because he died in love with us and for us, he belongs among us." (MN 32/2).

A man living in an ashhouse falls in love with a prince. He loves him for ten years without any hope. One day the vizier finds the opportunity to tell the prince that such-and-such a beggar has loved him for years. The prince is favorably disposed, while playing polo causes the ball to fly in the beggar's direction, and calls to him: "Catch the ball and throw it to me!" The beggar collapses in unconsciousness and must be carried back to his ashhouse. The prince visits him there, but the poor wretch has as little strength to endure the presence of the prince as the moth has to bear the flame. He fetches up a single sigh and dies. He didn't have the strength to be together with the beloved. (AN 21/2).—ᶜAṭṭār employs the story as an allegory for the weak love of God. He then adds to this the idea that God has no need of the person who loves Him. (On this cf. pp. 575 f. below).

A king has a handsome son. When the latter goes out riding, he's guarded from intrusive glances by guards with drawn swords. A dervish falls in love with the prince and spends his days and nights weeping, and no longer eats and sleeps. He lives for the fact that every now and then he can see the prince ride by in the distance. He torments himself to such an extent that in the end he's more dead than alive. One day when he sees the prince ride out again with his retinue, he can't stand it any longer. He bloodies his head banging it against a rock and finally falls down unconscious and covered in blood. The prince's guard notices him and reports to the king that a dubious person (*rind*) is pestering his son with proposals of love. The angered king orders the dervish to be hung on the gallows upside down. When the unfortunate man is brought to the place of execution, he asks for a postponement just long enough to utter a prayer. The request is granted him, and he beseeches God to let him see, just once before his death, the beauty of that boy. Then he would gladly give up his life a hundred thousand times. The king's vizier hears the prayer, is moved by it and reports it to the king. The vizier's narration causes the king to change his mind and he decides to forgive the dervish. The handsome prince himself is sent to the site of the gal-

lows to release the man in love with him. When the boy arrives at the gallows and sees the dervish lying on the ground, he can't help it but breaks into tears before the gathered people and is now smitten with love himself. He calls to the dervish in a friendly manner. The latter lifts his head and when he sees the prince, he says: "My sovereign, you could have killed me like this (simply through your presence). There was no need for all these soldiers." After these words he lets out a cry and dies. The proximity of the beloved resulted in his becoming completely extinguished (*fānī-i muṭlaq shudh*) and transferring to non-existence (*maᶜdūm shudh*).—The poet continues: "Nor am I any longer there after beholding the splendor of that sun. I've disappeared like a drop in the ocean, a drop which can no longer be found." (MṬ 44/4, pp. 159-62).

The story occurs in another form in Saᶜdī, *Gulistān* 5/4; Chauvin 8/142-43.

According to the *Majālis al-ᶜushshāq*, Ms. Bodleiana, Ouseley Add. 24, Catalogue 1, no. 1271, *Majlis* 71, fol. 177b (not in Ms. Ayasofya), the dervish was a certain Abū'l-Najīb al-Khuzārī who is described as a half-crazed person squatting on the ground and wearing a robe of poverty. He is meant to have come from Khuzār in Transoxania to Marw in the year 421 AH under Alp Arslan. The prince was no less a personage than the future sultan Jalāl al-Dīn Malikshāh, and the vizier was Niẓām al-Mulk. I have not found any information about this Khuzārī to date. Regarding the locality cf. *Muᶜjam al-buldān* 2/432. A miniature which is found in the Bodleiana Ms. depicts the scene. And another miniature is contained in the Ms. of the same work in Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı, Hazine 829 II, fol. 188a.

Here physical death is interpreted as extinction (in the sense ᶜAṭṭār conceives of it).

We have already become acquainted with the story of the beggar who falls in love with Ayāz and after having given a sermon on true love to Maḥmūd, dies (p. 393), as well as the story about the woman who loves Ayāz and dies after the latter has served her a delight-bestowing drink (p. 394).

Muḥammad Zangī relates in the *Nuzhat al-ᶜāshiqīn*:

On his way back from hunting a prince passes through a city. Among the curious who wish to see the prince's splendid procession is a student of the religious sciences who until now had been a staunch opponent of love. His gaze falls upon the handsome prince. He immediately falls in love and must admit that he's captured by love which he previously held to be so reprehensible. He spends the night, which seems like it will never end, in a terrible state. When at last it's morning, he rushes to the prince's encampment in the hope of catching a glimpse of him. But he finds the campsite empty. The prince has moved on with his retinue. Then the student sets out on the road for the city where the prince lives. His disturbed behavior is described to the prince's father. The latter in his day had "drunk from this beaker" himself and therefore has some sympathy for the state of his son's lover. He arranges a great banquet and, along with the prominent men of the city, he also invites the student. When the meal is fin-

ished, the king wishes to give delight to the young man through his son's proximity. He orders the prince to wait upon the guests as wine-pourer. When the royal wine-pourer comes to the student, the latter collapses and dies.

In another of Muḥammad Zangī's stories a student falls in love with a girl and becomes ill. Finally, she's betrothed to him but when she comes to his bedside, he can't endure the manifestation of her beauty and dies. Thousands of people from the cultivated best circles, even those who didn't know the youth at all, dye their clothes dark blue as a sign of mourning and accompany the dead man to his grave. (Tarzî-Ateş, pp. 137-40).

An Arabic story about a prince and a dervish which has a certain similarity to the above-related one, since in it the young man also has compassion for his lover, but, by virtue of its happy ending and its details, differs from it, is found in the *Aswāq al-ashwāq*:

The author of the *Nadīm al-musāmara* says: "Naṣr Allāh ibn Aḥmad ibn Ḥubaysh, the Koran-teacher, relates: 'In Wāsiṭ, in one of the local cloisters (*ribāṭ*), there lived a Ṣūfī who was well known for his renunciation of the world, and for his chastity and honesty. He fell in love with a youth, the son of an *amīr*. He was regularly on the lookout for when the youth rode forth, and would position himself so he could see him. Sometimes he would also go to the playing-field when the youth was playing and watch him. He did this so long that most of the slaves and friends of the *amīr*'s son were aware of it. Then one evening after the last evening prayer, the youth with a number of his slaves, some riding and some on foot, went for one reason or another to visit an *amīr* and they passed by the cloister where the Ṣūfī lived. The Ṣūfī was standing upright on the roof in order to pray. When he heard the young man's voice, he fell from the roof into the street so that the noise of his fallen body caused the horses to scatter. The candle-bearers immediately rushed to see who it was. They recognized him and began to laugh. The youth asked them: "Why are you laughing?" They replied: "It's nothing." But he said: "I won't let the matter drop until you tell me the truth!" One of the companions then went up to him and told him in secret: "He's in love with you." The youth: "How long have you known this?" The companion: "For a long time now." The youth: "You've known a long time and didn't say anything to me about it? It's a bad thing when a man doesn't know who loves him!" Then he dismounted and went to the Ṣūfī, had himself given a candle, and bent over the man to take a better look at him. A drop of the candle dripped onto the face of the man lying there. He came to and beheld the youth bending over him. He then wept and said (verse): "Oh you who burn the face of the one who loves you with fire! Easy now! My tears will put out the fire. Only burn my body and all my limbs! But spare my heart, for you're there inside!"

Then the youth said: "From this night on you must retreat from me no longer!" He ordered that they carry the Ṣūfī to his house and he had him as a close friend for as long as the man lived.'" (*Aswāq al-ashwāq*, Ms. Beşir Ağa 552, fol. 334b; *Tazyīn al-aswāq* 2/19-20).

The same verses occur in a less noble context in *Thamarāt al-awrāq* in the margin of *Muḥāḍarāt al-udabāʾ*, Būlāq 1286, 1/31-32.

It would be futile simply to search for contrived allegories of mystical love of God in all these stories. They are indeed on occasion used as parables for mystical love but given that ᶜAṭṭār sometimes makes use of them as a symbol for one idea and sometimes for another, that he frequently does not give or suggest any mystical interpretation at all with regard to them, and furthermore, the fact that Muḥammad Zangī conceives of them as thoroughly worldly love stories, excludes the possibility of making all these stories evaporate into allegories. As far as love of princes is concerned, the Ḥanbalite preacher on morals, Ibn al-Jawzī, would not have found it necessary in his book against love (*Dhamm al-hawā*) expressly to warn against this phenomenon if it were all only pure allegorical play of the fantasy. There are even alleged sayings of the Prophet which warn against love of the sons of kings: "Don't sit together with the sons of kings, for souls experience a longing for them such as they don't experience for young girls!" (*Wāḍiḥ* 1/11) and: "Don't fill your eyes with the sons of kings, for they represent a temptation which is worse than the temptation of maidens!" (*Talbīs* 293).

As is well known, Hilālī (d. 939/1532) made a dervish's love for a prince—with a happy ending—the subject of a special epic (*Grundriss der iranischen Philologie* 2/302). It is translated by Ethé, *Morgenländische Studien*, Leipzig 1870, 197-282. Miniatures from a magnificent manuscript, which illustrate the story, have been published by Sir Thomas Arnold: *The Miniatures in Hilālī's Mystical Poem The King and the Dervish*. Privately printed Vienna 1926. The same subject is treated by ᶜĀrifī (d. 853/1449) in his epic *The Ball and the Polo Stick* (*Grundriss der iranischen Philologie* 2/302). Translation with miniatures in *The Ball and the Polo Stick or Book of Ecstasy. A translation of the Persian Poem Gūi u Chaugān or Hālnāma by ᶜĀrifī*, with three unpublished miniatures in colour by R. S. Greenshields. London, Luzac 1932. A miniature is also found in Carl Diehm, *Asiatische Reiterspiele*, Berlin 1941, Plate 8, opposite p. 208.

If one compares the above-related stories with the numerous anecdotes about psychic death due to love in the Arabic literature on love, for instance the *Maṣāriᶜ al-ᶜushshāq* of Sarrāj or *Mughulṭay's Dictionary of the Martyrs of Love* (*al-Wāḍiḥ*) or Ibn Ḥazm's *The Dove's Neck-Ring*, what emerges, apart from the dif-

ference of milieu in which most of the stories take place, as we have noted (p. 382), is an intrinsic difference as well. Aside from a few exceptions, in the Arabic stories the cause of death, which, moreover, in accordance with the style of the Arabic art of narrative is recounted without psychological reflections and discussions, is not the weakness of the lover who cannot endure the beloved beauty's presence, but there are external or internal impediments and restraints which hinder the union of the love pair, make the lovers ill, and finally in a more or less dramatic scene cause them to die. External hindrances of this kind may be family politics, for example, which will not allow the marriage, or a social distance between the partners which is too great. As for inner hindrances, fear on the part of the girl, the woman or the boy, of being talked about by people may prevent them from granting the lover the possibility of even the most harmless meeting, with the result that they would rather let him die—and then sometimes follow after him in death—, or finally the excessive ascetic piety of one of the two partners. Pious young men would rather die than accept their girl's invitation which compassion has elicited from her. Others would rather die out of nobility than accept from a friend who has married the beloved the offer to give her up on his behalf. And there is much else of this kind.

Closest perhaps to our stories are the narratives in which intimacy in love, when finally conceded, comes too late and so no longer has a healing, happy effect on the lover who by now is inwardly broken, but only leads to his death.

The poet Mudrik ibn ᶜAlī (circa 390/1000, GAL², Suppl. 1/132-33), who is of bedouin origin and a *qāḍī* in Basra, loves a Christian boy named ᶜAmr ibn Yūḥannā. The latter avoids visiting him when he notices Mudrik is in love with him. Finally, the friends of the poet—by whom a long love poem to ᶜAmr in unusual metrical forms has become famous—manage to persuade the boy once more to visit his sick and utterly distraught lover, and to give him his hand. When Mudrik hears the greeting of his young friend, he loses consciousness. When he comes to again, he recites a few glowing verses on love and dies. (Yāqūt, *Irshād* [Margoliouth] 7/152-58; [Cairo] 19/135-46; *Tazyīn al-aswāq* 2/7-8).

One may also recall the famous story about the grammarian Aḥmad ibn Kulayb who died out of love for the young Aslam. (See the recently published *El Collar de la Paloma*... traducido del Arabe por Emilio García Gómez, Madrid 1952, pp. 315-20).

A Jewish story, which contains a similar motif, is related—allegedly from Ḥasan al-Baṣrī—by Ibn Abī'l-Dunyā:

An ascetic among the Israelites falls in love with a hetaera who asks a hundred dinars for the night. He raises the money with difficulty, but at the last moment recoils in pious timidity. She, being greatly impressed, offers to marry him, but he leaves her and returns to his homeland where he gives himself over to pious exercises but without being able to forget the beautiful woman. She then sells everything she owns and searches for her old lover in his homeland. When he sees her, he collapses and dies, whereupon she marries his brother and bears him seven future prophets... (*Wāḍiḥ* 1/139).

Those in love who died preserving their chastity are deemed martyrs according to one *ḥadīth*. (*Iḥyā'* 3/90, *Bayān faḍīlat man yukhālif, etc.*; Massignon, *Recueil* 239-40). The Ẓāhirite jurist Ibn Dāwūd cites this *ḥadīth* on his deathbed. He was himself destroyed by his love for Muḥammad ibn Jāmi[c] (above p. 397), a love which his religious views prevented him from fully enjoying.

22

Thus the beloved's presence which suddenly appears to the lover, the manifestation of beauty which unexpectedly overcomes him, is anything but an absolute cause of happiness and peace. It stirs up confusion and unrest, inflicts torment on the soul and indeed leads to death. But even then when the eye has accustomed itself to beauty's radiance and the soul perceives the rare proximity of the beloved as consoling and a cause of happiness, and longing appears to have been quenched, happiness is not perfect. For over their togetherness hovers the shadow of separation. One moment of being together is paid for with a thousand separations. In such a case they have scarcely sat down when the question arises: "When will you leave again?"

Amplification:

Abū [c]Alī al-Daqqāq visits one of his *murīd*s who is greatly pleased by this visit. As soon as the shaykh has seated himself, the disciple asks him: "Oh shaykh, when will you leave again?" Abū [c]Alī says: "Our togetherness has scarcely even come about, and you receive it with 'parting from one another'!" (MN 37/1).

In the world of imagination, however, there is no separation. This is what the *pīr* informs the world-traveller when the latter returns from visiting Imagination (*khayāl*). Fantasy can cause what is distant to be present.

That the beloved person resides in the heart and is permanently present there is a so frequently varied theme of the poets that we may content ourselves with a few limited examples.

And it's rare that I ask about someone who's present and whom I continually see, whose residence is in my heart, the light of whose beauty is in my eyes, and whose speech is in my ears. (Ibn al-Dabbāgh 6a).

And it's wondrous that I gaze day and night in the mirror of my heart and see only you.

W-īn ṭurfa ki dar āʾina-i dil shab u rōz   man mē-nigaram valē turā mē-bīnam.

Nuzhat al-majālis, Ms. Carullah 1676, 102.

True love, according to Aḥmad Ghazzālī, is precisely that love which lives from the internal image of the beloved.

Love in reality consists of the beloved's form becoming the image of (in) the lover's soul. And the soul then lives from this form which is forever present to the soul. That's why if the beloved is a thousand parasangs away, the lover sees him as present and views him as "nearer than all that is near". (*Sawāniḥ, Faṣl* 63_{1-5}).

Indeed, this inner togetherness is more perfect than external closeness to the beloved, because in the beloved's actual presence the lover feels it is impossible to achieve becoming truly one with him. The closer he approaches to him, the further he is from him. The ᶜUdhrite poet Jamīl already says: "My love dies when I'm together with you, and comes to life when we separate." (In Kinany, *Development of Gazal* 276). But Maḥmūd's complaint goes even deeper regarding the growing alienation in his love for Ayāz (above pp. 378 f.).

Aḥmad Ghazzālī teaches:

Here, however, is a great mystery. It consists in this that whoever is a true lover is continually with the beloved, and distance does not separate him from him. In fact nearness itself is distance. The hand of (external) nearness cannot attain his (the beloved's) hem. (*Sawāniḥ, Faṣl* 31/2).

This inner closeness is also deliverance from the tormenting and deadly effect of closeness to the beloved's beauty:

Here it happens that a person directs his gaze within himself and has nothing more to do with the exterior—to such an extent that if the beloved comes and draws him away from himself, he cannot endure the beloved's burden. For this vision in his own interior is appeasing, it diminishes any burden. Looking at the beloved, however, adds to the burden, and his death sentence casts forth its shadow. (*Sawāniḥ, Faṣl* 46/2).

In ᶜAṭṭār the motif of the beloved's inner presence, other than in the already cited passage on imagination and the story about

the secret passage which connects Maḥmūd with Ayāz (p. 345 above), is not developed further. Ibn ᶜArabī, a man with exceptional powers of imagination, attaches great importance to this phenomenon: "Union in the imagination is stronger (*ashaddu*) than external union" (*Futūḥāt* 2/338; Asín, *El Islam cristianizado* 496). He has amazing things to report about a visionary appearance of his own beloved:

The power of my imagination was so strong that in the external world my love physically presented the object of my love before my eyes, the way Gabriel displayed himself to the Prophet. At that time I couldn't look at him but he spoke to me, and I listened to him and understood what he said. For days on end he didn't let me eat. Whenever the table was set before me, he stood at the table's edge and said in a language which I heard with my ears: "You're eating while you see me?" And then I wouldn't accept the food. (*Futūḥāt* 2/325, *Bāb* 178; Asín, *El Islam cristianizado* 459).

This inner closeness of the beloved can actually go so far that his external closeness loses its importance because it does not signify true closeness. This lack of importance is naturally at its greatest in cases where the lover feels himself to be absolutely identical with the object of his love.

They said to Majnūn: "Laylā has come!" He said: "I myself am Laylā!", and then stuck his head under his garment again.

Majnūn-rā guftand: Laylī āmad! Guft: Man khwadh Laylīyam, wa-sar ba-girībān firō burd. ᶜAyn al-Quḍāt, *Zubda* 19a-b.

Someone brings Majnūn the news that he can now have Laylā. He says he doesn't want any woman. The messenger says: "Then drive this insane passion out of your mind!" Majnūn replies: "Remembering Laylā (mentioning her name) is more dear to me than Laylā herself."—In this way the mystic's heart is also completely filled with recollection of God. (MN 1/4).

The person who has entirely become the beloved no longer notices the beloved's physical closeness at all:

Aḥmad Ghazzālī relates in one of his sermons: "Jacob finally comes to Egypt and embraces in his arms Joseph whom he has missed for so long. At the same moment he cries out: "Where is Joseph? Has he fallen in the well?" They say to him: "What do you want? Why are you looking for him? You actually have him in your arms!" Jacob says: "Today I've become Joseph myself... I'm everything. Who's Joseph? I've found myself, and that's enough for me." (IN 22/6, p. 359).

From Aḥmad Ghazzālī's sermons, which according to Ibn al-Najjār were collected in two voulmes by Ṣāᶜid ibn Fāris al-Labbānī, only those fragments have come down to us which Ibn al-Jawzī quotes in the *Kitāb al-Quṣṣāṣ* and in the *Muntaẓam* (sub anno 520 AH) in

order to polemicize against them. ᶜAṭṭār may well have been familiar with much more and taken elements from them into his works in varying degrees of adaptation. Only here does he expressly mention his source by name.

Finally, the real presence of the beloved person is perceived as downright disturbing.

He sees the beloved as being on hand and together with him in imagination, and this being together is finer (*alṭaf*, more ethereal) than being together in accordance with external existence. And this it was that so occupied Majnūn that he paid no attention to Laylā when she came to him "in outward form", and he said to her: "Be gone from me! Love for you so engages me that I have no time for you!" (He said this) so that the coarseness (*kathāfa*, density) of her sensual manifestation wouldn't cut him off from the fineness of this vision in the imagination. (*Futūḥāt* 2/337, 352; cf. also *Ḥujub* 33-34).

Ilayki ᶜannī! Perhaps the story is an elaboration of one of Majnūn's verses that begins like this.

This internalization of love is also dealt with by Ibn al-Dabbāgh:

In some lovers the inner vision of the light of beauty has the upper hand to such an extent that it draws them away from vision of external forms. Indeed, they no longer look at these because the latter act as a distracting diversion and would lead them out of the actuality of inner vision.

It's recounted that when Laylā once drew her lover to her, he looked at her and said: "Be gone from me! Love for you so engages me that I have no time for you!" He was so immersed in beholding the inner image of her beauty which he bore within himself, that no room was left in him for her external form. The inner image is in fact what has a connection with the actual soul. Indeed, the inner image is (truly) with him, whereas the external form is a partition which hinders one from the internal form, even if to begin with it's a pre-condition for the coming into being of the latter. And this is the utmost degree of "presence". It's called "absorption (extinction) in beholding" (*al-fanāᵓ fī'l-mushāhada*), because the demands of the external intermediary hinder perfect vision of the beauty ensconced in the interior. It's as if these two somehow stood in opposition to one another (*mutaghāyirāni bi-wajhin mā*). Everything other than the goal actually sought after is a hindering partition which holds one back from the goal. Therefore, on this level, what had previously been a pre-condition is now a barrier. (Ibn al-Dabbāgh 29a).

With this complete internalization of love the way is now prepared for pure love of God, for which the greater part of the stories related in this chapter are actually meant to be a parable and a symbol. But before we deal with pure love of God, we must still consider an intermediary stage.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX

RELIGIOUS LOVE OF A BEAUTIFUL PERSON

There is a kind of aesthetic experience which goes beyond the enjoyment of beautiful forms that offer themselves to the senses, whether these forms originate in living nature or in the arts. What distinguishes this kind of experience from others is that it springs from a profound level of the personality, a level whose modes of experience have been characterized as primordial, archaic, mythical. (Cf. E. Rothacker, *Probleme der Kulturanthropologie*, Bonn 1948, 111). On such an occasion the person who is confronted with beauty feels, above and beyond the purely aesthetic impression, an encounter with a world and with powers which can no longer be described within the framework of sense perceptions. "...one now breaks through physical appearance as such by making contact with higher shaping forces experienced through the transparency of appearances" (Rothacker 120). Alfred Weber says regarding Michelangelo and his relation to beauty: "Beauty for him is not this or that. It is the fundamental power of existence, positive and transcendent, which we are too weak to bear in its full unveiling." (*Abschied von der bisherigen Geschichte*, Hamburg 1946, 42). This encounter with the beautiful has as a consequence that the aesthetic experience not only resonates more intensely but is all at once endowed with a seriousness which raises it far above the joyous feeling that the sight of the beautiful normally arouses. It is no longer a joyous feeling which exalts a person but an awesome shudder, an almost religious emotion which overwhelms him. "An aesthetic experience is attached to a phenomenon, to the graphic image which the latter visibly presents. It fixes itself on a phenomenon of the world, on the perceivable outward aspect of a phenomenon as this presents itself to the senses. A religious experience, on the other hand, is transcendent, it goes beyond the sphere accessible to the senses and, as it were, sees through things as if they were transparent." (Rothacker 119).

Such an experience can also be brought about by means of human beauty. Some people actually react to the sight of higher human beauty not only as if they had been struck by lightning—indeed, we have seen how powerful the effect is on ᶜAṭṭār's personages and how some of them are too weak "to bear the unveiling"—but for them the encounter is an encounter with the transcendent world beyond appearances which takes away their breath and obliges them to engage in worship.

The first author to describe this, as is well known, was Plato. "When someone who is fresh from the mystery, and saw much of the vision, beholds a godlike face or bodily form that truly expresses beauty, first there come upon him a shuddering and a measure of that awe which the vision inspired, and then reverence as at the sight of a god, and but for fear of being deemed an utter madman he would offer sacrifice to his beloved, as to a holy image of a deity." (*Phaedrus* 251a). Thus, in beholding the beautiful ephebe, he experiences the vision of absolute beauty itself. And already Plato, like the Neo-Platonists after him, demanded as an ideal attitude complete detachment from the beautiful of the sensory world in favor of the vision of transcendent beauty.

That the divine takes on appearance in the earthly world is also taught by the Christian Church in the doctrine of the incarnation of the Logos Christus. (Cf. the detailed description in the second volume of Adolf von Harnack's *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, Tübingen 1909). "Christus by becoming a human being made the divine tangible in a physical form and elevated physical human existence to God" (ibid. 480). Worship, above all Holy Communion, has become for the believer, particularly in the Greek Church, the means for achieving the most intimate contact with the divine (ibid. 452-66). On the level of art the same takes place in the adoration of images. "Images of Christ, of Mary and of the saints were revered since the fifth century through greetings, kisses and prostration, exactly as people had formerly behaved in paganism" (ibid. 480). The primordial need of a religious person to experience the divine through the medium of the earthly was satisfied by the Church. "Only the sense of beauty had become distorted. It was not thriving life which appeared beautiful but a life consecrated to asceticism and death" (ibid.). The concentration of this experience on the crucified Jesus and, to a lesser degree, on the saints, on the idea of suffering, asceticism and death, even if death has now been van-

quished, overshadowed the Platonic worship of beauty, leaving aside the reverence for Mary, and replaced it with something different—in so far as such worship was still alive toward the end of Antiquity.

In Islam, which rejects the mystery of incarnation, this Platonic form of experiencing beauty emerged once again in certain mystical circles and maintained itself for many centuries, vehemently opposed of course by orthodoxy which only recognized the presence of God in the word of the Koran. We shall see that it is spoken of with certain terms adopted from Christology.

In interpreting Persian lyrical poetry, especially the sort which celebrates pederasty in the anacreontic manner, the question has been discussed as to whether in the poems concerned earthly or heavenly love is meant. This alternative presupposes that the domains of earthly and heavenly love are always clearly separated from one another so that one can only enter upon the one or the other. But the mutual relationship of the two kinds of love cannot be defined solely by positing this alternative. The connection between the two in mysticizing love poetry is far more intimate, and their relation to one another far more many-sided than such an either-or (*majāzī-ḥaqīqī*) presupposes.

Likewise, on love as adoration cf. the book by Walter Schubart which, to be sure, is based on completely different premises: *Religion und Eros*, ed. by Friedrich Seifert, 2nd printing, Munich 1944.

1

To begin with, in Islamic literature we come upon the doctrine that earthly love, or as it is readily called by later mystics, unreal (*majāzī*) love, is a preparatory school for heavenly love, i.e. real (*ḥaqīqī*) love. When the conception of God as a commanding ruler who demands obedience stands in the foreground, this doctrine then takes the form that the pious man, through obedience to the beloved human being, fear of his wrath and striving to please him, is being trained in advance for the same behavior toward God. As the teaching of certain Ṣūfīs, to my knowledge it was first put forward by Ibn Dāwūd (d. 297/909).

Certain Ṣūfīs have maintained that God afflicts people with love so that they force themselves to obey the one they love, and so that it's hard for them when he's angry at them and they're happy when he's good to them. In this way they come to understand the value of obedience to God. For indeed God has no peer and there is nothing comparable to Him. And He is their creator who is in no

need of them, and their provider of sustenance who gives to them of His own free will without reminding them of His benefits. Therefore if they have made it their duty to obey a being other than Him, (they will recognize that) God is more deserving that they strive to please Him. (*Zahra* 1/18. Cf. Sharīshī 1/113).

Mas^cūdī (d. 345/956) attributes this doctrine to the Baghdad Ṣūfīs, i.e. the school of Junayd, and he adds that the *Bāṭiniyya al-mutaṣawwifa*—who is meant by this is not absolutely clear—has spoken (or written) a lot about this. As so often, he promises to deal with this subject in greater detail in the *Akhbār al-zamān*, which work, however, has not come down to us.

This doctrine at the same time implies that the slave relationship to God is overcome through love. One is not more obedient to God because as master He has the right to demand obedience, nor out of fear of punishment, but out of love.

Later among the Ṣūfīs, however, the image of God as a commanding and prohibiting master has changed or in any case shifted. His person enters so much into the center of feelings that interest is directed more to Himself than to the commands and prohibitions He has decreed (cf. "Ḥasan al-Baṣrī" 65). Therefore the goal of pedagogical love is no longer so much learning obedience as that of a love relationship with divinity itself, with all the difficulties which this entails.

Thus Muḥammad Zangī (circa 700/1300) teaches:

Earthly love is a touchstone for the authenticity of the claim to be a true lover. God afflicts the Ṣūfī with worldly love so that he learns the true way to love (*rusūm-i ^cishqbāzī*) and becomes familiar with its suffering and pains, and thereby becomes capable of sustaining the suffering and hardships of heavenly love. (*Nuzhat al-^cāshiqīn*).

Here God behaves like the father who places a wooden sword in his son's hand so that in this way his son learns to handle a proper sword. Or this is similar to how a horse intended for the king is first broken in by a trainer.—Earthly love is the bridge to heavenly love.

The wooden sword: ibid.; Sarı ^cAbdullāh, *Commentary on the Mathnawī* 1/215; Nicholson on *Mathnawī* 1/111.—Person who breaks in the horse: *Sawāniḥ, Faṣl* 1/3; Sarı ^cAbdullāh 1/215. Regarding the pedagogical value of children's games cf. the attractive passage in *Ḥadīqa* 462-63.

The motif of the annihilating effects of beauty, which we have already become familiar with (above pp. 435-44), ^cAyn al-Quḍāt (d. 533/1138) places in the foreground when he teaches that the earthly objects of love are veils of God's absolute beauty which serve the purpose of making the lover's eye accustomed to the

splendor of beauty so that later he may endure encountering God.

This was the sense of Majnūn's love for Laylā.

Do you know why He placed these curtains and barriers on the path? So that the eye of the lover, from day to day, becomes more mature, until it acquires the strength to sustain an encounter with God without veils. My dear, know that Laylā's beauty was bait placed in a hunting net. Do you know what a hunting net is? When the hunter of eternity wished to make a riding animal for His love out of Majnūn's nature but Majnūn was not prepared to fall into the hunting net of eternal love so as to be killed by the latter's beam, He ordered that Majnūn's nature be made into a riding animal for a period of time so he would become mature in love for Laylā and then be able to sustain love for God. My dear, haven't you seen how a riding animal which is so beautiful that it's only worthy of the king is first broken in by a trainer so its wildness and recalcitrance are changed to tameness and calm? (*Zubda*, *Tamhīd* 6, fol. 52a).

Shaykhs of Ṣūfī orders, as Muḥammad Zangī goes on to explain, do not consider a novice to be complete (*i*ᶜ*tibār nakunand*), if he has not been moved by earthly love. Regarding this point, he recounts a story:

A shaykh has a novice undertake several forty-day spiritual withdrawals in vain. The novice experiences no illuminations. He then sends him to a wine-tavern (*kharābāt*) where he falls in love and must endure the worst sufferings and humiliations. After some time, having become mature, he returns to the master.

ᶜIrāqī (d. 686/1287) relates the story (*Kulliyyāt* 227) as being about as early a figure as Shiblī (d. 334/945). Jāmī alludes to it briefly in his introduction to *Yūsuf u Zulaykhā* (completed in 888/1483).

In Ibn al-Dabbāgh (d. 696/1296-97) the transition to a love which is true and detached from the illusory world of the senses is represented more in accordance with Platonic philosophy (Diotima's speech in the *Symposium*, cf. Walther Kranz, *Die griechische Philosophie* 175-77) or Neo-Platonism which urges still greater detachment from the sensible world. In him the concept of beauty is at the same time ethicized, internal beauty is set against external beauty.

Rōzbihān Baqlī develops similar ideas in the *ᶜAbhar al-ᶜāshiqīn*, as does the above-mentioned Muḥammad Zangī in his writings.

2

Along with these doctrines are others as well which deal with the relationship of God's beauty to the beauty of human beings.

Islamic orthodoxy will absolutely not accept attributing a particular form to God. It concedes to the foremost of the senses (according to our conception, not that of the Arabs), the sense of sight, no share in God's revelation, whereas it is all the more generous with regard to the second sense, that of hearing. To orthodox Islam the idea that God could have a visible form is an abomination. It only adopted this defensive position against the conception of a God in visible form after conflicts with groups favorable to anthropomorphic thinking (*mushabbiha*), and its champions in that field were people who were later branded as heretics (Mu^{c}tazila). Ultimately, hostility to form and image with regard to divinity, as in the case of its teacher Judaism, came to prevail in Islam. On the other hand, it was never disturbed by conceiving of God's acoustic revelation, His word, in the most concrete terms, i.e. as embodied in a specific form, in specific sentences, words and sounds, and reproducable at any time by any believer—without ever perceiving this as anthropomorphism.

Perhaps this is connected with an originally more acoustic talent inherent among the Semitic peoples, an idea which in the case of the Arabs might be suggested by the fact that in their period of paganism they possessed a very richly developed verbal art, whereas their representational art was still at the stage of primitive beginnings and would only attain a higher development through contact with other peoples. But perhaps the horror of the idea of a visible form of God is a Jewish legacy and perhaps the lack of a representational art was conditioned by the nomadic way of life. In any case, in enumerating the five senses in Arabic the sense of hearing is mentioned before the sense of sight. Even when it is a question of the attributes of God, one usually says "the hearing, the seeing" (*al-samī^{c} al-baṣīr*), and not the other way round.

Already in the Old Testament hearing is the first of the senses. R. Bultmann, *Das Urchristentum*, Zurich 1949, p. 21.

God reveals Himself to His prophets through acts of hearing, not through visions. God has Moses come to Mt Sinai and speaks to him. But when Moses asks God to show Himself to him, God answers: "You will not see Me but look at that mountain! If it remains in its place, then you will see Me." When God reveals Himself to the mountain, the mountain crumbles to dust, and Moses falls to the ground as if struck by lightning. (Surah 7/143).

The basis for the episode is *Exodus* 33/18 ff. Heinrich Speyer, *Die biblischen Erzählungen im Qorān*, p. 341.

Man cannot see God in the here and now. He would not be able to endure the sight of Him. If God were to uncover His countenance, the radiance of His face would burn whatever His sight fell upon.

On this *ḥadīth* cf. Nallino, *Raccolta* 2/243. This conception as well is found in the Old Testament. Cf. Bultmann, *Urchristentum* p. 20.

That it is impossible to see God on earth is also established by surah 6/103: "The eyes do not attain Him."

Muḥammad's visions, which are dealt with in the Koran, concern God's messenger Gabriel, not God Himself. (Horovitz in: *Der Islam* 9/1919/159-60). Regarding the question as to whether on his "ascension" Muḥammad saw God, opinions are divided. Ghazzālī, who is uneasy with anything that smacks of anthropomorphism, denies it but he is confronted with the objection that "most religious scholars are of the opinion that he saw Him".

Iḥyā' 4/268, *Bayān al-sabab fī ziyādat al-naẓar*; *Stufen* 664/F.93; and ᶜIrāqī's remark about this.

Nevertheless, a kind of anthropomorphic conception of God was quite usual in circles of the pious who remained unaffected by the Muᶜtazila and later on by the Ashᶜarites. They based themselves on anthropomorphic passages in the Koran which they took literally and on a series of *ḥadīth*s, the *aḥādīth al-ṣifāt*, the authenticity of which was quite rightly contested by their opponents but which remained a living corpus of religious tradition. The struggle concerning the meaning of these Koranic passages and the authenticity of these *ḥadīth*s, i.e. the attempts to find interpretations to eliminate the anthropomorphic aspects, need not occupy us here, nor as historians of religion will it occur to us in this context to speak of "a crude conception of God".

I. Goldziher, *Vorlesungen über den Islam*, Heidelberg 1910, p. 107. And I would be reluctant to speak of "a jumble of silly fables" (p. 105).—European specialized studies are lacking. On the relevant literature cf. for the moment my "Philologika II" in: *Der Islam* 17/1928, especially pp. 255-57; and in addition *Bayān Mushkil al-Ḥadīth* of Ibn Fūrak, Auswahl... von Raimund Köbert, Rome, Pontificium Institutum Biblicum 1941, Analecta Orientalia 22. Regarding the *tashbīh* of the earlier Ḥanbalites, see Ibn al-Jawzī, *Dafᶜ shubah al-tashbīh wa'l-radd ᶜalā'l-mujassima mimman yantaḥil madhhab al-imām Aḥmad*, Cairo 1345; an edict of the caliph al-Rāḍī (322-329/934-940) against them is found in Aḥmad Amīn, *Ẓuhr al-islām*², Cairo 1946, p. 79.

The early man of letters Jāḥiẓ (d. 255/868), who as a Muᶜtazilite is above suspicion of anthropomorphism, reveals deeper religious-psychological insight when he attributes what in his

view is the inimitable zeal with which the Christians adore their God to the fact that they imagine him (i.e. Christ) as similar to themselves in human form, and he then goes on to add that for the same reason Islamic men of piety with a tendency to anthropomorphism are also more zealous in worshipping God than those who adopt a stance which rejects this view:

And for the same reason those of us (the Muslims) who conceive of God in human form are more zealous in worshipping God (*aᶜbad*) than those who deny this similarity. Indeed, I have sometimes seen how such a man out of longing for God sighed and moaned when there was mention of visiting God, wept when there was mention of seeing God, and lost consciousness when there was mention of removing the barriers of separation. And how much greater still is the longing of him who hopes to sit together with his God and to converse with his creator! (*Ḥujaj al-nubuwwa*, in the margin of Mubarrad's *Kāmil*, Cairo 1324, 2/51-52).

The popular preachers (*quṣṣāṣ*) who generally loved to stir the audience's imagination with vivid and extremely graphic descriptions are reproached for speaking about God the way they speak about Suᶜdā and Lubnā (typical names for female beauties in classical Arabic poetry) and for putting love of God on the same level as love of human beings for other humans in order to intensify the religious excitement of the audience, whereas God's absolute otherness excludes any such analogy.

The Ḥanbalite zealot Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1200) says in his book about popular preachers:

There are also popular preachers who give still another twist to their talk about love of God and describe God as if they were talking about Suᶜdā and Lubnā, and speak of God by hinting with these names.

But the uneducated (listener) does not understand what is meant. And if he does understand, at best he imagines a beautiful person for whom one experiences longing, and he loses his inner equilibrium and shouts out and tears his clothing. Ibn ᶜAqīl (Ibn al-Jawzī's teacher) relates: "One of the Persian preachers began by saying: '(God said): "Moses, whom do you want?" Moses said: "My brother Aaron."—"Muḥammad, whom do you want?" Muḥammad said: "My son."—"Jacob, whom do you want?" Jacob said: "Joseph." Then God said: "You all want something from Me. Is there no one who wants Me?"' Next the preacher became angry and struck the pulpit with his hand and said: 'Reader, recite: "You want His countenance"' (surah 6/52; 18/28). The reader then recited and the audience began to make a noise. Some of them fell to the ground unconscious, some of them tore their clothes thanks to this charlatanry, and several believed that what he said was truth's kernel and science itself."

Wa-mina'l-quṣṣāṣi man yukhriju'l-kalāma fī'l-maḥabbati ilā fannin ākhara fa-yaḥmilu ṣifata'l-Ḥaqqi ᶜazza wa-jalla ᶜalā ḥadīthi Suᶜdā wa-Lubnā wa-yushīru bi-hādhā ilā dhāk, etc. (*Quṣṣāṣ* 85a-86b).

Even beyond the circle of notorious popular preachers, however, the use of the names Suᶜdā and Lubnā or Laylā when "describing" God was not unheard of, but this was censured by the strict Ṣūfīs, although Qushayrī himself continually illustrates heavenly love with examples from profane love.

One of the companions of Sahl al-Tustarī (d. 283/896) sees in a dream the famous Ṣūfī Abū Saᶜīd Aḥmad b. ᶜĪsā al-Kharrāz (d. 277/890) after his death—he was well known for his predilection for musical gatherings (*samāᶜ*) and during them moved about a lot and would fall down unconscious—and asks him how God has treated him. He answers: "God had me stand before Him and said to me: 'Oh Aḥmad, you described Me as Laylā and Suᶜdā (*ḥamalta waṣfī ᶜalā Laylā wa-Suᶜdā*). If I hadn't seen that you desired Me in a pure mystical station, I would have punished you.'" (*Qūt* 2/61; *Nahrung* 2/509 f./32.744; cf. also *Talbīs* 266).

In any case, these names appeared in the poems which the preachers caused to be sung and which were also performed by the singer (*qawwāl*) during the musical gathering of the Ṣūfīs. This practice of having love songs performed during an assembly for preaching is also described as reprehensible by Muḥammad Ghazzālī.

Iḥyāʾ 1/32, *Kitāb* 1, *Bāb* 3, and 2/237 ff., *Rubᶜ* 2, *Kitāb* 8, *Bāb* 1; D. B. Macdonald, "Emotional Religion in Islam..." in: JRAS 1901/238. Cf. Nallino, *Raccolta* 2/205-06.

Of course, one should not conclude from the mention of these female beauties, which are simply literary clichés, that the early preachers and Ṣūfīs imagined God in a female form. If one had questioned them, they would certainly have rejected this emphatically and at most have said, like many at a later date, that all earthly beauty is a reflection of the divine, or that God is capable of manifesting Himself in any form that He wishes. Similarly, when later ᶜUmar Ibn al-Fāriḍ (d. 632/1235) in his lengthy Ṣūfī poem *al-Tāʾiyya* continually uses female pronouns, it clearly does not mean that he imagined the Godhead as female. The earliest commentator on the poem, Farghānī, states explicitly:

He has only used feminine verb forms and pronouns for the Beloved (*annatha'l-maḥbūb*) in accordance with the style of the bedouins—for the latter only speak of the object of their love in the feminine form—or in order to express his reverence for the beloved by never speaking of Him without adding to the sense the word *ḥaḍra* (approximately: majesty). (*Muntahā'l-madārik* 1/108).

Thus when translating, one will use the expression "the Godhead" on purpose if one wishes not to convey false impressions. Moreover, for ᶜUmar Ibn al-Fāriḍ the question about God's form is actually irrelevant. From the viewpoint of pantheism, which he and his contemporary mystics represent, God has no specific form. He manifests Himself in the whole of creation, displays His beauty in every beautiful creature, even in flowers and gardens. And even if nothing has been transmitted in tradition about God having created Eve in His image, Adam certainly saw a reflection of God's beauty in Eve.

ᶜUmar Ibn al-Fāriḍ, *Tāʾiyya*, verse 246-47; Farghānī 283-84; Najm al-Dīn Dāya (d. 654/1256), *Mirṣād al-ᶜibād* 52.

Since the second century AH some poets, in place of the *qaṣīda*'s erotic introduction referring to a woman (*al-tashbīb bi'l-nisāʾ*), present an introduction referring to boys and youths (*al-tashbīb bi'l-murdān*), before then proceeding to deal with wider subjects. Similarly, from this time on there are independent love poems about youths and boys. The legal judgement regarding this type of *tashbīb* is found for example in the commentary on Ghazzālī's *Iḥyāʾ* (*Itḥāf al-sāda al-muttaqīn*, 6/508-09). Strict jurists forbid this poetry completely, less strict jurists allow it on condition that it does not refer to a particular person but remains general. Perhaps this latter prohibition has contributed to the fact that the image of the beloved in Arabic and Persian poetry exhibits so few individual traits but only represents a general, ideal type of beauty. In Islam, where feminine traits are unthinkable in the conception of God, the masculine rather than the feminine form offered itself to the mystics of love as a symbol for the Godhead, although, as we just saw, the watered-down, clichéd feminine forms of earlier Arabic love poetry were also used as a symbol for the Godhead.

Let us dwell a moment on the subject of this symbolism. As is well known, several Oriental commentators (and Europeans following their lead) have interpreted Persian love poetry as a symbolic expression of love for God. They have not shrunk from interpreting details of the physical appearance of the beloved as specific religious concepts. Interpretation of this kind is already known to Ghazzālī. To explain this psychologically he recalls the cases already familiar to us where mystics misunderstand or give different meaning in the religious sense to a banal shout in the street for instance. (Above p. 354). "The person whose heart is filled with love of God, when hearing 'the blackness of locks',

thinks for example of the darkness of unbelief, when hearing 'the freshness of cheeks', thinks of the light of faith. At the mention of 'love's intimacy' (*wiṣāl*), he thinks of meeting with God (in the hereafter), and at the mention of 'separation', he thinks of the barriers which separate those who have been rejected by God. Mention of the spy (*raqīb*) who disturbs physical togetherness in love, makes him think of the hindrances and evil of this world which disturb the continuity of one's intimate relationship (*uns*) with God." In Ghazzālī's opinion there is nothing to object to in these interpretations.

Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, who is more strict, rejects such allegories.

Where *sukr*, "intoxication", "drunkenness in God" is treated in Anṣārī's *Manāzil al-sā'irīn*, he criticizes this expression, even though he accepts that the state itself does occur, i.e. when the believer comes to behold God in Paradise. In his view the expression drunkenness (*sukr*) is reprehensible (*munkar*), especially when in addition one speaks of drink (*sharāb*) and describes divine insights (*maᶜārif*) as "wine" (*khamr*), "inspirations" (*wāridāt*) as "drinking-cups", and God the Sublime as "cupbearer". (*Madārik al-sālikīn* 3/195).

Moreover, it is understandable that the mystics in part made use of the possibility of allegory in order to camouflage a different kind of experience and perhaps also to justify it to themselves. For the more strict mystics like Ghazzālī what is of utmost importance is that no real human person is intended or brought in by association.

In ᶜAṭṭār's epic poetry (regarding his lyrical poetry see below) this kind of interpretation plays no role. On the other hand, as we have seen especially in the case of the stories about Maḥmūd and Ayāz, he frequently explains the states of soul and forms of experience of the lovers of God through corresponding experiences of earthly lovers. But heavenly and earthly love remain separated from one another throughout.

But, as we have already indicated, we shall see that a far more close association of earthly and heavenly love occurred in Islamic mysticism than one might infer from the statements cited from Ghazzālī and the symbolical character of many of ᶜAṭṭār's stories. This association is not directly attested in ᶜAṭṭār's epics but clearly forms the assumption which alone is capable of explaining the powerful intensification of emotion found among his dervishes who experience love. This may serve as a justification for the following examination which at times shall lead us far afield of our poet.

3

If a specific form peculiar to God was envisaged by the early Ṣūfīs—an intolerable thought for orthodox Muslims—then it would be that of "a beardless youth" (*amrad*)—cf. Plato's contemplation of absolute beauty in connection with contemplation of a beautiful ephebe. The Ṣufīs represent the Prophet as already having warned: "Beware of looking at beardless youths because they have a complexion like the complexion of God."

Iyyākum wa'l-naẓara ilā'l-murdi fa'inna lahum lawnan ka-lawni'llāhi ta^cālā. ^cAyn al-Quḍāt, *Zubda, Tamhīd* 10, fol. 143b.

Along with the *ḥadīth* so popular among the Ṣūfīs which goes back to *Genesis* 1/27: "God created Adam in His own image" (Wensinck, *Concordance* s.v. *khalaqa*), there emerged at the latest around the middle of the second century AH another *ḥadīth*, the so-called *ḥadīth al-ru'ya*, according to which the Prophet beheld his God in a dream, or during the ascension, in the form of a beardless youth (*amrad*). Concerning one of the traditionists who is supposed to have circulated this *ḥadīth*, Ḥammād ibn Salama (d. 167/784, *Mīzān* s.n.), it is maintained that he only began teaching *ḥadīth*s of this kind after he had returned from a visit to the Ṣūfī settlement in ^cAbbādān on the Persian Gulf. Ibn al-Dayba^c, who died in 944/1537, maintains that this *ḥadīth* is still current among all the uneducated Ṣūfīs of his time.

J. W. Fück, "Spuren des Zindīqtums" in: *Festschrift P. Kahle*, Leyden 1935, p. 100.—Further below (p. 463) we shall see how Ghazzālī interpreted this *ḥadīth*.

In what follows I present all the main forms of this *ḥadīth*:

Dāraquṭnī (d. 385/995) in the *Kitāb Ru'yat al-bāri'* (Ms. Escorial[2] 1445, fol. 153a): "It has been transmitted to me from Abū Muḥammad al-Ḥasan b. Rashīq (Dhahabī, *Mīzān* s.n.) in Egypt from Abū'l-^cAbbās Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā b. Zakīr al-Bazzāz from ^cAbd al-Raḥmān b. Khālid b. Najīḥ (*Mīzān* s.n.) from his father from al-Layth b. Sa^cd (d. 175 AH, *Khulāṣat Tadhhīb al-Kamāl* 275) from Isḥāq b. ^cAbd Allāh b. Abī Farwa (d. 144 AH, ibid. 25) from Makḥūl (d. 113 AH, *Mīzān* s.n.) from Anas b. Mālik (d. 91-93 AH) that the Prophet said: *'I saw my Lord in the most beautiful form like a youth with abundant hair on the throne of grace, with a golden rug spread out around Him. He placed His hand between my shoulders and I felt its coolness in my liver. He spoke to me, etc.'*"

Ra'aytu rabbī fī aḥsani ṣūratin ka'l-shābbi'l-mūfiri ^calā kursiyyi'l-karāmati ḥawlahū firāshun min dhahabin fa-waḍa^ca yadahū bayna katifayya fa-wajadtu bardaha ^calā kabidī.

Dāraquṭnī ibidem: The tradition from Umm al-Ṭufayl, the wife of Ubayy b. Ka^cb (the latter d. 19, 20, 22, 30 or 32 AH). "It has been transmitted to me from

Aḥmad b. Ṣāliḥ (d. 248 AH, *Mīzān* s.n.) from (ᶜAbd Allāh) b. Wahb (b. Muslim) (d. 177 AH, *Mīzān* s.n.) from ᶜAmr b. al-Ḥārith (d. 148 AH, ibid.) from Saᶜīd b. Abī Hilāl (d. 130-149 AH, *Tahdhīb al-Tahdhīb* 4/95; *Khulāṣa* 122) from Marwān b. ᶜUthmān (b. Abī Saᶜīd) from ᶜUmāra b. ᶜĀmir (*Lisān al-Mīzān* 4/278) from Umm al-Ṭufayl, the wife of Ubayy b. Kaᶜb, that she said: *'The Prophet related that he saw his Lord in a dream in the form of a youth with abundant hair, His feet in greenery, with golden shoes, and on His face a covering (firāsh) of gold.'"*

For the same text Dāraquṭnī gives a partially different *isnād*: "It was transmitted to us from Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. ᶜAbd Allāh b. Ibrāhīm al-Shāfiᶜī (*Mīzān* 2/401 s.n.) from Muḥammad b. Ismāᶜīl al-Sulamī (d. 280 AH, *Mīzān* 2/350 s.n.) from Nuᶜaym b. Ḥammād (d. in prison 227-229 AH; GAL^2, Suppl. 1/257; *Taʾrīkh Baghdād* 13/313-14) from Ibn Wahb, etc. (the rest as above)." The *isnād* from Nuᶜaym b. Ḥammād onwards is also found in Suyūṭī, *Laʾālī* 1/15; cf. also Ibn Qutayba, *Mukhtalif al-ḥadīth* 274; *Mīzān* under Nuᶜaym b. Ḥammād; and *Taʾrīkh Baghdād* 13/311.

Ḥammād b. Salama (d. 167 AH) from Qatāda from ᶜIkrima from Ibn ᶜAbbās: *"The Prophet said: 'I saw my Lord as a beardless youth with curly hair (jaᶜdan amrada) in a green robe.'"* (Dhahabī, *Mīzān* s.n. Ḥammād b. Salama; cf. Suyūṭī, *Laʾālī* $1/16_{27}$).

Instead of curly (*jaᶜd*) one also finds frizzy- or woolly-haired (*qaṭaṭ*). Ibn Qutayba, *Mukhtalif al-ḥadīth* 8; Fück, "Spuren des Zindīqtums" 97-98; ᶜAyn al-Quḍāt, *Tamhīd* 10, fol. 143b. Both in Āmidī, *Abkār al-afkār*, Ms. Köprülü 794, fol. 112a. There in addition it is stated: "And some among them (the *mujassima*, anthropomorphists) say that He has the form of an old man with grey hair and a grey beard (*shaykh ashmaṭ al-raʾs wa'l-liḥya*)."

Other versions with the same *isnād*: *"I saw my Lord in the form of a youth with abundant hair."* (Suyūṭī, *Laʾālī* 1/16).

"Muḥammad saw his God in the form of a beardless youth behind a veil of pearls, His feet in greenery." (Dhahabī, *Mīzān* s.n. Ḥammād b. Salama).

(ᶜAbd al-Malik b. ᶜAbd al-ᶜAzīz) b. Jurayj (d. 149, 150 or 151 AH; *Tahdhīb al-Tahdhīb* 6/405) from Ḍaḥḥāk (b. Muzāḥim al-Balkhī, d. 105 or 106 AH; *Mīzān* s.n.) from Ibn ᶜAbbās: *"Muḥammad saw his Lord in the form of a beardless youth."* (Suyūṭī, *Laʾālī* $1/16_{18}$).

Ibn Jurayj from Ṣafwān b. Sulaym (d. 132 or 134; *Tahdhīb al-Tahdhīb* 4/426) from ᶜĀʾisha: *"The Prophet saw his Lord in the form of a youth sitting on a throne with His foot in greenery of glittering light."* (Suyūṭī, *Laʾālī* $1/16_{19}$).

Sufyān b. Ziyād from his uncle Sulaym b. Ziyād from...: *"The Prophet of God related to him that he had seen the Lord of the worlds in a heavenly garden (ḥaẓīra min al-quds) in the form of a youth with a crown which dazzled the eyes."* (Suyūṭī, *Laʾālī* $1/16_{23}$).

"I saw my Lord on the night of the ascension in the form of a beardless youth." (ᶜAyn al-Quḍāt, *Zubda*, *Tamhīd* 10, fol. 157b).

Perhaps one should here recall that Christ is also represented as a beardless youth in early Christian art. This representation reflects an ancient ideal of beauty which was later supplanted in the West by different conceptions.

In the *Maqālāt al-islāmiyyīn* Ash[c]arī (d. 324/935) cites several representatives of anthropomorphic teachings. The closest to our *ḥadīth*s is the teaching of the Shī[c]ite Hishām b. Sālim al-Jawālīqī. According to him, God has human form but not flesh and blood. He is a radiant light which has a white glow. He possesses five senses like a human being, as well as hands, feet and a nose, ears, eyes and a mouth. According to the report of Abū [c]Īsā al-Warrāq (d. 247/861), he maintained that God has abundant black hair consisting of black light.

Maqālāt 34 with the literature quoted there, and 209. Similar teachings which only deviate in details are attributed to the Koranic commentator Muqātil b. Sulaymān (d. 150/767) and others. *Maqālāt* 209; *Talbīs* 91, following Nawbakhtī.

There is no need here to enter into the orthodox criticism of these *ḥadīth*s. Merely as a curiosity, one may mention the book *al-Tamhīd fī'l-tawḥīd* by Muḥammad b. [c]Abd al-Sayyid b. Shu[c]ayb al-Laythī Abū Shakūr al-Sālimī, who lived around the middle of the 5th century (a few years after 460/1068 he was in Samarqand), in which they are given a rationalistic interpretation. The author maintains that the word *rabbī*, "my Lord", which in these *ḥadīth*s allegedly designates God, simply refers to a human being.

It is transmitted from Abū Hurayra that he said: "I saw my Lord on the road to Medina walking in a red cloak with creaking (pointy?) shoes on his feet." People said to him: "Have you become an unbeliever after previously being a believer? God doesn't walk!" Then he smiled and said: "I saw my lord, i.e. lord Ḥasan ibn [c]Alī." (Ms. Re[ɔ]is ül-küttab 624, fol. 28a, in the *Qawl fī'l-ḍidd wa'l-nidd*).

The same *ḥadīth* is given an allegorical interpretation by [c]Abd al-Karīm Jīlī in *al-Insān al-kāmil* 2/3-4.

4

But not only the Prophet has seen God, the mystics also frequently report dream visions of God, indeed even waking visions of God, which have been allotted to them. Tirmidhī claims to have seen God one thousand and one times in dreams. (TA $2/93_{22\text{-}23}$). The doctrine that someone may see God in a dream but not in a waking state is also recorded by Ash[c]arī (*Maqālāt*

214_9). Sometimes, though not very often, the form in which God appears is then described as well. God is capable of appearing to man, so the doctrine goes, in any form He wishes (*tamaththul*), just as the angel Gabriel one moment appeared to the Prophet in the form of a bedouin, and the next in the form of Diḥya al-Kalbī who became proverbial for his beauty.

On Diḥya: *Iṣāba* 2/162; EI s.n.; ᶜAyn al-Quḍāt, *Tamhīd* 10, fol. 143b.

In these visions, of course, God not only appears as a youth but as a woman as well.

ᶜAyn al-Quḍāt (fol. 145a) relates from Abū Bakr al-Qaḥṭabī (*Taᶜarruf* 12_6), a contemporary of Sumnūn who died before 298/911, that he said: "I saw the Lord of Honor in the form of my mother." To be sure he adds that by *ummī* (my mother) the Prophet is meant (*ummī* = illiterate).

Sulṭān Walad (d. 712/1312), the son of Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, reports:

One day the Ṣūfīs asked my father, the master: "Bāyazīd said: 'I saw my Lord in the form of a beardless youth.' How is this possible?" He replied: "This can mean two things. Either he saw God in the form of a particular youth, or God presented Himself to him in the form of a youth because of Bāyazīd's inclination."

There then follows a story about how the master entered the room of his godly friend Shams-i Tabrīzī and saw the latter's wife Kīmiyā, who in reality was absent, sitting there with him. So as not to disturb them he takes a stroll in the *madrasa*, is eventually called inside by Shams, and then sees that Shams is alone—the wife's manifestation had disappeared. Shams explains: "God loves me so much that He appears to me in whatever form I wish. Now He came to me in the shape of Kīmiyā and presented Himself in her form."—This is the way it was with Bāyazīd when God presented Himself to him in the form of a youth. (Aflākī 154b; C. Huart, *Les Saints* 2/134; O'Kane, *Feats* 439-40).

Rōzbihān Baqlī (d. 606/1209) saw God in the form of a Turk who had coquettishly cocked his hat at an angle.

The great shaykh Rōzbihān Baqlī of Shiraz said in a state of rapture (*ghalaba-i ḥāl*): "I saw God in the form of a Turk with a silk hat which he had tilted to one side. I gripped the hem of His robe and said: 'By the oneness of Your being! In whatever form You come forth and in whatever form You display Yourself to the loving eye (*jilwagar āyī*), I will still recognize You behind it (*az tu maḥjūb nakhwāham shudh*).'" (Dōst-i Muḥammad 51b-52a).

It is interesting how Muḥammad Ghazzālī interprets dream visions of God and manages to eliminate anthropomorphic conceptions:

What the one asleep sees in a dream is not the form of God—God is exalted above image and form—but only a symbol, a likeness. Radiant light and beautiful forms are likenesses for real, non-physical beauty which has no form.

Mithālun maḥsūsun min nūrin wa-ghayrihī mina'l-ṣuwari'l-jamīlati'llatī taṣluḥu an takūna mithālan li'l-jamāli'l-ḥaqīqiyyi'l-maᶜnawiyyi'lladhī lā ṣūrata fīh.

He recalls the Verse of Light in the Koran where God is described as the light of heaven and earth, comparable to the glass oil-lamp in a niche (surah 24/35). There is no similarity (*mumāthala*) between the light of God and that of a glass lamp. People do describe the sultan as the sun and the vizier as the moon without a physical similarity existing between them, and the Prophet described the faith as milk and the Koran as a rope that provides deliverance. These are images and similes for intelligible things (*maᶜqūlāt*). Likewise, *ḥadīths* such as that God created Adam in His own image tell nothing about the form of God's person which has no form, but this is a revelation presented as a similitude (*mithāl*), the way Gabriel for instance displayed himself to the Prophet in the form of Diḥya al-Kalbī as a similitude, without this form indicating something about Gabriel's form. (*Risāla fī taḥqīq ruʾyat Allāh fī'l-manām* 29-32).

This is the orthodox solution to the problem.

5

Already in the very early period we hear about persons who maintained that it is possible to see God in the here and now in living people.

The group of worshippers of God who went the furthest in this regard, namely by teaching that God takes up residence (*ḥulūl*) in people, have been designated by the doxographers, on the basis of this doctrine, with the term *ḥulūliyya*. Of course, not only the representatives of the doctrine that God "takes up residence" in a beautiful person are dubbed with this name but also people like Ḥallāj who in moments of rapture exclaimed: "I am God" and who was executed in 309/922, as well as certain extremist Shīᶜites who maintained the divinity of their Imams (Friedländer, *Heterodoxies*, Index s. v. Incarnation) or other heretics who viewed humans as divine beings (Malaṭī, d. 377/987, *Tanbīh* 17-19; *Farq* 241-50) and adherents of certain exotic, completely un-Islamic views which shall be occupying us straight away.

The term *ḥulūl* is a translation of the term ἐνοίκησις taken from Nestorian Christology. The parallel expression *ittiḥād* is a translation of the term ἕνωσις.

Cf. Erdmann Fritsch, *Islam und Christentum im Mittelalter*, Dissertation, Breslau 1938, p. 122; C. A. Nallino, *Raccolta* I/187, 338.

Ibn Fūrak, who died in 406/1015, ascribes in his *Niẓāmī* the following doctrines to the three Christian sects that he knows best, the Melkites, the Nestorians and the Jacobites:

The Christians teach that Jesus is human and divine, and discuss how the Logos took up residence (*ḥulūl*, ἐνοίκησις) in Mary. Some of them say that the Logos entered Mary (*ḥallat*) in the form of a mixture, the way water enters milk in the form of a mixture and blending.—Others say that it settled in her without undergoing mixture, the way a human being's form appears in a polished mirror, without mixture occurring between the two.—Still others say that the divine nature is related to the human nature as a seal to wax in as much as the former leaves an impression on the latter, so that apart from the image, no other trace of the seal remains in the wax. The first doctrine is that of the Jacobites, the second that of the Melkites and the third that of the Nestorians. In addition they teach union with God (*ittiḥād*, ἕνωσις)...

Unfortunately what follows in the text is uncertain. The above passage in Kamāl Paşazāde, *Risāla fī'l-ḥulūl wa'l-ittiḥād*, Ms. Aşir II 441, fol. 25b. The original text is not accessible to me at the moment.

We shall also encounter the doctrine of the reflection of God in Jesus, here attributed to the Melkites, in a different form among the mystics.

To begin with we shall draw together in chronological order what the most important sources tell us about the Ḥulūlīs and related groups, confining ourself in general to such doctrines as present God as taking up residence in a beautiful human being.

The doxographer Abū'l-Qāsim ᶜAbd Allāh b. Aḥmad al-Balkhī al-Kaᶜbī (d. 317/929 or 319/931, cf. *Der Islam* 18/1929/39) reports:

Concerning[1] some people among the anthropomorphists it's reported that they maintain the possibility of beholding God with one's eyes in the here and now and find nothing strange in the idea that He might be one of the persons they encounter in the street. In addition, several people also maintain that it's possible to exchange handshakes with Him, to be in His company continuously and to touch Him, and they maintain that they visit Him and that He visits them. In ᶜIrāq they are called the esoterics (*aṣḥāb al-bāṭin*), the people of inner whisperings (*waswās*) and the people of mad notions (*khaṭarāt*)." (*Talbīs* 184; cf. Ashᶜarī, *Maqālāt* 213, ftn.).

Ashᶜarī (d. 324/936) informs us in the *Maqālāt al-islāmiyyīn*:

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[1] I add the preposition *min*.

Some say: "It's possible for us to see God with our eyes in the here and now, and we don't find it strange that He's one of those whom we encounter in the street." (P. 214).

This passage obviously goes back to the preceding one.

And some of them maintain it's possible (for God) to take up residence in bodies. And if the *ḥulūl*-people see a person whom they find beautiful, they don't know whether perhaps their God is within him. (P. 214).

And many of those who maintain it's possible to see Him in the here and now maintain that it's possible to exchange handshakes with Him and to touch Him and that He visits them. (P. 214)

Likewise in Kaᶜbī.—The text continues:

And they say that the sincere (*mukhliṣūn*) among them can embrace Him in the here and now, as well as in the hereafter, if they so wish. This is related about some of the companions of Muḍar and Kahmas. (P. 214).

Muḍar is surely the Koran-reader Muḍar b. Muḥammad al-Kūfī (Ibn al-Jazarī, *Ṭabaqāt al-qurrāᵓ* no. 3613), about whom nothing else of this kind is known. Kahmas ibn al-Ḥasan al-Tamīmī, d. 149/766, was so strict an ascetic that he wept for forty years because of the sin he committed by cleaning a visitor's hand after dinner with a piece of stucco from a neighbor's wall (*Ḥilya* 6/211, *Tahdhīb al-Tahdhīb* 8/450). We do not know who is meant by "the companions" of the two of them. Shahrastānī, who quotes Ashᶜarī, states that Ashᶜarī received these reports from *Muḥammad b. ᶜĪsā*, a companion of the Muᶜtazilite Muᶜammar, if this is not a mistake for Abū ᶜĪsā Muḥammad b. Hārūn al-Warrāq (d. 247/861), who is well known as a doxograpaher and who had leanings toward Manichaeism. (*Der Islam* 18/1929/35). Moreover, to the two men of piety named in the Ashᶜarī text he adds Aḥmad al-Hujaymī, about whom apparently nothing else is known.

An additional passage from the *Maqālāt* (p. 288) contributes nothing new. By contrast, the following one is noteworthy:

And among the ascetics of the Ṣūfīs there are persons who are advocates of *ḥulūl* and maintain that the Creator takes up residence in individuals and that He can take up residence in a human being, in a wild animal and other individuals. When they behold something which they find beautiful, they say: "Who knows, perhaps God has taken up residence in it."

They are inclined to discard the holy laws and maintain that if a person has reached his God, no religious duties are any longer binding on him, and he no longer has to perfom any practices of worship. (13-14).

What is striking here is the doctrine that God can take up residence in a wild animal or in a thing. Nothing of this sort is known in any particular current among the Ṣūfīs. Here exotic doctrines are clearly being attributed to the Ṣūfīs.

Maqdisī says in the *Badᵓ al-khalq wa'l-taᵓrīkh* (written 355/966):

For several of them (the Ṣūfīs) are advocates of *ḥulūl*, and if they behold a beautiful form, they prostrate themselves before it in worship, and many of the Indians do this. (2/91).

This could be a literary echo but in another passage he maintains that he heard similar views himself from a Ṣūfī:

Several of them are advocates of *ḥulūl*. Indeed, I heard one of them maintain that His abode is between the cheeks of beardless youths. (5/48).

The Ḥulūlīs are only known to Sarrāj (d. 378/988) through literary sources. In the relevant chapter of his book he expressly says that he has never met one of their adherents and that he is only transmitting what has been reported.

I heard (i.e. read) that a group of Ḥulūlīs have maintained that God chooses bodies for Himself in order to take up residence in them with His divine attributes and to remove the human attributes... some among them advocate the doctrine of lights, others the doctrine of contemplating beautiful "testimonies" (*al-shawāhid al-mustaḥsanāt*, see below)... others say: "He takes up residence in beautiful things as well as in things that are not beautiful", and still others teach: "He only dwells in beautiful things." Some say: permanently, others: on a temporary basis. (*Lumaᶜ* 426; *Schlaglichter* 591/148.1; partially *Talbīs* 283).

The poet ᶜAbd al-ᶜAzīz ibn Muḥammad Ibn Nubāta (d. 405/1014) says in a verse about a boy:

I sacrifice my life for you, you full moon on a slender branch! My eyes would almost like to devour him with their vision. If I reflect while contemplating (his beauty), then I'm willing to admit that the doctrine of the Ḥulūlīs about "the forms" is true. (*Yatīma* 2/351; *Muḥāḍarāt al-udabāʾ*, 2/22).

ᶜAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (d. 429/1038) conceives of the term *ḥulūliyya* in the broadest sense. Of his ten Ḥulūlī sects only one interests us here, the Ḥulmāniyya, which appears in literature for the first time in this author.

The Ḥulmāniyya among the Ḥulūlī sects derives its name from Abū Ḥulmān al-Dimashqī (see above p. 354). The latter was originally from Fārs, grew up in Aleppo and appeared with his innovation in Damascus, this being the reason for his surname... He advocated the doctrine that God takes up residence in beautiful individuals. And when he and his companions beheld a beautiful form, they would prostrate themselves before it while acting as if God had taken up residence in it.

Furthermore, he advocated the doctrine of permissiveness (*ibāḥa*) and maintained that if someone has come to know his God as he imagines Him, nothing is any longer forbidden for him and he may permit himself everything that gives him pleasure and that he desires.

I myself heard a member of the Ḥulmāniyya quote the following Koranic verse as proof for the possibility of God taking up residence in bodies: "And when I have perfected him and breathed of My spirit into him, prostrate yourselves before him (Adam) in worship!" (15/29). He maintained that God had ordered the angels to bow down before Adam because He had taken up residence in Adam, and that He had taken up residence in him because He had created him with "the most beautiful form" (*aḥsani taqwīm*, surah 95/4). (*Farq* 245, cf. Isfarā'īnī, *Tabṣīr* 77).

It is possible that this Ḥulmāniyya is identical with those persons in Syria who are supposed to have maintained that they behold God in the here and now with their hearts the way one will behold God in the hereafter with one's eyes. Of course, Sarrāj, who touches briefly on this doctrine (*Lumaᶜ* 428; *Schlaglichter* 593/151), again says that he has never met one of these people, nor has he heard of anyone who has met one of them. But he has seen an epistle of Abū Saᶜīd al-Kharrāz (d. 277/890) to the inhabitants of Damascus in which it said: "I've heard that there are people in your region who say this and that." And he here presented a doctrine which corresponds to the one mentioned. It appears, according to Sarrāj, that there were people in the time of Abū Saᶜīd who had fallen into this error.

Thus the Ḥulmāniyya would have belonged to the third century AH. The fanatical Baghdādī will have greatly exaggerated, and it seems to me highly doubtful that the man of the Ḥulmāniyya whom he met had really considered himself to be a member of a community with that name. On the other hand, the first of the stories translated below (p. 475) and transmitted by Abū Ḥamza (d. 269/883) shows characteristics which closely resemble the doctrine that one can behold God in the here and now the way one will behold Him in the hereafter.

L. Massignon has drawn attention to a passage in the *Tamhīd* of the apostate (*murtadd*) Abū Shakūr al-Sālimī (wrote circa 470/1077, see above p. 461). In *Bāb* 12, *Qawl* 13 of his book, where he deals with "Magianism" (*al-tamajjus*), the author discusses the views of various Persian sects and boldly compares them with other sects which advocate similar doctrines. There it says:

The third kind are the Shamsiyya (Sun-Worshippers). These are people who worship every light such as the sun and moon and the stars and fire and other things. They teach that all these fires were one before God created creation, for instance the Throne, the heavens and the celestial Tablet. And once God created these things, these lights split up. To the eye they are separate but in reality they are all a single light which is the light of God. And this doctrine inclines

toward metempsychosis and resembles the doctrine of the philosophers about simple substance, and the idolaters of the Brahmans and the Buddhists (Sumaniyya) in Tibet and the Ḥulūlīs in the land (?) of the Ḥulmāniyya also believe this." (Ms. Istanbul Uni. Libr. AY 3660, fol. 130b).

One will surely judge this kind of comparison of religions to be very free. The doctrine about lights recalls what Sarrāj writes (above p. 466). Abū Shakūr then goes on to speak about the Manichaeans:

The Manichaeans teach that God Himself takes up residence in every *shāhid* (here apparently a beautiful object), and some say a part of Him takes up residence in every *shāhid*. And they worship everything which in their eyes is beautiful: lights, concrete objects (*aʿyān*), mountains, water, horses, camels, cattle, men, women, plants and other things. And this is (also) the teaching of the Ḥulūlīs of the Jalāliyya (read probably: Ḥallājiyya) and the extremist Shīʿites and therefore the latter teach that ʿAlī was a god. And this is the doctrine of the Manichaeans in China and Khutan and Tibet and in the land of the Khāqān. (Fol. 133a).

It could be possible that the passage in Ashʿarī where the revering of objects and wild animals by the Ḥulūlīs is discussed (above p. 465) refers to the same people, and likewise the following passage in Ghazzālī's *Mishkāt al-anwār*:

The second group (namely of those who are cut off from God by light mixed with darkness) form a community of the furthest Turks who have no religious community (*milla*) and no revealed law (*sharīʿa*). These believe that they have a God (*rabb*) and that He is the most beautiful of things. And when they behold a human being of extreme beauty or a tree or a horse or something else, they prostrate themselves in worship and say: "This is our God!"

They are cut off by the light of beauty mixed with the darkness of the senses but they are closer to beholding the light than the idolaters because they revere absolute beauty, not a particular individual, and they don't see that beauty as being limited to a particular individual to the exclusion of others. Moreover, they revere natural beauty, not that produced artistically by means of their own hands. (*Mishkāt al-anwār*, Cairo 1322, p. 51; Gairdner 92).

It is highly doubtful whether these doctrines are really Manichaean. One might think that these sentences, in a somewhat distorted way, reflect the Manichaean doctrine about the light particles enclosed in creation which the *electi* in particular have a duty to respect and to care for.

One could also think that Abū Shakūr has heard something about Manichaean paintings. To the Muhammadan, however, every picture easily appears to be an idolatrous one.

L. Massignon has drawn very far-reaching conclusions from the Abū Shakūr passage. (In Pope, *Survey of Persian Art* 3/1934-35). But Henning writes me via Minorsky (letter of 25/4/1947): "Nothing could be less like Manichaeism than the veneration of beautiful objects mentioned in Ritter's passage. Beautiful human beings, horses, or trees are still human beings, horses and trees, things of body and matter, and as such entirely daēvic. The divine light that pervades the world is indeed beautiful, but it is bodiless and spiritual and does not manifest itself in material substances.—The point of view rather resembles (probably accidentally) Zoroastrian ideas."

Minorsky himself writes me:

Your quotation from Ghazzālī reminds me of several passages in Arab and Persian geographers (IV/X cent.). The numerous and striking coincidences in Ibn Rusta, the *Ḥudūd* and Gardīzī make me think that all of them owe much to Jayhānī's lost work. This latter was so extensive (7 vols.) that one could probably abridge an item in several different ways.

In any case, your passage reminds me of Ibn Rusta 141, who writes of the Volga Bulghars: "And the infidels among them prostrate themselves before each of their friends whom they meet."

The *Ḥudūd* § 19 (fol. 18b) states that there are many merchants living among the Ghuz. And among the Ghuz as well as among the latter everything which is beautiful and wonderful is worshipped. Similarly the Ghuz esteem the physicians (*ṭabīb*, i.e. Turkish *qam*?) and when they see them they venerate them (*namāz*), and these physicians have power over their lives and property.

Gardīzī, the last of the *trio*, has no similar passage but Iṣṭakhrī, 220, —who is not dependent of Jayhānī—says in the paragraph on the Khazar: Their character is predominantly that of idolaters, they prostrate themselves before one another as a sign of showing respect. I presume that Ghazzālī must be amplifying some such story which he had found in one of the geographical works or books of *adab*.

The habit of "veneration" is variously attributed to the Bulghar, the Ghuz and the heathen Khazar. Even the Bulghar might have been called *aqāṣī t-turk* but we are bound to admit (ex silentio!) that neither Manichaeism nor Sufism were spread among them. The habit seems to be mentioned as a characteristic of some primitive tribes, and Ghazali himself says that the Turks whom he has in view had no *milla* and no *šarīʿa* (not Manichaeans then, but, according to the *Ḥudūd*, Shamanists). Consequently, I feel rather sceptical about the possibility of drawing any far-fetched conclusion from your passage.

Accordingly, one must in fact leave aside Ghazzālī's statements and those of Abū Shakūr concerning the alleged Manichaeans. There remains the passage of Ashʿarī in which he speaks of the Ḥulūlī-Ṣūfīs as believing that God also inhabits a wild animal. Perhaps Ashʿarī or his source have confounded some exotic practices of the above-described kind with those of certain Ṣūfīs. Or perhaps he has before him such stories as the following one about the Ṣūfī Abū Ḥamza (d. 269/882) whom we shall shortly

become familiar with as a narrator of a certain type of Ṣūfī stories:

Abū Ḥamza spoke (preached) in the mosque of Tarsus and would draw a large crowd (*qabilūh*). One day while he was speaking, a raven croaked on the roof of the mosque. Abū Ḥamza shouted: "At Your service! At Your service!" (*Labbayk*). They then accused him of being a *zindīq* (Manichaean) and said: "A Ḥulūlī, a *zindīq*!" And they denounced him. He was driven out (of the mosque), and his horse was sold by public proclamation at the mosque (with the words): "This is the horse of the *zindīq*!"

Ḥilya 10/321. Cf. *Lumaᶜ*, Pages from... ed. Arberry, pp. 6-7; *Schlaglichter* 551/133.2.

Abū Ḥamza was certainly neither a Ḥulūlī nor a *zindīq*. A Ṣūfī, in certain moods of soul, feels God is addressing him through every single thing, and connects whatever he experiences, even banal events, to his relationship with God. (Above pp. 353-54). But naturally it is quite interesting that they described him as a Manichaean.

Whatever the explanation for the passages cited, I believe these testimonies are in any case insufficient to prove that Ṣūfī revering of divine beauty in human beauty has a Manichaean origin. A Ṣūfī may perhaps revere divine beauty in a beautiful human being but not in animals or plants or lifeless objects. Of course, in ᶜUmar Ibn al-Fāriḍ, ᶜAṭṭār and the adherents of the monist Ibn ᶜArabī we encounter the doctrine that all beauty of this world, even that in a rose for instance, stems from divine beauty, but if one wishes to look for non-Islamic sources for these doctrines, it is more plausible to think of the Neo-Platonists, of someone like the Pseudo-Areopagite who advocated such doctrines. (Nallino, *Raccolta* 2/247, ftn. 2, and 2/297, 302). The parallel between *ḥulūl* and the Christological concept of ἐνοίκησις also more readily points to a Western origin. If the Manichaeans are really meant to have elaborated their light-particle theory into a cult of the beautiful person, and if this doctrine is meant to have then come to ᶜIrāq, one would certainly expect that it would reappear in one of the men of letters of the early ᶜAbbāsid period who were denounced as Manichaeans. But to my knowledge this is not the case.

I prefer to believe that the term *ḥulūliyya* in no way designates a special, historically tangible sect. Perhaps one had become familiar with the term *ḥulūl* = ἐνοίκησις from the Christians and then applied it to all people who advocated some form of doctrines, or had customs, which recalled the doctrine of Christ's divine nature inhabiting a human nature or who, like Ḥallāj, actu-

ally adopted Christian terms (*nāsūt-lāhūt*). That so early a writer as Sarrāj admits to never having met a Ḥulūlī shows that he did know the term but not a sect or Ṣūfī community which bore this name. The sect as such is an invention of the doxographers.

Now those people are supposed to be Ḥulūlīs who experience beauty in the manner described at the beginning of this chapter. This numinous experience of beauty is clearly expressed in the verses which Abū'l-ᶜAlā᾿ al-Maᶜarrī attributes to a Ḥulūlī in the *Risālat al-ghufrān* (Bint al-Shāṭi᾿ 396):

I saw my God enter the Yaḥyā Marketplace in Persian shoes and I almost collapsed. I said: "Is there hope of our being together?" He said: "None at all! Prudence forbids it. And if through God's ordaining there were intimate association in love, there would only be prostration and gazing."

Ra᾿aytu rabbī yamshī bi-lālakatin	*fī sūqi Yaḥyā fa-kidtu anfaṭiru*
Fa-qultu: Hal fī'ttiṣālinā ṭamaᶜun?	*Fa-qāla: Hayhāta! Yamnaᶜu'l-ḥadharu!*
Wa-law qaḍā'llāhu ulfatan bi-hawan	*lam yaku illā'l-sujūdu wa'l-naẓaru.*

The word *lālaka* which remained incomprehensible to the editor is, of course, the Persian *lālakā*. The Sūq Yaḥyā in Baghdad is named after the Barmakid Yaḥyā b. Khālid. Cf. Yāqūt, *Muᶜjam al-buldān* 3/195.

The strict Ṣūfī writer Hujwīrī (d. between 465-469/1072-1077) deals with "gazing at youths", while fully rejecting the practice, and says about it:

I saw that they have made an established ritual (*madhhab*) out of it... And this is a left-over from the Ḥulūlīs. (*Kashf al-maḥjūb* 542).

Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn ᶜAbd al-Karīm al-Bazdawī (d. 493/1100) writes in his work on dogma, the *Uṣūl al-dīn*:

Some Sūfīs teach that one of the attributes from among God's attributes (namely that of beauty) installs itself in the *shāhid*, i.e. the beardless youth with a beautiful face. And they are called Ḥulūlīs. They call him *shāhid* because they say: "We behold (*nushāhid*) that attribute from among God's attributes which has installed itself in him and we embrace him and kiss him because of this attribute." This doctrine is close to the doctrine of the Christians, indeed it is worse than the latter. For the Christians say: "The traces of divinity (*āthār al-rubūbiyya*) appeared in Jesus but only in him (*khāṣṣatan*)." But these Ṣūfīs say: "The traces of divinity appear in every beardless youth." However, this implies that they appear in a beardless youth among the infidels as well, and in fact such is their view.

Regarding this work see *Oriens* 2/1949/305-08. The passage is found in fol. 110b.

In his "Ars amandi" (*Jawāmiᶜ al-ladhdha*) ᶜAlī ibn Naṣr al-Kātib (d. 518/1124; Yāqūt, *Irshād* 15/97-98) states:

The Ṣūfīs have acted all too extravagantly (*ashrafa*) with regard to a youth distinguished by splendid beauty so that they even maintain that divinity has taken up residence in him. (Ms. Fatih 3729, fo. 71a).

Najm al-Dīn ʿUmar al-Nasafī (d. 537/1147) describes practices which he himself apparently witnessed and designates the Ṣūfīs he observed as Ḥulūlīs:

The doctrine of the Ḥulūlīs consists of their saying: "Contemplating the face of a *shāhid* and a beautiful woman and a beardless youth is permitted." And while doing this, they dance for joy (see below) and say: "An attribute from among the attributes of God has come down to us, and we have been able to kiss it and embrace it." But this is pure unbelief. (*Fī bayān madhhab al-ṣūfiyya*, Ms. Süleymaniye 1028, fol. 214b-215a).

ʿUmar Suhrawardī (d. 632/1235), who is equally strict in his disapproval, also recognizes the connection of the term *ḥulūl* with the Christological doctrine of ἐνοίκησις:

And there are people among them who teach *ḥulūl* and maintain that God takes up residence in them and in selected bodies, and something of the Christian doctrine of divinity and humanity (*lāhūt wa-nāsūt*) enters their mind (they have heard something about...), and many of them consider gazing at beautiful objects as permitted, while having this illusion in their sight. (*ʿAwārif al-maʿārif* 2/7; *Gaben* 87/9.7).

Mawlānā Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī (d. 672/1273) distances himself from *ḥulūl* when, in the context of a discussion about the damaging effects of being immoderately praised, he remarks:

Like the beardless youth whom they call God in order to cause him a bad reputation by this hypocrisy. (*Mathnawī* 1/1872).

Another time he says more playfully:

Don't shout so loud! Because the beloved is nearby, so near that one could think of *ḥulūl*. (*Dīwān*, Ms. Esad 2693).

Naʿra kam zan z-ānki nazdīkast yār ki zi-nazdīkī gumān āyadh ḥulūl.

The great textbooks of Sufism such as the works of Kalābādhī, Sarrāj, Qushayrī, Muḥammad Ghazzālī and ʿUmar Suhrawardī have undergone the influence of Ashʿarism which orthodox Ṣūfīs profess, and which rejects anthropomorphic conceptions of God, and, of course, *ḥulūl* even more so. Therefore later Sūfīs, as we have already seen, were accustomed to distance themselves quite explicitly from *ḥulūl* which was well known to them as heretical.

Thus, for example, even ʿUmar Ibn al-Fāriḍ (d. 632/1233; cf. Nallino, *Raccolta* 2/307). And see ʿAbd al-Karīm Jīlī in the *ʿAyniyya* in Nicholson, *Studies in Islamic Mysticism* 146, l. 17. The Mamlūk regime officially adopted a position against *ḥulūl* and *ittiḥād*. (Nallino, *Raccolta* 2/224-25).

6

Nonetheless the practice of Platonic gazing at beauty still lived on despite all the warnings and protests not only from non-Ṣūfīs but even from strict Ṣūfī masters themselves. On the other hand, the Ṣūfīs do not speak of *ḥulūl*—they probably never had done so—but of the *shāhid*, about whom we shall have more to say very shortly.

Many Ṣūfīs expressed themselves cautiously and did not say they revered the attribute of divine beauty in a beautiful face but that they wanted to fathom the creative art of God by gazing contemplatively at His creation, which thus allows God's transcendence to be preserved as demanded by orthodoxy. In this regard, they referred to alleged sayings of the Prophet in which gazing at beautiful objects is recommended or described as worship. Sulamī (d. 412/1021) had already adopted the same approach in a lost book about the practices of Ṣūfīs:

And ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān al-Sulamī composed a book which he called *The Customary Practices of the Ṣūfīs* (*Sunan al-ṣūfiyya*). At the end of the book he has a chapter dealing with all their "concessions" (*jawāmiᶜ rukhaṣihim*). There he speaks of dancing and singing and looking at a beautiful face, and he cites the saying of the Prophet: "Seek the good among those with a beautiful face!", and: "Three things confer luster on the eye (*tajlū'l-baṣar*): looking at greenery, looking at water, and looking at a beautiful face." (*Talbīs* 283).

Fīrūzābādī (d. 622/1225; *Der Islam* 21/1933/104) quotes another saying of the Prophet:

Looking upon the Kaᶜba is worship... looking at one's parents is worship, looking at greenery is worship, and looking at a beautiful face is worship. (*Jamḥat al-nuhā min lamḥat al-mahā*, Ms. Veliyeddin 1828, fol. 40b).

For the strict standpoint of Muḥammad Ghazzālī regarding gazing at beautiful faces, etc., cf. *Iḥyā'* 3/88, *Bayān mā ᶜalā'l-murīd fī tark al-tazwīj wa-fiᶜlih*.—The Ẓāhirite school of jurisprudences considered *naẓar ilā'l-murd* as permissible. Cf. for example *Tadhkirat al-ḥuffāẓ* 4/39, and p. 397 above. An adherent of this school, Muḥammad b. Ṭāhir al-Maqdisī (d. 507/1113), even composed a special work on "the permissibility of gazing at beardless youths". See p. 486 below.

But these Ṣūfīs as well find no mercy among opponents and are unmasked:

This party conceals its lusts and desires, and acts as if it only looks on in order to inform itself and draw conclusions (about God's omnipotence) (*ᶜibratan wa'stidlālan*). Indeed, some go so far as to imagine that their gazing is worship because they are looking at divine beauty's places of manifestation, and they

maintain that God—who is exalted above what these brothers of the Christians say—appears (*yaẓhar*) in the particular form in question... Our shaykh (Ibn Taymiyya) related to me how a beautiful youth walked past a man from these people and the latter followed him with his gaze. The shaykh said to him: "This is not befitting for a man like you!" He replied: "I see in him the attributes of the God I worship. He is a place of manifestation of His beauty." The shaykh said: "Surely you've already done something (with him)!" He answered: "And what if I have!" Our shaykh said: "God curse a community which sleeps with the one they honor as God!"

There follows a rejection of the previously quoted *ḥadīths*. (Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, d. 751/1350, *Rawḍat al-muḥibbīn* 134-35).

7

Of course, not all Ṣūfīs would have given such a defiant answer. In stories about the early Ṣūfīs who practiced gazing at youths (*naẓar ilā'l-murd*), as with Plato, it is a question of rejecting sensuality and combatting it, and it was a claim to fame for Ṣūfīs that they kept their association with youths free of sensuality.

One of the earliest Ṣūfīs, Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm Abū Ḥamza (d. 269/883; *Ḥilya* 10/320 no. 590; and following the latter *Ta'rīkh Baghdād* 1/390 no. 364)—apparently in a lost work, from which quotations have been preserved for us in Sarrāj's *Maṣāri' al-'ushshāq*—recounts a series of stories about Ṣūfīs who gaze at beautiful youths or have them as constant companions but meanwhile guard themselves against any sensual feelings. Some succeed without effort in keeping this association free of sensuality, others intentionally expose themselves to ascetic tests of strength. Again others deliberately avoid all risky situations, while still others have a bad conscience only from looking and are extremely unhappy because they could not stop gazing. Others consider that some suffering which befell them was punishment for a forbidden look. Many become ill or fall down dead. And in the midst of this the railing of moral preachers sounds forth, which on one occasion even causes a youth in full bloom to die from despair. What Abū Ḥamza intended by narrating these stories is not wholly clear. Perhaps by way of warning he wished to point out the conflicts of conscience and psychic disturbances which Ṣūfīs underwent because of this kind of gazing and association. On the other hand, perhaps he wished to show the reverse, that gazing like this is possible without *ḥulūl* and sensuality. The author who has preserved the stories for us, Abū

Muḥammad Sarrāj (d. 500/1106), was pursuing other goals by incorporating them into his work. He collected tragic love stories in order to console himself in the face of unhappy love.

Along with these stories from Abū Ḥamza there are additional ones which the famous Ṣūfī Khayr al-Nassāj (d. 320/932 allegedly at the age of 120) relates, as well as others, including one about Junayd.

Here we are above all interested in stories which expressly deal with gazing at the beauty of God and suchlike, but we shall also present the content of other stories which do not contain this motif because they make many of the Ṣūfī love stories in ᶜAṭṭār more comprehensible for us.

Abū Ḥamza, the Ṣūfī, says: "ᶜAbd Allāh b. al-Zubayr al-Ḥanafī related to me: 'I was seated with Abū'l-Naḍr al-Ghanawī, one of the most prominent God-fearing worshippers of God, when he caught sight of a beautiful youth (*ghulām*). His eyes didn't swerve from him until the latter had come nearby. Then he said to him: "I beg you by God, the Hearing, and by His majesty and His sublime power, to remain standing before me so that I can have my fill of seeing you!" At that the youth stood there a little and then walked on. Thereupon he said: "I beg you by the All-wise, the Highly-honored and the Gracious (God) who calls (creation) into manifestation and leads it back again (to its origin), to remain standing!" At that the youth remained a while, and the other began to run his gaze up and down over him. Then the youth turned to go, but he said: "I beg you by the One, the Almighty, the Eternal (God), who neither begets nor is begotten, to remain standing." The youth then remained standing a while (longer), and the other viewed him a long time and then the youth turned to go. But he said: "I beg you by the kind, knowing, hearing and seeing God who has no peer, that you (still) remain standing!" The youth remained standing, and he gazed at him. Then he looked down at the ground, and the youth went away. After a long time, while weeping he lifted his face and said: "When I looked at him, this person reminded me of a face which is elevated above every conception of similarity (*tashbīh*), is too holy for anyone to be able to conceive of it in (human) form (*tamthīl*), and too powerful to be subjected to spatial boundaries (*taḥdīd*). Truly, I shall now do everything within my power to win His satisfaction by fighting against all His enemies and adhering to His friends until I reach my goal of beholding His noble face and His lofty splendor! Indeed, I wish He had shown me His face and then locked me in Hell for as long as heaven and earth exist!" And then he fainted.'" (Sarrāj, *Maṣāriᶜ al-ᶜushshāq* 227; *Aswāq* 185b; *Talbīs* 284).

It appears that the shaykh or the narrator has not perceived the contradiction between his rejecting God's resemblance to human beings and his being reminded of God's face by the face of the beautiful youth. Moreover, the story is an illustration of Jāḥiẓ's

statement quoted above (pp. 454 f.) that the people who imagine God in a form similar to themselves are the most zealous worshippers of God. Here such a man is actually spurred on to fight for the faith by the sight of the beautiful youth.

The head of the Baghdad Ṣūfīs, Abū'l-Qāsim al-Junayd (d. 298/910), relates:

"For some reason or other I crossed over to the east side of Baghdad. There I saw an attractive-looking school. The teacher, dressed in an undergarment and an upper garment of fine linen, sat on a chair of teak wood, and before him lay a silver staff with two golden rings on it. And in his school boys with turbans and upper garments of fine linen sat on chairs of teak wood. I didn't know what I should be more amazed by, the teacher or the boys. I was amazed at their cleanliness, beauty, charm and correct speech, and I beheld how the teacher called one boy and had him read and heard his lessons. Next he had him do calculations and recite poems and finally withdraw. Then another came in the same way, until the last boy presented himself. He was the most beautiful of them and dressed in the cleanliest way, and he was the best at reading, calculating and reciting poetry, and had the most pleasant voice. He read and acquitted himself of his task better than the others. And when the boy was finished, the teacher took the staff and struck him with it, and the boy wept and the teacher wept with him. I thought to myself: 'The boy is weeping because he was struck, but why is the teacher weeping?' The next day and the day after that he did the same thing. I waited to question him but the boy did so ahead of me, saying: 'Teacher sir, why do you strike me? By God, I'm one of the best of all in reading and have the best reputation and the best voice and the cleanest clothing and the most beautiful face and am the nicest to look at and have the richest father. So why do you strike me?' The teacher said: 'Because you occupy a place in my heart which no one should occupy except God!' Then the boy said: 'I'm prepared to let you have your way with me.' The teacher said: 'Now rise and go wherever you wish! What I felt for you in my heart has disappeared. I humbled myself before you (*tadhallaltu*), as long as you caused me to feel the power of your beauty (*tadallalta ʿalayya*). But now you've humbled yourself before me, and how should the humble humble himself before the humble?'" Junayd relates: "Then I went up to the teacher and said to him: 'Oh Shaykh, what are you doing sitting here? You're one of the greatest of our companions!' And I took him by the hand and brought him to the Shūnīziyya Mosque and said to my companions (verse):

'By the right of love, you confidants of my love, see that you understand: the language of finding at the moment of finding is wondrous. It's forbidden for a heart that wants to love that anyone but God partake of its love.'

Then the teacher continued (verse):

'My feeling for Him is (love's) feeling (rapture) because of the feeling which causes finding Him, and the feeling of finding among those who find is a blaz-

ing flame. And if I actually die in love for my Lord, verily love is sweet in death!'

Then the teacher said: 'Oh Junayd, this is how the upright die!' (and he lay down and closed his eyes), and when we shook him, he was dead." (Fīrūzābādī, *Nasl* 81b-82a).

Text of the verses:

Bi-ḥaqqi'l-hawā yā ahl wuddī tafahhamū: lisānu'l-wujūdi fī'l-wujūdi ʿajību.
Ḥarāmun ʿalā qalbin taʿarraḍa li'l-hawā yakūnu li-ghayri'l-Ḥaqqi fīhi naṣību.
Fa-anshada'l-muʿallimu wa-qāl:
Fa-wajdī bihī wajdun li-wajdi wujūdihī wa-wajdu wujūdi'l-wājidīna lahību.
La-in muttu ḥaqqan fī maḥabbati sayyidī fa-ʿinda'l-manāyā lal-wadādu yaṭību.

I cannot unconditionally vouch for the correctness of the given translation. The ambiguity of *wajd* and *wujūd* allows for other interpretations.

One could doubt the authenticity of the story because of the excessive detail in description but the conclusion corresponds to similar stories which we have already become familiar with, and the complicated style of the verses is entirely typical of Junayd.

The unusual story illustrates very well the transition from mystical pederasty to love of God.

Abū Ḥamza, the Ṣūfī, relates: "In Jerusalem I saw a noble young Ṣūfī (*fatan min al-ṣūfiyya*) who had associated with a youth for a long time. Then the man died, and the youth grieved for him at length until, due to weakness and sorrow, he was reduced to skin and bones. One day I said to him: 'You've grieved a long time indeed for your friend! In fact it seems as if you haven't really wished to be consoled over his death.' He answered: 'How should I forget a man for whom God stood so high that even for one moment he wouldn't commit a sin with me against Him, and who preserved me from the filth of vice as long as we were together and alone with one another during the night and in the day.' (*Maṣāriʿ* 76; *Aswāq* 184a; *Tazyīn al-aswāq* 2/28; *Talbīs* 288).

Khayr al-Nassāj relates: "I was together with the Ṣūfī Muḥārib b. Ḥassān in the mosque of al-Khayf (in Minā near Mecca), and we were wearing the garb of pilgrims. A beautiful youth from the Maghrib sat down with us, and I saw that Muḥārib gazed at him with a look which displeased me. When the youth had gone, I said: 'You're here wearing holy clothes, in the holy month, on a holy day, in a holy place, among people dressed in holy clothing, in a holy mosque, and yet I saw you gazing at this youth with the look of someone in love?' He then said: 'You say this to me, you person of lascivious heart and eyes? Don't you know there are three things which stop me from falling into Satan's idolatry?' I asked: 'What are these things?' He said: 'The blanket of the faith and the chastity of Islam but above all shame before God lest He should see me engage in some bad act which my God has forbidden me.' Then he fell to the ground as if

thunderstruck so that people came running toward us." (*Ḥilya* 10/155; *Talbīs* 285).

Others adopt special measures so as not to be led into temptation.

Abū Ḥamza, the Ṣūfī, relates: "I saw a beautiful youth with Aḥmad b. ʿAlī, the Ṣūfī, in Jerusalem and I asked Aḥmad: 'How long has this youth been with you?' He said: 'For years.' I said: 'It would be better for you if you went to some cheap lodging where no one would see you, than to sit together in mosques and chat there with one another!' He said: 'I'm fearful that if I'm alone with him, Satan could outwit me, and I don't want God to see me together with him in a sin and to separate me from him on the day when lovers will possess their beloveds (the Resurrection).'" (*Maṣāriʿ* 88; *Aswāq* 184b).

Abū Ḥamza Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm relates: "I said to Muḥammad b. al-ʿAlāʾ from Damascus, who at that time was the chief (*sayyid*) of the Ṣūfīs (perhaps Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm b. al-ʿAlāʾ al-Shāmī al-Dimashqī is meant, an ascetic who resided in the Ṣūfī settlement in ʿAbbādān; Dhahabī, *Mīzān*, under his name alphabetically), when I observed him walking for a long time with a beautiful youth but then separate from him: 'Why do you break off with this young man I saw you with, after you were previously together with him and you had an inclination for him?' He said: 'I've separated from him without hatred and disgust.' I said: 'Why have you done this?' He said: 'I noticed that when I was alone with him and he was near me, my heart invited me to do something which, if I had done it, would lower me in the eyes of God... and I hope that because of this separation God will give me the reward He gives to those who patiently endure not doing the things He has forbidden...' Then he wept and I felt sorry for him." (*Maṣāriʿ* 238; *Aswāq* 184a; *Tazyīn al-aswāq* 2/28; *Talbīs* 289).

Abū Ḥamza relates: "Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh (ʿUbayd Allāh) b. al-Ashʿath al-Dimashqī, a pious worshipper of God, saw a beautiful youth and fainted. He was carried home and became ill so that he couldn't get up for a long time. We regularly went to visit him and asked how he was. But he never said anything to us about this story and the cause of his illness. The people, however, related the story of that look. The youth also heard the story and came to visit him. The patient behaved cheerfully toward him and gesticulated and laughed in front of his face and was pleased to see him. The youth went on visiting him until he could stand again and was finally healthy again. One day the youth invited him to come with him to his residence. But he didn't want to do so. Then the youth asked me to invite him to visit the youth. I did this but he was unwilling. When I asked him what he had against this, he answered: 'I'm not immune to enticement and am not safe before temptations. And I fear lest an affliction from Satan could befall me if an opportunity offered itself to me, and that a sin could occur between him and me, and that God could then cut me off from Himself, etc.'" (*Maṣāriʿ* 14-15; *Aswāq* 185a; *Tazyīn al-aswāq* 2/28; *Talbīs* 290).

Ascetic tests of strength:

Abū'l-Kumayt al-Andalusī relates as the most remarkable thing he saw among the Ṣūfīs the story about a converted Persian named Mihrajān who became a Ṣūfī: "He had with him a beautiful youth from whom he never separated. When night fell, he performed the prayers and lay down next to him to sleep. Then he stood up again full of fear, prayed again as much as was granted to him, and lay down again near the youth to sleep. This he did several times during the night. At the break of dawn he performed a *witr*-prayer, raised up his hands in prayer and said: 'God, you know that this night has passed in a salutary manner without my having done anything wicked and that during it the recording angels have recorded no sins on my behalf, although what I bear in my heart is so heavy that if it were loaded onto the mountains, they would burst apart... Oh Lord, don't separate us on the day when lovers become united!'"—The narrator who's observed the man and speaks with him about what he's seen, finally says to him: "Then why do you live together with someone who you fear can become a cause of sin for you?" (*Aswāq* 184b; *Tazyīn al-aswāq* 2/28; *Talbīs* 287-88).

Many have a bad conscience just because of a forbidden glance.

Abū Ḥamza relates about Abū'l-Ghamr Ḥusām b. al-Maḍā (?) al-Miṣrī that during a naval exploit under Hārūn he became stranded in Sicily and there met a man who couldn't hold back his tears from much weeping. He spoke with him and the man said forbidden glances had brought him to this wretched state. (*Maṣāri*ᶜ 108).

Perhaps it is rather a question of Ḥusām b. Miṣakk al-Baṣrī who of course died before Hārūn (170-193 AH), namely in 162/779. (*Tahdhīb al-Tahdhīb* 2/244, no. 446).

Abū Ḥamza, the Ṣūfī, relates: "I was together with Sinān b. Ibrāhīm, the Ṣūfī. He looked at a youth and said: 'God be praised for everything which happens! We were free through obedience to Him and became slaves through disobedience to Him, because of glances which have caused us torment...' Then he wept, and I said to him: 'Why are you weeping?' He said: 'How can I not weep when I must fear... because of a glance that engrossed me, that a calamity will strike me or a torment, or that the wrath of God will befall me. Then he sobbed and fell to the ground." (*Maṣāri*ᶜ 63-64; *Aswāq* 185b).

Abū Ḥamza, the Ṣūfī, relates: "ᶜAbd Allāh b. Mūsā was one of the chiefs and the most esteemed men among the Ṣūfīs. He beheld a beautiful youth on the street and became afflicted with love for him and almost lost his mind because of love and passion. Every day he stationed himself along the youth's way in order to see him when he came and went. And this affliction persisted for a long time, and weakness rendered him incapable of movement so that he could no longer walk one step. I visited him one day while he was sick and said to him: 'Oh Abū Muḥammad, what has happened to you, and what kind of a matter is this that has

brought you to such a state?' He said: 'Things which God has afflicted me with and whose torment I can't bear, nor have I the strength to endure. Indeed, man deems many a sin to be small which to God is greater than a deadly sin. Whoever casts forbidden glances deserves a long illness.' Then he wept, and when I asked him why he was weeping, he said: 'I fear that my damnation will last a long time in Hell.' I then left him and I felt sorry for him because of the wretched state I had seen him in." (*Aswāq* 185a; *Talbīs* 289-90).

A similar but less drastic story about Abū Muslim Saᶜīd ibn Juwayriyya al-Khushūᶜī is found in *Aswāq* 185a and *Talbīs* 292. A similar one about Umayya ibn al-Ṣāmit is related by Khayr al-Nassāj in *Ḥilya* 10/154; *Talbīs* 289. Another about Thābit ibn al-Sarī al-Ṣūfī occurs in *Aswāq* 185a.

Sometimes the sinners feel they have already been punished in the here and now.

One of the Syrian Ṣūfīs relates: "I beheld a beautiful Christain boy and stopped in order to gaze at him. Then (Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā) Ibn al-Jallāʾ al-Dimashqī walked past me and took hold of my hand. I felt ashamed before him and said: 'Oh Abū ᶜAbd Allāh, God is sublime! I wondered how this beautiful form and this splendid physique could be created for Hell.' He then pinched my hand and said: 'You'll feel the punishent for this later.' And (in reality) I experienced the punishment for it after thirty years."

Qūt 1/185; *Nahrung* 2/26 f./32.35; Qushayrī, *Risāla* 20; *Sendschreiben* 71/1.26; *Iḥyāʾ* 4/48, *Bāb al-tawba*; *Stufen* 123/A.289. In TA 2/63 the admirer of the Christian boy is Ibn al-Jallāʾ himself, the admonisher Junayd. Ibn al-Jallāʾ, a highly esteemed Ṣūfī who emigrated from Baghdad to Syria, died 306/918. *Taʾrīkh Baghdād* 5, no. 2687; Sulamī, *Ṭabaqāt* 176 and the literature referred to there.

The preachers on morals carry out their duties:

Abū Ḥamza relates: "Kāmil ibn al-Mukhāriq, the Ṣūfī, was one of the most beautiful young people I've ever seen among the Ṣūfīs. He had completely withdrawn into his residence in order to devote himself to religious exercises and only left the house every Friday. And when he then came out to go to the mosque, the people stopped and cast their glances at him and stared at him. Ḥajjār ibn Qays al-Makkī, an eloquent, intelligent man with whom I was friends, came with him to us in Damascus. Some of his companions had me ask him to hold an assembly of edification. He agreed. We set the date for a particular Friday and the people invited one another to come. On the Friday, after the early prayers, people arrived from every direction, and he took up his position and spoke to us. While he was speaking, Kāmil ibn al-Mukhāriq arrived. When the people saw him, they cast their glances at him and were no longer listening. When Ḥajjār noticed this, he broke off his discourse and said: 'Oh people, will you not ask God for serious behavior? Don't you see how God has created the seven heavens above one another and has placed the moon among them as light

and the sun as a lamp? Truly, what you see in these two heavenly bodies, despite their distance, pleases me better than that you look at this (youth). Be on guard lest your carnal souls return to you and dominate you, when hearts change in your secret thoughts! ...Whither do your lusts lead you, etc.?' Then he went on with his sermon, and I counted seventy men and youths who donned the pilgrim's garb after this assembly of edification." (*Maṣāri*ᶜ 100-01).

One of these preachers on morals preached in such a way that it drove a beautiful youth to death.

The story also comes from Abū Ḥamza. Briefly the content is as follows:

In Medina lived a youth of absolutely extraordinary beauty, of the Banū Makhzūm tribe. In order to protect him from the glances and disturbances of the Mecca-pilgrims passing through Medina his father doesn't allow him to enter the mosque as long as the pilgrims' caravan is in Medina. One day a group of Ṣūfīs comes on the return route from Mecca to Medina to visit the grave of the Prophet. One of them by the name of Ṭalḥa encounters the beautiful boy who's seated by the Prophet's grave waiting for the hour of prayer, and deems it appropriate to hold so severe an admonitory sermon against sins that the boy falls down unconscious and after three days dies. (*Maṣāri*ᶜ 121-22).

Sometimes the admired youth himself gives a sermon to his admirer.

Abū'l-Ḥusayn al-Nūrī (d. 295/908) relates: "I beheld a beautiful youth in Baghdad and gazed at him. Then I wished to look at him once more and said to him: 'You put on creaking boots and walk about the streets?' He said: 'Oh that's just fine! So you want to chat someone up by means of (moral) science (*atujammishu bi'l-ᶜilm*)?' And he recited the verses: 'Look with the eye of truth when you gaze at an attribute that contains the miraculous works of the Creator! And don't give the carnal soul's lust any share of it because of (the bad) which is in it, but look in truth at the Almighty's creative power!'"

Sulamī, *Ṭabaqāt* 166-67; *Ḥilya* 10/254; *Taʾrīkh Baghdād* 5/133; Ṣafadī, *Wāfī* 1/273. *Al-niᶜāl al-ṣarrāra* could also mean: shoes with turned up points. Cf. the note of the editor of the *Ṭabaqāt* and above p. 461.

The beautiful youth who rebukes his admirer later becomes a literary type in Persian poetry. Ḥāfiẓ portrays himself as being scolded by the wine-pourer, the Magian boy, and as receiving a lesson about God's beauty which appears in flesh and blood.

Ghazal: *Dōsh raftam ba-dar-i maykadha khwāb-ālūdha*, and *ghazal: Saḥargāhān ki makhmūr-i shabāna*, imitated in the *Festschrift Georg Jacob zum siebzigsten Geburtstag* 232-33; and some verses p. 501 below.

Many Ṣūfīs want to give up gazing at beautiful youths and keeping company with them but they are unable to do so.

Thus Yūsuf al-Rāzī confesses: "More than a hundred times I made a pact with God that I wouldn't associate with any youth." But the beauty of cheeks and the stature of figures and the roguish glint of eyes have time and again destroyed him. (*Talbīs* 291-92).

Yūsuf al-Rāzī, a famous Ṣūfī, died 304/916. Sulamī, *Ṭabaqāt* 185; *Ḥilya* 10/238, no. 567.

A Ṣūfī commits suicide because he catches himself experiencing sensual arousal in his love for a youth. (*Talbīs* 290).

A Ṣūfī in love dies in the wake of the death of his beloved youth.

Abū Ḥamza relates: "I saw a beautiful youth with Muḥammad ibn Qaṭan. They were inseparable whether at home or abroad and lived this way a long time. Then the youth died, and Muḥammad ibn Qaṭan grieved over him so much that finally he was only skin and bones. One day I saw him walking to the graves and I walked after him. He stopped at the youth's grave and wept and gazed at the grave while it was raining. He stood thus from morning to sunset, didn't move from the spot, nor did he sit down, keeping his hand under his cheek. I then departed while he was still standing this way. The next morning I went out again to see what he was doing and how things stood with him. I found him where he had fallen on his face, dead. I called the people who were on hand to the spot. They helped me carry him away, and I washed him and dressed him in a shroud and buried him near that grave." (*Maṣāri^{c}* 14; *Aswāq* 185b; *Tazyīn al-aswāq* 2/28).

The two remaining Abū Ḥamza stories also report on beautiful youths but have little to do with our subject. (*Maṣāri^{c}* 122-25, 143-44).

Abū Yaḥyā al-Taymī relates: "A young ascetic named Abū'l-Ḥusayn used to go with us to the class of Mis^{c}ar ibn Kidām and would be accompanied by a beautiful youth who caused distress in everyone's soul. And when people talked a lot about him and his association with the youth, the latter's family forbade the youth to meet him and to speak to him. This made Abū'l-Ḥusayn half-insane so that people feared for his life. Mis^{c}ar heard of the matter and said: 'Tell him he should no longer come in my vicinity and no longer attend my class because I detest him!' When I met him, I told him this. He then took a deep breath and recited these verses: 'Oh you whose wondrous beauty steers the reins of the eyes to Him! From you I receive what all men receive: a glance and a greeting in the street. But they are happy because they are sure, whereas I'm unfortunate out of fear when I see you.' Then he let out a cry and his gaze became fixed, and he was dead." (*Aswāq* 186a; Nuwayrī 2/191).

The narrator is perhaps Sulaymān al-Taymī (d. 143/760) who was famous for his piety and heard *ḥadīths* from Mis^{c}ar. (Cf. *Khulāṣat Tadhhīb al-Kamāl* s.n. Sulaymān b. Ṭarkhān and the Index to Ash^{c}arī's *Maqālāt*. But the latter's *kunya* is usually given as Abū Mu^{c}tamir). Mis^{c}ar ibn Kidām is a famous traditionist who died 152/769 or 155/772. The poet of the

verses is Isḥāq ibn al-Sabbāḥ, a friend of Nuṣayb *mawlā* al-Mahdī (*Aghānī*, 2nd printing, 20/33). The verses are found in the *Majmūʿ min laṭāʾif al-udabāʾ*, Ms. Ayasofya 4877, fol. 175b.

Three quarters of a millennium later the Persian poet Jāmī relates:

One of the religious scholars said: "One time I preached before gatherings and sowed the seeds of desire (to enter the circle of the Ṣūfīs) in the hearts of the audience. An old man regularly attended these sermons and was never absent but he continually sighed and shed tears, and sighing and weeping were inseparable from him. One day I had him come to me alone and asked him why he sighed and wept. He said: 'I was a man who bought and sold male and female slaves and made a living from this buying and selling. One day I bought a young male slave of exceptional beauty... for three hundred dinars. I expended great effort in educating him... and then brought him to the market like Joseph and enumerated his internal and external merits to the buyers. Then I saw that a refined horseman, dressed in the way of well-mannered people, came along and by chance looked at the boy. He jumped from his horse, sat by him and asked him his name, what country he came from, what skills he had and what sort of work he could do. Next he turned to me and asked what the price was. I said: 'A thousand dinars.' He said nothing but secretly passed something to the slave. When he'd gone, I weighed his gift and it came to a hundred dinars. On the next day and the third day he did the same thing so that his gift amounted to three hundred dinars. I said to myself: 'He has now paid in full the original price. It seems that he likes the boy but can't afford the price I've asked.' When he left, I walked after him without his being aware of it until I found out where he lived. When it was evening, I decked out the boy in attractive clothes and expensive perfumes, and went to the door of the house where the young man lived. I knocked at the door and he came out. When he saw us, he was visibly confounded and said: 'Verily, we belong to God and, verily, unto Him we shall return!' (Surah 2/156). Then he asked: 'Who brought you here and who showed you the way?' I said: 'A couple of noble gentlemen are bidding for this boy, but we haven't come to an agreement with them. Now I'm afraid they could pester him tonight. Therefore I would like to entrust him to you so he sleeps in security tonight under your protection.' He said: 'Come in yourself as well and stay with him!' I said: 'I have some urgent business and can't stay! So I gave the boy over to him and set out on my way home. When I reached home and locked the door behind me and sat down, I thought to myself: 'How will the two spend the night together?' Suddenly I heard the voice of the boy who came home shaking and weeping. I said: 'What took place, and what happened to you in the company of the young man?' He said: 'He's dead!' I said: 'For God's sake! How did this happen?' He answered: 'When you left, he took me into his house and brought me some food. When I had eaten and washed my hands, he prepared a bed for me, sprinkled me with musk and rose-water, and

brought me to bed. Then he placed his hand on my cheek and said: "By God, how beautiful this is and how lovable, and how ugly is that which my soul wants and what it lusts after! The punishment of God is worse than everything else, and whoever is afflicted by it is more unfortunate than anyone else." And he said: "Verily, we belong to God and, verily, unto Him we shall return!" Then he again placed his finger on my cheek and said: "I bear witness that this is infinitely beautiful and arouses hopes and desires. But chastity and purity is more beautiful still, and the reward for it promised by God is more perfect in beauty than anything else!" At that he fell to the ground and when I shook him, he was dead. He had transferred to the eternal life.'—The old man said: 'All my weeping is due to recalling this young man, his chastity, purity and goodness and his fine being, and his beautiful character ever remains before my eyes, as well as his noble behavior. As long as I live, I wish to travel this path and when I die, I wish to die this way!'"

Bahāristān, Rawḍa 5; Sayyid M. Shākir, *Sharḥ-i Bahāristān*, Istanbul 1252, pp. 295-305.

8

The technical term *shāhid* (cf. surah 85/3) for the beautiful youth who serves as object for the contemplation of beauty is already attested quite early on.

The verb, from which the word is derived, means: to be personally present at an event, to be an eye-witness, and then to testify regarding what one witnessed. Accordingly, *shāhid* sometimes means "one who is present", at other times "witness".

The Ṣūfīs, to begin with, use it to designate a psychic phenomenon, namely the interior image of an absent object which through the image appears to be present, then any content of the consciousness which predominates at a given moment, and finally a beautiful person whom one loves, either because the person causes the distant beauty of God to be present—re-presents it—or because one carries the person's image in one's heart.

Sarrāj (d. 378/988) says:

The *shāhid* is that which causes you to see as a witness what is absent from you (*yushhiduka bi-mā ghāba ʿank*), i.e. transposes your heart (the organ of inner perception) into its presence.

"For Him there is a *shāhid* (here best translated as 'witness, testimony') in every thing, which demonstrates that He is one."

Shāhid also has the meaning of "present". (*Lumaʿ* 339; *Schlaglichter* 476/120.22).

Junayd is asked why the *shāhid* is called *shāhid*. He answers:

The *shāhid* of God is present (*shāhid*) in your mind and your secrets when He surveys them, and bears witness to His beauty in His creatures and bondsmen. When the one looking looks at him, he bears witness that he knows about His looking at him (?). (*Luma*ᶜ 229; *Schlaglichter* 348/89.30).

I read: *shāhidu'l-Ḥaqqi*. What follows this is difficult to understand. The text is uncertain.

Qushayrī's definition of *shāhid* has become classical:

In their speech they frequently use the word *shāhid* (and say for example): "So-and-so is under the *shāhid* of learning (*huwa bi-shāhid al-ᶜilm*), so-and-so is under the *shāhid* of ecstatic emotion (*wajd*), so-and-so under the *shāhid* of a state (*ḥāl*)", and by this word they mean what is present in the person's heart, i.e. that which prevails over his thoughts (*al-ghālib ᶜalayhi dhikruh*), as if he saw it and was looking at it even though it's absent. And whenever a thought (*dhikr*) of something prevails in a person's heart, he is then "under its *shāhid*". ...what is present in your heart is your *shāhid*... And when someone has attached his heart to a person, it is said: 'This is his *shāhid*', i.e. the person is present in his heart. For indeed love has the effect that the lover continually thinks of the beloved and the beloved occupies his heart completely.

But some, in a forced manner, have had recourse to the linguistic derivation of the word (*shahida* = to bear witness) and said: "*Shāhid* comes from *shahāda*, bearing witness. If he looks at a beautiful person, and in so doing his humanity has dropped from him, and looking at this person doesn't distract him from the mystical state he is in, and being together with him exerts no form of influence (of a sensual kind) on him, then the *shāhid* bears witness on his behalf that his carnal soul has disappeared. But if looking does exert an influence, then it bears witness against him, to the effect that his humanity has remained and that he pays the carnal soul its tribute (*qiyāmihī bi-aḥkāmi bashariyyatih*). Thus it either bears witness for him or against him." There follows a very forced interpretation of the *ḥadīth*: "I saw my Lord in the most beautiful form." (*Risāla* 44, before the *Bāb al-tawba*; *Sendschreiben* 143/2.24).

Following Qushayrī: ᶜUmar al-Nasafī, *Ādāb al-taṣawwuf*, Ms. Carullah 1098, fol. 72b; Fīrūzābādī, *Dalālat al-mustanhij* (GAL² 1/569), Ms. Ayasofya 1785, fol. 105b; Anonymous, *Maqāmāt al-ᶜārifīn*, composed 771 AH, Ms. Köprülü 784, fol. 196b.

In Qushayrī's definition there is no clear indication that the *shāhid* is a representative of God's beauty. However, in a second passage, which shall be discussed shortly, in characterizing this doctrine he employs the word "polytheism".

That in practice for a certain number of Ṣūfīs the beautiful person, especially the beautiful youth, was a representative of the Godhead, is, on the basis of the text passages already quoted, and those which we shall still become familiar with, beyond any doubt.

The second category of Ṣūfīs mentioned by Qushayrī expose themselves to an ascetic test of strength. That repressing sensuality was a serious problem for the Ṣūfīs inclined to "gazing", we have already seen. The doctrine of *ḥulūl*, which was in opposition to established dogma, and the fear of sensuality—these were the two factors which led Qushayrī to reject the doctrine of the *shāhid* and to present warnings issued by himself and other strict Ṣūfīs against "association with youths" (*ṣuḥbat al-aḥdāth*).

Indeed, whereas in the above-quoted passage Qushayrī discusses the concept *shāhid* with complete objectivity, in the part of his epistle which is intended as guidance for novices he adopts a very strong stance against the people who adhere to the doctrine of the *shāhid*. There he says:

But if someone in this regard (association with youths) stands above the level of depravity and yet indicates (hints) that (association with and love for youths is in fact) an ordeal for souls and does no harm, and (refers to) what has been recounted about the deluded ideas of the adherents of the doctrine of the *shāhid*, and relates stories about certain shaykhs, their weaknesses and defects which it were better to cover up, then this is tantamount (*naẓīr*) to polytheism and stands on the same level as (*qarīn*) unbelief (as for instance that of the Christians). (*Risāla*, 184; *Sendschreiben* 544/54.16; ᶜArūsī's *Commentary* 4/221).

The sentence is overloaded, and the construction cumbersome and difficult to unravel.

Certainly the great moral reformer himself also subjected the stories that were accepted in his book to a strict censorship and "covered up the weaknesses of the shaykhs". His warnings are frequently repeated in later works.

Cf. for instance Ibn ᶜArabī's *Kitāb al-Amr al-muḥkam*, Ms. Umumi 3750, fol. 222a, where Qushayrī is quoted verbatim. (The whole passage is found in Spanish translation in Asín, *El Islam cristianizado* 326 ff.). Naturally, the judgements of Ṣūfī opponents such as Ibn al-Jawzī (*Talbīs* 282-96) and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (*Rawḍat al-muḥibbīn* 132 ff.) are even more severe.

The censorship recommended by Qushayrī appears to have been practiced later as well. In any case, some books in which one could expect more detailed information about the adherents of the *shāhid*-doctrine have not been preserved for us.

Examples are the book mentioned above (p. 473) by Sulamī, *Sunan al-ṣūfiyya*, the book about "the permissibility of gazing at beardless youths" by Ibn Ṭāhir al-Maqdisī (d. 507/1113; *Der Islam* 21/1933/92; *Muntaẓam* 9/177-79; and Samᶜānī, *Ansāb*) and the *Risāla-i Shāhid* of Maḥmūd Shabistarī (d. 720/1320). The late treatise on the same subject by ᶜAbd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī (d. 1143/1731) which has come down to us (*Der Islam* 21/93) is not very informative.

Tha^c^ālibī (d. 429/1038) gives a somewhat divergent explanation of the term *shāhid* which may also have been current, however, because it agrees exactly with that more cautious justification of gazing as *naẓar al-^c^ibra wa'l-istidlāl* which we have already become acquainted with.

From among the redefined terms of the Ṣūfīs, the term *shāhid* "witness" for a beautiful youth is relevant. They mean by this that because of his beautiful form he bears witness to the omnipotence of God. (*Al-Kināya wa'l-ta^c^rīḍ* p. 20; Ms. Racib Paşa 1473, fol. 17b).

In this connection Tha^c^ālibī recounts a funny story according to which a group of Ṣūfīs replaced the term *shāhid*, which in fact as a legal term means "witness", by another legal term, namely *ḥujja* "proof".

It's related about the followers of Abū ^c^Alī al-Thaqafī that out of respect for the shaykh they avoided the word *shāhid* and agreed among themselves to refer to a good-looking youth as a *ḥujja*, "a proof". One day when they were accompanying the shaykh on a road, a youth appeared in the distance. Then one of them said: "A proof!" He thought this way Abū ^c^Alī wouldn't follow what he meant. But when the youth came closer, he was not good-looking. Abū ^c^Alī then turned around to his companions and said: "But an invalid one!" Moreover, I heard a religious scholar tell this story about Abū Isḥāq al-Marwazī.

Abū ^c^Alī Muḥammad b. ^c^Abd al-Wahhāb al-Thaqafī al-Nīsābūrī died 328/940. Sulamī, *Ṭabaqāt* 361.—Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm b. ^c^Abd Allāh al-Marwazī died 241/855. *Tahdhīb al-Tahdhīb* 1/132, no. 234.

The term *shāhid* has undergone wide diffusion especially throughout the Persian-speaking area and there designates a beautiful youth, as well as more rarely a beautiful woman.

Aflākī reports from ^c^Ārif Chalabī who heard it from Sulṭān Walad, the son of Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, that Shams-i Tabrīz in order to test Jalāl al-Dīn one day pretended to him that he wanted a *shāhid*. Jalāl al-Dīn had at first wanted to place his own wife, Kirā Khātūn, at Shams' disposal. But Shams described her as his sister and demanded a boy instead. Then Jalāl al-Dīn placed his son Sulṭān Walad, the narrator, at Shams' disposal as a servant. (Ms. Veliyeddin 1843, fol. 151a; Huart, *Les Saints* 2/121; O'Kane, *Feats* 427-28).

As especially typical representatives of the doctrine of the *shāhid* (*al-qawl bi'l-shāhid*), or as the Persians put it, of "love-play with *shāhids*" (*shāhidbāzī*), three mystics in particular are named: Aḥmad Ghazzālī (d. 520/1126), Awḥad al-Dīn Kirmānī (d. circa mid-7th century AH) and the mystical poet Fakhr al-Dīn ^c^Irāqī (686/1287).

Aḥmad Ghazzālī, the earliest of the three, has left behind that deeply penetrating psychology of love, the "Aphorisms of Love" (*Sawāniḥ*) which we have already cited so frequently. In it there is no mention of *shāhidbāzī*. Nonetheless, his opponent Ibn al-Jawzī informs us that he was a proponent of the doctrine of the *shāhid*.

Muntaẓam 9/262, sub anno 520 AH. A relevant story is found there.

The same Ibn al-Jawzī relates about him:

It is also related that a group of Ṣūfīs went in to see him and found him alone with a beardless youth. Between the two of them was a rose, and one moment he looked at the rose and the next at the youth. And when they had sat down, one of them said: "Perhaps we have disturbed you." He said: "Yes." Then they all shouted out in emotional ecstasy (in mystical dance? *ᶜalā sabīl al-tawājud*). (*Talbīs* 285).

ᶜIrāqī relates another story about him in his short *mathnawī*:

The police chief of Tabrīz has a beautiful son. "The honorary robe of his person was, due to its symmetry, the image of divine creative power and kindness" (*khilᶜat-i dhāt-i ō zi-mawzūnī ṣūrat-i ṣunᶜ u luṭf-i bē-chūnī*). The shaykh hears about this and, gripped by longing, sets out on the road to the city. When the police chief is informed of this, he forbids the shaykh to enter the city, whereupon the latter halts two parasangs outside the city. At night the Prophet appears to the police chief in a dream, gives him a handful of raisins and orders him to deliver these personally to the shaykh. The police chief obeys. Before he reaches the shaykh, the latter has already prepared a platter with raisins. Thus he knows about the dream with the Prophet's appearance.—At this point the narrative breaks off. One must no doubt assume that the police chief no longer barred the way to his son's association with Aḥmad Ghazzālī. (*Kulliyyāt-i ᶜIrāqī* 214-15; *The Song of Lovers*, no. 40).

Another story in ᶜIrāqī depicts how Aḥmad Ghazzālī admires God's beauty in a young face, comes to be rebuked for this and defends himself. (*Kulliyyāt* 238; *The Song of Lovers*, no. 59).

A statement by Aḥmad Ghazzālī himself which would attest that he attributed a religious significance to his admiration of youthful beauty has not been handed down.

But such is the case with regard to the second of the Ṣūfīs mentioned, Awḥad al-Dīn Ḥāmid Kirmānī. Jāmī in the *Nafaḥāt* transmits the following quatrain by him:

For this reason I look with a physical eye at (earthly) form, because there is a trace of (supernatural) meaning in form. This world is a visible form, and we are within visible forms. One can only behold (supernatural) meaning in earthly form. (*Nafaḥāt*, lithograph 533; *Tercüme* 66; Browne, LHP 3/140).

The more strict [c]Umar Suhrawardī described Kirmānī as a heretical innovator (*mubtadi[c]*). In this connection Jāmī remarks:

Shaykh Shihāb al-Dīn ([c]Umar Suhrawardī) perhaps meant by this remark that Kirmānī, to contemplate "the Truth", made use of the mediation of its places of manifestation (*maẓāhir-i ṣūrī*) and gazed at absoulte beauty in the forms of contingent things. And we have already recounted about Shams-i Tabrīzī that he asked Kirmānī: "What is it you're doing?" The latter said: "I'm contemplating the moon in a water-basin." To this Shaykh Shams al-Dīn replied: "Why don't you contemplate it in the sky, if you don't have a boil on your neck?"

Cf. Aflākī, Ms. Veliyeddin 1843, fol. 150a; Huart, *Les Saints* 2/117; O'Kane, *Feats* 423-24.

Someone once said to Mawlānā Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī: "Kirmānī was a lover of *shāhids* (*shāhidbāz*) but who didn't do anything." Mawlānā replied: "Would that he had done something and that the matter were then finished!"

Kāsh kardē u gudhashtē! Cf. Huart, *Les Saints* 1/345-46; O'Kane, *Feats* 302.

One of the great knowers of God said: "People of the profession of oneness and truth consider as the perfect person he who sees God's absolute beauty in earthly physical places of manifestation (*maẓāhir-i kawnī-i ḥissī*) with the external eye, just as he sees it with the internal eye in spiritual places of manifestation... The perfect beauty of God has a double aspect (*du i[c]tibār*). One aspect is absolute beauty which is the beauty of His being as such. The knower of God can see this absolute beauty when he becomes extinguished in God."

On this beholding God in *fanā[ɔ]*, see Muḥammad Ghazzālī in Nallino, *Raccolta* 2/232.

"The other aspect is contingent beauty which comes about in physical or spiritual places of manifestation through (God's) descending (*tanazzul*). When the knower of God sees beauty, he sees it this way and knows that this beauty is the beauty of God which has descended into the levels of the phenomenal world (*marātib-i kawniyya*). Someone who isn't a knower of God and doesn't possess this sight should not gaze upon beautiful persons lest he ends up in the abyss of confusion."

In another passage he says: "Among the people of the path there are those who are caught up in love for places of manifestation and beautiful forms. And if the traveller doesn't pass beyond this, he ends up in danger of being cut off from God—as one of the great men said: 'God protect us from losing acquaintance with God after it has previously been allotted to us (*al-tanakkur ba[c]d al-ta[c]arruf*) and from being kept at a distance by a partition wall after (God's) manifestation (*tajallī*) has previously been granted us! Then in its movement this love attachment, which is linked to sense perception, doesn't go beyond beautiful form visible to the senses, no matter how much contingent vision and manifestation have been allotted to him. And when this love attachment (in such a man) detaches itself from one form, it binds itself to another form adorned with beauty

(instead of advancing to attachment to absolute beauty) and in this way it is forever drawn in different directions. Thus the love attachment and inclination for form opens the gate of total loss (*ḥirmān*), temptation, doom, and abandonment by God of the person in question. God protect us and all pious men from this evil end!'"

On behalf of such great persons as Shaykh Aḥmad Ghazzālī, Shaykh Awḥad al-Dīn Kirmānī and Shaykh Fakhr al-Dīn ᶜIrāqī who were occupied with contemplating beauty in physical images, we must assume, indeed we must firmly believe that, in so doing, they contemplated absolute beauty and didn't become caught in physical forms. And if some great men have condemned these persons (as did Suhrawardī), they wished to prevent those who are cut off (from absolute beauty) from referring to the latter and thereby ending up for all eternity in the depths of abandonment by God and in the lower world of (animal) nature. (*Nafaḥāt*, lithograph 533-35; *Tercüme* 661-62).

Awḥad al-Dīn, in any case, does not reckon himelf to be in the number of "those abandoned by God" who have not progressed beyond earthly beauty, but he specifically distances himself from them:

That transcendental *shāhid* whose body is my soul, the soul in my breast is his shining form. And that beautiful face which you call *shāhid*, that isn't the *shāhid*, but His residence.

Ān shāhid-i maᶜnawī ki jānam tan-i ōst *jān dar bar-i man ṣūrat-i rōshan-i ōst.*
W-ān rū-i nikū ki shāhidash mē-khwānī *ān shāhid nēst lēkin maskan-i ōst.*
Nuzhat al-majālis, chpt. *Shamᶜ*, *Bāb* 5.

Thus the *shāhid* is the inner image of absolute beauty.— Awḥad al-Dīn's gazing is free of sensuality:

If we impart a sign of the *shāhid* of the heart, we protect ourselves against the sorrow of the world. Because of a glance you're in need of ablutions, with one glance we confer ablutions on a whole world.

Az shāhid-i dil chu mā nishān-ē bidihīm *khwadh-rā zi-gham-i jihān amān-ē bidihīm.*
Tu az naẓar-ē ba-ghusl muḥtāj shawī *mā az naẓar-ē ghusl-i jihān-ē bidihīm.*
(Ibid.).

The story about the contemptuous remark of Shams-i Tabrīzī regarding Awḥad al-Dīn's *shāhidbāzī* (pp. 488 f.) has a doublet in which, however, the shaykh's name is not mentioned.

Shams, while on his travels, comes before a shaykh who had "the fault of *shāhidbāzī* and contemplation of form". Shams asks him what he's doing. The shaykh answers: "The forms of beautiful persons are a mirror in which I contemplate God. As has been said (verse): 'When I gaze at you with the eye of pure joy, I don't look at you out of lust or earthly love. Your beautiful face is the mirror for God's beauty by means of which I contemplate that beauty of God in you.'"

Shams answers: "You dumb wretch, if you see God in a mirror of flesh and blood, why don't you see Him in the mirror of the soul and the heart?" (Ms. Veliyeddin 1843, fol. 153a; Huart, *Les Saints* 2/128; O'Kane, *Feats* 434).

Thus Shams-i Tabrīzī was against *shāhidbāzī*. Yet God occasionally appeared to him in the form of a female (above p. 462). Moreover, he himself appears as a semi-divine being in Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī's ardent love songs which celebrate him as the representative of divine beauty. How all this is to be understood will perhaps be explained by a future analysis of Jalāl al-Dīn's *Dīwān*.

Let us allow some other fanatical opponents to have their say. The Ḥanbalite Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) is perhaps exaggerating when he reports:

In such a person matters go so far that he loves beardless youths and maintains that God the Sublime manifests Himself (*tajallā*) in such a youth. And they say: "He's 'the monk in the hermitage' and these are places of manifestation of beauty." Thus one of them kisses a beardless youth and says: "You are God!" About another it's related that he made advances to his own son (*yaʾtī'bnahū*) and claimed the latter was God, Lord of the worlds, or that he had created the heavens and the earth. And such a person says to the one sitting next to him: "You have created this!" and: "You are He" and suchlike. (*Al-Radd ʿalā Ibn ʿArabī wa'l-ṣūfiyya* 52; and cf. 64).

Ibn Taymiyya's student Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350) reports that there are people who imagine their earthly beloved when they pray.

Wa-in qāma fī khidmatihī fī'l-ṣalāti fa-lisānuhū yunājīhi wa-qalbuhū yunājī maʿshūqahū; wa-wajhu badanihī ilā'l-qiblati wa-wajhu qalbihī ilā'l-maʿshūq. (*Ighāthat al-lahfān* 301).

Prostrating oneself before a beautiful person is required by the Ḥurūfīs on the basis of God's command to the angels to bow down before Adam.

An example of this is found in the biography of the Ḥurūfī *qalandar* Temennāʾī in the *Teẓkire-i Laṭīfī*, Dersaʿādet 1314, pp. 110-11, in O. Rescher's translation, Tübingen 1950, pp. 82-83.

9

In the discussions by means of which Jāmī seeks to refute Suhrawardī's criticism of Awḥad al-Dīn a new note is being struck which we have not heard until now. Expressions like *iʿtibār* (aspect), *tanazzul* (to descend), *marātib-i kawniyya* (levels of the phenomenal world) originate from the monistic theosophy of Ibn ʿArabī (560-638/1165-1240) which is in part a systematization of

pantheistic currents that are perceptible from the 5th century AH and finally, with or without borrowings from Ibn ᶜArabī's terminology, came to exert a broad dominance over Sufism up into the modern era. According to this doctrine, the whole of creation is a self-manifestation of God who, as the only real Being, stands concealed behind all things and provides them with their Being. In things the attributes of God take on concrete form and in this way become accessible to perception. It is not necessary to occupy ourselves here with Ibn ᶜArabī's complicated system which has greatly influenced Jāmī (this dependence has not yet been studied in detail). We may limit ourself to some main ideas which in the Persian mystical poets continually find expression through the use of different images. God created the world (mankind) so that, like a divine Narcissus, He might admire His own beauty in it, as in a mirror, and engage in love-play with Himself. All beauty in the world, even that of the flowers and meadows, of beautiful women and beautiful youths, is a reflection of God's absolute beauty which has come to light in these "places of manifestation". Every lover in reality loves in his or her beloved the beauty of God. Put more precisely, through the lover God loves Himself. God presents Himself in different garments, the way a king shows himself to the people in different forms of fancy dress and processions. Or He hides Himself behind different veils and partitions. For if He did show His beauty in unveiled form, the world would be consumed in flames. (On this *ḥadīth* see pp. 589 f.). He does not show His own beauty, a beauty which is intrinsic to Himself, and for this very reason stimulates the mystics to seek Him everywhere. He is hidden precisely because He manifests Himself so clearly in this way (*bāṭin li-shiddati ẓuhūrih*). For His places of manifestation are simultaneously veils which conceal Him and which one cannot penetrate. The most perfect mirror of God, i.e. the garment which suits Him best, is man. (Cf. p. 464 for the Christological correspondence). Already Adam, himself a mirror of God, saw the reflection of divine beauty in Eve.

For our enraptured enthusiasts of beauty these doctrines had the advantage that they could now speak of the manifestation of God in beautiful young persons without being exposed to the reproach of *ḥulūl* (above pp. 463 ff.). God is not present with a part of His substance in a creature but only appears to be there as in a mirror. In this way they also distanced themselves from anthropomorphism (*tashbīh*) which ascribes a particular form to God.

Cf. Maḥmūd Alūsī, *al-Ajwiba al-ᶜirāqiyya* 12.

Thus ᶜIrāqī sings: "You're in all forms and you have no form" (see below).

A few selected texts will make this clear.

a) Theoretical discussions:

Even before the rise of actual pantheism (Nallino, *Raccolta* 2/ 331-35) Muḥammad Ghazzālī (d. 505/1111) writes:

All beauty in the world is only a contribution (*ḥasanatun min ḥasanāt*) from that beauty. (*Iḥyā*ᵓ 4/300, *Bayān ḥaqīqat al-riḍā*; *Stufen* 744/F.291).

ᶜAyn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadhānī (executed 525/1131):

You still don't even know why the *shāhid* is loved by all hearts. An element of heavenly love-play is contained in this earthly *shāhid*, this beautiful face. That "Truth" can assume the image of this beautiful form. I already praise one who reveres an earthly *shāhid*, because those who revere the heavenly *shāhid* are rare indeed. But don't think I mean the physical beloved! (*Tamhīd* 10, fol. 145a-b).

He had but one purpose in bringing forth both worlds' Existence... To see Himself in the mirror of the soul and then to become the lover of Himself who is without flaw. (*Tamhīd* 10, fol. 132a).

Maqṣūdash az ījād-i wujūd-i kawnayn *yak chīz buwadh ki ān hamē burhān ast.*
*Dar ā*ᵓ*ina-i rūḥ bi-bīnadh khwadh-rā* *pas ᶜāshiq-i khwadh shawadh ki bē-nuqṣān ast.*

ᶜUmar Ibn al-Fāriḍ (d. 632/1235) says in his famous mystical *qaṣīda*, the *Tā*ᵓ*iyya*:

And declare openly that beauty is absolute and out of an inclination to (outward) trumpery don't adhere to the view that it's contingent! For the beauty of every beautiful (youth) and every beautiful (woman) is on loan from Its (divinity's) beauty. For Its sake Qays (the lover) of Lubnā was enraptured, as was every lover, such as Majnūn (the lover) of Laylā or Kuthayyir (the lover) of ᶜAzza. And each of them loved the image of Its disguise in the form of a beauty which shone forth in the beauty of a form. This only happened because It came to light in places of manifestation, and they thought the latter were something other than It when It revealed Itself in them. It appeared under a veil and concealed Itself in places of manifestation, showing Itself in the various colors which become visible in each case. In the first becoming It appeared in the place of manifestation of Eve, before she became a mother. (Verses 241-46).—Sometimes It's Lubnā, another time Buthayna, and then again It's called ᶜAzza, the supremely noble. (Verse 251).

Ibn ᶜArabī (d. 638/1240) also teaches that every love, regardless of its object, is directed toward God, and that God brought forth the world in His own image, and contemplates and loves

Himself in it, as in a mirror. In the love of a person who loves, in reality God simply loves Himself.

It is He who appears to the eye of every lover in every beloved object, and in all existence there is only one lover. The whole world consists of lovers and beloveds, and all this goes back to Him... And likewise no one loves anything except his Creator but He removes Himself from sight through Love for Zaynab, Suᶜād, Hind and Laylā, for earthly goods, money, honor and everything which is loved in the world. The poets speak about all possible things without knowing (what they're really saying), but the knowers connect all poetry, every riddle, every eulogy and love poem to Him behind the veil of forms. For God is jealously on guard lest anything besides Himself be loved. (There follows the explanation that the causes of love, agreeable behavior and beauty, are only found with God). And since God knows Himself, He knows that the world is from Himself and He brings it forth in accordance with His own form, and it's a mirror for Him in which He sees His own form, and He loves nothing but Himself. (*Futūḥāt* 2/326, *Bāb* 178; Asín, *El Islam cristianizado* 463-64).

(Verse:) There is no object of love except for Him. Sulaymā and Laylā and the Zaynabs are only there to conceal matters. They're curtains which have been let down. This is what the poetry and prose of lovers says. Like Majnūn (the lover) of Laylā and he who preceded him, like Bishr and Hind, but I can't mention them all.

Know that divine beauty, because of which God called Himself beautiful and said of Himself through the mouth of His Prophet that He loves beauty, is in all things. Moreover, there is only one beauty. For God only created the world after His own image and He is beautiful. Therefore, the whole world is beautiful, and He loves beauty, and whoever loves beauty loves the beautiful. (*Futūḥāt* 2/542, *Bāb* 242). (Ibn ᶜArabī does not say here: God created Adam in His image but rather God created the world in His image, because according to Ibn ᶜArabī's macrocosm-microcosm doctrine, Adam, i.e. man, is a copy of the universe).

God loves beauty. This is an allusion to the *ḥadīth*: *Inna'llāha taᶜālā jamīlun yuḥibbu'l-jamāl*; Ibn al-Athīr, *Nihāya* 1/178. Cf. also *Fuṣūṣ*, *Ḥikma ādamiyya*, trans. by Moreno, *Antologia* 193; ᶜAbd al-Razzāq Qāshānī in Moreno, *Antologia* 239 ff.

Now Ibn ᶜArabī was most definitely very well disposed toward women and had no interest at all in "gazing at beardless youths". (*Futūḥāt* 2/190, *Bāb* 108). He says very nicely about love of women:

Whoever knows the worth of women and the secret contained within them will not refrain from loving them. Indeed, love for them is part of the perfection of the knower of God. For such love is a legacy from the Prophet and a divine love. And the Prophet says: "They were made dear to me (perfume and women)." Thus he designates no one other than God Himself as the cause of love for them. (*Futūḥāt* ibid.)

Ibn ᶜArabī did not shy away from conferring a mystical significance on his love experiences with a Meccan Beatrice whom he sang of in his poems, which led to his opponents criticizing him and accusing him of unbelief. (*The Terjumán al-ashwáq*, Introduction).

Jāmī himself, the author of the *Nafaḥāt al-uns*, whom we heard above defend the *shāhidbāz* Awḥad al-Dīn Kirmānī, expresses the same ideas in poetic form in the introduction to his epic *Yūsuf u Zulaykhā*:

He made a mirror of the atoms of this world and cast a reflection of His face on everything. From that radiance a splendor fell upon the rose, and from the rose confusion fell upon the nightingale's heart. From His own face He conferred adornment on Laylā, and from every hair of Majnūn love arose... His beauty displays itself everywhere... The heart which loves those who are beautiful loves Him, whether knowingly or not. (*Yūsuf u Zulaykhā* p. 24; cf. Browne, LHP 1/439-42).

Already Wāsiṭī (d. 331/942) admires the manifestation of God's beauty in nature. Massignon, *Recueil* 75. Creation as the mirror for God's beauty is also found in *Tuḥfat al-aḥrār* p. 36, *Maqāla* 1; trans. in Moreno, *Antologia* 127 f.

That Jāmī was inspired in his poetic production by this religious gazing at beauty is attested by his friend, the Chagatay poet Mīr ᶜAlī Shīr Nawāʾī (d. 906/1501), in his lovely obituary on the deceased poet:

He perceived divine beauty while gazing at its earthly places of manifestation and was then gripped by a kind of compulsion and couldn't refrain from reproducing this meaning in the garb of poetry. In this way he found an appeasement for the fire, and peace for a fiery heart.

Ḥaqīqat cemālin mecāz meẓāhiri müşāhedesi de muᶜāyene körüp bī-iḫtiyarlıġlar dest birüp irkendür. Ol maᶜnīni naẓm libāside edā qılmaqdın güzirleri yoq irkendür kim bu vāsiṭa bile otqa teskīn ve otlu köngülgä ārām bulur irkendür. (*Khamsat al-mutaḥayyirīn*, Ms. Fatih 4056, fol. 693b).

Dōst-i Muḥammad reports the following as a statement of Aḥmad Kāshānī (d. 949/1542):

This is like when a lofty king has many clothes sewn for himself, of every kind and every color, some of them long, others short, some tight, others loose-fitting. Sometimes he wears the one, sometimes he wears another of these clothes... Every form which exists in the world is a garment of God. In every kind of these clothes God appears according to the cut of the clothing in question but in the garment which is Adam's form He appears in perfection. The shaykh said: "The clothing which is Adam's form, God especially likes, and this garment fits Him and suits Him especially well. For His elevated person appears

in it the way He really is. Whether one says mirror or clothing, this is merely a dispute about words. Both are one... For in this clothing He has wholly taken on appearance, it's as He Himself is... The initiated (*khawāṣṣ*) recognize Him in every form.—There follows the story which was translated above about Rōzbihān Baqlī who recognized God in the form of a Turk. (See above p. 462).

From later literature one may at least mention Bahā᾽ al-Dīn al-ᶜĀmilī's (d. 1031/1622) *Risāla fī'l-Waḥda al-wujūdiyya* (in *Majmūᶜa*, Cairo 1328) in which (pp. 307-08) the early *ḥadīth al-ru᾽ya* (pp. 445-46) is referred to in order to demonstrate the possibility of God's self-revelation in earthly forms of manifestation.

We shall be coming back to these doctrines once again in a different connection (pp. 571 ff.).

b) Lyric poets.

It would be tempting to trace these attitudes among the Persian poets and see where they first emerge. But in the present state of Neo-Persian philology this would not be an easy task to carry out. Nevertheless, a few references may be given.

The *Dīwān* of the alleged poet Bābā Kūhī-i Shīrāzī (lithograph, Shiraz 1347) who died in 440 AH contains verses such as:

He walked with locks on His shoulders and shining like a moon at night. Tears burst from my eyes like a torrent... That truth, besides which there is nothing existent—I beheld It quickly, the way It walked in the form of a human (p. 23). It is He who sees His own beauty with every eye. He beholds His own beauty and admires Himself (p. 13).

But Bābā Kūhī is an early distortion of the name of the well-known Ṣūfī writer Ibn Bākūya, and Mīrzā Muḥammad Qazwīnī, who makes this assertion, also shows that the alleged *Dīwān* is a forgery and belongs to the 9th or 10th century AH. (*Shadd al-izār*, pp. 381 and 561).

If the *Dīwān* of Aḥmad Jāmī (441-536/1049-1142), which was published in Cawnpore in 1923, were authentic, then the curious mixture of piety, pantheistic theology and anacreontic love would already be documented in this relatively early Ṣūfī poet:

In the beauty of those with a beautiful face every moment I have openly seen God's essence.

The beauty of God which was concealed behind the curtain appeared to me unexpectedly from the cheek of the beloved.

Dar jamāl-i khūbrūyān har dam-ē *āshkārā dīdha-am dhāt-i Khudhā*. (P. 5).
Ḥusn-i Khudhāy ān ki nihān būdh dar tutuq *nāgah padīdh az rukh-i dildār shudh marā*. (P. 8).

One could pile up a number of such passages. But the authenticity of the *dīwān* is likewise dubious. It should presumably be dated to a much later period.

An especially rich source for these views is the *Dīwān* of Fakhr al-Dīn ᶜIrāqī (d. 686/1287). Irāqī is the third of the three shaykhs whom Jāmī feels called upon to defend because of their *shāhidbāzī* (above p. 490). In his biography only his simple love experiences are recounted and his intense cult of beauty is described, whereas in his poems his religious views clearly emerge.

As a student, out of love for a young *qalandar* dervish, ᶜIrāqī goes off with the latter's group to Multan in India, where he becomes the *murīd* and eventually the son-in-law of Bahāʾ al-Dīn Zakariyyāʾ Multānī. Later he comes to Anatolia, and we hear how the administrator of the Seljuk kingdom, Muᶜīn al-Dīn Parwāna, becomes his follower and builds him a cloister in Tokat. We also hear how one day the Parwāna attempts in vain to bestow gold on him and instead must engage for him the beautiful singer Qawwāl Ḥusayn, with whom ᶜIrāqī then arranges a mystical dance celebration (*samāᶜ*) for which he himself composes *ghazals*. In Cairo, where he settled after the Parwāna's death, he walks past a shoemaker's shop and there sees a beautiful apprentice. He asks the master: "Who is this boy?" "My son", answers the shoemaker. The shaykh points to the boy's lips and says: "Isn't it wrong that such lips and teeth should come in contact with donkey's leather?" The father says: "We're poor and this is our craft. If he doesn't grip donkey's leather between his teeth, he won't find his bread." The shaykh asks: "How much does he earn a day?"—"Four dirhams"—"I'll give you eight dirhams so he no longer does this work." Now the shaykh and his companions come every day to the shoemaker's shop, gaze without disturbance at the boy's face, and recite poetry and weep. This is reported to the sultan. The latter inquires whether the shaykh has ever taken the boy with him or been alone with him in the shop. When the answer turns out to be negative, he increases the sum given by ᶜIrāqī or his people by five dinars a day and offers to deliver the boy to the shaykh in the cloister. The shaykh refuses the offer: "We must obey him, we can't give him orders."—Toward the end of his life ᶜIrāqī goes to Damascus. At the behest of the Egyptian sultan, the local *amīr*, along with the clergy, shaykhs and prominent men, goes forth to welcome him. The *amīr* has his beautiful son with him. When the shaykh catches sight of him, he involuntarily (*bē-ikhtiyār*) falls at his feet, at which point the youth and his father, for their part, fall at the shaykh's feet. The Damascenes find fault with this but are unable to say anything. After six months ᶜIrāqī's son arrives in Damascus from Multan, and a short time after that the Ṣūfī poet, intoxicated with beauty, dies. (*Nafaḥāt*, lithograph 542-45; *Tercüme* 671-75; E. G. Browne, LHP 3/136 ff.).

ᶜIrāqī's *Dīwān* begins with a *qaṣīda* in which the above-depicted pantheistic ideas immediately appear with clarity:

...You've displayed your light in the garb of this and that. You've made your call "Be" (*kawn*) and "place" (*makān*) resound in the world (= You've brought

forth the world by means of Your creative word). You said to Your face: "Become visible in every form there is." Then You made resound in the world the call: "'Be!' and it was." ...You are in every form and Yourself have no form... You show Your face every moment in a thousand mirrors, in every mirror You show Your face differently... The play of Primordial Love (i.e. God) cast loving glances on Itself, then this confusion and this lamentation fell upon both worlds. In the rosegarden You contemplated Your own face with the eye of the nightingales. Then the rosegarden resounded with the nightingales' song. The play of Primordial Love from Itself unto Itself continues evermore, but the lovers are suspected (as if they were really the ones in love). (*Kulliyyāt* 2-3).

Other passages:

His beauty displays itself at every moment differently in every mirror. Sometimes it appears in the garment of Eve, other times in the form of Adam. (P. 42).

He distributes kisses to His own lip, He pursues love-play with His own cheek. (P. 44).

The forms of manifestation are at the same time revelation and unveiling of the beauty of God:

I have a beloved behind the curtain. The lights of His cheek are the curtained-off room. He lifted the veil from His cheek and said: "Look at My cheek instead of the curtain! Everything you find beautiful in both worlds, I am that behind the curtain." (P. 48).

Thus the old doctrine returns: "And if the *ḥulūl*-people see a person whom they find beautiful, they don't know whether perhaps their God is within him" (above p. 464). But the basic metaphysical mind-set has become different.

If God were to show Himself without veils, the world would be destroyed. (See pp. 589 f. below).

If the light of His beauty were to be seen even with the veil, the world would be consumed in flames by His beauty's splendor. (P. 53).

It is in this sense then that ᶜIrāqī views beautiful persons and the beauty of this world:

It's beautiful to see the beloved's face with the eye of the soul, in particular to catch sight of it unexpectedly. It's beautiful to see clearly all things hidden in the clarity of His cheek. Only in the mirror of His cheek can one see His cheek's reflection with the eyes. (P. 43).

I contemplated the beautiful stature of beautiful persons, then I saw the garment of Your beauty clearly in the slender figure of each of them. (P. 79).

The eye of the heart sees His face in the face of the *shāhid*. (P. 5).

Every moment absolute beauty (*jamāl-i muṭlaq*) shows itself to you in the form of this or that person. (P. 50).

With these verses may be compared two verses of the much later Hilālī (d. 939/1532), a far weaker poet than ᶜIrāqī, whose temperament is also noticeably different from that of his predecessor:

Oh you from whose face God's face appears to us, let us look at God in your face! (*Dīwān-i Hilālī*, lithograph Cawnpore 1912, p. 2).

God's art of creation became visible to me in your beauty. When I came to know you, I became a knower of God. (P. 88).

Man of piety, be gone! For I have an experience with the beautiful of the city which you don't have with your God. (P. 72).

In ᶜIrāqī, alongside verses of this kind in which the Godhead is addressed, i.e. where the poet philosophizes about divine appearance in earthly beauty, there are many others in which without any doubt a boy or a youth is addressed, or is the subject of discussion.

You're absolutely as fine as the soul, oh youth. What is still more beautiful than the soul? You are, oh youth! All hearts are inclined toward your face. Come now, you're a sweet heart-ravisher, oh youth! ...Give yourself a kiss on the lips and then know the taste of the water of life, oh youth! ...ᶜIrāqī can't live one moment in the world without your lips, oh youth! (Pp. 107-08).

Or:

We will (wish to) recall that gracious youth, we will fill the palate of the soul with sweetness, etc. (P. 92).

Or with the conventional motifs of lyrical love poetry:

I want to make it public—how long can I still keep it secret? "I love you!", (I cry) with a loud voice... Your lovers are to be excused indeed, for there's no one like you... Oh all of you who rebuke me because of love! My ear doesn't listen to such admonition. Even if I'm far from your breast, I've attached myself to your dream image. You're in my heart so much that one could think I look at you continually, oh you who have set chains on my heart! But where are you, and where am I? Ah, what distance! Oh ᶜIrāqī, don't dwell on such vain dreams! (Pp. 98-99).

Sometimes the desires and wish-dreams are modest:

Let me walk for a moment through your street, so I may perhaps be happy for a moment in life! (P. 184).

Sometimes they aspire to more bold goals:

I have new longing for the proximity of your love, I have a longing to speak with you in secret. Sweetly to lie against your breast during long nights until dawn, that's what I long for. (P. 182).

Moreover, ᶜIrāqī has hybrid poems which will scarcely yield a meaning if one does not assume that God and the earthly beloved are being addressed simultaneously.

When the sun of Your cheek paints shadows on the earth, then all earthly beings (raise their) robe's hem above the spheres. Look at me! For through me the sun of Your cheek becomes visible. The radiance of the sun doesn't appear if there's no earth. (God only reveals Himself in "the places of manifestation"). My heart is Your mirror, keep it pure (don't sadden it)! For the face only shows itself purely, if the mirror is pure. Press Your lips to my lips, come and kiss me! For my soul has already risen to my lips (in order to abandon me in death), where else should I receive the remedy? You strike me with the sword of a glance at me, but I'm afraid lest the sword You wield so fearlessly strike Yourself. (Because the lover has become the beloved). For the sake of Your own form You look at me. Otherwise would you look at a non-entity? Heaven forbid! You adorn me with the adornment of Your being so You can see Your beauty in me. If I were not dressed in the garment of Your being, I would tear up my collar because of Your self-sufficiency (pp. 571 ff. below)! Don't send ᶜIrāqī away all of a sudden! Your hand isn't like the ocean which drives the blade of straw away from itself. (Pp. 116-17, emended following manuscripts).

Now the poets were also accustomed to seek their *shāhid* in the wine-tavern and for this reason songs about wine (*khamriyyāt*) are not lacking in ᶜIrāqī. But in the wine-tavern as well the light of divinity appears to him, as everywhere else.

In the beauty of the cheek of the fair ones I openly saw only Him. In the eye of those with a beautiful face I saw full of charm only Him. In the eyes of every lover only He was worthy. In the glances of Wāmiq who loved ᶜAdhrā I saw only Him... I saw the flowers of gardens, the fields and the steppes: He was the rosegardens, in the fields I saw only Him. Oh you insane heart, go to the wine-tavern. For in the wine jug and the measure of wine I openly saw only Him. In the wine-tavern and in the rose-bush quaff gleaming wine, inhale the fragrance of the lily and the rose. For in them I saw only Him! (P. 140).

And in this sphere as well that hybrid form arises concerning which one does not know whether it is a human being or God.

Unexpectedly my idol walked drunken in the bazaar. Then all at once a tumult arose from the bazaar's gate... And His love passed by the hermit's cell and by the temple of the idols. Then the believer lost his heart and the gebr lost his gebr's belt. In the street of the wine-taverns His beauty cast a glance. Then tumult and noise emerged from the wine-seller's doors. At the time of prayers (*munājāt*) the beauty of His cheek shone. Then there came the cry of woe and lamentation from the hearts of the pious... Since no one sees anything except His cheek, that rapacious idol came forth in all forms. He extended His head from the collar of both worlds. Every moment that friend came forth in another garb. (P. 102).

Nallino notes the same phenomenon of erotic poetry's ambiguity—which he calls: "far correre sempre paralleli i due sensi

letterale ed allegorico"—in connection with the shorter poems of ᶜUmar Ibn al-Fāriḍ, and attributes this to Persian influence. (*Raccolta* 2/204). I would prefer to see in the phenomenon not so much a peculiarity of style but rather one of sensibility. God and the beloved melt into one another for the poet. This is pantheism in an erotic-emotional form.

But ᶜIrāqī's longing does not become quenched by means of the thousandfold reflections and veilings of the divine beloved.

Out of love for You I've completely lost my wits. Where are You? I wander through the world with Your scent (in my soul). I seek You everywhere. Where are You? Since the world can't encompass Your beauty, how should I know what You're like and where You are? ...Give a sign to my confused and distraught heart! Show a path! Where are You? Since poor ᶜIrāqī is completely out of his wits for You, won't You finally say: "You madman of love, where are you?" (Pp. 156-57).

ᶜIrāqī seeks God in vain outside in the creation:

My idol has never shown His face to anyone, all this talk of people is in vain. The one who praised You correctly has also only heard a story from someone else. (P. 198).

But he finds Him at last within his own soul:

Oh You soul of the world, I seek You with (my whole) soul. With a dizzy head I seek You all about the world. You sit in my heart day and night. And I seek Your traces in creatures. (P. 192).

Many of these motifs, as is well known, are also discernible in several "lofty" (*buland*) *ghazal*s of Ḥāfiẓ, as for example in the *ghazal* rhyming in *hā* (*shabāna*) which I have sought to imitate in the *Georg Jacob Festschrift* (pp. 232-33):

Er ists, der im sänger sich verhüllt,
Er der freund, Er, der den becher füllt;
Fleisch und blut sind mittel nur des Einen,
Dir im schattenbilde zu erscheinen.

Keinem half's, der um die gunst gefreit
Jenes königs, der seit ewigkeit,
Spiegelnd sich in eigner schönheit glanze,
Mit sich selber buhlt im weltentanze.

Ḥafiẓ, ach, von rätseln ist umsponnen,
Unser leben; wer ihm nachgesonnen
Und gemeint, er sei auf rechter spur,
Wusste fabelwerk und märchen nur.

(It's He who disguises Himself as the singer,
He's the friend, He it is who fills the cup.
Flesh and blood are simply the means
The One employs to appear to you in shadowy forms.

No one ever profited by wooing favor
From that king who since eternity,
Reflecting Himself in His own beauty's radiance,
Pursues love with Himself in the world's dance.

Alas Ḥāfiẓ, spun round with riddles
Is our life. Whoever puzzled over it
And thought he was on the right track,
Knew no more than myths and fables.)

10

Qalandariyyāt

It is not necessary for us to give samples from among the numerous anacreontic wine songs in which ᶜIrāqī sings of wine and the wine-pourer who serves him. On the other hand, by way of digression some indication may be given of a genre of poems also represented in the *Dīwān* of ᶜIrāqī, which had acquired a special significance in Persian literature: the *qalandar* songs (*qalandariyyāt*), named after the wandering dervish known as a *qalandar* who since the fifth century AH had pervaded Persia and by the beginning of the seventh had also arrived in Syria.

Handwörterbuch des Islam under "Ḳalenderīya"; Qāsim Ghanī, *Ḥāfiẓ* 2/440-05.

The *locus classicus* for the conception of life of these dervishes is found in *Bāb* 9 of the *ᶜAwārif al-maᶜārif* (*Gaben* 85/9.2) of ᶜUmar Suhrawardī:

With the word *qalandariyya* one designates people whose realm is the happiness of their hearts (*ṭības qulūbihim*) so that they tear down custom and usage (*takhrīb al-ᶜādāt*) and reject being bound by the good manners of social intercourse (*ādāb al-mujālasāt wa'l-mukhāṭabāt*) and they romp about in the arena of heart's joyfulness. They have few religious works such as fasting and prayer to show for themselves, except for the absolutely obligatory duties. They feel no qualms about enjoying the pleasures of the world, whatever is allowed by the concessions (*rukhaṣ*) of holy law. And frequently they are only engaged in the concessions and do not strive to implement the strict prescriptions of the law (*wa-lam yaṭlubū ḥaqāʾiqa'l-ᶜazīma*).

The strict Ṣūfī is engaged with the latter and not with the concessions. Concerning the terms *rukhṣa* and *ʿazīma* cf. Nallino, *Raccolta* 2/227, 271.

At the same time they make it a rule for themselves not to store up anything. They abstain from collecting and amassing goods. Nor do they adopt the outward manners of ascetics, people who withdraw from the world and worshippers of God, but they content themselves with happiness in God (*ṭībat qulūbihim maʿa'llāh*). They confine themselves to this. They are not interested in anything besides this, but their only aim is the happiness of their hearts.

We can add to this well-meaning description that the *qalandar*s devoted themselves without reservation to love, wine and gambling. In any case the term *qalandarkhāna* in ʿAṭṭār designates a place where gambling and drinking go on. (See above p. 394). The *qalandariyya* is most closely related to the type person known as a "*rind*" whose special characteristic consists of the fact that he does not care about the customs and opinions of the world around him but devotes himself without concern to life's pleasures, in particular to wine, and likewise develops a kind of humor toward life (namely *ṭībat al-qulūb*). Moreover, it should be added that among the *qalandar* dervishes the theme of indifference toward the positive religions and their rites is strongly developed. A frequently cited quatrain, attributed—whether correctly is open to doubt—to as early a figure as Abū Saʿīd ibn Abī'l-Khayr, goes as follows:

Until *madrasa* and minaret fall into ruin, this affair of the *qalandar* will not be settled. Until faith becomes unbelief and unbelief becomes faith, no bondsman of God will be a true Muslim.

Cf. Babinger in: *Der Islam* 11/1921/66; Goldziher, *Vorlesungen* 172; Abdülbâki Gölpınarlı, *Mevlânâ Celâleddîn*, 2nd edition, 1952, p. 271.

They have no interest at all in the titles to glory of the Ṣūfīs, i.e. asceticism, withdrawal from the world, stations (*maqām*s) and the miracles of saints. The young ʿIrāqī, who encounters *qalandar* dervishes for the first time in Hamadan, hears them sing:

We've moved from the mosque to the wine-tavern. We've drawn a line across the page of withdrawal from the world and miracles of saints. In the street of the Magians, in the ranks of lovers we've settled down. We took the cup from the hand of the drinkers in the tavern. If (only) the heart beats, this is henceforth the proper drum of honor. For we've hoisted the banner of dominion in the sky. We're beyond "withdrawal from the world" and "stations". For all too often have we drunk exhaustion's cup in withdrawal from the world and stations. (Ms. Fatih 3845, fol. 4b).

As is already clear from these samples, the content of *qalandar* poetry is not merely a straightforward description of "happiness of hearts" in which, for instance, there is no further mention at all of the neglected religious duties and the despised Ṣūfī rules. On the contrary, these poets are forever joyfully jangling their cast-off chains, so to speak, as if their consciousness of having destroyed their commitments confers an even greater happiness than the pleasure of their acquired freedom itself. They are proud that they have cast everything behind them, continually play at converting to Christianity and Magianism, describe the pious as hypocrites and declare that for themselves church and Kaᶜba are the same, and much more besides. But similarly the euphoria of the carousing drinker who, without a cent left in his purse, "hasn't got a leg to stand on", sounds forth from these verses.

This *qalandar* poetry is already fully developed in the *Dīwān* of Sanāʾī (d. 535/1140-41) where the word *qalandar* occurs (e.g. pp. 316, 829) and the *qalandar pīr* is praised (p. 83) whom we will find again later in Ḥāfiẓ.

Unfortunately the editor of the Tehran edition has reordered the *Dīwān* alphabetically. In its manuscripts the *qalandariyyāt* are grouped separately.

In the alleged *Dīwān* of Aḥmad Jāmī (above p. 496) such attitudes are also found:

Drunkenness and the life of the *qalandar* and the life of the *rind*, this is the old mentality of the people who've renounced their reason. Bankruptcy and indigence, poverty and dearth, this is the capital of the treasure of the have-nots. Devoting one's life to the street of the friend is better than eternal life.

Sell the wool of the Ṣūfī robe and drink wine, oh Aḥmad!

Mastī u qalandarī u rindī *īn khōy-i qadīm-i bē-hushān ast.*
Iflās u niyāz u faqr u ḥājat *sarmāya-i ganj-i muflisān ast.*
Jān bar sar-i kōy-i dōst dādhan *bihtar zi-ḥayāt-i jāwidhān ast.* (*Dīwān* p. 50).
Firōsh ṣūf-i muraqqaᶜ bi-nōsh Aḥmad may! (*Dīwān* p. 51).

ᶜIrāqī sings:

Boy, sing the *qalandar* tune if you are our companion. For we no longer have a liking for withdrawal from the world and piety! ...I have neither gold nor silver, neither heart nor religion, nor the world: I and (a good) companion and a corner and an empty purse as a treasure. Withdrawal from the world and practicing piety, I'm not cut out for that. Bring the wine-cup, for truly I've abjured hypocritical worship! ...When I'm drunk from wine, what's a church, what's the Kaᶜba? ...I went to circumambulate the Kaᶜba but they wouldn't let me into the sanctuary. "Go!", they said to me. "Who are you that you could enter the Kaᶜba?" I knocked at the cloister's gate. From within I heard the call: "Come inside,

ᶜIrāqī. For you're our intimate companion!" (*Kulliyyāt* pp. 154-55, emended following manuscripts).

Every reader of Ḥāfiẓ will recall those remarkable *ghazal*s in which the poet relates, for instance, that "our *pīr*" proceeded straight from the mosque to the wine-tavern, or in which he is proud he has pawned his Ṣūfī robe in the wine-tavern, or receives instruction from the aged Magian or from the Magian boy, stains his prayer rug with wine and pours the bowl of his scorn over the head of the sanctimonious hypocrite (*zāhid*), or describes how the wine-pourer, drunk, visits him at night and obliges him to drink, etc. These poems are moderate *qalandariyyāt*. They reflect the conception of life and emotional attitude toward life of the *qalandar* dervishes. In ᶜAṭṭār's collection of quatrains, the *Mukhtārnāma*, one chapter bears the heading *Qalandariyyāt wa-khamriyyāt*, "*Qalandar* and wine poems". The quatrains of this chapter are dominated by exactly the same themes as the above verses of Ḥāfiẓ, except that the make-believe conversion to infidelity emerges more strongly than in the poet of Shiraz. A few examples:

We've become slaves of the *rind*s. Without having drunk wine, we've begun to make noise. Withdraw your hand from good and bad, from unbelief and Islam! Serve wine! For we've become wine-drinkers.

In love with you I'll adopt a new faith. I'll speak and hear about fire-worship. I'll gird myself with the gebr's fourfold belt. I'll pawn my turban in the wine-tavern.

How long still (will you talk) about the hypocritical ascetic? Now drink wine if you're one of us! Our liver became bloody because of hypocritical asceticism. Oh you *qalandar rind*, where are you now?

Mā rindān-rā ḥalqa-ba-gōsh āmadhaʾīm *nā-khwarda sharāb dar khurōsh āmadhaʾīm.*
Dast az badh u nēk u kufr u islām bi-dār *durd-ē dih ki durd-nōsh āmadhaʾīm.*

Dar ᶜishq-i tu dīn-i khwēsh naw khwāham kard *dar tarsāʾī guft u shinaw khwāham kard.*
Zunnār-i chahār-i gabr khwāham bast *dastār ba-maykhāna giraw khwāham kard.*

Tā chand zi-zāhid-i riyāʾī ākhir *durd-ē dar kash agar zi-māʾī ākhir?*
Mārā jigar az zuhd-i riyāʾī khūn shudh *ay rind-i qalandarī kujāʾī ākhir?*

(Ms. Fatih 4052, fol. 256a).

The *Dīwān* of ᶜAṭṭār is very rich in poems such as these. The *pīr* who hurries from the mosque to the wine-tavern, abjures his faith, puts on the belt of the infidels, the wine-pourer who visits the poet at night and compels him to drink, these figures are frequently to be met with there and are even more distinctly devel-

oped than in Ḥāfiẓ. The same motifs, if not as distinct and graphically delineated as in ᶜAṭṭār, display themselves clearly enough in ᶜIrāqī. The *qalandar*s have therefore left enduring traces in Persian lyric poetry. It may be that the effect is a purely literary one, that the three named poets only devoted themselves to these forms of life in their fantasy. But this changes nothing with regard to the fact that these poems reflect real life, namely that of the *qalandar* dervishes. And if one considers that even today one encounters people in the Orient, in part among highly gifted artists, who profess these views and *mutatis mutandis* also lead their life in accordance with them, one cannot doubt that this *rind* lifestyle had also been current outside the narrow community of the dervishes.

11

After this deviation let us return to our actual subject, Platonic gazing at beauty. It would lead us too far astray to pursue the continued existence of this completely or half religious cult of beauty in Turkey. But a few indications at this point may not be out of place.

Toward the end of the 17th century, the secretary to the English legation writes in his work about Turkey—according to the Italian translation of Constantin Belli, p. 46:

...non sarà fuori di proposito nel presente addurre al Lettore, che la Dottrina dell'amor Platonico hà ritrouato discepoli, e sequaci nelle scuole de Turchi; che chiamano questa passione vna virtù lodabile, per cui si giunge all'amor di Dio; del quale solamente gli huomini sono capaci, ammirando, ed'amando nelle sue Creature l'imagine della beltà che loro hà impressa...

There follows the obligatory moral outcry on the part of a European.

Istoria della Stato presente dell'Impero Ottomano, Venice 1672, in Book 1, Chapter 7 *Dell'Amore e dell'Amicizia fra i Paggi del Serraglio*, p. 46.

By far the most important document for the continued existence of these views concerning love in Turkey is the valuable, and from a literary point of view in some parts brilliantly written, autobiography of the Aşçı Dede Seyyid Ibrahim, a schoolmate of Żiyā Paşa (d. 1295/1878). The author reports in the greatest detail about his erotic experiences from earliest youth on and in each case presents the relevant Ṣūfī theory. Unfortunately the immense size of the work makes it impossible to enter into its contents here.

A fair copy in three folio-volumes in Istanbul Uni. Libr. TY 78-80; likewise the first volume of the autograph, ibid. TY 3222.

12

However, there is still another form of gazing at beauty which we must concern ourself with.

The heroes of the stories which have thus far been recounted were individual Ṣūfīs who were struck by the beauty of a boy or a youth, i.e. admired in that beauty the reflection of God's beauty or His art of creation. But convivial gatherings were also arranged during which communal Platonic gazing at beauty sometimes formed a part of the program. These are the convivial musical events of the Ṣūfīs known under the name *samā*ᶜ, "listening to music". These events did not always have the character of a strictly regulated, solemn ceremony, as until recently the outsider could also observe in the cloisters of the Mevlevi dervishes (H. Ritter: "Der Reigen der 'Tanzenden Derwische'"). The *samā*ᶜ is not originally a religious exercise but, as a relaxation after such exercises, is conceived of as a concession (*rukhṣa*).

The outward basis is originally nothing other than the normal worldly conviviality which people organized for group amusement. People gathered at the place of the person who invited them, consumed a good meal together, drank and after the meal engaged male or female singers who performed music and in particular sang love songs. Sometimes in addition the men performed solo dances, as is still done today. At the same time flirting went on with the female singers or with the male wine-pourers and pages. A social gathering of this kind during which the guests dance, as organized by the vizier al-Muhallabī along with the *qāḍī* Tanūkhī (d. 342/953) and other friends, is depicted for instance by Thaᶜālibī in the *Yatīma* (2/309-10). What took place in such social gatherings at the court of the Khwārazmshāh is described by ᶜAwfī, following Rashīd al-Dīn Waṭwāṭ (d. 578/1182), in the *Lubāb al-albāb* (1/36-37). The poet Minōchihrī (d. before the middle of the 5th century AH) depicts the behavior of the Ghaznawid sultan Masᶜūd (killed 432/1041) during such a festivity:

The shah's hand is on the wine, his heart is with his intimate friends, his eye is on a beautiful face, and his ear is with the singer.

Dast ba-may shāh-rā wu dil ba-hazhīrān *dīdha ba-rūy-i nikū u gōsh ba-qawwāl.*
(*Majma*ᶜ *al-fuṣahā*ʾ 1/568, line 3 from bot. *Dīwān*, Tehran 1326, p. 137).

Naturally, the ruler does not dance but the people dance, just as today, under the influence of wine, music and love.

These customs correspond to what was usual behavior in Antiquity as well.

The symposium consisted of a communal meal and a drinking party, during which, once the feast was over, music was performed by musicians expressly engaged for this purpose. The guests danced themselves, and it was permitted to kiss the ephebes in attendance.

Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft* under "Symposion". Von Grunebaum in *Medieval Islam* 314-15 calls attention to the resemblance of several other Arabic drinking customs to those of the Greeks.

The *samā*ᶜ-parties of the Ṣūfīs are distinguished from these worldly gatherings by the fact that drunkenness or, generally speaking, wine and sensuality were frowned upon, and a spiritual, religious character was conferred on the whole, which, as one would expect, is strongly pushed into the foreground in the textbooks. In these books precise prescriptions are given about how one should behave during the *samā*ᶜ, which kind of *samā*ᶜ is allowed and which kind is forbidden, and when and how one should participate in the dancing; how one is to behave, if one is not aroused by the mood oneself; but chiefly, and for us at rather tedious lengths, the controversy around the question as to whether listening to music is allowed or forbidden, is discussed. Likewise, philosophical reflections regarding the effect of music on the human soul and other similar questions are readily dealt with. For the musical performance professional musicians, and in the early period even professional singers, were engaged, or one of the Ṣūfīs themselves sang the love songs.

Cf. for example Ibn ᶜArabī, *al-Amr al-muḥkam al-marbūṭ*, translated in Asín, *El Islam cristianizado* p. 330.

If one entered the appropriate mood, one would dance to the music, the high point of which is designated as *wajd*, a kind of erotic ecstasy. Among the Ṣūfīs who permitted this item of the program, a handsome boy or youth who was beautifully decked out formed the object of their gazing.

Of course, in the reformative writings of the strict Qushayrī and in the work of his predecessor Sarrāj (d. 378/988) one only finds hints of these practices. Indeed, we have already seen that Qushayrī condemned the doctrine of the *shāhid* and did not wish to know anything about the stories "of certain shaykhs". Sulamī's book about "the customs of the Ṣūfīs", in the concluding part of

which he spoke of the concessions of the Ṣūfīs (*rukhaṣuhum*) and dealt with dancing, singing and gazing at a beautiful face, has unfortunately not come down to us. (Above p. 473).

No one has collected the individual notices scattered throughout the relevant literature. (Cf. for example the verses about dancing cited by Yaḥyā ibn Muᶜādh in the *Ḥilya* 10/61$_{22-24}$).

Something further can be gleaned from the unabridged *Qūt al-qulūb* of the rather more lenient Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī (d. 386/996). (The printed version abbreviates the pertinent passages in chpt. 32). He condemns anthropomorphism (*tashbīh*) and sensuality, and at most will only concede as allowable that one think of legally permitted objects of love, i.e. one's wife or a female slave, during these gatherings. But as an ideal he demands a form of gazing which results in contemplative instruction about God's attributes (i.e. in particular His power of creation). He writes (sometimes with rather obscure expressions):

Whoever listens to music with an anthropomorphic conception of God (*ᶜalā'l-tashbīh wa'l-tamthīl*) commits a heretical act (*alḥada*). If someone listens with earthly love and sensuality (*ᶜalā'l-hawā wa'l-shahwa*), that is play and trifling (*laᶜib wa-lahw*). But if someone listens, and while doing so acquires understanding and the vision of knowledge about (*mushāhadat al-ᶜilm ᶜalā*) the meaning of divine attributes, and in order to find the way and proof for true miraculous signs (of God), then he listens with profit... And when listening to music (at the music gathering), there is allowed, forbidden and what is dubious. If someone listens with a carnal soul, with gazing in sensuality and worldly love, then it's forbidden. And if someone listens while he imagines in his thoughts the form of a permitted (object of love), a slave woman or spouse, then it's dubious (*shubha*, an intermediary stage between permitted and forbidden), because it involves empty trifling (*lahw*). Many of the ancients, the Companions of the Prophet, and the Followers did this with upright worship of God (*bi-iḥsān*).[2] But if someone listens with his heart while contemplating spiritual objects (*maᶜānin*) which lead him to proof (of any intelligible attributes of God, cf. the Ghazzālī passage above p. 463) and show him the ways to the divine Friend, then it's allowed... If someone at such a time beholds a creature, it is a sign that his heart is turbid and far from God, and if someone introduces play and trifling, then this is proof of a lack of understanding (*naqṣi lubbih*)... And if someone hears the tones and imagines in his fantasy the form of the singer who produces the tones (*qawwāl* and *shāhid* are thus identical here), this is a temptation for his conscience... For the upright and those who stand in the truth, it is an act of worship, whereas for him who is only pretending and behaves triflingly (*al-muddaᶜī al-*

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2 On the technical sense of this term see Nallino, *Raccolta* 2/267-68.

lāhī), it is sensuality and temptation. This is the pleasure which causes your feet to slip because anthropomorphic conceptions are involved in it. (Ms. Köprülü 765, fol. 247a; cf. the printed edition of the *Qūt* 2/61-62; *Nahrung* 2/511 ff./ 32.746 ff.).

The people of Medina, as well as the people of Mecca, have maintained up to our time a favorable attitude toward listening to music. I was also acquainted with the *qāḍī* Abū Marwān. He possessed female slaves who could play music, whom he kept on hand for the Ṣūfīs. He would gather the Ṣūfīs before them and then have the female singers perform songs. He was a very cultivated man... And what we say about music is also true about gazing. (If the one who does it thinks about worldly things and creatures, it's forbidden. On the other hand, if he thinks of eternal things and the Creator, it's permitted).

In another passage Makkī presents the various doctrinal opinions about the permissibility of drinking which proves that drinking did go on. The earlier men of piety appear not to have found anything objectionable about moderate enjoyment of wine.

Cf. the statements of Mālik ibn Dīnār (d. 113 AH), Muḥammad ibn Wāsiᶜ, Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161 AH) and others in Ibn Qutayba, *Kitāb al-Ashriba*, pp. 51-53.

In the present-day orders, as far as I am told, only drunkenness is frowned upon.

Then Makkī deals with the question of kissing.

Ibn ᶜAbbās and other Companions of the Prophet said when they were asked about kissing: "I disapprove of it for a young man. I see nothing wrong with it in the case of a shaykh."[3]

That listening to music and dancing took place after a meal, in which the Ṣūfīs compensated themselves for their otherwise sparse diet and their mortifications, is frequently attested. The following derisive verses Yāqūt ascribes to Abū'l-ᶜAlāᵓ al-Maᶜarrī (d. 449/1057) and, in a somewhat different form, to Shaddād b. Ibrāhīm (d. 401/1010):

I find that the group of Ṣūfīs is a wicked group. Say unto them—and how contemptible indeed is *ḥulūl*—: "Did God say to you while you were worshipping Him: 'I want you to eat like an animal and dance'?" (*Irshād*, Cairo, 3/135, 11/271).

In Sanāᵓī (d. 535/1140-41) we find:

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[3] I can no longer give the folia of the manuscript Köprülü 765 for the quoted passages. They belong to the section on the *samāᶜ* from which the first passage comes. — See *Nahrung* 2/521/32.757 where Gramlich incorporates this passage in his translation. (Translator's note).

The Ṣūfīs are out for pleasure, their direction of prayer is the *shāhid*, the candle and the belly. (*Dīwān* 76, l. 14).

The *qāḍī* of Salāmiyya, Ibrāhīm b. Naṣr, who died in the same city in 610/1213, visits the cloister of Makī in Bawāzīj near Salāmiyya, observes a dance of the Ṣūfīs there, and composes the following poem:

Tell Makī the word of an honest admonisher, and one should listen to admonition: "When did the people hear in their religion that singing was a *sunna* to follow? And that a man eats like a male camel and dances in company until he falls down? If he were hungry, he wouldn't twirl about in his enthusiasm for music and listen to music. They said: 'We're drunk from love of God', but only the drinking bowls have made them drunk. Donkeys are like this: if they have abundant food and drink, the fact of having drunk their fill and satiety cause them to jump about." (Ibn Khallikān 1/9-10 s.n. Ibrāhīm b. Naṣr).

Abū'l-Ṭayyib al-Ṭabarī (?) reports in Ibn al-Jawzī:

I've heard that the people who practice listening to music even add to this gazing at a beardless youth. And sometimes they adorn him with jewelry and gaudy clothes and braid, and maintain that they strive after increase in faith by means of contemplative gazing, and by inferring the Creator from creation. This is the acme of pursuing lusts, deceiving reason and opposing religious science. God has said: "Will you not look at yourselves?" (surah 51/21), and: "Why do you not look at the camel and how it was created?" (surah 88/17), as well as: "And why do they not look at the kingdom of heaven and the earth?" (surah 7/184). They have swerved from the kind of reflective contemplation which God has commanded, toward the direction of that which He has forbidden them. But these people do this after having consumed a range of fine foods. And when their carnal soul has had enough, it then demands from them music and dance and the pleasure of gazing at the faces of youths. If they would eat less, they wouldn't be inclined either to listening to music or to gazing. (*Talbīs* 286; similarly Ibn al-Ḥājj, *Mudkhal* 2/273).

Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī relates a funny story:

A Ṣūfī while travelling alights at a Ṣūfī convent and puts his donkey in the stable. The Ṣūfīs of the convent are very poor. They sell their guest's donkey and arrange a great banquet—this they can only rarely afford and so they eat with great gusto (verse 532)—after which there's dancing. "The convent filled up with smoke from the kitchen and the dust which was raised by the dancing feet" (verses 529-30). As a text for the music, they choose the words: "The donkey's gone! The donkey's gone!" The guest also joins in the singing. The next morning he finds his mount is missing and realizes what's happened. But there's nothing he can do. He had joined in the singing himself and thereby sanctioned what happened. (*Mathnawī* 2/514 ff.).

Social gatherings like these were also arranged by Abū Saᶜīd b. Abī'l-Khayr (d. 441/1049). He was not such a confirmed enemy of Ṣūfī veneration of the beauty of youths as was the strict Qushayrī and thus he had disagreements with the latter.

Qushayrī defrocks a dervish and bans him from the city because he had asked a friend to arrange a musical gathering and invite a young novice of Qushayrī's by the name of Ismāᶜīlak-i Daqqāq whom he admired: "So I may today emit a few cries due to his beauty, because we're all fire and flame for him." Abū Saᶜīd, who knows the dervish[4] has been enraptured with his eldest son for four years, during the meal orders the son to place a piece of marzipan in the dervish's mouth and to eat the other half himself. This is enough to drive the shocked dervish to set out on the pilgrimage. Abū Saᶜīd says to Qushayrī: "Is it necessary to expel a dervish when a little marzipan can drive him to the Ḥijāz?" (*Asrār al-tawḥīd* 65-66; O'Kane, *Secrets* 162-64; Nicholson, *Studies* 35-36.—For other stories about meals followed by dancing cf. for example *Asrār al-tawḥīd* 102; O'Kane, *Secrets* 216-18; TA 2/205).

With regard to dressing up the *shāhid* and the ascetic test of strength we have already referred to above (p. 485), Zakariyyāᵓ Anṣārī (d. 916/1511), the commentator on Qushayrī's *Risāla*, gives the following information when he glosses the cited passage:

There were those (*ṭāᵓifatun*) who used to take the most beautiful possible youth, dress him in the most beautiful clothes and adorn him with the most beautiful attire and place a candle in his hand during the listening to music. Each person then tested himself to see whether he would be distracted by the youth's beauty and his humanity would turn toward him, or whether, because of the psychic state induced by listening to music, his humanity would drop away and he would be so engrossed that the youth didn't occupy him. (*Natāᵓij al-afkār* 2/103. For the original text being commented on see above p. 485).

A few hours before I wrote down these sentences, a former Naqshbandī Ṣūfī informed me that until very recently the same ascetic practice had been current in various orders in a somewhat different form—the youth had played the role of the wine-pourer.

In the *Rabābnāma* Sulṭān Walad employs a simile which alludes to dressing up the *shāhid*:

The way one dresses a *shāhid* in various clothes so as to enjoy a different pleasure in the case of each garment. (Fol. 217a).

A verse of Saᶜdī's (d. 691/1292) alludes to dancing while gazing at the *shāhid*:

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4 Ritter has confused the unnamed defrocked dervish with Bū ᶜAlī Turshīzī. The latter was a follower of Shaykh Abū Saᶜīd and in love with the shaykh's son. It was he who felt impelled to set out for Mecca as described above. (Translator's note).

Those who are not moved to dance when they gaze at you, tear their clothing when you walk past.

Ānān ki ba-dīdhār-i tu dar raqṣ nayāyand chūn mē-gudharī dar ᶜāqibat jāma darānand.
Ṭayyibāt, Calcutta, p. 138.

Sometimes, as we have seen, the *shāhid* and the singer (*qawwāl*) are one and the same person.

Nifṭawayh (d. 323/935) relates about Idrīs ibn Idrīs: "I was in Egypt with a group of Ṣūfīs that had a beardless youth with them who sang for them. One of them became so overwhelmed (*ghalaba ᶜalā rajulin minhum amruhū*) that he didn't know what he should do. Finally, he said: 'You there! Say: *Lā ilāha illā'llāh* (the profession of faith)!' The youth said: '*Lā ilāha illā'llāh!*' Then the man said: 'I must kiss a mouth which has said: *Lā ilāha illā'llāh.*'" (*Aswāq*, Ms. Reᵓis ül-küttab 745, fol. 188a).

Rōzbihān Baqlī (d. 606/1209) demands straight out that the singer must be beautiful because to impart recreation to the hearts (*tarwīḥ al-qulūb*) during listening to music three things are necessary: perfumes, a beautiful face and an attractive voice. (*Nafaḥāt*, in his biography; *Tercüme* 298-99).

Muḥammad Tabādakānī, during the dance, feels a rush of rapture toward the young flute player, Darwīsh Muḥammad Nāyī.

We have already seen that the strict ᶜUmar Suhrawardī condemned these things (p. 489). He writes:

...especially if in addition his (the dancer's) movements are mixed with clearly false sentiment (*nifāq*) while he attests his love for one of those present and strives to draw near to him without (pure) intention but led by (?) the joyful mood of the soul (as it expresses itself) in embracing and kissing hands and feet, and suchlike... or that the singer is a beardless youth, whom the souls (*nufūs*) feel drawn to gaze upon and from seeing whom they experience pleasure, while secretly harboring wicked thoughts. (*ᶜAwārif al-maᶜārif* 2/196 in chpt. 22; *Gaben* 170/22.14,15).

Ibn ᶜArabī (d. 638/1240) also wants nothing to do with any of this:

One of the diseases of "states" is that a person takes up association with pious people in order to be regarded as one of them, while he is actually caught up in his sensual lust. If such a person then comes to a session of listening to music while he has a love relationship with a girl or a youth about which those present know nothing, an ecstasy of love grips him and "the state" overwhelms him because he is attached to that person who is in his soul, and then he moves (dances) and shouts and sighs and says: "Allāh! Allāh!" or "He!" and makes gestures and allusions (*yushīru bi-ishārāt*) like the people of God. Those present be-

lieve that his state is a divine state although he possesses a normal (*ṣaḥīḥ*) sensation of love and a normal state. (*Futūḥāt* 2/315).

Suhrawardī's younger contemporary Awḥad al-Dīn Kirmānī was of a different view. He was in fact notorious because of the very things censured by Suhrawardī and, as we have seen, was characterized by the latter as an adherent of wicked innovations (*mubtadi*ᶜ). Perhaps the quoted passage of the ᶜ*Awārif* is even intended for him. Jāmī, in the previously cited biography of Awḥad al-Dīn, reports the following:

It is related in a history work that when he became enflamed during listening to music, he would tear open the upper garment of the youths while dancing and place his chest against their chest. When he came to Baghdad, the beautiful son of the caliph heard about it and said: "This is an innovator (*mubtadi*ᶜ) and an infidel! If he behaves this way in my company, I'll kill him!" When the listening to music became more fiery, the shaykh noted this in a miraculous way and recited the verses:

"It's easy for me to stand before the point of the dagger, to lose my head on my knees for the sake of the friend. You came to kill an infidel. If you're the warrior against the infidels (*ghāzī*), how fine it is to be an infidel!"

At that the son of the caliph laid his head at the shaykh's feet and became his novice. (*Nafaḥāt*, lithograph, 533; *Tercüme* 661. Following this source, the *Majālis al-*ᶜ*ushshāq*).

For Awḥad al-Dīn's *samā*ᶜ-dance the presence of a *shāhid* was necessary. This is clear from certain of his quatrains:

So that you don't think I'm dancing out of art or that I'm dancing out of pleasure or because of (good) news (?): this dance of mine is a divine dance. Don't think I'm dancing because of so beautiful a boy!

(If one changes the punctuation and construes the grammar differently, one can also translate the second verse this way:

Don't take this dance of mine to be a divine dance! For I'm dancing because of so beautiful a boy.)

Tā ẓann na-barī k-az hunār-ē mē-raqṣam *yā az sar-i dhawq u khabar-ē mē-raqṣam.*
Īn raqṣ(-i) marā raqṣ-i khudhā'ī ma-shumar *k-az bahr-i chunīn pisar-ē mē-raqṣam.*
(Ms. Ayasofya 2910, fol. 119b).

Shāhid, candle and music belong together:

Since the *shāhid* is here and candle and music, for us may no day follow after this night!

*Chūn hast ḥuḍūr-i shāhid ū sham*ᶜ *u samā*ᶜ *gō imshab(-i) mārā ba-jihān rōz ma bādh!*
(fol. 120a).

There must even be a particular ephebe on hand:

Tonight there's no trace of musical excitement. Or if there is, then it's with others, not with us. We have nothing from the music tonight. For that beloved of ours is not on hand.

Tonight we have no share in musical excitement because my beloved isn't here tonight. Even if music, candle and *shāhid* are all on hand—what matters is his closeness in love and that's not here tonight.

Imshab zi-ṭarab hēch athar paydhā nēst. *war hast magar dar digar-ē dar mā nēst.*

Ḥaẓẓ-ē zi-samā^c *imshab ān-i mā nēst* *k-ān mūnis-e rōzgār-i mā īnjā nēst.*

Mārā zi-ṭarab naṣīb az ān imshab nēst *k-ān dilbar-i man dar īn miyān imshab nēst.*

Harchand samā^c *u sham*^{c} *u shāhid hama hast* *aṣl-i hama waṣl-i ōst u ān imshab nēst.* (Ibid.).

Once again let us listen to what an opponent has to say:

And many of them make a religion out of it (this love) and believe that they will thereby reach God's proximity, either because they maintain that it cleanses and purifies the soul, or because they maintain that they first concentrate their heart on a human being so as then to go over to worshipping God alone, or because they maintain that beautiful forms are places of divine manifestation and appearance—they call them "places of manifestation of the one original beauty"—or because they believe that God has taken up residence in them or has become one with them (*ḥulūl-ittiḥād*).

Thus one finds that the pious among these people and the poor (dervishes) and their chiefs and comrades have taken secondary gods besides Allāh, whom they love the way one loves God, either as religious behavior or out of sensuality or both at the same time. That's why they gather together for communal diabolic listening to music which arouses communal love and brings love to a boil in every heart it occurs in. The cause of this is that the heart is devoid of adoration of God for which it was created. (Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, d. 751/1350, *Ighāthat al-lahfān* 306-07).

The author of the *Nafaḥāt*, the poet Jāmī, also relates a characteristic story in the *Bahāristān*:

A shaykh of an order says to a beautiful *shāhid* for whose company the brethren of the order are competing: "Don't associate with just anyone, for you're the mirror which displays God. Consequently, you shouldn't show your face to anyone unworthy!" The youth becomes annoyed by the shaykh's telling him what to do, and stops letting himelf be seen for a few days. At that the brethren of the order, because they can't endure without him, apologize to him, saying he should come back. They're satisfied simply to play the role of uninvited guests (parasites) (i.e. are content with the crumbs that fall from the table of masters). He then comes back, and the joy in the convent is great. (*Bahāristān*, final story of *Rawḍa* 5).

We cannot here pursue the numerous allusions in literature to this communally practiced cult of beauty, nonetheless an impetuous verse of Ḥāfiẓ may be cited in this context:

Drunken we jump up and steal the wine from the banquet of the men of God and carry the *shāhid* out the door!

Bērūn jahīm sarkhwash w-az bazm-i ʿārifān ghārat kunīm bādha u shāhid ba-dar kashīm.

Communal admiration of youthful male beauty (*al-naẓar ilā'l-murd*) persisted in many Islamic countries up until very recent times. In the newspaper *Haber* in 1936 there appeared Memoirs on Albania by Nesip Karacay under the title "How We Lost Rumeli" (*Rumeliyi nasil kaybettik*). On 21/6/1936, in number 11 of these serialized articles, a report occurs about an Albanian practice which apparently remained completely incomprehensible to the author. The report says:

Still another oddity: among the Albanians there is "love of beauty" (*cemal aşkı*). Fifty to sixty people are united through love for a beautiful youth. Quite frequently they ask the father's permission in the morning, take the boy with them and have him sit on a table. Everyone sits in front of him and gazes at him admiringly for hours. These youths are called "*dilber*". They're dressed up like a girl, i.e. with fingerrings, a pleated silk shirt... silk sash and a small hat tilted to one side (*küçak bir külah yan yatırılmış*. Cf. the Turk above p. 462), etc. Their hair is allowed to grow long and it's called "*zülf*", in Albanian "*flok*". What's odd is that this behavior carries with it no moral taint, neither for the boy nor for his family. The lovers do him no harm. The fact that they ask the father for permission shows, moreover, that this tradition has an innocent character. If the "*dilber*" is famous, he makes use of his influence. He sends beans and maize to the rich and owners of herds, and demands one lira for a cob of maize and one *mecīdīye* for a bean. No one dares to refuse. He distributes part of this money among his poorer lovers, and part he keeps for himself.—Afterwards these young men allegedly often become leaders of gangs and exercise a kind of self-appointed authority in the Albanian cities.

Since Albania from far back in time has been a home for Ṣūfī orders, it is not far-fetched to assume that the described practice is also of Ṣūfī origin.

But that in Antiquity as well a beautiful boy had a whole circle of admirers and reverers is clear from known vase inscriptions.

Contemplating the beauty of God in a beautiful youth or boy is an alien element within the Semitic cultural sphere. Neither ancient Arabian paganism,[5] nor Judaeo-Christian monotheism, nor

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[5] Regarding individual cases of pederasty among the pagan Arabs see Massignon, *Passion* 797, ftn.

the social structure of the Semitic peoples who thought in terms of family connections, could have been favorable to the emergence of such attitudes. They only arose once Muslims had come into contact with Indo-European peoples. Moreover, the similarity of *naẓar ilā'l-murd* to Platonic gazing at beauty, the ancient cult of beauty and ancient customary practices is so striking that it is difficult to dismiss the idea that this may well be a question of a survival or a revival from Antiquity. The practice, combatted and yet tolerated, has persisted up until very recent times. It was reserved for Europe, which was proud of its classical learning, to clear away these remnants of ancient ways of life when it intruded into the Orient, and to render men's sight blind to a beauty in which the reflection of God's absolute beauty had once appeared to them.

13

Let us return to our ᶜAṭṭār after this long digression.

The beauty of God which is mirrored in human beings is occasionally, though not often, mentioned in his works. The comparison of God with a beautiful king who has people look at him in a mirror shall further occupy us below. Otherwise, the love of dervishes for their princes, and that of the Ṣūfīs for their youths, etc., is not depicted as if love of God is contained in it, but rather it is a symbol and a model for divine love. But in view of what has preceded, we understand better why it is predominantly Ṣūfīs and dervishes who fall in love with princes and other beautiful youths. We have already become acquainted with the relevant stories and only one, which has not yet been related, shall be added here.

A Ṣūfī falls in love with the son of a vizier, tells no one of his passion and weeps himself blind. But finally it becomes known why he has wept away his eyes, and the prominent men and *amīr*s come to see him. Likewise, the vizier, the father of the boy, hears about the blinded person and together with his beautiful son sets out to visit the latter. He sets the boy before the Ṣūfī and says: "Here's the boy. He's sitting in front of you. What more do you want?" The Ṣūfī lets out a shout and weeps like a rain cloud. The vizier says: "Why are you weeping? The boy is here with you!" He replies: "I've hoped for this moment my whole life but what good does the beloved's presence do me if I have no sight to behold his beauty?" (IN 4/2, pp. 77-79).—(In ᶜAṭṭār the story has a symbolic meaning: namely, man is blind to the fact that the whole world is beauty heaped upon beauty).

In this story as well, it is not a question of beholding the beauty of God in a human being, whereas the love of the daughter of Ka^cb, the poetess, for the slave Bektash is interpreted in this sense.

As one may recall (pp. 370 f.), she sends him a multitude of ardent love poems. But when, inflamed and encouraged by this, he meets her by chance and touches the hem of her robe, she reproaches him, saying: "Isn't it enough for you to be the 'pretext' (*bahāna*) in this matter?" (IN p. 341_{11}). [c]Aṭṭār then cites the testimony of Abū Sa[c]īd ibn Abī'l-Khayr who said he had inquired and confirmed that the poems of the daughter of Ka[c]b had nothing to do with a human being but refer to God. (IN pp. 341_{14}-342_{1}; apparently following him, Jāmī, *Nafaḥāt*, lithograph 564-65; *Tercüme* 703).

That a beautiful human being is only a reflection of God and therefore must not see himself but must see God in his beauty, is explained in another passage:

You're not you, you're only the reflection of Him. That's why you're beautiful. Yes, you're beautiful but because you're only a reflection, you're not (beautiful) yourself. See His (beauty) instead!

...You're not beautiful, secretly He's beautiful. Don't look at yourself and this soul and this body. Look at His being (*nihādh*), not at yourself! (IN p. 357_{10-13}).

The beautiful person can only see himself in the mirror.

Joseph one time looked in the mirror and in admiration praised his face as beautiful as the moon. But he thought it was the mirror. Had he been able to see himself in reality, he'd have had to suffer the torment of love. (IN 22/5, pp. 357-58).

In the same way, God created Adam in order to behold His own beauty in him.

He cast a veil over His beauty, He made a mirror of Adam for Himself. When He perceived His face in the mirror, He saw beauty devoid of sign within a sign. In admiration He praised His beauty. Don't think that He admired a human being! If an offspring of Adam out of conceit describes himself as beautiful, he's wrong like the mirror. (IN p. 358_{10-14}).—(In what follows, the train of thought veers off sharply).

As one may see, there are few passages in which the motifs dealt with in this chapter shine through.

The *Dīwān* of [c]Aṭṭār, as far as its content, has much in common with that of [c]Irāqī. In it as well that characteristic vacillation between love for a boy (*tarsābacha*) and longing for God is found. However, the two conceptions do not coincide as clearly as in

ᶜIrāqī. God reveals His beauty in the world but it is more a question of the reflection of His beauty in the whole of nature than its reflection in the appearance of a beautiful person. The longing at last to see openly the beauty of God which is hidden behind a thousand veils very often finds expression in poetry. In addition, many *qalandariyyāt* are found in ᶜAṭṭār's lyric poetry, a playing at lapsing into infidelity and suchlike, things which then appear again in Ḥāfiẓ in a very mild form.

In the introduction to the *Mukhtārnāma*, his collection of quatrains, the poet explains that this book is "a treasure of holy ideas" (*az maᶜānī-i quds*) and he recalls the saying of God: "I was a hidden treasure and I wanted to become known." Many of the poems are "dressed in the garb of locks and a beauty-mark, lips and a mouth" in the style of worldly poetry (*dar qālab-i ṣūrat-i alfāẓ-i mutadāwal-i ahl-i rusūm*). Nonetheless, he has accepted them into the *Dīwān*. People with understanding and knowers of art (*ān qawm ki ahl-i dhawq u ṣanᶜat-and*) will detach themselves from the external form and "see Gabriel in the appearance of Diḥya al-Kalbī (above p. 462)". But even the people who adhere to external form (*ki ahl-i ẓāhir u ṣūrat-and*) will not return home without being fed from this table. (*Der Islam* 25/1939/153).

And so ᶜAṭṭār counts on a twofold readership, one which understands these poems mystically, and one which conceives of them in a worldly way. Thus he is familiar with the alternative between earthly and heavenly love. The coincidence of the two, or their being joined together, is more rarely and less clearly expressed in him.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN

PURE LOVE OF GOD

Travellers to the halting-stations of love, so says Ibn al-Dabbāgh who is inclined to Neo-Platonic modes of thought, are divided into three groups. The first group is made up of people who reach love on the path of sensual perception and fantasy images, and do not progress beyond this. The second group is made up of people who reach love on the path of sensual perception and intellect as well. The third group consists of people who come to love on the path of intellect, while they progress beyond the previous two levels... For the first group the object of love is the world of bodies and its beautiful forms and wonderful figures, and nothing more. Their love does not go beyond the inner world of fantastical conceptions. They are in love with the harmony of forms, the radiant beauty of visible things and the miraculous works of creation. The chief role in this love is played by the usual things experienced by lovers among ordinary people, such as physical nearness and distance, being together and being separated, absence and presence, disappearance behind a barrier and showing oneself, separation and meeting again, and other contingent aspects of bodies... Consequently, one sees the adherents of this love spend their life addressing the faded traces of campsites and weeping over the windswept remains of dwelling places... The second group of lovers also comes to love on the path of sensual perception but then they attain perception through the intellect. They do not remain in the world of fantastical conceptions but manage to proceed beyond it. To this group belong most of the special class of "travellers on the path". For this group the object of love is beauty which is attached to a particular place. But if they advance in knowledge, they then come to detach beauty from these places... The third group of lovers is made up of those who behold holy beauty which reveals itself to their soul from the light-world. Their souls accept this within themselves because of their inner affinity with it, and its form impresses itself on their soul like the sun in a clear mirror. Then

the soul takes on the quality of that light and becomes imbued with the light's substance and beholds its own bright essence and the trace of the light-world therein and loves it because it is that holy light. (19a-20b).

For the early Ṣūfīs love (*maḥabba*) of God is the most important and highest of all halting-stations (*maqāmāt*), the quickest path which leads to God's proximity and the preliminary stage and pre-condition for the mystic's supreme goal, becoming one with God in extinction.

Lumaʿ 57-59, here *ḥāl*, not *maqām*; *Schlaglichter* 109-111/30; *Taʿarruf* 79-82; *Qūt* 2/50-83; *Nahrung* 2/446-599/32.660-861; Qushayrī, *Risāla* 143-48; *Sendschreiben* 438-451/48; Hujwīrī 392-404, Translation 306-13; *Manāzil al-sāʾirīn* 34; *Iḥyāʾ* 4/252 ff.; *Stufen* 629 ff./F.; *Elixir* 139 ff.; Ibn al-ʿArīf 90 ff.; *ʿAwārif* 4/331 ff., *Bāb* 61; *Gaben* 431/61; *Futūḥāt* 2/320 ff.; I. Goldziher, "Die Gottesliebe in der islamischen Theologie" in: *Der Islam* 9/1919/144-58.

1

Among mystical writers discussions are found which aim to prove that God alone is worthy of being loved because all known causes of love only apply in full measure to love of God. These discussions are developed in an especially systematic manner by Ghazzālī (*Iḥyāʾ* 4/258 ff.; *Stufen* 636 ff./F.13 ff.; *Elixir* 151-64). He mentions five causes, i.e. kinds of love: love of oneself, love because of a benefit which one receives oneself, love because of a benefit allotted to another and not to oneself, love of beauty, and finally love on the basis of inner affinity and similarity (*munāsaba*, *mushākala*; above p. 423). All these causes, as Ghazzālī demonstrates, only apply in full measure to love of God.

As evidence for the last kind of cause, the affinity (or primordial connection) and similarity between God and man, Ghazzālī first quotes a saying of the Prophet which contains the summons to adopt God's qualities by adopting certain virtues, and then he cites the *ḥadīth* which states God created man in His own image, once again voicing strict reservations about the anthropomorphism "seemingly" contained in it. Next he recalls God's words to Moses (!): "I was sick and you did not visit Me, etc." (See p. 578 below). Finally, he quotes the well-known saying of God: "The bondsman seeks closeness to Me by means of voluntary worship until I love him, and when I love him, then I am the ear with which he hears, etc." (See p. 576 below).

The involuntary and half-unconscious emergence of love of God on the basis of the primordial connection is very finely described by Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī (d. 673/1264) in the opening of his *Nafaḥāt*:

...they turn to God with the attribute of pure, absolute love and seek nothing else but Him. They love Him and seek Him not because they know Him or because someone has informed them about Him. But they do not know why they love Him and they have no specific request for Him. Their turning to Him is caused by an essential primordial connection... the experience of an inclination and of being attracted, from which the lover cannot escape. He perceives in his soul an attachment and an absolute need and attraction, a feeling of love and an affection for God, for which he knows no specific cause. Thus he is attracted and is inclined toward God and feels yearning without knowing why it is and how it is. And this is the essential primordial connection which I've often spoken about in my books.

...humu'l-muta^carriḍūna li'l-ḥaqqi bi-ṣifati'l-maḥabbati'l-khāliṣati'l-muṭlaqa; lā yaṭlubūna shay^ɔan siwāhu bal lā yuḥibbūnahū wa-yaṭlubūnahū min ḥaythu ^cilmuhum bihī aw ikhbāru aḥadin lahum ^canhu bal lā ya^crifūna lima yuḥibbūnahū wa-lā yata^cayyanu lahum maṭlūbun mā minhu wa-hādhā ta^carruḍun tūjibuhū munāsabatun aṣliyyatun dhātiyya... bi-wijdāni maylin wa-njidhābin lā yaqdiru ^calā daf^cihī bal yarā fī nafsihī'rtibāṭan wa-faqran muṭlaqan wa-njidhāban wa-ta^cashshuqan wa-maylan ilā'l-ḥaqqi lā ya^crifu lahū sababan mu^cayyanan fa-yanjadhibu wa-yamīlu wa-yashtāqu wa-lā yadrī lima hiya wa-lā kayfa wa-hādhihī hiya'l-munāsabatu'l-dhātiyyatu wa-qad dhakartuhā fī mawāḍi^ca min kutubinā. (Ms. Hekimoğlu 513, the first pages).

No doubt the young Junayd had experienced this kind of love. For when the shaykhs in Mecca talk about love and say to him, as the youngest among them: "Now say what you have to say, you man of ^cIrāq!", with tears in his eyes he replies:

(I'm) a bondsman who forgets about himself (*dhāhibun ^can nafsih*), constantly thinks of his Lord, fulfills the duties toward Him and in his heart looks at Him; whose heart has been set on fire by the lights of His essence, who drinks pure wine from the beaker of His love, and unto whom almighty God has revealed Himself from behind the curtains of His concealment. If he talks, he talks by means of God, and if he speaks, he speaks about God. If he moves, he does so at God's command. If he's still, he's still with God. He exists through God, for God, and with God. (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 147, *Bāb al-maḥabba*; *Sendschreiben* 450/48.17).

Also represented is the Platonic doctrine that love of God is based on an *anamnēsis* of divine beauty, which *anamnēsis*, however, is only possible among those who are not wholly ensnared in the earthly. (E.g. ^cUbayd Allāh b. al-Maḥmūd al-Shāshī

[Khwāja-i Aḥrār], *Risāla Ḥawrāʾiyya*, Appendix to the *Asrār al-tawḥīd*, Tehran 1313, pp. 322-23).

In ᶜAṭṭār as well God is the only object worthy of love, striving and yearning. One finds a substitute for everything else, but not for Him. (Above p. 341). The mystics, as Qūnawī describes the situation, want nothing from God; their longing is aimed at God Himself.

One of the birds asks the hoopoe what he should request from the Sīmurgh once he has reached him. The hoopoe reproaches him, saying: "You ignorant one! You know nothing about Him if you want something from Him. You must want Him Himself!" (Cf. the sermon above p. 455 and the dream of Bāyazīd's serving maid in *Nūr* 73-74[1]).

For He is better than everything which you wish to have. (MṬ 36/0, p. 120; above p. 15)

They seek Him their whole life long and do not forget Him.

A pious man is seen in a dream after his death and asked how things went in the grave during the interrogation by the angels. He answers: "I said to the angels: 'Go to God and tell Him: "This old man has always sought You. You haven't forgotten me on this day. How should I, who have no one but You, be able to forget You?"'" (AN 6/8).

2

However, not everyone from the outset feels this involuntary attraction to God which Qūnawī has described. Only a small part of the souls, already in pre-existence, decided in favor of God against the world and Paradise.

In pre-existence, an infinite amount of time before they're joined with bodies, the souls are gathered and drawn up in a line. Then the world appears before their eyes. A part of the souls run toward it with heart and soul. Then Paradise and Hell appear to those who had not moved. Again a part of the souls now run away from Hell toward Paradise. Only a small group is left which chooses neither the world, nor Paradise. The divine voice says to them: "You foolish souls, what is it you want? You don't want to know anything either of the world or of Paradise, nor are you moved by the sight of Hell!" Then the small group cries: "You know what we want. We want You and nothing else." Again the divine voice says: "If you desire Us, then you likewise desire immense torment, torment more than the hairs on the pelt of animals, more than the grains of sand in the desert, more than the drops of rain and the leaves of the trees." But the group

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[1] Read p. 74_2: *Al-nāsu kulluhum yaṭlubūna ghayrī mā khalā Abā Yazīda fa-innahū ṭalabanī.*

of the lovers of God cries out in joy: "We sacrifice our life to this torment. Whatever You wish to do with us, may it happen!" (IN 10/3, pp. 157-58).

A variant:

One day the friends of Dhū'l-Nūn came to him and found him weeping. They asked: "Why are you weeping?" He said: "Last night while prostrating myself in prayer my eyes were overcome by sleep. Then I saw God. He said to me: 'Oh Abū'l-Fayḍ, I created mankind, and they fall into ten groups. I showed them the world. Nine out of the ten groups devoted themselves to it. The remaining bunch again fell into ten parts. I showed them Paradise, and nine out of the ten devoted themselves to Paradise. The remaining bunch again fell into ten parts. I presented them with Hell. Nine parts of them ran from it and scattered out of fear of Hell. One part was left. They didn't allow themselves to be deceived by the world, nor were they inclined toward Paradise, nor were they afraid of Hell. I said to them: "My bondsmen, you haven't glanced at the world, have shown no inclination for Paradise, nor are you afraid of Hell. What is it you want?" Then they all raised their head and said: "You know what we want."'" (TA 1/117-18).

The same story occurs about Sarī al-Saqaṭī in the *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 1/112-13; Ṣaffūrī 1/43-44; Margret Smith, *An Early Mystic of Baghdad*, London 1935, p. 40. The author points out that the story is also found in Raimundus Lullus.

Many, like the bird referred to above, must first be induced through paraenesis to adopt the true goal. A great portion of the *Manṭiq al-ṭayr* is filled out with paraenetic efforts on the part of the hoopoe to motivate the birds to travel to the Sīmurgh, to induce them to give up all other ties, to despise all the dangers which threaten them on the journey, and not to be afraid to sacrifice their life on the path of love for the Sīmurgh.

Many belong to Ibn Dabbāgh's second group: they must first detach themselves from earthly love in order to move on from there to pure love of God. (Above p. 520). Some lovers come to make the transition by themselves.

A number of years ago I saw a Turkish puppet show about Laylā and Majnūn. The final scene portrayed how Laylā visits her crazed lover and is rejected by him. The last words he said were: *Leylâyı ararken, Mevlâyı buldum*, "While searching for Laylā, I found God."

Others collapse in the attempt to make the transition. Such is the case with the schoolteacher whom Junayd takes out of the school and who dies with verses about love of God on his lips. And similarly the flogged lover falls down dead when Shiblī calls to him: "What if you were to see the Great Beloved?" (Above p. 432).

Shams-i Tabrīzī attempts through mockery to make Awḥad al-Dīn give up his cult of the *shāhid*. (Above p. 490). In order to

sour the taste of lovers for earthly love, they are reminded one moment of the transitoriness of the object of their love and the next of the fact that it is only a construct of mucus and blood, and therefore unworthy of love. (Cf. above p. 51).

One of the birds replies to the hoopoe when the latter summons him to make the journey to the Sīmurgh: "I'm entangled in the bonds of love. Love has completely set me aflame and stolen my reason. To endure without the beloved would be infidelity in love."—The hoopoe replies: "You're entangled in the bonds of external form. Love of external form is not lofty love (*ᶜishq-i maᶜrifat*) but only the play of sensuality (*shahwatbāzī*). What you call beauty is only an ephemeral mixture of mucus and blood, nothing more hateful is conceivable. Transcendent (*ghayb*) beauty alone is free of defect (*ᶜayb*) and alone is worthy of love. Not to love such beauty would be real infidelity in love." (MṬ 25/0, pp. 86-87; above p. 14).

A man whose beloved has died complains of his grief to Shiblī. Shiblī admonishes him to choose for himself a beloved that doesn't die. (MṬ 25/1, p. 87; Arabic version in Ibn al-Dabbāgh 19b).

Whoever is afflicted with love for beautiful form will only have care and torment from it. This is experienced by every man who sells the slave woman he loves and then attempts in vain to buy her back. (MṬ 25/2; above p. 405).

Set out on the path of real true love! (MṬ p. 88, verse 2257a).

Indeed, the stories about unreal (*majāzī*) earthly love which we have become acquainted with, as well as being told for their own sake, are also parables and symbols for this real true (*ḥaqīqī*) love.

3

As far as I can see, the term *munāsaba* "(primordial) affinity, (primordial) connection" does not appear in ᶜAṭṭār. On the other hand, in a passage of the *Ilāhīnāma* one finds all the conceptual motifs which Ghazzālī cites in justification and explanation of this idea. The poet refers to the *ḥadīth* according to which God created man in His own image (IN p. 364_{2a}) and speaks about the assumption of divine attributes brought about by God (364_{2b}). And like Ghazzālī, he also raises objections against going into further details about similarity to God (IN 364_{4}), and finally the same echo of Matthew 25:41 ff. is not missing either. These ideas are symbolized by the story about how Maḥmūd exchanges clothes with Ayāz and goes to visit Shaykh Kharaqānī. God too has bestowed on man His clothing, i.e. His form, and in the end He will also confer on him His attributes. (IN 22/10, pp. 362-64).

The story occurs in a different context, and we shall be coming back to it later on.

Instead of the term *munāsaba*, "(primordial) affinity", the term one finds in ᶜAṭṭār is *āshnāʾī*, "(primordial) acquaintance". It is perhaps a translation of the Arabic *maᶜrifa*, "acquaintance with God, knowledge of God". This is the name of a *maqām* which possesses the closest of connections with the *maqām* of *maḥabba*. Indeed, yearning for closeness to God on the part of he lover of God is likewise always a yearning for personal disclosure of God's person, His essence, for the tearing away of the veil of transcendence which separates him from the object of his longing and for intimate personal acquaintance with God on the basis of inner experience of God.

Maᶜrifa, according to Nallino (*Raccolta* 2/187), is "traduzione della γνῶσις dei cristiani neoplatonizzanti e dei gnostici". If one translates the word accordingly with "gnosis", one must in any case bear in mind that the term has nothing to do with gnosis meaning the philosophy of revelation of the Gnostics.

However, in ᶜAṭṭār *āshnāʾī* also bears the special meaning of that secret primordial familiarity which, in sudden *anamnēsis*, becomes activated at a later time and once again revives a temporarily forgotten relationship of familiarity. He illustrates this idea with several worldly and religious stories.

It is inner, potentially available familiarity which makes it possible for Benjamin to recognize his long-lost brother in the great Egyptian lord (at the end of the Joseph story, IN 3/6, p. 68). Ayāz recognizes Maḥmūd, who has come on a visit, without seeing him but by means of "the scent of familiarity" (*bōy-i āshnāʾī*, IN 20/5, pp. 321-22; above p. 420). The chicks who have been hatched by an alien bird recognize their mother as soon as they hear her voice (above p. 275). This story, which concludes with the exhortation to listen to the call of God and no longer to let Satan make one's decisions, is introduced with the words: "If you're gone for one day, why should you remain a stranger and abandoned? Be assured that if that 'familiarity' (*āshnāʾī*) comes to light, then being separated ceases!" (IN p. $207_{7\text{-}8}$).

The idea of the secret primordial familiarity is illustrated in great detail by the long story about Ardashīr, the founder of the Iranian dynasty of the Sassanids, and his son Shāpūr.

The mother of Shāpūr, because of an attempt to poison her spouse, is repudiated by Ardashīr and handed over to a *mūbad* for execution. But the *mūbad* saves the woman in opposition to the king's order because she's pregnant with a suc-

cessor to the throne. To ward off any suspicion he castrates himself. The king grows old and is sad that he has no son. Then the *mūbad* tells him that a son of the king is alive. To test his paternal heart, the happy king orders him to present the prince together with boys of the same age dressed in the same clothes. He wishes to see whether he'll recognize the boy. In fact he recognizes him immediately on the basis of that inner, latent familiarity. (IN 20/4, pp. 317-21).

The story is a very free reworking of what Ṭabarī reports about Shāpūr's birth. Cf. Theodor Nöldeke, *Geschichte der Perser und Araber zur Zeit der Sasaniden*, pp. 26-30. It is also found in the "Nabataean Agriculture" and from there ended up in the book of magic of Pseudo-Majrīṭī, *Ghāyat al-ḥakīm*, 389-90; *Thamarāt al-awrāq*, 221-23, in the 2nd *Dhayl*.

The story is introduced with the thought:

For the mystic the dawn light of familiarity will shine forth from the dark clouds of separation, if he closes all doors to the world, attaches himself to the door of God and binds his heart to Him completely. And if he's allotted this light, he'll find the path again to (primordial) familiarity. (IN p. $317_{13\text{-}17}$).

In the epilogue it says:

This familiarity is the reason that through God every mote within a sunbeam is in the light. The mote within a sunbeam is cut off from the light, if it doesn't find the face of the sun. If it finds familiarity with the sun, then through the sun it becomes light. (IN p. $321_{2\text{-}4}$).

The story of Joseph and Benjamin closes with the words:

You possess a familiarity in the hidden chamber of the soul because earlier you already had an experience with Him. If you recognize Him again for an instant, then you attain pre-eminence above all humanity... If your heart doesn't contain familiarity, then all your action is lacking in light. But whoever possesses recollection (the scent) of this primordial familiarity, he will reach lasting closeness to God. (IN p. $68_{9\text{-}10, 12\text{-}13}$).

This primordial familiarity with God saves a youth weighed down with sins from Hell-fire on the Resurrection. (IN 3/7, pp. 68-70; above p. 266).—When the fire-worshipper converts to Islam, "the morning of familiarity shines on him from behind the curtain". (IN p. 182_{14}; cf. above p. 271). "If you have perceived the scent of familiarity", ᶜAṭṭār continues after the story about Ayāz who has an eye-illness but perceives Maḥmūd's proximity (above p. 420), "then you shine beyond the horizons of both worlds, for each atom of the light of familiarity shines like a hundred suns, and this is proof of God's love for you." (IN p. $322_{6\text{ ff.}}$).

"The scent" of familiarity here passes over into "the light" of familiarity, in the sense of the inner experience of God and

knowledge of God. This light emanates from God, transforms man and brings about his salvation. (Above p. 271).

4

Love of God as love of an unattainable object—Junayd says: "Love is extreme desire without attainment" (*al-maḥabbatu ifrāṭu'l-mayl bilā nayl*; *Risāla* 145; *Sendschreiben* 445/48.9)—expresses itself on earth in forever unquenched longing (*shawq*, e.g. Qushayrī, *Risāla* 148-50, *Bāb al-shawq*; *Sendschreiben* 452-457/49) both for closeness to God (see pp. 341 ff. above), as well as disclosure of His essence and His person. It is the yearning of the seeker of God for the primordial ground, the author and lord of all things, and the yearning of the pantheist for true Being which hides itself behind its reflections in the world of appearances, the unquenchable longing that the veil which surrounds this mysterious essence and makes it invisble may for once be lifted, the desire for God to manifest Himself.

This seeking God or the more impersonally conceived world-ground is the basic theme of the two fundamental narratives of the *Manṭiq al-ṭayr* and the *Muṣībatnāma*.

It also finds expression in the direct addresses to God (*munājāt*) with which ᶜAṭṭār introduces his epics.

I'm confused and upset on account of Your being. I've remained in the depths in the ocean of Your attributes. I'm seeking the pearl of loving closeness to You. I'm caught up in this ocean. I've suddenly come to be in this ocean. I have no path except unto You. Show me the path so I may acquire the pearl of loving closeness to You from the ocean of Your sublimity! (IN p. $7_{8\text{-}11}$).

From You ᶜAṭṭār wants You in both worlds. He forever tells secrets about You and to You. From You he wants You so that You show Your cheek and answer him from heart and soul. In truth, from You he wants You here below so that You show him clearly "the truth". From You he wants You so that he may see the secret and see You again in the treasure-chamber of the soul. From You he wants You in the village of this world so that he may behold Your face in this world. From You he wants You in all secrets so that You show Yourself to him in the end. (IN p. $8_{6\text{-}11}$).

Oh You who have caused a world full of people to enter confusion, who remain hidden behind the curtain, lift at last the curtain and don't let my heart burn, don't let me burn away any longer in the inner chamber! Unexpectedly I became lost in the ocean of Your wave. Rescue me from all this confusion! (MṬ p. 7, verses 178-80. Cf. the verses by ᶜIrāqī above p. 501).

But God is so lofty that He would never give Himself entirely to a human being. Thus ignorance and the pain of longing will continue to exist.

Even if your pain is immense, how could the Beloved completely extend His hand to you?[2] The lover must always burn so that through him the Beloved may always shine. Since the Beloved is worthy of all creatures, how could He come to one creature in totality! Our knowledge is not adequate, the pain of longing for Him remains with us. (IN p. $189_{12\text{-}15}$).

This torment of longing belongs to good pain, to the pain of religion (*dard-i dīn*; above p. 259).

With a heart full of grief and a soul full of woe, I shed tears like a cloud out of longing for You. (MṬ p. 8, verse 194).—The prophet Shuᶜayb weeps until he becomes blind out of longing for God and wishes to remain blind until he can see God. (IN 20/9; above p. 261).

The eye which cannot see God is worthless.

A man damned to Hell blinds himself and says: "What good are eyes to me if I can't see with them the one I worship?" (AN 7/2).

Abū ᶜAlī Ṭūsī says: "On the day of Resurrection those damned to Hell will see the blessed in Paradise. The dwellers in Paradise will say: 'The joys of Paradise disappeared for us when the sun of that divine beauty shone on us.' Then the dwellers in Hell will say: 'Indeed, we believe that. For when we learned that we would be separated from that face for eternity, the fire of the pain of longing so overwhelmed us that we felt nothing of the flames which engulfed us from head to foot.'" (MṬ 37/3, pp. 126-27).

With regard to the weeping of those damned to Hell see as well p. 262 above.

The mere thought of being cut off in the hereafter for one moment from seeing God, brings the lover of God into despair.

A lover of God is weeping and someone asks him what's making him weep. He answers: "It's said that in the hereafter God shows Himself to His chosen ones for forty thousand years without interruption. But then a moment will come when they'll be returned to themselves and see themselves. Because of this moment when I'll be returned to myself and see myself, I wish to take my own life in grief."—Not to see oneself is a pre-condition for beholding God and becoming God. (Cf. pp. 604 ff. below). (MN 20/6).

The days and nights become long for Rābiᶜa due to longing for God. (*Ḥilya* 6/193; Smith, *Rābiᶜa* 15).

Whoever has drunk of this wine, his thirst will only become greater and must become greater.

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2 Read: *hastat... dastat.*

If a taste (*dhawq*) of His secrets arrives, then new longing always arrives as well. Here thirst becomes complete. (MṬ p. 198, verses 3474-75a).

Drink up seven seas and then, with pain in your body, die while desiring an additional drop! ...Don't sip the cup so long, you strange fellow! If you've drunk, then wish for an additional cup! (MN in 0/1).

Yaḥyā ibn Muᶜādh writes to Bāyazīd: "What does the shaykh say about a man who has drunk a sip (of love of God) and has had a headache for thirty years because of it?" Bāyazīd answers: "Here's a man who has imbibed sea and land, heaven and earth, and still cries: 'Isn't there any more (*hal min mazīd*)?'" (IN 18/7, pp. 294-95; TA 1/143).

Qushayrī, *Risāla* 39, *Bāb al-dhawq wa'l-shurb*, 146, *Bāb al-maḥabba*; *Sendschreiben* 128/2.11, 447/48.13. The second of the passages indicated is evidently ᶜAṭṭār's source. Hujwīrī 233, Translation 187; *Nūr* 136. The story is commonly quoted as an example for "tasting and drinking" or "drunkenness".

Abū'l-Ḥusayn al-Nūrī (d. 295/907) hears a blind beggar pronounce the name of God. He runs to him and says: "What do you know about Him? And if you know Him, why are you still alive?" In an ecstatic state Nūrī then enters a reedbed where the reeds have been cut, and wounds himself so badly on the sharp stumps that he dies. (IN 7/8, p. 110; TA 2/55).—In the Arabic version, having heard someone sing a love verse, he enters an ecstatic state and dances into a field where there are sharp reed stumps, and goes on repeating the verse until the morning. He wounds himself so badly in this way that he dies from his wounds. (*Taʾrīkh Baghdād* 5/135-36; cf. *Elixir* 163; quite different in *Talbīs* 381).

5

ᶜAṭṭār is an unrivalled master in the art of making mythical and cosmic essences and mute creatures speak through "the language of states" and making them appear, by means of fantastical aetiologies and free interpretations of their qualities and their situation, as living bearers of the same religious feelings which animate men of piety. Thus he represents mythical and natural entities as taking part in longing for God and seeking after Him. This form of aetiology is in particular very richly developed in the *Muṣībatnāma* where all the mythical, cosmic and natural entities explain to the traveller that things are no better for them than for him because they also seek closeness to God in vain, etc. The cosmos as well yearns for its divine ultimate ground, to which it will one day return (pp. 631 f. below). A few examples from the rich abundance:

The stars in the sky course through cosmic space because they're seeking God (MN 7/0; above p. 24).—The sun burns because of love and longing, is one

moment red, the next yellow because of pain, and wears a blue garment of mourning because of love's sorrow (MN 13/0; above p. 25). Every evening it falls to the earth in a swoon (rubs its ear on the earth) out of longing for God (MṬ p. 3, verse 73).—The moon wastes away out of love for God and every month throws away its shield (*sipar*) out of perplexity (verse 74). Water wanders restlessly in search of Him, it surges and rages out of longing and consists of nothing but tears of yearning (MN 17/0; above p. 25).—The ocean, like the Ṣūfīs, has donned a blue robe, it's in eternal restlessness and thirsts after a drop from the ocean of God (MN 20/0; above p. 20), it beats with its head (up and down) out of confusion over God, the hem of its skirts is wet and its lip (the shore) is dry (MṬ p. 3, verse 75).—The mountain has its foot in mud because of longing for God, is perplexed and motionless and without heart (reason, i.e. it has lost its reason) (IN p. 3_6).—The rose laughs in the spring out of longing for You, that is why it has countless colors. The violet is a wearer of the ascetic robe of the convent. Out of longing for Your path it lowers its head to its breast (as in meditation) (IN p. $6_{16,18}$).—Out of love for You the tulip went on drinking heart's blood. That's why it has a heart full of blood and yellow cheeks. (IN p. 7_1).

This secret language of nature is not only understood by ᶜAṭṭār but is understood by the mystics as well.

Someone asked Shiblī: "Why does the sun become yellow when it sets?" He answered: "Because it became remote from the halting-station (*maqām*) of perfection. Thus it turns yellow in fear because of its situation. (Qushayrī, *Risāla* $62_{14\text{-}15}$, *Bāb al-khawf*; *Sendschreiben* 196/10.19; *Muḥāḍarāt al-udabāʾ*, Cairo 1326, 2/28).

This aetiology is also known as typically Ṣūfī to the rhetorician ᶜAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī. Cf. *Asrār al-balāgha*, my edition p. 257.

A man "with vision" comes to the ocean and asks it: "Why do you bear the blue color of mourning? Why do you boil, although no fire is present?" The ocean answers: "I'm in tormented restlessness because of separation from the Friend. I'm not worthy of Him. Due to suffering over Him I wear a blue garment. With dry lip (the shore) I sit in confusion and boil because of the fire of love, etc." (MṬ 10/1, p. 38).

A perfect mystic comes upon a fire-temple and falls to the ground at the sight of the fire. When he comes back to his senses and a companion asks him what happened to him, he answers: "The fire said to me: 'Don't look upon me with a contemptuous gaze! Due to this glowing heat and fire which is in me I don't worry about a handful of donkeys (the fire-worshippers).—Anyone who hasn't been like fire in love hasn't experienced genuine love. (MN 39/5).

6

Just as the earthly lover does not and should not endure without the beloved, the lover of God cannot endure without God. Even at the mere mention of the words "to endure without God" (*al-ṣabr ᶜan Allāh*), Shiblī lets out a shout and comes close to death (*Iḥyāʾ* 4/69, at the end of the section on *ṣabr*; *Stufen* 176/B.81). And the lover of God should also sleep as little as the earthly lover.

God says: "Whoever maintains that he loves Me and sleeps forgetting Me (*nāma ᶜannī*) when night engulfs him, he is a liar." (*Qūt* $2/55_{12}$ and 60_{22}; *Nahrung* 2/469/32.689, 2/501/32.730; Qushayrī, *Risāla* 176_{14}, *Bāb ruʾyā'l-qawm*; *Sendschreiben* 524/53.3).

He does not behave like the ungrateful parrot who forgets his master:

A merchant has a parrot he's fed with sugar for a whole year without succeeding in getting it to speak. Finally, when a fire breaks out in the house and the flames are flickering about the cage, the parrot decides to speak and calls the master for help. But the latter says: "If you must first be impelled by fire before you think of me, then you may just as well burn up!" (MN 31/6; cf. also above pp. 275 f. and 352).

Not being able to endure remoteness from God is illustrated by the story of a fool of God which may be introduced here, even if it does not occur in ᶜAṭṭār.

Shiblī observes how a madman is pursued by boys throwing stones at him and how the man's face is bloody and his head is full of holes. Shiblī seeks to stop the boys from their cruel action but they say: "Let us kill him, oh shaykh, he's an infidel!" Shiblī asks: "What sign of infidelity did you perceive in him?" The boys answer: "He claims to see his God (*rabbuhū*) and to speak with Him." Shiblī says: "Stop now while I question him!" He goes up to the man and he hears him laugh and say: "It's really fine of You that You set these boys on me!" (Cf. above p. 182). Shiblī addresses him and says: "Is it true, brother, what these boys say?" The man: "What do they say?" Shiblī: "They say you've seen your God and spoken with Him." Then the man shouts out and says: "Shiblī! By Him who has made me a bewildered slave of His love[3] and causes me to wander restlessly between remoteness from Him and closeness: If He were to hide Himself from me for a moment, I would go to pieces because of the pain of separation." Then he recited the verse: "Your image (*khayāluka*)[4] is in my eyes, Your name (*dhikruka*) is in my mouth, Your dwelling place is in my heart—how could

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3 Read, of course, on p. 95, l. 4: *tayyamanī*.
4 Variant: *jamāluka* "Your beauty".

You be remote from me?" (Ibn al-ᶜArīf 94-95; *Rawḍ al-rayāḥīn* no. 36; the shorter version in Hujwīrī 430-31, Translation 332;[5] Ṣaffūrī 1/44).

Evidently ᶜAbbāsa wishes to illustrate the powerful effect of love when he says:

If an atom of the pain of love shines on a person, a woman will be born from that person if he's a man. And if it's a woman, a man will be born from her. Thus a woman was born from Adam, and from Mary a man was born. (MṬ 40/4, p. 141).

According to a well-known folk belief, a married couple will have a girl if the husband is the more in love of the two, and a boy if the wife is more in love.

The love of the lover of God is so great that speaking and singing about it to inspired and uninspired listeners causes incredible effects. Moreover, if the singing is also performed with great mastery, it can even have a lethal effect.

The soul of David, so the *pīr* instructs the world-traveller, is the ocean of *mawadda*, "love between friends". (MN 33/0; above p. 28). David sang the Psalter so beautifully for twenty years that reason no longer remained in its place, the foot forgot how to walk, the leaves of the trees all became ears, water ceased to flow, birds stopped flying. But everyone experienced only joy from the singing and went on living happily. One day, however, he was struck by the arrow of pain and now he sang sorrowful songs. Then everyone who heard him died so that in the end 40,000 people lost their life in this way, and God Himself had to reproach him. (MN 33/1).

Iḥyāʾ 4/158-59, *Bayān aḥwāl al-anbiyāʾ*, etc.; *Stufen* 380 f./C.166. Cf. Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums*, 3rd edition, p. 99.

When Sumnūn preaches about love, all the lamps in the mosque break in pieces (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 146, *Bāb al-maḥabba*; *Sendschreiben* 446/48.12; TA $2/83_{1\text{-}3}$).—Another time while he's preaching a small bird sits on his hand. It then beats its beak against the ground until it bleeds and the bird dies. (Above p. 387).

A veil impregnated with love of God protects people from the lethal radiance of God.

When Moses comes back from Sinai, the radiance of God is on his face, and everyone who looks at him dies. Nor does it help at all that Moses puts a veil over his face. He asks God what he should do against this. God orders him to make a veil from a robe which a lover of God had torn apart in a moment of ecstasy. This will protect people from being blinded. (MN 27/12. Cf. *Exodus* 34: 29-35).

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5 Read in the Persian text, p. 431, line 2: *ṭāqatash na-dāram*, and change the translation accordingly.

Jirku, "Die Gesichtsmaske des Moses" in: ZDPV 67/43 ff.

If a person is overwhelmed by love of God, this can produce numbing (*ḥayrat*) and a dazed effect.

Jesus comes to a man who spends his time worshipping in a house of prayer by a spring. The man asks Jesus to intercede for him with God so that God will grant him one atom of love of God. Jesus fulfills his requests and goes his way. When after some time he returns to the same place, he finds the house of prayer in ruin and the spring dried up. The man himself is not on hand. God informs Jesus that the hermit is living on a mountain. Jesus ascends the mountain and scarcely recognizes the hermit who looks more like a corpse than a living person. The man doesn't even return the prophet's greeting. Then God reveals to Jesus: "This man desired from Me one atom of love for God. When I granted his wish, he gave up everything, forgot about himself and entered the state you see him in. If I had given him one more atom of love, he would have broken up into atoms." (MN 31/1).

Arabic versions which deviate in details are found in *Qūt* 2/60$_{11-18}$; *Nahrung* 2/499/32.728; *Iḥyā'* 4/288, *al-Qawl fī ᶜalāmāt, etc.*; *Stufen* 712/F.212; Ibn al-ᶜArīf 92-93; Ṣaffūrī 1/44-45.

7

Among the various forms of profane love which we mentioned above, two are connected with a particular legal relationship: marriage and slavery. The first of these two relationships never underwent a transference in Islam to the relationship with divinity—for instance in the form of a spiritual marriage. "A spiritual bridegroom" is inconceivable in Islam. Rather, the legal relationship of man to God is always that of the slave to his master. If the great men of piety attain a more intimate relationship to God, that of Friendship with God, and therefore acquire the honorary title "Friends of God", their slave relationship is not abolished because of this (above pp. 289-92). Madness alone liberates a person from slavery to God (above p. 173).

On the other hand, the mystics of love emotionally assimilate this slave relationship so that the feeling of being a slave and love merge in one. It makes good sense therefore if the behavior of Ayāz, the ideal slave who loves his master and prefers his master's favor and closeness to all goods in the world, is presented as a metaphor and a symbolic example for love of God.

The feeling of being a slave combined with love appears clearly in the utterances of the first female mystic in Islam, Rābiᶜa al-ᶜAdawiyya, as ᶜAṭṭār portrays her. We have already in part be-

come acquainted with stories in this category and we shall encounter others as well.

Love for the master also lightens the performance of works of obedience. (*Iḥyā*ʾ 4/286, *al-Qawl fī ʿalāmāt, etc.*; *Stufen* 698/ F.212).

8

Love of God makes an absolute claim on the heart of the mystic. It is irreconcilable with love of earthly things. Thus conflicts arise which are triumphantly overcome by the real lovers of God. Even a small mishap in providing for her daily needs in life causes the conflict to manifest itself in Rābiʿa's case.

When one mishap after another occurs while she's preparing her meal so that finally she has nothing to eat and drink, she calls to God: "How long will You torment me?" She receives the answer: "If you wish, I'll bestow on you everything between heaven and earth, but then I'll remove the pain of love for Me from your heart. For there isn't room for both of these at the same time in one heart. If you have the one, you have no hope of having the other. One doesn't receive anxiety over God without paying a price." (IN 10/5; above p. 261).

The model for love of God among the early prophets or patriarchs is Abraham (Ibrāhīm), who bears the honorary title Khalīl Allāh, "The Friend of God".

Cf. van der Leeuw, *La religion dans son essence et ses manifestations. Phénoménologie de la religion*, Paris 1948, pp. 466-67.

For the mere sound of the divine name he gives away all his possessions. Nor does he recoil from sacrificing his own son and giving up his own life and he rejects all assistance by way of mediation.

Abraham has 40,000 slaves. Each of them has at his disposal a sheep-dog with a golden collar. It's impossible to know the number of sheep which are protected by these dogs. In view of this wealth of Abraham's, the angels are in doubt as to whether his heart really loves God alone or whether it's instead engaged with these herds. In order to prove to the angels Abraham's loyalty, God sends forth Gabriel. He's to pronounce God's name in Abraham's presence and then report how Abraham behaves. Gabriel in human form goes before Abraham and says with a gentle voice: "Quddūs" (the All-holy). Abraham immediately falls to the ground, bestows one-third of his sheep on the visitor whom he does not know and requests that he pronounce the name once more. Gabriel pronounces the holy name two more times and for this receives the remaining two-thirds of the herds as a gift. Then the angel reveals himself and says he has no need of the sheep, Abraham should keep them. Abraham, however, won't take

back property once he's given it away. Gabriel reports the result of the test, but the angels still aren't satisfied. After that God orders Abraham to sacrifice his son. The prophet doesn't shrink from this sacrifice either. The angels still aren't convinced and demand that he prove his love of God not only by sacrificing his child but by sacrificing his own life as well. God then subjects Abraham to the final test. Nimrod has him hurled into a fire by means of a catapult. Gabriel goes to him in this moment of extreme need and asks whether he has a request. Abraham answers: "Not for you!" He doesn't want anything to do with anyone but the divine Friend. Only now are the angels convinced of Abraham's pure love of God and declare that he's truly worthy of the honorary title "the Friend of God". (IN 19/11, pp. 309-13).

From the wealth of literature: the first test, with extensive deviations, Ṣaffūrī 1/180; the second: Kisāʾī 150-51; Thaʿlabī, 57-59; Ibn ʿAsākir 2/146-49; the third: Kisāʾī 139; Thaʿlabī 48-49; Ibn ʿAsākir 2/141-42; Qushayrī, *Risāla* 77, *Bāb al-tawakkul*; *Sendschreiben* 239/19.8, 242/19.15; Hujwīrī 423; *Iḥyāʾ* 4/211, *Bayān faḍīlat al-tawakkul*; *Stufen* 563 f./E.106; *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/37; Nuwayrī 5/272; *Ḥadīqa* 168; *Mathnawī* 3/4215-16. A miniature in Sir Thomas Arnold, *The Old and New Testaments in Muslim Religious Art*, London 1932, p. 24, plate 8.—Regarding the sources: D. Sidersky, *Les Origines des légendes musulmanes dans le Coran et dans les vies des prophètes*, Paris 1933, pp. 33-35 and the literature cited by W. Bousset in *Die Religion des Judentums im späthellenistischen Zeitalter*, 3rd edition 1926, p. 23, ftn. 6.

The true lover of God, like Abraham, wants no interference of others in his relationship with God.

Bishr the Barefoot relates: "When I was still at the beginning of Sufism, I came to ʿAbbādān and there I saw a blind, leprous, insane epileptic lying on the ground, whose flesh the ants were gnawing on. I lifted his head and rested it on my lap and said prayers for him. When he regained his senses, he said: 'Who is this intruder who wishes to force his way between me and my Lord? If he were to cut me up in pieces, I would only love Him all the more!'" (*Iḥyāʾ* 4/298, *Bayān ḥaqīqat al-riḍā*; *Stufen* 737/F.275; *Elixir* 171).

Variants: *Qūt* 2/43; *Nahrung* 2/437/32.625; Qushayrī, *Risāla* 138, *Bāb aḥwālihim ʿinda'l-khurūj, etc.* and ibid. 71-72, *Bāb mukhālafat al-nafs*, with extensive deviations; *Sendschreiben* 422/46.7, 223/15.5; *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 1/115; *Tazyīn al-aswāq* 1/29; TA 2/152-53.

A drunk comes to the Ṣūfī convent where Abū Saʿīd is staying and remains lying in tears before the convent door. The shaykh takes pity on him, wants to help him and says to him: "Give me your hand and stand up!" The man answers: "Be gone! It's not your business to extend a helping hand. Leave me to Him!" (MN *Khātima*/17).

A man who affects piety walks by a pious fool and says to him: "May God cause you to be greeted! (God greet you!)." The fool then gets worked up and says: "See that you progress further and stop such idle talk! You don't know God. He doesn't need a representative like you. Mind your own business. God can speak and act without your being the messenger!" (MN 22/12).

Abraham's sacrifice of his son is an act of obedience by means of which the patriarch proves that he loves God more than his own son. In other stories the idea that love of God is not at all compatible with love of wife and children stands more in the foreground. (See above p. 372). Ibrāhīm b. Adham beseeches God for the death of his own son so that his heart will not be distracted from God by paternal love. (Above pp. 373 f.). And extreme Ṣūfīs are even averse to loving one's spouse. Rābiᶜa refuses several marriage proposals because she has no room in her heart for any love but love of God (*Qūt* 2/57; *Nahrung* 2/483 f./32.709; Smith, *Rābiᶜa* 11-13). Murtaᶜish recoils from marriage on the wedding night. (Above p. 373). Zulaykhā, who does finally become married to Joseph, is only moved to share Joseph's bed by reference to God's command. (*Iḥyāᵓ* 4/284, *al-Qawl fī ᶜalāmāt, etc.*; *Stufen* 699/F.184).

In principle, Islam, as is well known, does not look favorably upon monkery. Marriage is *sunna* of the Prophet and for this reason it is held in honor by the pious. The author of the *Qūt al-qulūb* is not himself of the opinion that love of parents and children, love of one's spouse and worldly affairs (*maṣāliḥ al-dunyā*) infringes on love of God but he does report that many of the forefathers held a contrary view. (*Qūt* $2/69_{21\text{-}25}$, and cf. 2/237 ff; *Nahrung* 2/559 f./32.804, 3/536 ff./45; above pp. 354-57).

Concerning the hostile attitude of Christian ascetics toward the family cf. Tor Andrae, "Zuhd" in: *Monde Oriental* 1931/313. Rabbūlā separates himself from wife and child; cf. C. Brockelmann, *Syrische Grammatik*, Supplement to the text pp. 75-76.

Tenderness to a child is already disloyalty toward God.

The ascetic Riyāḥ al-Qaysī comes to Rābiᶜa and in her presence kisses a boy who belongs to his family, and embraces him. Rābiᶜa says to him: "Do you love the boy?" He replies: "Yes." Then she says: "I didn't think there was room in your heart for love of anyone besides God." Riyāḥ shouts out and falls to the ground unconscious. When he comes back to his senses, he wipes the sweat from his brow and says: "It's a mercy for children which God has placed in the hearts of His bondsmen."

Ḥilya 6/195; *Maṣāriᶜ* 181; Massignon, *Recueil* 6; Margret Smith, *Rābiᶜa* 15-16. Concerning Riyāḥ (not Rabāḥ) cf. *Lisān al-Mīzān* 2/469, no. 1888. There he is declared a *zindīq*, like Rābiᶜa.

Abū'l-Faraj al-ᶜUkbarī relates: "Shiblī said to me: 'Oh Abū'l-Faraj, what do you occupy your time with?' I said: 'With my wife and child.' He said: 'Thus you waste time, which is more precious than red sulphur, with something other than God, even though the Prophet says: "God is jealous and loves everyone who is

jealous"? And what this means is that, out of jealousy regarding His friends, He doesn't tolerate that things other than He get the upper hand over them.'" (Sulamī, *Kitāb al-Futuwwa*, Ms. Ayasofya 2049, fol. 88a).

The knower of God turns away from people completely.

One of the great masters said: "Since I've come to know God, I have neither peace nor security. I have neither friendship nor enmity with any human being." (IN 20/2, p. 316).

Not only the normal emotional commitments such as those toward one's spouse and child are displaced from the feelings of the lover of God, but even the venerable persons of the prophets should not distract him from God.

In Rābiᶜa's heart there is neither room to love the Prophet, nor to hate Satan. (TA 1/67; Smith, *Rābiᶜa* 99; *Iḥyāʾ* 4/308, *Khātimat Kitāb al-maḥabba*; *Stufen* 765/F.331).

A man asks Moses to beseech God for him that He cause him to taste His pure love. Moses does this, and God grants his request. When Moses returns to the man, the latter flees from him. God gives Moses the explanation: "Oh Moses, don't you know that whoever experiences love for Me recoils from everyone but Me and doesn't feel intimate with anyone but Me?" (Fīrūzābādī, *Nasl* 77a; Yāfiᶜī, *Mukhtaṣar Rawḍ al-rayāḥīn* in the margin of Thaᶜlabī, *ᶜArāʾis* 261-62).

The continuation of the story in Yāfiᶜī shall occupy us later in another context.

Abū Saᶜīd al-Kharrāz sees the Prophet in a dream and says to him: "Oh Apostle of God, excuse me but love of God leaves me no time (*shaghalatnī ᶜan*) for love of you!" The Prophet replies: "You little fool (*yā mubārak*)! Whoever loves God thereby loves me." (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 147, *Bāb al-maḥabba*; *Sendschreiben* 450/48.18; TA $2/41_{14\text{-}17}$).

And the lover of God must even ban from his heart experiencing delight in nature.

In the story about the black slave Burkh (?) whom Moses makes ask God for rain (see p. 584 below), it says that God told Moses: "Burkh is a good bondsman to Me but he has one fault." Moses: "And what fault is that?" God: "He's pleased by the morning breeze and takes pleasure in it. But whoever loves Me takes no pleasure in anything at all." (*Qūt* 2/54; *Nahrung* 2/462/32.680; *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/91).

A worshipper of God serves God for many years unremittingly. One time a bird lands on a tree in his courtyard and sings. The pious man listens to the bird with pleasure. Then God has him informed by the prophet of the era: "After having served Us faithfully for so many years, you've sold Us for a bird." (MṬ 32/3, p. 82).

An Arabic version:

A worshipper of God serves God for a long time in a forest. One day a bird rests in a tree and lets its song pour forth. The worshipper of God decides to move his place of prayer under this tree in order to enjoy the bird's voice. Then God has him informed by the prophet of the era: "You've found pleasure in a creature. I shall demote you one level, and no pious work shall cause you to attain the lost level again." (*Qūt* 2/54$_{15-18}$; *Nahrung* 2/463/32.680; *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/91).

Rābi^{c}a withdraws into her dark house during the most beautiful spring. An ascetic (TA: her handmaid) urges her to go outside and to admire God's creation. Rābi^{c}a replies: "Instead, you come in the house to behold the Creator! If I have the Creator, what do I care about His creation?" (MN 19/5. Quite different in details: TA 1/68, which Smith follows: *Rābi^{c}a* 62).

Nor does the lover of God wish to have anything to do with the venerable house of God, the Ka^{c}ba.

The Ka^{c}ba has less esteem with God than the slave of God.

Naṣrābādhī sees the curtains of the Ka^{c}ba flutter in the wind and addresses the Ka^{c}ba like a bride who places herself on view in adornments: "You have many lovers who don't shy from the thorny path in order to reach you! But you have no reason to be haughty. For if the divine Friend one time says to you: 'My house' (surah 2/125), He says seventy times to me: 'My slave'!" (MN 19/7).

While Rābi^{c}a is on pilgrimage, the Ka^{c}ba comes to meet her half-way. But she says: "I need the master of the house. What's the house to me?" (TA 1/61-62; Smith, *Rābi^{c}a* 8-9).

They see Shiblī running with a firebrand in his hand and ask him: "Where are you headed?" He answers: "I'm running to set the Ka^{c}ba on fire so that people become concerned about the lord of the Ka^{c}ba." (TA 2/163$_{13-14}$).

A God-loving Indian sees the Muhammadans going on the pilgrimage and is informed by them that God has a house in a particular place. Whoever visits it is safe from eternal punishment. He immediately sets out and travels to the Ka^{c}ba. There he asks where God is. When he's told that God isn't in the house, he's inconsolable and reproaches the Muhammadans for having caused him to make this long journey. What does he care about the house without the master of the house? (MN 19/4).

Someone asks Majnūn which is the direction of prayer. He says: "If you're an ignorant clod of earth, then it's the stone of the Ka^{c}ba. For the lovers it's God, for Majnūn the face of Laylā."—The Ka^{c}ba is the direction of prayer for men of the world, the real Ka^{c}ba is the soul. (MN 19/6).

For Bāyazīd cf. *Nūr* 77, 79, 108, 142.

Finally, the delights of Paradise are rejected as a distraction from God. Only God, who will reveal Himself in the hereafter in His beauty and lordliness to those who love Him, can be the goal

of the mystic's hopes. Hope of Paradise and fear of the punishment of Hell are no longer a reason for action for lovers of God. They serve God out of love and because God is the Master. (Above pp. 289-90). Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī mentions the names of a number of pious men as far back as the second generation after the Prophet who adopted this attitude. (*Qūt* 2/56; *Nahrung* 2/478 f./32.703. In particular rejection of the Ḥūrīs: *Qūt* 2/73; *Nahrung* 2/573/32.824; *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/90). Yaḥyā ibn Muᶜādh goes still further: Paradise is the prison of the knowers of God. (ᶜAyn al-Quḍāt, *Tamhīd* 6, fol. 66b). Bāyazīd says: "God has bondsmen who, if Paradise appeared to them in its adornment, would cry out (*la-ḍajjū*) before it (in fear) the way the people of Hell-fire cry out before Hell-fire (in fear)." (*Nūr* 84, variant 110).—There are men of piety who will have to be dragged into Paradise in chains. This is one of the points which Paradise put to the world-traveller in order to show him that it is not in such a fortunate position as he thinks. (MN 10/0. Also AN 7/1). According to a *ḥadīth*, God is amazed by such people.

ᶜAjiba rabbuka min qawmin yuqādūna ilā'l-jannati fī'l-salāsil. Wensinck 1/377; Lane s.v. *ᶜajiba*; *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/42-43, characteristically reinterpreted; ᶜAyn al-Quḍāt, *Tamhīd* 6, fol. 66b-67a, formulated somewhat differently.

A saying of the Prophet is also quoted according to which Paradise has no Ḥūrīs, castles, milk and honey. (*Tamhīd* 6, 66b). Shiblī is supposed to have said that there is no one else in Paradise besides God. (Ibid.).

Abū ᶜAlī Rūdhabārī says on his deathbed: "The door of heaven has been opened wide for me and a place has been arranged for me in Paradise, and the angels are singing: 'Enter, you lover!' But my soul says (to God): 'What's this to me? You've made me wait a whole lifetime. I can't now lower myself by accepting a gift as a bribe like the people of lust do. Love for You has been implanted in my soul. I know nothing of Hell and nothing of Paradise. And if You burn me to ashes, I still want[6] no one but You.'" (MṬ 36/1, p. 120).

The symbolic model for the mystic is Ayāz who, when Maḥmūd allows his royal treasures to be plundered, does not touch anything because for him gazing at the king is of greater worth. (Above p. 347).

You too give up striving for Paradise, the way Adam gave it up! (AN in 7/1).

According to this view Adam gave up Paradise voluntarily. At other times he is said to have been driven out of Paradise precisely because he had attached his heart to it.

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6 Read in verse 3039b: *dar na-bāyadh*.

Someone asks a master why Adam lost Paradise. The master answers: "This is punishment for the fact that he concerned himself with something other than God Himself." With this story the hoopoe reproaches the peacock who declares that he has only one desire, namely to return to Paradise once again. (MṬ 5/0-1, pp. 31-32; above p. 11).

Rābiᶜa says to Sufyān al-Thawrī: "I've not served God out of fear of Him—then I would be like a bad handmaid who only works if she's afraid—; and I haven't served Him out of love of Paradise—then I would be like a bad handmaid who only works if one gives her something—; but I've served Him out of love for Him and out of yearning for Him." (*Qūt* 2/57; *Nahrung* 2/483/32.709).

Cf. Nicholson's *Commentary* on *Mathnawī* 5/2714-15; TA $1/73_{3-6}$; Smith, *Rābiᶜa*, chpt. VIII; and above p. 290).

Shiblī, whom we encountered above in the act of burning down the Kaᶜba, is seen another time with two firebrands in his hands. With one he wishes to burn Hell and with the other Paradise, so that people come to have concern for God Himself. (TA 2/163).

Transferred to Rābiᶜa in Aflākī, *Manāqib al-ᶜārifīn*; Huart, *Les Saints* 1/310-1; O'Kane, *Feats* 274; Smith, *Rābiᶜa* 98; Massignon, *Recueil* 8.

According to Bāyazīd, Paradise is the greatest barrier separating one from God. It seduces people into finding peace in something other than God. (Massignon, *Recueil* 30).

Sometimes the rejection of Paradise appears in the form of declaring renunciation of "both worlds", the here and now as well as the hereafter. In a *ḥadīth*, which obviously emerged in circles of mystics, it says: "This world is forbidden (*ḥarām*) for the people of the other world, and the other world is forbidden for the people of this world, and this world and the other world are forbidden for the people of God." (*Fayḍ al-qadīr* no. 4269).

Shiblī finds a skull in the desert on which is written: "This is the skull of an afflicted man who has lost both this and the other world." He then lets out a shout and says to his companions: "This must be the skull of a Ṣūfī. For whoever doesn't gamble away both worlds, attains no access to the sanctuary of love's intimacy (*waṣl*)." (AN 7/3; TA $2/170_{3-6}$).

A similar story, but with a different interpretation, occurs about Bāyazīd: TA $1/137_{8-13}$.

Shiblī is fond of expressing himself in drastic terms:

One day while speaking to God, he says: "God, place this and the other world in my hand. Then I'll make a morsel out of this world and stick it in the mouth of a dog, and out of the other world I'll make another morsel and stick it in the mouth of a Jew. Both are only a barrier separating one from the sought after goal." (TA $2/165_{16-18}$).

Rābiᶜa says to God: "Give this world to Your enemies, the other world to Your friends. I want nothing from either world, because You're enough for me. May I be an unbeliever if I glance at the two worlds or desire anything else but You." (MṬ 36/4, pp. 122-23. Somewhat differently in TA 1/73$_{2-3}$, Smith, *Rābiᶜa* 30).

9

God is jealous. (Above p. 350). Not only does He want to be revered exclusively as master by His slaves but He also wants to be loved exclusively by those who love Him. "Whatever you love, you become its slave, and He doesn't want you to be the slave of anyone else." (*Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/53). He rebukes lovers or punishes them.

Cf. for example the story about the worshipper of God and the bird, above pp. 538 f.

Rābiᶜa becomes ill. When someone asks her what the cause of her illness is, she answers: "My heart looked for Paradise in the morning. Then the Friend rebuked me, and this illness is a rebuke from Him." (TA 1/70$_{10-13}$; Smith, *Rābiᶜa* 23. Arabic version in Qushayrī, *Risāla* 116, *Bāb al-ghayra*; *Sendschreiben* 356/37.9).

Nor does He want His friends to turn to others for help. Joseph learns about this in prison.

God has Gabriel tell Joseph in prison: "What have We done bad to you that you seek refuge with others than Us? You've sent a man with a message to the ᶜAzīz of Egypt. If you have a friend such as Me, how can you then make the ᶜAzīz your confidant? May I not be God if I don't make you sit here for some years in prison as a reprimand (*ᶜitāb*) for this!" (MN 37/7; Thaᶜlabī 78).

Moses asks God to show him one of His friends. God points out for him a valley in which he will find one of God's chosen men. Moses goes there and finds a man lying on the ground covered with a ragged robe, with half a brick under his head as a pillow, and tormented by thousands of ants, wasps and flies. Moses greets him and asks whether he can do something for him. The man asks him for a drink of water. The prophet goes to fetch a water jug. When he returns, the man is dead. Moses goes away in amazement to obtain a shroud and have a grave dug. When he comes back, a lion has torn apart the corpse of the lover of God. Moses is overcome with painful emotion and says to God that this ordaining of God's is incomprehensible to him. God's answer is: "Until now We've always given him water, We've clothed him. Now he has turned to others. That's why We've taken him away. He'll no longer obtain a hint of a whiff from Us until he has accounted for that ragged robe and that brick." (IN 10/2, pp. 155-56).

Ibrāhīm b. Adham, when making the pilgrimage, arrives at the pilgrims' halting-station Dhāt al-ᶜIrq and finds seventy wearers of ascetic robes lying on the ground. Only one of them still has a little life in him and is able to relate for

Ibn Adham what happened to him and his companions. "Be on guard, oh Ibrāhīm", he says, "against the Friend who has slaughtered us like infidel Greeks and who wages war on pilgrims! Know, oh shaykh, that we were seventy pilgrims. We vowed to remain silent along the entire road to the Ka^{c}ba, and to think of nothing but God and direct our gaze to nothing else. When we arrived in Dhāt al-^{c}Irq, Khiḍr met us. He greeted us, and we returned his greeting. We were delighted thinking: 'It's a good omen that Khiḍr has come to meet us.' Then we heard a voice call out: 'Oh you liars and hypocrites! Your vow will not be accepted, for someone else has occupied your attention. Since you've broken the pact, I'll not make peace with you until I've shed your blood!" Ibn Adham asks: "Why have you alone remained alive?" The youth answers: "I was told: 'You're still unripe and incomplete. As soon as you've become ripe, We'll send you as well where the others are.'" Having spoken thus, he then gives up the ghost. (IN 20/8, pp. 324-25; TA 1/88-89).

10

The jealousy of the lover of God forms a counterpart to God's jealousy.

Cf. the *Bāb al-ghayra* in Qushayrī's *Risāla*; *Sendschreiben* 352-357/37; in comparison *Rawḍat al-muḥibbīn* 295. Qurashī (d. 1071/1660) wrote a special work on the subject, GAL^{2} 2/450 no. 13.

Shiblī is an especially jealous lover of God.

Someone asked Shiblī: "When do you feel at peace?" He said: "When I see that no one pronounces God's name." (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 116, *Bāb al-ghayra*; *Sendschreiben* 354/37.5; *Firdaws al-murshidiyya* 267; TA 2/179$_{23\text{-}24}$ with the addition "i.e. that I alone pronounce it").

Shiblī fills his sleeve with pieces of sugar, puts a piece of sugar in the mouth of every boy he meets and tells him to say "Allāh". Then he puts gold and silver coins in his sleeve and promises to fill with them the mouth of everyone who says the name of God once. But then he's seized by jealousy and threatens to cut off the head of everyone who says "Allāh"—because as he explains later, people don't pronounce the name with earnestness and fervor, but do so indifferently and out of habit. Then he covers all the walls completely by writing out God's name until finally a voice calls to him that he should at last leave the name and instead seek the one referred to by the name. (TA 2/162$_{10\text{-}20}$).

At the hour of his death he strikes his hands together and weeps. When someone asks him why he's weeping, he explains: "I'm jealous of Satan on whom God has bestowed His curse." (*Firdaws al-murshidiyya* 267$_{20\text{-}22}$).

Somewhat expanded in ^{c}Aṭṭār:

At the hour of his death Shiblī is sitting on a heap of ashes with his eyes shut and girded with a Christian belt. He weeps and pours ashes over his head. Some-

one asks: "Has anyone ever seen a person who puts on the Christian belt at such an hour?" Shiblī answers: "I'm melting out of jealousy toward Satan to whom God said: 'My curse be upon you!'" (MṬ 38/2, pp. 129-30).

The jealousy of the lover of God finally directs itself, as in profane love, against the lover himself.

Bāyazīd tells Yaḥyā ibn Muᶜādh about one of his visionary heavenly journeys. He spoke with God, and God promised to bestow on him whatever he requested of Him. But he refused everything because nothing seemed desirable to him. Yaḥyā relates: "I said: 'Why didn't you ask Him for knowledge of Himself (*al-maᶜrifata bih*) since He said: "Ask Me for what you wish!"?' He then shouted at me: 'Be silent! I felt jealousy toward myself regarding Him.'" (*Qūt* 2/70$_{23\text{-}26}$; *Nahrung* 2/566/32.813).

They asked one of the Ṣūfīs: "Would you like to see Him?" He answered: "No." They asked: "Why not?" He said: "To me that beauty is too sublime that someone like me should see it." (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 115, *Bāb al-ghayra*; *Sendschreiben* 354/37.5; Ibn al-Dabbāgh 26a).

ᶜAṭṭār relates:

One of the great men asks God to make all people except him blind on the day of Resurrection so that he alone sees God's beauty. After some time his jealousy leaves him no peace and he asks God to make him blind as well because he begrudges himself sight of the divine beauty. (MN 37/6).

This surely refers to Shiblī.

Shiblī says in his prayer to God: "Let me be resurrected blind, for You're too lofty and sublime that my eye should see You!"

Wa-ān chi Shiblī guft dar munājāt-i khwadh: Allāhumma'ḥshirnī aᶜmā fa-innaka aᶜlā wa-aᶜẓamu ᶜindī min an tarāka ᶜaynī. (Unfortunately the reference for this passage now escapes me).

The same Shiblī says: "True love consists of your being too jealous regarding the Beloved to let someone like yourself love Him." (Ibn al-Dabbāgh 26a).

Ḥaqīqatu'l-maḥabbati an taghāra ᶜalā'l-maḥbūbi an yuḥibbahū mithluk.

11

Sorrow is inextricably bound up with love. Both belong together so necessarily that God Himself points out to the lovers of God in pre-existence who have decided on love of God instead of love of the world or Paradise the torments which they may expect because of this decision (above pp. 523 f.), nor can He offer any prospect of consolation to Shuᶜayb who has wept himself blind (above p. 261).

This sorrow is first of all internal sorrow that arises from unquenched yearning, the pain of being separated. It is the grief which rains down from seventy clouds on the heart of someone who is sad because of God (above pp. 260 f.). This grief of a heart which cannot endure without God is part of religious pain, about which ᶜAṭṭār so often speaks (above pp. 259-62).

However, external torment also awaits the lover of God.

It is transmitted that a man said to the Prophet: "I love you!" The Prophet replied: "Be ready for poverty!" (*Qūt* 2/50 bot.; *Nahrung* 2/450/32.663).

When Ḥallāj's hands are chopped off, he wipes his face and arms with bood and says: "Whoever has known the secret of love must perform the ablutions for prayer with his blood." (IN 6/5, p. 107; TA $2/144_{1\text{-}3}$).

In another passage the same gesture is interpreted differently, in a heroic manner:

Ḥallāj wipes his face, which has become pale through his loss of blood, so that those standing around don't think he's pale out of fear and so that in their eyes he appears "red-faced" (*surkhrū* = honored or content). (MṬ 25/4, pp. 88-89; TA $2/143_{22\text{-}25}$; Massignon, *Passion* 453).

Cf. the execution of Bābak. Gholam Sadighi, *Les Mouvements Religieux Iraniens au IIe et au IIIe siècle de l'hégire*, Paris 1938, p. 275.

When Junayd preaches in Baghdad, the severed head of his son is thrown into the gathered assembly. He says: "In the cooking pot I placed on the fire this evening concerning divine secrets, this is the least herb which it was necessary to add." (This is the least sacrifice which must be made for the love of God I've preached about). (MṬ 25/5, p. 89).

We have seen above (pp. 238 ff.) what conceptual motifs Islamic piety has developed for the interpretation of sorrow. To the mysticism of love belongs the idea that God torments the one He loves, that torment is actually a sign of God's love. (Cf. p. 245). Even more extreme than the saying quoted there (under 16) is the statement of one religious scholar: "If you see that you love God and that He afflicts you with torment, then know He wants to enter into a friendly relationship with you (*yurīdu an yuṣāfiyak*)." (*Qūt* $2/53_{13}$; *Nahrung* 2/458/32.675). The idea also occurs that by imposing suffering God wishes to test whether the love of His worshipper is sincere "so that not every low-minded person claims to love Him and then runs away if he encounters torment". (Sumnūn, TA $2/85_{12\text{-}14}$).

Cf. the story about Shiblī in the madhouse (above p. 404) and the one about the boy who tests the Ṣūfī with regard to his love (above pp. 405).

In ᶜAṭṭār's epics this behavior appears more as a regular practice of God which one has to accept and which is based on the nature of the love relationship itself.

Abū Saᶜīd b. Abī'l-Khayr, as a young man, visits the strange holy man Luqmān al-Sarakhsī. The latter is holding a stone in one hand and in the other a piece of touchwood (which one places on wounds). When in amazement he asks him what this is meant to signify, Luqmān replies: "In order to instruct you I'll knock a hole in your head with the stone and then place the touchwood on it as a pain reliever. This is the remedy for your pain. One moment you're struck and wounded, and the next you're allotted relief by means of a plaster. As long as you're not wounded by His blows, you have no hope of finding peace." (MN 9/5).

A perfect man (mystic) said: "On the path of God there are innumerble torments. It's a strange way to behave if you hide behind a wall in fear of this. If you wish to have the drink of His kindness in your cup, you must first traverse in full the valley of His violence (severity, *qahr*). Without the one you won't obtain the other." (MN 3/3).

Love (*khillat*) is nothing but experiencing sorrow (*ᶜayn-i kāruftādhagī*). If you're the friend (*khalīl*) of God, then don't desire freedom! Your path is to fall head over heels (*zīr u zabar uftādhan*). Indeed, your welfare consists in matters steadily getting worse for you. (MN 31/6, at the end).

Amplification:

Someone asks a fool how he's doing. The fool answers: "I set out on the road in every direction (*bar har pahlūy-ē*), and at all times matters only got worse for me." (MN 31/7).

12

Everything God imposes on him, the lover of God submits to with patience, understanding, indeed even with joy (*Elixir* 168-75), and hopes that God Himself will heal the wound He has inflicted.

I make my soul (*jān*) the target for every arrow which is sped from the bow of divine providence. For each arrow I sacrifice a hundred lives (*jān*), if You remove the arrowhead with Your own hand. (MN 0, after 2. Cf. the story on p. 405 above).

The movingly wondrous fools of God still love God, even if He continues to treat them so badly.

Shiblī says: "My God, if you make the heavens into a chain for my neck and the earth into fetters for my feet, and if You cause the whole world to thirst after my blood, I still won't renounce You." (TA 2/180$_{14-16}$).

A wondrous, God-loving fool, who has neither clothing nor nourishment, and must endure much suffering, is accustomed to say: "God, I'll give you an answer all right!" When his final hour draws near, he orders that after his death they cut his heart out of his breast and with his heart's blood write on his shroud and gravestone: "This fool now answers You: since there wasn't room for You and him together in the world, he's abandoned the world and devoted himself to You completely."

Cf. also pp. 250 ff. above concerning "contentment" (*riḍā*).

13

As in the case of earthly love, there are grades associated with love of God in which the pain caused by the Beloved comes to be enjoyed, indeed in the end is no longer perceived at all. (*Elixir* 168-74; Smith, *Rābiᶜa* 89-90).

Someone asked Rābiᶜa: "When is the bondsman of God 'in agreement (with the will of God)'?" She said: "When he enjoys the torment as much as acts of kindness." (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 89, *Bāb al-riḍā*; *Sendschreiben* 277 f./24.7).

The mystics virtually outbid one another in their demands.

Dhū'l-Nūn visited one of his companions who spoke much about love of God, and found he was afflicted with indescribable torment. Dhū'l-Nūn then said: "Whoever perceives the pain of His blows doesn't love Him." The man said: "But I say whoever doesn't find pleasure in His blows doesn't love Him." Dhū'l-Nūn: "But I say: whoever displays his love of Him doesn't love Him." The man (who had neglected the duty to conceal his love) says: "I ask God for forgiveness and return to Him in remorse." (*Qūt* 2/66$_{14\text{-}16}$; *Nahrung* 2/547 f./32.790).

Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, Mālik ibn Dīnār and Shaqīq al-Balkhī visit Rābiᶜa who is ill. Ḥasan says: "No one is sincere in his claim (to love God) who doesn't bear the blows of his Lord patiently." Rābiᶜa says: "From this talk one can perceive the odor of ego-affirmation (*manī*)." Shaqīq says: "No one is sincere in his claim (to love God) who isn't thankful for the blows of his Lord." Rābiᶜa says: "Something better is still required." Mālik says: "No one is sincere in his claim who doesn't find pleasure in the blows of his Lord." Rābiᶜa says: "Something better is still required." At that the visitors say: "Then say something yourself!" She says: "No one is sincere in his claim (to love God) who doesn't forget the blows while looking at his Lord."—Nor is this strange, for the Egyptian women while looking at a creature (Joseph) didn't feel pain (when they cut their fingers instead of peeling the oranges; surah 12/31). If this happens to someone who beholds the Creator, it's nothing extraordinary. (TA 1/71-72; Smith, *Rābiᶜa* 43).

The voice of beloved God makes St George able to bear martyrdom.

Georgios suffers martyrdom when a wheel that cuts him to pieces is rolled over his body. While this is happening, he hears God's voice say: "Whoever claims to love Us will not drink pure wine without bitter dregs. The friends of God must allow the wheel to pass over them." They ask Georgios: "Do you still have some wish on earth?" He says: "That they make the wheel of torture cut me to pieces again so I hear the Friend address me one more time!" (IN 20/6, pp. 322-23).

Regarding his martyrdom cf. *The Fākhir* of al-Mufaḍḍal ibn Salama, ed. C. A. Storey, Leyden 1915, pp. 257-59.

Anaesthesia is also brought about through meditating on God, for example during prayer, and through listening to the Koran and similar activities.

They ask Rābiᶜa what she has to say about the Companions of the Prophet. She answers she's so occupied with God that she can't concern herself with human beings, not even the Prophet's Companions. Moreover, she relates how one time, while prostrating herself in prayer, she stuck a thorn in her eye without noticing it, causing the eye to bleed. (MṬ 0/9, p. 22. The same experience in TA $1/63_{12-14}$; there the thorn is replaced by a piece of reed from the prayer mat; Smith, *Rābiᶜa* 23[7]).

ᶜAlī notices nothing of the operation when during the prayers they cut out an arrowhead which had lodged itself in his foot (or his cheek) at the battle by the mountain Uḥud. (*Ḥadīqa* 140; Jāmī, *Tuḥfat al-aḥrār* 47).—Abū Ḥafṣ al-Ḥaddād and Fatḥ al-Mawṣilī take hold of glowing iron without feeling any effect from it. (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 37, *al-Ghayba wa'l-ḥuḍūr*, 97-98, *Bāb al-ṣidq*; *Sendschreiben* 124/2.9, 303/29.8).—Abū'l-Khayr Aqṭaᶜ has his diseased hand amputated during the prayers, and he does not preceive anything of it. (TA $2/100_{19-20}$).

A similar story about ᶜUrwa ibn al-Zubayr occurs in *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 1/114.

14

Just as love helps the lover of God overcome sorrow, love also helps him overcome the terrors of death.

According to a saying of God (*ḥadīth qudsī*), God is in the habit of killing those who love Him but He pays the wergild Himself and He Himself is the wergild. "Whoever loves Me, I

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7 There incorrectly translated. Cf. the variants on p. 27 of Nicholson's edition.

kill, and whomever I have killed, I am the wergild for him." (Nicholson's *Commentary* to *Mathnawī* 4/2963). Another version: "Whoever falls in love with Me, I fall in love with him, and whomever I fall in love with, I kill, and his wergild is incumbent on Me and I am the wergild for him whose wergild is incumbent on Me." (Massignon, *Recueil* 78, ftn. 1; *Akhlāq-i jalālī*, Calcutta 1225/1810, p. 167).

On the day they hung Ḥusayn ibn Manṣūr (al-Ḥallāj) on the gallows, Shiblī said: "I had a prayer-conversation in the night with God and said: 'My God, how long will You go on killing the lovers?' He replied: 'As long as I dispose over the wergild.' I asked: 'My God, what is Your wergild?' He replied: 'Coming to Me and My beauty are the wergild of the lovers.'"

...ilā kam taqtulu'l-muḥibbīn? Qāla: Ilā an ajida'l-diyata, faqultu: Yā rabbi wa-mā diyatuk? Qāla: Liqā'ī wa-jamālī diyatu'l-muḥibbīn. (ᶜAyn al-Quḍat, *Tamhīd* 9, fol. 112b-113a; a somewhat different version in Massignon, *Recueil* 78).—Distantly related ideas occur in *Qūt* 2/51 (*Nahrung* 2/451/32.665) with reference to the combat which God demands on the battlefield.

In ᶜAṭṭār the story is transferred to Dhū'l-Nūn in a variant of the narrative about the seventy wearers of ascetic robes (above pp. 542 f.):

Dhū'l-Nūn while on a journey in the desert sees forty wearers of ascetic robes lying on the ground dead. He says to God: "What is this, oh God? How many men will You still kill?" The divine voice answers: "We alone know this. We kill and We pay the wergild." Dhū'l-Nūn says: "How long will You go on killing so deplorably?" God answers: "As long as I have the wergild in my treasure-chamber. I kill the lover of God but if he's utterly destroyed and has disappeared, then I show him My face and bestow on him the honorary robe of My beauty."—He will then be a shadow which has disappeared beneath the sun of God's face. (MṬ 29/3, pp. 100-01).

Thus the story ends with the *fanā'*-motif, see Chpt. 28 below. This by itself is found in Faẓl Allāh Ḥurūfī's explanation of the *ḥadīth*: *dhāt-i Ḥaqq baᶜd az ān bāqī mānad ki maᶜshūq ast wa ᶜāshiq az miyān bar khāst wa fānī shud. Īn ast maᶜnā-i Anā diyatuhū... wa-anā diyatuhū yaᶜnī qā'immaqām-i ᶜāshiqān-i khwad shawam. Maḥabbatnāma*, Ms. Paris, Blochet no. 162, fol. 27b.

In a variant on the story which occurs in Yāfiᶜī about the lover of God who flees from Moses, the wergild appears to be of a more material nature (above p. 538):

When Moses comes back from Sinai where he presented this man's request for love of God, he finds that the man is no longer there. God informs Moses: "He has fled from you. For whoever loves Me is not concerned with anyone else. If you wish to see him, then go into that forest!" When Moses goes there, he sees

a lion devouring the man. God explains to the astonished prophet: "This is how I treat My friends in the world of temporality. But see here in the world of eternity!" When Moses looks, he sees a domed building made of ruby, three times as big as the whole world. "This is for him", says God, "and I am also for him." (*Mukhtaṣar Rawḍ al-rayāḥīn*, in the margin of Thaʿlabī, *ʿArāʾis* 261-62).

The idea that God first kills and then confers a present is illustrated with a different image in a Ḥallāj story:

Ḥallāj is seen after his execution by a pious man in a dream, without a head and with a drinking-cup in his hand. Asked what this means, he answers: "The King only gives the drinking-cup once He has taken one's head." (AN 6/2).

The story is probably an elaboration of the verses in *Akhbār al-Ḥallāj* no. 16. For ʿAṭṭār in this passage it symbolizes becoming extinct which is a pre-condition for knowledge of "the secret". (See pp. 603 ff. below).

The genuine lover does not shrink from sacrificing his life for the beloved. Whoever clings to life is not a real lover.

The parrot with his green feathers has only one desire: to drink from the water of life of Khiḍr who is dressed in green. He is reprimanded by the hoopoe. The nature of the true lover of God is not to strive after eternal life but to sacrifice his life. (MṬ 4/0 p. 30; above p. 11).

A pious fool is asked by Khiḍr whether he would like to become his companion. He answers: "No! You've drunk of the water of life in order to be able to live eternally. But I want to sacrifice my life because I can't endure without the Beloved." (MṬ 4/1, p. 31. The man of piety is Ibrāhīm al-Khawwāṣ, cf. TA 2/148).

An aetiology typical of ʿAṭṭār. In the original Arabic narration Ibrāhīm al-Khawwāṣ rejects Khiḍr's offer because he fears he would be depending on Khiḍr rather than on God, and thus be violating his "trust in God" (*tawakkul*). Qushayrī, *Risāla* 77, *Bāb al-tawakkul*; *Sendschreiben* 241/19.10; *Iḥyāʾ* 4/231, *Bāb al-tawakkul*; *Stufen* 574/E.134.

In the time of the Prophet sacrificing one's life meant death on the battlefield in holy war.

ʿAlī is sad every time one of the Companions of the Prophet falls in battle, because he would like to be killed himself. (MṬ 0/6, p. 21).

That Indian ascetics burned themselves alive came to the knowledge of Muslims quite early on. (Nawbakhtī, *Firaq al-shīʿa*, page kd). It is interpreted by our mystics of love in accordance with their own views.

When the Indians attain perfection in love of the idol, in addition to this they fashion something like a bowl, pour naphtha in it and smear it over their body, take hold of a firebrand and wish to die before the blind eye of the idol. The priests, with sollemn ceremony, then remove the veil from before the idol's beauty. Those others direct their gaze to that beauty, light the naphtha and die

while they secretly play at love with the fantasy image of the idol. As if they were saying:

"Oh soul broken in the midst of fire! Come in and drink the wine of love! When you come in with the image of the Beloved in your soul, then you dance happily like the moth (around the flame)!"

Hinduwān chun dar ᶜishq-i but kamāl-ē yāband, bar sar-i ān hama chun kās-ē bi-sāzand wa rōghan-i naft dar ō andāzand u andām badhān charb kunand wa ātash dar dast bi-gīrand u khwāhand ki dar muqābala-i dīdha-i bē-bīnā-i but bi-mīrand. Shamanān ba-taᶜẓīm parda az pēsh-i jamāl-i but bar dārand. Ēshān naẓar bar ān jamāl gumārand u ātash dar naft andāzand u bā khayāl-i ō ᶜishqhā bāzand u mē-gōyand ba-zabān-i ḥāl:

Ay jān-i shikasta dar miyān-i ātash, *sarmast dar āy u bādha-i ᶜishq mē-kash.*
Chun mast dar āyī bā khayāl-i maᶜshūq, *parwāna-ṣifat raqṣ hamē kun khwash khwash.*

ᶜAyn al-Quḍāt, *Lawāʾiḥ* (cf. *Der Islam* 21/1933/94), fol. 63a-b.

ᶜAṭṭār recounts the matter rather differently and with mounting dramatization:

Abū'l-Qāsim Hamadhānī comes to a temple of an idol. There he sees a cauldron with boiling oil on a fire. After some time an idolater (*tarsā-ē*) comes and prostrates himself before the idol. They ask him: "What are you to the God?" He says: "A slave." He's then ordered to present his gift. After he's done this, he goes away. Then another comes, says and does the same thing, until ten people have presented their gift. Finally, a completely emaciated man comes who's more like a corpse. They ask him: "What are you?" He says: "I'm a piece of skin (and bone). I love my Master." Then the vessel with the boiling oil is poured over his head, which causes his skull to separate from his torso and fall on the ground. The rest of his body is likewise burned, and from the ashes a medicine against all illnesses is prepared.—Abū'l-Qāsim takes to heart what he's seen: "If even an idolater sacrifices himself like this for a false love, then you must sacrifice your life all the more for the true Beloved." (IN 6/9, pp. 111-12).

Ibn al-Khafīf is meant to have witnessed how in "Rūm" a monk was burned, and the blind and sick were cured with his ashes. (TA $2/127_{14\text{-}21}$).

ᶜAṭṭār has a certain preference for stories like this in which infidels, sinners and members of despised professions appear as a standard and a model for the believers. Many of these are at the same time fool figures who dare to rebuke God and even to impart lessons to Him (see the last of these fool stories above p. 547).

A thief who has been caught is led to the gallows. He asks for time to make a final prayer and says to God: "See what the sword of Your violence (*qahr*) has inflicted on me here on the gallows! You seize me like this, unexpectedly, with Your cruel violence, whereas I sacrifice my life out of love for You. I'm like this and You're like that. Now I'm dying, and You know the rest!"—This is how you

too must die when you die—in happiness and without hesitation. (IN 14/19, p. 236).

However, death for the lover of God is still more than the loving sacrifice of one's life. It is the bridge which leads the lover to the Beloved. (*Ḥilya* in Smith, *Rābi^c^a* 41).

When the angel of death demands Abraham's life, Abraham says: "Have you ever seen a friend who kills a friend?" Then God has the angel tell him: "Have you ever seen a friend who struggled against coming to a friend?" Abraham says: "Now take my soul!" (*Ḥilya* 10/9; *Iḥyā*ʾ 4/253, *al-Maḥabba wa'l-shawq*; *Stufen* 633/F.6; *Elixir* 140).

In ^c^Aṭṭār's version of the story everything appears one degree more intensified. God does not invite Abraham to come to Him but demands that he give up his life, and Abraham refuses because he wants nothing to do with the mediator, the angel of death:

When Abraham's final hour had come, he didn't immediately give his soul to the angel of death ^c^Azrāʾīl. He said: "Go back and say to the King: 'Don't demand the life of Your friend!'" God answered: "If you're really a friend, then sacrifice your life for the Friend. Who refuses to sacrifice his life for the friend?" One of those present said to Abraham: "Why don't you give your life to the angel of death? Lovers give up their life. Why are you being stingy with it?" Abraham answered: "How am I meant to give up my life when ^c^Azrāʾīl is mixed up in the matter? Didn't I reject Gabriel's intervention when they cast me into the fire? (Above pp. 535 f.). How could I give ^c^Azrāʾīl my life? If I hear the command to die from God Himself, I will not hesitate to surrender my life." (MṬ 39/6, p. 137.—The same refusal to consign his soul to the angel of death with the same justification in the case of Shiblī, TA 2/1662-65).

Likewise, death has also lost its horrors for the mystics of love. Indeed, fear of death is replaced by a longing for death and joy at the time of dying.

Regarding this subject see *Qūt* 2/51; *Nahrung* 2/451/32.665.

A lover of God is dying while laughing to himself. When they ask him how he can laugh at this difficult moment, he answers: "When the beautiful raise the curtain, lovers die like this before them!" (*Ḥadīqa* 327).

In ^c^Aṭṭār the story is more elaborately worked out and slanted differently.

A lover lies dying and laughs. Someone asks him: "What makes you laugh at a moment when you should be weeping?" The moribund man answers: "I'm a lover who's together with the Beloved. I'm like the early morning which laughs because it bears the sun within itself. I have the sun in my breast but like the sky I now place it on the plate (the sun advances above the horizon). The day has ar-

rived for me, and night has gone. My Beloved has come, and the cry of lamentation: 'Oh God!' is over." (MN 10/2).

Thus the lovers of God thirst after their own blood (MṬ p. 88, verse 2260), i.e. they yearn to be killed by God, a motif which we have already encountered in earthly love (above pp. 409 ff.).

Later this will be expressed very clearly by Faẓl Allāh Ḥurūfī: his most perfect level consists in his wishing to be killed by the beloved, even though he knows himself to be identical with the beloved.

Kamāl-i martaba-i ō bar ān ast ki mē-khwāhad ki kushta-i maᶜshūq-i khwad shawad agarchi khwad-rā ᶜayn-i maᶜshūq mē-dānad. (*Maḥabbatnāma* fol. 25a).

15

In ᶜAṭṭār the mythical model for the lover of God is—rather oddly—Satan (Iblīs = διάβολος), the fallen angel cursed by God.

To begin with at least, he appears in ᶜAṭṭār in his usual role as enemy and seducer of man, whom the believer should not follow lest the same thing happen to him as happens to the man who walks seven steps behind the Antichrist (Dajjāl) when the latter appears to him, and then cannot get free of him (IN p. $91_{5\text{-}7}$). The believer must get free of him in time (IN pp. 88, 91) and harken to the call of God, just like the chicks that were hatched by a foreign bird—when they hear their true mother's voice, they abandon the false mother and fly toward the true mother. (IN p. $208_{1\text{-}2}$; see above pp. 275, 526). He is the lord of this world which has been given to him as his fief, and in particular he is the lord of marketplaces (above pp. 52-53). The pious complain about his snares which they themselves are responsible for because of their own behaviour (p. 53). The king in the *Ilāhīnāma* reproaches the second prince who wishes to possess the art of magic, because this desire is satanic. Satan has set up his throne within him and seduced him into striving after magic powers (IN 5/0, pp. 87-88; above p. 5).

Satan sits within the blood of human beings.

Inna'l-Shayṭāna yajrī mini'bni Ādama majrā'l-dam. Wensinck, *Concordance* 1/342a; *Mathnawī* 2/638 ff.

How this came about we learn from a story about Adam and Eve.

Ḥakīm Tirmidhī relates:

After Adam and Eve were driven out of Paradise and had made atonement and come back together again, the devil appears to Eve one day while Adam has

gone off to attend to his affairs. He's brought with him his child called Khannās and asks Eve to look after him. He has to do something and can't look after the child. Eve agrees to do it. When Adam returns home and sees the devil's child, he becomes angry and says to Eve: "Why did you accept this child? Do you want to be led astray by Satan a second time?" He takes the devil's child, cuts it into pieces and scatters the pieces over the field. When he's gone again, the devil comes back and calls his child by name. The pieces then come to him and he fits them all together again. After much beseeching, he succeeds in getting Eve to watch over the child again. When Adam comes home and sees the devil's child a second time, he scolds Eve, burns the child and scatters its ashes to the winds. Adam has scarcely left when the devil returns, calls the child by name, and the particles of ash join together again, and the child stands there once more as it had been. For the third time Satan succeeds in convincing Eve to accept the child. When Adam comes home and finds the devil's child for the third time, he feels there's nothing left to do but butcher the child, roast it and eat the devil's roast together with Eve. When he goes away, the devil comes to Eve again and calls his child by name. It then answers him from within Eve's body. Then the devil says: "I've succeeded. This is what I wanted." Ever since, man has had the devil in his body. (IN 8/1, pp. 127-28; TA 2/96-97.—Chauvin 8/164; cf. Tirmidhī, *Nawādir al-uṣūl* 292).

A human being has in his heart a devil's tree (*dirakht-i dēw*), in which the devils make their nest.

A man complains to Abū ᶜAlī Daqqāq about the snares of Satan which torment him so much that he wishes for death. Abū ᶜAlī says: "Cut down the tree inside your house so the devil's birds don't nest in it! If you burn the devil's nest, the devil can do you no harm." (MN 25/6).

Alongside this normal and orthodox conception there now develops among the Ṣūfīs another completely new attitude toward Satan. It begins with a reinterpretation of his refusal to prostrate himself before Adam (surah 38/71-85). According to the story which originates from Christian apocryphal writings, God orders all the angels to bow down before Adam who has just been created. Only Satan refuses on the grounds that he is better than Adam (*anā khayrun minh*) because Adam is created from earth, whereas he is created from fire. He is punished for his arrogant disobedience by means of God's curse.

On Iblīs in general cf. Wensinck under "Iblīs" in the EI, on Satan's promptings and the controversies concerning them *Qūt* 1/113-14; *Nahrung* 1/375-380/30.1-7; *Riᶜāya* 111-14; *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/84-85. A story about how Satan dissuades a man from cutting down a tree worshipped by idolaters in: *Tanbīh al-ghāfilīn* 40a, *Bāb al-amr bi'l-maᶜrūf*; Satan as a teacher of Isḥāq al-Mawṣilī: *Thamarāt al-awrāq*, Cairo 1300, p. 24.—Regarding the refusal of prostration and its sources: M. Grünbaum, *Neue Beiträge* 57, 60; H. Speyer, *Die biblischen*

Erzählungen im Qorān 54-58. A miniature which depicts the scene, in Thomas Arnold, *Painting in Islam*, Plate 34. On the views of earlier leaders of sects and Ṣūfīs regarding Satan's fall see Massignon, *Ṭawāsīn* 170-72. There is disagreement as to whether Satan's sin consisted of disobedience or arrogance. See Ashʿarī, *Maqālāt* 133_7, 137_4; and William Thomson "The character of Early Islamic Sects" in: *Ignace Goldziher Memorial Volume*, Part I, Budapest 1948, p. 104. From the mystical point of view to say "I" is already a mistake. (See pp. 595 ff. below). A different interpretation of the story in *al-Risāla al-jāmiʿa* al-mansūba li'l-ḥakīm al-Majrīṭī, ed. Jamīl Ṣalībā 1/6-7. Among the Mandaeans: *Ginza. Der Schatz oder das Grosse Buch der Mandäer*, translated and explained by Mark Lidzbarski, Göttingen/Leipzig 1924, pp. 16 and 34.—On the prostration of the angels before Adam see Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums* 335-36, 352.

Now this story contains a motif which must have particularly enticed the mystics to formulate a reinterpretation. The demand to bow down in worship before a created being, someone other than God, is in fact a direct slap in the face to the most sacred command of mystical monotheism. Strictly speaking, the refusal to prostrate oneself before a being other than God must have seemed to them an act of genuine monotheistic adoration of God. In this way Satan now becomes, so to speak, more monotheistic than God Himself, unless God wants something other than what He ordered. In fact, the latter is what comes to be taught (e.g. *Asrār al-tawḥīd* $211_{9\text{-}10}$; O'Kane, *Secrets* 383).

This distinction between the command (*amr*) and the will (*irāda*) of God, or between two different kinds of will (*irāda* and *mashīʾa*) is frequently discussed. Cf. Watt, *Free Will* 121 on the *Waṣiyya* of Abū Ḥanīfa; *Qūt* 1/127-28; *Nahrung* 1/414/30.57,58; Massignon, article "Sālimīya" in the EI; idem, *Ṭawāsīn* 145-50, *Passion* 624-25; Nicholson, *Studies* 54 and 158; Jīlī, *al-Insān al-kāmil* 1/38; Maḥmūd Firkāwī, *Sharḥ Manāzil al-sāʾirīn* 37.

Satan practices pure worship of God contrary to the explicit command of God. He becomes cursed for his disobedience to God's command which, however, was really an act of exclusive adoration as God had otherwise demanded. Nor do the millions of years of loyal worship which he had previously performed afford him any benefit. Thus his destiny is likewise a vivid example of the groundless, arbitrary judgement of God which His creatures have to put up with. In view of what we have so far learned about the attitudes of the mystics, there can be no doubt as to how Satan will respond to being cursed. He will feel that the inscrutable decision of God is very difficult (above pp. 73-74) but he will accept it obediently and willingly. As in the case of the rejected worshipper of God referred to above (pp. 297 f.), he will not take it as a reason to decrease his adoration of God in the least, in fact, as a real lover, he will go further than this and

consider his being cursed by God as a felicitous distinction because, in contrast to all the other angels, he has become the object of an expression of God's will aimed especially at him.

According to a passage in Hujwīrī, Satan in person had already presented this new justification of his disobedience to the early mystic Junayd to whom he appeared in a mosque.

Junayd asks him why he hadn't bowed down before Adam. He answers: "Oh Junayd, how can you imagine I would prostrate myself before anyone but God?" Junayd is deeply affected by the answer, but then the thought occurs to him to say to the cursed one: "You're lying! If you'd been an obedient slave, you wouldn't have acted contrary to His command and prohibition." Satan hears the voice in Junayd's heart and cries: "You've burned me!", and disappears. (Hujwīrī 163; Translation 129-30; TA $2/14_{14\text{-}22}$; Massignon, *Essai* 278).

If the attribution to Wahb b. Munabbih (d. 114/732) of the conversation between Satan and Moses quoted below (p. 557) is correct, then the reinterpretation of Satan's disobedience is even earlier.

Otherwise Ḥallāj is considered to be the first tangible literary representative of the new conception of Satan. A text of Ḥallāj which has been preserved in the Koran commentary of Rōzbihān Baqlī goes as follows:

When Satan was told: "Bow down before Adam!", he addressed God and said: "Has the honor of bowing down (before You) been withdrawn from my interior? Do You no longer wish for prostration so that I should bow down before him? If You've ordered me to do this, You've also forbidden it (earlier)!" God said to him: "I will torment (punish) you with eternal torment." Satan: "Will You not look at me while You torment me?" God: "Yes, I will." Satan: "Then Your gaze directed at me will cause me to endure the sight of the torment (the punishment). Do what You wish with me!" God: "I will make you into the pelted one." Satan: "Isn't it so that nothing else but You has ever penetrated my interior? Do what You wish with me!" (Massignon, *Ṭawāsīn* p. XI-XII; *Essai* 77; *Passion* 866-67).

The reasoning regarding Satan's refusal is then taken still further in *Ṭawāsīn* chpts. VI-VII, pp. 41-57.

Satan ends up in confusion due to command and counter-command. Jīlī expresses this somewhat more clearly:

Satan had served God so many thousands of years before the latter created creatures, and God had said to him: "Oh ᶜAzāzīl, worship no one other than Me!" But when God created Adam and ordered the angels to bow down before him, Iblīs was thrown into confusion (*iltabasa ᶜalayh*). He thought that if he bowed down before Adam, he would be worshipping someone other than God—he didn't realize that whoever bows down at the command of God thereby bows down before God—and that's why he refused. And he was named Iblīs because of this illusion

(*talbīs*) he fell into. His earlier name was ᶜAzāzīl and his surname (*kunya*) Abū Murra. (Jīlī, *al-Insān al-kāmil* $2/39_{20-23}$, *Bāb* 59; Nicholson, *Studies* 119-20).

Even outside mystical circles there are occasionally indications that Satan's refusal to bow down before a creature is approved by some. The Shāfiᶜite religious scholar and poet Muḥammad b. ᶜAlī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Wāsiṭī (d. 468/1075) says in a poem: "Nothing pleases me (*lastu arḍā*) in the actions of Satan except that he refrained from bowing down before a created being." (Yāqūt, *Irshād*, Cairo, 18/258; Margoliouth 7/44).

This redeeming of Satan's honor was then taken up very enthusiastically by the mystic preacher Aḥmad Ghazzālī.

Ibn al-Jawzī, his opponent, says of him: "He passionately took the side of Satan and excused him. He went so far as to say one day: 'The poor wretch (*miskīn*) didn't know that the claws of providence draw blood when they scratch, and that the bows of predetermination kill quickly when they shoot!'" Then he recited the verse (of Kuthayyir ᶜAzza 1/50 v. 23): "I and Laylā[8] ascended in love and when we had reached the end together, I stood firm and she slipped." (*Muntaẓam* 9/261; Massignon, *Recueil* 98, following Abū Ḥayyān).

In these sentences which Ibn al-Jawzī already objects to, Satan is represented as simply a victim of God's arbitrariness. But Ḥallāj as well as Aḥmad go further by making Satan appear as the true monotheist.

The above-quoted conversation between God and Satan is not transmitted by Aḥmad Ghazzālī and ᶜAṭṭār but they do present another conversation between Moses and Satan which, if the information of Ṣaffūrī is correct, in its main features goes all the way back to Wahb b. al-Munabbih (d. 114/732) whose *Isrāʾīliyyāt* introduced numerous legends from the Bible and the Haggada into Arabic literature.

Wahb said: "I read in one of the books of God that Moses said to Iblīs: 'Why didn't you bow down before Adam?' He replied: 'I didn't want to be like you. After all, I claimed to love Him. To you He said: "Look at that mountain (surah 7/143)!" And you looked at it. If you had closed your eyes, then you would have seen Him.'" (Ṣaffūrī $1/45_{25-28}$).

In Ḥallāj's *Ṭawāsīn* and Maqdisī's *Taflīs Iblīs* (Cairo 1301, p. 25), which follows the latter with some changes, the story is more extensively elaborated, and the introduction of elements from the mysticism of love is even more clear.

a) Moses and Satan met on the pass of Mt Sinai. Moses said to Satan: "Oh Satan, what hindered you from bowing down?" Satan: "I was hindered by my claim only to have one object of worship. If I had bowed down before him (Adam), then I would be like you. For you were called to only once: 'Look at the moun-

8 In the *Dīwān* instead of *wa-Laylā*: *salaknā*.

tain!', and you looked at it. But I was called to a thousand times: 'Bow down!', and I didn't bow down because of the claim I'd made."

b) Moses: "You left the command without carrying it out." Satan: "This was a form of testing, not a command." (*Taflīs*: Satan: "He didn't give me a command." Moses: "Didn't He say: 'Bow down before him!'? Satan: "This was a command by way of a test, not a command of the will. If it had been a command of the will, then I would have bowed down.")

c) "But He changed your form." Satan: "This is only an illusion. There's no relying on the state of the moment. It changes (*ḥāl-yaḥūl*). But knowledge of God is intact as it was and has not changed."

d) Moses: "Do you recollect Him (by mentioning His name)?" Satan: "Oh Moses, there's no need still to think about recollection. I'm mentioned, if He's mentioned (whenever the Koranic verses 38/78-82 are read). If I mention Him, He mentions me and vice versa. Can two parties who mention one another reciprocally be other than together?"

e) "My service is now purer and my state of mind happier and my recollection of God clearer. Indeed, earlier I served Him for my sake but now I serve Him for His sake." (*Ṭawāsīn* 45-47; Maqdisī, *Taflīs Iblīs*, Ms. in my possession fol. 7b-8a).

Aḥmad Ghazzālī tells the same story with slightly different wording, rather more clearly and with a few additions.

a) Moses met with Satan on Sinai and said to him: "Oh Satan, why didn't you bow down before Adam?" Satan: "No! I will never bow down before a human being, oh Moses! You made the claim to be a monotheist, but I *am* a monotheist and have never turned to another. You, however, said: 'Let me see You!', and then you looked at the mountain. Thus I'm more upright in monotheism than you. He said: 'Bow down before the other!' I didn't bow down, but you turned toward the mountain."—At this point Aḥmad Ghazzālī inserted: "Whoever doesn't learn monotheism from Satan is a heretic (*zindīq*)."

b) Moses: "Your external form has been transformed from the angelic to the demonic."[9] Satan: "This is only a state of the moment which is transitory and will change again. Oh Moses, the greater His love becomes for someone other than me, the greater my love becomes for Him."

c) Moses: "Do you still recollect Him (do you still mention His name)?"—Satan: "I'm mentioned along with His mention (when He says surah 38/78): 'And upon you is My curse (*waʾinna ʿalayka laʿnatī*).' Does He not use the pronoun of the second and the first person together?"[10]

d) And he (Aḥmad Ghazzālī) said: "When Satan was repudiated, neither his service, nor his love, nor his recollection of God was thereby decreased." (Ibn

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9 Read: *min al-malʾakiyya ilā'l-shayṭana.*

10 Read: *kāfan wa-yāʾan.*

al-Jawzī, *Quṣṣāṣ* fol. 77a. Massignon, *Recuil* 96. Ibn al-Jawzī claims to have read this legend himself in a transcription of Aḥmad Ghazzālī's sermons which bore the latter's signature.)

In his *Sawāniḥ* (p. 37) Aḥmad Ghazzālī cites a quatrain whose third line goes: "And know that that black light is higher than the unpointed (word)!" As we learn from ᶜAyn al-Quḍāt's *Zubda* (*Tamhīd* 6, fol. 58b and *Tamhīd* 9, fol. 120a-b) the poet's name is Abū'l-Ḥusayn Bustī. The black light is the light of Satan, and the unpointed word is the profession of faith *Lā ilāha illā'llāh*, in which no diacritical marks occur. The hemistich wants to say that Satan is a monotheist in a higher sense than the ordinary believer with the profession of faith on his lips.

ᶜAṭṭār on three occasions devotes a *maqāla* to Satan. In the *Manṭiq al-ṭayr* (*Maq*. 22) one of the birds complains that he is unable to free himself from Satan's seduction. (Above p. 14). The hoopoe tells him that his carnal soul and his egotistical desires are to blame for this, and he relates stories which we have already become acquainted with. In the *Muṣībatnāma* the traveller also visits Satan (above p. 27). In his eulogy he describes him as the being who has suffered the most sorrow: because of one act of disobedience he became cursed after 70,000 years of intimate closeness to God. He is now the ruler of the entire world. Perhaps he knows a hidden path to the treasure, which he could show him. After describing his own destiny, Satan warns him not to expose himself to God's curse which he would not be able to endure. The *pīr* to whom the traveller returns explains to him that Satan embodies the world of envy and egotism.

More informative is *Maqāla* 8 of the *Ilāhīnāma*. The second prince has expressed the wish to learn magic (above pp. 5-6). The father replies that this wish is a prompting of Satan's. When the prince asks for further clarification (IN p. 126), his father explains for him Satan's arts of seduction and begins by relating the story we have already become familiar with (above pp. 553-54) about the devil's child which was eaten by Adam and Eve. In connection with this ᶜAṭṭār presents his Satanology. Already in the second story he drops the subject of Satan's arts of seduction and from then on describes the fallen angel in the light of Ḥallāj's and Aḥmad Ghazzālī's conception. Moreover, besides these main passages he frequently comes to speak of Satan. But it would be a futile undertaking to wish to restrict the poet to a fixed, consistent Satanology. In Satan's case, as with other subjects, divergent conceptions occur together so that one obtains a colorful picture

of all the motifs which had developed in circles of mysticism in ᶜAṭṭār's time.

The reason for Satan's refusal is pride. But such pride is mystically interpreted as mystical sin *per se*, the affirmation of the ego, wanting to see oneself and not to see God. This is the reason for his punishment. Alongside this explanation for the punishment, however, stands the other explanation that God's judgement is inscrutable, that God determines the destiny of His creatures arbitrarily. Here the concept of divine predestination sometimes imperceptibly passes over into the concept of destiny. Both explanations are found alongside one another in a passage of the *Jawhar al-dhāt* which we will take the opportunity to quote here.

Satan visits the Prophet Muḥammad and asks him how it is that God has cursed him because of a single disrespectful act, whereas the Prophet promises God's forgiveness to his community which commits numerous sins. The Prophet tells him to wait until Gabriel comes. Gabriel comes and says that the real reason for his being cursed is as follows: when Satan was still an angel, he once mounted the divine pulpit and saw the hosts of angels below himself. The thought then occurred to him: "If only God didn't exist and I were alone in both worlds!" This pride is immediately interpreted mystically: "Whoever looks at himself and something other than God here experiences torment of body and soul... Don't see yourself, see God in everything as long as you can. For this is eternal life!" Satan then weeps profusely and says: "You're right, but this was only a pretext for God. The real reason", so he says, "was the inscrutable will of God, the absolute Ruler. Such was my story. God used this pretext against me. I know His secret and want to tell it: 'God does what He wishes (surah 3/40). He knows what He does because He is the Almighty.' The pen has written it thus." (*Jawhar al-dhāt*, Ayasofya 1757, 410b-412a).—A little further below, when a questioner wants to know how it was possible that Satan, despite his better judgement, would commit this kind of polytheism (*shirk*) (by maintaining his ego), ᶜAṭṭār replies that Satan did in fact know what was right but he wanted to be everything instead of letting God be everything. (*Jawhar al-dhāt* 413b).—The same idea is echoed in a verse of the *Ilāhīnāma*: "You're occupied with your own Being, you're worse than Satan in beholding yourself." (IN p. 291_7; cf. above pp. 92 f.).

Rather unusual is the explanation of Satan's refusal to bow down which, according to ᶜAṭṭār, ᶜAmr b. ᶜUthmān al-Makkī (d. 291/903-04) put forward.

God orders the angels to bow down so that they don't see how God breathes the secret, the vital soul, into Adam. Satan doesn't prostrate himself and secretly watches the event, whereby he attains knowledge of "the secrets" of man. God then wants to kill him, the way a king has people killed who've given help

in burying a treasure and know the treasure's location. Satan, upon request, receives a reprieve but is cursed. (MṬ 38/1, pp. 128-29; in great detail TA 2/37-38).

In ᶜAṭṭār, however, Ḥallāj's explanation of the refusal also clearly occupies a central position. ᶜAṭṭār has taken over almost verbatim the passage *Ṭawāsīn* VI, 9 (p. 43):

They told him: "Bow down!" He said: "(Before) no one else!" Then they recited for him (surah 23/108): "Stay far (from Me in Hell)!" He then said: "It doesn't matter! (IN p. 133_2). Even if I cause myself to be cursed, how should I ever lower my head before anyone else but Him? (IN p. 133_3). To be cursed by You is a hundred times preferable than to turn my head away from You and towards another." (IN p. 134_2).

Thus Satan proves to be a sincere loyal servant and lover, the same way Ayāz, whom Maḥmūd on his deathbed asks not to serve any lord after him, answers his master: "Whoever has bagged game like Maḥmūd can't be so base-minded as to serve another." (IN 8/6, p. 133, the application to Satan p. 134).—He does not behave like the Ṣūfī who declares himself to be in love with a princess he meets but then turns around when she tells him that behind her her sister is coming who is much more beautiful than she is. (Above p. 389). Satan in fact relates this story to a man who asks him the reason for his refusal to bow down before Adam. (MN 26/1).

That he was repudiated by God for no reason (*bē-ᶜillat-ē*), and that God willed his disobedience, is also affirmed by Satan in ᶜAṭṭār's version of the conversation with Moses.

Moses asks him: "Why didn't you bow down before Adam?" The cursed one answers: "Oh you whom God has accepted, I've been repudiated by divine power without a reason. If I'd been able to perform this prostration, then I would have become an interlocutor with God (*kalīm Allāh*) like you. But since God didn't will it, the prostration didn't take place." (IN 8/13, p. 138, 3b-6).

Satan experiences the problem of theodicy in its full cruelty.

One of the men of piety finds Satan lying on the ground by a stone and weeping. Black blood is flowing from his eyes. Then he says: "This matter (my destiny) doesn't come from that beautiful moon-like face (God) but because the color of my robe is black (because of my evil destiny). They don't want me to do acts of obedience, and yet they lumber me with the sin!" (IN 8/2, p. 129; above p. 73).

In ᶜUmar b. al-Ḥasan al-Nīsābūrī's *Rawnaq al-majālis* the following strange story is attributed to Dhū'l-Nūn. The latter relates:

When I was taking a walk one time, I beheld coming forth from between two mountains a stream whose water was different from ordinary water. I walked up-

stream and reached a cave. There I saw Satan sitting on a rock and weeping. I said to him: "What's the meaning of this weeping?" He answered: "Oh Dhū'l-Nūn, how should I not weep? No one has more of a reason to weep than I do. Earlier I used to bring people to God. Then He repudiated me and cursed me." I asked Satan: "Why didn't you carry out His command?" He answered: "I wouldn't have expected such words from you! In my affair there was a lack of favor (*ᶜināya*)." Then he recited the words of the Koran: "And there appeared to them from God what they never reckoned with" (39/47), and recited the verses: "I have a wounded heart (*kabid*). Who will sell me an unwounded one for it? Ah, people don't want to buy it. Who then will buy a sick heart for a healthy one?"

Extract from the *Rawnaq al-majālis* of ᶜUmar b. al-Ḥasan al-Nīsābūrī al-maᶜrūf bi'l-Samarqandī taken from ᶜUthmān b. Yaḥyā al-Mīrī, *Bāb* 12, *Zawāl al-maᶜrifa.*

Abū'l-Ḥusayn al-Nūrī is sitting next to another person and both are weeping bitterly. When the other person goes away, Nūrī turns to his companions and says: "Do you know who that was?" They answer: "No." Nūrī says: "That was Satan. He told me the story of his services and his destiny, and complained about the pain of separation and wept as you've seen. Then I wept as well." (TA $2/51_{19\text{-}21}$).

God has not counted the acts of obedience of Satan because in His loftiness He has no need of the services of His worshippers (*istighnā*).

For so many thousands of years Iblīs did nothing but praise God and sanctify Him. All these acts of obedience were gathered together and cast to the wind, because of God's lack of need. (AN 0 in the *munājāt*).

One morning Satan asks to be admitted to see the Prophet. He's refused by Salmān and ᶜAlī. The Prophet as well doesn't want to let him come in at first, but Gabriel requests that he grant admission to the cursed one for a moment, so he may describe to him the pain of banishment and being distant from God. Satan, who has now been admitted, asks the Prophet whether on his Ascension he had seen, to the left of the divine Throne, an evil (*munkar*) valley, a black desert and therein a broken-up pulpit. His place had been there. On that pulpit he had preached to the angels about God. He had thought he possessed good fortune and had never foreseen that ahead of him was the curse consisting of five letters (*lᶜnty*, surah 38/78). "You've been allotted good fortune", so he says, "with five letters (*lᶜmrk*, surah 15/72). They became a crown for you, for me they became a neck-fetter. But when I see your crown, I'm not without hope. And for your part, look at my neck-fetter and don't be lulled into security!" (MN 26/2).

For Satan still goes on hoping that one day he will be accepted into God's favor again. Not even he despairs of God's mercifulness (surah 39/53. Cf. *Ṭawāsīn* 169).

There is a halting-station (*maqām*) in love in which hope is better than attainment. Iblīs occupied this *maqām*. (ᶜAyn al-Quḍāt, *Maktūbāt*, Ms. Nafız 464, fol. 50ab).

In the conversation between Satan and the Prophet which we presented above (p. 560) from the *Jawhar al-dhāt*, Satan finally asks Muḥammad whether the acts of obedience which he had previously undertaken would be accepted by God, and the Prophet is able to announce to him the glad tidings that these achievements of obedience have not been lost and that in the end God will forgive him. Thereupon Satan goes off feeling consoled. (*Jawhar al-dhāt* 412a).

We have already seen how Shiblī meets Satan among the pilgrims in ᶜArafāt, has Satan tell him his story and hears from him that he still hopes to be forgiven by God. (Above p. 272).

In orthodox sermons there is less hope for Satan. According to the *Tanbīh al-ghāfilīn* (85b, *Bāb fī kaẓm al-ghayth*), Satan makes an attempt at remorseful contrition (*tawba*). Moses is meant to undertake mediation with God. But when God imposes the condition that Satan bow down before Adam's grave, Satan persists in his refusal.

According to Jīlī, after the Day of Judgement when Hell has ceased to exist, Satan will return to closeness with God. Jīlī admittedly does not claim that God's mercifulness is the reason for this but he gives a cosmic-metaphysical explanation: of necessity all things which God has created return again to their primordial state. (*Al-Insān al-kāmil* 2/40$_{18\text{-}23}$, *Bāb* 59. Cf. also Massignon, *Passion* 866, ftn. 4).

Moreover, being cursed now comes to be evaluated positively, on the one hand objectively, and on the other within the feelings of Satan who thereby proves himself to be a true lover.

Having the curse placed on him has not been completely without benefit for Satan. Because of it he has acquired a long life and a position of power over the whole world. (Cf. surah 17/62: "Verily, if You allow me to live until the Final Day, I will surely force his [Adam's] descendants to be under my power except for a few.") And he stands continually at God's door.

Satan says: "If I had looked at someone else, my dominion would not now extend from 'the moon to the Fish' (over the whole sublunar world)." (IN p. 133$_4$).—Once this curse fell upon him, he asked for a reprieve (surah 7/13), chose the curse with his entire soul and asked for eternal life. (IN p. 131$_{15}$).—Since he, alone of all beings, strove after God's harshness (*qahr*), he became master over many people. (IN p. 131$_{10}$).—Now he stands at the door of God's

Throne with the lance of power in his hand. You can't say *ilāhī* ("my God!") (or recite or sing any *munājāt*-poems, or recite the Koran) without first saying: "I take my refuge with God from pelted Satan!" He is the assayer of souls and knocks anyone down who wishes to approach God with false coin. He says to him: "In half an hour God smashed over my head the acts of obedience of thousands of years, and you wish proudly to bring before God this atom of acts of obedience and aren't ashamed?" (IN p. $130_{1ff.}$).—Even if he's rejected and cursed, he's still continually in the King's presence. (IN p. 137_{19}).—If he weren't nourished by this curse, then how would he be able to display such power over human beings? (IN p. 131_{14}).

From God's viewpoint as well, Satan's being cursed also appears to be a distinction which is intended on God's part and not just perceived as such by Satan. Only outwardly does it have the character of an unmasking in order to conceal the real intimacy.

When Joseph wants to be together on intimate terms and be the best of friends with his favorite brother Benjamin, he hides the drinking-cup in the latter's luggage and accuses him of theft. God also behaved the same way with Satan. He drove him away from His door on account of this secret and distinguished him before the whole world through His curse. He covered him with the cloak of His violence (*qahr*) and thereby concealed him from the eyes of ordinary people. (IN 8/3, p. 129_{13-18}).

And Satan himself wants this distinction, the curse. He wants to possess something special which distinguishes him before all the other angels and creatures.

He saw that all others strove after God's kindness (*lutf*) and that is why he strove after God's harshness (*qahr*, IN p. 131_{9-10a}). All strive after God's mercifulness and that is why Satan chooses God's curse precisely as a special distinction. He is the slave of the curse, all others are slaves of mercifulness. In this way Satan is a model for the upright seeker of God. (MṬ p. 129, verses 3250-51, after the story encountered above on pp. 560-61).

We have already seen (pp. 543 f.) that Shiblī envies Satan because the latter was especially addressed when cursed by God.

Thus Ayāz in particular caresses Maḥmūd's foot and kisses it because everyone else is involved with his face. (IN 8/4, pp. 130-31).

Caressing or rubbing (*mālīdhan*) the foot is a service which is otherwise frequently rendered to lovers by their young male or female friends in literature. Abū Saᶜīd has his foot rubbed by a female Turkish slave (TA $2/328_{23-24}$) and another time by a dervish (*Asrār al-tawḥīd* 113; O'Kane, *Secrets* 232; Nicholson, *Studies* 36); likewise a king's foot is massaged by his female slave (*Heft Peiker* 32/43). That Rōzbihān Baqlī has this service rendered to him causes objections to be raised and is reported to Atabeg Saᶜd Zangī (ᶜIrāqī, *Dahnāma*, *Kulliyyāt* 236). Strict ascetics forbade the practice (*Firdaws al-murshidiyya* 385_{4-6}).

That which would be an evil for everyone else is a precious gift for Satan. Here is an allegorical story dealing with this point:

Someone falls in love with a beautiful person who lives in the steppes under a tent, but he has no possibility of ever attaining him. One day a sudden shower occurs and everyone quickly seeks shelter in the first tent he can reach. As chance would have it, the man who's in love enters the very tent where the object of his love is staying. To the man's joy, the rain becomes so violent that both of them must seek refuge under one blanket. Everyone prays to God that He cause the terrible rain to stop. Only the man in love asks Him: "Let the rain continue until the Final Day!"—So Satan as well asked God to be cursed more and more in order to be honored continually by God addressing him. (This occurs every time the relevant Koranic verse is recited.) (IN 8/5, pp. 131-33).

The story is also found in a somewhat different version in Ibn Ḥazm's *Ṭawq al-ḥamāma* p. 61, end of chpt. 20. ᶜUmar ibn Abī Rabīᶜa has an entirely similar experience with his Zaynab. (*Aghānī*[3] 1/100).

Satan behaves like the authentic lover who gladly endures whatever the beloved does to him, indeed experiences it as something that makes him happy, because in such a case the beloved focuses his will on him.

Satan did what the friends of Shiblī didn't do when the latter threw stones at them, i.e. he endured the pain which the divine Friend caused him. He didn't flee from the Beloved's blows but made from them a hundredfold balsam for himself. (IN p. $137_{11\text{-}12}$).

The blow which beloved God delivers is so precious that it's not too expensive to buy it with a thousand years of acts of obedience. (IN p. $137_{14\text{-}15}$).—Satan doesn't see the bitterness of the dregs which are offered to him, he only sees the wine-pourer. He doesn't perceive whether the curse which has befallen him is good or bad, he only sees that it comes from Him. (IN p. $134_{7,\ 9\text{-}10}$).

God's abusive words are dear and valuable for Satan, like Laylā's swear-words for Majnūn.

A *pīr* asks Satan how he feels after having been cursed. He answers: "I've been highly honored by being addressed by God. His words, even if they're abusive words, are a cause of honor for me." (*Jawhar al-dhāt*, Ms. Ayasofya 1757, fol. 70a). He then gives a long description of himself which culminates in his saying that his unbelief (*kufr*) is the path to true love of God (verse):

If you breathe a moment in unbelief, you set up your tent above the roof of seventh heaven... If you become an unbeliever, then you're a Muslim. But one can't say this everywhere... I've chosen the Friend in unbelief. In unbelief I've been allotted sight of the Friend, etc.—The long passage closes with a prayer (*munājāt*) of Satan to God which we cannot enter into here.

Agar dar kufr yak dam dam zanī tu ba-bām-i haftumīn khargah zanī tu...

Agar kāfir shawī bāshī musalmān *walē har jā mar-īn guftan bi-natwān...*
Man andar kāfirī bu-gzīdha'am yār. *ham andar kāfirī mē-dīdha'am yār!*

Jīlī writes: "It's related that when Satan was cursed, he was so overwhelmed with joy that he filled the whole world with himself (the whole world was too narrow for him). They said to him: 'You do this though you've actually been expelled from God's presence?' He said: 'Being cursed is a robe of honor which the Beloved has conferred on me alone, and which no cherub and no prophet can don.'" (Jīlī, *al-Insān al-kāmil* $2/40_{22-24}$, *Bāb* 59).

As we saw above (pp. 408 f.), in Aḥmad Ghazzālī one finds the grandiose image of the beloved as an archer who shoots the fatal arrow at the lover but causes him to be happy precisely because in taking aim he necessarily focuses his gaze on him with complete concentration of the soul. In ᶜAṭṭār the simile is applied to Satan:

Someone asks Satan: "Oh you unhappy creature! But after knowing that you've been cursed, why do you bear the curse like a treasure in your heart and soul?" Satan answers: "The curse is the arrow of the King. But the King must first take aim. He must gaze at the target so that the arrow may speed (straight) from the bow. You only know about the arrow but you must see the gaze." (IN 8/10, p. 135).—As an illustration of this the poet then relates the story about Ayāz who wishes to become the target for Maḥmūd's arrow. (IN 8/11, p. 136; above p. 409).

In his role as gate-keeper Satan practices both the loyalty and the jealousy of the true lover. This fact explains in the strangest way why he keeps people away from God.

They asked him: "How are you holding up in this distance (from God)?" He said: "I stand with a sword in my hand and drive everyone back from that door so no one approaches it. Doing this is enough for me in the whole world. I stand at a distance, both eyes (raining) like a cloud, because to me that face is too good for everyone (?). I stand at a distance because I'm not worthy of Him. I stand at a distance because I can't bear that someone besides me sees His face. I stand at a distance because I don't have the strength to endure that intimacy of love (cf. above pp. 435 ff.). Even though I've been driven from His royal gate, I don't turn my head away from His path. Since I planted my foot in the street of the Beloved, I haven't looked anywhere else but at Him." (MN 26/0).

Likewise, the motif of jealousy toward oneself (above p. 544) is also transferred to Satan.

Satan neither wants himself nor other creatures to be able to see that gate and that threshold so that no beam of light from that door is polluted by the gaze of the unworthy. (IN p. 135_{2-3}, after the story about the thief with the chopped-off hand on which the beloved's name was recorded).—Thus the moon too would

prefer to know that the sun is concealed because it begrudges its own eyes sight of the sun (IN 8/8, p. 135; above p. 395), and so Majnūn cries out: "Thanks be to God!", when he learns of Laylā's death.

To Moses' question whether he still recollects God, Satan answers with the affirmation that he will never forget God and never cease to love Him.

Will a lover such as I ever forget Him for one moment? Just as He has no hate, shouldn't the love for Him in my breast also be thus? (IN p. $138_{8\text{-}9}$).[11]—On account of the bitter dregs he doesn't foreget the pure wine which he had drunk previously. (IN p. $134_{5\text{-}6}$).—Even if the whole world cursed him, his love wouldn't become one atom less because of it. (IN p. 130_{9}).—Even if his Beloved cursed him, the fire of his love would only become fanned by this curse. (IN p. 138_{11}).—Iblīs isn't free from this fire of love for a single moment. Learn manliness from the cursed Iblīs! (IN p. 130_{16}).

Only once is the fact that Satan continues worshipping judged negatively, namely where he says that he carries on performing prostrations out of an old habit (above p. 303).

Cf. in addition Massignon, *Passion* 864-77, 934-39; *Essai* 278; and the Indices of both works.

At this point we take leave of the cursed one who in such a strange way has become the model for pure monotheism and pure love of God among the mystics. He has already detained us—such is his nature—quite long enough.

16

God is enthroned in inaccessible glory above all the worlds. The distance from created beings is so vast, the road so far, that it seems presumptuous if a creature wishes to approach Him.

When the birds, deeply stirred by the story of Shaykh Ṣanᶜān's love for a Christian woman (above p. 400), have decided to set out on the road to the Sīmurgh, with an awesome shudder they behold before them an unending road devoid of any living being. It stretches before them empty and still, overshadowed by endless silence. One of them asks: "Why is the road so empty?" The hoopoe answers: "Because of the King's majesty." (MṬ in 15/0, p. 61).

Bāyazīd one night walks from the city out into the steppes. The moon illuminates the still landscape with the brightness of day, the stars adorn the dark sky. As far as the shaykh wanders through the nocturnal fields, in every direction no human being stirs. A shudder spreads over his soul and he says: "Lord,

[11] The text from 9b on is difficult. Adding a question mark makes it more understandable but it still remains strange. Should one read *kīnash* instead of *mihrash*?

why is Your high royal hall so empty of yearning lovers?" A voice answers him: "Oh you confused one! It befits the majesty of this court that beggars stay far from Our door. If the residence of Our majesty emits its light, then it drives away indifferent sleepers. People waited many years until one out of thousands was granted entry." (MṬ 15/1, p. 61; as an experience in childhood TA 1/155-56).

This is how God's transcendence is experienced emotionally.

How should a dweller in an ashhouse dare to raise his eyes to this King? The distance is too great. If the King wished to visit you, you wouldn't have room to receive Him, nor anything with which to entertain him worthily. (AN 21/2, at the end).

The poet illustrates this with an animal fable.

A mouse sees a camel left standing without a guard and decides to make off with it. He takes hold of the halter and leads the big animal away up to his mouse-hole where it immediately becomes obvious that his house is no suitable dwelling for a camel. (AN 21/3).

Cf. Rückert, "Das Kamel im Mausloch. Djamis Fabeln", in *Erbauliches und Beschauliches aus dem Morgenlande*. (There the mouse is crushed to death by the camel).—The story is very much transformed in *Mathnawī* 2/3436-52. There the mouse plays the role of camel-driver and is forced to recognize and confess his incompetence in this regard on the bank of a river. According to Badīᶜ al-Zamān Furūzānfar: *Risāla dar taḥqīq-i aḥwāl wa zindagānī-i Mawlānā Jalāl al-Dīn*, p. 98, ftn. 1, this form of the story originates from the *Maqālāt* of Shams-i Tabrīz.

"Lack of need" (*istighnā*), one of the beloved's most difficult characteristics for the lover to bear (Above pp. 414-15), is a characteristic of divinity to an incomparably higher degree.

God has no need of the service and worship of His bondsmen.

Your obedience is of no use to Him, and your disobedience causes Him no harm. His having ordered you to do this and forbidden you to do that is in your interest.—It neither increases nor decreases His honor if one person turns toward Him or another person turns away from Him. (*Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/54).

Neither do You gain benefit from Moses, nor do You suffer loss from Pharaoh. (MṬ p. 7, verse 175).

And God also has no need of the worship of the angels. That is why, according to one of ᶜAṭṭār's free interpretations, God ordered the angels to bow down before Adam because He Himself has no need of their worship. (AN 2/2).

Rather, the angels fade away and die out of yearning for God.

In the *Qūt al-qulūb* it says: "Every day angels as numerous as the human beings who ever have existed and ever will exist from the beginning of creation to the end of time burn to ashes in God's light, and in their place as many angels immediately arise again." (MN 5/1).

God's lack of need, His complete independence from the action of His slaves, is also displayed in predestination. No one knows what kind of destiny God has imposed on him. The good or bad behavior of human beings is not able to limit God's freedom to do what He wishes. That is why the great men (of religion) who have recognized God's lack of need do not sleep at night and have no peace during the day. (IN p. 114_{16}; above p. 140). It makes no difference to God whether a pilgrim smashes his head against the Kaᶜba.

A pious fool stands the whole night before the door of the Kaᶜba and says: "If You don't open the door for me and take me into Your favor, I'll break my head in two against the door so that my heart is released from its burning." The divine voice answers: "This house was filled a few times with idols. The idols inside were smashed to pieces. What does it matter if another idol is smashed to pieces outside? If you smash your head outside, you're the kind of idol that's overthrown. Here where the ocean counts for no more than a drop, lacking a head doesn't make any difference." A pious man who's overheard the conversation, as a result falls to the ground in tears. (IN 7/4 p. 115-16).

The suffering of human beings does not matter to God. Whether Job weeps over his situation makes no difference to God (IN 7/5, p. 116; above p. 63), the same way it does not matter to Joseph whether Zulaykhā pines away because of him. (IN 7/6, pp. 116-17; see above pp. 414 f.).

The yearning of the lover of God is of no significance for God.

A fool is sitting by the road on a heap of ashes. One minute he weeps, the next he scatters ashes over himself. When someone asks him why he's weeping, he answers: "Because I need God, and God doesn't need me." (IN 10/12, pp. 167-68).

The yearning for knowledge on the part of the seeker of God is as meaningless for God as the acknowledgement of His dominion by His creatures. Whether the birds choose the Sīmurgh as their king or not, it makes no difference to him. He is the Master whether they recongize him as such or not. Indeed, everything that happens in the two worlds is devoid of the least importance for God.

The birds see the road without end over which the wind of "lack of need" blows. (MṬ 16/0 p. 62, verses 1602a, 1603).

One of the valleys which the birds must travel through is "the Valley of Detachment" (*wādī-i istighnā*, above p. 16). There the seven seas are no more than a puddle of water. There the seven planets are only a spark, the seven Paradises are dead and the seven Hells are congealed ice. A hundred caravans must perish so

that a crow is sated, a hundred thousand angels must die so that a torch is lit for Adam. A hundred thousand bodies must become lifeless so that Noah can harvest new crops, a hundred thousand children are decapitated (by Pharaoh's henchmen) until Moses' eyes are opened. If thousands of souls drowned in this sea, it wouldn't mean any more than that a dewdrop had fallen into the boundless ocean. (MṬ 41/0, pp. 141-42).

This lack of importance of all events *sub specie aeternitatis* is illustrated by the poet, first of all, by means of one of those simple stories with which ᶜAṭṭār loves to amplify individual ideas and concepts.

"In our village", so the poet relates, "there was a youth named Muḥammad. He fell into a well-shaft and became submerged. In the end, he was dragged out more dead than alive. His father called to him with all his pet names and beseeched him just to say one word. Finally, the son who'd been submerged said the words: 'Say Muḥammad, say son, say no one—(it's all the same)', and then he died.— So you too can say: Muḥammad, Adam, Adam's offspring, earth, mountain, ocean, sky, peris and *dēws*, it's all the same. In the end, nothing is left behind for you in the sieve." (MṬ 41/1, pp. 142-43).

This valley is difficult to travel through. If the ocean has become full with your heart's blood, then you've only accomplished one day's journey. If you've travelled through the whole world, then you've only taken the first step. No traveller has ever seen the end of the road, no one has found a remedy for this pain. Whether you stand still or walk, it makes no difference. Whether you act or don't act, it's the same.[12] Here the lightning of lack of need has burned a hundred worlds. A hundred worlds have here collapsed. Whether they exist or not, it makes no difference in this valley. (MṬ p. 143-44).

Perhaps you've seen how an astrologer (sand-soothsayer) draws in the dust fixed stars and planets, sky, earth and signs of the zodiac, the rising and setting of the stars, a horoscope, celestial mansions. When his calculation is finished, he erases everything again. The whole world is like that. (MṬ 41/3, p. 144).

If you don't have the strength to travel this road, then you weigh no more than a blade of straw even if you're as big as a mountain.

Amplification of "weakness":

The veil of secrets is lifted for a pious man, and the divine voice promises his every request will be granted. But he says: "The prophets experienced only torment and grief in this world, how should I, a poor old man, find peace? I want neither honor nor lowliness. If the great were only allotted pain and grief, how should the small be allotted a treasure? I have no strength. Leave me the way I am!" (MṬ 41/4, p. 144).

If you knew the dangers of this road, you wouldn't want to travel along it.

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12 This is approximately the overall sense of verses 3604-12.

Amplification of "ignorance of the danger":

A fly sees a jug filled with honey standing in a corner. He has so great a desire to get inside the jug that he gives an ounce as a reward to the one who places him inside. He has scarcely entered the jug when his feet become stuck and he's caught. Now he would gladly pay two ounces to get out of the jug again. (MṬ 41/5, p. 145).

Nevertheless, the summons is issued to travel through this valley as well. (The epilogue of this story).

The most grandiose description of the divine lack of need, however, is the scene in which the thirty birds arrive at the court of the Sīmurgh after endless efforts and there the lightning of "lack of need" flashes and the guard turns them away because their existence or non-existence is of no importance whatsoever at this court. We have already paraphrased this passage above (p. 17) and do not need to deal with it here once again.

17

The idea that God is not in need of his worshippers and lovers also arises, however, in connection with the conceptual motif that God, being sufficient unto Himself, loves Himself. We have already met with the motif in another context (above pp. 492, 500 f.). We must here come back to this idea once more.

The doxographer Shahrastānī (d. 548/1153) in his *Milal wa'l-niḥal* (p. 316) refers to the Aristotelian doctrine that God experiences blissful pleasure in contemplating His own essence as the most perfect object (*al-awwalu mubtahijun bi-dhātih*). (Cf. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, 3rd edition 2, 2, 367). In Sayyid Murtaḍā ibn al-Dāᶜī (7th cent. AH) the doctrine takes the form that God is in love with His own essence and absorbed in it and for this very reason is perfect.

Mabdaʾ-i awwal ba-ghāyat-i kamāl ast zīrā ki ᶜāshiq-i dhāt-i khwadh ast u badhān mashghūl ast. Tabṣirat al-ᶜawāmm, ed. by ᶜAbbās Iqbāl, p. 5.

ᶜAṭṭār says: "He desires His own beauty." (IN p. 4_{17b}).

Occasionally it is explicitly stated that this self-love of God's excludes love for His creatures.

ᶜAyn al-Quḍāt writes: "God possesses such an abundant degree of love for Himself that He has no concern for anyone and doesn't pay any attention to anyone. People, however, believe that He loves them."

Khudhāy-rā tabāraka wa-taʿālā chandān az ʿishq-i khwadh uftādha ast ki parwā-i hēch kas na-dāradh u ba-hēch kas ōrā iltifāt nēst u khalq pindāshta-and ki ō ʿāshiq-i ēshān ast. (*Tamhīd* 9, fol. 104a).

Shiblī asks God in prayers of intimate conversation: "Toward whom were You (inclined)?" He answers: "No one."

Waqt-ē dar munājāt guft: Bār khudāyā, kirā būdhī? Guft: Hēch kas-rā.—Ibid.

Ḥāfiẓ expresses himself more clearly:

Who gains love's intimacy by love for a king who eternally pursues love-play with Himself? (*Dīwān* ed. Khalkhālī, p. 218; above p. 501):

Ki bandadh ṭarf-i waṣl az ʿishq-i shāh-ē ki bā khwadh ʿishq bāzadh jāwidhāna.

Connected with this conception of God's love for Himself is a corresponding explanation of the act of creation. God created the world, or man, i.e. Adam, in His own image as a mirror in which He contemplates Himself.

One can find a Hellenistic forerunner of this idea in a passage of the *Poimandres* (Reitzenstein Chpt. I, § 12), if one leaves aside the view of God as father, which is an intolerable conception for Muslims.

"The father of all, Nous, being life and light, produced Man who is like Him. He loved him as His own child. For he was beautiful since he was the image of the father. In reality, God actually loved His own form."

Ὁ δὲ πάντων πατὴρ ὁ Νοῦς, ὢν ζωὴ καὶ φῶς, ἀπεκύησεν Ἄνθρωπον αὐτῷ ἴσον· οὗ ἠράσθη ὡς ἰδίου τόκου· περικαλλὴς γὰρ <ἦν> τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς εἰκόνα ἔχων· ὄντως γὰρ καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἠράσθη τῆς ἰδίας μορφῆς.

Reitzenstein rightly says on p. 304 that Plato's *Timaeus* 37c (Reitzenstein erroneously cites 37d) is the basis for this passage:

"But when He perceived that it (the produced being) moved and was alive, an image of the eternal gods, the Father who had engendered it was pleased and in His joy decided to make it even more similar to His example."

Ὡς δὲ κινηθὲν αὐτὸ καὶ ζῶν ἐνόησεν τῶν ἀιδίων θεῶν γεγονὸς ἄγαλμα ὁ γεννήσας πατὴρ ἠγάσθη τε καὶ εὐφρανθεὶς ἔτι δὴ μᾶλλον ὅμοιον πρὸς τὸ παράδειγμα ἐπενόησεν ἀπεργάσασθαι.

Ἠγάσθη "was pleased" of the Timaeus has become ἠράσθη "loved him" in the *Poimandres*.[13]

But with this doctrine the rigid transcendence of the God who pursues love-play all alone has already been breached. God loves His creature as His own likeness created by Himself, even if this means that in so doing He also loves Himself.

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13 Professor Walther Kranz has kindly drawn my attention to these textual connections.

If the author of a book loves his book, in so doing he loves himself, and if a master loves his work, in so doing he loves himself, and if a father loves his son in so far as he is his son, in so doing he loves himself. But everything which has Being besides God is the work of God and if He loves it, then He is only loving Himself. (*Iḥyā*ʾ 4/74, after the saying of Abū Saʿīd which will be immediately quoted below; *Stufen* 189 f./B.103).

However, connected with this idea among the Islamic mystics, is another idea stemming from an early pantheistic trend, namely that God alone has true Being and exists, which idea finds a certain support in the orthodox dogmatic proposition that God Himself directly causes everything that happens, even the acts of people (pp. 615 ff. below). Thus in the case of the lover who loves God's reflection in beautiful persons, it is actually God who loves Himself. The subject and object of love thereby coincide with one another in divinity which is perfect in all respects, and is the only truly existing and active entity.

All perfection and beauty, all radiance and all majesty can be (predicated) about divinity, and all these (characteristics) are present in it, on hand and necessarily on hand from eternity to eternity... Therefore God doesn't look at another (e.g. a human being) in so far as the latter is another, but His gaze directs itself only to Himself (*ilā dhātih*) and His action, and in existence there is nothing but He Himself and His actions (*laysa fī'l-wujūdi illā dhātuhū wa-afʿāluhū*). That's why, when they recited the Koranic verse before him: "He loves them and they love Him" (surah 5/54), Shaykh Abū Saʿīd said: "Verily, He loves them, for He only loves Himself." What this means is that He is everything and there is nothing in existence besides Him, etc. (*Iḥyā*ʾ 4/281, *Bayān maḥabbat Allāh li'l-ʿabd*; *Stufen* 692/F.169-170). In another passage where Ghazzālī cites the same saying of Abū Saʿīd, he adds: "By this he indicates that God is simultaneously lover and beloved." (*Iḥyā*ʾ 4/74, *Bayān ṭarīq kashf, etc.*; *Stufen* 189/B.102).

Now if love is considered to be an attribute of God's essence, then in the end all three entities, the lover, the beloved and love coincide with one another.

And this is what one finds in Ḥallāj and Ibn Sīnā and others.

L. Massignon, "Interférences philosophiques et percées metaphysiques dans la mystique Ḥallājienne: Notion de 'L'Essentiel Désir'" in: *Mélanges Maréchal* vol. II, Brussels 1950, p. 271. In Ibn Sīnā: *Risāla fī ʿishq* p. 5; Louis Gardet, *La Pensée Religieuse d'Avicenne*, Paris 1951, p. 51, ftns. 1 and 2, and pp. 167-71. Cf. Plotinus VI, 8, 15.

To the mystic Abū Saʿīd ibn Abī'l-Khayr (d. 440/1049) is attributed the quatrain: "I said: 'To whom are You (favorable) in this beauty?' He said: 'To Myself. For I am unique to Myself. I am love, the lover and the beloved at the same time; at the same time, mirror, beauty and the seeing eye.'"

Hermann Ethé, "Die Rubâ^cîs des Abû Sa^cîd bin Abulkhair" in: SBAkad. München 1875, Band II, Heft II, p. 161. — But now see Meier, *Abū Sa^cīd*, pp. 210-213. Regarding the *coincidentia oppositorum* cf. also von Grunebaum, "Islam and Hellenism" in: *Scientia* 1950, 26. He refers to equivalent verses by Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī.

Rōzbihān Baqlī (d. 606/1209-10) considers love (*ᶜishq*) to be a pre-eternal attribute of God, the same way that "knowledge" is such an attribute according to the dogmatists. Since He loves Himself, love, the lover and the beloved coincide with one another.

God has eternal attributes from pre-eternity and for eternity forward. One of these attributes is love (*ᶜishq*). He loves Himself, and therefore He is love, the lover and the beloved at the same time... God's love is to be conceived of like His "knowledge": He has loved Himself from eternity just as He has known Himself from eternity and beheld Himself. (*ᶜAbhar al-ᶜāshiqīn*, according to a manuscript cited by Qāsim Ghanī, *Ḥāfiẓ* 2/422, ftn. 1).

In pre-eternity He fell in love with His own beauty. Therefore love, the lover and the beloved are necessarily one. (Idem, *Sharḥ al-shaṭḥiyyāt*, Ms. Şehid Ali 1342, fol. 29a).

ᶜIrāqī treats the same idea in his *Lamaᶜāt*.

Sulṭān Walad (d. 712/1312) devotes a special chapter of his *Rabābnāma* to the idea that God loves Himself in man and likewise develops out of this the idea that the lover and the beloved are basically one, which he then uses to explain Ḥallāj's famous saying "I am God".

Furthermore, God the Sublime is in love with Himself and He has no one who is similar to Him so that He could look at him.

He continually pursues love-play with Himself. That's why you must become free from yourself and from considering yourself and be filled with love and love's passion for God so that He sees Himself in you. In truth, there aren't two involved, for the lover is the mirror of the beloved, but in the mirror the face of the beloved appears and nothing else. Therefore there aren't two. Even if according to external form and words the mirror and the beloved are two, according to inner meaning, however, they are one because in the mirror there is only the face of the beloved. In this way water from the spring flows into the river. The intelligent man sees only one in both forms of water. For the water in the river is the same as that in the spring. If Ḥallāj said: "I am God", God said it, not Ḥallāj, because duality doesn't enter into oneness. (Tarzî-Ateş, *Farsça Grameri* p. 191).

How with these monistic trains of thought one may go on to explain that a human being loves God in a beautiful human being and that this love is actually a manifestation of God's love for

Himself, has already been explained (pp. 461 ff.) and need not occupy us here once again.

Now it is the duty of the mystic to remain conscious of this love which emanates from God, to eliminate as much as possible the feeling of acting independently (*fanāʾ al-nafs*) and to look at things with the eye of "oneness" (*naẓar bi-ᶜayn al-tawḥīd*). (*Iḥyāʾ* 4/74 in the explanation of the saying of Abū Saᶜīd which was just quoted; *Stufen* 190/B.103).

With regard to man's love for God this is especially true because the distance between God and a creature is so great that it would be a presumptuous undertaking on the part of a creature to wish to start up a love relationship on his own initiative with the highest being, the Creator. This conceptual motif is treated by ᶜAṭṭār in one of the conversations which the hoopoe conducts with the individual birds.

One of the birds, with eloquent words, boasts of his love for the Sīmurgh.—The hoopoe reprimands him, saying: "One doesn't draw near the Sīmurgh with talk and the claim to love (*daᶜwā*). Don't be always speaking of your love for Him! 'He doesn't enter into everyone's sack.' But if the gentle breeze of good fortune blows, He may perhaps lift the veil from this matter. He draws you into His track and then lets you be with Him in intimacy. Love which proceeds from you is only discomfort. His love alone brings gain." (MṬ 33/0, pp. 110-11; above p. 15).

In fact, it is of no consequence at all what man does. All that matters is what God does. Similarly the master-bondsman relationship between God and man only really has meaning or value if it proceeds from God.

To the interrogating angels who test him in the grave and ask: "Who is your Lord?", Bāyazīd responds: "What value does it have if I say: 'He is my Lord'? Go to Him and ask Him whether He counts me as one of His slaves! It's not for me to call Him my Lord but for Him to call me His slave." (MṬ 33/1, p. 111; TA 1/178$_{8-13}$).

When it comes to love of God, God is also the real agent.

A dervish, whose soul has been burned by excessive love of God, complains and weeps out of jealousy. A voice calls to him: "Stop this idle talk! What makes you think you can enter into a love relationship with empty words?" The dervish answers: "Without any doubt it's He who has entered into a love relationship with me. How can so weak a creature as myself love a being such as Him? What have I done? He has done everything."—If He loves you and grants you access, guard against imagining that you're the one acting. Who are you that you could undertake to do something so immense? If He pursues love-play with you, know that He continually pursues love-play with His creation. You're

nothing at all. A creature turns into nothing. Let everything be the Creator! (MṬ 33/2, pp. 111-12).

The story about the dweller in the ashhouse whom Sultan Maḥmūd visits (above p. 129) is meant to symbolize the idea that all that matters is God's love for man.

The dweller in the ashhouse only asks for one thing, that the sultan may occasionally still come to visit him. This proof of the sultan's friendship is enough for him.—What you need is God's love, that's a gain for you. Your love for Him is only sorrow and discomfort. (Verse 2858).

God's love for man precedes man's love for God, and that is why in the Koranic verse (5/54) it first says: "He loves them", and only then adds: "and they love Him". (Cf. *Sawāniḥ*, *Faṣl* 8).

18

What earlier Islamic mysticism has to say about God's love for man is on the whole simple and straightforward. It has no need of pursuing the roundabout path of God's self-love in order to postulate God's love for His creature.

The great textbooks of mysticism treat God's love for man in connection with man's love for God.

Qūt 2/53-79; *Nahrung* 2/458-590/32.674-847; Qushayrī, *Risāla* in the first part of the *Bāb al-maḥabba*, pp. 143-44, concerning which see ᶜArūsī 4/78 ff.; *Sendschreiben* 438 ff./48; *Iḥyā*ᵓ 4/290-92 in a special section; *Stufen* 695 ff./F.179 ff.; *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/138.

In these works Koranic passages are referred to in which God's love for certain categories of believers is mentioned, categories such as persons who repent, warriors for the faith, and others as well, or in which mention is made of the reciprocal love between God and man, as in: "He loves them and they love Him" (5/54). (Cf. Smith, *Rābiᶜa* p. 92). Likewise, a series of divine sayings (*ḥadīth qudsī*), words of the Prophet, and statements of the early men of piety are cited. In the most famous of these sayings of God *unio mystica* is already even hinted at:

My bondsman goes on seeking closeness to Me through voluntary works until I love him. And if I come to love him, I am the hearing with which he hears, the sight with which he sees, the hand with which he grasps and the foot with which he walks. If he asks Me for something, I give it to him, etc.

Ṣaḥīḥ of Bukhārī, Istanbul 1315, 7/190, *Kitāb al-riqāq*, *Bāb al-tawāḍu*ᶜ; *Luma*ᶜ 59, cf. 383-84; *Schlaglichter* 110 f./30.4; Ibn Abī'l-Dunyā, *Kitāb al-Awliyā*ᵓ 195b; Qushayrī, *Risāla* 42, 143; *Sendschreiben* 135 f./2.18, 438/48.1; the *Commentary* of ᶜArūsī 4/79 ff.; *Amālī* of

Sayyid al-Murtaḍā, Cairo 1907, 2/6; Ibn ᶜArabī, *Mishkāt* 38; above pp. 28, 342; Ibn Taymiyya, *al-Radd ᶜalā Ibn ᶜArabī wa'l-ṣūfiyya* 47 ff.

One *ḥadīth* says:

If God feels affection for a bondsman, He tells this to Gabriel and then Gabriel feels affection for him and announces the chosen one's name to the angels, whereupon they also feel affection for him. (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 143-44; *Sendschreiben* 439/48.1).—Another *ḥadīth*:

God says: "I have bondsmen who love Me and whom I love, who yearn for Me and for whom I yearn. They recollect Me and I recollect them. They look at Me and I look at them, etc." (*Qūt* 2/60; *Nahrung* 2/501/32.731).

And yet God's love should not be represented as parallel with human love, because God is elevated above human emotions and above the feelings of happiness which a human being feels in the beloved's proximity. As Ghazzālī explains, one can only speak of love on the part of God in the sense one says about a king that he draws into his closeness a slave whom he is well-disposed toward and who is worthy of this privilege because of his excellent qualities. (*Iḥyā*ᵓ 4/281; *Stufen* 692/F.171).

In these statements God appears as an ethical personality which is surrounded by the radiance of divine majesty and elevated above all passions. If occasionally in early texts the word *ᶜishq* occurs, one must not therefore draw conclusions which go too far. Besides being used for erotic passion, the word can also simply be applied to intense affection and does not necessarily refer to being in love. The earliest evidence for applying the word *ᶜishq* to God is a divine saying allegedly transmitted by ᶜAbd al-Wāḥid ibn Zayd (d. 177/793-4) from Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (which, however, is already doubted by Abū Nuᶜaym), in which God declares: "If I cause My bondsman's happiness and delight to consist in recollecting Me, then he feels affection for Me and I feel affection for him (*ᶜashiqanī*, *ᶜashiqtuh*)."

The text of this rather long *ḥadīth qudsī* occurs in *Ḥilya* 6/165 in the life of ᶜAbd al-Wāḥid. Nicholson cites a different source in his *Commentary* on *Mathnawī* 5/2186-87. The reading *wa-ṣirtu maᶜāliman* with *alif* at the end—which Nicholson contests—is already found in the earliest manuscript. Perhaps one should read *maᶜlaman*, "a visible sign which one constantly has before one's eyes".—Another version: In one of the books sent down by God it says: "If recollecting Me completely occupies My bondsman, then he feels affection for Me and I feel affection for him." (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 103, *Bāb al-dhikr*, Junayd about Sarī al-Saqaṭī; *Sendschreiben* 317/32.10. When it comes to love involving God, Abū ᶜAlī al-Daqqāq, of course, rejects the possibility of *ᶜishq*, for both parties. Ibid. 145; *Sendschreiben* 442 f./48.7). Another version is cited by Ibn Sīnā, *Risāla fī'l-ᶜishq* 26.

ᶜAṭṭār also speaks of this love of God for man in connection with the explanations about the (primordial) familiarity (*āshnāʾī*) which links God and man, His creation. After he has illustrated this primordial familiarity (IN 20/4-5) with the symbolical story about Ardashīr who recognizes his son Shāpūr despite the latter's disguise (above pp. 526 f.), and the story about Ayāz who is suffering an eye illness but perceives Maḥmūd enter his sick-room (above p. 420), ᶜAṭṭār goes on to relate:

If you've perceived the scent of His familiarity, then you shine above both worlds because one atom of the light of this familiarity shines like a hundred suns. For the love of God is such that just one atom of it is better than both worlds. A God loves you so much. Shouldn't you be beside yourself with joy? (IN p. $322_{6\text{-}9}$).

In this connection there actually seem to be Christian tones discernible. For the sake of man God takes on the bondsman's form.

Maḥmūd visits Shaykh Kharaqānī. To test the shaykh's perspicacity he dresses Ayāz in royal garments and himself puts on the clothes of a slave. Kharaqānī immediately recognizes the ruler in his disguise and admonishes him to adopt humility. (IN 22/10, pp. 362-63; TA 2/208-10, in far greater detail. Cf. p. 525 below).

The source is probably the *Kitāb Nūr al-ᶜulūm*, which contained the *vita* of Kharaqānī. A selection from it has been edited by E. Bertels in the Russian journal *Iran*, vol. 3, pp. 155-224. Our story occurs there on pp. 192-93.

Then the poet continues:

Likewise, the Maḥmūd of eternity did something similar. He possessed an unbounded ocean of (divine) attributes, He had a world of knowers of God and divine knowledge. All this He abandoned for the sake of man. He came forth in the form (*ba-dast*) of people of the world. He took on that attribute (humanity) in purity and came forth in the form of this quality: "I fell sick. Why is it you didn't visit Me? When I sought bread and water at your door, I had to depart from you with neither the one nor the other. (Cf. Matthew 25:41 ff.). I buy from you your possessions and yourself (surah 9/111)... During all this I yearn for you and feel affection for you. It would be good if you would also yearn for Me." (IN p. $363_{5\text{-}12}$).

The passage in Matthew is also transmitted as a saying of God (*ḥadīth qudsī*):

God says: "Oh son of man, I was sick and you didn't visit Me." Then the man says: "Lord, how can I visit You? You're the Lord of the worlds." God says: "My bondsman so-and-so was sick, and if you had visited him, you would have found the reward for it with Me. And I begged you to give Me to drink, and you didn't give Me to drink." The man says: "How should I do that? You're the Lord of the

worlds." God says: "My bondsman so-and-so asked you to give him to drink, and if you had done that, you would have found the reward for it with Me. And I asked you to feed Me, and you didn't feed Me, etc."

Kalābādhī, *Baḥr al-maʿānī*, Ms. Fatih 697, fol. 179b. Cf. Ibn ʿArabī, *Mishkāt al-anwār fīmā ruwiya min Allāh min al-akhbār*, Aleppo 1346, p. 40 and ʿAlī al-Qāriʾ, *al-Aḥādīth al-qudsiyya al-arbaʿīniyya*, printed at the beginning of the previous work, p. 3; *Elixir* 163; *Mathnawī* 2/1737-39 and 2/2156; in another form, following the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of Muslim 8/13, in Ibn Taymiyya, *al-Radd ʿalā Ibn ʿArabī wa'l-ṣūfiyya* 57, 61-62.

After the story about the repentant sinner who on the Final Day sees to his surprise the wicked deeds in his register of sins annulled by good deeds (IN 9/12; above p. 276), ʿAṭṭār develops the idea that man is loved by God in secret, and that all intermediary causes which God inserts between Himself and man, even the grave, are only curtains behind which the beloved is kept concealed. (IN p. 152).—Keeping the beloved concealed is then illustrated with a story about Maḥmūd and Ayāz. (IN 9/13; above p. 396).

19

But those whom God loves, He will not punish in the hereafter.

God is not such that He would torment His friends with Hell-fire. (*Qūt* $2/50_{11\text{-}12}$; *Nahrung* 2/447/32.660).—Whomever one loves one does not call to account. (*Qūt* $2/66_{2}$; *Nahrung* 2/539/32.780).—If God loves a bondsman, He then looks at him, and if God looks at a bondsman, He does not punish him (above p. 268), just as the gaze of the king means pardon for a criminal (ibid.).—Indeed, God forgives all sins in advance to the one He loves: Zayd ibn Aslam says: "God loves man to such a degree that He says to him: 'Do what you wish! I forgive you.'" (*Qūt* $2/50_{13\text{-}14}$; *Nahrung* 2/447/32.780; *Iḥyāʾ* 4/281, *Bayān maḥabbat Allāh li'l-ʿabd*; *Stufen* 691/F.166; *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/138).—If God loves a human being, no sin will hurt him. (*Qūt* $2/50_{15}$; *Nahrung* 2/447/32.660; Hujwīrī 279_{3}).

Thus God's unapproachable lack of need and self-sufficiency is not the final word. And just as He imparts His kindness to those whom He loves, He also accepts into His favor those who love Him.

As for the birds who are at first rejected, the door is then opened for them.

Even though His lack of need was without bounds, His kindness (*luṭf*) displayed a new face. The chamberlain of kindness came and opened the door. A world came to light devoid of partition walls, the light of lights took on appear-

ance. The chamberlain had the birds sit down on the pillow of proximity, on the throne of awe and majesty. (MṬ 45/2, p. 165; above p. 17).

Likewise, God's kindness will not punish in the hereafter those who have loved Him in the here and now.

Rābiᶜa asks God: "Will You burn with Hell-fire a heart that loves You?" The divine voice answers: "We're not such that We would do that. Don't think badly of Us!" (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 147-48, *Bāb al-maḥabba*; *Sendschreiben* 450 f./ 48. 18; Smith, *Rābiᶜa* 29).

A similar story is told about ᶜAbd Allāh b. Muḥammad and a female worshipper of God, *Iḥyāʾ* 4/308, *Khātimat Kitāb al-maḥabba*; *Stufen* 765 f./F.332.

More drastic is one of ᶜAṭṭār's stories:

A man asks ᶜAmr ibn Qays: "If tomorrow God sent you to Hell, what would you do?" He answers: "I would go about in Hell and say: 'This is His prison, and this is the reward for him who loves Him!'" That night he sees God in a dream and hears Him say: "How can you think so badly of Me? I shall not withhold Paradise from My friends. How should I place the sword of Hell on the nape of their neck?" (MN 19/8).

God does not allow those who love Him to burn twice.

Whoever is burned by the fire of love will not be burned by another fire. That's the reason why Nimrod's blazing pyre could do no harm to Abraham. (*Firdaws al-murshidiyya* 337-38).

Indeed, one woman is so sure that God will not torment her twice with fire that she knows she is safe from a conflagration on earth as well.

A fire breaks out in the bazaar of Baghdad. Nevertheless, supported on her walking stick, an old woman calmly proceeds along her way. Someone calls to her: "Don't go away! Your house is burning!" But she says: "God won't let my house burn." In fact her house remains unharmed in the middle of the fire. When astonished people ask her how she knew this in advance, she answers: "He won't burn both my heart and my house. He's burned my heart in grief, that's why He won't burn my house." (IN 9/9, p. 149; see p. 584 below).

The "familiarity" established through the first burning is illustrated by the following story:

When steel and stone are struck against one another, fire springs forth from them. Tinder (in Persian *sōkhta* = "the burned") draws near. The fire says: "Who's this then?" The tinder says: "I'm an acquaintance of yours, oh intimate friend!" The fire says: "I'm bright and you're dark. How can we be acquainted with one another?" The tinder replies: "Through whom do I become dark if not through you? It's you who've burned me! Therefore be kind and accept the one you yourself have burned!" Then the fire recognizes his weak old acquaintance

again and embraces him. (Fantastical aetiology for tinder's delay in catching fire. IN 9/10, pp. 149-50).

Nor does God punish someone who loves His friends.

When Joseph one day goes out riding, he sees the aged, blind and impoverished Zulaykhā sitting by the road. She hopes that perhaps some of the dust which Joseph's horse stirs up will reach her. Joseph feels annoyed by his obstinate lover and asks God to free him from the woman who is jeopardizing the good reputation of His prophet. Gabriel brings him the message: "We won't remove her, because she loves the one who loves Us. I'll make her young again for you." (IN 20/7, pp. 323-24; cf. above p. 388).

In Ṣaffūrī 1/43$_{13\text{-}14}$ the story appears in the following form: When Joseph became the ruler, he complained to God about what she had done to him. Gabriel said: "God wants to kill her but He doesn't do so because: 'She loves the one whom We love.'"

In Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiᶜ al-zuhūr*, Cairo 1281, 1/95, Zulaykhā calls out when she sees Joseph ride by in great splendor: "Praise be to Him who makes slaves into kings because of their obedience and makes kings into slaves because of their disobedience!" Joseph has her brought into the castle and asks her what she wishes. Then Gabriel arrives and delivers the message to him that God orders him to marry her. God will make her once more young, beautiful and able to see. And again somewhat differently in Kisāʾī, *Qiṣaṣ* 167-68.

Thus for the mystics of love, alongside or in place of self-justification through the profession of faith, through works, or by means of the Prophet's intercession, there emerges self-justification through love. The demands of legalistic religion recede into the background, another possibility contained in monotheism is activated: the relationship of the master who gives orders and the slave who obeys is transformed into the relationship between beloved and lover.

Therefore God no longer allows the recording angels to write down the deeds of those who love Him.

Abū ᶜAlī Fārmadī says: "Tomorrow on the Day of Judgement God will place in a man's hand his book (register of sins) and say: 'There! See and read!' The man then looks at the book but finds nothing written in it. When he asks about this in surprise, he receives the answer: 'The deeds of those who love Me are not written down. The Lord has considered your good and bad deeds as non-existent. See that you too consider Paradise and Hell as non-existent. Everything which stands between us has been removed. You are Mine and I am yours for eternity. And if you don't wish this, why do you hesitate? For We are everything, We are everything, and you are nothing.'" (IN 9/11, p. 150).

In this last sentence mysticism now goes one step further: the lover of God merges with God the beloved through extinction, or pantheism abolishes the duality between God and man.

This motif of extinction becomes clearer as the antithesis to awareness of one's sins, in the continuation of the story about the birds after their arrival before the Sīmurgh. (See the next chapter).

20

In Islamic piety there are initial signs of the concept that God's kindness and mercy extends to all people universally. He causes His sun to rise over righteous and unrighteous, He looks after the unbeliever (above pp. 217 and 328) and forgives him (above pp. 270-72). We have seen above (p. 335) how in the case of individual mystics a general love of mankind develops which would also like to see the unbelievers, e.g. the Jews, included in God's mercy. On the other hand, however, in old original Islamic sermons the summons to convert to Muḥammad's community as the only way to attain blessedness stands so firmly in the foreground, salvation is made so dependent on professing the true faith, that the idea of a general love for man on God's part recedes before it. God, in accordance with His inscrutable judgement, chooses believers and unbelievers, blessed and damned, and one may not ask for the reason behind His ordaining. But within the Muslim community as well it is chiefly individual groups which are con-sidered to be the object of God's love. Already in the Koran God's love is always connected with particular categories of believers who meet special requirements, as a glance at the con-cordance of the Koran demonstrates. (*Al-Muᶜjam al-mufahras* 192).

Among the mystics, who in contrast to nominal Muslims, strove after a direct, especially close relationship with divinity, and distinguished themselves from others through their love of God and were conscious of their distinction, the idea seemed obvious that God possesses an elect group of friends or adherents whom He favors above others, the way the king has a chosen circle (*khawāṣṣ*) with whom he maintains a closer and more intimate relationship than with the rest of his subjects.

Even among the prophets God created differences. In a particular sense Abraham is His friend and bears the honorific title "The Friend of God" (*Khalīl Allāh*, above p. 535). God loves Joseph especially (*Qūt* 2/53; *Nahrung* 2/458/32.675), Muḥammad's relationship with God is that of God's beloved, Moses'

relationship only that of lover of God. (*Qūt* 2/66$_{13\ ff.}$; *Nahrung* 2/541/32.784).

But among other men as well there is a special group of friends of God (*awliyā*ᵓ *Allāh*, in accordance with surah 10/62) who love God from pre-eternity.

Cf. for instance *Ḥilya* 10/280. With regard to the corresponding Christian concept cf. von Grunebaum, *Medieval Islam* 138, ftn.

In one passage ᶜAṭṭār calls the chosen ones "the people of acquaintance with God" (*ahl-i ma*ᶜ*rifat*; IN p. 158$_{12}$). God loves the others but He has a special connection to these persons. God has a secret relationship to every soul, and every soul thinks it is privileged but only God has a view over the whole. Only He knows about the special relationship which exists between Him and "the people of acquaintance". ᶜAṭṭār illustrates this by means of a variant of the ring fable.

Cf. Rescher in: *Der Islam* 16/1927/154.

Muḥammad's wives one day ask him to tell them which of them he loves the most. The Prophet promises to give them an answer on the next day. That evening he secretly summons each one individually and gives her a ring. The next day the wives gather again before the Prophet and ask him the same question as the day before. The Prophet answers: "I love best the one to whom I gave my ring in secret." Thus each thinks she's the favorite wife. Each one has a secret with the Prophet. But ᶜĀᵓisha is still the favorite. (IN 10/4, pp. 158-59).

On the Final Day the various religious communities will be called to their prophets, but the friends of God will be called to God separately. (MN 31/5).

These "friends of God" have such an intimate relationship with God that He does their will if they beseech Him. In this connection a *ḥadīth* is cited: "There is many a man with dishevelled, dusty hair, and dressed in two rags, whose oath God fulfills if he beseeches Him."

Fayḍ al-qadīr no. 4401, variant 4400; *Luma*ᶜ 16$_{19}$; *Schlaglichter* 52/7.2; *Iḥyā*ᵓ 4/306; *Stufen* 414/D.34; *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 1/18. Cf. Wensinck, *Concordance* 1/159b. In addition, Ibn Abī'l-Dunyā in the *Kitāb al-Awliyā*ᵓ in a *majmū*ᶜ*a* of his *Rasā*ᵓ*il*, Cairo 1935, pp. 100-38, early manuscript Lâleli 3664, fol. 195a-211b. I. Goldziher, "Zauberelemente im islamischen Gebet" in: *Orientalische Studien* 1/304 ff.

Ghazzālī and Ibn Abī'l-Dunyā have a whole series of such cases to relate. One of them might have been the model for the story ᶜAṭṭār tells about the old woman during the conflagration (above p. 580). He would then have "spiritualized" it in his own manner, raised it to a higher level of mystical love:

In Basra reed huts are burning but one among them remains unharmed. Abū Mūsā al-Ashʿarī, the governor, has the owner brought and asks him: "Why didn't your hut burn down?" The man answers: "I beseeched my God not to burn it." Then the governor remembers the above-cited *ḥadīth*. (*Awliyāʾ* p. 109, no. 42; *Iḥyāʾ* 4/292; *Stufen* 721/F.234; *Ṣifat al-ṣafwa* 4/7).

Beseeching God, making an impertinent request like this, is not allowed for everyone. Only someone who is in a special relationship of intimacy (*uns*) with God may allow himself such unconstrained behavior (*inbisāṭ*), such audacious reliance on his preferential position as a friend of God (*idlāl*). Whoever might wish to imitate this privileged person would be destroyed and end up in danger of unbelief. (*Qūt* 2/64; *Nahrung* 2/532/32.773; *Iḥyāʾ* 4/292, *Bayān maʿnā'l-inbisāṭ wa'l-idlāl*; *Stufen* 720/F.232). In this respect these saints are close to the category of the holy fools who are excused after having done similar things (above pp. 169 f.). Frequently both categories also coincide with one another.

This is the case, for example, with the negro Burkh (?) whom Moses has ask God for rain. God's kindness, which here appears to be personified, finds enjoyment, as it were, in its deranged impudent admirer, and grants him what he wants.

The Israelites are suffering from a drought. Moses arranges a prayer for rain, but without success. To his request God replies that he should have the black slave Burkh pray for rain. The negro's prayer is in fact answered. When the negro boasts because of this before Moses with insolent words, Moses becomes angry and wants to punish him. But Gabriel informs him that God says: "This negro has been Our slave for a long time. Three times a day he causes Our kindness (*luṭf*) to laugh like the rose petals of spring. You're unable to do this. Only he can do it." (MN 3/2).

In the original version in Arabic the slave's prayer is presented. In its boldness it fully recalls ʿAṭṭār's fools:

What's this behavior of Yours? What sort of patience is this? What's this You've taken into Your head? Has rain become scarce for You, or don't the winds obey You anymore? Or are Your provisions exhausted? Or has Your anger become so intense against sinners? Weren't You a forgiver before You created the sinners? You created mercy and recommended kindness, and do You now act against Your own command? Or do You want to show us that You can say no? Or do You want to punish us quickly because You're afraid You'll lose the opportunity to do so?" And he went on speaking like this until the Children of Israel were wet from rain, and God made the grass grow knee-high in half a day. (*Qūt* 2/65-66; *Nahrung* 2/538 f./32.780; *Iḥyāʾ* 4/292; *Stufen* 720/F.233; *1001 Nacht* [Littmann] 3/746 ff.).

Another story about a negro who successfully prays for rain in the Islamic period occurs in the *Kitāb al-Awliyā'* p. 112, no. 53; *Ṣifat al-ṣafwa* 2/152 ff.; similarly Qalyūbī, *Nawādir* no. 9; about the fool Saᶜdūn, *Ṣifat al-ṣafwa* 2/289; *Rawḍ al-rayāḥīn* no. 21; Chauvin 6/186; cf. also the prayer of the bedouin in *Kāmil* 562 cited in von Grunebaum, *Medieval Islam* 119.

Rābiᶜa speaks a wholly similar bold language which reminds one of the fools:

During the pilgrimage the donkey on which she has loaded her luggage dies. She then lifts her face to the sky and says: "Lord, is this the way kings treat an abandoned, weak woman? You've called me to Your house, and do You then cause my donkey to die half-way on the road and leave me standing alone in the desert?" She had still not finished speaking when the donkey sprang up again fresh and lively. (TA $1/61_{13-19}$).

Abū Ḥafṣ al-Ḥaddād meets a peasant who's upset and when he questions him, the man tells him that his donkey has strayed off. Nor does he have another donkey. Abū Ḥafṣ then stands still and says: "By Your divine honor (*wa-ᶜizzatik*), I won't walk one step further until You've returned his donkey to this man!" In fact the donkey immediately appears, and Abū Ḥafṣ can continue on his way. (*Iḥyā'* 4/292; *Stufen* 721 f./F.235).

Occasionally the prophets as well are among those to whom this free speech and not entirely reverential behavior is allowed. Noah reproaches God about the pots he is ordered to smash to pieces (above pp. 266 f.); Moses is allowed to break the tablets with the laws which God gave him because he is a lover of God (MN 27/4), and so on.

Additional examples in *Qūt* 2/64-65; *Nahrung* 2/528 ff.

21

As Muḥammad Ghazzālī informs us, this free and unceremonious way of behaving toward God is the fruit of *uns*, "intimacy". As a human emotion *uns* means a sense of well-being in close proximity to a beloved person, which is not impaired by fear and inhibiting shyness and awe, nor is it disturbed by the anxiety of unsatisfied yearning for someone who is absent. God is perceived as directly nearby, not in His majesty but as a familiar being in whose closeness one feels comfortable, unconstrained, intimate and safe. This feeling of intimacy brings with it that special relationship between the lover of God and God which allows the former to take certain liberties (*idlāl*), to exploit his being liked by behaving more feely and making use of a form of speech which others cannot permit themselves.

If intimacy (*uns*) persists and gains the upper hand and consolidates itself and isn't brought into confusion by the anxiety of yearning and isn't impaired by fear of change (in the relationship) and being excluded, it brings forth as fruit a kind of bold confidentiality (*inbisāṭ*) in speech and behavior and in conversation with God which, in its form, is sometimes offensive because of the boldness and lack of reverence associated with it. This is tolerated in the case of people who have been posted in the halting-station (*maqām*) of intimacy (*uns*). But if someone who hasn't been posted in this halting-station imitates these people in actions and words, he is thereby destroyed and ends up in danger of unbelief. (*Iḥyā*ʾ 4/292, beginning of the chapter *Bayān maʿnā'l-inbisāṭ wa'l-idlāl*; *Stufen* 720/F.232).

The "halting-station" of *uns* is already very clearly described by Junayd.

In this halting-station the bondsman of God knows that God loves him and says something like: "On account of the claim I have on You", or "On account of the esteem I enjoy with You", or "On account of the love which You have for me". These are the ones who on the basis of God's love for them take liberties (*al-mudillūna ʿalā'llāh*), feel they are in an intimate relationship with Him (*al-mustaʾnisūna bi'llāh*), who sit together with God (and don't stand before him as before a person to be respected), for whom respectful shyness has been removed, and among whom the feeling of reserve between them and God has ceased. They say things which among ordinary people would signify unbelief, because they know that God loves them and that they enjoy esteem and honorific rank with Him. (*Qūt* 2/77; *Nahrung* 2/585 f./32.840).—But according to another tradition Junayd claims to know that awe (*hayba*) is maintained during *uns*. (*Lumaʿ* 66_1; *Schlaglichter* 119 f./34.3).

Ghazzālī comments on the concept of *uns* by contrasting it with that of yearning (*shawq*) and that of fear (*khawf*) but without doing justice to all the emotional nuances which the word contains. He explains:

When the state which dominates the lover is such that he sees the divine beauty as if behind a veil from a distance but feels that he is still very far away, his heart is compelled to seek and desire. This is yearning (*shawq*). If he has the feeling of closeness, of beholding the presence of God, without his grieving about what he has not yet reached and perceived, then his heart delights in what it sees, and this delight is called intimacy (*uns*). But if his gaze is directed at the characteristics of loftiness, lack of need, and the indifference of God, and at the danger that his vision may end and that distance may replace it, then the feeling of pain which this arouses is fear (*khawf*). Intimacy manifests itself in the fact that the lover feels constrained when in contact with people and feels collected and happy in the solitude of recollecting God. (*Iḥyā*ʾ 4/291, *Bayān maʿnā'l-uns*; *Stufen* 717 f./F.226).

Thus intimacy is a possible emotional component of "presence" (*ḥuḍūr*). (Cf. the story about the *pīr* who lives all alone, above p. 345).

The feeling of intimate security in the presence of God can become increased to a vivid feeling of joy, of sheer delight in God.

Ibrāhīm al-Māristānī defines *uns* as the heart's joy in the Beloved. (*Lumaᶜ* 66_2; *Schlaglichter* 120/34.3)

Someone asks Junayd: "When is the heart happy?" He answers: "Then when He is in the heart." (Anṣārī, *Ṭabaqāt* 224).

God says to David: "Tell the upright men of piety they should take pleasure in Me and experience joy in recollecting Me!" (*Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/128).—The commentator in connection with this *ḥikma* relates the story about ᶜUtba al-Ghulām who walks into the room proudly because he has become God's slave and God has become his master (above pp. 291 f.), as well as another story about a pilgrim to Mecca who is dancing for joy with the Koran in his hand and answers a surprised person who questions him about this: "I said to myself: 'Whose slave am I and whose word do I read and whose house am I seeking?' Then an exuberant feeling (*wajd*) overpowered me and I began to dance."

The story about Majnūn who whenever someone mentions Laylā's name, becomes beside himself with joy and has the beloved name repeated to himself (above p. 419), is introduced by ᶜAṭṭār with the exhortation to be happy in God: "To be happy in an unhappy situation as well, this is perfection. For to seek happiness directly (actually *naqd*... cash, something one has in one's hand) is impossible... You must be happy in Him, otherwise you'll be unhappy. If you're actually happy in Him (through Him), then you have the happiness of a whole world directly in your hand (*tu dārī naqd-i shādhī-i jihān-ē.* IN p. $122_{8,\ 11\text{-}12}$).

One of the birds asks the hoopoe what he can find pleasure in during the long journey to the Sīmurgh so the journey doesn't become disagreeable. The hoopoe exhorts him to find pleasure in God. (MṬ 35/0, pp. 117-18; see above p. 315).

A lover of God feels so pleasant in the presence of God that he doesn't understand why he must die.

A lover weeps when the hour of his death arrives. When they ask him why he's weeping, he says: "I'm weeping because I must die now. How can I die since my heart is actually with Him? How can a person die whose heart is with God? Since my heart is united with Him in love, it seemed impossible to me that I would have to die." (MṬ 35/2, p. 118).

In ᶜAṭṭār the euphoria of the mystical fool sometimes occupies the position of happiness in God, seeing as how in our poet the fool is often the representative of love of God and has an especially intimate relationship with divinity. Then again, sometimes a religious reason for this happiness on the fool's part is scarcely

discernible. We have already recounted the stories in this category in a different connection (Chapt. 15/7 above).

22

The lover of God yearns to see God. To behold God's face in the hereafter is for him the highest, indeed the only joy in Paradise.

With regard to seeing God in the hereafter, early orthodoxy put forward the proposition: "God will be seen on the Final Day with the eyes, the way one sees the moon on the night of the full moon." (Ashᶜarī, *Maqālāt* 292). Of course, Ghazzālī, who was averse to all forms of anthropomorphism, did not neglect to assert that this beholding does not refer to a special image which will be seen in a particular place or in a particular direction, but that it is a question of a gradually more perfect form of earthly, intelligible knowledge of God in which one also does not imagine any particular image. (*Iḥyāᵓ* 4/268, *Bayān al-sabab fī ziyādat al-naẓar*; *Stufen* 661/F.93).

The mystics are not so timid.

Bāyazīd says: "If God demands a reckoning from me for my seventy years, then I'll demand a reckoning from Him for seventy thousand years. Indeed, seventy thousand years ago He said: 'Am I not your Lord?' (above pp. 351 f.) and made them all confused by having them say: 'Yes.' All the longing which is in heaven and on earth comes from longing for this 'Am I not...'" Then Bāyazīd said: "After that I heard a voice which declared: 'Hear the answer! On the day of reckoning We'll make your seven bodily members into atoms and give an eye to each atom and say to you: "This is the reckoning for the seventy thousand years. And the total and the remainder We've placed in your lap."'" (TA $1/159_{15\text{-}21}$; less clear in MN 10/1).

Perhaps connected with this story are the words of a Ṣūfī who says: "I wish I were responsible for all humanity's sins so that God would exact a reckoning from me for each one (and I could then look at Him that much longer). (*Anwār al-rabīᶜ* 755. See the profane parallel story above p. 414).

ᶜAlī ibn al-Muwaffaq sees himself transported to Paradise in a dream. There he sees a man seated at a table who is waited upon and fed by angels. He also sees the guardian of Paradise at the gate and how he lets one person in and drives another person away. Finally, in the innermost holy garden, he sees a man who gazes fixedly at God. He asks the guardian of Paradise who this is. The angel answers: "Maᶜrūf al-Karkhī. He served God not out of fear of His Hell-fire, nor out of longing for His Paradise, but out of love for Him. That's why God has allowed him to gaze at Him until the Day of Resurrection." (*Qūt* 2/56; *Nahrung* 2/480/

32.705; *Iḥyā*ʾ 4/266, *Bayān anna ajall al-ladhdhāt, etc.*; *Stufen* 661/F.86).

On the Final Day, at God's command a youth is led into a castle which has been assigned to him. The castle has many thousands of windows but in whichever window he looks, he sees only God. (IN 8/8, p. 70).

A pious man is asked what he longs for in the grave after death. He answers: "A soul within which the beauty of God can be seen. The eye should be fixed on it from all directions and not stray from it for one moment. I want to remain like this until the Day of the Resurrection." (MN 10/10).

God has no one who is like Himself (just as Maḥmūd has no Maḥmūd the way Ayāz does, above p. 341), but human beings have a God. That is why they sit in expectation of seeing Him. (MN 10/6 at the end).

If you desire beauty's manifestation, from head to foot become an eye for the Beloved so that in Paradise they grant you vision with this eye for all eternity. For the soul a seeing eye is provisions for the road (on the journey to the hereafter). Ever ask your God for eyes! (MN in 10/7).

There follows as amplification the story about the man who didn't recognize in the dog the guest whom God had sent to him (MN 10/8; above p. 339), as well as the famous story about Majnūn:

Hārūn has heard about Majnūn's love for Laylā and wishes to behold her celebrated beauty. He has Laylā brought to him, but doesn't find that she's especially beautiful. He calls Majnūn and says to him: "This Laylā, whose beauty has caused you to lose your reason, is really not so beautiful!" Majnūn replies: "Laylā's beauty has no defect but your eye has a defect. In order to recognize her beauty, one must possess the loving eye of Majnūn." (MN 10/9. Cf. *Mathnawī* 1/407-08; Saᶜdī, *Gulistān* 5, story 18).

Abū ᶜAlī Ṭūsī says: "Here you're in perfect torment. For from head to foot you're (in) violation. You're all back. Become all face on the path, there become all sight, all eyes! Become all eyes, all heart! Etc." (IN 22/2, p. 355).

You must have a hundred eyes in order to see a hundredfold. Whoever has sight like this never rests from looking for one moment. (MN 10/4 at the end).

Amplification:

They ask an Arab why he eats with his five fingers. He answers: "Because I have no sixth one." (MN 10/5).

One must take along to the hereafter a seeing eye so that one may there behold God's beauty in perfection. One's eye must already become capable of seeing God in the here and now.

However, the earthly eye would not be able to bear the radiance of divine beauty, just as weak lovers cannot bear the sight of the beauty of their earthly beloveds but die. "God has seventy partition walls of light and darkness. If He were to remove them,

the radiance of His face would burn everyone who looked at Him."

Wensinck, *Concordance* 1/449b; *Mishkāt al-anwār* of Muḥammad Ghazzālī 47; Nallino, *Raccolta* 2/243; Ibn Taymiyya, *Radd* 69.

In a paraenetic passage ᶜAṭṭār reproaches his listener for his presumption and weakness:

Without a hundred troubles you won't acquire a grain of gold. Will you hasten to reach God without trouble?... You say: "I want nothing besides God, I don't want Paradise and the Ḥūrīs... Before a lion your strength (literally: gall-bladder) turns to water, how do you expect to endure that awesomeness? Even a pain causes your reason to collapse. How do you expect your reason to stay in its place there?"

Amplification:

The gnat complains to Solomon about the wind which continually drives it to and fro. Solomon has the wind summoned. When the wind appears, the gnat takes to its heels. It's blown away by it. Solomon delivers the judgement: "The wind has done nothing wrong, but the gnat didn't have the strength to remain." (AN 7/4; *Mathnawī* 3/4624 ff.).

However, one can see God's beauty indirectly, in its reflection.

Since no one has an eye capable of seeing that beauty but we can't endure without that beauty, and since no one can pursue love-play with His beauty, out of His perfect kindness He has fashioned a mirror which is our heart. If you want to see His face, then look in your heart!

A king was so beautiful that he only went out riding with a veil on. Everyone who looked at him was killed, everyone who spoke his name had his tongue cut out. Thousands died from the grief of love, and whoever looked upon his beauty by accident, for instance, immediately died. Finally, when the dying of the people surpassed all bounds, the king had a large mirror set up and had the people look at him in the mirror.—The mirror is your heart. (MṬ 13/1, pp. 42-43).

It is possible that ᶜAṭṭār here had in mind an inner vision of God in a beautiful human form, which in fact is also suggested by the symbolism of those love stories about beautiful princes and by the characteristic which frequently occurs in love poetry, namely that the lover carries and sees the distant beloved in his heart. But the verses which then immediately follow point in a completely different direction, that of pantheism.

Every garment which adorns the meadow is a shadow of the beautiful Sīmurgh. If the Sīmurgh shows you His beauty, then you see the shadow of the Sīmurgh without delusion. Whether it's thirty birds or forty, everything you see is the Sīmurgh's shadow.

This means that everything that exists is an emanation of divinity (see pp. 620 f. below). The mystic, even in the here and now, sees God everywhere, just like that youth in the hereafter (p. 589).

23

Earlier mystical literature emotionally justifies seeing God everywhere and refers to the analogy of the psychic states of earthly lovers. Majnūn enters Laylā's village and there kisses every wall and every door. Asked about this, he says that everywhere he has only seen Laylā's face (above p. 420).

The man of God here sees nothing besides God. For here there is neither Kaᶜba, nor convent. From Him he hears words (which are spoken), through Him his existence is maintained. He at no time sees anyone other than Him and for all time knows no one besides Him. He is in Him, from Him and with Him, and at the same time outside of all three. (MṬ p. 147, verses 3690-93).

The whole world is beauty upon beauty, but the blind man says this is impossible. If you become seeing... then you see a hundred rosegardens in every atom. If the whole world is the Worshipped One (God), and if you have no eyes, what use is it? (IN p. $79_{3, 5b, 1}$).

This phenomenon of seeing God everywhere has found very beautiful poetic expression in the second poem of Pseudo-Bābā Kūhī (see above p. 496):

In secret and among human beings I saw God. In the valleys and in the hills I saw God. I saw Him with me in torment. I saw God in good fortune and when receiving gifts. I opened my eye with the sight of His countenance. In the midst of eyes I saw God. In every mote of a sunbeam which revealed itself to sight, in the sun with the moon-like face I saw God. I burned in His fire like a candle. In the midst of the flames I saw God. I saw myself clearly with my own eye. With the eye of God I saw God. No one besides God sees God, it is said. Who am I then that I saw God somewhere? I became utterly extinct and was non-existent. In extinction I saw God as permanence (or permanent). I went from door to door, begging for God.[14] In everything, in the king and in the beggar, I saw God... In the tongue and the palate of every existing thing (when it said): "Our Lord, our Lord!", I saw God. In prayer and the performance of worship, in the praise and utterance of God's name, as well as in the law of Muṣṭafā, I saw God. Not as an ac-

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14 I read: *dar ba-dar gashtam ba-shay li-llāh-i ō*. Literally: "I went from door to door with His beggar's request (the beggar's request for Him): '(Give) something for the sake of God!'" Beggars say: "*Shayʾan li'llāh!*" That which he asks for is *ō* = God.

cident, nor as a body, not as substance, nor as soul, not as "What?" and "How?" and "Why?", I saw God.[15]

However, seeing and feeling God everywhere in this way is not only an emotional psychic state of the mystic. It is connected, here evidently already in a characteristic manner, with a pantheistic theory which will be dealt with below in Chapter 29.

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[15] Nicholson, *Eastern Poetry and Prose* 101, cited in Smith, *Rābiʿa* 64, appears to have had a divergent text before him.

CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT

EXTINCTION AND UNION WITH DIVINITY

The highest goal of all mysticism is union with divinity, with the world-ground. In Islamic mysticism this *unio mystica* manifests itself in a series of varying forms, and does not always appear in the same form or under the same aspect even in one particular mystic. Utterances of mystics at times place one side of the experience in the foreground and at times another, now shimmer with this color, now with that color. Sometimes utterances of union with God appear as an expression of exuberant moments (*shaṭḥiyyāt*) and as such are, so to speak, excused and accepted by the Islamic community. Other times they are an expression of an enduring, intensified religious self-importance, in which case the mystic, especially if the union with God he claims to have attained appears to his critics to be related to Christian or Manichaean doctrines (*ḥulūl*, *ittiḥād*, *zandaqa*), runs the risk of being persecuted by the orthodox authorities (Ḥallāj). At times they are privately cultivated emotional experiences which are revealed in mystical poems (ᶜUmar Ibn al-Fāriḍ), at times one instead encounters a rational system of thought about which theologians are in dispute as to whether its character is acceptable or heretical (Ibn ᶜArabī). On occasion the experience has a clearly erotic character and has analogies with the experience of profane love, other times a longing predominates to penetrate on the path of inner experiences to knowledge of the primordial world-ground, the ground of Being. Sometimes the goal of longing is the personal God of theism, other times the mystic's idea of a personal God merges into the pantheistic concept of a divine universe, of "Being", within which he wishes to become submerged. Moreover, the characteristic correlation between God and ego results in the mystic sometimes thinking that everywhere he looks he finds only God, and at times thinking he finds only himself everywhere, so that we are not sure whether we are dealing with a mystical theology or a mystical anthropology.

It cannot here be our task to trace the various forms of mystical experience of oneness through the centuries of Islamic religious history. We are primarily concerned with ᶜAṭṭār and shall only bring in statements not by ᶜAṭṭār when we feel the latter make his ideas more comprehensible. Thus we shall endeavor, as far as possible, to present in an ordered sequence the different aspects and nuances which the experience of oneness displays in his epics.

1

The Prophet on his heavenly ascension, according to ᶜAṭṭār, attains union with God when his guide Gabriel can no longer accompany him any further and the Prophet alone is admitted into God's presence. This moment of the heavenly ascension is readily used to demonstrate the *unio mystica.*

ᶜAṭṭār once says that God on that occasion concluded the ancient Arabian blood-bond (*musāqāt*) with Muḥammad.

If two Arab lords wished to enter a bond of friendship with each other, they joined two bows together as a sign that the two of them had become one. If this bond, known as *ᶜaqd al-musāqāt*, was concluded, then the words and deeds of the two were united with one another. The property of the one was the property of the other, the situation of the one was the situation of the other. Duality, I and you, ceased. That night God concluded such a bond with the Prophet. They placed the two bows of the *qāba qawsayn* (surah 53/9) on top of one another. Since this bond was concluded, the words and deeds of the Prophet are the genuine words and deeds of God. (MN 0/3).

The translation of *musāqāt* as blood-bond is arbitrary. The word, which has a completely different meaning in Arabic, could at most signify that persons offer one another something to drink, possibly even their own blood. Alliances between parties were indeed concluded with such rites in pagan Arabia (Pedersen, *Der Eid bei den Semiten* 26), but blood-brotherhoods of this kind are neither found in Arabian paganism, nor in Islam. When Ibn Taymiyya issues a *fatwā* against concluding such bonds with the drinking of blood, in the opinion of Nallino (*Raccolta* 4/626-29) it is a matter of military brotherhoods of non-Arab and non-Islamic (perhaps Mongol-Turkish?) origin. Placing bows on top of one another is an invention of ᶜAṭṭār's. It is conceived on the basis of the expression *qāba qawsayn* which in the Koran designates the distance at which Muḥammad beheld one of his two visions mentioned in the Koran. "He stood upright on the highest horizon, then He drew near and descended and was (only) two bow-lengths away or even closer and revealed to His servant that which He revealed." (Surah 53/6-10. J. Horovitz, "Muhammeds Himmelfahrt" in: *Der Islam* 9/1919/159). Generally, the mystics have allowed themselves very free interpretations of this *qāba*

qawsayn. Cf. e.g. Joachim Hein, "Bogenhandwerk und Bogensport bei den Osmanen" in: *Der Islam* 15/1926/263.

Thus the union of the Prophet with God is here pictured in the form of a profound bond between the two partners. But this representation stands in total isolation, the story does not really mean much, and one should not draw far-reaching conclusions from it. One of the preceding verses already points in a completely different direction: the *m* of *Aḥmad* (= Muḥammad) was erased and *Aḥad* (the one God, cf. surah 112/1) was produced from *Aḥmad*. The one God remained, Aḥmad disappeared.

Indeed, union of God and man, the removal of duality, takes place in Islamic mysticism in such a way that the human partner is, so to speak, dissolved in divinity, or room is made for divinity so that in place of two only one still remains, God. The lover must become the beloved, not the other way round. (Cf. the passage in the *Sawāniḥ* above p. 422).

The process by means of which union occurs is "disappearance", *fanā᾽*, i.e. extinction.

Cf. Nicholson on *Mathnawī* 1/128; Jīlī, *al-Insān al-kāmil* 1/54, *Bāb* 18.

Now this concept appears in ᶜAṭṭār in varying shades which we shall examine in what immediately follows.

2

Fanā᾽ is directed against the individual ego and therefore, to begin with, can have a purely ethical character. Indeed, we also employ the expression "selflessness".

If everything you have is for Him, then you're worthy of His friendship. But if you like yourself more than Him, then you're an enemy.

A youth visits Maᶜshūq Ṭūsī who is sick and begins to recite the *Fātiḥa* so that the breath of it may have an effect on the sick man. Maᶜshūq stops him, saying: "If you recite the *Fātiḥa*, then cast the breath on God! This is not seemly for this poor man. He should have everything, not I." (MN 37/11).

To direct thoughts to oneself, to say "I", is already an ethical-religious fault. ᶜAṭṭār time and again demands "being without an ego", *bē-khwēshī*, the state of not saying "I". To begin with, this eliminates over-evaluation of one's own person, vanity regarding religious status and the position one has attained, but at the same time is the pre-condition for actual extinction.

After ᶜAṭṭār has related the story about Shaykh Abū Bakr Nēshāpūrī who is cured of his vain ideas by his donkey's fart (MṬ 34/1; above p. 302), he contin-

ues: "Oh you who every moment in every root of your hair are another Pharaoh (Pharaoh claimed to be God)! As long as one atom of yourself still remains, a hundred signs of your insincerity (*nifāq*) still remain (with you)... If one day you attain extinction of the ego, you become light, even if you're a night within night. Don't say 'I', you who are in a hundred torments because of I-ness, lest Satanhood come over you as a torment!" (MṬ p. 115, verses 2908-09, 2911-12).

God says to Moses he should obtain a wise lesson (*ramz*) from the devil. When Moses meets the devil and asks him for the lesson, the devil says to him: "Never forget this one word: 'Don't say "I"' (as I did when I said: 'I am better than he', namely Adam, surah 38/76), lest things turn out for you as they did for me!" (MṬ 34/2, p. 115; cf. *Asrār al-tawḥīd* 250, 256; O'Kane, *Secrets* 454, 464).

A pious man says: "It's better for a beginner to be completely in the dark and not to have any illuminations so that he becomes completely submerged in the ocean of divine grace and has no connection[1] with existence. For if he experiences illuminations, he will be deluded by pride and thus become an unbeliever." (MṬ 34/3, p. 115).

Vainly seeing oneself is what separates man from God. It causes man to be hated by God. (*Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/108). The lover rejects his favorite because the latter looked in the mirror (above p. 397). The slave who admires himself or looks in the mirror will be killed by the king (above p. 350). After the second of these two stories ᶜAṭṭār continues:

If you wish to enter into friendship with God (*khillat*), then arrive without your own being, without yourself (*bē-khwēsh*)! Don't look at one atom in your own existence lest you become deluded in pride by this atom! (MN 31/3).

In these stories and even more so in the poet's comments on them, the ethical concept of discarding the self as a cleansing of egotistical vices now passes over into a purely mystical concept, according to which from here on extinction signifies giving up self-assertion of the personality. The beautiful slave's looking at himself is not only a sign of reprehensible vanity. Directing one's gaze to oneself is *per se* already a partition wall which makes friendship (*khillat*) with God impossible.

3

In many stories, to be sure, there is no mention at all, or only an occasional hint, of a positive goal which is meant to be attained

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[1] Read: *bandash*.

by means of *fanā*ʾ. Interest is so focused on the act of negation that the negation itself almost seems to be the longed for goal, the quenching of a psychic need, although disappearance in God is always latently included in the process.

A dervish asks Shiblī who had been Shiblī's first guide on the path. He replies: "A thirsty dog that I saw standing by a body of water. It saw its own reflection in the water, thought this was a foreign dog and out of fear didn't dare approach the water. Finally, tormented by thirst, it threw itself into the water. The foreign dog instantly disappeared. Its own reflection had been the separating wall which held it back from the water. I then learned that my own ego is my separating wall, and I became divested of myself." (IN 12/12, pp. 195-96).

Soul and body should not remain with me, and if these two do remain, the "I" should not remain. "I" and "you" are a hundredweight of poison, one gram of which can overturn a mountain.

A king is riding along in great pomp. He sees a man sitting on the road and asks him: "Would you like to be me?" The one asked replies: "It's precisely 'me' I don't want to be!" (AN 6/3).

Great men look at things with the eye of non-being.

Shaykh Abū Saᶜīd sends three things as a gift to Maᶜshūq Ṭūsī[2] whom he reveres: a toothpick, a cap and sugar. Maᶜshūq refuses the gifts with fantastical aetiologies: "I eat and drink nothing but blood (grief) and therefore have no need of a toothpick. My mouth is always bitter from poison, so sugar is not suitable for me. A cap is only suitable for someone who has a head. But I have no head, I'm like a collar without a head. Keep your three things, one thing is enough for me!" (IN 12/7, p. 192).

The traveller at the juncture of three roads out of despair travels down the road from which there is no return. But ᶜAṭṭār explains that this is precisely the road of "truth", the actual road of mysticism which leads to annihilation in God. (MN 19/1; above p. 147).

One could also put the following story in the same category:

When Hippocrates[3] is dying, one of his students asks where they should bury him. He answers: "If you find me, you may bury me wherever you wish. I haven't found myself all throughout my long life. How will you find me in death? I've departed in such a way that at the moment of my death I don't have a hair's breadth of knowledge of myself." (MṬ 26/5, pp. 92-93. In the *Qābūsnāma*, at the end of chpt. 28, the story is told about Socrates without a mystical sense.—It surely goes back to Plato, *Phaedo* 105 C).—The story is used by ᶜAṭṭār as further amplification of the theme of not finding oneself and not knowing oneself.

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2 Read line 3 this way.

3 Mistake for graphically similar Suqrāṭ.

Become so lost that you cannot possibly find yourself!

A vistor knocks on Bāyazīd's door. Inside Bāyazīd is submerged in meditation. He asks the visitor: "Where do you come from?" The man answers: "I'm a foreigner who reveres you. I've come from far-off in order to see you." The shaykh answers: "Oh dervish, for thirty years I've been seeking Bāyazīd and haven't found him. I don't know where he's gone." (IN 22/9, p. 361).

An Arabic version:

It's related that Dhū'l-Nūn sent one of his disciples to Abū Yazīd so the disciple would inform him what sort of man Abū Yazīd is. When the disciple arrived in Bisṭām, he asked for Abū Yazīd's house and went in to see him. Abū Yazīd said: "Who is it you looking for?" The man: "Abū Yazīd." Abū Yazīd said: "Who is Abū Yazīd and where is Abū Yazīd? I'm looking for Abū Yazīd myself." Then the man left and said: "He's mad." Returning to Dhū'l-Nūn, he told him what he'd experienced. Dhū'l-Nūn then wept and said: "My brother, Abū Yazīd has departed among those who've gone to God!" (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 38, *Bāb al-ghayba*, etc.; *Sendschreiben* 125/2.9; shorter and somewhat divergent *Nūr* 73, 110, 117; Hujwīrī 322; in two forms TA $1/156_{16\text{-}20}$. And with the answer: "Be gone! There's no one in the house except God", *Nūr* 131).

But objections can even be levelled against this claim which asserts something about the ego.

A Ṣūfī receives a slap on the back of the neck from a ruffian. He turns around and says: "The one whom you've dealt this blow has been dead for thirty years and is departed. He finished with the world of existence (*ba-pāyān burd*) and is gone." The other says: "You hypocrite! Does a dead man speak? Shame on you!"—Whoever still speaks and attributes something to himself, asserts something about himself, is far from the halting-station of closeness to God (MṬ 44/3, p. 158).

Whoever has arrived hither for one moment disappears forever. His name becomes lost in both worlds, just like the dewdrop that enters the ocean.

A woman has lost her child and is wailing in the street. A Ṣūfī says to her: "Woman, don't wail! If you don't find the child in this world, you'll find it in the world to come." The woman says: "I also know that a person is either in this world or in the world to come." The Ṣūfī: "Whoever ends up among the Ṣūfīs disappears from both worlds. If your child had ended up among the Ṣūfīs, then you would really have to be sad. Because then his name would be extinguished for all eternity." (MN 35/5).—Only in the epilogue of this story is it mentioned that whoever finds closeness to God disappears in God like a drop in the ocean, just as above it is only Dhū'l-Nūn who gives this interpretation to Bāyazīd's words.

Sometimes different effects of extinction are vaguely hinted at by ᶜAṭṭār.

A stone and a clod of earth join company to travel about. By accident they both fall in the ocean. The stone says: "I've drowned. Now I can tell the bottom

of the ocean about my experiences." But the clod of earth disappears, it loses itself. I don't know where it's ended up and gone. It says in a mute language but one perceptible to a knowing person: "Nothing of my body has remained in both worlds. One can't see either my body or my soul."—If you dissolve and disappear in this ocean, you become a gleaming pearl. If you wish to keep your Being, you won't attain either life or wisdom. (IN 12/2, pp. 186-87).

You must abandon yourself so that this matter is a success for you. (IN p. 193_1).—It suits the reed pen to have its head cut off. For only in this way does writing come about. (IN p. 192_8).—As long as your own Being is before your eyes, you suffer eternal torment with yourself. (IN p. 194_{16}).

Only by discarding the self does one attain worth.

If you're not on hand, then you're completely on hand. As soon as you've reached nothingness, you're praised. As long as you're with yourself, people don't speak about you but if you're without self, then people seek only you.

The moon says: "Through the love I feel for the sun I'll fill the world with light for all eternity!" The moon is told: "If what you say is true, then day and night you must run in haste to reach the sun. And when you arrive there, you must disappear and be absorbed in him. You then burn away (astrological term) under his radiance, and only when you take on appearance once more (as the new moon), are people susceptible to your beauty. They point you out to one another with their fingers (at the beginning and end of the month of fasting) and open their eyes in order to see you." As long as the two-week-old moon vainly makes a show of her own beauty, nobody looks at her, but when she reaches self-destruction, she acquires worth. (IN 12/9, p. 194).

Extinction brings liberation.

You sit before your own eyes. Stand up and depart from your eyes. Then you'll find liberation! (IN p. 188_9).—Go away from the path of your sight! You're a barrier for yourself. Go away! If one hair's breadth of your selfhood continues to exist, you have a heavy chain around your leg. (IN 196_{8-9}).

4

Sometimes becoming a light is suggested as an effect of extinction, whether in the sense of becoming dematerialized, etherialized, in which process body turns into soul, or in the sense of taking on a real glow. (Cf. the story just related above about the clod of earth).

If one day you attain extinction of the ego, you become light, even if you're a night within night (above p. 596).—When the candle separates from its head (is trimmed with scissors), its light increases, and the darkness of the people gath-

ered around it becomes bright. (IN p. 192_{17})—The full moon[4] takes its abundance of light precisely from the decreasing of the crescent moon. (IN p. 194_{13}). Being devoid of your self is "light upon light" (surah 24/35). (IN p. 196_{13b}).

The body disappears in extinction or becomes soul.

If the "I" doesn't remain within you, then you travel on the path of soul, and the body doesn't remain. If body and soul become light, then your body becomes soul, and the soul becomes (the true) body. (AN 6/3).

While still here, one must make the body and soul into light.

Make body and soul into light with secrets, otherwise both will be caught together! Body and soul resemble the blind man and the cripple in the following allegory:

A blind man and a one-eyed cripple set out together to steal. The cripple sits on the blind man's shoulders and shows him the way. They're caught. The one-eyed cripple has his one eye put out, and the blind man is made into a cripple. (AN 6/7).

The story *Der Blinde und der Lahme* is widely disseminated in the West in medieval adaptations (Oesterley, *Gesta Romanorum*, p. 385, no. 71; Burkhard Waldis, *Esop*, ed. Kurz in: Deutsche Bibliothek, vol. 1, book 4, no. 61, pp. 145-46 and vol. 2, ftn. p. 168; Wesselski, *Mittelalter*, 244; Bolte-Polívka 4/323); Gellert, *Fabeln und Erzählungen* 1/28, took the material for his well-known fable of the same name from these sources. The subject itself, without a doubt, originates in the East and is already found early on in Jewish and Indian literature.

In Jewish legend (*Mechilta*, Friedmann 366; Horovitz p. 125; *Talmud, Sanhedrin* 91a-b) it's related: A king entrusts his garden to a lame and to a blind servant. The cripple sits on the blind man's back and they both steal the figs. Called to account by the king, the cripple defends himself by saying he can't walk and the blind man by saying he can't see. The clever king sits the cripple on top of the blind man and says: "This is how you ate my figs!" One day God will haul the soul and the body before the lawcourt in this manner. The body puts the blame on the soul, the soul on the body.—Additional literature: Joseph Perles, *Zur rabbinischen Sprach- und Sagenkunde*, 1873, pp. 79-81; I. Lévi, "L'aveugle et le cul-de-jatte", *Revue des Études Juives*, 23, 199-205; M. Steinschneider, *Die hebraeischen Übersetzungen*, p. 852, ftn. 43; idem, *Rangstreit-Literatur*, Sitzungsberichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. Kl., Bd. 155, Vienna 1908, pp. 58-60.

This parable is also found in the apocryphal scriptures, e.g. the Pseudo-Ezechiel (A. Resch, *Agrapha*, 2nd ed. 1906, Logion 56, p. 330; Nestle, OLZ 15/1912, column 254; and regarding the latter, Perles, column 348 and Marmorstein, column 449).

From this source the allegory and its application probably made its way into Islam. The story is not only found in the *ḥadīth* (I. Goldziher, *Vorlesungen*, 1910, p. 74; 2nd ed. 1925, pp. 39, 312) and in Arabic wisdom literature: "The Brethren of Purity", *Le Livre de la Création*,

4 Read line 138: *du hafta*.

ed. C. Huart, Paris 1900-1903, 2, 11 (Arabic), 110 (French trans.); *Mufīd al-ʿulūm wa-mubīd al-humūm*, Cairo 1310, 65 (from Goldziher, "Der Seelenvogel, etc." in: *Globus* 83/1903, p. 301); al-Bīrūnī, *India*, trans. E. Sachau, I, p. 47 and in the apocryphal literature (Thilo, *Codex apocryphus*, p. 145; Roesch, "Jesusmythen" in: *Theol. Stud. u. Kritiken* 1876, p. 443; Thaʿlabī, *ʿArāʾis* 243), but in Arabic *belles-lettres* as well: *1001 Nacht* (Littmann) 6/51-53; Chauvin 2/221, 3/52; idem, *La Récension Égyptienne des Mille et une Nuits*, Brussels 1899, p. 80; E. Galtier, *Futūḥ al-Bahnasā* (Mém. de l'Inst. Franç. d'Arch. Orient. du Caire, XXII, 1909) p. 20, ftn. 1. It is interesting that in the "Brethren of Purity" reference is made to Indian sources. In fact the existence of this subject-matter in India can be demonstrated, and moreover the connection of body and soul is typical of the Sāmkhya philosophy. The philosopher Ishvarakrishna in his Sāmkhya-Kārikā teaches the following: the connection of the spirit and nature is like that of the blind man and the cripple. The cripple sits on the shoulders of the blind man, and with him the blind man proceeds along his way (H. Dutt Sharma, *The Sāmkhya-Kārikā*, Poona 1933, p. 33; Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, 1909, p. 185). Thus one could also imagine an Indian origin. On the other hand, M. Steinschneider wishes to interpret *hind* in the "Brethren of Purity" as a mistake in transcription for *hūd* meaning *yahūd* = Jewish. The question of the origin of the subject-matter must still be studied in greater detail. (Cf. as well O. Spies, *Der Orient in der deutschen Literatur* II, Kevelaer 1951, pp. 13-15, and B. Heller in *Handwörterbuch des deutschen Märchens* 1/277-78).

5

Becoming dematerialized and turning into light often go hand in hand with death and resurrection. (Cf. above p. 194)

Soul and body are related to one another like the front and back of a mirror. If the back is erased, then the whole glass becomes light, both sides become the same. (AN 6/3; above p. 194).

Your soul is like a lamp in the open country, which is screened by the niche of the body. If the niche disappears, then the open country becomes eternally shining like the sun. (IN p. $208_{5\text{-}6}$).

One must forestall life's dematerialized state in the hereafter by already undergoing death before one's physical demise. (Above p. 195). In a *ḥadīth* it says: "Die before you die!"

Mūtū qabla an tamūtū. Ibn al-Daybaʿ 220.

If you die before physical death, you'll attain the whole world in that one moment. (IN p. 387_{13}).—Become such that when the hour of your death arrives, your body has remained but your soul, without self, has already departed. If you die before the hour of death, through your death[5] you'll have abundance (*barg*) in eternity. (IN p. $208_{3\text{-}4}$).

5 Read: *zi-margat*.

Deliverance from the body is achieved in advance by means of mystically divesting oneself of self.

In the hereafter, instead of the sorrow which we undergo in the here and now, we'll be allotted joy and happiness. But the pre-condition for attaining those joys is that one must separate from one's self (*az khwadh burīdhan*). If you die here unto your Being, you'll grasp the door-ring of the door there. (AN 11/0).

An Indian wise man comes to the court of a ruler in Turkestan. The ruler keeps a parrot in a cage. The parrot requests of the wise man that when he returns to India, he ask the parrots there how he can free himself from the cage and join them again. The wise man does as he was bid. The parrots to whom he puts the question of their imprisoned comrade, instead of giving an answer fall from the trees they were sitting in, as if they're dead. The wise man, who doesn't understand their behavior, upon his return to Turkestan relates to the imprisoned parrot that his comrades, due to grief at the sad message that their brother is in captivity, fell to the earth dead. The parrot understands better what they wished to say. He pretends to be dead, and a servant takes hold of him by the leg and throws him into the ashhouse, whence he then flies back to India delighted.—Die unto yourself so that you attain deliverance! If you die, you'll live eternally. (AN 11/1. Cf. *Mathnawī* 1/1547 ff.).

Sometimes physical death is also conceived of as extinction, as in the story about the dervish who dies in the presence of the prince (above pp. 439 f.), and in the story about the forty wearers of ascetic robes (above p. 549).

After the already quoted verse: "If one hair of selfhood still remains with you, you'll have a heavy chain on your leg" (p. 599), ᶜAṭṭār then continues: "It would be better for you, oh ephemeral man, if they had carried you straight from the cradle to the coffin. That's why Moses attained such rank with God because he was transferred directly from the cradle to the coffin (the box in which he was exposed). If you wish for His continuous presence, then don't bring yourself with you!" (IN p. $196_{10\text{-}12}$).

If you wish for life in death, you must know that the illusion consisting of life is death. If you want the sign of eternity, you'll find such a sign through lack of all signs.

Jamshēdh's drinking-cup says to Kay-Khusraw: "If you wish to become like us, abandon yourself and become extinct unto yourself! In this place a fortress of extinction is necessary, otherwise blows will reach you from all sides."—When Kay-Khusraw became aware of this secret, he found that his hand was empty of sovereignty. It became clear to him that his sovereignty was nothing but transitoriness, for existence in the earthly world has no permanence. When he saw that the field of I-ness was a partition wall for him, he saw that the garb of being-without-self suited him. Like "the men" he gave up short-lived sovereignty, proclaimed the profession of faith and lay down in extinction. He sat Luhrāsp in

his place on the throne, entered a cave and took that magic drinking-cup with him, and he went beneath the snow—and think no more about it! Whoever has drowned, there's no trace of him. Those on the shore have no knowledge of him. (IN in 12/1, pp. 185-86).

Regarding the end of Kay-Khusraw who, according to Iranian legend, renounced the kingship and disappeared in the snow of the Alburz mountains cf. Arthur Christensen, *Les Kayanides*, Copenhagen 1931, Det Kgl. Danske Videnskabernes Selskab, Hist.-fil. Mededelser XIX, 2, p. 117.

The following verses appear to describe dream-like life as being completely a process of extinction and passing away:

You too are in the middle of the whirlpool. You don't know that you're asleep. For along with us you're a piece of ice in the sun or a handfull of earth (*gil*) on the surface of the water. If you enter the ocean without a ship, then the ocean tells you what you are. (IN p. 186_{9-11}).

6

The mystic's longing is both the longing of love as well as the longing for knowledge. For knowledge renunciation of the "ego" is also a prerequisite.

Cf. Otfried Becker, *Plotin* 35, 43 ff.

A symbol for that knowledge which is linked with the prerequisite of extinction is the drinking-cup of Jamshēdh that works like a magic mirror. Images of the world appear in it if one does not see oneself, if one has disappeared.

Kay-Khusraw sits and looks into Jamshēdh's magic drinking-cup. In it he sees the secrets of the seven countries, the course of the seven planets and everything else that there is. But the king looks in vain for the cup itself among the things which appear in the drinking-cup. He doesn't see Jamshēdh's drinking-cup. Finally written words appear: "How can you see us in ourself? We've become extinct unto ourself. Who would be able to see us in the earthly world? Body and soul have disappeared from us. Neither name nor trace has remained unto us. You're everything you see. We're not that. We shall never again come back in appearance. That's why one can see all things by means of us, because one can't see us." (IN 12/1, pp. 184-85).

On the magic drinking-cup cf. Arthur Christensen, *Les types du premier homme et du premier roi dans l'histoire légendaire des Iraniens*. IIe partie, Leyden 1934, in: Archives d'Études Orientales Vol. 14: 2, pp. 128-33; Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie*, the articles "Hydromanteia", "Katoptromanteia", "Lekanomanteia".

Likewise, one can only attain knowledge of oneself if one dies unto oneself.

If you seek knowledge of yourself, then die unto yourself and don't direct your gaze at yourself! ...(Let your eyes be a model for you:) they have died unto themselves for you. That's why they don't see themselves, because as long as they've existed they've chosen their own death... The dead don't see themselves. (IN p. 185_{13-16}).

Whoever becomes lost in the ocean of all[6] (see below) is lost and at peace forever. The heart finds nothing in this peaceful ocean except being lost. If it's returned from this state of being lost, then it becomes capable of sight into creation (*ṣunᶜbīn*), and many secrets are given to it. (MṬ in 44/0, p. 156, verses 3925-27).

This means that after overcoming subjectivity by annihilating the ego, in the second phase the mystic hopes to see things the way they really are.

All statements which man makes about the world-ground, about divinity, actually originate from his own subjectivity and express nothing about God Himself. (Above pp. 80-81). Even "recollecting God" (pronouncing His names) is impossible without divesting oneself of self.

If you recollect your own being lost, then you may recollect Him (speak of Him, recite His names). But as long as you have a separating wall (*sadd*) of selfhood before you, when you recollect Him, you only recollect yourself. (IN p. 123_{3-4}).

Indeed, the chief purpose of systematic "recollection of God", *dhikr*-performance, consists of eliminating consciousness of the ego and replacing it with consciousness of God.

Extinction is the pre-condition for direct experience of God, for beholding God.

Whoever allows even only a hair's breadth of himself in the picture will be barred from the vision. The man of God must be extinguished (*maḥw*) in both worlds. One shouldn't be able to distinguish the head from the foot. If there's the slightest distinction between them, then from head to foot you're an idol (which shuts you off from God). (MN 20/6, at the end).

Bē sar u pā būdhan, to be without head and foot, like the polo ball, is an image for the state of the extinguished mystic as well as for that of the confused and helpless poor man.

Amplification of the image:

A fool continually runs about barefoot and with bare head. Someone asks him: "Why are you going about with a bare head?" He answers: "Covering one's head is a woman's practice, not the practice of men." "But why are you barefoot?" The fool answers: "You dupe! If the head is bare, the foot is certainly not better than the head!"—One must gamble away foot and head on this path in or-

6 Read: *kul*.

der to learn one's own inestimable worth (*qadr-i bē-qadrī-i khwadh*). If you bring yourself into the picture (intrude in between), then you make the gain into loss. (MN 20/7).—This latter idea, in free amplification, is worked into the story about how Shiblī wants to divide a nut between two boys. (MN 20/2; above p. 223).

The lover of God weeps over the moment during which the vision of God in the hereafter will be interrupted, and he'll be returned to himself and will have to see himself. For he's only with God as long as he's free from seeing himself. (MN 20/6; above p. 529).

This disappearance at the moment of perception is likewise a disappearance within the object of perception, a becoming identical with it in the sense that one is extinguished in it.

The *Qūt al-qulūb* cites the verse: "You appeared to him whom You annihilated after he had previously been in existence. And thus he became without being because You were he."

Ẓaharta li-man afnayta baᶜda baqāʾihī fa-ṣāra bilā kawnin li-annaka kuntahū.
(*Qūt* 2/72; *Nahrung* 2/553/32.796).

The act of knowing is simultaneous with absorption in the object of knowledge, is in fact identical with absorption. But this results in the paradox that the subject of knowing simultaneously disappears as such, that there is no longer any information about the one who obtained information.

Abū Saᶜīd says: "For many years in every way I've sought a sign (of God or the world-ground). When I saw what I was seeking, I became lost. I became a drop in the ocean. Now I'm lost behind the secret's curtain. The lost person doesn't find again what was lost. Since you've become lost, what can you find of what was lost? Since the road is closed, what can you find behind the curtain?" (AN 11/3).

Here knowledge in extinction almost seems to change into an agnostic mood. Some of Bāyazīd's sayings point in the same direction.

They asked him: "What is the most amazing thing you've seen on this path?" He answered: "That anyone at all appears there again." (TA $1/142_{10-11}$; with "ocean" instead of "path" AN 12/2).

They asked him: "When does the bondsman reach God on this path?" He said: "Has one ever arrived? It would be amazing if one were to appear here!" (AN 11/2).

An Arabic version:

They asked him: "When does the bondsman of God reach God?" He answered: "You poor wretch! Has one ever reached Him? If only one atom of Him appeared

to creatures, neither the world would remain, nor that which it contains!" (*Nūr* 84).

Here, of course, the explanation is somewhat different. The one experiencing knowledge does not become annihilated because this is a pre-condition of knowing, but because he cannot sustain the splendor of the manifestation. (See above pp. 589 f.).

Thus the effacement of the ego is both a pre-condition and a consequence of the act of knowing. If effacement of the personality is taken seriously in the extreme, then the act of knowing becomes a mystical leap to death.

One night the moths assemble and speak about the object of their longing, the candle's flame. They decide to send one of their number to gather information about the flame. The scout flies close to the castle where the candle is burning, only sees its reflection on the empty space before the window, returns and gives a description as best he can. But his report is judged to be inadequate by an authoritative critic. The latter says the moth knows nothing about the candle. Then another moth flies there and penetrates as far as the light's gleam itself, but his report doesn't satisfy the critic either. Finally, a third moth flies there and hurls himself straight into the flame. The flame engulfs him and causes him to burn up completely in the fire. When the critic sees this from far-off, he says: "He alone really knows what the candle's flame is." Only he who has become devoid of knowledge and trace possesses knowledge. As long as you don't lose knowledge about body and soul—how do you expect to acquire knowledge of the Beloved! (MṬ 44/2, pp. 157-58).

The source for this symbolic story is *Ṭawāsīn* 16-17. There the text adds: "Whoever has reached sight (*naẓar*) no longer has any need of knowledge (*khabar*). And whoever has reached what is seen no longer has need of seeing."

Muḥammad says to the world-traveller who is seeking God: "As long as you're with yourself, there's no path... As long as one hair of you remains, intoxication and longing are your lot. But if you wish to have denudation (*faqr*) and extinction (*fanā*), you must become nothing in the Being of God. Be a shadow which has disappeared in the sun, become nothing!" (MN 35/0).

7

The union of the lover of God with his divine beloved is likewise achieved in the form of extinction. Asked what love is, Junayd answers that the characteristics of the beloved appear in place of the characteristics of the lover. (*Lumaᶜ* 59; *Schlaglichter* 110/30.4; Qushayrī, *Risāla* 145, *Bāb al-maḥabba*; *Sendschreiben* 442/48.7). In this connection Sarrāj recalls the saying of God: "My bondsman continues to draw near to Me through voluntary

works until I love him, and when I love him, then I am the hearing with which he hears, etc." (Above p. 576).—According to another definition, love is the annihilation of the lover with his characteristics and the "affirmation" (*ithbāt*) of the beloved and his being. (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 144; *Sendschreiben* 442/48.6).—The following verse is ascribed to Abū Sa[c]īd:

There's no trace left of me. Where does this love come from? I've become the beloved completely. Who is now the lover?

(*Asrār al-tawḥīd* 74; O'Kane, *Secrets* 176).

[c]Aṭṭār illustrates the lover's becoming one with the object of his love and his absorption in him, his being transformed into him, almost throughout with worldly love stories. (Above pp. 421 ff.). The classical example is always Majnūn with his Laylā already referred to by Shiblī (above p. 425). God has made him "the proof" (*ḥujja*) for the lovers of God (above p. 384). As we have already seen, to this early love couple [c]Aṭṭār added the later couple Maḥmūd and Ayāz, and many others as well.

The vanishing of consciousness of one's personality, symbolized by sleep, as a pre-condition for closeness in love is illustrated by [c]Aṭṭār with the story about Maḥmūd's visit to Ayāz who is asleep (IN 12/8; above pp. 428 f.).

When Ayāz wakes up and resumes consciousness of himself, Maḥmūd, who symbolically represents the divine Beloved, goes away. He says: "When I gazed at you (in sleep), then you were not there. I was there in your place. When you came back to yourself, the beloved disappeared. When you became the one seeking, the one sought after disappeared. Don't exist, my friend, so that you may be the Beloved. For if you exist, you're cut off by yourself. Put yourself behind you. For without yourself you're completely We! If you're not there, then you're there completely. If you reach nothingness, then you're completely Maḥmūd (also: praiseworthy)." (IN pp. 193-94).

Here losing consciousness in sleep is the symbol for shedding one's self, for extinction. Maḥmūd symbolizes divinity which appears if the mystic abandons his self. The same idea appears in a story about Rābi[c]a.

During the time period of your *fanā*, your Friend steps into your place without you.

A thief sneaks into Rābi[c]a's house while she's asleep, and steals her shawl. Then he can't find the way to the door. He puts down the garment and gropes his way back to the door. Then he picks up the shawl, and once more the door has disappeared for him. When he puts it down again, he again finds the door. Finally, a voice calls to him: "You must immediately return the shawl. If a friend is asleep, then another watches on his behalf. If you want the door, then put down

the shawl. If you want the shawl, then you have to remain sitting here." (MN 37/10; differently TA 1/63; Smith, *Rābiᶜa* 32).

We have already become acquainted (p. 429) with two other symbolic stories about extinction in which the slave Ayāz "dies" in the presence and under the gaze of the royal master.

The desired consequence of *fanā* is the removal of duality.

Whoever was (is) in duality, he was (is) a worshipper of partners with God (*mushrik*). That's why my torment was (is) I-ness and you-ness. If being two disappears completely, then this will and that will become one.—And thus the tormenting antithesis between what man plans (*tadbīr*) and what's ordained for him (*taqdīr*) also disappears. (IN p. $101_{18\text{-}19,\ 15\text{-}17}$).

Luqmān Sarakhsī, who has been liberated from slavery to God through madness, knows nothing about himself any more. His personality has been eliminated in God. He says: "I don't know whether You are I or I am You. I've merged within You, and duality has been removed." (MṬ 42/3; above p. 173).

8

Does extinction in God lead to the mystic becoming God in ᶜAṭṭār's poetry? Do the birds become God once they have learned that they are the Sīmurgh and that the Sīmurgh is they? Does this knowledge lead to an expansion and heightening of one's self-importance, as seems to be attested in sayings like Ḥallāj's "I am the Divinity" (*anā'l-Ḥaqq*) or Bāyazīd's "I am sublime" (*subḥānī*)?

In the epics of our poet which are being dealt with here this is not the case. Of course, by ᶜAṭṭār's time the two sayings just quoted had long since become "classic", and he also occasionally quotes them as utterances which are made at the moment extinction descends over persons:

If the soul becomes completely annihilated through that light, it bursts forth with *subḥānī* and with *anā'l-Ḥaqq* (above p. 271).—If with becoming one (*tawḥīd*) the eye of your soul opens, your tongue will cry: "I am sublime (*subḥānī*)!" (AN in 11/3).

But verses like the refrain of the *Bēsarnāma*: "I am God, I am God, I am God!" (*Man khudhāyam man khudhāyam man khudhā*), or the verse of Nasīmī: "I saw that from head to foot I am God!" (*Sar tā ba-qadam wujūd-i khwad Ḥaq dīdam. Dīwān-i Nasīmī*, Ms. Hekimoğlu 639, fol. 171b), or that of Shāh Ismāᵓīl: "I am God Himself, I am God Himself! Come and see God now, you blind person gone astray!" (*ᶜAin Allāham ᶜain Allāham ᶜain Allāh, gel imdi Ḥaqqı gör ey kōr-i gümrāh!*, Minorsky, *The Po-*

etry of Shāh Ismāʾīl no. 204)—one will search for in vain in these epics.

The present book's concluding chapter shall discuss the sole sense in which ᶜAṭṭār is acquainted with an expansion of self-importance, a heightening of metaphysical self-esteem, if one may put it that way, and how he takes this to be a transitional stage. This limited expansion of the ego at a particular stage of mystical experience does not stop him from distancing himself from deification of the mystic and especially from the two heretical forms of union between God and man, *ḥulūl* and *ittiḥād*, ἐνοίκησις and ἕνωσις (above p. 463). He opposes to these two terms a third term, which in his view is the only admissible one: *istighrāq*, "being immersed, engrossed" in God, for which, as we have already seen and shall still see, he employs a series of vivid expressions.

Everyone who becomes He is an immersed one (*mustaghriq*). Far be it from you to say he is God! If you become transformed into that which we said, you're not God but you're continually immersed in God. How could an immersed man be a Ḥulūlī? ...If you realize whose shadow you are, it makes no difference to you whether you die or live. (MṬ p. 42, verses 1059-62).

Don't become a Ḥulūlī out of arrogance. For the immersed man is no Ḥulūlī! (AN 11/1, final verse).—Beware, oh presumptuous man, of becoming a Ḥulūlī on account of what I've said! *Ḥulūl* and *ittiḥād* are here forbidden (*ḥarām*) but immersion is general. (AN in 11/5. Cf. also TA $2/135_{21\text{-}23}$).

Whereas *fanā* is here characterized as "immersion" in God, in another passage it is described as becoming lost in theophany (*tajallī*). The latter term has its origin in surah 7/143. God does not show Himself to Moses but does show Himself to the mountain. (Above p. 453).

The Prophet instructs the world-traveller about the path into one's own interior which he must travel. (Above p. 28). Five halting-stations which must be traversed are mentioned there. The last one is the soul. The Prophet says: "If you've come to know your soul like this, then you give up your soul (your life) for knowledge of God. (Perhaps an allusion to the *ḥadīth*: *Man ᶜarafa nafsahū faqad ᶜarafa rabbah*. See pp. 637 f. below). If you come forth from these five halting-stations, then you see yourself without yourself. You see everything with the eye of another, you hear everything but are deaf yourself. You speak words, but it's not your tongue (which speaks). You remain in life, but that life isn't yours. If you don't know what source it comes from, —it's the story of: 'Then he sees through Me and hears through Me' (allusion to the *taqarrub-ḥadīth*, above pp. 28, ftn., 576, 606 f.). If you've become lost in theophany (*tajallī*), then you're no longer a human being. When at that moment Moses fell

down unconscious, he became mute in non-existence and existence. Don't enter into *ḥulūl* if you travel the path. Enter into *tajallī*, etc. If you reach this halting-station in complete denudation (*pākbāz*), —it would take a long time for me to tell you everything (you'll then experience)." (MN 35/0).

9

The contrast with *ḥulūl* is even clearer if extinction is conceived in such a way that of the two parties, God and man, the second comes to be completely eliminated so that God alone remains. This is the sense in which the famous saying of the mystic martyr Ḥallāj is to be understood: "It's enough for the lover if he lets the One exist alone."

Ḥasbu'l-wājidi ifrādu'l-wāḥid. (Nicholson in Massignon, *Passion* 329).

If you come forth from body and soul, then you don't remain, only God remains. (MN a little before 0/1).

Chun birūn āyī zi-jism ū jān tamām *tū na-mānī Ḥaq bi-mānadh wa'l-salām.*

A dervish seeks to bring about this *ifrād Allāh* by means of a double murder:

One dervish asks another: "What is it you wish for?" The dervish who's been asked answers: "A spear with two points so as to remove myself from the world with the one and remove you with the other, because if neither you nor I still exist, God without our shame (shameful existence) will shine forth in brightness." (MN 20/5).

God confronts the lover of God with the alternative: either you or I. This alternative is felt as a torment by a youth:

Shiblī meets a beautiful, well-dressed youth in the desert who's gracefully strutting about like a partridge with a bouquet of daffodils in his hand. To the shaykh's question as to where he comes from he answers he comes from Baghdad and is making a long journey. When Shiblī arrives in Mecca, he sees a youth there who's lying on the ground, emaciated and wretched. The half-dead man says to him: "I'm the elegant youth you saw in that place. With a thousand kindnesses and honors He called me unto Himself and opened the door for me, gave me rich treasures and more than I desired. But now that I've come back to myself for a moment, He makes my heart bleed, casts me out of the rosegarden into the ashhouse, and torments me with sickness and poverty. Now I have neither heart, nor world, nor religion. Shiblī says: "Become as you've been ordered!" In reply the youth says: "Oh Shiblī, who has the strength to do that? I don't understand this riddle. He says: 'Either you are all or I.' That's why I'm melting away like this. For this (either/or) doesn't leave me a hair's breadth of room. What am I to do?" (IN 12/3, pp. 187-88).

It is quite interesting to compare the Arabic original with this story. In fact, the alternative of extinction has been added by ᶜAṭṭār.

Junayd relates: "In the middle of the year I resolved to entrust myself absolutely to God (*bi-ᶜaqd al-tawakkul*, above p. 220), in the desert. After a few days I came upon a watering-place in the midst of vegetation. I performed an ablution, filled my bowl and stood up to begin the prayers. Then I saw a youth arrive wearing a merchant's clothes, as if he'd walked from home to his shop in the morning or was heading home from the shop. He greeted me, and I said: 'Where does this young master come from?' He said: 'From Baghdad.' I said: 'When did you leave Baghdad?' He replied: 'Yesterday.' This amazed me, for it had taken me several days to reach this spot. Then he sat down with me and we conversed. He then took something from within his sleeve and ate it. I said to him: 'Give me some of what you're eating!' He placed a colocynth (bitter gourd) in my hand and I found that it tasted like fresh dates. He then went his way and left me. When I came to Mecca and began the circumambulation, someone tugged at my robe from behind. I turned around and saw a youth who resembled a worn out waterskin. He was wearing a piece of a shawl, a part of which hung down onto his shoulder. I said to him: 'Let me see more clearly who you are!' He replied: 'I'm that youth who gave you the colocynth to eat.' I said: 'And what has happened to you?' He said: 'Oh Abū'l-Qāsim, they (i.e. God) pushed me away (*daraʾūnī*) and when they had made me fall over, they said: "Stand firm!"'" (*Ḥilya* 10/275).

Verses like the following point in the same direction:

Our disappearance is Your remaining... You exist for eternity, I don't. In the end I don't remain, You remain. (IN p. $11_{3\text{-}4}$).

Sometimes the course of events is described as if there is not room enough for two and so one of them must leave the field.

Disappear in Him, you who are there. You and He together don't have enough room!

Someone observes a fool and hears him say to God: "This madman was with You for a time in the house. But since he had no room along with You in the house because either You had to be in the house or he, I've now left this house at Your order. Since You're here, madman that I am, I've departed." (IN 12/5; above p. 174).

With extinction as death:

A fool wishes that after his death they write on his shroud and gravestone with his heart's blood: "This fool now answers You: since there wasn't room for You and him together in the world, he's abandoned the world and devoted himself to You completely." (MN 19/3; above p. 547).

God and man cannot be together.

Anyone from whom a whiff (*bōy-ē*) still remains here will find no place, even if he's as thin as a hair.

Niẓām al-Mulk, the great friend of the men of God, tells a Ṣūfī to ask for a wish. The Ṣūfī answers: "I don't even ask God for anything, let alone you." The vizier says: "Then fulfill a wish of mine. At the moment when you're alone with God, think of me!" The Ṣūfī says: "If such a moment with God is allotted to me, then I'll be put outside by Him. How should someone who isn't even there think of you?" (MN 19/2).

10

As we have seen, ᶜAṭṭār makes use of various images in order to illustrate the process of extinction.

Complete disappearance in God is like the disappearance of a shadow in the sun.

The Prophet instructs the world-traveller: "If you wish to acquire denudation and extinction, then you must become nothing within God's Being. Become a shadow that's lost itself in the sun, become nothing—and God knows best!" (MN 35/0).

Again with death as extinction:

God answers Dhū'l-Nūn's question as to how long He still wishes to kill the men of God: "I kill him... and if he has disappeared completely, then I show him the sun of My face and make a robe of honor for him out of My beauty... I make him into a shadow in My street and then cause the sun of My face to rise. If the sun of My face rises, how can a shadow still remain in My street?" When the shadow disappeared in the sun, then he became nothing[7]—and God knows best!" (MṬ 29/3, p. 101; cf. above p. 549).

When the birds are definitively merged in the Sīmurgh, the text says: "They became annihilated within Him forever. A shadow was lost in the sun, and that was the end." (MṬ 45/3 p. 168, verse 4230).

Annihilation in and by means of love's union is symbolized by the moth's death in the flame. (See above pp. 427 f. and 606).

11

In other images extinction appears to be not so much becoming annihilated but rather the merging of an individual being within a universal substance.

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7 Read: *hēch shudh.*

This disappearance of the lover's Being in the Being of the beloved they also call becoming a hair among the ringlets of the beloved. (*Sawāniḥ*, *Faṣl* 19/4.—Cf. in this connection the words of Maᶜshūq Ṭūsī to a novice, above p. 428).

But more frequently in ᶜAṭṭār there appears the image of the drop merging in the ocean. It corresponds best to the concept of "immersion and absorption" (*istighrāq*) which ᶜAṭṭār contrasts with heretical *ḥulūl* and *ittiḥād* (above pp. 609 f.).

Whoever reached here for one moment... his name becomes lost in both worlds, like a dewdrop which ends up in the ocean... Whoever for one moment attained God's proximity, he resembles a dewdrop in the ocean. For the drop which became merged in the ocean both worlds apart from God are only an illusion. The water of the ocean surrounds him on six sides. He dies with a thirsty heart in God's street. (Preface and epilogue to the story about the woman whose child became lost. MN 35/5; above p. 609).

After the poet has related the death of the dervish because of the closeness of the prince (above pp. 439 f.), he indulges in reflections about himself:

When I saw the gleam of that sun (denudation, *faqr*), then I no longer remained. An amount of water returned to the water. Although I sometimes won and sometimes lost, (finally) I threw everything into the black water. I became annihilated, I became lost. Nothing remained of me. I became a mere shadow, not one atom of my own emotion remained at all. I was a drop and became lost in the ocean of secrets. Now I can't find this drop again. (MṬ p. 162, verses 4092-97).

In this image, the impersonal primordial ground of the universe, the primordial ocean of "the secrets" of Being, uniform and without qualities, has by now imperceptibly come to replace the personal God.

Both conceptions occur strangely mixed together in a passage of the *Arsārnāma*:

They ask Bāyazīd: "What's the most amazing thing in this ocean?" He answers: "What's most amazing in my opinion is that anyone at all appears in the ocean (above p. 605)."—Then the text continues: "What would be more amazing than if you were to find a dewdrop again in the ocean! Three drops exist there, so you must think. For each drop there is a special ocean. One is Hell, if you think badly of God (*pindār-i zisht* = *sūʾ al-ẓann bi'llāh*). The second is Paradise, if you think well of Him (*ḥusn al-ẓann*). The third drop is in the ocean of secrets. Neither soul, nor body exist there.[8] Without doubt the place of the universe's unity (*waḥdat-i kull*) is there. Become without-self, for there is found "Abandon your self!" (*Utruk nafsak*, see p. 651 below)." (AN in 11/2).

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8 Text uncertain.

The birds must traverse "the Valley of Denudation and Extinction" (*faqr u fanā*) on their journey to the Sīmurgh (above p. 16). This is the valley of forgetfulness, muteness, deafness and unconsciousness. There you see a hundred thousand shadows disappear for all eternity in one sun. If the ocean begins to undulate, then how can the images upon it (which appear as a reflection in it) remain in their place? ...Whoever has become lost in the ocean of the universe[9] is lost forever and at peace. (Above p. 604). ...Travellers become lost with the first step, no one takes a second step. If an impure person becomes immersed in the ocean of the universe, he remains in baseness in his characteristics (cf. above p. 191). But if a pure person enters this ocean, he disappears from his Being. His motion is from then on the motion of the ocean. (MṬ 44/0, p. 156).

Longing for immersion in the divine ocean of the universe is presented most grandiosely in a work of ᶜAṭṭār's which is of doubtful authenticity, the *Jawhar al-dhāt*. There an apotheosized youth throws himself into the ocean in order to disappear within the universe and thus become united with it.

What is this essence, one moment described as sunlight, the next moment as an ocean, into which ᶜAṭṭār's mystic plunges and disappears? Before we pursue further the subject of extinction and union with God and the world-ground, we wish to attempt to attain clarity on this matter.

9 Read: *kul*.

CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE

GOD, THE WORLD AND THE UNIVERSAL SOUL

According to the teachings of Islamic orthodoxy, God created the world as He willed and He maintains it by means of continuous new creation. In essence He is separate from His creatures. None of His attributes is to be understood in the same sense as the corresponding attributes of His creatures. He is elevated above the attributes of creatures and fundamentally different from anything created. He is the cause of everything that happens, even the actions of human beings.

But the uncompromising transcendence of God is mitigated and softened in Islamic mysticism. Moreover, the Ash[c]arite doctrine of God's continual and direct action in the world and on the world, the doctrine of God's causation of human acts, is itself a factor which diminishes the gulf between Creator and creature. It is an inherent consequence of this doctrine that the profession of faith: *Lā ilāha illā'llāh* "There is no god but God" becomes elevated to the proposition: *Lā fā[c]ila illā'llāh* "There is no active subject but God."

1

With regard to occurrences in external nature, this proposition leads to the rejection of natural philosophy among the pious (see above p. 83). A typical example of this conception is provided by the story about the man of piety, Bishr, who goes on a journey with a natural philosopher. The natural philosopher seeks to explain all forms of meteorological phenomena by means of natural causes, whereas the pious Bishr claims to see God's direct ordaining in such phenomena (Niẓāmī, *Heft Peiker* pp. 167-69). This conception even makes its way into the textbooks on rhetoric. A sentence like: "Spring brings forth flowers" is considered to be "a propositional trope" (*majāz [c]aqlī*) because the true active subject is not spring but God. (Jurjānī, *Asrār al-balāgha*,

my edition, pp. 356, 377 ff.). The mystics who are continually in direct contact with God carry this idea to its logical conclusion.

According to the view of the knowers of God, it is not bread which causes satiety and it is not water which quenches thirst, just as possessions do not make one rich, nor does having nothing make one poor. For it is God who causes satiety and quenches thirst, who makes one rich and makes one poor. (*Qūt* 2/25$_{20\text{-}21}$; *Nahrung* 2/365/32.548).

Whoever attributes efficacy to foodstuffs makes himself guilty of covert polytheism (*shirk khafī*).

Bāyazīd is seen after his death in a dream and asked what he said to God when he came before Him. The blessed man answers: "He asked me: 'What have you brought with you?' I said: 'I've brought sins with me but at least I haven't brought polytheism which God doesn't forgive.'—But one time on earth I had drunk milk and then suffered a stomach-ache and said to myself: 'This comes from the milk I drank.'—Then God said to me: 'You claim not to have brought polytheism with you, but have you so quickly forgotten that you practiced polytheism with that milk? By attributing the pain to the milk, you renounced the profession of God's oneness (*tawḥīd*).'" (IN 12/10, p. 195; TA 1/178$_{13\text{-}18}$;[1] Basset 3/359).

2

But even what human beings do is, according to good Ashᶜarite doctrine, directly brought about by God. This proposition is of central significance for mystics.

They said to Junayd: "Explain for us *tawḥīd* and teach us what it is!" He said: "It's certain knowledge (*al-yaqīn*)." They said: "Explain this for us!" He answered: "It consists in your knowing that creatures' movements and rest are caused by God alone who has no partner." (*Ḥilya* 10/256).

Therefore the pious man, as we have already seen (above p. 219), must conceive of everything good and bad which is done to him by other seemingly free agents, as directly caused by God. For a good deed he should thank God, not a human being. And if a gift is denied to him or he suffers some evil, he should not scold the one who denied it or the evil-doer. Otherwise, he is committing covert polytheism.

An old woman wants to give Abū ᶜAlī (al-Daqqāq) a sheet of gold-leaf as a gift. Abū ᶜAlī refuses the gift because he has vowed not to accept anything from anyone but Him. The woman responds: "There's nothing for you to say in the

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[1] Here the reading of manuscript C (p. 43) should be adopted in the text.

matter. How long will you still see something besides God—unless you have double vision!" (MṬ 42/2, p. 147).

Shaykh Būshanjī receives a slap on the back of the neck from a violent Turk. When they explain to the Turk whom he has struck, he goes to the shaykh in remorse and excuses himself. It was an error, and he had been drunk. The shaykh answers: "Don't worry yourself! If I considered the blow as your action, then it would be a mistake. But there where the blow came from it was no error." (IN 10/7, p. 163; TA $2/90_{5\text{-}9}$. See also above p. 333).

God's causation is explained by Muḥammad Ghazzālī through secondary causes—which has a levelling effect—through a regression back to the first cause. For this purpose he makes use of the parable about the man who holds the piece of paper responsible for what is written on it. The man is referred by the paper to the ink, by the ink to the pen, by the pen to the hand, etc., until he finally comes to God as the actual author. (*Iḥyā*ᵓ 4/215-17, *Bāb ḥaqīqat al-tawḥīd... aṣl al-tawakkul*; *Stufen* 527 ff./E.30 ff.).

Cf. Wehr's German translation, *Al-Ġazzālī's Buch vom Gottvertrauen*, Halle 1940, pp. 15-24. See also the instructive introduction pp. XIX-XXIII and cf. *Nūr* 129; *Mathnawī* 4/3721 ff.

3

The principle: "There is no active subject but God" becomes more difficult, but quite genuinely mystical, when the mystic applies it to his own action as well. In everything he does, he then feels he is only an object or an instrument of God's activity, and in a state of extreme passivity. He feels that in everything he does, God has anticipated him, that the initiative is always taken in advance by God. (*Lahū al-awwaliyya. Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/145).

Bāyazīd speaks thus: "In the beginning I was mistaken in four things. I thought that I remembered Him, that I knew Him, loved Him and sought Him. In the end I realized that His remembering, His love, His knowledge and His seeking preceded mine." (Ibid; somewhat differently in *Nūr* 96).

To the same Bāyazīd are attributed the words: "The religious scholar says: 'What should I do?' The knower of God says: 'What will He do?'" (TA $1/163_{21\text{-}22}$; somewhat differently *Nūr* 131).—Similarly: Bāyazīd said: "I sought after God for thirty years. I thought that I desired Him. Then it became clear that He desired me." (*Nūr* 69).

Kharaqānī sees God in a dream and says to Him: "I've sought You day and night for sixty years. Free me from myself and bestow on me the early morning light of familiarity!" God answers: "My Kharaqānī! If you've sought Me for sixty years, —I've been seeking you ever since pre-eternity, before you existed,

long before you sought Me. The desire (seeking) which arose from your soul today is not your desire but entirely My desire. That's also why you've become a lamp of religion." (MN 40/4).

Thus all activity and subjectivity merge into God's activity and subjectivity so that all occurrences are solely occurrences within God.

Cf. also Nallino, *Raccolta* 2/331-35.

The passive state of the mystic *vis-à-vis* God is already described by Junayd in his definition of *tawḥīd al-khāṣṣ*, the highest level of the profession of God's oneness. He says that man is only a figure in the hand of God, upon which the changeful ordaining of God is carried out in accordance with the provisions of His omnipotence, and that man at this point again enters the state he was in before he existed, i.e. the state in which he was entirely at the mercy of God's creative will. (Qushayrī, *Risāla* 135-36, *Bāb al-tawḥīd*; *Sendschreiben* 412/45.7; R. Hartmann, *Al-Ḳuschairîs Darstellung des Ṣûfîtums* 50-51; Sarrāj, *Lumaᶜ* 29 ff.; *Schlaglichter* 67 f./15.3).

We became acquainted above (p. 62) with the story about how a person listens to a sermon and becomes emotionally confused when he hears that body and soul are both in God's hand and consequently nothing is left over for man. The story is introduced by ᶜAṭṭār with the words: "When heart and body (*gil*) are lost in God, then man truly becomes man. Everything is God, man is nothing." (MN 23/2, at the end).

This attitude is pursued in its most detailed consequences by the school of the Shādhiliyya. Its chief representative works, the *Ḥikam* of Ibn ᶜAṭāʾ Allāh al-Iskandarī (d. 709/1309) with the beautiful commentary by Rundī (d. 792/1390), as well as al-Iskandarī's *Kitāb al-Tanwīr fī isqāṭ al-tadbīr*, present instructions for implementing this fundamental attitude in all problems of the religious life.

Cf. Miguel Asín Palacios, "Šaḏilīes y alumbrados" in: *Al-Andalus* 9/1944/321-45; 10/1945/1-52, 255-84; 11/1946/1-67; 12/1947/1-25, 245-65; 13/1948/1-47, 255-73; 14/1949/1-28, 253-72; 15/1950/1-25, 275-88; 16/1951/1-15.

If the mystic establishes this attitude in himself, i.e. if it becomes an actuality in him, then once more this amounts to a kind of shedding of self or extinction for him.

In ᶜAṭṭār the realization that the mystic does not act, but that the real subject of his action is God, is attained by the birds when they experience the first extinction at the court of the Sīmurgh.

Their deeds, which have been recorded in the book the chamberlain presents them with, become erased.

When the birds examine the document laid before them, they find all their deeds recorded in it and they die of confusion and shame, just as the brothers of Joseph died of shame and confusion when Joseph laid before them the old sale's contract which attested to their having ignominiously sold off their brother. (MṬ 45/3 p. 166, verses 4193 ff.). The birds had also sold their Joseph, that is to say, they had forgotten God and turned to others, given Him away for something else.

Thus according to the commentator Şemᶜī who here relates the story about the ascetic who "sells" God for a bird's song. (Above p. 538). But perhaps what is meant by selling Joseph is forgetting the primordial connection with God and forgetting the kingly rank of the soul which dwells in a place unworthy of it. (Cf. above pp. 351 ff.).

They die out of shame and confusion, they become extinct unto themselves. Then they receive new life through the light of Divinity. Everything that they've done and omitted to do is erased from their breast. (MṬ pp. 166-67).

What now follows is the high point of the whole poem:

The thirty birds, *sī murgh*, see that they themselves are the Sīmurgh (p. 650 below). This unheard of idea causes them great astonishment, and they ask what the meaning of this mystery is.

The answer which is accorded them contains several conceptual motifs, of which only one concerns us here.

Everything which you have known and seen, spoken and said (about God), that was not He. (Cf. above p. 80).

Verse 4224. Thus according to Şemᶜī. But perhaps what is meant here is: was not that which you thought. Your action was not really your action.

All the valleys which you've traversed, all the manliness which you've displayed, despite all that, you've only travelled in Our action, you've seen the valley of (Our) essence and (Our) attributes. (MṬ p. 167, verses 4225 ff.).

In the *Muṣībatnāma* the *pīr* instructs the traveller that he must realize that seeking God is seeking the Friend by means of the Friend Himself. (MN 40/0).

Abū ᶜAlī Ṭūsī asks Mīr Kārēz whether the path leads from God to man or from man to God. He answers: "Both are false. The path leads from God to God." (MN 40/3).

What the angels think they do is also in reality the action of God.

When God set up His throne, he ordered 10,000 angels to carry it. They proved to be too weak to do so. Then He gave eight angels the command to carry the throne and behold, they succeed in doing it. They become filled with pride

and conceit because of this. God then orders them to look where their feet are standing. They see they're standing on the empty air and are overcome with fear. God then says: "You imagine that you're carrying the throne. Who is it that bears your load?" Then pride disappears from the angels' hearts.—The restless soul can't carry the secret of the Creator. He alone carries it. The husk of the world is carried by the kernel of the world. Only Rustam's horse, Rakhsh, can carry Rustam. If God hadn't said: "We have carried it" (surah 17/70), no one could carry the secret on the basis of his own strength. (MN 40/5).

In accordance with this, the talk of a mystic is speech from God to God.

Junayd reproaches Shiblī for having made mystical secrets publicly known to all the people: "We only spoke of this in cellars. Then you came and talked about it in the bazaars!" Shiblī answers: "I'm he who speaks and I'm he who listens. Who is there then in both worlds besides me? No, these are words which go from God to God, and Shiblī is not really there!" (TA $2/166_{15\text{-}19}$).

And the utterances "I am sublime!" and "I am God!" (above pp. 608 f.) are also to be interpreted this way.

If the soul, annihilated in that light, goes forth (from this world) with these words (*Subḥānī* and *Anā'l-Ḥaqq*) and enters Paradise, then it's told: "This is a letter (a mission) from the unique King to the eternal King! Since they've dressed him in royal clothes, it's a letter (mission) from the All-holy to the All-holy!" (IN $362_{8\text{-}11}$).

4

Now from here on monism becomes intensified into the doctrine that there is nothing in Existence except God. (*Laysa fī'l-wujūdi illā'llāh*). The Ṣūfī, on the highest level, still sees only one being (one thing) in Existence. Nor does he see himself any longer. Mystics who link this knowledge to extinction call it "extinction in the profession of God's oneness" (*al-fanā᾽ fī'l-tawḥīd*). (*Iḥyā᾽* 4/212, *Bayān ḥaqīqat al-tawḥīd*; *Stufen* 520 f./E.12).

Cf. also Abū Saᶜīd in Nicholson, *Studies* 50; Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān*, Cairo 1909, pp. 62 ff.

Whoever knows God sees Him in all things! (*Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/10).—You see everything as Him because He's everything. In both worlds there's nothing except the Friend. (MN 10/2, the last verse).

As an illustration of this verse, ᶜAṭṭār follows it up with a rather strange story.

Zulaykhā, who's in love with Joseph, tries in vain to get the beautiful young prophet to cast a glance at her. Neither her weeping, nor her cajolery makes any impression on him. She then resorts to a strange device. She has a room ar-

ranged so that all its four walls, ceiling and floor, are painted with pictures of herself. When Joseph is led into this room, everywhere he looks he sees Zulaykhā.—In this way the mystic sees the light of God wherever he looks. (MN 10/3).

On his heavenly ascension the Prophet says to God: "You exist and besides You there's nothing. You're reason, You're heart, You're soul!" (IN 17_4).—I see nothing else but You. Since You're there, why should any other things be there? (AN 0, verse 54).—You exist. I know no other thing here. Besides You I never saw anything in both worlds. (IN 7_{4a}, $_{5b}$).

This doctrine is, according to Muḥammad Ghazzālī, in part of speculative origin and in part emotionally determined.

The knowers of God, after having ascended to the heaven of "Truth", are of one opinion, that they have seen nothing in Existence except the one divinity (*Ḥaqq*). But some of them reach this state by means of theosophical knowledge (*ᶜirfānan ᶜilmiyyan*), whereas others do so through emotion and a psychic state (*dhawqan wa-ḥālan*). And multiplicity ceases for them completely. They become immersed (*istaghraqū*) in pure unicity (*fardāniyya*), and their consciousness loses itself in it (*istahwat fīhā ᶜuqūluhum*) and they become as if stunned, and no room is left for them to think of anything other than God, nor to think of themselves, and thus nothing remains for them but God. (*Mishkāt*, Cairo 1322, p. 19; Nallino, *Raccolta* 2/233; cf. *Iḥyā*ᵓ 4/212; *Stufen* 520 ff./E.19 ff.; Wehr pp. 6 ff.).

Perhaps the emotional root is the original one. The complete filling up of the consciousness through God then transforms itself into a metaphysical doctrine.—We have already seen how this psychic state takes effect in the emotional world of profane love and love of God, and likewise how the rational proposition there arises that love, the lover and the beloved are one. (Above pp. 420 f., 572 ff., 591 f.).

5

To this monism, this idea that nothing except God "is", that the predicate "to be" is fitting for Him alone, corresponds, on the other hand, the doctrine that everything that exists besides God, or appears to exist, is nothing. Sometimes the idea that only God exists emerges more in the foreground, sometimes the other idea, that all things are nothing. Both thoughts are very concisely formulated in two "points of wisdom" of Ibn ᶜAṭāᵓ Allāh: "God was and nothing was with Him at the same time, and He is (alone) now just as He was", and: "You are not separated from Him because something else is with Him at the same time, but the illusion

that something is with Him at the same time separates you from Him." Things other than God are pure illusion.

Kāna'llāhu wa-lā shay'a ma^cahū wa-huwa'l-āna mā ^calayhi kān. (*Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 1/146).—*Mā ḥajabaka ^cani'llāhi wujūdu mawjūdin ma^cahū wa-lākin ḥajabaka ^canhu tawahhumu mawjūdin ma^cah.* (Ibid. 1/148).

Therefore, in this way things are both places of manifestation of God, modalities of His Being, as well as non-entities, nothingness. How is this meant to be conceived? Ghazzālī answers: "Things have a double face, a twofold aspect."

All things except God are pure nothingness if you consider them in and for themselves in accordance with their nature. But if one looks at them from the viewpoint that Being emanates forth unto them (*yasrī ilayh*) from the Primordial First, the Godhead, then they appear as existent, not in terms of their essence, but from the side (*wajh*) which lies toward their Creator (*mūjid*). The existent is the side (*wajh*, also face) of God alone. Thus all things have two faces (sides): one toward itself and one toward God. Considered from the viewpoint of the side of their self, they are nothing, whereas from the viewpoint of the side of God they are Being. (There follows a reference to the Koranic verse: "All things perish except His face", surah 28/88, which exploits the double meaning of the word *wajh* = "side" and "face"). (*Mishkāt* 18; treated in detail by Nallino, *Raccolta* 2/233).

Moreover, it is taught that the empty things with seeming existence are one among themselves and only appear to be differentiated. If the gaze turns to God, things appear to be an emanation from God. If the gaze turns to things without thought for their relationship to God, then they appear uniform and empty.

Cf. also Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān*, Cairo 1909, p. 66.

Sometimes one also speaks of the unity of all things generally, without it being clear whether a untiy of things in God is meant or a unity of things among themselves. Such is the case in one of the early-monistic passages of Muḥammad Ghazzālī who here hints at teachings but with a certain timidity refrains from going into details, apparently being guided simply by the endeavor to win tolerance among his readers for extreme utterances by Ṣūfīs. He seeks to make the doctrine of these mystics understandable to his readers by modes of thought which do not run very deep and which smooth over the problem.

How is it possible, he has the reader ask (*Iḥyā'* 4/212, *Bayān ḥaqīqat al-tawḥīd*; *Stufen* 522/E.19), that the mystic sees only one? After all, he sees heaven and earth and all the other perceptible bodies, and these are multiform! How can the many be one? To this he answers cautiously:

"This is the most extreme goal of the sciences of revelation, and the secrets of this science should not be set down in writing in a book."—But then he does give a popular explanation: This monism is a particular point of view (*i^ctibār*). You can, for instance, view man

as a unity, but you can also direct your gaze to the many parts out of which his body is composed. If you reflect on this, you won't find offensive the mystics' vision of unity which one time has duration and another time comes over them for a single moment like lightning.

ᶜAṭṭār also speaks of the unity of all things.

Endeavor through reflection, understanding and the power of discrimination to see all things in the world as only one. Know definitely that husk and kernel are one... If in your eye all things have become one, then no more doubt can ever come over you. (AN in 11/3).—Everything is one, whether beginning or end, but the eye of the beholder has double vision. (AN 0, verse 32).

Frequently he describes the nothingness, the illusory character and the actual oneness of things, with images.

A fool answers the question as to what "the two worlds" are, saying: "These two worlds are a drop of water which is neither non-existent, nor existent. At first a drop of water appeared, a drop of water with so many images. All these images on the surface of the water perish, even though they be of iron... No one has ever seen the water stand still. How can a building stand upon water?" (MṬ 6/1, p. 33).

The world is foam from the ocean, an illusion (*khayāl*), about which only a child would let itself dream. (AN in 6/0).

Everything is non-thing and ephemeral and nothingness. Everything is an intricate talisman (*ṭilism-ē pēch bar pēch*, see p. 625 below). What you know and see is a delusion. Delusion (fantasy), reason and sense perception, which are all valid in their own place (*dar maqām-i khwadh tamāmast*), are only illusion when you go forth from this place.

Someone asks a wise fool what the world is. The fool answers: "A soap-bubble. Take a little soap foam on a pipe and blow a world out of it. Look at the pretty colorful form which comes forth from the pipe! As pretty as this form is, it's still like the second image which is seen by someone who sees double... It's a non-existent thing filled with air which disappears into nothingness. If you look with the light of the heart, you see neither door nor wall. Everything disappears in your heart like a mote in a sunbeam. A drop disappears in the ocean." (AN 8/2).

Another fool answers the question as to what the world is by saying: "The world is an artificial flower of wax that glitters with a hundred colors. If someone crushes it in his hand, it becomes obvious that it's all wax." (MṬ 42/1, pp. 146-67).

In extinction antitheses collapse and become meaningless. We saw in the story about the birds and the disappearance of the register of their sins (above p. 619), that good and bad deeds merge into one another in *fanā* and become meaningless.

It seems that an utterance of Abū ᶜAlī Fārmadī, which is not actually entirely clear, refers to a higher state, "a different color", in which it is meaningless whether one is accepted or rejected:

Be neither happy if you're accepted, nor have a sad heart if you're rejected! Don't consider being accepted as (welcome) booty, nor turn to flight if you're refused. If you don't let yourself be deceived by the benefits you experience (*istidrāj*, surah 7/182, 68/44, cf. above p. 73), then you won't end up in grief because of calamity. You'll be brought forth with another color which is different from all this. If this color falls on your robe, both worlds will give off the scent of ambergris through your scent. Since all things become a thing through you, then how can you turn to a thing. Since you're always you, you have all things for eternity. (IN 22/7, p. 360).—(In the last verses the idea: "I am everything" sounds forth, which verges on solipsism. This shall be discussed on pp. 646-49 below).

For the disappearance of good and bad compare the verses:

As long as you exist, good and bad are found here. If you've become extinct, all this is an illusion. If you persist in this Being, you'll suffer much good and bad! (MṬ p. 147, verses 3698-99).

Sometimes one thinks one can detect an emotional root to this doctrine that all things are the same. The things from which interest has been removed become "alike", "one and the same".

In chpt. 49 of Kalābādhī's *Taᶜarruf* there is mention of a state of soul experienced by a mystic in which the differences between things disappear for him.

Discrimination between things drops away from him since he has become extinct unto things, removed by that in which he has become extinct. (P. 92).

Of course, among the things that are no longer distinguished, Kalābādhī first of all has in mind pleasure and pain, but then apparently things in general:

And the meaning of cessation of discrimination is, as we have said, (cessation of discriminating) between pain and pleasure, and that things become as one for him. (P. $96_{10\text{-}11}$).

Zakariyyāᵓ al-Anṣārī expresses the idea somewhat more clearly in his commentary on Qushayrī's *Risāla*:

If the attribute of beauty is revealed to the bondsman, he becomes intoxicated, his soul enters joyful excitement (*ṭarab*), and his heart is transported in rapture (*hāma*) and the distinction between pain and pleasure falls away from him. For if the revelation of beauty and beholding the qualities of perfection completely take possession of the bondsman so that he no longer sees anything but God, then things become one thing in relation to God and he no longer discriminates between things. (ᶜArūsī 2/70).

6

But how is one to conceive of the relationship between God, who is everything and alone has Being, and ephemeral things as they appear to the eye?

The poet is disposed to answer this question about the relationship of God to the world with images and similes. In so doing, one moment he more or less holds on to the personal concept of God, the next he replaces it with an impersonal concept of Being (*wujūd*, *būdh*). Both conceptions stand side by side without disturbing one another.

God is light which shines throughout the world.

You're the light and as such You're the concrete things of Being (*aᶜyān-i wujūd*). (IN p. 6_8).

Cf. the whole passage p. 6_{3-12} in which God is addressed as light. But the image is already Koranic (24/35). The effect of this divine light on souls is described in IN p. 162. Cf. above pp. 271 and 527.

Oh You, through whose light the world is illuminated! Adam was formed from the reflection of Your light. (IN p. 4_{16}).

The world is the talisman by means of which the divine treasure is kept hidden—the world is only a name.

What does the air stand on? On nothingness, and nothing else. All this is nothingness, and nothing else. The Throne stands on water, the world on air. Never mind water and air! Everything is God! The Throne and the world are only a talisman. He (God) exists. That's why all this is only a name, nothing more. See this world and the other world in such a way that they are He! Nothing exists besides Him, and if something does exist, then it too is He. (MṬ p. 3, verses 49, 52-54).—(Previously ᶜAṭṭār had described God's creative work in accordance with orthodoxy).

The world is one drop from the ocean of Being.

Yūsuf-i Hamadhānī says: "Ascend upwards to above 'the Throne' (the sky) and then descend downwards to below 'the Footstool' (the earth). Everything that is, was and will be, everything good and bad, every atom of things—it's all one drop from the ocean of Being. (But) a Being whose child appeared as non-being,[2] what use is it?" (An allusion to the aporia that non-existent things actually arise from Being. Cf. above p. 621). (MṬ 41/2, p. 143).

The world is the changing robe of God. (Cf. already above pp. 495 f.).

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2 With much reservation I read verse 3598b as: *būdh farzandash na-būdh āmadh chi sūdh?*

If you're a traveller, then look at everything as a garment of the King. If (you know that) the King dons a thousand different clothes, you won't end up in the group of the restless. Make no mistake! The King forever changes His clothes. If the world is full of black and full of white, know that this is the (changing) dress of the King. Both worlds are like a single garment. See the unity, for seeing double is the polytheism of the Magians! The King has many garments in His chamber. For your part don't see the clothing, see only the King! (IN p. 84_{10-15}, after the story about the officer who was in love with the prince; above p. 438).

You step forth in whatever robe You wish. You display Yourself in whatever image You wish. (IN p. 5_{14}).

Thus Maḥmūd who puts on the clothes of Ayāz is also the symbol for God who appears in human clothes. (IN 22/10; above p. 578).

The world is God's shadow.

The birds whom the hoopoe invites to set out with him on the journey to the court of the Sīmurgh excuse themselves one after the other. Each presents a different excuse. Finally, they ask the hoopoe what they actually have to do with the Sīmurgh. If there were a real connection between Him and them (cf. above pp. 525 ff.), they would also feel a longing for Him.—The hoopoe answers: "The Sīmurgh, like the sun, once unveiled His face. He cast a hundred thousand shadows on the earth, and then He cast His glance on the pure shadow. He scattered His shadow over the earth. Then so many birds arose at every moment. The forms of the birds of the world are all His shadow. (There follows the warning not to understand this connection with God as identity with God in the sense of *ḥulūl*. Above pp. 608 f.). If you know whose shadow you are, it's all the same to you whether you've died or you're alive. If no bird had taken on appearance, the Sīmurgh would have no shadow. And if the Sīmurgh had remained concealed, then there would be no shadow (of Him) in the world. (The world would not exist)." (MṬ 13/0, pp. 40-42).

Every garment which covers the meadow is a shadow of the beautiful Sīmurgh. What matters is to recognize the Sīmurgh in this shadow, for the Sīmurgh is inseparable from shadow. One should not remain caught in shadow, one must see the Sīmurgh in the shadow. In the shadow you see the sun. If a gate of knowledge is opened for you, then you see how the shadow disappears in the sun, and you see that everything is sun. (MṬ the transition to 13/2, p. 43, verses 1095-1100).

The Sīmurgh is as present in his shadow as Alexander in his envoy who was he himself in disguise. No one had the eye to recognize him. (MṬ 13/2, p. 43).

Ibn ᶜAṭāᵓ Allāh also employs the image of the shadow.

That which of all things has the greatest similarity with the Being of existent things, if you look at them with the inner eye, is the Being of shadows. A shadow is neither existent in the sense of all the stages of Being, nor non-exis-

tent in all the stages of non-being! (*Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 1/148. Cf. also Muḥammad Ghazzālī in Nallino, *Raccolta* 2/231; Ibn ᶜArabī in Nicholson, *Studies* 153).

The view that "all this" is a shadow of God, and likewise the view that things are traces of His creative power, are found directly alongside one another in one of ᶜAṭṭār's verses:

The Being of all things is the shadow of Your majesty. All things are traces of Your creative power. (AN 0, verse 50).

Wujūd-i jumla ẓill-i ḥaḍrat-i tust, hama āthār-i ṣunᶜ-i qudrat-i tust.

Another image:

One time the Sīmurgh cast off a feather in China and thereby unleashed confusion in all countries. Everyone formed an image of this feather. Everyone who saw the image began (another) action. The feather is kept today in China. That's why one should seek knowledge even in China. If the image of this feather hadn't become public, there wouldn't be all this noise and strife in the world. All these traces of creation originate from His kingly glory, all souls from the markings of His feather. (MṬ 2/1, p. 28).

The things of this world are a reflection of God, i.e. of "Being". God or pure Being can only be endured in a reflection. That is why the divine king has a mirror set up in which human beings can see Him. (Above p. 590).

The ignorant man takes the reflection as Being, and Being as Non-being.

If someone wishes to get a parrot to talk, he makes him look in a mirror and has a man who's standing behind the mirror recite the words the parrot is meant to learn. The parrot thinks his reflection in the mirror is a real parrot, whereas it's only an illusion.

Cf. *Mathnawī* 5/91 ff. and Nicholson's *Commentary* p. 255.

In the same way an ignorant person takes the reflection of Being as true Being. Your Being is the mirror but it's hidden. Non-being is the encompassing frame for the mirror. All images which appear in this mirror are only a reflection and fantasy... You think that the voice and all things come from that reflection, because you only know about reflections... If Being itself became manifest for one moment, both worlds would collapse. Being is like fire, the world like carded wool. Fire and wool don't remain peaceful when together. The world and everything that's in both worlds is like a reflection but you believe the opposite. If something other than a mere reflection were to fall on you, fire would fall on you like it did on Ḥallāj. (AN 11/5).

Ḥallāj was executed because he had said: "I am God!", i.e. he was burned, according to ᶜAṭṭār, when divine Being appeared to him without being mitigated by the mirror.

The things are not as they appear. They are one in origin. That which the eye sees is only an image, a likeness (*mithāl*).

Who says that the sky is the way your eye sees or your reason knows? Thus that which enters your eye is no more than an image, a likeness (*mithāl*)... If things were the way they appear, then the Prophet would not have asked God: "Show me the things as they are!" (*Arinī'l-ashyā'a kamā hī*)... God knows the way these things are, in your eyes they appear distorted... All these things are in their origin one and nothing else. One, but one outside a series (not one of many). That one has neither sign, nor number. All things remain in eternity through one thing, from every mote in a sunbeam on up to the sun. Both worlds are immersed in an ocean of light, the external form of the world is a delusion. (AN in 8/1).

Of course, things are one in their nothingness but in contrast to the one Being which flows through them, they appear differentiated in multiplicity. The Plotinian question as to how multiplicity could arise out of oneness, ᶜAṭṭār answers with images.

"That" and "this", "this" and "that" (differentiation, number) only exists here. There all this is illusion. If you want a similitude which is easy to understand: (the One is) like the ocean which turns into rain(drops). Everything which comes forth from proximity with the One and enters appearance—if it descends, number (plurality) appears. The Koran is in truth only one discourse but when it was sent down, it became innumerable (verses). Hundreds of thousands of drops make up an ocean. If they leave the ocean, they become rain(drops). Everything which acquired a name and entered existence is all only a dewdrop from the ocean of largess (*jūd*). (MN after 40/5).

God, the light of the one Being, appears in manifold reflections in nature. Thus ᶜIrāqī sings:

All is one thing, wave and jewel, sea and stone. The forms of individual things have brought forth differences. You're in every form, and You have no form Yourself... You've shown Your face in a thousand mirrors. In every mirror You show Your cheek differently. A sun which gleams in thousands of glasses... Everything is a light but in different colors. A difference has entered the illusory belief of human beings and spirits. (From the first *qaṣīda* of the *Dīwān*).

Jumla yak chīz ast mawj u gawhar u daryā wu sang.
ṣūrat-i har yak khilāf-ē dar miyān andākhta.
Dar hama ṣūrat tu'ī ū nēst khwadh ṣūrat turā
...
Rūy-i khwadh bi-nmūdha dar hazārān āyina.
dar har āyīna rukhat dīgar nishān andākhta.
Āftāb-ē dar hazārān ābgīna tāfta
...

Jumla yak nūrast lēkin ranghā-ē mukhtalif.
ikhtilāf-ē dar gumān-i ins u jānn andākhta.

And the poet ᶜAṭṭār too enjoys the appearance of God in the beauty of nature:

When You become manifest in the springtime, then You really lift the curtain from Your cheek. You cast the radiance of Your face on the earth and on the earth You paint marvelous pictures. (IN p. 6_{13-14}).

In fact every garment which covers the meadow is a shadow of the Sīmurgh. (Above pp. 590 and 626).

In combination with the erotic motifs described above on pp. 491 ff. and 571 ff., the Primordial One appears in the cosmogony of Jāmī—who is influenced by the system of Ibn ᶜArabī—as a *shāhid*, a youth who gazes upon his own beauty in the differentiated state of his characteristics.

The *shāhid* of the hidden world who was alone in the apartment (*shāhid-i khalwatgah-i ghayb*) had girded himself in the beginning in order to display His beauty (*jilwa*). He held before Himself the mirror which displays the hidden, and displayed His beauty to Himself. He was at one and the same time beholder and beheld, no one else traversed this field. Everything was one, no duality existed, and there was no we-ness and you-ness. The reed pen was still untroubled by the cutting penknife, the Tablet was still undisturbed by the scratching (of the reed pen). The Throne (sky) hadn't yet placed its foot on the Footstool (earth), the intellect didn't yet think of asking about strange things... The stars still hadn't been strung on the thread of the spheres, the back of the earth still supported no human beings... In this cradle the child of the kingdoms of nature still slept with bated breath. The eye of that *shāhid*, beholding non-existence, saw the inner sense of the non-existent as existent. Indeed, He (already) saw in the undifferentiation of essence (*dar ijmāl-i dhāt*) the beauty of differentiated ways of being and characteristics (*ḥusn-i tafāṣīl-i shuyūn u ṣifāt*), but He wished to display His beauty to Himself in other mirrors as well, He wished, in accordance with His (different) pre-eternal characteristics, (in each case) to display a different face (*jilwa dihadh*). Then He created the life-bestowing meadow of the world, He created the garden of "becoming" and "the place of becoming" (*kawn u makān*). His displaying His beauty (*jilwa* = self-revelation) made manifest another beauty from each branch, each rose, each leaf and every thorn. To the cypress He gave a sign of His slender stature, to the rose He gave knowledge of His lovely face, etc. (*Tuḥfat al-aḥrār* 1/0, pp. 36-37).

However, the idea of a successive unfolding of the Primordial One, as Jāmī, following Ibn ᶜArabī, presents it, is foreign to ᶜAṭṭār.

7

But pure divine Being in itself is transcendent. It reveals itself in its shadow, in its reflections, yet it is inaccessible to sight. It is concealed behind the things in which it reveals itself. Thus things are at the same time revelation and a veil of Being. It is hidden because it is so manifest.

He's barred (from those who see) because He's so very manifest. He's concealed from eyes because His light is so powerful.

Innamā'ḥtajaba li-shiddati ẓuhūrih, wa-khafiya ᶜani'l-abṣāri li-ᶜiẓami nūrih. (*Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 2/10).

Because You're so manifest, You remain concealed. (IN p. 5_{13}).—No one has seen You here clearly, that's why here You're the first and the last. The world is full of Your name, and there's no sign of You! Through You reason sees, and You're invisible! (IN p. $4_{3\text{-}4}$). You're the light which, were it to become evident, the seven spheres would burn up out of jealousy. (IN p. 6_9. Cf. above pp. 590 and 627).—Oh You who are invisible because of Your being manifest, You're the whole world and yet You're not to be seen (MṬ p. 3, verse 58).—All souls exist through You. You're the kernel, all the others are in truth the husk. You're the kernel (the pith) in everyone's soul. That's why You're manifest and hidden unto everyone. (IN pp. 3_{19}, 4_1).—You're concealed from the reason and manifest in Being. You've displayed a reflection from the light of Your essence. (IN p. 4_5).—All the world is only a talisman, You're the treasure (made inaccessible by the talisman). (IN p. 4_{9b}).—Indeed, You're amazingly manifest and yet You've remained concealed. You're in the soul and yet You're without soul. (IN p. 3_{18}).—One moment You become manifest in Your loftiness, the next You enter into concealment in Your proximity. One moment You're manifest in Your attributes, the next you enter into concealment in Your essence. (IN p. $5_{9\text{-}10}$).—You're concealed and manifest in the heart. You're in every place and you're without place in the heart. (IN p. 7_{15}).—The world is filled with You, and You're not in the world. All are lost in You, and You're not actually there. You're at all times concealed and manifest. (AN 0, verses 42-43).

God is everything and that is why one can say nothing about Him.

Abū Saᶜīd relates: "Once I went to a *pīr* and I found that he continually remained silent. I said to him: 'But say something, oh *pīr*, so the heart may become strengthened through it!' At that he lowered his head for a while and then he said: 'Do you know anything besides God? What should I seek? I don't want to be troublesome, but what should I say? Since the real truth can't be spoken, I remain silent.'" (IN 7/17, p. 124).

Whoever does not have the eye for it does not know God.

A king in disguise must flee to a foreign city before the invading army of the enemy. There he knows no one. One of his intimate friends sees him[3] and says to him: "Why are you living like a beggar? Tell the people: 'I'm the king!' Why do you sit so bewildered in lowliness?" The king answers: "If I say that, they'll tear me to pieces (because they'll take me for a liar)."—Whoever doesn't have the eye for the Sultan can't go to the Sultan. (IN 4/3 p. 79. Cf. Alexander in a disguised state, above p. 626).

Earlier mysticism offers a different explanation for God's concealment.

The fact that God is concealed is a mercy from God. If God were manifest, the sins of human beings would become (unforgivable) unbelief because they would still not desist from the sins which have been predetermined for them (*al-maktūba ᶜalayhim*), and because God would appear to them in a manner (*bi-waṣfin*) which would not hinder them from sins. (*Qūt* 1/206, lines 5-3 from bot.; *Nahrung* 2/91/32.145).

8

Fully developed monism is to a certain extent static. Once divine Being has been deployed, it flows on with uninterrupted uniformity and orderliness in the things which are its shadow. That is why things do not bar one from God, any more than the shadow of trees in water obstructs a ship's course. (*Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 1/148). And so for monists extinction is particularly extinction from false knowledge which results in real knowledge, and not so much a longed for immersion in the primordial ocean of Being or in God.—ᶜAṭṭār thinks and feels more dynamically. The oneness of the universe, disappearance in God, is for him a sought after goal, extinction is a true dying unto the self, not a non-existence achieved by means of knowledge. The task of the mystic is first and foremost the realization of oneness.

In ᶜAṭṭār there is also found a cosmic extinction which consists of all things except God disappearing in God, in Primordial Being. Indeed, it says in the Koran: "All things perish except His face" (28/88). (Cf. AN 8/2). This Koranic verse is "the foundation" (*asās*) of the world which is similar to a soap-bubble and which will disappear like a drop in the ocean. (AN 8/2; above p. 623). Things return to the primordial ocean from which they came. Jīlī also teaches that all things which God created must of necessity return to their original state. (*Al-Insān al-kāmil* 2/40).

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3 Read with B: *Ba-jā-ē dīdh*.

Thus multiplicity will once more be abolished in the original oneness of higher value, derivation (*far*ᶜ) will disappear, the foundation (*aṣl*) will continue to exist, and this is all that matters. (See p. 651 below).

That becoming one is of higher value than becoming two ᶜAṭṭār illustrates with the following comic story:

A fool asks a shopkeeper why he's sitting there in the shop. The shopkeeper says: "For the sake of gain." The fool asks: "What gain?" The shopkeeper answers: "If you have one and two emerges from it, that's gain." To that the fool says: "Is your heart blind? If one emerges from two, that's gain."—If heart and body merge in God, only then does man truly become man. (MN 23/2).

The motif that in the hereafter all human beings become one also turns up.

A fool puts pressure on someone in his debt in order to recover the loan from him. A dervish gets involved in the quarrel and advises the fool to renounce the money now and demand it on the Final Day. The fool says: "I can't obtain the money from him there. For becoming one (*tawḥīd*) will appear there, he and I will become one. If he's me there and I'm him, I can't have any quarrel with him. But *tawḥīd* doesn't occur here. Consequently, I can obtain my money here but not there." (MN 23/1).

With regard to putting off a creditor until the hereafter, cf. the story which is told as the reason for the revelation of surah 19/77. (Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr* 16/91; *Ri*ᶜ*āya* $271_{15ff.}$).

Mankind and all things will disappear in Being.

After ᶜAṭṭār has related the story about Majnūn which explains that one day of being together with Laylā signifies a thousand years for him (IN 3/9; above p. 430), he engages in reflections about "yonder" where a thousand years only signifies one moment and about the fact that both worlds will disappear in an endless Being.

When both worlds attain endless Being, then non-being remains for them as their district of rule (*wilāyat*). See, oh friend, what kind of Being this is before which all atoms prostrate themselves! This is Being which neither became more, nor less: in it all things became nothing. What lofty Being in which these things will gladly disappear! If man becomes non-existent there, then all his loss there becomes gain. Then the hand of all mankind can't reach this man's hem. For he doesn't exist, nor does a hem to which any hand could extend itself. (IN p. $71_{15\text{-}21}$).

The latter idea is then briefly amplified by means of a fool's answer to the question: "Is the fever taking hold of you?" The fool replies: "If I now die, whom is the fever supposed to take hold of?" (IN 3/10, p. 72).

One of the valleys through which the birds have to pass is "the Valley of Oneness" (*tawḥīd*). There they all become one, they all bring forth their head

from the same collar. All multiplicity of numbers is only one there. It isn't the one of the series of numbers but the oneness which stands outside of measure and number. (Cf. AN 8/1; above p. 628). Past and future eternity disappear. Nothing has its own existence any longer, everything is nothing. (MṬ 42/0, p. 146; see above p. 16).

Who is there in the world from "the Fish to the moon" that doesn't become lost? (MṬ p. 162, verse 4097).

A person asks Nūrī how one may travel the path to union (variant: knowledge of God). He answers: "We must pass through seven oceans of fire and light. When you've traversed these seven oceans, an immense fish will devour you with one gulp. A fish which swallows down the first and the last with one breath. A fish without head and foot (without shape and form) which lives in the ocean of "lack of need". When it engulfs both worlds like a crocodile, it swallows up all creatures with one gulp. (MṬ 44/5, pp. 162-63; TA $2/54_{1\text{-}4}$, the reading in C).

This fish which swallows up both worlds in one gulp is evidently related to the beast (*dābba*) which is mentioned in a very similar connection in *Lumaᶜ* 389; *Schlaglichter* 529/126.5. To explain a statement of Junayd's, Sarrāj cites an exegesis given by Ibn ᶜAbbās on the following Koranic verses: "Then He went to the sky when it was smoke and said to it and the earth: 'Come here, voluntarily or under compulsion!' Then they both said: 'We are coming in obedience!'" (Surah 41/11). "Ibn ᶜAbbās says: 'Then the angels said: "Oh Lord, if they hadn't come, what would You have done?" God said: "I would have released one of My beasts (*dābbatan min dawābbī*) against the two of them. It would have swallowed them both in one bite!" They said: "Where is this beast?" God said: "In one of My grass-covered steppes (*marjin min murūjī*)." They said: "Where is this steppe, oh Lord?" He said: "In My concealed knowledge."—The beast and the bite signifies the disappearance of heaven and earth. The grass-covered steppe (which only exists in God's knowledge) is the disappearance of disappearance (*dhahāb al-dhahāb*).'"—The beast is perhaps identical with the Devourer (Halūᶜ) above p. 95. Regarding the *dābba* in eschatology cf. EI s.v.: "Dābba".

Many have sunk to the bottom of this endless ocean, and there's no news of any of them. In this immense ocean the world is a mote in a sunbeam, and a mote in a sunbeam is the world... If the world disappears, and if a mote in a sunbeam disappears, only two water-bubbles have disappeared from this ocean. (MṬ p. 6, verses 136-37, 139).

Furthermore, in ᶜAṭṭār the ocean to which all things return, and in which the mystic also becomes extinct through "immersion" (*istighrāq*), is also the undifferentiated primordial ground from which all things come forth. It is the ocean of eternity from which all things arise and to which they all return without its undergoing change.

An endless ocean was laid out, and from this ocean a vein was diverted to the soul (*jān*). From this ocean one moment a believer comes forth, another moment

an infidel. In this ocean which has neither bottom nor shore, there's miracle upon miracle without number. Oh this endless ocean of secrets which has neither beginning, nor bottom! If this ocean weren't concealed behind the curtain, then all that's been done would remain undone. A world of things that have been done, if it becomes filled with this light, remains existent (only) as long as it's not far from it. If you say: "Why has it remained behind the curtain since nothing that has been done persists there?", the tongue isn't allowed to speak about this here... All things which were determined yesterday in pre-eternity, the sky's wheel brings in action today. Thousands of ages had to elapse before a being like you could take on appearance. (AN 10/0).

9
"The Ocean of the Soul"

With the image of the primordial ocean of Being from which all things have come forth, and from which a branch leads to the mystic's soul, ᶜAṭṭār in the *Muṣībatnāma* likewise gives an answer to the question concerning man's relationship to the primordial world-ground. Man is attached by his soul to this primordial ground. Through the soul, and through the soul alone, he has access to it. Through "the Ocean of the Soul" alone can the world-traveller, after having visited in vain one cosmic being after the other and turned in vain to one prophet after the other, find that which he has sought. This redeeming knowledge is imparted to him by the Prophet Muḥammad. The moment when the Prophet advises him to travel the path into his own interior, instead of seeking outside in vain, forms the climax and the turning point of the big frame-story of the *Muṣībatnāma*.

I cannot enter into the parallels relevant to the history of religion, in particular the Indian ones. Cf. e.g. K. Coomaraswamy, "The Sea", in *India Antiqua* pp. 89-94; Alexander Rüstow, *Ortsbestimmung der Gegenwart* 2/69 ff.

The Prophet advised the world-traveller to travel the path into his own interior instead of wandering about in the cosmos. There he will have to pass through five stations, the last of which is the soul. The traveller follows the Prophet's advice and on the journey within himself finally reaches the soul. (Above pp. 28-29). He addresses the soul: "You're both the soul (*jān*) and the universe (*jihān-i muṭlaq*), the breath and exhalation of God. My soul (*jān*) is a branch from your ocean. I will now die, and it's now a matter for you to do what you believe is right." (MN in 40/0).—The soul (*rūḥ*) answers: "Oh you traveller with bewildered soul! Even if you've wandered about in the world so much—you've traversed hundreds of worlds in passionate longing for me until you finally reached the shore of my ocean! ...Now that you've arrived here, divest yourself,

immerse yourself in an ocean, be a man! I'm like an ocean without end, without boundary and end I extend into eternity. Make your head into your foot on the shore of my ocean, don't think of life and hurl yourself within! If you're entirely immersed in this ocean, then forever sink still deeper! For as long as God exists, you'll never see the beginning or the end of this ocean. And the deeper you sink—oh wonder—the more thirsty you'll become! The drop forever searches for water because it wants to be like the ocean." (Ibid.).

The traveller does as he has been told (pp. 638 f. below). Before we follow him on this path into his own soul, we must still consider a few passages in which the cosmological significance of this ocean is presented.

To begin with, the state of individual existence separated from this ocean is described. Just as there is no good and bad after extinction (above p. 624), there is also no good and bad in the primordial ocean into which the one who experiences extinction is meant to hurl himself. These two are only found in separate individual existence.

The eternal ocean knows nothing of good and bad. Whether the drop is a believer or an idolater, the ocean always remains the way it is. All good and bad takes on appearance in you, all pure and impure comes from you. (MN in 40/0).

The tormenting questions only arise in separate individual existence. The horizon of knowledge is confined and prone to subjectivity.

The drop that's separated from the ocean falls into "why?", "what?" and "how?" But if it's in the flow, then there's neither "why?", nor "what?", nor "how?" ...Outside, the great and the small all run on in accordance with their own illusions. (Ibid.).

The drop pursues its activity on the surface of the ocean in accordance with the extent of its vision. There where its vision ends is the shore for the drop. But since this ocean has no shore, how can the drop see a shore there? If it sees a shore, then that's its imagination. If it sees a phantom, then that's its opinion. If the ant crosses a mountain, to his eye the mountain is less than a piece of straw. If the fly were to see the elephant's size, he wouldn't make the elephant's blood his fountain. If the sun were to appear in its full size, the chameleon wouldn't be in love with it. He imagines in his ignorance that the sun moves from its position for his sake... You're caught in your own sack and worship your own illusion. The matter lies beyond what you imagine... You're like the fly that lands on the elephant in order to throw it to the ground with his own hand, or like the sparrow that flies to Mt Qāf in order to split it with his beak, or the mote in the sunbeam that wants to trample the sun under its foot. You're a drop that presumes to drink up the whole ocean. (MN in 40/0).

Then the characteristics of the universal soul are described. After the traveller has come back from the soul, the *pīr* gives him further instruction about the soul's nature. (Above pp. 29-30).

It is the creative divine light. It is the light of Muḥammad from which all differentiated things arise.

On the light of God see above pp. 271, 527 and 625. On the light of Muḥammad above p. 29, ftn. 19 and Nallino, *Raccolta* 2/240.

Everything that's concealed and visible is a trace of creation of the world-illuminating soul... A beam appeared out of holiness and cast a burning into the world and the soul. It was a beam without end, up to the boundary of both worlds. Everything that is, was, and will be, received from this beam the name "thing". The name of this light was soul. Through it both worlds are nourished (*madad*)... It appeared in thousands of forms. The soul had attributes and essence... The origin of the soul was pure light, the light of Muḥammad. The essence of the soul lit up, then there arose the divine Throne (highest heaven). When the Throne lit up, the divine Throne-Frame arose (the sphere of the fixed stars). When the Throne-Frame lit up, there arose the sky (of the planets). From their lighting up the four elements arose, from the mixing of which comes the sublunar world, animals, plants and all compound things. (Ibid.).

Along with this cosmogony, which in part reminds one of Neo-Platonic ideas, there is the cosmogony known from Islamic monism, according to which the world (here the mythical world is meant) arises from the manifestations of the different divine attributes.

The essence of the soul also had attributes. From "the Knowledge" of the soul arose "the well-guarded Tablet", from "the Power" the reed pen, from "the Will" the angels, from "the Satisfaction" Paradise, from "the Wrath" Hell, from "the Command" the angel Gabriel, from "the Goodness" Michael, the custodian of donations of sustenance, from "Violence" ᶜAzrāʾīl, the angel of death, from "Generation and Destruction" Asrāfīl, the trumpeting angel whose first trumpet blast kills everything and whose second blast revives everything again. (Ibid.).

CHAPTER THIRTY

TRAVELLING WITHIN ONESELF. METAPHYSICAL SELF-IMPORTANCE. FINAL EXTINCTION.

The universal soul is joined with the individual soul by a channel, "a vein". Through this channel the mystic reaches the primordial ground of being (above p. 634). The channel is also described as a secret passageway.

When the traveller returns from Man, the *pīr* instructs him: "The soul of man is the all of all... Whoever travels the path into the soul reaches the (divine) Beloved on the soul's path. To travel the path to the soul means travelling the path to the Beloved, but first it's called travelling to the soul. The Beloved has a covert path to the soul but this is hidden from the world. If the soul (man) finds this path to Him again, it sees His face covertly for all eternity. The King has a secret passageway to every heart. (MN 28/0).—There follows the symbolic story about the secret passageway through which Maḥmūd reaches Ayāz. (Above pp. 344 f.).

The philosophy of Neo-Platonism is already familiar with the idea "that the path to God is the path into our interior, and that turning to the Highest and the Absolute is attained through the state of a higher turning to oneself". (Otfried Becker, *Plotin und das Problem der geistigen Aneignung*, Berlin 1940, p. 24). In Islamic literature this idea is readily dressed in the form of a pseudo-*ḥadīth*: "Whoever knows himself (his soul), he knows His God." (*Man ᶜarafa nafsahū faqad ᶜarafa rabbah*).

The saying is attributed to Muḥammad by "the Pure Brethren" but is supposed to have been introduced by the mystic Yaḥyā ibn Muᶜādh (d. 258/871). (Massignon, *Recueil* 27; *Essai* 239). See Suyūṭī's writing on the subject in GAL^2 2/187, no. 72; and the commentary by Kamāl Paşazāde in Ms. Aşir II 441, 21b-22. Regarding Ibn Sīnā: *Traités Mystiques d'Abou Alî al-Hosain b. Abdallâh b. Sînâ ou Avicenne*, éd. par A. F. Mehren, IIIe fasc,. Leyden 1895, p. 46; Louis Gardet, *La Pensée Religieuse d'Avicenne*, Paris 1951, pp. 147-48; in Abū Saᶜīd: Nicholson, *Studies* 50. See also *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 1/110; Ibn al-Daybaᶜ 209.

The idea also appears among the Syrian mystics, such as Isaac of Niniveh, and is likewise well known to later Christian mysticism. (Arberry, *The Mawáqif and Mukháṭabát of Muḥammad ibn ᶜAbdi-l-Jabbár al-Niffarí*, p. 210). In some Arabic works sayings of a similar kind are attributed to Plato and Aristotle. (Franz Rosenthal, "On the Knowledge of Plato's

Philosophy in the Islamic World" in: *Islamic Culture* 14/1940/409-10. Additional references are given there. Cf. also Nallino, *Raccolta* 2/239, 279-80, note 2, 469-70.)—In fact it is a translation of a saying by Clement of Alexandria, *Paedagogus* III, 1: ἑαυτὸν γάρ τις ἐὰν γνῷ θεὸν εἴσεται (Fritz Meier, "Die Schriften des ᶜAzīz-i Nasafī" in: WZKM 52/953, p. 127).

1

But if the real path to God, to the world-ground, is the path leading into one's own interior, then it no longer makes sense to travel through the cosmos to seek Him there. Instead, the mystic finds his goal through travelling within himself.

As long as you don't journey within yourself, you won't reach the inner meaning (*kunh*) of yourself. If you've found the path to the inner meaning of yourself, you'll find that the angels are a derivation (*farᶜ*) from you. Without this journey within yourself you don't possess this worth (*khaṭar*).

Abū Saᶜīd goes to a mill, stands in front of it for a while and then turns around and says to his companions: "This mill is a good teacher. It said to me in secret: 'Now I'm a Ṣūfī and can become your teacher in Sufism. Day and night I journey within myself. I keep my foot in one place and yet I travel with my whole body. From everyone I receive what is coarse and make it fine. Become like me, if you're a man of work. Otherwise, sit down and do nothing since you lack the pain of work.'" (MN 5/7).

The Soul says to the traveller:

If you wish to go to every atom, the path is not to travel from "the moon" to "the Fish". What you seek you have within yourself. You're your own partition wall which holds you back from it. Adam first rushed to every atom but he didn't find the path until he found the path to himself. Even though you've travelled much in a circle, forward and backward, you've never reached your own essence (*nihādh*, primordial ground). (MN 40/0).

In the *Manṭiq al-ṭayr* the birds realize that they themselves are the Sīmurgh they have been seeking, that all their action was the action of the Sīmurgh. In the *Muṣībatnāma* the traveller discovers all existing things in his own soul (in himself), the soul which is joined with the ocean of the universal soul by a channel, and he realizes that all his action was only the action of the soul.

When the soul has given its explanations to the traveller, he hurls himself headlong into the ocean of the soul.

When the traveller, with no concern for his life, plunged into the ocean of the soul, his soul (his self) saw, as far as it looked behind and ahead, that both worlds were a shadow of its (his) being. He saw that all seeking and all zeal and all effort, all loyalty, all longing which had existed the whole time, all the

head's confusion, all lamentation and wailing, and all sorrow, didn't come from the body (his human existence) but from the soul (*jān*), nay, not from the soul, from the (divine) Beloved (*jānān*). He became bewildered and separated from himself (cf. the extinction of the birds in bewilderment p. 619). He became free (*pāk*) from himself and sat down in a corner. Though he had striven so eagerly in seeking, he now found that seeking by itself had been without purpose (*bar hēch*). He said: "Oh soul, since you were everything that is, since you yourself both said and heard: 'Am I not your Lord?' (above p. 352) (the soul is both partners at once), why did you let me travel about so much?" The soul said: "So you'd appreciate my worth. If someone finds a treasure easily, he doesn't really appreciate it. Only a treasure acquired with effort is appreciated for its worth." (MN 40/0).

This idea is amplified with two stories:

At the beginning of his Sufism, Shiblī comes to Junayd and says to him: "They say you possess the jewel of knowledge of God. Either bestow it on me or sell it to me!" Junayd answers: "If I sell you the jewel, it will make you poor. For its price is inestimable. But if I bestow it on you, you won't appreciate its worth and you'll become arrogant. No, do as I do and drown in the ocean of asceticism, then through patience and waiting you'll receive the jewel!" (MN 40/1).

ᶜUmar says to his son: "How can you perceive the taste of (true) religion! I recognize it because I've experienced the taste of paganism." (MN 40/2.—*Ḥadīqa* 460).

The soul is everything.

When the soul (*jān*) (the self of the traveller[1]) saw itself as being so rich, it cried out: "I was in truth the seeker of myself! I haven't stopped seeking for one moment. Day and night I've sought myself. Wherever I went, above or below, everything is light and embellishment of my soul. Since in reality I was everything, the provider of light of the seven rosegardens (spheres), why did I make the journey outside? Why did I look at this and at that? Alas, I traversed a world but I didn't recognize my own worth! Had I gone into my own soul, from one atom I'd have grown into a hundred." (MN 40 after 2).

The traveller went from "the miraculous signs of God in the horizons" to "the miraculous signs in the soul". (Surah 41/53: "We will show them Our miraculous signs in the horizons and in their souls [themselves]"). Though he had looked very much ahead and behind, he (now) saw both worlds within himself. He perceived that both worlds were a reflection of his soul. He acquired sight through the secret of his soul, became alive and became a (true) slave unto God. (MN 40, shortly before the *Khātima*).

The journey of the traveller ends the way the poet foretold:

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[1] One often has the impression that in ᶜAṭṭār the Persian word *jān* = "soul" represents the Arabic word *nafs* in both its senses: "soul" and "self".

Give up your reason completely in the sacred law. Then enter into yearning for God in the true sense so that when reason, law and yearning have appeared (and done their work), what you seek will appear to you in emotional experience (*ba-dhawq*). You'll have to traverse forty stations (*maqāms*), (the way the book contains forty *maqālas*)... If you've adopted the forty-day retreat (*chilla*) as the path (*ṭarīqat*), then peace is concluded with "the truth" (*ḥaqīqat*). If you seek yourself in forty stations, then you're at the end of all self. It's finished! (Final verses of the introduction of MN, before the *Sharḥ-i kitāb*).

That man finds in himself what he is seeking, that he is really everything himself, ᶜAṭṭār also illustrates with the peculiar fairy-tale about the magician's apprentice.

When the first prince asks his father to tell him what the princess of the fairies whom he desires so much actually is, the father answers him with a story.

A man in India has a clever son who early on has learned all the sciences but is especially interested in astrology. In the astrological books he's read about the king of China's daughter and fallen in love with her. In a far-off city lives a famous astrologist and doctor who's stingy with his knowledge, however, and doesn't accept any students. But through a ruse the clever youth figures out a way to smuggle himself into his presence as a student. He makes believe he's deaf and dumb, and the father must convince the master to take on the deaf mute as a domestic servant for the sake of God's reward. To confirm that the youth is really a deaf mute, the master gives him a sleeping potion. But the youth knows how to undo its effect, and once the master has gone out, he runs about the house and makes movements so as not to succumb to sleep. When the master returns, the youth pretends to be sleeping. The master sticks him in the leg with an awl but the young man controls himself and only makes sounds as one would expect from a deaf mute. And he prudently leaves unanswered the questions of the master. After that he's accepted as a domestic and he now secretly reads through the master's books and pays close attention when the latter talks about his knowledge. Only there's one chest which he can't examine because the master is careful to keep it locked. The youth is convinced that what he seeks is contained in this particular chest. One day the master is called to attend on the king's sick daughter. The student, dressed in women's clothes, sneaks into the women's quarters of the palace. The king's daughter has an abscess in her scalp. Sitting inside it is a crab-like animal that's dug its claws into her skin. When the doctor cuts open the swelling and approaches the animal with an instrument, the animal digs itself deeper into the skin so that the princess cries out in pain. When the student sees this, he can no longer hold back and cries to the master: "You're driving the animal deeper into the skin with the metal instrument. You must burn it with a glowing iron. Then it will let go of the skin!" When the master realizes he's been deceived, he dies from anger. The student brings the treatment to a happy conclusion and he's awarded the title of "Sarpātak".

After returning to the dead master's house, he opens the above-mentioned chest and performs an incantation following the instructions of a book he finds in the chest. Then after forty days "the fairy-daughter" he's in love with actually appears to him. When he looks at her carefully, he notices that she's sitting in his own breast. In response to his surprised question the peri informs him: "I've been with you from the first day. I'm your soul (yourself). You're only seeking yourself. If you look properly, all the world is you."—There follow teachings about the various souls mentioned in the Koran (*ammāra* surah 12/53, *muṭmaʾinna* 98/27). (IN 4/1, pp. 72-76).

On the story about the magician's apprentice cf. Bolte-Polívka 2/60; Emmanuel Cosquin, "Les Mongols et leur prétendu rôle dans la transmission des contes indiens vers l'Occident européen". Étude de Folk-lore comparé sur l'introduction du "Siddhi-Kûr" et le conte du "Magicien et son Apprenti" (*Extrait Revue Traditions Populaires* 1912, Viort 1913); *Bāgh u Bahār* 144-47.—The incantation recalls the incantation of the personal daimonion (*al-ṭibāᶜ al-tāmm*) of the magic books. (Cf. H. Ritter, *Picatrix, Ein arabisches Handbuch hellenistischer Magie* in: Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg 1923, pp. 26 ff.). It is here woven together with novella motifs and mystical ideas to form a strange whole.

In the epilogue of the story the poet then says:

Now, oh son, you're the thing you sought. Everything is in you, but you're weak at doing work. If you remain manly in God's work, then you're everything and you're a co-habitant of the house. Suddenly, without yourself, you became lost because you seek yourself on this path. You're your own beloved. Arrive unto yourself! Don't go out into the field,[2] return to the homeland (to yourself)! (IN p. $77_{4\text{-}7}$).

2

The heightened metaphysical self-importance which can be paraphrased with the formula "I am everything" is linked with extinction in ᶜAṭṭār as in the mystics before him. It is precisely through giving up the ego, individual personality, that mystics feel themselves to be identical with the universe. If this self-importance comes to compete with the proposition "Everything is God", then paradoxical psychic states can arise such as those we became acquainted with above (p. 148). A fluctuation of one's self-importance between extremes can also take place, and then contradictions occur such as the listener to Shiblī claims to find in Shiblī's statements:

Someone asks Shiblī during a preaching session who the knower of God (*ᶜārif*) is. Shiblī answers: "It is he who turns the two worlds upside down (*bi-*

2 Reading from B, p. 437.

gīradh az jāy) with a single eyelash." On another day the same question is put to him. This time he answers: "The knower of God is he who's so weak he can't carry (endure) this world for one moment." A person then jumps up and reproaches him for the contradiction between his two statements. Shiblī answers: "That other day I wasn't me (TA: but Him). But today I am me." (IN 11/5, p. 173; TA $2/176_{18\text{-}21}$).

Heightened self-importance is supported by the teachings—which go back to Gnostic ideas—about the hidden divine substance in man, about his high rank which places him above the angels, who in fact already prostrated themselves before Adam, and about the divine primordial homeland whence he originates and whither he is meant to return, etc.

We have already met with the idea that man's proper place is in God's proximity (pp. 352 f.) and that he is imprisoned in the world like the royal falcon in the old woman's hut. Recognizing one's own high rank, recollecting the primordial homeland, etc., is called for in ᶜAṭṭār's four epics in the paraenesis, while the heightened self-importance of the mystic who becomes God bursts forth in triumphant dithyrambs in the late works (if they are authentic).

The story about the parrot who pretends to be dead (becomes extinct unto himself), and is thereby released from his cage and flies back to his comrades in India (AN 11/1, above p. 602), shifts into exhortations to strive after eternal life and eternal bondage unto God. Then it goes further: "What do you want with this ashhouse? It's not your place. The garment of earth's dust doesn't suit you. Be engaged in finding yourself again within yourself, in extracting yourself from so many curtains!"

David asks God why the world has been created. God answers with the well-known divine saying: "I was a hidden treasure and I wanted to become known. That's why I created creatures, so that they would know Me." (*Kuntu kanzan makhfiyyan, etc.* Alluded to in IN p. 4_{10}).—If you're called to know a treasure, why do you lower yourself to the level of the ashhouse? (AN 11/11).—Once again there follows the summons to make the falcon of the soul worthy of the king's hand, etc. (See above pp. 352 f.).

Man is of higher rank than heaven and earth. For he alone was capable of sustaining "the entrusted deposit" (*amāna*) which had been offered in vain to heaven and earth (surah 33/72). But then this doesn't refer to a donkey like you! (AN 6/1).

By the *amāna* what is usually understood is the obligation to follow the law. Various interpretations of the *āya* are found in Ṭabarī's *Tafsīr*. The term is also understood to mean knowledge of God (Rāzī's *Tafsīr* on the *āya*). See other Ṣūfī interpetations in Nicholson on *Mathnawī* 1/1958-59.

Both worlds have been created for the sake of man. The spheres and the angels exist for his sake—in order to serve him. He is more than the angels.

With regard to man as the purpose of creation cf. also Farghānī's commentary on the *Tāʾiyya* of ʿUmar Ibn al-Fāriḍ, introduction.

Both worlds have been created for Adam's sake. What purpose do the angels have without Adam? Hundreds of worlds full of angels have been brought into action in order to work for Adam. This is hidden today but tomorrow the true difference in value (between man and the angels) will be revealed by God's touchstone. (MN 5/5 at the end).

A parable dealing with this detail:

In the kitchen of king Jamshēdh the stone pot is arguing with the golden plate. The pot says: "If I didn't exist, you would be empty, etc." The plate answers: "Everything you say means nothing to me. For I stand before Jamshēdh. If you wish, we can go to the money-changer to see which of us two is worth more. The same will be revealed if we go to the pawnbroker." (MN 5/6).

How should these powerfully rotating spheres revolve for the sake of a handful of earth? This immense wheel, oh friend, doesn't rotate for a handful of veins and skin! ...The fly thinks the butcher opens the shop door for its sake only. But what am I saying here? It's nothing marvelous for God that He causes the mill to turn for the sake of a kernel of grain. The sphere rotates for the sake of the pure soul, not for a few handfuls of water and earth. Set down your foot on this path like men because this turning wheel is your servant! The Lord of the world only keeps you in earth's prison for a few days so that when you come forth from this transitory prison you'll recognize the worth of the rosegarden. At the door of that mine whose jewel is the souls, the sphere is no more than a speck of dust, etc. (AN in 13/2).

Man has the privilege of love as an advantage over the angels, and the privilege of love of God as well. Man is more than they are.

The bearer of the Throne instructs the traveller: "The angels in heaven and on earth stand ready to serve man with their skirts tucked up. They sacrifice their heart in order to serve Him. Love is the privilege of man." (MN 5/0).

The angels serve God incessantly and perish out of longing for God. (There follows the daily burning up of the angels referred to in the *Qūt al-qulūb*; above p. 568).—Only by prostrating themselves before Adam do they become acquainted with one atom of love. They found the path to God through Adam's soul and will now serve Him for all eternity. (MN 5/1).

Cf. above p. 136. In another place it is not actually love but the pain of love which is denied to angels:

Qudsiyān-rā ʿishq hast u dard nēst *dard-rā juz ādamī darkhward nēst.*

MṬ 14/0. Missing in Garcin de Tassy's edition.

The angel, which in the form of a dove lands on the corpse of Junayd (above p. 340), says to the people: "His outer shell (*qālab*) belongs to us (the angels), his heart to the divine Beloved. If one atom of his heart were to be made visible, it would become the key to the castle of both worlds! Hundreds of worlds full of angels thirst after one scented whiff of him." (MN 5/2).

"In this way", ᶜAṭṭār continues by way of amplification, "the magician angels, Hārūt and Mārūt, thirst after the water which flows a hand's width below them in the well where they've been suspended head first." (MN 5/2).

People have the water nearby, in their own house, but they do not see it.

A perfect man says to a foreigner: "Why do you go on scrubbing your house? Make the house into a well, throw the earth away! If you remove the dark earth, then the bright spring will bubble forth from the well. The water is nearby, go two ells deeper and the water is there. (What you seek is within you)."—You die while being thirsty and you have the lake beneath you. You have your foot on the treasure and you're begging. So many angels strove and sought the treasure, and yet they were standing on top of it. Before the soul of Adam took on appearance, they didn't know the way to the Creator. When Adam took on appearance, the key to both worlds was revealed. (MN 5/4).

Man is of high rank, of higher rank than the angels. Indeed, he is everything.

What the bearers of the Throne took to be the divine Throne that they were carrying was in reality the light-filled heart of Adam. For Adam was both worlds. (MN 5/0, the final verse).

Ḥadīth: Qalbu'l-muᵓmini ᶜarshu'llāh. (Nicholson on *Mathnawī* 1/3665).

Of course man is only a handful of earth, but his soul, his substance, is of a higher rank.

They dress up a jar with hair and silk clothes to give it a human appearance and use it as an apotropaic figure. If someone sees it from far-off, he thinks it's a beautiful maiden of Paradise. But when it's finally thrown down from the roof, one sees it's nothing but a painted jar filled with air.—Today you too are such a beautiful figure for warding off the evil eye. But just wait until they throw you into the grave!

The similitude is rather forced. What follows except for a few verses = IN p. $389_{8\text{-}12}$.

Even though your place is under the earth, the pure soul is still pure of earth. Ah, your substance is behind a narrow curtain, rusted with the rust of "nature"! If the angels see your substance, they'll prostrate themselves before you one more time! Isn't it your substance before which the angels prostrate themselves? Don't you bear the crown of the caliphate (surah 2/30) on your head? You're a

caliph's son. Leave the ashhouse and enter the rosegarden. Give up being a beggar! ...A kingdom is prepared for you in Egypt. Why are you at the bottom of the well like Joseph? The only reason you don't have command over your realm is because Solomon is the demon in your place. If you find the signet-ring again, the *dēws* and peris will obey you once more.

Concerning this legend about Solomon see the EI under "Sulaymān".

You're king first and last but you're squint-eyed, caught behind the curtain of delusion. You see one as two, two as a hundred. What meaning has one, two, or a hundred? You yourself are everything! (AN 11/8).

Amplification:

A master has a cross-eyed apprentice. He sends him to fetch a bottle of oil. The apprentice goes off, sees two bottles instead of one and asks what he should do. In annoyance the master calls to him: "Break one of the bottles and bring the other here!" The apprentice then breaks one bottle and now no longer sees the other. (AN 11/9.—Chauvin 2/196).—If you see something else besides yourself, then you're this cross-eyed person. Everything you see is you. But what do you know about this in your error? (The final verse).

The poet pursues similar trains of thought when he calls upon his soul, which is likewise the universal soul, to begin the poem.

Oh you musk of the soul, open the musk-pouch. For you're the deputy of the house of the caliphate! Since you're in possession of "The soul is under the command of my Lord" (*al-rūḥu min amri rabbī*, surah 17/85), the throne of the soul's kingdom is yours. Both worlds are only a handful of dust, the holy place of the royal court is pure.[3] The entire world is completely tied to you, the heavens and the earth are tied to you... Paradise and Hell and Judgement Day are all a sign for your name. On the angels you bestow knowledge with a secret sign (*ramz*). On creatures you bestow characteristics in a hundred forms... One from among your atoms is the divine Throne... You're a wondrous bird, I don't know what you're like. For you're beyond our affirmation (*ithbāt*) and negation. You're neither in the heavens, nor on earth. Where are you then? With the Lord of the worlds! You're all things and none of them as well... Cause a musk-laden breath to emerge from your heart! ...You're king and caliph for eternity... Put on the caliph's black robe like Adam. Travel within your own breast as if (in a) world! ...Seat yourself like Solomon on the ruler's seat with the signet-ring in your hand! Show yourself with Joseph's beauty. Like Abraham make your seven limbs into an eye! ...Spread out both wings in the shadow of the Sīmurgh! ...After innumerable efforts and endeavors help will come to you from Muḥammad's light. Since you've attained this perfection in religion, it's now permitted for you to speak words (to compose poetry).—There follows praise of words, of poetic discourse. (IN pp. 28-29).

3 Move the *iḍāfa* in 6b accordingly.

By means of the soul union is established with the universe. The soul is a part of the universe, nay the universe itself. Everything revolves around man.

Day and night, my son, these seven circles are at work for your sake. The obedience of the angels is for your sake. Paradise and Hell are a reflection of your kindness (*luṭf*) and violence (*qahr*). The angels all prostrated themselves before you. Part and whole have merged in your Being. Don't look upon yourself[4] with contempt, for no one can be more than you. Your body is a particle, your soul the universe... The body is not separated from the soul, it's a part of it. The soul is not separated from the universe, it's one of its limbs. But since there's no number (multiplicity) on this path of "the one", people can never again speak of part and whole. (MṬ after 19/5, p. 72, verses 1865-69a, 1871-72).

Psychological and metaphysical ways of thinking flow into one another. That the world is present in human fantasy serves as a support of metaphysical self-importance.

What are both worlds? An ocean whose name is the heart... Enter a while the ocean of your breast so that you see a world vanished within you! A hundred worlds are hidden in your heart, how can a hundred (external) worlds have meaning in your eye? There you recognize earth and heaven, because you're this world as well as that world... If you wish, a world will immediately come to light for you from the (inner) power of creation. In that world the bird doesn't come from the egg. ...honey doesn't come from the bee, nor milk from the goat, nor wine from the grape... There the intermediary causes disappear, there all this pours forth from nothing. Everything you like appears there simply because you wish for it. Don't look upon yourself with contempt, don't think that both worlds are something other than (your) body and soul! You're everything. Why are you still afraid of (Hell-)fire? Your heart is the divine Throne, your breast is the Throne-Frame. (IN p. 148_{3-16}).

These realizations are bound to the pre-condition of extinction. (See above p. 603).

If you've come forth from "we" and "I", then you're both worlds. (MN 35/3, final verse).

Through Him know Him and vanish in this extinction into new being (*dar ān ᶜayn-i fanā ᶜayn-i baqā shaw*)! You attain new being (*bāqī gardī*), if you become extinct unto yourself. You remain everything, if you remain without yourself. (AN in 11/6).

One day the shaykh of Mihna (Abū Saᶜīd) spoke thus: "Consider the world to be a body and close your eyes! The earth and the heavens are full of Bāyazīd, but he himself has disappeared from the scene." (AN 11/7).

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4 In verse 1869 read: *tu* instead of *ō*.

A variant:

Abū Sa^c^īd says: "I see 18,000 worlds full of Bāyazīd, but I don't see Bāyazīd. That is to say, Bāyazīd has merged within God." (TA 1/135$_{13\text{-}15}$).

The world is full of you, and you're not in the world. Everything is lost in you, and you don't exist. (AN 0, verse 42).

Man cannot in fact see himself directly the way he sees the external world. But if he does come to know himself, he finds that he is everything. Mystical ideas merge with primitive epistemological theory.

A great man said: "The Creator shows you clearly everything He has called into existence, what is ahead and behind, above and below: the stars, the heavenly spheres, the sun, moon, ocean, land, mountains and grass, the celestial Tablet, the Pen, Throne, Throne-Frame, angels and cherubim, wine, grapes, Paradise and Ḥūrīs, Fish and moon, snake and ant... all secrets in both worlds... but of you yourself He shows you not one hair. Your you-ness must be hidden from yourself. If your eye fell on your own face, you would raise lamentation out of love for yourself. If you wish to catch a whiff of yourself, then undertake ascetic austerities (*riyāḍat kun*). For the world is full of you... You thought that your Being was not on hand." (AN 11/4).—There follows the story about the training of the parrot (above p. 627) in which the sentence occurs: "Your Being is the mirror but it's hidden; non-being (the external world) is the frame (*āyīnadān*) of the mirror". (Cf. also the story about Jamshēdh's drinking-cup above pp. 602).

Here the very Being which flows through all non-existent things and cannot be perceived without these shadow entities becomes clearly identified with the mystic.

The internal eye recognizes the high rank of man.

If you're in the heavens or on the earth, you actually see nothing other than what you see (with the external eye). But if an eye opens inside your substance, then in order to honor you they pour out both worlds over you. At the moment that this eye is allotted to you, both worlds become lost within you, and you become lost within yourself. You're the substance which, if you know it, is higher than this and that world. (AN in 11/10).

Sometimes these ideas take on an almost solipsistic twist.

Someone asks Bāyazīd: "All hidden and visible things, the Throne and the earth, the two worlds, what is all this?" "All this is me", said Bāyazīd, "because I've died unto life."—As soon as your body-soul existence (*nihādh*) dissolves, this as well as that world is destroyed. Nothing remains, if you don't remain. For you're both this as well as that world. (AN 11/10).

The parallel Indian doctrine that the external world only exists in our consciousness cannot be entered into here. (Cf. Otto Strauss, *Indische Philosophie*, Munich 1925). The motif "I am everything" is present in the sayings of Bāyazīd to a very marked degree. (Cf. my article

"Die aussprüche des Bāyezīd Bisṭāmī" in the Festschrift for Tschudi: *Westöstliche Abhandlungen*, p. 243.

Additional sayings of Bāyazīd's in which he declares he is everything:

Someone asked him: "What is the Throne?" He said: "It's me." The man asked: "What is the Throne-Frame?" He said: "It's me." The man said: "What is the Tablet and the Pen?" He said: "It's me." The person said: "They say that God has bondsmen who are on the heart of Gabriel, Michael, Asrāfīl and ᶜAzrāʾīl." He said: "They're all me." The man then fell silent.—ᶜAṭṭār adds by way of commentary: "Bāyazīd says: 'Indeed, everyone who's disappeared in God and reached the true reality of all that is, is completely God. And if such a man with the light of God sees everything as himself, that's not really strange.'" (TA $1/171_{18\text{-}24}$, the reading in C).

"On the heart", i.e. according to Ibn ᶜArabī (*Futūḥāt* 2/9, *Bāb* 73), their hearts are so related to the hearts of the angels mentioned that the divine insights which are conferred in the heart of the angels are likewise conferred in the heart of the persons in question.

ᶜAṭṭār has here combined several dicta from the Arabic tradition and treated them in greater detail. Cf. *Nūr* 113, 80; *Talbīs* 368; Rōzbihān Baqlī, *Sharḥ al-Shaṭḥiyyāt* 24b.

One day he was speaking about "the Truth". Then he sucked on his lips and said: "I am the wine-drinker as well as the wine and the wine-pourer." (TA $1/133_{2\text{-}4}$).

In ᶜAṭṭār he reports on his psychic heavenly ascension:

Then I flew for 30,000 years into the space of His oneness (*waḥdāniyyat*) and another 30,000 years within divinity (*ulūhiyyat*) and another 30,000 years in unicity (*fardāniyyat*). When 90,000 years had elapsed, I saw Bāyazīd and everything I saw was me. (TA $1/175_{5\text{-}8}$).

Concerning the other versions see my essay in the Festschrift for Tschudi just cited above.

Bāyazīd is the Throne. His servant Abū Mūsā learns this at the moment when his master dies:

On the night when he died, Abū Mūsā was not present. He relates: "I saw in a dream that the celestial Throne had been placed on my head and I was carrying it, and I was amazed at this. In the morning I got up to tell the shaykh about it. (The *murīd* is meant to inform the *murshid* about his dreams). But the shaykh had died, and countless people had arrived from every direction. When they lifted up the coffin, I endeavored to have them give me a corner of the coffin (to carry). I was not successful. Then I became impatient, went underneath the coffin, took it on top of my head and walked forward like this. I had forgotten the dream. Then I suddenly saw the shaykh who said: 'Oh Abū Mūsā, this is the interpretation of the dream which you had last night, namely that you've taken the celestial

Throne upon your head. That Throne is this corpse of Bāyazīd.'" (TA 1/177$_{25}$-178$_{8}$; MN 5/5).

The idea "I am everything" can be traced very widely in Islamic mystical literature. We cannot here enter into the subject.

Cf. for example the poem in Jīlī, *al-Insān al-kāmil* 1/21. For the Bektashīs see Edmond Saussey, *Littérature populaire turque*, Paris 1936, p. 367, and L. Massignon in: *Revue des Études Islamiques* 1941-46, pp. 89 ff.

3

The increase of metaphysical self-importance by means of becoming one with divinity through extinction, as we already know, led among some mystics to such hybrid statements as: "I am God" (*Anā'l-Ḥaqq*, Ḥallāj) and "I am sublime and how mighty am I!" (*Subḥānī wa-mā aᶜẓama shaʾnī!* Bāyazīd).

On these and other similar statements of Bāyazīd's cf. *Nūr* 68, 77, 78, 111, 118, 124, 131, 138-40, 147.

These statements are explained psychologically and criticized by Muḥammad Ghazzālī. In the latter's view they do not attest to a true union but should be judged like the words of lovers in a state of erotic intoxication which are to be folded up and not related further (*yuṭwā wa-lā yuḥkā*).

When these people are returned to the rule of reason, which is the scales of God on His earth, they recognize that this was no real union but is merely similar to union, just as when the lover in love's exhilaration says: "I'm he whom I love, and he whom I love is I; we're two souls who inhabit one body" (see above p. 421). If someone suddenly looks in a mirror and doesn't notice the mirror, he actually thinks that the form he sees in the mirror is the mirror's form which is one with him (cf. above p. 627), or he looks at wine in a glass and thinks that the wine possesses the color of the glass.—In this connection Gazzālī cites the verse of Ibn ᶜAbbād which has already been presented (above p. 425). (*Mishkāt al-anwār* [Gairdner], pp. 60-61; cf. *Iḥyāʾ* 3/350, *Aṣnāf al-mughtarrīn*).

For our mystics, however, the matter is not a psychological problem but rather a religious-metaphysical one. In particular, the above-described expansion of the ego into "everything" is a final hindrance for them on the path to God. This is felt most poignantly by precisely the boldest of these visionaries who see "everything" as "I", namely Bāyazīd.

I flew in the air of He-ness until I saw the arena (*maydān*) of oneness beneath me and in it caught sight of the tree of eternity. When I looked, it was all me. I said: "My God! With my I-ness I find no path to You and I don't come forth from

my selfhood. What should I do?" Then the command came: "Oh Bāyazīd, liberation from your you-ness is connected with emulation of My friend (Muḥammad), etc." (Hujwīrī 306_{7-11}; TA 1/175-76).

Yet with this answer the problem is pushed to one side. Nor is an answer in this form found in the Arabic sources (so far as I know). In Sarrāj, Bāyazīd expresses himself more harshly:

He says after telling about the tree of oneness in the arena of eternity: "Then I looked and saw that everything was delusion." (*Lumaᶜ* 384_{17}; *Schlaglichter* 525/125.1; Rōzbihān Baqlī, *Sharḥ al-Shaṭḥiyyāt* 15a).

Bāyazīd's experience is presented even more boldly in ᶜAṭṭār:

I flew in space and non-space three times 30,000 years. When they admitted me to the lofty Throne, then Bāyazīd appeared to me there as well. I cried out: "Oh God, lift the curtain!" Then once again Bāyazīd came forth from the curtain. (AN 11/2).

Perhaps this version is an elaboration based on the saying: "...until I reached the Throne. Then it was empty and I threw myself upon it, etc." (*Nūr* 128).

The story in a strange way reminds one of the distich by Novalis:

One met with success—he lifted the veil of the goddess at Sais—But what did he see? He saw—oh wonder of wonders—himself!

Novalis, *Paralipomena zu den Lehrlingen zu Sais. Schriften*, ed. Kluckhohn 1/41. (For this reference I am indebted to the kindness of the university lecturer Traugott Fuchs, Istanbul).

Thus divinity still remains transcendent. It remains transcendent because it is Being devoid of qualities which only manifests itself in so far as, like a mirror, it reflects back his image to the beholder. The birds experience this as well after they have attained or think they have attained oneness with the Sīmurgh.

The birds perished and became extinct unto themselves out of shame upon beholding the register of their deeds. When they gained new life through the light of majesty, everything they had and had not done was erased from their breast. (Above p. 17). "The sun of proximity shone from pre-eternity[5]... From the reflection of the face of the thirty birds (*sī murgh*) they saw the face of the Sīmurgh... Without doubt that Sīmurgh was those thirty birds. They all experienced consternation and confusion. ...They saw that they themselves were the Sīmurgh... When they looked at the Sīmurgh, that Sīmurgh was actually the thirty birds who'd travelled the path.[6] If they looked at themselves, then the thirty birds were that other Sīmurgh. And if they looked at both at the same time, then both were one Sīmurgh."—In their confusion they don't know how to

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5 In verse 4205 read: *az pēshān*.

6 In verse 4210b read: *Būdh ān Sīmurgh īn sī murgh-i rāh*.

explain this to themselves and they ask that majesty to clear up the mystery. Then they're given the answer: "This kingly presence is like a sun-bright mirror. Whoever comes here sees himself in it... You've come here as *sī murgh* (thirty birds) and appeared as thirty birds in the mirror... How could anyone's eye ever reach Us? How could the eye of the ant penetrate to the Pleiades? Have you ever seen an ant that lifted an anvil or a gnat that raised up an elephant in its teeth?" (MṬ after 45/3; cf. above p. 17).

The idea that the bondsman of God only sees himself in the mirror of knowledge of God and in reality does not see God is clearly stated by ᶜAṭṭār's contemporary Ibn ᶜArabī and commentated upon by Shaᶜrānī. (Shaᶜrānī, *al-Yawāqīt wa'l-jawāhir*, Cairo 1321, 1/123).

The passage is dealt with by H. S. Nyberg in: *Kleinere Schriften des Ibn al-ᶜArabī*, p. 102: "If man thinks he sees God, he only sees himself. Being which is devoid of qualities cannot be seen. It is like a mirror-glass which is only visible in as much as it reflects an image. Therefore if a human being steps before this mirror, only his own image is beamed back at him." We do not know whether ᶜAṭṭār was acquainted with Ibn ᶜArabī's writings. The emotionality of the treatment and the poetic drama of the presentation are in any case entirely his own work.—Cf. for this and the following stage in Ibn Sīnā: Louis Gardet, *La Pensée religieuse d'Avicenne* 147-48.

4

How then is the mystic meant to escape the deceptive effect of the ego which confronts him and bars his way to God at the very moment when he thinks he is closest to Him? The mystical answer to this perhaps lies in a dictum of Bāyazīd's to which ᶜAṭṭār occasionally alludes (AN 11/2): "Bāyazīd sees God in a dream and asks Him: 'What is the path to You?' God answers: 'Leave yourself and come!' (*Utruk nafsaka wa-taᶜāl! Nūr* 64, 96)."

A new, final extinction from extinction (*fanāᵓ ᶜan al-fanāᵓ*) in which the mystic beheld himself (= God), an extinction which completely effaces the "I" and causes it to merge in divinity, provides the solution and a release from the spell of the "I". For the pantheistic mystic God is in fact he himself, the mystic, but he is such only in the derivative sense, not in the sense of true, original Being. The correct situation is re-established if the derivation (*farᶜ*) disappears within the origin (*aṣl*).

After their incapacity to reach the Sīmurgh is made clear to the birds by means of the parable of the ant and the gnat, the *lā fāᶜila illā'llāh* is presented to them. Their journey to the Sīmurgh was a journeying in the action of the Sīmurgh Himself. Then the Sīmurgh goes on to say: "We're much more worthy of

Sīmurgh-ship than you are because We're the real, essential Sīmurgh (*Mā ba-Sīmurghī bas-ē awlātarīm, z-ān ki Sīmurgh-i ḥaqīqī-gawharīm*). Merge within Us so you find yourselves in Us once more!" They then merged within Him forever. The shadow disappeared in the sun, and that's the end! (MṬ pp. 167-68).

The *pīr* instructs the traveller:

Now travel within yourself forever! ...But if you've found liberation from the self so as to be admitted into the curtain of the highest oneness (*tawḥīd-i khāṣṣ*), you must go forth from the Being of the soul (one's own Being). Now you must become the confidant of the Beloved! (MN 40, after 5).

The traveller who had journeyed so long to God, now has before him the journey in God. ...If I were here to talk to you about this journey, I would surely shatter both worlds. If another life is bestowed on me, then I'll give you a description (*sharḥ*) of it. If I make a new book about this journey, I'll fill both worlds with light for all eternity. If permission for it is granted me by divine providence, I'm ready to do so. But it would be a mistake if I were to give this description on my own. I may only do so once I've been granted permission from the divine royal court. I've given a full description of this (first) journey. Now I must wait to see what kind of command arrives. (MN the end of 40, before the *Khātima*).

In the *Manṭiq al-ṭayr* in place of "journeying in God" there appears the Ṣūfī term "permanence after extinction" (*al-baqāʾ baʿd al-fanāʾ*). "Permanence" is described with rather general expressions as a higher form of existence, about which, however, scarcely anything concrete is postulated. (Cf. the passage in AN 11/6; above p. 646).

It is the situation after the second extinction.

If someone disappears (*az miyān raft*), this is "extinction" (*fanā*). If he becomes extinct unto extinction (*fanā gasht az fanā = al-fanāʾ ʿan al-fanāʾ*), then it's "permanence" (*baqā*). (MṬ p. 157, verse 3942).—If you wish to reach this high station, first become extinct unto yourself, but then travel further onward from nothingness! (3947-48).—Close your eyes and open them again, disappear and then also disappear from there, then disappear as well from this second stage! Go on like this in peace until you reach the world of the state of disappearance! (3953-55).

ʿAṭṭār here describes going on beyond extinction (*fanāʾ ʿan al-fanāʾ*). But then he does not lead us any further along the way into "permanence" (*baqā*). At the end of the *Manṭiq al-ṭayr* the birds reach "permanence", just as the traveller in the *Muṣībat-nāma* enters upon "the journey in God". But the poet declares straightway that no one has ever spoken about this "permanence" and that no one has either been able to describe it or to give information about it.

After more than a hundred thousand aeons had elapsed since the extinction of the birds, aeons without temporal dimension and without before and after, the birds were returned to themselves in complete "extinction". After they had returned to themselves again in this way, they came forth in "permanence after disappearance". But no recent and no ancient person has spoken about this disappearance and permanence. It can't be described or reported on.— "Nonetheless", so ᶜAṭṭār continues, "our friends desired a description at least by means of a similitude." But this would require a new book. He then recalls how God causes man to exist from a single drop, gives him reason and knowledge of divine mysteries, but then casts him down from his position of honor into the humiliation of death in order then to confer on him the honorific gift of permanence in the resurrection from death. Humiliation in death is the pre-condition for attaining exaltation in *baqā*. (MṬ 45/5, pp. 168-69).

To illustrate this exaltation in "permanence" after humiliation in "disappearance" he then relates the long story about the king who out of jealousy gives the order to execute his vizier's son whom he loves, but is protected from the consequences of his fit of rage by the vizier's wisdom.

But from this story as well we actually learn nothing as far as what characterizes the state of mystical *baqā*.

The story portrays with splendid mastery the state of extreme psychic misery and moral ruination of a human being who through his own fault destroyed the dearest thing he possessed, the person in whom all lovely charm of youthful, blossoming life was embodied, and the incomprehensible, undeserved happiness which is allotted him when a kind destiny again bestows on him what he had lost.

A king loves his vizier's handsome son, keeps him always nearby and can't be separated from him even for a few moments. The result is that the youth no longer has much freedom of movement to be together with his parents. Now the vizier's son falls in love with the daughter of a neighboring prince and one evening, unbeknowns to the king, he has a rendezvous with her. The king, who on this night is intoxicated with wine, wakes up at midnight and doesn't find the youth in his usual place. Tormented by jealousy and suspicion, he springs to his feet and surprises the couple in intimate conversation. He feels himself betrayed, deceived, treated with ingratitude, and in blind rage he orders the youth to be flayed and hung from the gallows upside down. The father manages to convince the executioners, partly with gifts and partly by pointing out that the king has given this order in drunkenness and will surely come to regret it, to execute a criminal in place of his son. He then hides the boy in his house. After a few days, love and yearning once again awaken in the king's heart. He bitterly regrets what he did, weeps day and night, remains secluded and doesn't eat and

sleep. On the fortieth day the boy appears to him in a dream covered in blood and reproaches him for his disgraceful behavior. Has a lover ever treated his beloved in this manner? For the horrible deed he will call the king to account before God's Seat of Judgement. The king wakes up near to madness and finally, tormented by regret and qualms of conscience, becomes so wretched that he asks the Creator for the one mercy of releasing him through death from his miserable life. The vizier has witnessed the king's condition and overheard his prayer. He sends his son to the king, tells him to bow down before him and ask him for forgiveness for his previous small mistake. "What came over the king when he saw the boy alive before him once more, can't be expressed in words", says the poet. "What the one said and the other came to hear, this 'was seen by a blind man and heard by a deaf man's ear'. Who am I that I could describe it? I wasn't present, so how am I to recount it? That's why I'm silent." (MṬ 45/6, pp. 169-75.—Chauvin 8/127-28).

According to the *Majālis al-ᶜushshāq* (Ms. Bodleiana, *Majlis* 63, fol. 158a; Ms. Ayasofya, *Majlis* 64, fol. 195a), the king of this story was the Seljuk sultan Muḥammad ibn Malikshāh (d. 511/1118), and the vizier was ᶜIzz al-Mulk ᶜAbd al-Jalīl al-Dihistānī. The name of the vizier is a conflation of two names: a) ᶜIzz al-Mulk, the son of Niẓām al-Mulk, the vizier of Barkyāruq from 485-87 AH, and b) al-Wazīr al-Aᶜazz Abū'l-Maḥāsin ᶜAbd al-Jalīl ibn ᶜAlī ibn Muḥammad al-Dihistānī. The latter was appointed chief of the financial administration (*ᶜamīd*) of Baghdad in the year 482 AH (Ibn al-Athīr 10/120) where he distinguished himself by quelling a mob uprising in the year 486 AH (ibid. 153-54). From 493 AH he is vizier of Baghdad for Barkyāruq. In the latter's first unfortunate battle against his brother Muḥammad, ᶜAbd al-Jalīl led the right wing, was taken prisoner, granted mercy and once again sent to Baghdad as *ᶜamīd*, where he had the Friday prayer recited from the pulpit on behalf of Muḥammad (ibid. 199). In the second battle between the brothers in 494 AH Muḥammad was defeated. From Ṣafar 494 ᶜAbd al-Jalīl was the vizier of Barkyāruq (ibid. 206) and in Ṣafar 495 he was murdered (ibid. 229).

If the concepts of *fanā* and *baqā* are meant to be clarified with this story, this does not happen in the sense of the normal terminological meaning of the two words. Becoming annihilated by means of an awareness of guilt can at best be compared with the situation of the birds who perish out of shame when the register of their sins is presented to them at the royal court of the Sīmurgh. This situation is in fact also described by the poet as *fanā* (MṬ p. 166, final verse). But *baqā* is a blessed state of happiness which the poet cannot and will not describe in greater detail in this story either. ᶜAṭṭār diverts his readers' concern for knowledge with an impressive story. And then, as in the *Muṣībatnāma*, he promises to say more if God gives him permission to do so. But now speech has reached the end. "It's time to act. How long will I still go on talking?" (MṬ p. 175, verse 4423).

We will not be wrong in assuming that the poet did not know anything concrete to say about "travelling in God" and "permanence after passing away", just as generally speaking the mystics have little to report about this *baqā*.

Regarding the usual meaning of the term *baqā'* cf. Nallino, *Raccolta* 2/223-24.

All interest is concentrated on the act of extinction, whether this is conceived of as a temporary suspension of consciousness of ego, as immersion in the Beloved, as one partner making room for the sake of the other, or, figuratively speaking, as the immersion of the drop in the ocean, disappearance of the sunbeam's mote within the sun, as the vanishing of derivation (*far*[c]) in the origin (*aṣl*) which alone is worthy of Being and participates in it, as a cosmic return of all things into the primordial ground of Being, or finally as physical death.

In the epics of [c]Aṭṭār which we have examined we have met with several, indeed altogether four, layers of Islamic piety. In the first layer the goal of life and striving appears to be acceptance in an orthodox sense into the mercy of a personal God, a Master who forgives the defective achievements and sins of His creatures and slaves, and accepts them into His Paradise after this earthly vale of tears. In the second layer, appropriate to an earlier stage of mysticism, the chief content of piety appears to be detachment from setting oneself worldly goals in favor of higher, religious ideals. In the third layer, which corresponds to the developed mysticism of love, yearning directs itself to beloved God Himself, and the goal of all the heart's desires is to look upon His sublimely beautiful face or to become united with Him through extinction. In the fourth, which is the pantheistic-monistic layer, the goal is to merge into divinity or pure Being and the origin of all things, a goal which was reached by the thirty birds after a long, exhausting flight during which they had to traverse seven frightful valleys, and by the world-traveller after many detours and mistaken wanderings throughout the cosmos. This fourth form of piety is without doubt the one which was actually of ultimate concern to [c]Aṭṭār. For the depiction of the journey to this goal is the very content of the two grandiose chief tales of the *Manṭiq al-ṭayr* and the *Muṣībatnāma*, whereas the tale of the *Ilāhīnāma* belongs more properly to the second layer of piety.

By extending the concept of extinction to cosmic immersion of all things in the primordial ocean of Being and to physical death, this death in a new sense also becomes accepted into existence as something meaningful. The cessation of individual existence is

no longer a menacing end, the gate to an unknown destiny in the hereafter which man looks forward to with dread and trembling. Nor is it any longer the bridge to beholding the divine Beloved's face. Rather, it is immersion and extinction in the primordial ground of Being itself, disappearance of the drop in the ocean of transcendence whence it originates and is derived, where as an individual it will henceforth be "suspended" in a double sense, vanished, concealed and sheltered at the same time. The essential here is that the primordial ground remains, this is the only thing that matters. The individual drop may merge within the ocean, the individual mote may disappear in the sun. Being "suspended" in the transcendent primordial ground of the universe—we may perhaps interpret the poet's cautious hints thus—is for him *baqā*, the new existence after extinction.

With this knowledge about man's deep connection to the primordial ground, the ocean of Being, the return to which is the meaningful and desired goal of life, with achieving an inner attitude which accepts "Being-toward-death"[7] in this sense into one's feeling for life, ᶜAṭṭār's piety, at this ultimate stage, also attains a new solution to the existential problem whose solution appeared to be so hopeless at the outset.

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7 See Ritter's quotation from Heidegger on p. 42 of Introduction. (Translator's note)

ABBREVIATED TITLES

Alte Vorbilder = Richard Gramlich, *Alte Vorbilder des Sufitums*. 1-2. Wiesbaden 1995.

Gaben = *Die Gaben der Erkenntnisse des ᶜUmar as-Suhrawardī (ᶜAwārif al-maᶜārif)*, übersetzt und eingeleitet von Richard Gramlich. Wiesbaden 1978.

Nahrung = *Die Nahrung der Herzen*. Abū Ṭālib al-Makkīs *Qūt al-qulūb*, eingeleitet, übersetzt und kommentiert von Richard Gramlich. Wiesbaden 1992-1995.

Schlaglichter = *Schlaglichter über das Sufitum*. Abū Naṣr as-Sarrāǧs *Kitāb al-lumaᶜ*, eingeleitet, übersetzt und kommentiert von Richard Gramlich. Wiesbaden 1990.

Sendschreiben = *Das Sendschreiben al-Qušayrīs über das Sufitum*. Eingeleitet, übersetzt und kommentiert von Richard Gramlich. Wiesbaden 1989.

Stufen = *Muḥammad al-Ghazzālīs Lehre von den Stufen der Gottesliebe*. Die Bücher 31-36 seines Hauptwerkes eingeleitet, übersetzt und kommentiert von Richard Gramlich. Wiesbaden 1984.

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Abdülbâki. See Gölpınarlı.

Abū'l-ᶜAlāʾ Aḥmad b. ᶜAbd Allāh al-Maᶜarrī (d. 449/1057), *Luzūm mā lā yalzam*. See: A. von Kremer, "Ein Freidenker des Islam" in: ZDMG 29/1875/304-12. Idem, "Philosophische Gedichte des ʾAbû-lᶜalâ Maᶜarrī" in: ZDMG 30/1876/40-52, 31/1877/471-83; R. A. Nicholson, *Studies in Islamic Poetry*, Cambridge 1921, pp. 43-289.

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ANALYTIC INDEX

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1 Also in *Ḥilya* 1/20; *Mathnawī* 4/2974 ff.; Furūzānfar, *Maʾākhidh* no. 172.

2 This *nisba* is dubious.

3 Cf. Diogenes in Shahrastānī 332, 333, Socrates in Ibn al-Qifṭī (Cairo 1326) 135 and more in Furūzānfar, *Maᵓākhidh* no. 50 on *Mathnawī* 2/1465 ff., as well as Nicholson's *Commentary* in vol. 7/292.

4 Consequently the information given on p. 440, line 16, is dubious.

[5] Also in *Mathnawī* 1/327 ff., *Marzubānnāma* 83.

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6 In the *Fawāt al-wafayāt* 1/82 Ḥamdūna, the daughter of Hārūn, appears in place of ^cĀtika(Ṭabarī III 577, 758).

7 The man is the cupbearer, cf. Speyer 208.

8 Additional references in Furūzānfar, *Maʾākhidh*, no. 10.

9 Also in *Fawāt al-wafayāt* 1/82.

10 Also: ᶜAwfī, *Jawāmiᶜ* in Furūzānfar, *Maʾākhidh* no. 19; *Introduction* 192.

[11] Also in *Mathnawī* 5/1242 ff.

12 Cf. Furūzānfar, *Maᵓākhidh* no. 134.

13 ᶜAwfī, *Jawāmiᶜ al-ḥikāyāt* in Furūzānfar, *Maᵓākhidh* no. 51; *Introduction* 192.

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14 *Mathnawī* 5/1760 ff. A corresponding verse of the *Shāhnāma* in Furūzānfar, *Maʾākhidh* no. 197, p. 172.

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[15] An additional example occurs in *Nafaḥāt* (Lees) 698 where a dervish dies this way in ᶜAṭṭār's shop and causes the poet to repent; and again in Yāqūt, *Muᶜjam al-buldān* 2/707.

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16 See ftn. 32 below.

17 Cf. *Mathnawī* 4/3712 ff. and Furūzānfar, *Maʾākhidh* no. 180.
18 See also M. Ghazzālī, *Makātīb-i fārsī* 18-20.

[19] *Mathnawī* 2/1510 ff. about Luqmān; about Abyssinian slave in Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī, *al-Imtāᶜ* 2/121: Furūzānfar, *Maʾākhidh* no. 51.

20 Furūzānfar identifies the *ᶜamīd* as Muḥammad b. Manṣūr Nasawī, d. 594 AH, *Maʾākhidh* no. 211, p. 183.

[21] Text from *Asrārnāma* and the passage from ᶜIrāqī's *Lamaᶜāt* are found in Furūzānfar, *Maʾākhidh* no. 135, p. 126.

22 About an Israelite in Muḥammad Ghazzālī, *Makātīb-i fārsī* 94.

23 Also in: ᶜAwfī, *Introduction* 243; and see also Furūzānfar, *Maʾākhidh* no. 163.

24 Cf. also Nicholson's *Commentary* 7/303; *Ṣaḥīḥ* Muslim 8/13 and additional passages in Furūzānfar, *Maʾākhidh* no. 62.

25 This story also occurs in Ibn al-Jawzī, *Quṣṣāṣ* 46a-b.

26 *Mathnawī* 5/2855 ff.

[27] See there as well the conversation with his teacher Ibrāhīm Sitanba.

28 Cf. Furūzānfar, *Maᵓākhidh*, no. 14.

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29 Anṣārī, *Risāla-i ʿAql u ʿishq* in Furūzānfar, *Maʾākhidh* no. 25; and compare with Jāḥiẓ, *Ḥayawān* 1/337 (Furūzānfar, ibid.).

30 Similarly *Mathnawī* 6/593 ff.; and in this regard Furūzānfar no. 227.

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31 Transferred to Dhū'l-Nūn in *Mathnawī* 2/1386 ff.; see Nicholson, *Commentary* in vol. 7/289 f.

32 In *Mathnawī* 3/567 ff. Majnūn pets and kisses the dog. See Nicholson vol. 8/16. Additional passages in Furūzānfar, *Maʾākhidh* no. 91.

33 *Mathnawī* 6/2829 ff.; cf. Furūzānfar, *Maʾākhidh* no. 247.

34 Cf. Furūzānfar, *Maʾākhidh* no. 4.

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35 Text of *Maqālāt-i* Shams, ibid. no. 223.

36 Cf. ftn. 5, p. 715.

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37 Cf. Thaᶜlabī, *ᶜArāʾis* 129; *Mathnawī*, 6/3059 and more in Furūzānfar, *Maʾākhidh* no. 250, p. 214.

38 Cf. also Furūzānfar, *Maʾākhidh* no. 78.

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[39] Also in *Mathnawī* 2/2688; 4/2490 ff. Additional passages taken from Ābī, *Nathr al-durr*, Ḥuṣrī, *Jamᶜ al-jawāhir* 227, and *Maqālāt-i* Shams, printed in Furūzānfar, *Maʾākhidh* no. 68, pp. 73 ff.

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40 Cf. B. Furūzānfar's edition of the *Maᶜārif* of Bahāᵓ al-Dīn Walad, Tehran 1333/1954 page *lb* f. Fakhr al-Dīn takes the pigeon in his hand.

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41 Muḥammad al-Ghazzālī, *Kīmiyā-i sa^cādat* in Furūzānfar, *Ma'ākhidh* no. 137; *Mathnawī* 3/257 ff.

42 About a Ṣūfī, *Mathnawī* 4/1358 ff.; cf. Furūzānfar, *Maʾākhidh* no. 152.

NOTES FOR THE 1978 GERMAN EDITION ADDED BY RUDOLF SELLHEIM FROM HELLMUT RITTER'S ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT

p. 1, ftn. 1— The actual date of ʿAṭṭār's death seems to be Ṣafar 618/April 1221. See Furūzānfar, *Sharḥ-i aḥwāl wa naqd u taḥlīl-i āthār-i Shaykh Farīd al-Dīn-i Muḥammad-i ʿAṭṭār-i Nīshābūrī*, Tehran 1339-40/1960-61, p. 91. This reference is found in *Encyclopaedia Iranica* 3/20 f., s.n. ʿAṭṭār (B. Reinert).

p. 37 — The angel of death with Solomon: *Iḥyāʾ* 4/399, *Bayān al-ḥasra ʿinda liqāʾ al-mawt.*

p. 38 — A greedy man: *Iḥyāʾ* 4/399. Similar stories found here and previously.

pp. 48 f. — Prince sleeps with a corpse: somewhat differently in Ibn Bābōya, *Kamāl al-dīn* 354.

p. 49 — The thirsty bedouin: Saʿdī's *Gulistān, Bāb faḍīlat-i qanāʿat.*

p. 52 — Saying of Ibn Sīrīn: *Iḥyāʾ* 3/164, *Bayān dhamm al-ḥasad.*

p. 73 — The term *istidrāj* comes from surahs 7/182 and 68/44. Cf. also Fritz Meier, "Zur Biographie Aḥmad-i Ǧām's"; *Qūt* 1/261 bot.; *Riʿāya* 272; *Sharḥ al-Ḥikam* 1/73; *Iḥyāʾ* 4/115, *al-Rukn al-thālith min kitāb al-shukr.*

p. 103 — Jesus: *Iḥyāʾ* 4/395, *al-Bāb al-thālith min sakarāt al-mawt.*

p. 106 — The protagonists of the last story are in fact Ḥasan al-Baṣrī and his disciple Ḥabīb al-ʿAjamī. In the text of IN one should read Ḥabīb for Ḥusayn. The story is recounted in greater detail in TA 1/54, where the river involved is the Tigris. Also in a different form in Abū'l-Ḥasan al-Daylamī, *Sīrat al-shaykh al-kabīr Abū ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Khafīf al-Shīrāzī*, ed. Annemarie Schimmel-Tarı, Ankara 1955, pp. 118-19.

p. 135 f. — Isḥāq-i Nadīm is no doubt the son of the musician Ibrāhīm al-Mawṣilī al-Nadīm (EI s.n.).

p. 141 — On the effect of Koranic verses: *Iḥyāʾ* 2/262, *al-Bāb al-thānī fī āthār al-samāʿ.*

p. 142 — The story about the pious *pīr*: told about Aḥmad ibn Ḥarb, *Iḥyāʾ* 4/351, *al-Murāqaba al-rābiʿa.*

p. 162 — Ḥassān's pulpit: *Iḥyāʾ* 2/252, *Bayān al-dalīl ʿalā ibāḥat al-samāʿ.*

p. 184 — As Fritz Meier notes, it is better to understand the word *maghfūrī* as an adjective: i.e. fashioned by the late (master) so-and-so. The object in question is probably a rug rather than a porcelain bowl.

p. 185 — Uways: *Iḥyā'* 3/192-93, *Bayān ḥaqīqat al-dunyā.*

p. 213 — The monk whose carnal soul is a dog: *Iḥyā'* 4/350, *al-Murāqaba al-rābiʿa.*

p. 230 — Aṣmaʿī and the sewer-sweeper: *Aghānī*[3] 1/415.

p. 237 — The final story: *Iḥyā'* 3/115, *al-Āfa al-thālitha ʿashra.*

p. 241 — On the final Day: *Iḥyā'* 4/454, *al-Qawl fī ṣifat Jahannam.*

p. 242 — On being sick see also: *Iḥyā'* 4/248, *Bayān anna tark al-tadāwī.*

p. 249 — ʿAmmār, etc.: *Iḥyā'* 4/248, *Bayān anna tark al-tadāwī.*

p. 256 — The king and the goblet: *Iḥyā'* 3/228, *Bayān ʿilāj al-bukhl.*

p. 265 — *Law lam tudhnibū*: *Iḥyā'* 4/131, *Bayān dawā' al-rajā.*

p. 292 — Junayd on his deathbed: *Iḥyā'* 4/411, 412, *Bayān aqāwīl jamāʿa.*

p. 333 — The king and his prisoners: *Iḥyā'* 3/160 about ʿAbd al-Malik.

p. 354 — The story about Abū Ḥulmān: *Iḥyā'* 2/249.

p. 363 — Add to the bibliographical paragraph: A. Fischer, ZDMG 72/1918/290.

p. 408 — About a Ṣūfī's death: *Iḥyā'* 4/411, *Bayān aqāwīl jamāʿa.*

p. 502 — Cf. Hellmut Ritter in: *Oriens* 12/1959/14-20.

p. 505 — A few of these hemistiches are metrically defective.

p. 535 f. — Abraham and Gabriel: also in *Iḥyā'* 4/148, *Bayān al-dawā'.*

p. 548 — Anaesthesia: a case in al-Daylamī, *Sīrat ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Khafīf*, ed. Annemarie Schimmel-Tarı, pp. 116-17.

p. 554 — Satan and Adam: Tor Andrae, *Les origines de l'Islam et le Christianisme*, traduit de l'allemand par Jules Roche, Paris 1955, p. 201.

p. 570, add to line 18: One of the valleys the birds must travel through on their journey to the Simurgh is the Valley of Lack of Need.

Moreover, one should consult Fritz Meier's meticulous book review in *Oriens* 9/1956/319-31, in particular from p. 331 where typographical errors and further source references are noted, as well as that of Jan Rypka in OLZ 53/1958/363-71, and Wolfgang Lentz's article "Attar als Allegoriker. Bemerkungen zu Ritters *Meer der Seele*" in *Der Islam* 35/1960/52-96. Nor should the following later articles by Hellmut Ritter himself which deal with this subject be overlooked: "Philologika XIV, Farīduddīn ʿAṭṭār. II", in *Oriens* 11/1958/1-76; "Philologika XV, Farīduddīn ʿAṭṭār. III, *Der Dīwān* (mit vergleich einiger verse von Sanā'ī und Ḥāfiẓ)", in *Oriens* 12/1959/1-88 (including: Zwei Nachträge zum *Meer der Seele* on pp. 87 f.); "Philologika XVI, Farīduddīn ʿAṭṭār. IV, *Muxtārnāme, Pandnāme*", in *Oriens* 13-14/1960-61/195-239; "Die Mevlânafeier in Konya vom 11.-17. Dezember 1960", in *Oriens* 15/1962/249-70.

Frankfurt/Main Rudolf Sellheim.

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The Ocean of the Soul is one of the great works of the German Orientalist Hellmut Ritter (1892-1971). It presents a comprehensive analysis of the writings of the mystical Persian poet Farīd al-Dīn ʿAṭṭar who is thought to have died at an advanced age in April 1221 when the Mongols destroyed his home city of Nīshāpūr in the north-east of Iran. The book, which resulted from decades of investigation of literary and historical sources, was first published in 1955 and has since remained unsurpassed not only as the definitive study of ʿAṭṭar's world of ideas but as an indispensable guide to understanding pre-modern Islamic literature in general.

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John O'Kane, B.A. (1963) in Classics, Princeton University, is an independent scholar. His translations include *The Secrets of God's Mystical Oneness* (Mazda, 1992), *Essays on Islamic Piety and Mysticism by Fritz Meier* (Brill, 1999) and *The Feats of the Knowers of God* (Manāqeb al-ʿārefīn) by Shams al-Dīn Aḥmad-e Aflākī (Brill, 2002).

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